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The 1990S: Trouble in the Balkans 117 The 1990s: Trouble in the Balkans 117 Chapter Five The 1990s: Trouble in the Balkans A CHANGING WORLD The end of the Cold War brought profound changes to international relations. During the Cold War, both the Soviets and the West had supported client states around the globe, sometimes suppressing internal dissent in those countries to prop up friendly regimes. Now that the Cold War’s strategic rationales had dwindled away, dissent could reappear, sometimes turning into conflict. Coun- tries and alliances either adapted to the changed situation or disappeared. The US Army was also facing major changes, most notably, a substantial re- duction in size. With fewer threats on the horizon, neither the public nor poli- ticians were willing to spend as much money on the military. The American public expected a “peace dividend” of lower defense spending, and the political question shifted from whether candidates were hawkish about defense to how they would spend the “dividend.” Some favored spending the money on various programs, others preferred tax cuts. Meanwhile, the active duty Army fell by 32%, from 772,000 to 529,000. A less obvious change for the Army was a shift in the locations where it might see combat. Since Vietnam, the Army’s major emphasis had been preparing to fight a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack in Europe. Now that the Soviet threat was over and an invasion of Germany unlikely, major reductions of American forces in Europe, especially in Germany, were planned. Remaining troops had to be ready to deploy elsewhere, wherever the trouble was. Germany would be a starting point, not the scene of action. Concurrently, the Army was grappling with different kinds of operations. Af- ter Vietnam, the Army had switched from counter-insurgency wars and fighting in developing countries, and prepared to fight high-intensity battles against mas- sive Soviet armies, with thousands of tanks and plenty of artillery and aircraft. Doctrine was focused on how the smaller NATO forces could win. This doctrine had served well against the Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm. However, it 118 Skilled and Resolute might not be as effective against a more amorphous enemy, nor in a multisided conflict. The 1993 edition of the Army’s central doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (which describes the Army’s vision of its functions), gave far more attention to “operations other than war” or “stability operations,” in- cluding missions ranging from humanitarian relief, to peacekeeping, to “peace enforcement,” an entirely new term. As countries collapsed and groups within them came into conflict, missions such as humanitarian relief and peacekeep- ing became more likely and more common. During the Cold War, the United States had seldom engaged in peacekeeping operations, but American diplo- macy changed in response to the world’s changes. Meanwhile, the UN was also changing. Without superpower rivalry to stymie action, the UN Security Council could reach agreement and it was easier to intervene in conflicts. Instead of peacekeepers arriving after a conflict had sub- sided (and either East or West had won), now the UN tried peace-enforcement or peace-implementation missions that sought to end the fighting. Often the UN’s motives were mixed; it was not just about saving lives by stopping the fighting, but also about keeping countries and regions stable. The Army’s normal train- ing routine still prepared soldiers for high-intensity warfare, but predeployment training focused on mission-specific topics, such as the rules of engagement, how to handle provocations, and how to avoid giving offense in unfamiliar cul- tures. Additionally, the United States would be working with (and possibly for) the UN, and although US and UN methods, procedures, and goals often over- lapped, differences were still problematic. It took significant coordination and experience to make the partnership reasonably smooth. YUGOSLAVIA’S GRADUAL IMPLOSION Yugoslavia was a multiethnic, multinational product of World War I, made up of Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, Albanians, Macedonians, Hungarians, ethnic Germans, the Romani people, and other groups who identified themselves along ethnic and religious lines. Yugoslavia’s peoples distrusted and disliked each other for reasons stretching back centuries. Serbs were the largest ethnic group, comprising about 40% of the country’s population, and ended up with the most power, dominating not just the country but several of the regions, even those in which they were a small minority, such as Kosovo. In 1941, the Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia and quickly conquered it, partly by playing ethnic groups against each other. However, a strong leader and a supranational ideology arose that allowed Yugoslavia to reunify after the war. Communism promised an end to ethnic and religious differences, and Josip Broz, also known as “Tito,” who had built up the communist forces, had earned credibility as the national liberator and unifier. Tito ruled Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in 1980, maintaining commu- nism and suppressing ethnic and nationalist dissent. However, communism had The 1990s: Trouble in the Balkans 119 Map 5-1. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1990. Map reproduced from: Central Intelligence Agency, DI Cartography Center, 753540AI (A04646) 8-01. failed to dissolve ethnic and religious differences. As it waned around the world in the 1980s, its unifying power in Yugoslavia also faded, and minority groups in- creasingly complained about Serb dominance. At the same time, a group of Serb nationalist politicians, headed by Slobodan Milosevic, shored up their power by provoking non-Serbs, then rallying Serbs by claiming a threat to Yugoslavia and Serbia. They also deployed the Yugoslav National Army to maintain order. In mid-1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence; Slovenia (on the northwestern edge of Yugoslavia) was buffered by Croatia and broke away clean- ly, but there was fighting in Croatia from mid-1991 into early 1992. 120 Skilled and Resolute Map 5-2. Ethnic composition in the former Yugoslavia, 1991. Map reproduced from: Central Intelligence Agency, DI Cartography Center, 753543AI (R00472) 8-01. Outside countries (mainly European, but including the United States) wanted the fighting to end but would not directly intervene and could do little to re- solve the causes of the conflict. Negotiations periodically resulted in cease-fires, but the fighting spread as Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH, a province bordering both Croatia and Serbia) declared independence in April 1992. A three-sided contest The 1990s: Trouble in the Balkans 121 developed with both Serbia and Croatia sending troops to the province. In response, the UN asked NATO to block arms shipments to the region, and NATO deployed ships to block maritime shipments. As the fighting grew and more civilians were affected, international pressure to protect civilians grew. Again, ceasefires came and went, but humanitarian safe havens were agreed upon, with UN troops assigned to monitor them. Humanitarian supplies were delivered by air (in a few cases by parachute drop, more commonly by aircraft landing at airfields), and later trucked to the safe havens. US involvement was limited in hopes that other countries, especially European countries with deeper ties to the region, could bring peace. American warships helped enforce the arms embargo and US aircraft transported supplies. The Army’s role was to provide medical support to UN forces in Croatia and BiH. Medical support was to in- clude a hospital, the new 212th MASH. THE 212TH’S FIRST DEPLOYMENT: CAMP PLESO, CROatIA, NOVEMBER 1992–APRIL 1993 The 212th was selected for the mission for two reasons. First, its deployment readiness was higher than that of any other field hospital in Germany. Second, using the small MASH would be less disruptive to healthcare for Army person- nel and families in Germany than sending a larger hospital. USAREUR, trying to avoid inconveniencing large numbers of personnel and their families, asked for reservists to be activated to replace the deploying medical staff. Preparations and Deployment The 212th was out on a training exercise, testing its new personnel and equip- ment on a corner of the Landstuhl medical facility, when it received word of its deployment. The 212th was given 3 weeks’ notice, time it needed to bring in the commander, extra staff, and extra equipment. The AMEDD still required that physicians command deployed hospitals, and Lieutenant Colonel Everett “Mike” Newcomb, who was listed as the deployment commander, but who had had little contact with the unit, arrived (the garrison commander, Lieuten- ant Colonel Felipe Casso, had previously handled day-to-day activities, and became the executive officer during the deployment to Croatia). Although the MASH’s personnel and equipment were ready to go, the assigned mission (Op- eration Provide Promise) did not match the unit’s abilities. The UN wanted a hospital that could hold patients for up to 30 days and cover a broad range of medical and surgical problems. The MASH was focused on battlefield surgery and designed to hold patients only 3 days. Ultimately, the 212th had to be aug- mented with personnel and equipment. It was not difficult to find the personnel; equipment was harder to procure. The 212th had to obtain and pack the all the equipment it might need in that narrow 3-week period. Part of tailoring the unit 122 Skilled and Resolute meant getting the right kind of beds, and instead of the normal 60 intensive care unit (ICU) beds, the MASH used 12 ICU, 40 intermediate-care, and 8 minimal- care beds. The extra personnel turned the 212th MASH into “Task Force 212,” about double the hospital’s strength. There were more medical staff, including preven- tive medicine, mental health, dental (including oral surgery), and family prac- titioners, extra internal medicine staff, a radiologist, and a physical therapist. The increased number of personnel necessitated a larger laboratory, pharmacy, and blood bank, and more medical maintenance personnel.
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