•Œan Unusual Voyage in Far Northern Watersâ•Š1 the Royal Canadian
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Canadian Military History Volume 22 Issue 4 Article 4 2013 “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950 Richard O. Mayne Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Richard O. Mayne "“An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950." Canadian Military History 22, 4 (2013) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950 Published34 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 4 “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950 Richard O. Mayne o one in Canada knew it was Important studies have there. The automatic weather Abstract: Looking at the Royal addressed the larger strategic N Canadian Navy’s operational station set up on the shore of context of challenges to Canadian record between 1945 to 1950 it northern Labrador by the German would appear that one exercise, sovereignty in the Arctic during submarine U-537 in October 1943 two deployments, and a scientific and immediately after the Second was undiscovered until 1981, when a expedition in the Arctic was not the World War.3 This article, by contrast, German researcher alerted Canadian type of commitment that matched the focuses on the RCN’s activities in growing strategic significance of this authorities. Yet the fact that the Royal the Arctic between 1946 and 1950 area in the immediate postwar period. Canadian Navy (RCN) virtually Analysis of documents from this time, from a tactical and operational ignored the country’s Northern however, shows that the RCN not only perspective. It does so because this littoral during the Second World was keen to explore the extreme and approach yields important insights War was understandable. Despite unique challenges that this region into the RCN’s attitudes towards the posed to naval operations, but also this single incursion into what at Arctic and the unique operational that the navy was eager to protect the time was the British colony of the nation’s interests in the Arctic. challenges they faced in this region. Newfoundland, Germany did not This article, therefore, looks at early Indeed, the operational records have the technology to threaten RCN attitudes towards the Arctic as from this period (which show that Canada’s North. This state of affairs well as the tactical and operational the RCN only initiated one exercise, factors that impacted these early quickly changed in the immediate two northern deployments and a Northern forays. In doing so it argues 2 4 postwar period. The emergence of that it was government cutbacks and scientific expedition ) suggest that the Soviet Union as a threat to Western limited resources that prevented them the Canadian Arctic was not only security and the development of new from doing more. “the sole domain of the USN,” technologies, such as long-range but also that the RCN failed to aircraft, made the Canadian Arctic a At least that was the conclusion represent the national interests in potential frontline in a future conflict. drawn by the United States Navy the North prior to the commissioning Canadian War Museum 19980028-006 Canadian War (USN) whose increased interest and of HMCS Labrador, the Navy’s first activity in the Arctic raised Canadian (and only) icebreaker, in 1954.5 Opposite: The Royal Canadian Navy only made it into the Arctic a few times prior concerns about sovereignty. This However, closer examination of to the commissioning of HMCS Labrador created an awkward situation for these documents reveals that after in 1954, and that creates a perception the RCN, which was caught between 1945 the Navy gave the Arctic a high it was not interested in this area in the a worried ally and a new adversary priority and stretched its extremely immediate postwar period. In reality, who were both eyeing a region of limited resources as much as possible northern operations were a focus of the Navy from 1945 on and were limited the nation in which Canadian forces to establish a presence there in spite only by a paucity of available resources. had little tactical or operational of the challenges posed by the great experience. distances and extreme environment. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/4© Canadian Military History, Volume 22, Number 4, Autumn 2013, pp.34-44. 35 2 : “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950 There were two things that the of spurring Canada into a greater exaggerated, there is ample evidence Americans had come to accept about watchfulness [and] activity in Arctic that Prime Minister William Lyon the Arctic in late 1945. The first development.”6 In reality, this Mackenzie King’s Liberal government was that growing tensions with supposed trigger to Canadian naval did not want Canada to be the spark their former Soviet partners would involvement in the Arctic was never that ignited the simmering tensions increase the strategic significance pulled; this myth was the product between the US and Soviet Union. In of the region, while the second was of erroneous assumptions made by fact, the government was willing to that any defence preparations in an over-anxious national media.7 go to considerable lengths to avoid the Arctic would involve thorny Not only did the Americans ask the appearance that it was siding too negotiations with their Canadian permission to visit and establish a closely with the Americans in Arctic allies. Certainly that was the weather station on the island, but defence. Discussions in late 1945 conclusion drawn by historian they also respected the fact that the regarding the joint Canadian Army- George Stanley who observed that Canadian cabinet had deferred a Royal Canadian Air Force Operation the American government’s 1946 decision on whether to commit to this Musk-Ox (a 3,100-mile trek from unilateral announcement of the venture until 1947.8 Churchill, Manitoba, to Edmonton, dispatch of a US Navy expedition Although the significance of the Alberta, to test equipment in cold to Melville Island “had…the effect Melville Island incident has been weather environments) provided a good example of these sensitivities. Suggestions that American observers wear Canadian uniforms to conceal their identities were viewed with grave scepticism south of the border. Similarly, the Canadian government’s desire to publicize the mission as “peaceful” and “purely scientific” in nature brought the US Naval Attaché in Ottawa to mockingly observe that the Soviets were “not… born yesterday” and were “not swallowing this explanation.”9 The Americans were right and King knew it. King brooded in his diary that the “Musk-Ox expedition,” had been “folly” and had gone a long way to increasing Soviet suspicions of the West.10 The American desire to operate in the Arctic only served to heighten these Canadian fears. For instance, the appropriately named Operation Frostbite in early 1946 saw the large US Navy photos US Navy attack carrier USS Midway sail into The USS Midway, a large US fleet carrier, participated in Operation Frostbite in March 1946 which involved sailing the carrier and its support vessels into the icy waters of the Davis Strait between Labrador and Greenland. Top: The Midway passes through icy water. Bottom: A Corsair on the deck of the carrier needs to be cleared of ice and snow before flying operations can commence. Published36 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 4 Department (DND) of National Defence Davis Strait to test the effect of cold exercise be kept as “undramatic as be “primarily a civilian one,” and weather on air operations. While possible with emphasis on scientific while his government was willing the ships that carried out Frostbite knowledge acquired rather than on to co-operate with the Americans did not actually sail into Canadian purely defence aspects.” in northern defence he privately waters, those assigned to Operation King was clearly nervous about argued that “our best defence in Nanook, also in 1946, did manage military activity in the Canadian the Arctic was the Arctic itself” – a to do so (this was the operation that north, yet there is a well-told story in rather naïve belief that inhospitable was originally going to establish the an important popular history of the conditions in the north were enough Melville Island weather station). Canadian Navy that the service only to deter any aggressor.12 His thoughts Consisting of five warships and took an interest in the region because about replacing Warrior were even one Coast Guard vessel, Nanook the prime minister was willing to more direct, as he confided to his was primarily a reconnaissance acquire a replacement aircraft carrier diary that the idea of procuring the and training exercise designed to for HMCS Warrior providing the British carrier Magnificent made him familiarise the USN with Arctic new vessel was “Arcticized.”11 Upon “shudder.”13 conditions. Despite an invitation for closer examination, however, this Claxton, moreover, did not Canadian observers to participate, support for the Navy operating in understand that “Arcticizing” King’s government remained the North actually came from the new Magnificent was simply a term for concerned about appearances.