Canadian Military History

Volume 22 Issue 4 Article 4

2013

“An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The ’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950

Richard O. Mayne

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Recommended Citation Richard O. Mayne "“An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950." Canadian Military History 22, 4 (2013)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950

Published34 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 4 “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950

Richard O. Mayne

o one in Canada knew it was Important studies have there. The automatic weather Abstract: Looking at the Royal addressed the larger strategic N Canadian Navy’s operational station set up on the shore of context of challenges to Canadian record between 1945 to 1950 it northern Labrador by the German would appear that one exercise, sovereignty in the Arctic during submarine U-537 in October 1943 two deployments, and a scientific and immediately after the Second was undiscovered until 1981, when a expedition in the Arctic was not the World War.3 This article, by contrast, German researcher alerted Canadian type of commitment that matched the focuses on the RCN’s activities in growing strategic significance of this authorities. Yet the fact that the Royal the Arctic between 1946 and 1950 area in the immediate postwar period. Canadian Navy (RCN) virtually Analysis of documents from this time, from a tactical and operational ignored the country’s Northern however, shows that the RCN not only perspective. It does so because this littoral during the Second World was keen to explore the extreme and approach yields important insights War was understandable. Despite unique challenges that this region into the RCN’s attitudes towards the posed to naval operations, but also this single incursion into what at Arctic and the unique operational that the navy was eager to protect the time was the British colony of the nation’s interests in the Arctic. challenges they faced in this region. Newfoundland, Germany did not This article, therefore, looks at early Indeed, the operational records have the technology to threaten RCN attitudes towards the Arctic as from this period (which show that Canada’s North. This state of affairs well as the tactical and operational the RCN only initiated one exercise, factors that impacted these early quickly changed in the immediate two northern deployments and a Northern forays. In doing so it argues 2 4 postwar period. The emergence of that it was government cutbacks and scientific expedition ) suggest that the Soviet Union as a threat to Western limited resources that prevented them the Canadian Arctic was not only security and the development of new from doing more. “the sole domain of the USN,” technologies, such as long-range but also that the RCN failed to aircraft, made the Canadian Arctic a At least that was the conclusion represent the national interests in potential frontline in a future conflict. drawn by the the North prior to the commissioning

Canadian War Museum 19980028-006 Canadian War (USN) whose increased interest and of HMCS Labrador, the Navy’s first activity in the Arctic raised Canadian (and only) icebreaker, in 1954.5 Opposite: The Royal Canadian Navy only made it into the Arctic a few times prior concerns about sovereignty. This However, closer examination of to the commissioning of HMCS Labrador created an awkward situation for these documents reveals that after in 1954, and that creates a perception the RCN, which was caught between 1945 the Navy gave the Arctic a high it was not interested in this area in the a worried ally and a new adversary priority and stretched its extremely immediate postwar period. In reality, who were both eyeing a region of limited resources as much as possible northern operations were a focus of the Navy from 1945 on and were limited the nation in which Canadian forces to establish a presence there in spite only by a paucity of available resources. had little tactical or operational of the challenges posed by the great experience. distances and extreme environment.

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There were two things that the of spurring Canada into a greater exaggerated, there is ample evidence Americans had come to accept about watchfulness [and] activity in Arctic that Prime Minister William Lyon the Arctic in late 1945. The first development.”6 In reality, this Mackenzie King’s Liberal government was that growing tensions with supposed trigger to Canadian naval did not want Canada to be the spark their former Soviet partners would involvement in the Arctic was never that ignited the simmering tensions increase the strategic significance pulled; this myth was the product between the US and Soviet Union. In of the region, while the second was of erroneous assumptions made by fact, the government was willing to that any defence preparations in an over-anxious national media.7 go to considerable lengths to avoid the Arctic would involve thorny Not only did the Americans ask the appearance that it was siding too negotiations with their Canadian permission to visit and establish a closely with the Americans in Arctic allies. Certainly that was the weather station on the island, but defence. Discussions in late 1945 conclusion drawn by historian they also respected the fact that the regarding the joint Canadian Army- George Stanley who observed that Canadian cabinet had deferred a Operation the American government’s 1946 decision on whether to commit to this Musk-Ox (a 3,100-mile trek from unilateral announcement of the venture until 1947.8 Churchill, Manitoba, to Edmonton, dispatch of a US Navy expedition Although the significance of the Alberta, to test equipment in cold to Melville Island “had…the effect Melville Island incident has been weather environments) provided a good example of these sensitivities. Suggestions that American observers wear Canadian uniforms to conceal their identities were viewed with grave scepticism south of the border. Similarly, the Canadian government’s desire to publicize the mission as “peaceful” and “purely scientific” in nature brought the US Naval Attaché in Ottawa to mockingly observe that the Soviets were “not… born yesterday” and were “not swallowing this explanation.”9 The Americans were right and King knew it. King brooded in his diary that the “Musk-Ox expedition,” had been “folly” and had gone a long way to increasing Soviet suspicions of the West.10 The American desire to operate in the Arctic only served to heighten these Canadian fears. For instance, the appropriately named Operation Frostbite in early 1946 saw the large US Navy photos US Navy attack carrier USS Midway sail into

The USS Midway, a large US fleet carrier, participated in Operation Frostbite in March 1946 which involved sailing the carrier and its support vessels into the icy waters of the Davis Strait between Labrador and . Top: The Midway passes through icy water. Bottom: A Corsair on the deck of the carrier needs to be cleared of ice and snow before flying operations can commence.

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Davis Strait to test the effect of cold exercise be kept as “undramatic as be “primarily a civilian one,” and weather on air operations. While possible with emphasis on scientific while his government was willing the ships that carried out Frostbite knowledge acquired rather than on to co-operate with the Americans did not actually sail into Canadian purely defence aspects.” in northern defence he privately waters, those assigned to Operation King was clearly nervous about argued that “our best defence in Nanook, also in 1946, did manage military activity in the Canadian the Arctic was the Arctic itself” – a to do so (this was the operation that north, yet there is a well-told story in rather naïve belief that inhospitable was originally going to establish the an important popular history of the conditions in the north were enough Melville Island weather station). Canadian Navy that the service only to deter any aggressor.12 His thoughts Consisting of five warships and took an interest in the region because about replacing Warrior were even one Coast Guard vessel, Nanook the prime minister was willing to more direct, as he confided to his was primarily a reconnaissance acquire a replacement diary that the idea of procuring the and training exercise designed to for HMCS Warrior providing the British carrier Magnificent made him familiarise the USN with Arctic new vessel was “Arcticized.”11 Upon “shudder.”13 conditions. Despite an invitation for closer examination, however, this Claxton, moreover, did not Canadian observers to participate, support for the Navy operating in understand that “Arcticizing” King’s government remained the North actually came from the new Magnificent was simply a term for concerned about appearances. defence minister, Brooke Claxton, modifications that would allow Although giving their blessing for rather than King. The prime minister her to operate more comfortably Nanook, the government again asked remained unrelenting in his belief in the cold weather environment that any publicity surrounding the that Canada’s northern policy should of the North West Atlantic. The

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/4 37 4 : “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950 DND Photo

A strong sign of the RCN’s early resolve in the North: the new aircraft carrier, HMCS Magnificent (left), accompanies two destroyers, HMCS Nootka (right) and HMCS Haida into Arctic latitudes during Northern Cruise 1948.

Navy, however, was willing to use the general staff, was surprised that this requirement and viewed the this angle if it helped shore up the the neither the RCN nor RCAF were idea of borrowing and adapting an defence minister’s support for the putting proposals for Arctic exercises American Tank Landing Ship (LST) acquisition of the carrier. But King’s before the Chiefs of Staff Committee. for this task as impractical. Although attitude towards the Arctic was an It was for that reason that Mann was the concept of a Northern operation obstacle. The chief of the naval staff pushing an Army proposal involving was highly desirable, the Naval Staff (CNS), Vice-Admiral H.E. Reid, was naval assets with the aim that it could had no choice but to recommend that already in trouble with King for be useful to start “a ‘Navy baby.’”15 the Army be told that the Navy was openly criticising the deep budget The concept itself was ambitious, in no position to participate in this cuts that were making it extremely calling for either a 4,700 or 10,000 particular exercise.16 difficult for the Navy to maintain its ton naval headquarters ship to be The rejection of the Army current responsibilities in the Atlantic “frozen in” so it could support a proposal did not mean that the and Pacific.14 More to the point, purely Canadian Arctic Expedition Navy was bereft of its own ideas. Reid’s objection to the government’s from 1 September 1947 to the end of In fact, according to the assistant funding and manpower ceilings August 1948. Of course, the Navy chief of the naval staff, Commodore underscored a recurring theme that did not have any ships that met H.G. DeWolf, the Plans division would haunt the RCN’s had been “cooking up” efforts in the Arctic between Horatio Nelson Lay and has famous uncle, Prime Minister various Arctic schemes that 1946 and 1950; namely, that William Lyon Mackenzie King during the Second World War. In were not entirely dissimilar they would have to respond the postwar years Lay played a pivotal role in getting the RCN to the one that the Army to the growing significance into the North. had contemplated. Some of the region with limited within the Navy wanted resources. to act independently of The fact that the RCN the Americans, as in the was struggling to meet Army’s proposal. This was its current commitment certainly the view held to two oceans led some to by the director of naval believe that the Navy was plans and intelligence, not interested in Arctic Captain H.N. Lay, who defence. Certainly that was had recorded that it was the impression formed by inadvisable to approach the Army when the vice the Americans about chief of the general staff, converting a Tank Landing Major-General Churchill ship because it “would Mann, wrote to the Navy on almost certainly mean the 30 September 1946 advising USN would wish to be the that his boss, the chief of dominant partner in the Library and Archives Canada PA 104221 Published38 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013 5 Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 4

expedition, and I believe if Canada Strait only served to re-enforce the slim, but not for the reasons that is able to do it herself, she should do notion that the RCN would have to DeWolf gave. Commodore Frank so.” As the prime minister’s nephew, find ways to operate in the North, Houghton was disappointed to learn Lay undoubtedly had the inside yet DeWolf recognized that Canada that the Americans were only sending track on King’s fears of aligning simply did not have the maritime a token force of three ships on what too closely with the Americans, assets to patrol the region alone.18 was essentially a supply mission.20 possibly explaining why he saw a From his perspective, the better Moreover, while the Americans were unilateral approach as the Navy’s option was to participate with the favourable to a Canadian ship sailing best option. In the short-term, the USN’s next northern deployment. with this miniature task force, they Naval Staff seemed to agree as plans Even that, however, would be a did have some reservations about were hashed out to send the destroyer challenge as DeWolf confided to the “suitability and practicability HMCS Nootka on an “exploratory Major-General Mann that the Navy of including light-hulled vessels, expedition” to the Arctic sometime was “anxious to send a ship along such as destroyers, in a Force of this over the summer of 1947.17 [with the Americans], if we can spare kind.”21 It was a salient point. This Commodore DeWolf, however, one, but to do so we will certainly task force required an icebreaker had reservations about this approach. stretch our resources.”19 because it was operating at a time of Unconfirmed reports that a Russian The chances of the RCN joining year when heavy ice was still present, submarine was operating in the Davis an American operation in 1947 were a circumstance that drove home the

Top: HMCS Magnificent, the RCN’s newest aircraft carrier, with Sea Fury aircraft on its flight deck while coming to anchor in Northern waters; Bottom: HMCS Nootka (R96) refueling from HMCS Magnificent on the Northward journey from Halifax. DND Photo DND Photo

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reality that the RCN’s current ships could only head north when ice conditions were most favourable. The impracticality of joining the US Navy’s mission in 1947 was good news for Lay’s plan for a purely RCN northern cruise. Indeed,

DND Photo because the Americans were not planning anything on the same scale as Operation Nanook, the Naval Staff saw little value in a joint endeavour. Capitalizing on the moment, Lay immediately pushed his own agenda, reminding the Naval Staff that no RCN warships had ever entered Hudson Strait or Bay and that “in the light of the present interest in the Canadian Arctic it is considered that such a cruise would be of benefit to the Canadian defence programme.” The Naval Staff agreed, and with a nationalistic fervour observed that they were “of the firm opinion that it would be preferable to undertake a northern cruise under Canadian auspices.” On 29 April 1947 the Naval Board gave its blessing, and with that the RCN had set a tight deadline for its plan to embark on its first Arctic foray. 22 The RCN clearly understood the growing importance of the Arctic as well as the urgent need to show the flag there, but they also realized that this pioneering excursion would pose new logistical and operational challenges. Planning for Operation Iceworm, which was the codename for the proposed Cruise, clearly bears this out. The concept itself was simple: the destroyers HMCS Nootka and Micmac would embark on a five to six week northern

DND Photo familiarization deployment to conduct radio communication tests,

Top: RCN personnel involved in a Northern deployment get a good sense of exactly how far away they are from their home port of Halifax while visiting Padloping Island; Bottom: Sailors from HMCS Swansea, possibly on Padloping Island, meeting with members of the local community.

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bathythermographic exploration, refuelling vessel. Each method had its have established its presence in the hydrographic and magnetic drawbacks. For instance, the Dundalk country’s own Arctic waters in the observations.23 Defining the mission had neither a gyroscopic compass summer of 1947. Although a letter was the easy part; the complications nor radar, both of which were from Houghton to an American soon followed. Indeed, just as the essential for the extreme navigational admiral makes it clear that it was Americans had warned, the window challenges in the iceberg-infested, Claxton who cancelled the cruise, it of opportunity for operating lightly magnetically confused North. is uncertain why he did so.26 constructed destroyers in the North Nevertheless, this latter option - in Despite this setback, the RCN was was small as ice conditions dictated conjunction with a decision to send undeterred. In addition to forwarding that the cruise would have to arrive only a single destroyer (Nootka) – still a submission for the acquisition a before mid-August and leave no later seemed the better one. The expense Canadian naval icebreaker to the than mid-September. But by far the of transporting naval fuel via rail to defence minister, the Naval Board, at greatest obstacle facing the planning Churchill and St. John’s was just too its 25 February 1948 meeting, declared staff was one that would haunt all the high. Worse yet, even after refuelling the intention to dispatch HMC Ships RCN’s Arctic ambitions, and that was at St. John’s, Nootka would have only on northern cruises during ice free the issue of fuel. 25 percent fuel left in reserve by the periods.27 The Naval Staff also took DND Photo

A great sea level view of Haida, Nootka and Magnificent on their transit North.

The intended passage, from time she reached Churchill, leaving advantage of the time provided by Halifax to Churchill, Manitoba, no margin for exercises or diversions Iceworm’s cancellation to plan a on Hudson’s Bay and back, was a en route.24 new and far more ambitious cruise distance of some 4,800 miles, required Fuel was a thorny issue for other scheduled for 2–28 September 1948. the destroyers to refuel. However reasons as well. Getting a single Although the aims would remain the two points where this could destroyer to Churchill and back was the same as Iceworm, the forces occur, St. John’s, Newfoundland, going to consume a considerable assigned were considerably larger. and Churchill, either did not have amount of the RCN’s yearly Along with the destroyer Nootka, the the suitable type of fuel or sufficient operational allowance. This was RCN was now planning to send her quantities of it. There were two particularly problematic since the sister ship Haida, as well as the new possible solutions to this problem. The government’s cuts had just forced the aircraft carrier HMCS Magnificent.28 first was to use tank cars to transport Navy to reduce that appropriation Because the minister’s support for the fuel to St. John’s and Churchill, while by 25 percent.25 Nevertheless, the acquisition of Magnificent had been the second was to give the soon- Northern Cruise obviously had partly contingent on her ability to to-be mothballed Canadian Naval momentum, and had it not been operate in cold weather environments Auxiliary Vessel Dundalk a temporary for the intervention by the defence this deployment so early in her career reprieve by turning her into an Arctic minister, Claxton, the RCN would was smart politics even if she was https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/4 41 8 : “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950 DND Photo

A good example of the distances that RCN ships had to travel to reach Canada’s arctic waters exposing why fuel was always a concern on round trips from Halifax.

not going to participate in the full There were other risks as well. personnel to the cruise. They also voyage. Instead, Magnificent would Dundalk in particular was vulnerable. examined the possibility of acquiring conduct air operations with the RCAF There was no time to install radar, 25-foot motorboat cutters equipped while sailing with the destroyers up and that left some officers worried with echo sounders that would scout the Labrador coast to Wakeham Bay. about her operating off the often out areas for the destroyers where After topping up the destroyer’s foggy and ice-packed Labrador coast depth information was scanty.32 fuel, Magnificent would head back with inadequate charts.30 The fact Although careful planning and to Halifax, while Nootka and Haida that Captain A.H. Storrs was about preparations resulted in a cruise would make a stop at Erik Cove before to replace Captain H.F. Pullen as that was a tremendous success there continuing on to Churchill through the commanding officer of Nootka were disappointments. The Navy had Hudson Strait and Bay. On the return was also a point of concern for already admitted that Magnificent’s voyage the destroyers, having fuelled the flag officer Atlantic Coast who part in the exercise was “a small one,” in Churchill, would sail to Coral considered it “unfair…to have him but inclement weather ensured that Harbour on Southampton Island make his first voyage…in these her role was diminished further.33 followed by Port Burwell where poorly charted waters.”31 While This particular aspect of the voyage Dundalk would be waiting with one Naval Service Headquarters saw was a setback, especially since Navy last consignment of fuel.29 this as overly cautious and even and Air Force planners had gone The fear of running out of fuel suspected that Pullen was lobbying to such lengths to produce creative and stranding a destroyer in northern to extend his command for the war scenarios. Situations where waters was still a dominant anxiety, trip, they were in the process of Magnificent’s aircraft would have explaining why the Navy was now exploring other precautions, such as covered a fictional wartime Hudson willing to employ both the tank car additional shackles for potentially Bay-bound convoy, or conducted and Dundalk methods of refuelling deep anchorages, propeller guards, reconnaissance missions looking that had been explored for Iceworm. as well as assigning specialized for enemy refuelling depots, would

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have provided invaluable training.34 expression of sovereignty during it hard for the RCN to join Noramex Instead, Magnificent’s single day of the following year. Instead, they II, but just as they had done over the flying was spent with her fighters settled for three smaller deployments. past four years the Naval Board was countering enemy reconnaissance The voyage of the HMCS willing to go to extreme lengths to flights staged by a RCAF Avro Swansea, which travelled from scavenge personnel to man Nootka Lancaster and Consolidated Canso. Halifax to Frobisher Bay and for this particular exercise. It was all Much was learned from these Godthaab, Greenland, between 24 for naught as once again operational shadowing exercises, but the true August and 20 September 1949, was factors (this time the outbreak of significance ofMagnificent ’s presence particularly important because it hostilities in Korea) placed these was that the RCN had shown its represented an attempt to continue Arctic ambitions on the backburner.40 resolve to send its most valuable an independent RCN presence in the The RCN would not return to asset into the Arctic.35 It was a brief, north. Tasked with the same scientific the Arctic until HMCS Labrador, the but shinning, moment as Magnificent explorations, familiarisation and Navy’s new icebreaker, sailed into would never again sail this far north training work started by the previous these waters in the summer of 1954, in North American waters. year’s cruise, Swansea’s experience and this long gap would suggest that This cruise was undoubtedly the was unsurprisingly similar those the RCN’s capabilities did not match high point of the RCN’s involvement of Nootka and Haida. Nevertheless, the large operational significance in the Arctic in the late 1940s, the more an incident at the American base the service attached to the region. so since the rest of the deployment on Padloping Island underscored In reality, the 1948 Northern Cruise went so well. Much intelligence was the need for a Canadian naval represented the type of presence gleaned, equipment successfully presence in the Arctic. “The NCO- that the RCN wanted regularly to tested and invaluable scientific data in-charge stated that some of his men maintain in the Arctic during the gathered, but the cruise was also were wondering why a Canadian summer months. Unfortunately, a success for a number of other Warship was in these waters,” wrote those ambitions could not be realized reasons. Both Nootka and Haida Swansea’s CO: “It was pointed out in in the face of budget cuts, manning reported that they experienced no a friendly but firm manner that this shortages, existing operational major difficulties with navigation was not unreasonable since this was commitments, and ship limitations, and found summer operations in Canada.”37 as well as restrictions imposed by the region similar to the western The participation of HMCS logistical and fuelling constraints. north Atlantic in iceberg season. Cedarwood and HMCS Haida in two But one thing was clear: the Navy’s Future cruises were nonetheless separate joint ventures with the desire to work in the North between recommended because of the limited Americans did little to raise the RCN’s 1946 and 1950 was there even if the area covered as well as the fact that profile in the region.38 In fact, Haida’s resources were not. the terrain and atmosphere were so involvement in Exercise Noramex different, a point that was illustrated demonstrated how the RCN’s limited by the unusually deep anchorage of resources left Canada with little Notes 40 fathoms in Wakeham Bay. The choice but to rely on the USN to deployment was also popular with help defend its North. Designed . 1 The title for this article is taken from the crew and offered the Navy a to prevent an enemy force from a Report of Proceeding [ROP] from HMCS Nootka, Directorate of History good public relations opportunity turning a Labrador weather station and Heritage [DHH], 81/520/8000, Box in Churchill as well as the smaller into an airstrip, the 33 American 71, file 5. The author is indebted to his communities that were visited. As ships and 3,500 marines dwarfed the former colleagues at DHH, particularly the postwar naval team led by Mike was anticipated, ice and fuel were lone Canadian destroyer assigned to Whitby as well as members of the Arctic the only serious concerns during the the exercise. The RCN had wanted integrating concept team at Chief of cruise; small growlers and “bergy to provide additional forces, but Force Development whose insights on defence issues related to the Canadian bits” were not always detected while operational commitments elsewhere North helped with the development of the destroyers’ consumption rate prevented them from doing so. this article. left “little margin for unforeseen The dream of sending Canadian 2. There is currently only one known file that deals directly with suspected 36 contingencies.” destroyers and on yearly U-boat operations in Hudson Bay The force sent to the Arctic cruises to the North had already come during the Second World War. For more in 1948 was a relatively large to an end, but things only got worse in information see: “Submarines - Enemy Activities - Activities in Arctic Ocean 39 one by Canadian standards, but 1950. Further manning reductions and Hudson Bay, Library and Archives unfortunately the RCN could not and anti-submarine requirements in Canada [LAC], Record Group 24 [RG afford to repeat this powerful the Atlantic and Pacific were making 24], Vol. 4027, file 1062-13-22. Michael https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/4 43 10 : “An unusual voyage in far northern waters”1 The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays into the Arctic, 1946-1950

Hadley, U-boats against Canada: German evidence suggests that this station could 1948, LAC, RG 24, vol.11193, file ACC submarines in Canadian Waters (Kingston: not be established in 1947 because of the 1650-26 SUB I. McGill-Queen’s, 1985), pp.163-165. While inability of the expedition to get to the 30. E EinC to A/CNTS (ships), 26 July 1948, German records show that all sightings in island. and Alterations and Additions, CNAT the North were false, there was one case 9. Cabinet Conclusion, 19 December 1945, “Dundalk” and “Dundurn,” 29 July 1948, where a U-boat was indeed operating in LAC, RG 2, vol.2637, reel 2364. LAC, RG 24, vol.8153, file 1660-18, vol.1. Canada’s Northern waters. In October 10. William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary, 4 31. FOAC to NSHQ, 19 May 1948, LAC, RG 1943, a landing party from U-537 erected February 1946, LAC. 24, vol.8153, file NSS 1660-18, vol.1. a weather station at Martin Bay off the 11. German, The Sea is at our Gates, p.250. 32. Captain D, Nootka to FOAC, Boats Northern tip of Labrador. For more 12. Text of Joint Statement issued in Ottawa Echo Sounding Gear, 10 June 1948 and information see W.A.B. Douglas, “The and Washington, 12 February 1947, DHH, Proposed Northern Cruise, 4 June 1948, Nazi Weather Station in Labrador,” 82/196, file 5, meeting 58; King Diary, 22 LAC, RG 24, vol.11193, file Acc 1650-26 Canadian Geographic 101, no.6 (December November 1946, LAC; Stanley, Canada’s SUB I. 1981/ January 1982), pp. 42-47. Soldiers, 2p.68. 33. SCNOA to Captain D, 9 June 1948, LAC, 3. One of the best accounts of Labrador’s 13 King Diary, 9 April 1948, LAC; King RG 24, vol.11193, file Acc 1650-26 Sub I. efforts in the North can be found in J.M. Diary, 9 January 1947, LAC. 34. Joint RCN FOAC/ RCAF 10 Group Leeming, “HMCS Labrador and the 14. Cabinet conclusion, 15 November 1946, Operations Order no.1/48, and SCNOA Canadian Arctic,” in James A Boutilier, LAC, RG 2, vol.2639, reel T-2364; King to FOAC, 25 July 1948, LAC, RG 24, ed., RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968 (UBC Diary, 13 November 1946, LAC. vol.11193, file Acc 1650-26 Sub I. Press, Vancouver, 1982), pp.286-287. For 15. C.C. Mann to ACNS (H.G. DeWolf), 30 35. CO Magnificent to FOAC, 7 December works that address the larger naval and September 1946, LAC, RG 24, vol. 8153, 1948, LAC, RG 24, vol.8153, file NSS 1660- maritime strategic context of the Arctic file NSS 1660-18, vol.1. 18, vol.18. to Canada during and just after the 16. D/DNP to DNPI, 10 October 1946, LAC, 36. CO HMCS Nootka to FOAC, Northern Second World War see Shelagh Grant, RG 24, vol.8153, file NSS 1660-18, vol. 1; Cruise 1948, 7 October 1948, LAC, RG Sovereignty or Security? Government Naval Staff Meeting, 28 October 1946, 24, vol.11193, file ACC 1650-26 Sub I; Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950 DHH, 81/520/1000-100/3, Box 32, file 2; HMCS Haida ROP, September 1948, DHH, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988); Elizabeth Naval Board meeting, 6 November 1946, 81/520/8000, Box 44, file 3. That latter B Elliot-Meisel, “Arctic Focus: The Royal DHH, 81/520/1000-100/2, box 22, file 3. point was further rammed home the Canadian Navy in Arctic Waters, 1946- 17. Naval Staff Minute, 28 October 1946, following year when the frigate HMCS 1949,” The Northern Mariner X, no.2 (April DHH, 81/520/1000-100/3, Box 32, file Swansea was forced to deviate from her 1999), pp.23-39. 2; Naval Staff minute, 27 January 1947, operational schedule during her Arctic 4. For an excellent summary of the scientific DHH, 81/520/1000-100/3, Box 32, file 3. cruise to rescue the RCAF re-supply expedition see Isabel Campbell, “Making 18. DNPI to ACNS, 21 October 1946, LAC, vessel Malahat off Diggs Island. A Brief a Difference in Arctic Naval Research: RG 24, vol.8153, file NSS 1660-18, vol.1. History of HMCS Swansea, nd, DHH, HMCS Cedarwood, 1948 to 1956,” Canadian 19. DeWolf to Mann, 19 December 1946, LAC, 81/520/8000, Box 203, file 27. Naval Review 8, no.1 (Spring 2012), pp.10- RG 24, vol.8153, file 1660-18, vol.1. 37. HMCS Swansea, Report of Northern 14 while an account of HMCS Swansea’s 20. Report on the Engineering Aspects of Cruise and Operation Malahat, 24 1949 deployment can be found in Richard the Operations of US Task Force 68, 24 August to 28 September 1949, DHH, Mayne, “‘An Art of its own’: Corporate November 1947, DHH, 79/134. 81/520/8000, Box 102, file 5; Maritime knowledge, the Canadian Navy, and 21. Houghton to Jones, 6 March 1947, LAC, Group Headquarters’ Operational Order, Arctic Operations,” Canadian Naval Review RG 24, vol.8153, file NSS 1660-18, vol.1; LAC, RG 24, vol.11195, file ACC 1660-41. 5, no.3 (Fall 2009), pp.10-16. For one of the Jones to Houghton, 12 March 1947, LAC, 38. Cedarwood feature, October 1956, most interesting studies that highlights RG 24, vol.8153, file NSS 1660-18 vol.1. DHH, 81/520/8000, Box 21, file 1. The the significance of a US Arctic endeavour 22. Naval Staff Meeting, 21 April 1947, DHH, Cedarwood was participating in a joint on the Canadian government’s Northern 81/520/1000-100/3, Box 32, file 3; Naval operation with the United States Naval policy see: Peter Kikkert and P. Whitney Board meeting, 29 April 1947, DHH, Electronic Laboratory. Lackenbauer, “Setting an Arctic Course: 81/520/1000-100/2, Box 22, file 3. 39. Proposed Combined Canada-US Winter Task Force 80 and Canadian Control in 23. DNPI to ACNS, 23 May 1947, LAC, RG Exercise 1949-50, DHH, 73/1223, file the Arctic, 1948,” The Northern Mariner 24, vol.8153, file NSS 1660-18, vol.1; Joint 1324; Naval Staff Meeting, 4 April 1950, XXI, no.4 (October 2011), pp.327-358. planning Committee, 95th Meeting, 13 DHH, 81/520/1000-100/3, Box 33, file 3; 5. Tony German, The Sea is at our Gates May 1947, LAC, RG 24, vol.8153, NSS Defence Council, 8-9 May 1950, DHH, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), 1660-18, vol.1. 81/609. pp.249-251. 24. DNPI to ACNS, Operation Iceworm, 23 40. Naval Board Meeting, 19 April 1950, 6. George Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers: The May 1947, LAC, RG 24, vol.8153, file NSS DHH, 81/520/1000-100/2, box 23, file 1. Military History of an Unmilitary People 1660-18 vol.1. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), p.411; Moira 25. Naval Staff Meeting, 17 March 1947, Dunbar and Keith Greenway, Arctic DHH, 81/520/1000-100/3, Box 32, file 3; Dr. Richard Oliver Mayne, CD, received Canada from the Air,(Ottawa: Queen’s Naval Staff Meeting, 21 April 1947, DHH, his MA from Wilfrid Laurier University Printer, 1956), p.238. 81/520/1000-100/3, Box 32, file 3. and a PhD in military history from 7. “Ottawa Scotches US Plan to Man 26. Memo note, 18 June 1947 and Houghton Queen’s University. He is currently the Weather Bases in Canadian Arctic,” to Jones, 21 June 1947, LAC, RG 24, Director of Air History and Heritage Toronto Financial Post, 20 July 1946; vol.8153, file NSS 1660-18, vol.1. with the RCAF and has authored, co- “Canada Must Frame Policy for Arctic,” 27. Naval Board Meeting, 25 February 1948, authored, or co-edited a number of Toronto Financial Post, 20 July 1946. DHH, 81/520/1000-100/2, Box 22, file 4. works on various aspects of Canadian 8. Chiefs of Staff Committee, 9 April 1946, 28. SO (Operations) to VCNS, 17 February military history and defence issues. Prior DHH, Raymont Collection, 73/ 1223, 1948, DHH, 81/520/1650-239/2, Box 105, to being employed as an historian for the Box 59, file 1301; Permanent Joint Board file 7. RCAF he was a defence analyst with the on Defence Journal of Discussions, 29 29. A Brief History of HMCS Nootka, nd, Chief of Force Development as well as an April 1946, DHH, Canada-United States DHH, 81/520/8000, Box 71, file 5; A historian with the Directorate of History PJBD fonds, 82/196; Cabinet Conclusions, Brief History of HMCS Haida, DHH, and Heritage both at National Defence 12 June and 27 June 1946, LAC, RG 2, 81/520/8000, Box 44, file 1; FOAC to Headquarters in Ottawa. vol.2638, Reel T-2364; House of Commons SCNOA, Northern Cruise, 25 August Debates, 19 July 1946, 3606. The available

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