MOX Data Fabrication: Lack of Regulatory Ability Exposed

TOKYO March/April NUKE INFO 2000 Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center No. 76 3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003, JAPAN URL: http://www.jca.apc.org/cnic/ e-mail : [email protected] MOX Data Fabrication: Lack of Regulatory Ability Exposed

(Left) Protest against MOX utilization. (Right) X-ray photo of rejected BNFL fuel rods (source: Kansai Electric) The criticality accident at Tokai last fall Plant (PWR) on Oct. 1, the day after the demonstrated the inherent risks of nuclear JCO accident. Data fabrication by BNFL energy, and forced Japan to review its was revealed on Sep. 19, after the ship had nuclear power policies. Shortly before, left the British port, by an article in the UK and soon after, this worst-ever accident in newspaper, The Independent, which was Japan's nuclear history on Sep. 30, 1999, based on inside information. Kansai Elec- MOX fuel manufactured at British Nuclear tric announced that it had postponed the Fuels plc (BNFL) and Belgonuclaire arrived loading of MOX fuel into Takahama 3 on in Japan. It was later revealed that data CONTENTS for the quality control of the BNFL fuel had NII report on MOX data fabrication 1-2 been falsified. Plans for nuclear plant canceled 3 The ships carrying MOX fuel left Europe Aging and decommisioning of reactors 4-7 in mid-July and delivered 32 assemblies to STA's dose evaluation of JCO accident 8 Tokyo Electric's Fukushima I plant (BWR) Latest on Rokkasho facilities 9 on the eastern side of Japan on Sep. 27, Who's Who: Kazumasa Aizawa 10 1999, and eight assemblies to Takahama News Watch 11-12 2 March/April 2000 No.76 Nuke Info Tokyo

November 1, and Takahama 4 on Decem- sai Electric witnessed the inspection during ber 20. The use of MOX fuel manufactured manufacturing, and the fuel passed an external by BNFL was canceled, and MOX fuel cur- inspection by MITI upon arriving in Japan. rently under process at French company The agency was also prepared to pass the fuel COGEMA is planned to be loaded. for inspection prior to its being loaded into The UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate the reactor. Kansai Electric only cancelled its (NII), which investigated the data falsifica- application for approval to burn this particular tion, released a report on their findings on Feb. MOX fuel after the news reports in the UK and 18, 2000. The report states that "one example analysis of the fuel data by Japanese NGOs of falsification has been found dating back forced the company to admit that data fabrica- to 1996," and that "a systematic management tion had taken place. failure allowed various individuals to falsify These circumstances show that nuclear fuel quality assurance records." - thus making it regulation in Japan is virtually non-existent. amply clear that poor management at BNFL MITI's inspections and regulations are done was one of the reasons why the data falsifica- almost entirely on paper; there is no adequate tion was allowed to continue for so long. Fur- system for detecting such anomalies as screws thermore, John Taylor, the recently resigned mixed in with pellets, nor is there a system for chief executive of BNFL who visited Kansai determining whether data has been tampered Electric, reported that "two fuel rods were with. Throughout this series of scandals, MITI rejected because a small concrete block and a and the Nuclear Safety Commission have screw were found to be mixed in with the pel- maintained that there are "no problems" with lets." These problems touch on rudimentary the fuel. They have refused to admit, or even issues, demonstrating that there is inadequate discuss the possibility, that the provisions for control of stages of the manufacturing process inspection and regulation are insufficient. preceding data specification. It seems that the The data fabrication scandal has cast light production of MOX fuel is a dubious business on a fundamental problem for Japan's nuclear from the bottom up. power program: no one individual and no sin- But the problems are even more serious than gle institution can determine - let alone guaran- this; the fuel with falsified data had passed tee - the safety of nuclear energy. the inspection of the Ministry of International by Masako Sawai Trade and Industry (MITI) which is the regu- [We have made the NII report available on our latory body for nuclear fuel in Japan. Kan- web-site.] SUBSCRIPTION Nuke Info Tokyo is a bi-monthly newsletter that aims to provide foreign friends with up-to- date information on the Japanese nuclear industry as well as on the movements against it. Please write to us for a subscription (subscription rates: Regular subscriber - $30 or ¥3,000/year; sup- porting subscriber $50 or ¥5,000/year). The subscription fee should be remitted from a post office to our post office account No. 00160-0-185799, HANGENPATU-NEWS. We would also appreciate receiving information and newsletters from groups abroad in exchange for this newsletter. (When sending the subscription fee from overseas, please send it by international postal money order.) Citizens' Nuclear Information Center 3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003 JAPAN Tel: 81-3-5330-9520; Fax: 81-3-5330-9530 Translators: Rick Davis, Gaia Hoerner, Taeko Miwa, Kumiko Tanaka, Junko Yamaka Proof-readers: Antony Boys, Antony Moore Scientific Advisor: Jinzaburo Takagi Editor: Gaia Hoerner Nuke Info Tokyo March/April 2000 No.76 3 Plans For Nuclear Power Plant at Ashihama Dropped

Plans were to build a nuclear power plant at this site. Thanks to the governor and all of those involved, the area is no longer at risk. On February 22, Kitagawa Masayasu, the observe a cooling-off period until the Governor of Mie Prefecture, announced end of 1999. All three parties consented, in the course of a policy speech to the and halted their respective activities for prefectural assembly that plans for the opposition and promotion. Meanwhile, Ashihama nuclear power plant should be Mie prefecture consulted with experts cancelled. The president of the Chubu and made inspection tours of nuclear Electric Power Co., Hiroji Ota, responded power facilities, and after the cooling-off on the same day that the utility intended period concluded, the governor made his to abandon the plan. This marked the end announcement. of a plan that had plagued local citizens There is no doubt that many prefectural for 37 long years. citizens welcome the plan's cancellation. Chubu Electric first announced its plan It must have been good news even to to build a nuclear plant in 1963. The site Chubu Electric because, with the level- straddled the border between Nanto ing off in electric power demand, and the Town and Kisei Town in Mie Prefecture, struggle for the electric power industry to and while the town assembly of Nanto hold its own under deregulation, building decided in 1964 to oppose the plan, the a nuclear plant was simply not an option Kisei assembly voted to encourage it. for the utility if it wanted to preserve its In 1993, Nanto's town assembly reaf- own corporate well-being. firmed its opposition. In 1996, over It is now evident that Japan's plans for 810,000 of Mie's citizens -- well over half of nuclear power development are overam- the electorate -- signed petitions oppos- bitious. Surely now is the time to cancel ing the plan, which they submitted to the all such construction plans and take a big governor. step toward phasing out nuclear power. In 1997, the government asked Chubu by Nishio Baku Electric, Nanto Town, and Kisei Town to 4 March/April 2000 No.76 Nuke Info Tokyo Problems Caused by the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants 1. Japan's Situation Regarding the Dis- posal of Decommissioned Reactors

In the 1970s, the construction of light water reactors was implemented rapidly, and by the end of 1999, a total of 53 plants had been built. Japan's first commercial nuclear power plant was Tokai and it was decommissioned in 1998. The early nuclear plants have already been operating for 25-30 years, and problems are emerging term outlook there are plans for increas- because of equipment aging. ing capacity to 100 GW by 2030 (Fig.2). Under the government's policy, decom- If Japan is to have 100 GW in 2030 so as missioned nuclear plants will all be left to compensate also for the capacity loss five to ten years (cooling period), after due to this reactor decommissioning, the which another eight to 10 years would be country will be required to build two to six required for dismantling. If we assume 1100 MW-class nuclear plants each year. a lifetime of 40 years, a cooling period of However, judging by the current inabil- five years, and dismantling period of eight ity of Japan's electric power and nuclear years, then an increasing number of plants power industries to build even one plant a would be decommissioned in the mid year, such a goal is quite unrealistic. 2010s, and the dismantling of those reactors would be concentrated in the 2020s 2. Wastes from Decommissioned Reac- through the 2040s (Fig. 1). tors The government's recent energy plan 2.1 The amount of wastes generated calls for building an additional 20 reactors by 2010 with the goal being 70 GW The Nuclear Power Working Group of of nuclear capacity, and under a longer the Advisory Committee on Energy claims that radioactive wastes from reactor dismantling belong to the same category as wastes generated in conjunction with plant operation (work clothing worn in controlled areas, etc.). The low concentrations of radioactive substances make them "low-level radioactive wastes." How- ever, the Working Group actually consid- ers everything except highly radioactive wastes as low level. Even items like the Nuke Info Tokyo March/April 2000 No.76 5 interior structural parts of reactors and pressure vessels are put into the low-level category. Table I shows the classification of wastes by the Working Group. According to the Working Group, the clearance level is apparently a concentration level of radioactive substances in dismantling wastes that requires no consideration of radiation impact on humans or the environment even when no special measures are taken to treat the wastes. As illustrated in the dismantling waste categories created by the Working Group, the term "clearance level" indicates that wastes whose concentration levels are below 1x106 Bq/t are to be disposed as general wastes, which we believe entails able indeed. serious problems. The government's idea Fig. 3 shows the amount of wastes is that even substances that have been generated when dismantling a 1100 MW- artificially contaminated with radioactiv- class Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). (a) is the ity will be disposed along with ordinary amount anticipated by the government, wastes if their concentrations are below a which totals 8,790 m3. But if we take all certain level. But there is no reason why, wastes into consideration, as shown in (b), in addition to the radiation we receive in the amount generated will be about 20 everyday life already, we must also suffer times as much, or 210,790 m3 per reactor. exposure to radioactive substances that Fig. 4 shows the amount of wastes will enter our lives due to the establish- accumulated over the years. (a) does not ment of such a clearance level, and it is include wastes below the clearance level. therefore not right to prescribe a level As this illustrates, the low-level wastes of this kind. What is more, the Working above the clearance level alone, will Group's assumption that we need not amount to about 2.1x105 m3 (about 525 consider the human dangers of exposure kt) in 2050. However, when wastes below caused by discarding wastes of a concen- clearance level are added, as in (b), the tration below this level - i.e., in the cat- amount comes to more than 6x106 m3 egory of general wastes - is very question- (over 15 Mt), which is far larger than in (a). In the final analysis, dismantling is bound to result in the rapid accumula- tion of an unimaginably huge amount of waste, and it seems that the only available answer to this problem is to entrust the disposal of these mountains of toxic substances to future generations.

2.2 The Economics of Decommissioning Reac- tors 6 March/April 2000 No.76 Nuke Info Tokyo

The cost of dismantling is considered to be generate electricity, but just to decommission about 40 billion yen per plant. However, an nuclear reactors and attend to their wastes. interim report by the Advisory Committee on Energy estimates that in addition to this, about 3. Aging of Nuclear Plants 17.8 billion yen (for an 1100 MW-class BWR) 3.1 Problems of Plant Aging will be needed to cover the processing, inspection, transport, and disposal of dismantling Ordinarily, the lifetime of a nuclear power wastes. plant is assumed to be about 30-40 years. According to Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.'s However, the government is considering life annual financial statement, sales data for its extension because of the expense and the enor- underground waste disposal operation indicate mous amounts of waste produced by decom- that, 11.8 billion yen were spent for 19,520 missioning. drums (each 200 liters or 0.5 t), which comes The Japan's Atomic Energy Commis- to about 600,000 yen per drum. If we use this sion and Nuclear Safety Commission have as a standard, then, using the results in Fig. 4(a) channels for considering how to man- and assuming that high beta gamma, concrete age reactor decommissioning, and there pit, and VLLW are all disposed in drums, that is much technical discussion on matters comes to about 44,000 drums when wastes including methods for dismantling and below clearance level are not included. The removal. However, there is no discussion disposal of 8,790 m3 (about 22,000 t) would at all on the creation of standards with therefore cost about 26.4 billion yen. Thus, regard to the vital matter of what kind of a consideration of disposal costs alone shows indicators are used and what extent of that, simply for the amount of wastes to be safety margin is expected when deciding buried, the 17.8 billion yen estimate of the on reactor decommissioning. This makes aforementioned interim report is about half of it possible that henceforth reactor decom- the actual cost, making the government's figure missioning will be postponed owing to a gross underestimate. If we include the wastes political judgments by the electric utilities, below clearance level, that cost is about 633 and that aged, dangerous nuclear plants billion yen. In other words, if all dismantling with no economic merit will be kept in wastes are buried according to present law operation, necessitating a papering over without resorting to the clearance level, dis- of their problems. Stopping this will defi- posal costs will be inflated by about 20 times. nitely require the vigilance of the citizens. These disposal costs are about twice the con- The indications of the dangers posed by struction costs of 1100 MW-class plants of the aging reactors are easy to see; some of respective reactor types. them are described below. These massive expenses must be the real To study the aging problem we reason why the government and electric utili- assumed the following two types of nucle- ties want to dispose wastes of decommissioned ar power plants. reactors using the dangerous and reckless (1) Nos. 1, 2, 3: Three representative plants notion of clearance level. Depending on how that began operating early and have been this problem is managed, it could disrupt the in service for a comparatively long time entire economic foundation of the nuclear (No.1 : Fukushima I-1, No.2 : Mihama 1, power industry, and thus undermine its very No.3 : Tsuruga 1). The years of operation basis for existence. From these estimations, are 28,29,29 respectively (as of 1999). beginning in 2010 we will force future genera- (2) Nos. 4, 5: Two representative plants not tions to pay colossal sums of money, not to long in operation (No.4 : Sendai 1, No.5 : Nuke Info Tokyo March/April 2000 No.76 7

Onagawa 1). The years of operation are 15 each.

3.2 Decrease of Capacity Factor and Age- Induced Troubles

Fig. 5 illustrates how the capacity factor changes with the passage of years. We took the average capacity factor for aged plants (Nos. 1, 2, 3), and smoothed the times. curve using three-year averages. The plots Fig.6 shows the number of problems (black dots) show the actual values from for each nuclear plants. The number of the above process, the broken line curve incidents for each reactor was divided showing the trend. As the graph clearly by its years in operation to determine shows, the aged nuclear plants reached the average annual number of incidents. their utilization factor peaks 15-20 years Troubles include automatic and manual after beginning operation, after which the shutdowns during operation, damage to factor declined. During the first few years steam generators during shutdowns, etc. the factor is under 50%, which may have These results include not only incidents much to do with the accident suffered related to aging, but all reported prob- by Mihama 1. in its early years, in which lems. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that radioactivity leaked from its steam genera- aged nuclear plants clearly have a much tor tubes, causing a shutdown. Although larger number of problems. Furthermore, our results were dependent also on the this result shows that while aged nuclear conditions at the plants chosen for this plants average 1.76 incidents a year, study, such smoothing revealed a trend newer plants average 0.53 a year, which that would have been hard to discern by is a difference of over three to one. This examining only the utilization factor data poses a serious safety problem for nuclear for each individual plant. The results show power. that these aged plants are overtaxing their equipment. The as- yet unaged plants 4. Conclusion (Nos. 4, 5) have capacity factors of about 78%, which is perhaps due to their higher The notion of a "clearance level" looks technological levels. However, compari- very much like a ploy by which the gov- son with these unaged plants shows that ernment hopes to underestimate both the the capacity factors of the aged plants amount of waste created by the disman- will not improve despite major repair or tling of nuclear power plants and the cost improvement efforts to prolong their life- of the dismantling process itself. As this study makes clear, even if we lay aside the many other problems caused by the nuclear power industry, the enor- mous safety, environmental and economic problems involved in the dismantling of aging plants are sufficient in themselves to justify the belief that the nuclear energy system is anything but "sustainable." by Tadahiro Katsuta 8 March/April 2000 No.76 Nuke Info Tokyo JCO Criticality Accident: STA Lowers Evaluation Levels of Exposure Dose

On Jan. 31, 2000, the Science and Tech- nology Agency (STA) released the exposure levels of the local residents and the workers who carried out various tasks, such as the extraction of coolant water, during efforts to contain the criticality accident at Tokai-mura, Ibaraki Prefecture JCO plant. The site of the criticality accident on Sep. 30, 1999. in September last year. These levels are (photo by Kenji Higuchi) drastically lower than the previous dose four demands; 1) The withdrawal of, and level evaluations. STA explains that in the an apology for propagandizing to the case of residents, lower dose levels are the public the false argument that doses less result of considering the shielding effects than 200mSv or 50msv are safe, thereby of buildings, and for the workers, a result implying that there is a threshold level of of revising sensitivity of the pocket dosim- safety. 2) A scientific reevaluation of the eters and neutron Rem counters. latest dose level estimates. 3) A repeat of According to the report, there were 119 the dose evaluation for the JCO accident residents who were exposed to more than on the basis of the 1990 recommenda- 1mSv, the annual dose limit for the public, tions of the International Commission and the highest exposure rate is estimated on Radiological Protection. 4) Exposed as low as 21mSv. As for exposed workers, residents must be guaranteed health the worker who was measured to have examinations in accordance with those received 120mSv during the extraction for nuclear-workers, including blood tests, of coolant water is estimated in the latest and that they should be issued with health report to have been exposed to less than management cards. 50mSv. However, this is just one evalua- by Chihiro Kamisawa tion result which itself contains margins of error, and could easily be several times larger or smaller depending on methods of evaluation. On Feb. 16, CNIC, acting with the "Criti- cality Accident Victims' Group," submitted a proposal to the STA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the details of the exposure dose evaluation for this accident and the ways these agencies have been treating the local residents. The proposal contained the following STA's Estimation on Exposure Dose Nuke Info Tokyo March/April 2000 No.76 9 Updates on Nuclear Facilities at Rokkasho Village, Aomori Missing parts at reprocessing plant One hundred and four canisters of vitri- Work on construction of the Rokkasho Repro- fied high-level waste arrived at Rokkasho cessing Plant is proceeding on a 24-hour sched- early in the morning of February 23, 2000. ule, with three continuous shifts, in an effort to The transport ship Pacific Swan sailed have the plant running by 2005. Work has been through the Panama Canal, which has been hindered, however, by the discovery of a number used twice in the past, and the concerns of of missing or faulty parts. The faulty compo- the Caribbean people over the transporta- nents were found in liquid waste storage vessels, tion are mounting. Representing the voice which were manufactured by Hitachi. The com- of the Caribbean people, Tito de Jesus flew pany imported reprocessing technology from the from Puerto Rico to join Japanese citizens in French company COGEMA, but it had neglected their protests against the arrival of the ship to transcribe some parts of COGEMA's original at Mutsu-Ogasawara port in Rokkasho. machinery structure plan. The high-level waste shipped this time Liquid Waste Storage Vessel No.1 was not includes liquid waste originating from equipped with an "air lift" (about 10 cm long) French gas-cooled reactors and fast breeder which is necessary to extract samples of liquid reactors. The Federation of Electric Power waste. Out of sixteen cooling coils of each of Companies, which oversees reprocessing the two high-level concentrated Liquid Waste contracts, has publicly announced that fur- Temporary Storage Vessels, only twelve were ther shipments of radioactive waste will be equipped with 20 cm long anti-seismic supports. returned to Japan, and that 200 canisters Hitachi had informed Japan Nuclear Fuel will be transported with each shipment. Limited (JNFL) of the missing parts on Feb. 17, 2000. However, JNFL did not make this infor- Uranium Enrichment Facility mation public until Feb. 25. The information was simply concealed until the high-level waste JNFL announced on Feb. 28, 2000 that had arrived. The governor of Aomori, Morihisa one of the manufacturing lines at the Ura- Kimura, was furious that the company had not nium Enrichment Facility will be shut down. only withheld this information but was not able This facility is running with 1100SWU, and to detect faults in the construction until recently. has five lines. One of the cascade lines The company had deceived local residents and called RE-1A has experienced continual the local government. It is disgraceful that JNFL problems, and already over 4000 centrifuge has resorted to deception in an effort to obviate units have shut down. RE-1A was the first the reasonable concerns of local residents and one to be operated, and has been running government officials. The failure to make an since 1992. According to the officials, the accurate copy of the COGEMA blue-print, as total number of centrifuge units at the facil- described above, is also a cause of grave concern, ity cannot be made public due to concerns since the Rokkasho plant relies solely on import- over proliferation of nuclear materials. In ed technology. The safety of the plant is now in any case, the facility has not been able to serious doubt. prepare uranium which meets the specified Fifth shipment of high-level waste concentration. RE-1A will be shut down in arrives at Rokkasho April, 2000. by Masako Sawai 10 March/April 2000 No.76 Nuke Info Tokyo

Anti-Nuke Who's Who Kazumasa Aizawa A man to free Tokai of its nuclear burdens By Hiroshi Kuroha Anti-Nuke Ibaraki Action Association Tokaimura is located in North Ibaraki after the JCO accident, candidates to the prefecture near the center of Japan. This assembly did not talk about the danger small village with a population of about 34,000 and an area of 37 square kilo- metres has lived with nuclear power for more than 40 years. Fifteen nuclear facilities occupy 13.4% of the village area. A third of villagers work for nuclear facilities. The village has enjoyed tax incomes from nuclear facilities, as well as many fine civic facilities and well-maintained roads. Tokaimura has developed itself as "the Village of Nuclear Power." It was a taboo to criticise nuclear power energy there, and it appeared as if words such as "anti-nuclear" or "nuclear phase-out" did not exist in the Tokai vocabulary. However, the fire and explosion of the or the rights or wrongs of nuclear power. Tokai Reprocessing Plant three years ago Thus, he resigned his long-held position and the recent JCO criticality accident and stood for the election. have certainly affected villagers. This He has been involved with anti-nucle- became apparent at the Village Assem- ar movement for a long time. For exam- bly election which was held soon after ple, he is the representative of plaintiffs the JCO accident - for the first time in of the Tokai II Plant Case. He is a man of a village history dominated by nuclear gentle but strong and enduring will. power, an anti-nuclear candidate, 58 Many troubles await him as the only year-old Kazumasa Aizawa, was elected assembly member who advocates nucle- as the Villages Assembly member. ar phase-out in Tokaimura. But I'm sure Mr. Aizawa had been a researcher that in his effort to make Tokaimura a of the modern history of Japan at the much safer place for its people, Mr Aiza- Ibaraki Prefecture Historical Museum wa will lead Tokaimura in the new cen- until becoming the assembly member. tury from being "the village of nuclear He had not intended to join the elec- power" to "a village of nuclear phase- tion until shortly before the election day. out." However, he was outraged that even Nuke Info Tokyo March/April 2000 No.76 11 NEWS WATCH

People of Maki-machi Once Again tion lies in the change of the assumptions Vote Against Nuclear Plant guiding the calculation. First, the service life was lengthened: it used to be set to

In a plebiscite which was held in Maki- 15 years for thermal power and 16 years machi, Niigata Prefecture, on August 4, for nuclear power, but this was radically 1996, 61% of the voters opposed the plan extended to 40 years. Then, the capacity by Tohoku Electric to construct a nuclear factor was raised from 70% to 80%. These power plant in the area. At the mayoral changes were made more advantageous election in Maki-machi on January 16, to nuclear power plants, whose cost of 2000, the current mayor, Takashi Sasagu- construction is high and cost of fuel rela- chi, whose platform included the proposal tively low. There was no change in the to have Tohoku Electric abandon their conditions of hydropower: the service life construction plans, was reelected. The day was set to 40 years and the capacity factor after his re-election, the mayor expressed 45%. his intentions to personally visit Tohoku The reason for these changes is that Electric and the Ministry of International without them the cost of LNG-fired ther- Trade and Industry to demand that the mal power would become cheaper, and plan be canceled. The company has the Agency could not say "nuclear power refused to meet with the mayor. is the cheapest." For reference, according to a trial calculation published five Claims of Nuclear Power Costs Mere years ago, the cost of power generation by nuclear power and LNG-fired thermal Propaganda power was the same, at ¥9/kWh, that by coal and petroleum was ¥10/kWh and by In December last year, for the first hydropower ¥13/kWh. In recent calcula- time in five years, the Agency of Natu- tion LNG-fired thermal power was made ral Resources and Energy published the to be only ¥0.5/kWh higher than nuclear trial costs of power generation by types power. of power generators. According to the But even now, if we adjust the calcula- report, nuclear power costs ¥5.9 per 1 tions totally with the current exchange kWh, LNG-fired thermal power ¥6.4, coal- rate of ¥128 to the dollar, the cost of LNG- fired thermal power ¥6.5, petroleum-fired fired thermal power becomes cheaper. thermal power ¥10.2 and hydropower It seems that the Agency will once again ¥13.6. It is no wonder that the nuclear have to come up with altered conditions power is the cheapest, for these figures are for the calculation to ensure that nuclear propaganda. power seems to be the cheapest. Over the past ten years, the Agency The Agency did not show any detailed stated that the cost of power generation breakdown when they published the trial by nuclear power was ¥9/kWh. Why, then, values of power generation costs. Those was it reduced to ¥5.9/kWh? The explana- details mentioned include only the cost 12 March/April 2000 No.76 Nuke Info Tokyo of reprocessing (¥0.63/kWh), and the cost North Korea, and JGC is looking for an oppor- of treatment and disposal of radioactive tunity to join the project. It also aims at busi- wastes (¥0.25/kWh). If you work back- ness expansion in the Asian market, including wards and calculate the cost of repro- China, in cooperation with KOPEC. cessing per 1 tHM of spent fuel from the reported reprocessing cost, you get a Nuclear Power Industry Plagued by figure of less than ¥300 million. Since the Y2K Glitches actual cost of Rokkasho reprocessing plant is believed to be ¥300-500 million, the Contrary to some people's concerns, the estimate for spent fuel is clearly too low. arrival of the new century brought no major The treatment and disposal of radioactive disruptions to nuclear power facilities in Japan. waste is an inordinately expensive process, However, there were a number of small Y2K and for this reason alone there can be no problems, and we cannot be entirely sure that question that nuclear power costs more there will be no further such problems in the than the Agency's report has suggested. future. Although it is not included in the recent trial Some of the difficulties which occurred calculation, as much as ¥400-500 billion has were caused by computers reading the year been appropriated every year from the national "99" as "2099" or "00" as "1900." In many budget for nuclear power development. For cases, the interruption of data processing meant thermal power development the budget appro- that the malfunction was quickly recognized, priation is ¥20-25 billion. The fact that nuclear allowing proper measures to be taken to avoid power requires a long-distance transmission, more serious difficulties. At Fukushima II-1, also adds significantly to the cost of this form however, there was a bigger problem. For of power. a while, the position of the control rods was unknown, apparently because operators were JGC Corp. Sign Agreement on unaware that a built-in clock was set at Green- Business Collaboration with Korean wich Mean Time. Firm Fire at Nuclear Plant in Miyagi

JGC Corp. announced on February 15 that Extinguishes Itself the company had signed a business agreement with KOPEC, a subsidiary of Korea Electric. A fire broke out on February 24, 2000, in a Under this agreement, JGC will allow KOPEC control building next to Tohoku Electric's Ona- to make use of its engineering know-how in gawa 1 plant (BWR) in Miyagi Prefecture. The all fields of radioactive waste management. fire died out by itself, there were no radiation Only last year Korea lifted its ban on imports leak, and no one was injured. However, it took of nuclear equipment and technologies from the company 15-25 minutes to inform local Japan. This agreement will be the first full- governments of the accident. Local residents scale technical cooperation between the two are now greatly alarmed by the existing safety countries. measures in case of accidents. Following In the immediate future, the major task the criticality accident at JCO, residents have will be the construction of low-level radioac- become extremely sensitive to nuclear-related tive waste solidification facilities in nuclear accidents, and efforts are being made across plants in Korea. KOPEC is participating in the nation to become more informed on nuclear the project to construct a light-water reactor in issues.