Overview of Virginia Supreme Court Cases on Domestic Relations: 1970-1980 Peter N
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
University of Richmond Law Review Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 6 1981 Overview of Virginia Supreme Court Cases on Domestic Relations: 1970-1980 Peter N. Pross University of Richmond Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview Part of the Courts Commons, and the Family Law Commons Recommended Citation Peter N. Pross, Overview of Virginia Supreme Court Cases on Domestic Relations: 1970-1980, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 321 (1981). Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/6 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTE OVERVIEW OF VIRGINIA SUPREME *COURT DECISIONS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1970-1980* I. Introduction ........................................... 322 I. Annulment and Divorce ................................ 323 A. Annulm ent ........................................ 323 B . D ivorce ........................................... 325 1. Grounds for Divorce ............................ 325 2. Defenses to Divorce ............................. 330 3. Jurisdiction over Alimony, Child Support and Property ....................................... 331 4. Separation Agreements and Property Settlements 340 5. Alimony or Support and Maintenance of Spouse 345 6. Child Custody .................................. 355 7. Child Support Orders ........................... 361 8. Enforcement of Maintenance and Support Decrees 364 Ill. The Fam ily ............................................ 366 A. Illegitimate Children ............................... 366 1. Child Support Orders ........................... 366 2. Workmen's Compensation Death Benefits ......... 369 3. Wrongful Death Benefits ........................ 371 B. Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption ........ 372 1. Introduction ................................... 372 2. Dual Approach Followed in Custody and Adoption Proceedings .................................... 374 3. Parental Intervention in Adoption Proceedings .... 376 4. Termination of Residual Parental Rights ......... 377 C. M iscellaneous ...................................... 379 1. Name Changes of Married Women ............... 379 2. Name Changes of Children of Divorced Parents ... 382 IV. Conclusion ............................................ 383 * The student contributor is Peter N. Pross. UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:321 I. INTRODUCTION The Supreme Court of Virginia examined a variety of domestic rela- tions problems and issues during the last decade. Most of the court's de- cisions involved divorce issues such as jurisdiction, alimony or support and maintenance, and child custody or support orders. However, the court also decided cases on annulment, the enforcement of support and maintenance decrees, legitimacy and paternity, adoption, name changes and intrafamily tort immunity.1 1. The decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court regarding intrafamily tort immunity will not be discussed in the text of this note. It should be noted, however, that the court has not abolished the doctrine. See Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972) (parental immunity upheld in action by unemancipated child against father for alleged acts of simple negligence not related to his business or vocation and not involving a motor vehicle). See also Counts v. Counts, - Va. , 266 S.E.2d 895 (1980) (wife immune from liability in tort for personal injuries intentionally inflicted upon her husband at her direction during their marriage). The 1981 Virginia General Assembly significantly negated the holding in Counts, however, by abolishing the common-law defense of interspousal immunity in causes of ac- tion in tort arising on or after July 1, 1981. 19- Va. Acts, ch. - (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1). Rather than abrogate the doctrine of intrafamily tort immunity, the court has chosen to create several narrow exceptions. See Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195 (1975) (action for wrongful death may be maintained and predicated upon injuries to one spouse arising out of wrongful act by the other spouse, when such act terminates marriage by death, and when the deceased spouse is survived by no living child or grandchild); Sur- ratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971) (interspousal immunity abolished in actions for personal injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971) (parental immunity abrogated in automobile accident litigation). The court has likewise declined to construe liberally these exceptions to immunity. See McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979) (Surratt exception to inter- spousal immunity not applied in action by wife when automobile accident occurred in Ten- nessee and that state had not abrogated doctrine); Tyles v. Jackson, 216 Va. 797, 223 S.E.2d 873 (1976) (Smith exception to parental immunity did not have retrospective effect); Foun- tain v. Fountain, 214 Va. 347, 200 S.E.2d 513 (1973) (Surratt exception did not have retro- spective effect). The court's policy of preserving family and marital harmony through the application of intrafamily tort immunity is contrary to the modern trend of abrogating the doctrine. A majority of states have completely or partially abandoned intraspousal and pa- rental immunity. See Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 901 (1979); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 904 (1972). See also Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956); Comment, IntrafamilyImmunity-The Doctrineand Its Present Status, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 27 (1967). See generally W. PRossmR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs § 122 (4th ed. 1971). It should also be noted, however, that the Virginia Supreme Court has permitted one spouse to testify against the other spouse in certain criminal proceedings. See Cumbee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1132, 254 S.E.2d 112 (1979) (wife permitted to testify against her husband during prosecution of husband for incest against their minor daughter); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 887, 252 S.E.2d 329 (1979) (husband convicted ot grand larceny of wife's personal property and wife permitted to testify against her husband because couple 1981] DOMESTIC RELATIONS NOTE The purpose of this note is to provide a reference guide for the Virginia practitioner regarding the supreme court's decisions during the past dec- ade. Although the scope of this note necessitates limited analysis, rele- vant cases, statutes and supplementary materials have been cited for fur- ther reference purposes. For organizational purposes, the court's decisions have been discussed under the major headings of ANNULMENT AND DIVORCE and THE FAMILY. II. ANNULMENT AND DIVORCE A. Annulment There were only two decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court between 3 1970 and 1980 which concerned annulment.2 In Sanderson v. Sanderson, the husband sought an annulment of his marriage on the ground of mis- representation. Mr. Sanderson alleged that his wife falsely represented before their marriage that she had been previously married and divorced only once, when in fact she had been married and divorced five times. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the annulment and held that a misrepresentation as to prior marital status was not grounds for annulment.4 This decision is in line with the weight of authority.5 In McConkey v. McConkey,6 the Virginia Supreme Court determined that a divorced wife is not entitled to reinstatement of alimony payments 7 from her first husband upon annulment of her voidable second marriage. The court examined Code section 20-1108 and distinguished between voidable marriages9 and those void ab initio.10 This distinction is impor- not validly married at time of trial); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 204 S.E.2d 829 (1974) (actions of husband, charged with statutory rape of his stepdaughter, in beating wife, did not constitute "privileged communications" within meaning of statute). 2. For the various statutory grounds for annulment, see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-89.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980). 3. 212 Va. 537, 186 S.E.2d 84 (1972). 4. Id. at 537, 186 S.E.2d at 85. 5. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605 (1862), is the leading early authority for the view that fraud must relate to the "essentials" of marriage (e.g., ability to consummate the marriage and to have children) in order to constitute grounds for annulment. For a contemporary decision relying on Reynolds, see Masters v. Masters, 13 Wis. 2d 332, 108 N.W.2d 674 (1961). See generally cases collected in Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 759 (1967). 6. 216 Va. 106, 215 S.E.2d 640 (1975). 7. The annulment was based on fraud by the wife's second husband. As a result, the marriage was voidable if the wife desired to have it annulled. Id. at 107, 215 S.E.2d at 641. 8. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-110 (RepL Vol. 1975) provides: "If any former spouse to whom support and maintenance has been awarded shall thereafter marry, such support and main- tenance shall cease as of the date of such marriage." 9. Voidable marriages enjoy legal validity until annulled because the aggrieved spouse UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:321 tant because the court expressly refrained from deciding whether Code section 20-110 "would apply to a person to whom alimony has been awarded who thereafter is involved in a void marriage."" The supreme court's decision in McConkey follows the