2

FREE TRADE AND WORKER SOLIDARITY IN THE NORTH AMERICAN AUTO INDUSTRY

STEVE BABSON

In many ways, the Ford assembly plants in Hermosillo, Sonora, and wayne, MichiganlãióiémäiRã6it 3id:il,ar. äoî[ buiiä th¿ ;ä¡ne cár-thè Esöoil uiìtil 1999, "now'ihê'Fòcus. Both use nearly identical plant and equipment, featuring Kawas¿ki robots and Komatsu stamping presses. Both borrow selectively frog¡ a. iilean production" model that includes work teams and just-in-time inventory. In both fâctories, union workers produce cars with competitive ratings for quality and cost (Babson 2000). But there is one visible difference between the two plants thât speaks directly to what-Uls. antlcantdìõ-autoworkers fear most about global- ization: the eri.ìÞlõyéeÞâiking löts. At Wayne, ihey àre full óf late-model Ford, Clirysler, and GM products, most of them bigger, more expensive models than the subcompacts produced at the plânt. At Hermosillo, on the other hand, the hourly lot is small, and tlìere is not a siugle Focus behind the fence. As the best paid factory workers in the state, Flermosilio's Ford employees earned between $2 and $3.4n hou¡.in.2000 (Contrato Colectivo de Trabajo 2000-2002: 28)-more than double the rate in many of Sonora's border factories, but.one-tenth the str¿ight- time wages of Michigan's Ford workers. With the Focus selling for

The author would like to thank fellow nembers of tlre lntemational Research Network on Autowo¡k ìn the Americas (IRNAA) for rhcir commentâry and assis- tance, especially Huberto Juá¡ez of the Autonomous University of Puebla.

17 I8 SÍEVE BABSON FREE IRADE AND WORKER SOLIDAR{ÏY IN fHE AU'IO INDUSTRY 19

$15,000 and up in Mexico, even this subcompact is a luxury item for two factories in Flint, Michigan, where local strikes over work intensity niost Mexicans. Consequendy" Ford exports 95 percent ofthe Hermosillo and job security gradually starved GM's assembly plants of parts, Over plant's cars northward ("Producción Mensual"), leaving the parking ìot the preceding twenty years, the FlintEast workforce had fallen from 13,000 to a fleet of white busses that every morning pick up workers who build 1o fewer than 6.000 as the company installed ncw lechnology and ex- cars for foreign customers. pänded its Mexiôan þioduction of instrument clusters and other small parts. These workers are not reconciled to their low wqg.qq, no¡ do they "They just crated the equipment, hoisted it onto a tractor trailer, and sent weliome their role as low-cost competitors of U.S-. and Canadian it away to Mexico," as one local leader told the N¿w Yo rk'[imes.'"lhere's autoworkers. Nevenhèless, that is the role forced upon them in the glo- hardly anybody at thìs plant who hasn't seen machinery moving out in a bal arena of free irádé. A corresponding question is forced upon crate with an address on it says 'Mexico"' (Dillon 1998). àùtoworkers across tlìe còntiient: can the dive¡se labor movements of Since the lâte 1970s, GM has been unloading these..crates in Mexico, the United States, and Canada overcome the competitive dy- Mg!1.T91.9r, n*ylosa. Ciudad Juárez. and orher lactory towiri õn Mexico's namic of free trade and establish a rcgìonal union movement bascd on northern border, a region known for its low wages and low levels of crosçbórdèr sôlidáriìy? The aniwer to this question requires the posing unionization. By 1998, GM's Delphi pa.ns division had grown to fifty of another: what is the economic and sociopolitical terrain of cross- border factories employing 58,000 Mexican workers, nearly matching bo¡der trade as it helps or hurts cross-border solidarity? the 64,000 union members at its U.S. and Canadian parts plants (Delphi Automotive Systems 1998). In the meantime, GM was also opening North Àmerican Auto new assembly plants in north and central Mexico, where workers pro- duced 315,000 Cavalicrs, Silverados, and Suburbans in 1998-two-thi¡ds While auto labor in the new millennium remains fragmented and local, for export (Lira 2000). Significantly, oftwenty-nine GM assembly plants iÌ-re qulo cornpafieÀ ãiá reorgánìzing on a c,ontinental basis. This dra- in North America, the company's plant in Ramos Arizpe was one of matic shift in corporate strategy is highlighted by the ioùtiásting dy- only two that continued operating throughout the eight-week FIint strike, namics in the United Auto Workers*General Motors (UAW-GM) strikes apparently supplied by parts made in Mexico and Brazil; among the few of I970 and I998. assembly þlants able to reopen before the end of the Flint strikes, the In M91i99 footnote .in. the UAWls ¡ational plant ]91Q, -1v,q9^gr..irrqle¡ant. hrst was the company's in Silao, Guanajuato ("GM to Resume stiike against GM over i,ssues ofpay and retirement benefits. The com- Production ât Mexican Plant Next Week" 1998). pany had just two factories in Mexico, employing a total of4,300 work- In the scale and scope of its commitment to Mexico, GM has been at ers: an aging tiuck plant in the Fèderal District, dating from the 1930s, the'cùtiirg êdle df inidei ôhãñgeS trãnSforniìñg ihè Sôrithèíq tiei ôf the and an engine plant in Toluca, opened in 1965. Both factorles p¡o{uged Nönh Americân auto industry. At êach step in this transforming pro- for Mexico's tiny domestic market, delivering a wide variety of models cess, governmènt policy on tjôt[ sides of the border has provided the in relatively low volùmes with little automation. It could be no other blueprini áícl ihé inóôntives fór chànge. ìn Íhil-'srjniË,'"gló6alization" isl way-high tariffs and local-content qeg¡¡,|¡erneltq lppq¡gd by the not the spontaneous expression of market forcàs so often invoked by free | - country's natiònáliit !óvèrirment prevented GM from.imp-o_rt-!ng.vg-li,qleg trade þiópònenti bur ìs ¡áùher a þioduct òf public pòücy âììgned-:more | '' (Monis 1998, 115-116; Middlebrook 1995,231, A. Garc ía and Lara ofÉÍi than not-with corporate pianning. Àt'the sarne time, globalization--l 1998,207-2131. a time wben production totaled just 165,000 units in is not whctlly determined by drêpolicy góals ofthe corporate interests that 1969 (less than 2^t percent of the U.S. total), Mexico hardly mattered to profit by it. Cenainly. U.S. corporations have reaped the bottom-line har- the strike antagonists in the year that followed. vest ofi4exico's lo* *ug"r, but, ironically, it wai the political success of I In -l998, however, GM's Mexican operations were a flash point in the U.S. labor movement in 1965 that unii,itéätidnâlly ópened the door ] locâl strikes that shut down the company's North American operations. f

bracero progr4r¡, a World War Il-era policy that gave Mexican to foreign capital (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1999). In this sense, the fàrnìworkers temporàry visas to iravel north and work for U.S. "maquilazation" of the economy was already well advanced by 1993, , agribusiness. Since this transicnt workforce undermined the organizìng w-heä the Nórth Americdi'i Free Trade Agreemenr iNAFTA) ratiired efforts oftlle farmworkérò únion, the laboi mòvêment lobbied the Johnson Mexlco's intó â Nòrth ¡,meiican trading bloc dominated by r-- - integiáiion I adnxnistration tbr repeal. Success created a new problem for Mexico, the United States. Where before the opening of Mexico's economy to r -" however, since it left Mexican farmworkers stranded aldng the i tiorder. foreign investmênt dèþended on shifting government policy, now the In ,"rpon.", the Mèiì-ðln goTèiñrilôñt-iriì-ple..diôn'rðd-â-*bdrãöiiä¿lüStii- changes were codified in treaty law (see Canillo 2000; Kopinak 1996, àiizaiiôriÞìö¿iâm"-tïãÌ i 'c-.ort úôùìd átiraci corporate investmènt Io'thðriôith: 8-17; Monis 19981. ,I edge oi rhè"iounrry. CoInpanles rhár búili "maquiladora" ior By the turn of the century, these policy-inspired transformations had "maquila"t ¡/ , planrs, ãs these border facrories were called. could impofl dramaiically rèaligned Meiico's industrjal with the auto in- jà 9congmy,. J parts duty-free and pay taxes onÌy on ìhe value àddèri long as the dustry (referred ro alsò âs "auto") taking the lead. Mexìcò's output of plant exported 100 percent / of iis ourput back ro the Unireã Stàres cars and light trucks had soared to 1.9 million units by the year 2000, a L lMatArthur 2000. 17; Kopinak I996,7-8). growth of 980 percent compared to 1970 and more tlìan double the I jobs The goal was to attract to the economicâlly depressed north with- 755,000 units built i¡ 1990 (Chappell 2001; "The Automotive Sectors f out otherwise amending the policies of economic nationalism that dated of Latin America 1999," 292). Th9_,lve .lqg,g¡t ma-4u{1qtuJ9ls; back to ihô Mexican revolution ôflSl t-i917. iÈat upheaval had been Volkswagen, GM, Daimler*Chrysler, Ford, and Nissan-accounted for sparked by popuìâr rescntment of the Díaz dictatoiship's close alliãnce 99 peióêät òl iiJtáIiiodüðiion, wiih cM ;lône Èiânnlng ro aouùle oúç ., ' wirh U.S. corporations and forcign ìandowners, who together owned 25 pút tö rnóre thãn 600,00Õ uìi1is Uy ZOOZ (Karoub 1998; Lira 2000). A ' pCrcent of the country's land ánd dominàted Mexico's economy (Hart dramatic shift toward production for export was also gaining momen- 1t 1981, 2"16:-326). To dismantle this originál "Îiéè tiadè" iêgiine, the tüiñ: I;-i97CMêxiðàn'vèhiðle exports were effectively zero; by 1986, i revolution's leaders eventually (in the 1930s) nationalized key industriès they had inched upwards to 72,000 cars and light trucks, or 21 percent i like oìl and electricity while protccting Mexican business against foreign of totâl production; by 2000, exports had climbed to 1.4 million ve- J competition. The maqúiladóras were ro be the exception ro;les thar still hicles, representing 74 percent of total production. Domestic sales of opposed "Yankee imperialism" with high tariffs, local content requte- cars and light trucks meanwhile climbed to 854,000 in 2000, nearly half ments, ând restrictions on foreign ownership (Moris 1998, I 15-117). of them imports (Chappell 2001), While this marked a new record, it ' In the 1970s, however, government the began to open additional loop- represented a growth ofjust 21 percent since the previous record year of hrjlês fo¡ rnaqüiÌâaorà empioyôrs, incluaing a growing list of exemp- 1992; in the same period, production for export had grown 260 percent, tions from iedèrâl ia¡oi there . lâw. By.t974 were already 455 maquila This shift toward production for export entailed numerous changes iii \ factoriès along thê toióei, emptoying 75,000 workers, mosr of them un- MèXiC¿ih'â-ssiëi'iibly p-lâñls;iriöIüdiñg a iédùction-in ilie ñumireiðf mõa- \ derpâid women rather than the male farmworkers originally targeted by e1rÞioiIüCed,-äïõñilsFónälñg-äðcêlerãtiõìiôTþroduðiiòn ad módel mix --l program. the Investment accelerated yet agâin in the 1980s, when Mexico was simplified, an increase in automation, a shift toward certain lean experienced a seve¡e debt crisis and the govemment-at the urging of production methods, and dramatic improvements in productivity and U.S. creditors and the Intemational Monetary Fund-abandoned its pre- quality as thèse changes were implemented. ì viôus strâtegy ecónomic of nationalism. To pay its dollar-denorninated The growth in mqguil4dg¡q f39!9_Ii-e_s_g_ql!!ngg{ as well. In March d.ebt¡, the Mexican govemment not only widened the incentives for U.S. ' 2000, the industry magazine Twin Plant,ryelvs counted a total of 3,384 ,_ . l' côrporâtions to invest in maquiladora production, but also began to open ' maquila plants employing L2 million.ygll<.gli_ a 1,50{.r pèicerii þrõilì'tr ' domestic markdts to investment and t¡ade. By the mid-1980s, currency ì in ãmpìóymentìinðêT074. nóspltË itiJiõ*-wãges in the border ptanrô, I dêvaluations had drivèn the dollar cost of Mexican labor belôw levels rural povefy and farm mechaniz.ation continued to drive new recruits j , paid in South Korea and Taiwan, making Mexico all the more âttractive nönh, swelliirg theo'üercrowdcd colonias nea¡ the factories. Thã iort"rt I --t, 22 STEVE BABSON FREE TRADE AND WORKER SOLIDARIIY IN IHE AUIO INDUSTRY 23 / gro*iog maquila sector in this hothouse economy was arto p_artJ., with corporations moving to cheaper labor sites in the United States (and plants 228 employing 214,000 workers, traiting only tñé ièxriiäcìothing beyond) has been matched by an identical "nofhem strategylljg,\49I!go and electrical/electronic industries ("Maquila L' Scorecaid 2000;;). By ihð (Bensusán and Bayón 1998, 119-120). mid:1990s, Meiiðo'Jiôial émplòymenr i;parts mâking (maquila as well The southward migration of employers is a well-established feature as domestic firms) was already 2.5 times greatcr than Canada's and 45 of u.S. ìàbor ielaaíóls, oàiing iJâõk to îlié nineieenth century. In ìhe lâCi' percent of U.S. levels, with average hourly pay and benefits totalingjust twenty years, auto parts makers have extended this union-avóidanóê strar (Weintr $3.32 an hour aub 1998, 235-237). In maquila plants on the north, egy beyond thè southòm Uúitêd States to include Mexico, with a cone- ðm border, total labol costs were lower still, estimated at $1.75 an hour sponding multiplication of whípsawing threats in the remaining plants in 1999 (MacArthw 2000, 332).In a significant departure from previ- of the north. Two examples will suffice, one involving an organizing ous maquila investment, GM-Delphi in 1995 also began to transfer en- drive, the other contract negotiations. gineering work fiom an¿-Ciìriñ, ü¿iã-ni;lô iÈiesõàiôh änd dèvèlopmènt facility in Ciúdad Juárez tCarrillo 2000). ITT Automotíve ¡ In sum, Mexico's integration into a North American auto industry has followed an accelerating Éf/ course over the last thir.ty years, guided When workers at ITT Automotive in Michigan tried to organize a union [_ and promoted by public policy initiatives on both sidcs of the border. and bargain for improvements in wages and worliing conditions, ihe ' The ¡esult, however, is not a uniform distribution of sales and produc- còinpany responded with a fear campaign fooused on Mexico, as de- tion across the continent's three countries. Instead, Mexico and Canada scribed by this report to the NAIiIA labor commission: have both become- for diFlerent reasons-low-cost expof platforms to the U.S. market. Canadian labor costs expressed in U.S. dollars were The company parked thirteen flat-bed tractor-trailers loaded with shrink- roughly 26 þéiceäf iower in the mid-1990s than in the United States, wrâpped production equipment in f¡ont of the plant for tho duration of with the $11 an hour (Canadian) differential artributable to Canada's the campaign with Ìarge hot-pink signs posted on the side which read "Mexico transfer job." The equipment came from a production line they devalued currency and lowè¡heàlihôâié CôstC (KuniârâriiÌflòimês iSg8, ' had closed down over the weekend without warning. The same company 103)ì IÍi òbn¿iäíi, Mèiiòo's ðõii ä¿vänìàgê ïâi depended on pubìic poli- also flew employees from their Mexican facility to videotape Michigan cies favoring low wages and iupprèssion oi läbor righrs. wcìrkdrs on iþiòãLìôtiôl lìnê which supervisors clximed they were "con- It is in this uneven rônaiñ thai corporatiõns find iÈdleverage to exert sidering moving to Mexico." (Bronfenbrenner 1996, l1) i. downward pressure on wages and working conditions throughout the North American auto industry. This. same report indicated that-following the paTag-g of NAFTA, em- rl-g.v.g¡ ye¡e r_ng¡e- !i[C.ly_ tS lh'g4!9¡-!9 m-oräpiõãüctiõñîöãvoid ilúon- Downward Convergence nãiidn; wiïh qs péieè¡f ôf,máñ,r-ft-ð-afjì¡ri_ó_qrrip¿úiÞt- usìriË-iHd rá¡irc ãgãinÀt unìon oigánizing drives surveyed between 1993 and i9t5. In l0 There is growing public awareness that Mexico's low wages and troubled percent of the more thân 500 èarhpàign! surveyed, unicin oiganizers re- unions are the fulcrum for downward pressure on pay and working con- ported that companies like ITT openly threatened to move to Mexico, diÍions north of the border. While thousands oi U.S. autoworkeri have while in many others the threat was veiled or delivered in one-on-one jobs losi théir beôÀusè thé émployéi tiânsferred oþerâtións tci Mexico, meetings with supervisors (Bronfenbrenner 1996, 9*13). thè fai laiger numbei whó remÁin have expeiìenòéd á móie pervasive form ,,,.' of "whipsawìng"-the thrèat of irânsfe¡ to MéÍiCci òi elsewhere G M- Delphi-Packard Ele clric " unless wor-kers mõãäie their wage demands and amend their work rules. What is less weìl known is that many Mexican autoworke¡s have This company's Wq:r_en, Ohio, factory employed 13,500 workers in 1973 also been victimized by whipsawing. In fact, the "southem strâtegy" of making the wire hamesses thãt distribute electrical signals throughout 24 STEVE BAESON FREE TRADE AND WORKER SOLIDARIry IN THE AU-IO INDUSTRY 25

the car. GM began to move the most labor-intensive tasks south in the Table 2.1 mid-1970s, flrsi to Mississippi, then to Mexico. By 199g, virtually all of the assembly work was in northem Mexico, and the Warren plant em_ Cross-Border Vehicle Sourclng by rhe B¡g Three, 1998 ployed fewer than 6,000. To stem the continuing job loss, the Interna- Company and models Moxican plant U,S.-Canadian plant tional Union ofElectrical Workers.(I[IE) agreed to cut wages in half for Daimler-Chrysler new hires and postpone their movement to full ¡ày uüäi leniól wõike¡b Neon Toluca Belvodire retired. "Every disCussiòn or còmplaint," one workèr said of her iñter- Cirrus, Stralus, Toluca Steling Heighls ,,,We Plymouth actions with management, met tlìe same response; can always move Br€eze Toluca Bloomingtonb Sebring, Avbnger St. Lou¡s #2 your job to Mexicg"' (cited Saltillo in Helper 1998, 309-324). This whipsaw_ Dodge Ram LagoAlberto Warrên Truck irig dynâmìc is esþècially powerful in the industry's more labor-inren- General Motors sive parts sector. While inflation-adj usted wages fell just 2 percent Caval¡er, Sunbird Ramos Arizpe Lordstown, Lansing between 1988 and 1998 in U.S. assembly opeÍations (pulled down by Suburban, Silverado, S¡lao" Janosville, Arl¡ngton,, Tahoe, Yukon, Sìerra, Oshawa, Fod nonunion transplants), they fell 9 percent in the auto parts sector and Wãyne, Fljnt l3 Chevrolet Pickup Truck percent in engine electrical equipment (Herzenberg 1999, 6). Ford Wage indexes do not tell the whole story since they faiì to capture the Escod, Tracer Hermosillo Wayne eff9.c19 o_f_q. p9rygqiç_.{_oy¡y,4¡,{- p,_1es_s¡¡e .sn .W-ol-|1 r9!9q Contour, Myst¡que Cuaul¡tlán Kansas City .¡hq1 -i-¡ .spread- ing to the ass9mbl.V.gl1-1t secto,r. The potential for this kind of wñipsäw- Ford F-Series Cuautitlán Kansas C¡ty, Kentucky Truck Ontario, Norlolk ing grows as the companies build more car and t¡uck models on both sides of the borde¡, as indicated in Table 2.1. Multiple sourcing is cur- Soørce: Compiled f¡om "No¡th America 2000 Vchicìe production,,, Autu¡notue rently the Big Three's preferred option since íl'lJiltiì6ùtðs piõdü¿äon Industries, Oclobü 1999, pulloutì Harbour Report 1999, pp. 29-31. 'Trucks and SUVs. across the continêirtal mãrkèi and makes the compäny less vúlnòrã61ð bMitsubishi, to formerly jointly owned with Chrysler. local disruþtiôrìs.ln Melìcó, èômpaôi óars ãie mòie iìkély io Rna miadte- ôlâss customéi¡, ühile light trucks go to fleet sales and wealthy house- cornpany's demands or risk losing the new model. Bargaining was sus- holds; when these domestic markets slump, as in the mid-1990s, output pended in 1999 pending national contract talks, and GM soon after posr can be exported to the north in even greater numbers (,,The Autoiriôtive poned introduction of the Delta models, citing marker forecâsts and the Sectors of Latin America, 1999" 270,281-285, 292). Equally impor- shift to light trucks (Pryweller 1999). When local bargaining resumed, tant, Mexican factories establish a low-cost benchmark for work orga- the union signed a '\helf agreement" lhat promised Lo reducejob classi- nization arid labòr ielàtions ãng wilrr it, a hgighÉled pôl"ntirt-'Io, ficaiións anä'tìim'ihê size ôf work teams if CM chose Lordsrown'.to whipsawing U.S.iCánadian plantg This, possiUi-iity has äiready been produce the next generation óf small cars (Bureau of National Affairs dêmonstrated in the case of GM Lordstown. With the aging of the J-car 2001, A-3). models produced in Ohio and Ramos Arizpe, the company þrôposed- In the meantime, GM had already installed its modular manufactur- that the tiext geneiatiòn Delta model be ássembled in a new,.modular" ing system in Ramos Aiii¡ie, where assembly of the pontiac Azrek be- facto¡y next to the old Lordstown plant-a move that would entail gan in 2000 in a new factory based on the same principals of outsourcing outsourcing of major components to lower-wage supplicrs, with cone- and radical downsizing ofthe workforce. "The Mexican plant,', reported spõnrling ðuts in ihè âistìnbly pfãñ( wó-itf-öt_ð-g. Lôlãl'Eãrgaining over Aulotnotive News, "provides the closest look at where GM wants to go the required work rule revisions began in 1998 ãmid headlines announc- with its new and renovated assembly plants in the United States', (cited ing that "GMWeìghs Scrapping Ohio Plant, Building in Mexico" (i998). in Miller 2000, l). Based on company documen-ts. to the media, these reports put -leaked As it happens, Ramos Arizpe also shows where the companies want additional pressure on local uniôä ieadeis tci irièèt-at least some of the to go with their iëw àsÀeäìbly þlànts in Mexico..In rhis case, the Aztek 2ó SÌËVE BABSON FREE TRADE AND WORKER SOLIDAR Y IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY 27

factory and other northem plants built since l9g0 are the fulcrum for Cuautitlán union's sixty-one-day strike protesting this ultimatum, Ford whipsawing that points southward, toward Mexican autoworkers in the fi¡ed the entire workforce, annulled the contrâct (paying a legally re- older manufacturing centers around Mexico City and the Federal Dis_ quirèd levèiâiròè), ánd ieléètiVely rehired 80 perce;t of the workforce hict, In fact, GM's initial move northward to Râmos Arizpe, where it under amended work rules and wages. Because the rehired workers had broke ground for new assembly and engine plants in 19g0, marked the lost their seniority, Ford's payroll costs fell an estimâted 40 percent (R. opening round in the corporate catnpaign to renovate Mexican Garcia and Hills 1998, 146-150). auromaking. GM's target was the militanr local union in the Federal While whipsawing is primarily a north*south phenomenon in the as- District plant, where workers had conducted six strikes between 1965 sembly and engine-making sectors of Mexico's auto industry, it covers and 1979, winning work rules and wages that pùt them in the forefront all points of the compass in the maquila sector, where employers can of Mexican auto unions. In 1980, however, GM refused to submit to plausibly th-reaten to move labor-intensive operations to whatever loca- contract terms granting jurisdiction bargaining to the Federal District tion offers the cheapest labor. Even in Nogales, a border city with rela- union for any new plants GM in Mexico. The 106-day strike that fol_ tively low wages, nonunion auto pafts workers report that complaints to lowed ended in defeat fol the Ferleral District union, leaving GM free to supervisors elicit this all too common response: "They answered that open the first Ramos Arizpe plant under contract with a rivaì.labor orga- we could complain all we wanted but that there was no other law than nízation (Bayón 1997, 90; Middlebrook 1995, 27 0, 273). Thereafter, the thc maquila law and that no one can tell them anything, because if they lower wages and weaker union traditions north of Mexico City attracted do the plants will leave" (cited in Kopinak 1996, 142). additional investnent in assembly and engine piãüti: Chrysler Saltillo These constraints are wound all the tiglìter by govemment policies that (engines and trucks), Ford Chihuahua (engines), Ford Hermosillo (cars), hold wages below inflation while suppressing independent unions. De- Nissan Aguascalientes (engines and cars), GM Silao (trucks), and Ramos òigned to âItiàctfúrthìer ìñüesrmèrif ihilgiòùttr üráiègi nâJ pli tvtexican Arizpe again (SIlVs) (Bayón 1997,62-65; Middtebrook tggs,27t_ workers on a wildly_careening roller qga,s.çi.linóe the.!áie i970s, wiìh iëãl 212). At the same time, Ford closcd two plants in the Mexico City area wages falling dramatically during periods of economic crisis and peso and humbled the union at a third-Cuautitlán-in a series of bitter strikes devãluation::::thé látè1970s tò éarlt I9S0s, the midfl980¡, ànA ihe mid- and violent confrontations between 1987 and 1991. In 1995, GM capped 1990s-ànd riising slowly during subsequent booms. From their record its "northem" strategy by shutting rhe Federal District plant and shifting high in 1977, real manufacturing wãges had iallen 33 percent by 1999- truck making to Silao, greenfield a plant with a fledgling union. despíte a doubling in labor productivity (Ramírez de la O 2000, l8). Volkswagen-the only major company that did not move northward- otherwise conformed to events in 1992, fíring the entire workforce to Potential Allies break a strike and enfo¡ce its model of lean production (Bayón 1997, 93-96; Iuârez 1998, 173-205). While many autoworkers in the United States and Cânada assume that For many of Mexico's unionized autoworkers, the outcome of this Mexicans must be benefiting from globalization to the same degree that has been no less disastrous than il has been ¡robess for UAW and Cana- northern workers are losing, the actual outcomes are mixed on both sides I diâri Auiò Workers (CAW) members victimized by whipsawing. Wliile l ,of .!he.horder. Jobs are up in*miatteãrs, 6ùT reâlüágès'ãid 5täg-ná-rror jobs háVe gioùl ìi the north ând cennai iegions, tirey håve faiiãn in the Ialling, bargaining leverage is weakened, arid de-unionization is gro\t- south; where w¿igès are higher and union traditions stronger. The mecha- iñg âórosi thê õöliirienï. 0ñ this basiÈ ãlòne, pioþoäerits òfcross-bõfiler i nism for ratcheting pay downwards was the same âs in Ohio, with the l 'iiJvèiCèd: s"olidarity can find potential allies from Puebla to Oshawa. polarities woikerd ar Fo;d's 'Mobilizing I Cuautitlán assembly plant near tharpóteniial is difficult, however, when thére are so few '.1 Mexico City were told in 1987 that bccause their high wages made them InlA ámõñg ihè iàbòr mòvemónrs of Norrh America. Until the 1970s, uncompetitive, the company would not match the 23 pe¡cent raise it had U.S. labor generally favored policies that opened foreign markets to already negotiated with Hermosillo's plant-based union. To end the unign made exports, ând so long as import competition remained weak, 28 STEVÊ BABSON FRÊÊ IRADE AND WORKER SOLIDARIry IN IHE AUTO INDUSIRY 29

this free-trade alliance with U.S. corBorations went largely unopposed in political leverage meanr that federal and local Boards of Conciliation union circles. When jobs corporate America began to export rather than and Arbitration favored the federation over riväiìniôns, and t.hä..exclu- goods, the initiâl respon¡e was protectiónist, with mobt uiions favoririg sion clause" in iäost conlracis rgq¡¡ired ç.ompa¡ie¡ to'fire any'mem- "Buy campaigns American" that stressed patriotic feeling over cross- ber--ìissidents especial\,----e¡p"¡.¿ from the union. As the auto indusiry border solidarity, Efforts to frnd allies in foreign countries were also ham- grew, however, these patemalistiê structureS came ùniler increasing pres- pered by War politics, Cold which narrowed the range ofacceptable allies sure f¡om members protesting the lack of representation, and with p¡esi- to official, anticommunist organizations like the-Cp¡f.e3þ¡4t_r,o,1..-o_!,Mç¡t- dent Luís Echeve-rrÍ?lr- ig !.þ,9,%I_ty lp]Os, u môu"rnàit can Workers (CTM) (Nissen 1999,4445i 1997, "$iyqS4_rgp.pSlt - Cowie 3-32). to democratize union governance gained the upper hand. ln âdaitiön-to For its pan, Mexico's dominant labor organization / neither welcomed establishing re'gulãi eieôiìoiìs anä geñdiâl a3èem6liél ln'äùñy local auto nor promoted crois-border links itriòugtr mosioi ttre tisäi an¿ iglôs. /' unions, movement leaders initiated an escalating strike wave that saw The CTM's aversion, if not.h_ostility, to intemational links with North the number of walkouts jump from ¡ust two duiing rhe l96bì to at least American labor was rooted in that organization's unique ties to the Mexi- twenty-five between 19'72 and 1979. By the end of the 1970s, many can state and the seventy-year reign ofthe Pafy of the Institutional Revo- unions in the assembly sector had won higher wages and improved work (PRI). lution The CTM was forged in the 1930s, and its incorporation rules goveming work intensity, seniority rights, transfers, promotions, party into the ruling ùas part of a wider realignmentof Mexican þolitics and use of temporary workers (Middlebrook 1995, ZZ2-254; Ttman under President Lázâro Cárdenas (1934-1940). The Cárdenas govern- 1998, 148-178). Íièät wàs moving ièftivara-natìðnalizing U.S. oil companids;' üiiÍlar- As we have seen, events in thc 1980s and 1990s reversed this trend ing land reform, and supporting union organization-and the newly with a series of union dcfeats at GM, Ford, and Volkswagen. yet euen as - organized CTM, as it mobilized support for these initiatives, soon gained asseùbly plánt locaii had ro accept flexibie contracrs ,lith dirninirt official status in the party's ''labgJ. Subsequent presidential re- "¿ !-9ç!..o-¡.'' work rules, some retained the democratic reforms of the 1970s and gimes were rarely populist govemments so or fabgr-fri9q{ly, but PRI some-in the north-adopted their ówn democratic by laws (Babson still delivered a widening stream of welfare benefits and social pro- 2000; Middlebrook 1995,273-274). At the same time, the CTM's na_ grams, including (in 1943_) national health cate syste¡¡1_organized un- -a- tional leaders were endorsing (sometimes reluctantli) ihê'pRI der the Mexican Institute for Social Security (IMSS). As dominant the govemrÌìeiîr's'tum róWaid'fièe tradè (Bayón 1997, 36_37, 57), while organizations in the PRI's offìcial labor sectoi, the ÖTM's affiliated t'protection corrupt leadèis sóld' sweetheárt contracts" to companies as unions automaticaìly counted their constituents as pany members; the jTsurânce lôù:c¡jst agâitist i.¡hrésr (LaBotz 1992, 53-55). The result has PRI, in tum, rôutinêly àpþointed CTM leaders ro the tripanire còuncils beén a ccintinuing tensiciri'tictwéen local proresrs and ofhcial condem- y' (labor, management, and govemmenÐ of the IMSS and the Boards of nation, as plant-based unio¡s hãúe colrtesred low wages and diluted profir Conciliation and A¡bitration-the latter regulating union formation and sharing while nãtiónaf-ièaders have supponed govemment wage ceil_ labor relations. By the 1960s, the theruling çT14,:.s-::g_fftg¡alll !q!gs.19 ings and productivity campaigns. This widening gap betwcen union party's labor arm had thóióùghly politicized labor relations in auto and members and national leadèis was uriäeriìne¿ in-1996, whcn thé ira- elsewhère, with collective bargaining often reduced to top-down deal- dòüâì óii\4 öänôèlè¿ ils iiãäilioñãi tray Dày mârðh tò fòieìfaìt þõþùtar making between"co¡porâte and political elites (La Botz 1992, 64-74; pòtests and húndréds of ihouiands oi*ò.[".s pou."d into ih"'.t.""t, Middìebrook 1995, 89-106). anyway. The CTM's dominant Þosition eroded further after 1997, lvhen This would change in the i970s in ways that still define the labor severat major únions joiñèd wiih thcÀüintlntr! W-ô-ir1f!î.rf-ônllF;{r) to ,_- relations system in auto, especially in the assembly sector. Until that establish the Nation¿l Workers U*ni9,n 11¡ñfus ái inaàpËnàóni f"aera- decade, most autoworkers were subordinated to leâders apþointed by tion'(Biooks an¿ caiióiì lîds). ihe CTM's itaìè federatións. Many'tocal unions had no regulai elec- With JohnSwcene¡r..'s election ro the AFL-CIO presidency in 1995, tions, only oôòàsionâl meétings, and no printed contracts. The CTM's the U.S. lãboi ñöi,eirent began to reach beyond its continuing tics tJ 30 STEVE BABSON FRËE IRADE AND WORKÊR SOLIDARIry IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY 3ì thq CTM and establis_tr parallel links with these new formations. In the eles of some CTM leaders, movements within the CTM and independent unions fighting for recog- this simply confirmed their claim that U.S. and Canadian ..foreign nition, as well as the mo¡e numerous company unions and protection uniônists were destuUllizers,, anJ protectionists in league with local contracts. dissidents. For independent unions un¿ A"tno"ruti. ciìrrents within the CTM, Consequently, the prospects for cross-border solidarity vary accord- on the other hand, the support of North Ameri_ can unìonists was ing to local conditions, a fact that widens the range of possible initia- a welcome boost to the wideninÀiermeni in M"xico,. labor tives while also limiting the deglee to which success in one movement. Even with the pRI.s defeat in locatìon can it f."rlo"ntiur generalized rions of 2000, however. ttre põiþeciì roir;iã"?;o*i;=;J;;;#;;;_" "r"._ be to others. Consider the variation in the following cases. , t:I|^i:Till rl."-Þ'::ú1.'iñess Nàrionai Aci;"" P;;lpnÑ.;; rne erecrron onilqg: a promise Nogales or rèî0iin aïd-lrènioöiâri;ätiôn, bur rocar pAN governments in northem Mexico have been uniformly hostilè to demo_ cr:itic and independrjit únions This production center on the Sonora-Arizona border is known for the in thelnrqritud;;;l;;tr.ïå.ul un¿ ràà_ eral Boards of Conciliation lower level of unìonization and the highcr pr,rponion of men in its añd Arbìûation arà stilì: ãòfrinatea Uy old-guard appoinrees linked rñaquiladora facrories. ''The only unions herc," one U.S. pìant manager to rocar erites an¿ wi liteiv continue to rule has observed, "aré ones which the company pays the dues against planrbâsed dissidents and independent unioís. p.ot"ction fo¡ and the contracrs barring independ,ert workers don't even know they belong" (cited in Kopinak 1996, 169). organ izatìon àre stin in place ac¡ciss the rräqulraoora zone, and extra-legaì arrest and offìcial violence rcmain as rhe final bulv/arks of Malatnoros r,, rhe starus quo (Garza 2000; f_u noi" iOOOl. :9 1r :iqgìt v"-' j, rb; g o1i,oc"?:'"':11'J l=*: le õ;;iiïq.s!,¡ At the eastern end of the border, workers at least k¡ow they belong to a "Yï l",q d-99¡t9-,.b¿,rh tü-¡Ll'Þ.Vi-Tj!_il!-,1"b""L!,ì";óËì¡,,,q "r / union acìiùi.óilôl âìi"iìiéi åEôs union. Mòre than any oihei CTM affiliate in the maquila cconomy, the " gfj¡e-boìdè;. in assèising *ilui ,ni, _"un, '- fòr ihê ñòitli Union of Industrial Workers and Day Laborers TSJOI) has a reputation Àmeríóàri àütö indusiry iiä impo.unt-to ìfiogntr" ttut the presumption of a for contesting the tenñò and cônditions ofwork and winning higher.wages CTM monoli¡þ-__ho*"u".."l"uuniin ti,"- p-a.s.L¡o longer ànd shorter work hoùrs. However, SIOI's Capaðity holds. The underlying srructure of labo.,Jni"i, i" ìn" nl*¡.u" to win these improve- auro lndùslry has always been ments declined after a bruising confrontation in 1992, when the union's decentralized and frãgmenred, a fäci ob_ sCured by govenrmenr aging leader, Agapito Goñzàlez, thrèâtdned to strike if èmployers eflorts rorute by a".r". uno iyit áî;il;t'CiM:; did not periodic agree to a 30 percent raise. On the eve of the interventjons in local bargaining. Otherwise, ,t.¡" i. fr. t"r. walkout, federal police ar_ tabor rctations than rested Gonzalez and removed him to Mexico City, where he was placed :"if"Ttrl]l..il. is the iase in t¡" fj¡ii"ã Stut", un¿ whrle plant-by-plant under house arrestìn the HospitalLos Angeles. The chastened union called .,/, :lnu_o,u. variations have grown in all th¡ee coun_ l,/ rnes, rhere are stiJI national off the strike and settled for a smaller raise (Adler 2000 ZZ|,-Z}4). auto u..li,o-l-s. ¡! !!g United.states and Canada, , j ' wiih pattem ag.""-ánt, on ùugôi, bè"êfiir,'";;;;ú *üær. upprying across assembly, Ford Hermosillo ii, power tiain,:ànd Bis T#""t;;;;tiin, luu". Ì dwindling¡. t,lr" ln Mexico, on rhe other haid, there is nò nâtional autoworkers' union Democratic ferment in this plant is measured by the number r and, consdquently, no industry*id" palem. Forìhat of cau- t: no companywide cuses-six-that have contested recent union clections. The CTM co ecrive bargaining in any secror of or- i rneTi,l:rj Ìndustry. :L:_:. ganized a nâtional comnittee of Ford : Ì.ach assembly plânt negotiarcs ,"purutãly, with workers in tire l97fi^büf-flîèfe links to hãs.tberinõ regional CTM federations usually óõiñitãñt'widð-baisäiiú;iñlñòe Èôrð óiõied irì Fädejiä tDis_ i -..,1,"_uno outweighing the connec_ bodies (B.ay6n tiiör Þl¿iiìrs iä rhe nid-I930¡. I!,$ìÀ cônt"ii'ù,é io"aì'hai tee7, s3, 7 2_73). rn the Laquiìadora.r ãàóptedi I supplter:i:l_i: lll:-lar secto¡, variation widèliri! réþérioìrè ôfðolléðiivê ãirions to press \ is equally evident, encompassing democratic for higher wages and profit sharing, including formal strikes, unofficial walkouts, plant-gate SIEVE BABSON 32 FREE TRADE AND WORKER SOLIDARIÍY IN THE AUIO INDIJSÍRY 33

sítdowns, "collective absences," and slowdowns. After years ofhousing in the strike and lockour of that year, rhey affiliated with the Federarion its offices inside the factory, the local has purchased land near the plant of Goods and Services Unions (FESEBES); in 1997, when FESEBES to build a union hall (Babson 2000). hèlped found the new national labor federation, the UNT, the VW union became one of its largest afFrliates (Vanderbush 1998, 254-260). In the GM Sìlao union's 2000 elections, â new leadership slate--one of twenty contest- ing the outcome in a plant workforce of nearly 13,00O workers-won There is no national bargaining for GM plants and, unlike Ford, no na- control of the bargaining committee and launched a sustained drive for tional CTMb'omr¡iittèô. Woikeìs ât the Silao truck plani are membeifof wage increases well beyond the 9 percent offered by VW and endorsed tliè Uniòn of WôiÈöiöín the Metal and Mechanical Indusrries (SITIMM), by the govemment. When the govemment decla¡ed the union's fivc-day a regional CTM affìliate with thirty-six locals and 14,000 members, strike to be illegal on technical grounds, union le¿ders molilized a cam- most of them in the state of Guanajuato. In addition ro the Silao plant, paign of work-to-rule, refusal of overtime, piunt-gut" iiì lni, marctres, SITIMM also represents several major companies in the nearby sup- rallies, and highway blockings that finally forced the company to agree pliér park, including American Axle's new plant supplying rear axles to an .18 percent wâge increase. Since 1999, as VIV hâs outsou¡ced ma- for Silao. Since GM Silao opened in 1995, SITIMM's plant union has jor components to an ever-growing supplier park, the VW union has developed a vigorous intemal democracy, with the 2000 elections going also begun to support strikes and organizing among parts workers.2 to a militant slate demanding-and winning-wage increases well above the government benchmark.¡ Cross-Border Solidarity

Chrysler Toluca Given the fragmentâtion of Mexico's auto unions, the extreme ¿gCgL \ tràIitätiõä'.tf -b-argãuirnc,an¿rî6eî#Gil-òiãînì;üó.ü[i.t-i"ìòipiÑ] The democracy movement of the 1970s never reâched this assembly -\till ulii-ôñs;-éffeõti'võ"snãægîes fõr-öfoss:böül'ei sólìalâiit,t havê to ad- I plânt. A former þrôdùction manager served as the uniori's general sècre- jusr r'Ò loiáI iôäìlitiöÍìs òIÍ ácã¡èìy-taiè balil. Ëlðñ ìä this ïãiied ter:' I iâry between 1970 and 1993, initially appoinred by the regional CTM rain, however, thèie aie some ðommon"' " -' features that can help, or hun. .l and thereafter running unopposed in ritualistic elections. John Tuman the prospects for mobilizátiôñ. describes his hold on power: \. On thepositive side, the Nor_tþ AEg_t¡-93L.!ll Cl4-qi,o¡..-o,f ..pt,o-d_uçllon has eiiäbliiñõdã?-ônrñóí idiom" familiar ro auroworkers With the help of the and the CTM, he defeated emerging de- "óöultaio;àl .goMany aðiòsÀ thè contineni. Ái'ùe have ieôn, wtjrkèiÈ àie buiidñ¿ ;üãsamc mocracy movements in 1970 and 1975 by applying the exclusiôn clause partl ànd ñîiòhèd vêäiðtes for tne sarne marker, and . against dissident workers, Because ofhis loyalty ro the CTM, thegerieral while this cerrainly sé'Crètâry of thè ChiySlei loèal wás màde a PRI labor sector representa- widens the opportunities for whipsawing, it also demonstrates thè.po-

tive in the Chamber of Deputies in the lg?Os. Retiring from offiôe in ióniial fôr ã countelàiling sôiìoâiity. Efforts'io supþòrr workers in oi- 1

1993, he appointed his son as the new general secrerary. (Tuman 1998, vèiSe lóêãtiori"i wiìi àiÀõ-tie' airieil by the shárèd nóräenclàtrüö of ì 157-158) rrrrsn¡rdöäâl p'rirdriötioi. Méx-iõâä ptont! ui" ¡tiif¡e_q! fu19m¡dd ryr -J their norther¡i coünferp¡iits-, but'thé gäþ hai.nanowed dramatically in W Puebla iècénlyeâis. Work oigãniáaiión id tit

,,team- authority), "jusrin-time inventory" (intensifying work stress), and ing conditions. The problem with Hermosillo, then, is not that Ford is worÏ" (promoting þroduction-only goals). Whipsawing, as we have seen, inr'esting in Mexicán production, but that Ford is investing in Mexican victimizes workdrs ín Mexìco as well as in the United States and Canada, pr'oduction without ¿1so investing in Mexican consumption. Mexico's and it is accompanied by a second dynamic that most UAW and CAW autoworkers (like their U.S. and Canadian counterparts) need good pay- members would not expect to find in Mcxico: "outsourcing"-â word ingjobs, with real wages that are not only "good" compared to Meiico's often used without translation-is increasingly b-n thè miäiß-òf Mexi- faliing standards. but "good" compared to their rìsing productivity. Ac- can workers in the assembly sector, wheiè Coriìþâniêi bid out seàts, in- cording to mainstream economists, this improvement in real earnings strument panels, and other components tò ¡upplieis paying lower wages. can happen only gradually-ignoring the fact that it did not happen ¿t the same At time, there are many barriers that stand in the wây of a all through most ofthe 1980s and 1990s, while in our own history it has wider mobilization, none more obvious than the language barrier be- happened rather suddenly: in 1914, for example, when Henry Ford 1 tween Spanish- and Engtish-speaking peoples. Sô lõ;g ä iËñ bäriier doubled wages in ónò st¡oke of the pen, and in 194Gt948, when rhe ' blocks the way, routine communication will depend on specialists and UAW and GM agrecd to sizablc wage increases protected by a cosrol- translation media rather than the worker{o-worker interaction thât builds living escalator. In a context where Mexican workers need substantial a wider movement. This hurdle can be loweied: moré peoþle à?è learn- and steâdy improvements in purchasing power to become cusromers for inj a Secônd langúâge; simultaneous translation is becoming more avail- their own product, these remedies can find support among autoworkers able, and translation software.makes wriitèn è)ichanges more feasible. on either side of the U.S-Mexico border But these remedièi go only so far Leaming a second language is not for Th"-@cannot be sustained, everyone, and fianslation services are not easily deployed beyond con- however, if collaboration is limited to the occasional summit meeting of ferences and written communicâtions. Many of these solutions also re- top leaders. Important as these are, cross-border solidarity must âlso quire up-front fundilg f91 q¡4. c.o¡¡pg.!_ers. focal p.gi¡r1 9lg¡qe¡, l1ans¡qtolq, þcome 1 of un!gnlwidq 1nüiâtiics ihär óóùniói inó pôtËntiat A second barier is the heightened job insecurity felt in man_y , -corners iòi 1x9noph9u¡ó_qâi&!?!h:Eifòiù in this directión have gainád some of the âuto industry. Shiftirlg riâikdfË¡iáiê{ glõ6âf meigêiÀ,-ãnã peri- momentum in recent years, and this accumulating experience suggests odið downsi2iiìg àll òôñrìíbü.[è icj-¿his àniious itatè, which contiúental the possible future of â North American movement of autoworkers. Its whipsavúiñþ'mdkêÈ âll tlè ¡iìore intense, continuous, and porentìälly di- elements would include the following. visive' fôi ãñlðiois:boidéi'union mòvèment. particutarti ìñ â¡¡eräbly ,ñcirking arid fä6i:iièi SüÞÞlièr plãriis, üheie þäy ãrìd conditions tend to Local-to- Local Me etings be highei, uñìoä ilémbêiÈ ãld leaders in Mexico as well as in the United States and Canada naturally rally to the defense of thei¡ livelihood. The entry-level basis for cross-border solidarity i, .thgjg-.-"_:qq-leçC ,¡r- Whipsawing may inspire some of them to acts of soiidarity. but in the counter among wo:ke_rs -making the same product or working for the absence of countervailing union stiategièò, it can èasily inspire a plânt- sãnie company. Local-to-local mectings can begin with informarion ex- based patriotisÌn ând a backlash against all competitors. The temptation changes that increase understanding and deepen the commitment to con- jingoistic to fall bâck on or racist slogâneering is especially powerful tinued communication and proceed frorn there to more focused "the when others" competing for jobs are foreign and remote-cast in collaboration as opportunities arisc. stereotypicâl form as "gringo protectionists" or "wetbacks who work for nothing." Worlæi to-Worker Meetings TIì¡: ch9!Ylli!!i9- pglgsqie! eêrì.bq cglllqrqC 9!!y wilh ç4¡¡rp,4isns that unite rather than divide ,/, workers. The shift from "Buy American" to Plançbased union meetings are not always possible, particularly in the / "F¡:y Union" js.a srep in ihe right direciioñ, ãs is any iãllyìñffi that maquiladora parts sector where union organization is sparse or is cor- djËðtl¿iiie;¡iôlìo the need for an upwanl convergence of pay and work- rupted by protection contracts and company unions. On the U.S. and 3ó STEVE BABSON FREE RADE AND WORKER SOLIDARIIY IN THÊ AUTO INDUSfRY 37

Canadian side, the initiative may lie with citywide or regionaì bodies fund with contributions and plant-gate collections, the money ear- prepared to support the work of volunteers drawn from a vanetf of iô ma¡ked for a CFO organizer in Reynosa ("Indiana Labor Trip to Yield cals. UAW'Règiôì 1Ä òn Dritioìls wêsi side has éþorisóied àri-Iniemà-- Results" 1998). tional Laboi Solidarity Network (ILSN) that periodicãliy-ìãrìðs delcgations to maqüila cities and Big Thiðé àìsembly plants in Mexi-c-o. Heallh and Safety Training with followup reports to regional and local meetings after they return. ILSN has also sponsored visits to Drctroit by maquiladora workers re- Because there is no national auto union in Mexico and because bargain- porting on their efforts to organize. Such initiàtivès havè only a limitèd ing has so often been subordinated to political deaì making, there is a impact if divorced from a wide¡ commitment to buiiding a cross-border corresponding underdevelopment-uniol'ói[anizaiioñ. of the technical skills and training that movement, but they are a necessary first step towârd chaíging workers' suppoÍ broad-baÀea Crôss-bor¿ói initiatìviiò tìat perceþtions. In I998, ihe Céntral Làbor Council of Nórtheasi Indianâ help address this lack òf infrásiruòtui" orà especiâily visible in the área sent á miied delegation to Reynosa that included worke¡s from United ofworkplace health and safety, witl both union and activist groups like Steering-a plãit t,osing jòbs tô Meiico. "ìr's amazing rhar people sur- the Maquiladora Health and Safety Network providing training on haz- vive under these circumstances," the president of Paperworkers Local ard recognition and control. The CJM significantly expanded its train- 7452 lzter told his members at United Steering, reportíng on rhe en- ing program in 2000 with regional meètings in Ciùdâd Juárez, Reynosa, poverty demic in Reynosa. "It gqry þg!p9d qq,rçqliZp..!h.Ct.t-l¡-e-prsblp_r.r^r is and Nuevo Laredo, drawing local organizers and plant workers to train- not Mexican workers taking oùi jó6i; it's coryorate Ameriia and our the-trainer workshops conducted by UAW and CAW staff (Coalition for owñ'govemmeni" ("IndìanàLàbor Tilþ ióyiéid ResuùJ; tllSj. rni, Una Justice in the Maquiladoras 2000; Kourous 1998).5 of colleòtivé experience can spur unionists to more concrete action. suwo:l Solidarifi Funds lrisì: _ The crucial role of cross-border solidarity has been underlined in the Hosting cross-border delegations and worker-to-worker meetings can prolonged struÊAle to win recognition for the independent union at be expensive, especially fói the cásh-diarved groüþs ihàl ìuppon Hqn Y9g4g, a Korean-owned supplier of truck frames located in máQuilãdorá õrganizing. Organizations like the Coalition for Justice in T'ijuana. With the first strike in 1997 over low wages and dangerous the Maquilad-oras or Border Com¡nittðäoi^Wo*"tt U¡orke.s ,(C-JM) -the shop conditions, community-based activists and unionists in the United (CFO) depend on dues and limiteð conniburions from religious. envi- States ând Canada supported the Han Young workers âgainst compâny ronmental, labor, and women's groups on both sides of the border. To firings and government suppression. {.threqt9ned. þgyc¡tt qf H)undâJ- support theù efforts, â growing (but stilì small) number of unions.h-gve Han Young's customer*and picketing of showrooms, loading docks, established "Solidarity Funds" to help staff workers'centers and sup- and Mexican consulates in twenty cities generated substantial public- pon rhe cost of organizers. The CAW's Social Justice fund ìs rhe largesr ity that helped restrain govemment suppression of the independents, of these, gene,rating áùÞ!t-$?..l------milliglqpuqlty rhrough contract lan- While the outcome of this battle swung between defeat and victory guage obligating employeri (â6ôut tOilin àtt) to pay a per capitiãirìóuìt and back again, with complicating divisions among the independent iñio thd fund-ihree ceriii'ân hour in the case of Big Three contracts, unionists, the Hân Young struggle achieved a singular victory when down to one cent an hour for smaller firms.3 Several other unions have government officials had to grant legal standing to the first official established a !3y-f9]l g_Þg-c-þ.ff ($ I per pay period in the case of Unired strike by an independent union in the maquiladora zone ("Victory in Electrical WorkerS [IE] contracts) to support cross-border initiatives Tijuana" 1997; "As Han Young Strike Enters Third Month, Support (Wells l99S)-à In thè casrj ôfihe Nórtheast Inðiânã Cèntiàl Laboi Coun- Grows" 1998; "Han Young Strike Resunected" 1999). Cross-border (CLC), cil local unions have pledged to suppolt the CLC's solidarity solidarity has also played a visible role in the case of Custom Trim, a 38 STEVF BABSON FREE TRADE AND WORKER SOLIDARIIY IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY 39 formerly Canadian-based company that moved production of steering Union Councils wheels to northem Mexico in the mid-1990s. Here too, a series of strikes and protests beginning in 1997 over wages and workplace safety The Echlin-Dana NAO submissì_on ivqq..the. oltgror,yth of the first.for._ led to illegal firings and official repression, countered by the solidar- mal èffort ãrläñg âìto ùliõñs to ôôòi¿ùate their efforts on a conrinenral ity efforts of U.S. and Canadian unions. This support grew pre- out of basis: Bë$ñiiäg àS.the Edhlin Workéi!' Alliancê in i99i an¿ continu- vious c¡oss-borde¡ links and information-sharing focused on chemical iäg ád ihëDana Workers'Alliance after a change in plant ownership, the exposures. "The workers in Canada at first told us, 'We can't talk about coalition eventually brought together every union representing Dana's solidarity when we're losing ourjobs,"' recalled organizer Marta Ojeda. organized faètories in North America, including the UAW, CAW" EAT, "But we said, 'You are going to lose your jobs anyway, at least lose UE, IUE, f'eamsters, Steelworkers, Machinists, and paperwork-ers. In them with dignity."'The Canadian Steelworkers subsequently spon- April 1999, these unions organized a public rally in Fort Wayne, Indi_ sored a speaking toùr for the fìred Mexican workers, generating sub- ana, and conducted planfbased leafleting of Dana workers across the stantial publicity ("Border Forum" 1998; "Ruling Keeps Custom Trim continent, calling for rhe rehiring of workers illegally fired from the Struggle Alive" i999). company's Mexican plant.6 The initiatives described above-local-to-local, and worker-to-,,vorker NAO Submissíons meetings, solidarity funds, health and safety training, crisis support, NAO submissions, and union councils-represent the emerging elements of a Under NAFTA s labor side accords, citizen organizations can file "sub- North American movement of autoworkers. Cross-border solidarity has missions" before the National Administrative Offices (NAOs) in Canada, even demonStfatèd itS cãþaciiy to alier thé bálance of power in collec_ Mèxìcb, ànd ihe UniÌèd Siâteì'àlleg;ng rtrat any one of rhese govem- tive bargâiiring, thõùgh thè chief example concenis Canada rathei than ments has failed to enforce ils own labor laws. Even as a bureaucratic Mexiðó. Duiinþ the Flint GM strikes of 1998, when rhe company moved dead end with úo enforóement powei, the NÀô process promotes cross- crucial stamping dies oùi oi a ¡aruik lòcâaion, CAW preiident Buzz border solidarity by stipulating that citizens cannot file NAO complaints Hargrove announced that union members at GM's Oshawa plant,woukl against their own govemment-the filing must be initiated in a seôond not acccpt the "runaway" stanrpings----even though such refusãl wàs il_ còuntry. Consequently, labor and support groùps have formed cross- legal under Canadian labor law. Recalling the UAW's suppof in 1996 border coalitions to submit cases that highlighr illegal suppression of ,,to when the Canadian union struck GM, Hargrove pledged repay that union organization in the United States and Canada, as well as Mexico. same kind of solidarity" (Ake 1998). Of two dozen submissions in NAFTA's fìrst seven years, three have It is important to stress, however, that these initiatives hâve nor yet focused on auto plants: Han Young, Custom Trim, and Echlin-Dana, coalesced into additional union councils, much less a North American the last a brake factory where FAT supporters contesting CTM control federation of auto unions. The case of the Dana Workers' Alliance is were beâten and fired. The submission process has helped bring together telling: as the first formal council of auto unions, it is also the onlv such a widening coalition of unions and community-based groups, but âs council, úirh little recenr aciivìty. Thc UE-FAT .'Strategic Allíancel expected, the practical outcomes have been lim.ited (Bognanno and Lu -have initiated ìn 1992 is still the only câse where rwo unions 2000). The official response to the NAO hndings against Han Young -..e"d I their cross-border activities to coordinate organizing and Uargainingln and Echlin-Dana was to convene an informational meeting in Mexico \ a continental basis. OI special interest is their insistence that solidarity --J in the summer of 2000 in which government adminisfators reminded rs a two-way street, witlì UE delegations traveling south to support or_ official union leaders of the legal rights protecting workers and dissi- ganizing drives and a Workers'Center in Citdad Juárez and FAf orga_ dents. When independent unionists from Han Young marched into the nizers traveling north to help IJE organize Mexican American workers they were physically meeting, attacked by the official union leaders (Alexander 1998). (Bacon 2000). The UE-FAT cultu¡e of organizing is not easily reproduced across 40 STEVE BAESON FREE TRADE AND WORKER SOLIDARITY IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY 4I

the larger scale and scope of union organization in Nofh America. UE described themselves as "fair traders" and 37 percent who said they and FAT are relâtively small unions with a combined membership of were "protectionist" ("Globalization: What Americans Are Wonied Iess than 100,000 and a long history of bottom-up organizing-the AbouC'2000). latter a survival mechanism during years of repression and (in the case This sea change in public opinion bodes well for a labor movement of the UE) past "red scares." In this unique environment, the excep- still struggling to find its legs in the global economy. The organiza- tional skills and personal ties of individual leaders can shape union tional and political barriers to cross-border collaboration remain for- strategy in wâys that are not easily reproduced in larger, more diverse midable, but the mental revolution that must precede programmatic o¡ganizations, where proper channels are more deliberate and internal change is underway. If nothing else, there is a growing recognition of politics more complicated. There has been a widening recognition in the unique histories that define each nation's labor movement and the recent years that worker-to-worker mobilization is a necessary sur- common grievances that link them all. The latter was demonstrated in vival mechanism for all unions in an era of official strike breaking and the AFL-CIO'S iècent accords wíth Mexico's UNT and CTM, both of whipsawing. But application is uneven and uncertain, especially in a which call for measures protecting the workplace rights of millions of coalition effo¡t like the Dana Workers' Alliance, where one or several Moxicans woiliìng in lhe United States 1"efL-CtO Oeepens Ties with unions can veto initiatives or withdraw support. Latiä Añeriðai Uñiòns" 1999; "AFL, CTM Agree to Cooperate" 1999). While these organizational dynamics can slow and even fracture Recognition that these immigrant workers come from a nâtion with â cross-bolder solidarity, there is a political overlay to continental trade long and continuing history of workplace struggle has also gained that also widèns the field for coalition building. Cross-border trade is ground in recent years, slowly supplanting the image of helpless vic- creâted and defined by government poiicy, and there is little doubt tims deserving only sympathy or scorn. Mexican labor law, it tums that union campaigns opposing NAFTA and blocking its extension have out, is in many ways superior to labor law-ìn ihðîìiièd StâteSnnd linked labor with a wider movement of students, environmentalists, Canàdà äince ilràny woikþiaðe iights aiö énsläined-ìä'ilie Côrìstiiutioù and border-based community groups. In all lìkelihood, futule cam- of 1917-a legacy óf ihe Mdiiôãn iévôlijtiôí. "Thé þrciblêirí ís that paigns will present a far more united labor front than in 1993, when thèse rights ãrbñ't ènfoiðe¿ in Mexlco; tüày'ãie not even enforced in Mexico's offrcial uniòns endorsed NAFTA and only FAT and a hand- this country," UAW president Stephen Yokich observed in 2000. His ful of others opposed it. Since then, support for unfettered free trade remarks represented a signìficant advance over tlìe protectionism of has fallen dramatically in Mexico, with ifie IIñT--ïöw-þübüõly-jõi-ning years past. "I wish we had the Mexican Constitution 4s far as workers' th¿i'ÄFL-CIO in ðäliiñg-îôi"a lundamenral revision of NAFTA" rights," he added. "It was born uñder a revolution, but I think it's ('AFL-CIO Deepens Ties with Latin American Unions" 1999). Pub- dying under capitalism" ("UAW Organizing Continues in Vance, lic opinion in the United States has also swung behind the call for Mexico" 1999). international labor rights, a shift demonstrated in 1999 and 2000 by the diversity of groups protesting the World Trade Organization (WTO) Notes in Seattle and the China trade bill in Washington. Fo)lowing these dem- onstrations, a national Business Weeklllanis poll indicated that two- l, lnterviews with leadership of SITIMM, May 2l--24,2000. thirds of those surveyed believed free trade benefited consumers, but 2. Interview with members of the VW union's bargaining committee (Revision 69 percent also believed that trâde agreements with low-wage coun- Commission), September 29, 2000. 3.¡hone interview with Ken Luckhart of the CAW's International Affairs de- tries undermined U.S. wages. Survey respondents placed the highest pafment, August 14, 2000. priority for future trade agreements on preserving the environment, 4. Phone interview \.vith IJE Inte¡national Affai¡s Director Robin Alexander, avoiding job loss, and protecting workers' rights and expressed less August 11, 2000. Interview with Frank Meirer and Pamela Vossenas, UAW Health and Safety concern for expanding exports or keeping prices low. Only 10 per- 5. Department, August 11, 2000. cent called themselves "free traders," compared to 51 percent who ó. In¡erview with Brad Markell, UAW Research Department, August I l, 2000. 42 S'IÊVE BABSON FREE TRADE AND WORKER SOLIDARITY IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY 43

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