Space Reporter's Handbook Mission Supplement

Home , Donald Pettit, Eric Boe, Faint Object Camera, Gennady Padalka, Hubble Deep Field, Josh Byerly

CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 1

The CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook Mission Supplement

Shuttle Mission STS-125: Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 4

Written and Produced By

William G. Harwood CBS News Space Analyst [email protected]

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 2 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Revision History

Editor's Note Mission-speciﬁc sections of the Space Reporter's Handbook are posted as ﬂight data becomes available. Readers should check the CBS News "Space Place" web site in the weeks before a launch to download the latest edition:

http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/current.html

DATE RELEASE NOTES

08/03/08 Initial STS-125 release 04/11/09 Updating to reflect may 12 launch; revised flight plan 04/15/09 Adding EVA breakdown; walkthrough 04/23/09 Updating for 5/11 launch target date 04/30/09 Adding STS-400 details from FRR briefing 05/04/09 Adding trajectory data; abort boundaries; STS-400 launch windows

Introduction

This document is an outgrowth of my original UPI Space Reporter's Handbook, prepared prior to STS-26 for United Press International and updated for several flights thereafter due to popular demand. The current version is prepared for CBS News. As with the original, the goal here is to provide useful information on U.S. and Russian space flights so reporters and producers will not be forced to rely on government or industry public affairs officers at times when it might be difficult to get timely responses. All of these data are available elsewhere, of course, but not necessarily in one place.

The STS-125 version of the CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook was compiled from NASA news releases, JSC ﬂight plans, the Shuttle Flight Data and In-Flight Anomaly List, NASA Public Affairs and the Flight Dynamics ofﬁce (abort boundaries) at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. Sections of NASA's STS-125 press kit, crew bios and the mission TV schedule are downloaded via the Internet, formatted and included in this document. Word-for-word passages (other than lists) are clearly indicated.

The SRH is a work in progress and while every effort is made to insure accuracy, errors are inevitable in a document of this nature and readers should double check critical data before publication. As always, questions, comments and suggestions for improvements are always welcome. And if you spot a mistake or a typo, please let me know!

Written, Compiled and Edited By

William G. Harwood CBS News Space Consultant LC-39 Press Site Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899

[email protected]

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 3

Table of Contents

Topic Page

NASA Media Information ...... 4 NASA Public Affairs Contacts ...... 5 STS-125: Internet Pages of Interest ...... 5 CBS News STS-125 Mission Preview ...... 7 STS-125 Mission Priorities ...... 27 STS-125 Spacewalk Overview ...... 29 Hubble Space Telescope EVA History ...... 50 STS-400: Just in Case ...... 51 A Brief History of the Hubble Space Telescope ...... 63 Reﬂections on Hubble ...... 79 NASA STS-125 Mission Overview ...... 83 NASA STS-125 Payload Overview ...... 87 STS-125: Quick-Look Mission Data ...... 103 STS-125: Quick-Look Program Statistics ...... 104 STS-125 NASA Crew Thumbnails ...... 105 Current Space Demographics (post Soyuz TMA-14) ...... 106 Projected Space Demographics (post STS-125) ...... 107 Space Fatalities ...... 108 STS-125/ISS-19 NASA Crew Biographies ...... 109 1. Commander: Scott D. Altman, 49 ...... 109 2. Pilot: Gregory C. Johnson, 54 ...... 111 3. MS-1/EV-4: Air Force Capt. Michael T. Good, 46 ...... 113 4. MS2/FE/RMS: Megan McArthur, Ph.D., 37 ...... 115 5. MS3/EV1: John Grunsfeld, 50 ...... 117 6. MS4/EV-3: Michael Massimino, Ph.D., 46 ...... 119 7. MS5/EV-2: Andrew J. Feustel, Ph.D., 43 ...... 121 8. ISS-19 Commander: Gennady Ivanovich Padalka, 50 ...... 123 9. ISS-19 FE: Koichi Wakata (Japan), 45 ...... 125 10. ISS-19 FE: Michael Barratt, M.D., 50 ...... 127 STS-125 Crew Photographs ...... 129 ISS-19 Crew Photographs ...... 130 STS-125/400 Launch Windows ...... 131 STS-125 Launch and Flight Control Personnel ...... 132 STS-125 Flight Hardware/Software ...... 135 Atlantis Flight History ...... 136 STS-125 Countdown Timeline ...... 137 STS-125 Weather Guidelines ...... 141 STS-125 Ascent Events Summary ...... 145 STS-125 Trajectory Data ...... 146 STS-125 Flight Plan ...... 149 STS-125 Television Schedule ...... 157 Appendix 1: Space Shuttle Flight and Abort Scenarios ...... 163 Appendix 2: STS-51L and STS-107 ...... 175 Appendix 3: NASA Acronyms ...... 211

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 4 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

NASA Media Information

NASA Television Transmission

NASA Television is now carried on an MPEG-2 digital signal accessed via satellite AMC-6, at 72 degrees west longitude, transponder 17C, 4040 MHz, vertical polarization. A Digital Video Broadcast (DVB) - compliant Integrated Receiver Decoder (IRD) with modulation of QPSK/DBV, data rate of 36.86 and FEC 3/4 is needed for reception. NASA TV Multichannel Broadcast includes: Public Services Channel (Channel 101); the Education Channel (Channel 102) and the Media Services Channel (Channel 103).

The new Digital NASA TV will have four digital channels:

1. NASA Public Service ("Free to Air"), featuring documentaries, archival programming, and coverage of NASA missions and events; 2. NASA Education Services ("Free to Air/Addressable"), dedicated to providing educational programming to schools, educational institutions and museums; 3. NASA Media Services ("Addressable"), for broadcast news organizations; and 4. NASA Mission Operations (Internal Only)

The new digital NASA Public Service Channel will be streamed on the Web. All you'll need is access to a computer. ... You may want to check with your local cable or satellite service provider whether it plans to continue carrying the NASA Public Service "Free to Air" Channel. If your C-Band-sized satellite dish is capable of receiving digital television signals, you'll still need a Digital Video Broadcast (DVB)-compliant MPEG-2 Integrated Receiver Decoder, or IRD, to get the new Digital NASA's Public Service "Free to Air" Channel.

An IRD that receives "Free to Air" programming like the new Digital NASA Public Service Channel can be purchased from many sources, including "off-the-shelf" at your local electronics store.

The new Digital NASA TV will be on the same satellite (AMC 6) as current analog NASA TV, but on a different transponder (17). In Alaska and Hawaii, we'll be on AMC 7, Transponder 18.

Satellite Downlink for continental North America: Uplink provider = Americom Satellite = AMC 6 Transponder = 17C 72 Degrees West Downlink frequency: 4040 Mhz Polarity: Vertical FEC = 3/4 Data Rate r= 36.860 Mhz Symbol = 26.665 Ms Transmission = DVB

"Public" Programming: Program = 101, Video PID = 111, Audio PID = 114 "Education" Programming: Program = 102, Video PID = 121, Audio PID = 124 "Media" Programming = Program = 103, Video PID = 1031, Audio PID = 1034 "SOMD" Programming = Program = 104, Video PID = 1041, Audio PID = 1044

Home Page: http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/nasatv/index.html Daily Programming: http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/nasatv/MM_NTV_Breaking.html Videoﬁle Programming: ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/tv-advisory/nasa-tv.txt NTV on the Internet: http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/nasatv/MM_NTV_Web.html

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 5

NASA Public Affairs Contacts

Kennedy 321-867-2468 (voice) Space 321-867-2692 (fax) Center 321-867-2525 (code-a-phone)

Johnson 281-483-5811 (voice) Space 281-483-2000 (fax) Center 281-483-8600 (code-a-phone)

Marshall 256-544-0034 (voice) Space 256-544-5852 (fax) Flight 256-544-6397 (code-a-phone). Center

   STS-125: Internet Pages of Interest

CBS Shuttle Statistics http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/spacestats.html CBS Current Mission Page http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/current.html CBS Challenger/Columbia Page http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/SRH_Disasters.htm

NASA Shuttle Home Page http://spaceﬂight.nasa.gov/shuttle/ NASA Station Home Page http://spaceﬂight.nasa.gov/station/

NASA News Releases http://spaceﬂight.nasa.gov/spacenews/index.html KSC Status Reports http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/status/stsstat/current.htm JSC Status Reports http://spaceﬂight.nasa.gov/spacenews/reports/index.html

STS-125 NASA Press Kit http://www.shuttlepresskit.com/ STS-125 Imagery http://spaceﬂight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/shuttle/STS-125/ndxpage1.html STS-125 Home Page http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/main/index.html

Spaceﬂight Meteorology Group http://www.srh.noaa.gov/smg/smgwx.htm Hurricane Center http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/index.shtml Melbourne, Fla., Weather http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mlb/

Entry Groundtracks http://spaceﬂight.nasa.gov/realdata/index.html

KSC Video http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/countdown/video/ ELV Video http://countdown.ksc.nasa.gov/elv/elv.html Comprehensive TV/Audio Links http://www.idb.com.au/dcottle/pages/nasatv.html

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 6 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 7

CBS News STS-125 Mission Preview

Editor’s Note... Portions of this story were originally written for CBS News and Astronomy Now magazine.

By WILLIAM HARWOOD CBS News Space Consultant

NASA's fifth and final mission to service and upgrade the Hubble Space Telescope will add one of the most dramatic chapters yet to an ongoing saga that reads like "The Perils of Pauline." Or an over-the-top Hollywood screenplay about a scientific superstar repeatedly rescued from the brink of disaster.

"I don't think anybody except Arthur C. Clarke could have crafted such a great story," said astronomer-astronaut John Grunsfeld, the mission's lead spacewalker. "If it were just about Hubble, it would be a great story. But when you look about the science and the discoveries scientists have made using Hubble, then it just becomes an unbelievable story.

"I'm relatively glib in saying Hubble is perhaps the most important and productive scientiﬁc instrument ever created by humans. Only history will tell, but it's a truly remarkable story."

Space shuttle Atlantis, poised to capture the Hubble Space Telescope (NASA graphic)

Grunsfeld, commander Scott Altman, pilot Gregory C. Johnson, robot arm operator Megan McArthur and fellow spacewalkers Michael Massimino, Andrew Feustel and Michael Good are scheduled for launch aboard shuttle Atlantis on May 11 at 2:01:49 p.m. It will be the second Hubble visit in a row for Altman and Massimino and the third for Grunsfeld. The rest are shuttle rookies.

Launch originally was scheduled for last Oct. 14, but just three weeks before takeoff a critical circuit in the telescope’s science instrument data system malfunctioned. To restore full redundancy, NASA managers decided to delay the servicing mission to give engineers time to check out and certify a ﬂight spare that had been used for

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 8 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement ground testing. The replacement computer was delivered to the Kennedy Space Center on March 30, setting the stage for launch.

Hoping to extend Hubble's life well into the next decade, the four spacewalkers, working in two-man teams, plan ﬁve back-to-back excursions to install six new stabilizing gyroscopes, six new nickel-hydrogen battery packs, the new data computer and two new instruments, the $126 million Wide Field Camera 3 and the $81 million Cosmic Origins Spectrograph. Like all modern Hubble instruments, both are equipped with corrective optics to counteract the spherical aberration that prevents Hubble's 94.5-inch mirror from achieving a sharp focus.

The Atlantis astronauts also will attempt to repair two other instruments: the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph, which suffered a power supply failure in 2004, and the Advanced Camera for Surveys, which broke down in 2007. Neither instrument was designed to be serviced in orbit, but determined engineers devised custom tools and an ingenious plan for the spacewalkers to bypass the failed electronics.

NASA graphic showing Hubble launch, servicing missions

The repair crew also plans to install an upgraded ﬁne guidance sensor, new insulation and a grapple ﬁxture that will permit attachment of a rocket motor or even NASA's new Orion manned spacecraft in the future to drive Hubble out of orbit when it is no longer able to do science.

"On Servicing Mission 4, we're going to give Hubble another extreme makeover," said Program Manager Preston Burch. "This makeover will be the best one yet because we will outﬁt Hubble with the most powerful and advanced imaging and spectrographic instruments available and we will extend Hubble's operating lifetime for ﬁve additional years."

Without Servicing Mission 4, engineers believe Hubble would be hard pressed to survive past 2010. But if the Atlantis astronauts are successful, they will leave behind an essentially new telescope, one that is equipped with a full suite of five operational scientific instruments for the first time since launch in 1990. And with new gyros and

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 9 batteries, Hubble has a good chance of remaining fully operational long enough to work in concert with its eventual replacement, the James Webb Space Telescope.

“It's been seven years since we've serviced the Hubble space telescope,” said Project Scientist David Lekrone. “And that interval of time, seven years, is twice as long as we should go in terms of servicing intervals. As a consequence of that, over the last few years we've seen signiﬁcant deterioration within the set of scientiﬁc instruments that we provide to the astronomical community. The toolkit that the community uses to do all kinds of science has really diminished in its capabilities.

“I liken this to the situation of a champion athlete who is playing hurt, who has an injury and who is playing through the pain, still doing very well. But now, by golly, it's time to go off and get our surgery and get back to a hundred percent.”

NASA has spent about $10 billion on the Hubble Space Telescope to date, making it one of the most expensive science projects in history. Asked whether it made sense to spend more money on a 20-year-old space telescope, former NASA Administrator Mike Grifﬁn, the man who approved Hubble Servicing Mission 4 after it was canceled in the wake of the 2003 Columbia disaster, said it makes all the sense in the world.

"After we get done with it, it's not an old telescope,” he told CBS News in a recent interview. “Every subsystem that needs refurbishment is being refurbished and it's getting a new complement of instruments. So the only part of it that's old is the optical metering structure and the glass. And the glass doesn't care. When they're done, it really is not an old telescope, it's a new telescope.”

“So the question you want to ask yourself when you look at the value proposition, if for the cost of this shuttle ﬂight - and bear in mind, most of the instrument costs and all that were already paid for - plus the team that we've been carrying, and it's about a $10-million-a-month team, if for whatever all that adds up to you could get yourself a new telescope in space, would you think that would be worthwhile? And I think most people, most astronomers, would say yes.

“Not because it's the biggest telescope, because we can build bigger ones on the ground. And with the new ﬂexible mirror technology and multiple mirror technology, we can get some pretty large apertures,” Grifﬁn said. “But, being above the atmosphere still has value, and the best value of all is the coordination of ground-based observations and space-based observations. Between the two, you get a picture that is more than the sum of the parts.

“The question in brief is, if for what we're spending on this mission you could have a new telescope, would you buy one? And I think the answer is yes.”

Bruce Margon, former associate director for science at the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore, said shuttle servicing missions and NASA’s ability to upgrade the telescope are the keys to the project’s success.

"The thing to remember about these Hubble servicing missions is they're not just 'let's keep a groaning patient on life support,'" he said. "When you put new focal plane instruments into Hubble, you essentially leave with not only a brand new, but a much better observatory. And when you look at our graph of discoveries as reﬂected by published scientiﬁc papers versus year, it's an amazing thing because it just goes up every single year.

"The reason for that is not that the scientists who are using Hubble are smart. It's servicing. That's the reason, because when you leave Hubble you have not just something with better longevity but something that is an order of magnitude more capable than the previous thing, almost like it's a brand new generation of satellite. And the two new focal plane instruments for SM-4 are predicted to do the same thing. And it's not a whistling in the wind prediction."

For Ed Weiler, NASA’s associate administrator for space science and a former Hubble project scientist, the key point is not the telescope’s serviceability or even its obvious value to the astronomical community. It’s the way Hubble has “brought the universe close up and personal to the average citizen.”

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 10 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

“It's images have become part of our culture in our textbooks, magazines, art and even popular movies and TV programs,” he said. “Although we probably never will be able to visit these places or objects, Hubble actually allows our human minds and spirits to travel light years and even billions of light years to the farthest reaches of the cosmos. And SM-4 will allow that dream to continue.”

As for the telescope’s astronomical price tag, Weiler agreed “you can build a lot of ground- based telescopes for that kind of money. But you can't get rid of the atmosphere.”

“We've heard about adaptive optics (for ground-based telescopes) and how that's going to blow Hubble out of the water,” he said. “We've heard that for 20 years now. We haven't seen it. What's amazing is, whenever a new telescope comes out on the ground, a press release will always come out that 'oh, this can see a hundred times better than Hubble, or 10 times better.’ Yeah, it can, probably, over a very, very tiny ﬁeld of view. But you don't see Eagle nebulas [right] on the cover of Time Magazine taken from the ground. It's taken from Hubble.”

Malcolm Niedner, deputy senior project scientist, said the repaired and upgraded Hubble will be "a new machine that's going to be more powerful than the machine we've had."

"It is enough to make your mouth really water," he said. "Hubble is really going to be loaded to the max with capability. I think it's going to be a mission for the record books."

But as with any good thriller, there is more at stake than just the obvious.

"Leaving Hubble in the best possible shape is very important to NASA," Altman said in an interview. "It could really carry the ﬂag for NASA or it could be a huge black eye if we don't do well. So I think we have a challenge in front of us to do the best that we possibly can."

Launched from Atlantis in April 1990 with a famously ﬂawed mirror, Hubble was equipped with corrective optics during a riveting, make-or-break 1993 shuttle repair mission. Since then, the Lockheed Martin-built observatory has generated a steady stream of discoveries, ranging from a more precise determination of the age of the universe - 13.7 billion years - to conﬁrmation of the existence of super-massive black holes.

It has captured light from infant galaxies in the process of colliding and merging less than a billion years after the big bang birth of the universe. And it has helped reﬁne our understanding of the life cycles of stars, from their birth in vast stellar nurseries to the supernova explosions and more common slow fading that mark old age and death.

In recent years, Hubble's remarkable vision has played a key role in the worldwide effort to understand the nature of dark energy, the enigmatic repulsive force that astronomers believe is accelerating the expansion of the universe.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 11

Throughout it all, Hubble has beamed back a steady stream of spectacular photographs of planets, stars, nebulae and galaxies that have found their way into all facets of modern society, making the telescope an instantly recognized icon of science.

But keeping Hubble healthy in the unforgiving environment of space has not been easy. During a second servicing mission in February 1997, shuttle astronauts installed two new instruments - the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph and an infrared camera known as NICMOS - replaced a ﬁne guidance sensor, a gyroscope assembly and installed a solid-state data recorder.

Because of multiple gyro failures in the late 1990s, Servicing Mission 3 was broken up into two shuttle flights, SM-3A in December 1999 and SM-3B in March 2002. During SM-3A, spacewalking astronauts installed a new flight computer, a second solid-state recorder, another fine guidance sensor and a full suite of six gyroscopes.

The objectives of SM-3B included installation of two new solar arrays, the Advanced Camera for Surveys, an experimental cooling system to revive Hubble's infrared camera and a replacement power control unit. The latter operation was analogous to a heart transplant, requiring the telescope to be shut down for the ﬁrst time since launch.

One year after SM-3B, NASA was well into planning the ﬁfth and ﬁnal service call when the shuttle Columbia disintegrated during re-entry on February 1, 2003, the victim of heat shield damage caused by a piece of foam insulation falling from the ship's external fuel tank during launch.

A year later, in January 2004, then NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe sent shock waves through the astronomical community when he abruptly canceled SM-4. The decision was announced two days after President Bush ordered NASA to complete the international space station and retire the shuttle by the end of 2010.

Citing safety concerns in the wake of Columbia and a lack of time and money to properly address them, O'Keefe said it was simply too dangerous to launch astronauts to the space telescope. Heat shield inspection and repair techniques were immature and NASA was still struggling to prevent foam insulation from falling off the shuttle's external tank.

More important, a Hubble crew could not seek "safe haven" aboard the international space station if some post- launch mishap or orbital debris impact prevented a safe re-entry. Hubble and the space station operate in different orbital planes and the shuttle does not carry enough rocket fuel to move from one to the other.

O'Keefe defended his hugely unpopular decision by citing the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, which recommended autonomous heat shield inspection and repair capability for any non-station shuttle ﬂights. Under pressure from Hubble supporters in Congress, he agreed to let engineers explore options for a robotic servicing mission. But the scope of that mission was more limited, the technical risks were high and the projected cost was extreme.

Even so, project managers pressed ahead, fearing subsequent equipment failures in orbit that would knock the observatory out of action once and for all. And they had reason for concern.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 12 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

In August 2004, the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph’s one operational channel failed because of a power supply problem. The observatory's stabilizing gyroscopes were suffering problems and engineers worried the telescope's crucial battery packs, operating continuously since launch in 1990, were slowly degrading. No one knew when one might suddenly fail.

Against this backdrop of concern, NASA pressed ahead with space station assembly ﬂights, implementing a series of upgrades to minimize foam shedding from external tanks. The agency also carried out a series of tests to perfect heat shield inspection and repair techniques.

In one critical test, spacewalking astronauts showed the shuttle's robot arm and a new 50-foot-long tile inspection boom were strong enough to support an astronaut if repairs were needed and the station was not available.

O'Keefe's replacement, Mike Grifﬁn, made no secret of his desire to ﬂy Servicing Mission 4, saying "Hubble servicing represents the highest priority utilization of a single shuttle mission that I can conceive."

Finally, after three successful post-Columbia missions and tests to demonstrate heat-shield repair tools and techniques, Grifﬁn ofﬁcially reinstated SM-4 in May 2006.

“I don't believe I've talked to anyone in the agency, from ﬂight crew to ﬂight ops managers to, you know, even budget guys, I don't believe I've talked to anyone who thinks we shouldn't do this,” he said.

To address the safe haven concern, he ordered the shuttle program to process a second orbiter - Endeavour - in parallel and to have it ready for takeoff within a few days of an emergency being declared to carry out a rescue mission if needed (see “STS-400: Just in Case” for additional details).

"The way we've designed the mission, we've got an answer to each of the risk points that, I think, brings us right into the family of same risk level as going to the station," said Altman. "First, get rid of the debris at the source, ﬁxing the tank. Number two is the ability to detect damage, we've got that. Three is the ability to repair, that's come along pretty well.

"And then the ﬁnal thing is OK, if you screw all that up and you're stuck there with an unsafe vehicle to come home, what do you do? I think that was a big sticking point before with the administrator and now that we have this launch- on-need plan where another shuttle will come to us and rescue us, we have an answer for that, too."

As if to drive home the need for another servicing mission, the Advanced Camera for Surveys failed in January 2007, the apparent victim of a short circuit in its CCD control electronics. Its high resolution and heavily used wide ﬁeld channels were knocked out of action, although its more limited solar blind channel continued to operate. That left Hubble with two fully operational instruments: The Wide Field Planetary Camera 2 and the Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer, or NICMOS.

Then, after a software upgrade prior to the original October launch date for Atlantis, engineers were unable to restart the NICMOS cooling system, presumably because of ice particles that had formed in the coolant lines. Engineers are optimistic about ultimately melting the ice and restarting NICMOS, but as of this writing, the space telescope only has one fully operational instrument - WFPC-2 - and the solar blind channel of the Advanced Camera for Surveys.

“The WFPC-2 has proved to be very durable, but it's been there since December of '93,” Burch said. “So it's close to 15 years old and really doesn't owe us anything. So we've got aging science instruments, we've got a weak complement of gyros. I think it's really tough to imagine going much beyond 2010 (without SM-4). And if we lost NICMOS and just became basically the WFPC-2 observatory in space, I think our operation would be cut back substantially. It costs a lot to operate this observatory, the operational cost per year is on the order of a hundred million dollars plus, which includes all the science grants and what not. And to only have the use of WFPC-2 with no prospects of a future servicing mission, I think NASA would feel strongly that they'd want to start putting the money toward the future rather than the past.”

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 13

(NASA graphic)

Hubble Space Telescope Facts & Figures (Source: NASA/Lockheed Martin)

Weight 24,500 lb (11,110 kg) Length 43.5 ft (15.9 m) 10 ft (3.1 m) Light Shield and Forward Shell Diameter 14 ft (4.2 m) Equipment Section and Aft Shroud Optical system Ritchey-Chretien design Cassegrain telescope Focal length 189 ft (56.7 m) folded to 21 ft (6.3 m) Primary mirror 94.5 in. (2.4 m) in diameter Secondary mirror 12.2 in. (0.3 m) in diameter Pointing accuracy 0.007 arcsec for 24 hours Magnitude range 5 mvto 30 mv (visual magnitude) Wavelength range 1100 to 24,000 Å Angular resolution 0.1 arcsec at 6328 Å Orbit 350 statute miles (563 km), inclined 28.5 degrees from equator Orbital period 96 minutes per orbit Lifetime 20+ years

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 14 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

The goals of Servicing Mission 4 are roughly the same as those of the mission O’Keefe canceled, with the addition of the science instrument data computer:

 Installation of three new rate sensing units, or RSUs, containing two gyroscopes each to restore full redundancy in the telescope's pointing control system

 Installation of six new nickel-hydrogen batteries to replace the power packs launched with Hubble in 1990

 Installation of the Wide Field Camera 3 (in place of the current Wide Field Planetary Camera 2), providing high-resolution optical coverage from the near-infrared region of the spectrum to the ultraviolet

 Installation of the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph, sensitive to ultraviolet wavelengths. COS will take the place of a no-longer-used instrument known as COSTAR that once was used to correct for the spherical aberration of Hubble's primary mirror. All current Hubble instruments are equipped with their own corrective optics

 Repair of the Advanced Camera for Surveys

 Repair of the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph

 Installation of a refurbished ﬁne guidance sensor, one of three used to lock onto and track astronomical targets (two of Hubble's three sensors suffer degraded performance). The refurbished FGS, removed from Hubble during a 1999 servicing mission, will replace FGS-2R, which has a problem with an LED sensor in a star selector subsystem

 Installation of the replacement science instrument command and data handling system computer

 Attachment of new outer blanket layer - NOBL - insulation to replace degrading panels

 Attachment of the soft capture mechanism to permit future attachment to a deorbit rocket motor or NASA’s planned Orion capsule

"All of the tasks kind of break down into two big categories," said SM-4 mission director Chuck Shaw, an accomplished amateur astronomer. "The life extension tasks and then the mission science extension tasks. And the life extension tasks are clearly the most important, to keep the facility operating, and we'll get those done and then the mission science extension tasks, where we install new capability to do science above what it can do now."

FRESH BATTERIES, GYROS NEEDED TO EXTEND HUBBLE'S LIFE

From an operational standpoint, the two most serious issues facing Hubble are the observatory's batteries and gyros. The gyroscopes, which help Hubble slew and lock onto targets, are the limiting factor on science. But the batteries, which have never been replaced, are the limiting factor when it comes to simply keeping the telescope alive.

When Hubble was launched in 1990, its six state-of-the-art batteries, charged during the daylight portion of each orbit, provided about 550 amp hours of capacity to keep the telescope warm and to run its instruments, computers and communications systems during orbital darkness.

At the end of 2005, the batteries had about 300 amp hours of capacity. A 2004 battery test showed they were declining at an average of about 6.3 amp hours per battery per year.

"In order to get through an orbital night period, we need 40 amp hours total for the whole system," Burch said in a 2004 interview. "But that means you would come out of the orbital night period with nothing, so you need some reserve. It's sort of like ﬂying an airplane. You wouldn't ﬁll the tanks with just enough gas to get there. You'd want extra.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 15

"So our benchmark that we've set for ourselves is we would like a minimum of 110 amp hours. (That) would give us one orbit to cope with any kind of a major failure on the system and entry into a safe mode or something like that."

Hubble cannot survive without power. Within days of a total power loss, low temperatures would cause titanium ﬁttings to unbond and the optical system would lose its critical alignment. In 2004, engineers believed Hubble would reach that 110-amp-hour point in late 2008 or 2009.

"We've now extended that based on the latest data that we've taken," Burch said in a November 2005 interview. "Our best estimate at the moment is we think we're good out to the middle of 2010, so we've got about a four-and-a- half-year window to get up there."

Engineers bought the extra time by changing the way the batteries are recharged.

“What's happened with the batteries is we have become smarter in managing them and we have been able to arrest the rate of decline and their current capacity has stayed about the same for the last couple of years and it's on the order of 300 amp hours,” he said in 2008. “We modiﬁed our method of handling the recharging of them, we also are avoiding deep discharging them. So-called battery reconditioning turns out to have negative aspects to it. ... Overall, it hurts the batteries in terms of their charge capacities. So we've ceased and desisted on that.

“The batteries are kind of going sideways. You might say, well gosh, that's not too bad. Why not just not change them out? The thing is, they are 20 years old. They were built a couple of years before we launched in '90. We're so far beyond the design lifetime it's anybody's guess as to how long they could continue to go. We know it's not inﬁnite. So our best judgment is we should go ahead and still change them out. However, there are some reduced mission scenarios where if we got into an extreme case of having lost a few EVA days, we, in fact, might only change out one module. That could come into play, but only a very extreme situation.”

Hubble's gyroscopes are another pressing concern. The telescope was designed with redundancy in mind and while it was equipped with six gyros, only three were required for science operations. But gyros 2, 3 and 5 have failed and gyro 6 exhibits symptoms of a problem that eventually could knock it out of action.

“We're flying on 1 and 6. 4 is in reserve,” Burch said. “However, 6 you may recall has some flaky characteristics that were detected not too long after it was installed on servicing mission 3A. We suspect it has to do with the suspension system in it. When you slew the observatory, the drift rate on the gyro changes significantly on it. That's the bad news. The good news is, it changes in a very predictable way. We cleverly put some flight software on board that enables us to use gyro 6 and not be confused or whatever by the shift in the gyro drift bias.

“Now gyro 1 recently had a sudden surge in its motor current which is indicative of a temporary rotor restriction event. And this has happened (several) times. The current has gone up, but it's come back down. But it's still running at a value slightly higher than normal. So our best experts and our past experience tell us 1 is living on borrowed time and it could go at any time. Gyro 4, although it's off and held in reserve, was used for a long time and has a lot of run time on it. It's up there, it's up around the 50 percent point in terms of probability of failure. It's not clear how long gyro 4 could last if and when we had to turn it on and use it.

“So the bottom line is, all three of the remaining gyros have got liens against them if you will,” Burch said. “Six because of the ﬂaky suspension, 1 because of the ﬂaky motor current and 4 because it's got a lot of run time on it. So you ask, how much longer can you guys keep going on gyros, even with a one-gyro science mode, and that becomes highly speculative. ... Our previous calculations showed we could probably get through 2009 with the gyros that we have. I think getting much past 2010 would be a bit of a stretch.”

Protecting against future failures, engineers earlier developed complex computer techniques to continue science operations using just two operational gyroscopes in concert with Hubble's magnetic sensing system, ﬁxed-head star trackers and a ﬁne guidance sensor. The new control technique went into operation Aug. 29, 2005. Engineers then developed a one-gyro control mode for worst-case failures.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 16 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

“Basically what we're doing is, instead of using gyros we're using the other sensors,” Burch said. “The fine guidance sensors were never intended to be used on a continuous pointing basis. You always used the gyros and then you update the gyro reference with the fine guidance sensor information and you just do that from time to time. Now, what we do is, we put the fine guidance sensor into the control loop so it's an active controlling sensor as opposed to being a sort of partial consultant, you might say. It required a major change in the flight software and, of course, a huge change on the ground for how you schedule these things. ... The problem with using the FGS's, of course, is that they get occulted and when they're occulted, you're back to just gyro information and if you've only got one or two gyros then you've really got problems.”

Otherwise, Hubble's upgraded computers and new solar arrays, installed during a servicing mission in 2002, are performing ﬂawlessly. The solar panels, in fact, generate more power than Hubble needs given the new battery recharging procedure. Fine guidance sensor 3, in operation since Hubble's launch in 1990, has a problem with the mechanical bearings in a servo subsystem. While it's not causing any problems at present, the control team is "babying it," Burch said.

If the new batteries and gyros are successfully installed, Burch believes Hubble will be able to continue its scientiﬁc observations for at least ﬁve more years.

"That's what we're gearing ourselves for," he said. "I think there's a good chance we could go beyond ﬁve, but our nominal end of mission would be ﬁve years from the date of the servicing mission."

COMPLEX INSTRUMENT REPAIRS WILL CHALLENGE SPACEWALKERS

Repairing the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph and the Advanced Camera for Surveys represent major challenges for the SM-4 spacewalkers. Neither instrument was designed to be repaired in orbit.

"If we pull it off, it'll be amazing, frankly, especially if we pull off both,” Weiler said. “We're not claiming we have to fix both of those for minimum mission success. But if we fix both of those, it goes well beyond full mission success. Right now we have two dead instruments. We got our full scientific value that we had planned. But they represent a quarter-of-a-billion-dollar investment by the U.S. taxpayer. And that was in 1999 dollars, so you can imagine what they would cost today. If we can pull even one of those instruments back into life, we're getting our dividends again, it would be a real home run. We've got one of the best astronaut crews we could hope for. ... I think we've got a good shot at it.”

STIS broke down in 2004, the victim of a blown power supply. To ﬁx it, the astronauts must remove a cover held in place by more than 100 screws and then replace a circuit board that is locked in place.

“In order to get at a failed electronics board inside the STIS main electronics box, we need to take the cover off the box,” Burch said. “We're very fortunate in that when the astronauts open the doors to the aft shroud and look at this instrument, that cover is sitting right there in front of them. The challenge is the 111 screws that are holding it on. The screws are not captive. So they have to go in there and take all these screws out. You can imagine what went through a lot of people's minds when we ﬁrst started thinking about this, you know, 111 screws ﬂoating around all inside Hubble. That was unacceptable.

“So, we came up with a very clever device called the fastener capture plate, which is basically made out of a Lexan- type material. This plate goes over the top of the MEB (main electronics box) cover, it's aligned and fastened on there. And then this fastener capture plate has a series of little holes in it that line up with all the screws. The holes are small enough to allow the tool bit to go in so you can turn the screw, but they're small enough to keep the screw from falling out. So once you get all 111 screws taken care of, the cover stays attached to the fastener capture plate and you move the whole thing out. So all the debris and all the screws are captured in there.”

An astronaut-friendly replacement cover was developed that will be installed in place of the main electronics box cover that was removed.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 17

“Once we're done servicing, we take the new cover and put it on,” Burch said. “There are two latches, you just throw the latches and bingo, it's on there. And then there's a third latch they throw that has some ﬁngers that grab the electronics boards and mate them to the cover.”

Astronaut Mike Massimino practices removing instrument cover plate screws using a “fastener capture plate”

That was one challenge. Another was making sure the astronauts could replace the circuit card with the failed power supply.

“If you've ever fooled around with your desktop computer, those things usually aren't much of a challenge,” Burch said. “But the way these instruments are built on Hubble, these boards slide into slots in the box but they're held in place by things called wedge locks. And the wedge locks are designed to keep the boards from rattling around and they also provide a heat path to reject waste heat out to the sides of the box so things stay nice and cool.

“Unfortunately, these wedge locks have a property like these Chinese ﬁnger handcuffs you may have played with as a kid. You put them on and the harder you pull, the tighter it gets. Well, the wedge locks have this kind of a property and when you loosen the bolts on them sometimes you can slide the board right out and sometimes you have to wrestle with it for a half hour or an hour to get it out.

“We obviously needed a tool to overcome this problem. So we have a card extraction tool that was developed. We went into a small research program to see even if these wedge locks jammed in their worst possible way could we pull the board out without having the board disintegrate and leave a pile of debris. I'm happy to report we've come up with a tool that enables us to do exactly that. So those were the major challenges.”

STIS will be repaired during the crew’s fourth spacewalk.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 18 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Repairing the Advanced Camera for Surveys posed another difﬁcult challenge for Hubble engineers and the task originally was spread across two spacewalks. But the addition of the science instrument data computer replacement forced NASA managers to consider a one-shot repair attempt for ACS. Grunsfeld, practicing the procedure in NASA’s spacewalk training pool, said he’s conﬁdent the repair can be completed in a single spacewalk.

But engineers initially were “pretty negative” about attempting any sort of ACS repair, Burch said.

“We knew how long it was taking us to get the STIS repair done,” he said. “That took us over three years to get that done. And when ACS failed, we didn't have the luxury of three years to get that together. That kind of told us this was going to be a huge challenge. Second of all, we had failures on both sides of the main electronics box, 1 and 2, which we had on STIS also. But the problem was that on ... one of the sides (of the ACS), we couldn't get into the box because it was blocked by the NICMOS cooling system and we'd have had to disassemble that partially to get in there and nobody wanted to do that. The other side that was accessible was difﬁcult to get at and if you got it open, we were concerned about a contamination risk because of the catastrophic nature of the failure. So much current went through there that we we thought there was the potential for a lot of collateral damage and you open that box up and it's like Pandora's box, you don't know what's coming out of there and we didn't think that was a healthy scenario.

Schematic view of ACS repair concept

“So we had to come up with a whole new approach to repairing ACS,” he said. “We can't get into either of the low voltage power supplies on ACS. So our approach is, we're going to provide an additional low voltage power supply and we'll just hang it on the outside of the instrument and we'll tap into the power connector coming into the instrument. So we'll kind of T off the power to that. Ideally, we'd like to restore both the wide-field channel and the high-resolution channel on the ACS. It turns out, even though the high-resolution channel as the name implies provides the best, the deepest pictures, the most sensitive and the highest resolved pictures, it was not the most popular channel by the astronomers because of its very narrow field of view. They found the wide-field channel very useful for the majority of observations that they wanted to make. So the wide-field channel was used a very high percentage of the time, it was on the order of 70 some odd percent whereas the high-res channel was maybe 20 percent or less and the solar blind channel was like 5 percent.

“So we said OK, let's look at how we might do this. And the technique that we came up with, it turns out you can get access to the CCD electronics box that powers each of those channels, you can gain access to those somewhat

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 19 conveniently going in through the outside of the instrument. You don't have to take off a bunch of covers and go through a lot of stuff to get at them. but it's not real easy, either. There are two CCD electronics boxes, one for the wide-ﬁeld channel and one for the high-res channel. In order to get access to them, you have to cut off an EMI grid. There's like this screen, this very coarse screen on the outside. So we came up with a special cutter tool that cuts that screen away and it cuts the individual wires. There's roughly a dozen wires or so that need to be cut. Once you've done that, you're now looking at a plate that needs to be removed and it's got 30 some odd screws in it. So you put a fastener-capture plate on that and remove the screws and once you pull that plate out, you're now looking at four printed circuit boards in each of those cavities that contain the electronics that power and control the CCD for each of those channels.

The replacement CCD electronics box - CEB - circuit boards that are critical to restoring the ACS to near-normal operation

“So the idea is, pull those boards out and put in a new set of boards but wire them up in a way that they bypass or ignore the damaged areas coming from the existing main electronic box. This new module that would go in that replaces those four boards, it'll be powered by the external low voltage power supply that you've just attached to the outside of the instrument and it in turn will provide the power and control signals to the CCD using the existing wires that are in there, but it can be done in a way that avoids the damaged areas in the main electronics box.

“The downside here is we just didn't have the time and the money to replace the electronics in both the wide-ﬁeld channel's CCD electronics box and the high-resolution channel's CCD box. So we came up with a scheme, it turns out there are shared copper paths between the electronics for both of those channels. So what we said was, hey, why don't we get to the high-res channel through the electronics path that are connected to the wide-ﬁeld channel? We'll just back power the existing printed circuit boards that are in the high-resolution channel CCD. We tested that on the ground and sure enough, it turns out to be feasible to do that. The only question mark is the status of the low voltage power supply on the MED 1 and MED 2 sides. In other words, it's possible that if there's damage on the sides of the interpoint converters, the secondary sides that are powering the high-resolution channel, it's possible there are some short circuits there that will prevent this scheme from working. Particularly on the one side that suffered the major damage. That may not work very well.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 20 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

“In any event, what we decided to do is, we're providing an additional built-in power supply that will try to rejuvenate, or bring back to life, the high-resolution channel by back powering the high-res channel through these shared copper paths that connect to the wide-ﬁeld channel,” Burch said. “I won't say it's a long shot. It IS somewhat of a long shot, but people need to understand that this doesn't have the same degree of rigor as, let's say, building a brand new science instrument or a new black box that we're hooking up to standard interfaces that already exist on the telescope. This is really a bit of an experiment.”

February 2008: Testing of an engineering version of the CCD electronics box at the Detector Characterization Laboratory at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center

Even if ACS is revived, engineers would face yet another hurdle: “tuning” the CCD control electronics to get optimum performance.

“They go to great pains on the ground to tune the electronics to get optimum performance out of these things to get the best sensitivity,” Burch said. “Unfortunately, the detectors are up there and we're down here and we don't have that opportunity. So the question is, well, how do you make that happen? What we did was, we borrowed some technology from James Webb Space Telescope. We have employed the use of an ASIC chip, an application specific integrated circuit known as a sidecar, which is basically a video processing chip. And this chip is going to be key to enabling us to fine tune the control electronics, the new electronics we're putting in for the wide field channel so that we can get the lowest possible read noise out of the system when it's installed on orbit and operating.

“We're very fortunate that we have an excellent flight spare detector for ACS right here on the ground. Actually, we have several and we've experimented with those and saved our final testing for the best chip. And so we were able to put this into a dewar, get the temperature down to what it's experiencing on orbit and we've been able to fine tune the electronics with the software to demonstrate that this technique works and that we can get the kind of performance that we're looking to achieve. As a matter of fact, I probably shouldn't say this, if it works out up there the way it's worked out on the ground we'll be getting better pictures out of the ACS wide field channel than before the failure occurred.”

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 21

Developing the ACS repair concept and perfecting the techniques required has required “a super human effort,” Burch said.

“The general feeling is that this will be the most challenging mission that we've had to date,” he said. “It is jam packed. It's got two instruments that are being repaired and these two instrument repairs are about roughly a day and a half worth of time. This is fine work using new tools, this is stuff that hasn't been done before, getting access to this ACS CCD electronics box area is very, very difficult because it's up near the top of the instrument, there's some structure that's in the way that makes getting direct viewing of this area exceedingly difficult. We've had to build and modify tooling to get in there. It's going to be tough. With the bulky suits and gloves, it's going to be tough work.”

But “if these instrument repairs don't go well, they won't do any harm to the observatory so we won't be any worse off for not having tried. But it is a pretty packed timeline and the crew and our engineers have worked very hard to refine the tools and the techniques to get all this stuff to fit within five EVA days. It's a very ambitious mission.”

For his part, Grunsfeld said he’s conﬁdent the astronauts can successfully repair the broken instruments.

“The extra time we've had with the flight delay has allowed us to practice over and over again the removal of these tiny screws,” he told CBS News. “For both the STIS repair, with Mike Massimino at the screw driver, and myself for the Advanced Camera for Surveys repair, we've really honed it to the maximum efficiency. As a result, I have high confidence going into it that we'll be able to finish it in the EVA day, maybe a slightly extended EVA day, but that's in the absence of any surprises. And one thing I've learned from the first two missions and involvement in all the Hubble missions is, Hubble is always full of surprises. So we'll have to see on the day we get there.”

Burch said he believes “the odds are better than 50-50 for ACS and I think they're much better than 80 percent for STIS. But I hope I don't have to eat my words after this mission.”

UPGRADED HUBBLE WILL EXPAND SCIENTIFIC HORIZONS

The Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3) and the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), both with built-in corrective optics to compensate for the ﬂaw in Hubble's primary mirror, are expected to boost the observatory's data output 44 times above what it was 10 years ago.

The new camera will capture stunning views of planets in our solar system, distant Kuiper Belt objects and all the other usual deep space targets.

WFC3 is the first panchromatic instrument built for Hubble, a wide-field camera with a wide spectral range that will open new windows on the universe and, at the same time, restore lost visual performance due to radiation damage in other detectors. In the near ultraviolet, WFC3 will boost discovery efficiency by 40 percent while the near infrared detector will allow much faster surveys.

"The thing WFC3 has that's particularly exciting is sensitivity into the near infrared," Margon said. "The reason that's important is, once again, the red shift. If you want to look at the distant universe, it gets redder and redder as you look farther and farther away. Hubble is a general purpose telescope, it will look at everything, planets, stars, galaxies, all that. But the problem that probably excites people the most right now is this issue of the dark energy, which is accelerating the expansion of the universe. And that's a problem that didn't exist when Hubble was launched.

"The status of this dark energy now is, everybody agrees it's there, which is itself pretty astonishing, and that the dark energy that is responsible for accelerating the expansion is actually 75 percent of the matter/energy budget of the universe. So not only is it there, but it's the overwhelming form of stuff, even though (10) years ago we had not even a glimmer that it existed."

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 22 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Hubble has played a major role in the ongoing search for answers, by ﬁnding distant Type 1A supernovas, stellar explosions thought to occur when a compact white dwarf in a binary star system accumulates enough mass from its companion to reach a critical density. At that point, the quantum mechanical property that had been resisting the inward crush of gravity is overwhelmed, triggering a catastrophic collapse and explosion.

Because the explosions occur at the same mathematical point - the moment the star's mass exceeds roughly 1.44 times that of the sun - astronomers believe their energy output is roughly the same. Thus, the light output of a Type 1A supernova can be used as a so-called "standard candle,” a mileage marker, in effect, that can be used to determine the distance to objects farther back in space and time than otherwise possible.

Wide Field Planetary Camera 3

The apparent brightness of an object drops off with distance from the observer in a precise way and observations in the late 1990s showed Type 1A supernovas in remote galaxies were dimmer than expected. The most obvious explanation, assuming the supernovas really do behave like standard candles, was that the universe had expanded more - and that the supernovas were more distant - than would be expected if the cosmic expansion was slowing down.

Astronomers believe the dark energy driving that acceleration has been present since the big bang, but it was overshadowed by gravity through the first five billion years or so of the cosmic expansion. But as the universe thinned out and its density dropped, dark energy began reversing what to that point had been a gravity-driven deceleration. And so, the universe began accelerating and flying apart faster and faster.

Hubble has found the most distant Type 1A supernovas, helping scientists conﬁrm the idea of dark energy. The problem is, Margon said, "nobody knows what it is, nobody has any clue as to why it's there, what its form is, it's just there. The next thing you want to ask is what the hell is it? Is it Einstein's cosmological constant, is it something else?"

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 23

"It turns out, an extremely sensitive test of what form the dark energy is in is to just ask how does this 'oomph' change with cosmic time? How does its importance change with cosmic time? And Einstein's cosmological constant, this repulsive gravity, it doesn't change at all with cosmic time. But if, for example, we're part of a multi-dimensional universe and there are other dimensions pushing on us and stuff like that, those things change with cosmic time.

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph

"So the way you can actually probe that, of course, is to simply look backwards and look at distant objects, because then you're testing the geometry of the universe in the past. And if you ask how far back do I need to look to start to make a difference amongst the different ideas about what dark energy is, it turns out to be a red shift that corresponds very, very nicely to the reddest sensitivity of Wide Field Camera 3. Mostly by good luck, I've got to say!

"So if you can just continue to map out the deviations from the Hubble diagram (classical expansion) of very distant galaxies out in the reddest band where Wide Field 3 works, you should be able to differentiate between models of the dark energy. ... That, I think, is really exciting."

The Cosmic Origins Spectrograph, twice as sensitive as STIS and 10 to 20 times more sensitive than earlier instruments in medium and high resolution spectroscopy, offers equally exciting science.

COS was designed to study the large-scale structure of the universe, the intergalactic medium, the origin of the elements, the formation and evolution of galaxies, the interstellar medium and the formation of stars and planets.

"We now understand that the universe has sort of three slices of the pie," Margon said. "There's dark energy, which is about 75 percent. There's dark matter, which is about 20 percent. And then there are atoms (of normal matter), which is just about 5 percent. But something that there have been glimmers of for about 50 years and now we're ﬁnally

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 24 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement quite certain of, is that in the atoms-we-know category, most of them are not contained in stars and galaxies, but are rather contained in a very dilute gas in between galaxies.

A section of the Hubble Ultra Deep Field, showing some of the most distant galaxies ever imaged

"The original naive picture of the way the universe was put together was that galaxies were the building blocks and in between galaxies there was essentially a perfect vacuum. Gradually, creeping up over 50 years, the picture is actually reversed. It turn out that probably more than 50 percent of all normal atoms are between galaxies, rather than inside them. Which, of course, continues to drive the Earth, sun and things we know to more of a footnote."

So how does one study the intergalactic medium, or IGM? By looking at distant objects like quasars and ﬁguring out how that light was affected by its passage through the IGM on its way to Earth.

While COS is a general purpose instrument and will be used by astronomers to study a variety of targets, "sort of the motivating design problem was to look at very distant quasars, just as background targets, and your line of sight to them will have to traverse a huge number of these atoms in the intergalactic medium," Margon said.

"It turns out that given the conditions in the intergalactic medium, the only place they will interfere with light from those distant quasars is in the ultraviolet. ... The critical diagnostics cannot be reached from ground-based telescopes. And again, because you need to observe in the UV, there's no future clever technological development from ground- based telescopes that will overcome that. Nobody's going to invent some device to observe light that doesn't arrive.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 25

"So characterizing the state of this intergalactic medium, where most atoms reside, is kind of the father problem for the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph. That's why it's called 'cosmic origins.' Because that dilute medium is the medium out of which galaxies and stars eventually collapsed. But it turns out what has been left behind is, in fact, the majority of the atoms in the universe. It's probably 90 percent hydrogen and 10 percent helium. Everything else, with the exception of just very trace amounts of lithium and deuterium have been built up later in stars."

The STS-125 crew (left to right): Megan McArthur, Michael Good, pilot Gregory C. Johnson, commander Scott Altman, John Grunsfeld, Michael Massimino, Andrew Feustel

It is not yet clear how uniform the IGM might be - the degree to which it is lumpy, ﬁlamentary or smoothly distributed - but COS may help ﬁnd the answer.

"As we see absorptions, as we see interference in the spectra of background objects caused by the intergalactic medium, those pieces of matter will have characteristic red shifts depending on how far away they are," Margon said. "And so COS will take these ultraviolet spectra of very distant objects and will ask, are there discrete interruptions of the spectra that correspond to discrete red shifts, in which case it would be very lumpy. Or are there just kind of absorptions everywhere through the spectrum, in which case it might be more uniform. Nobody really knows."

But the answer, Margon said, "actually has very profound cosmological data in it."

"The lumpiness bears an imprint of conditions very early on in the big bang because there's essentially nothing to change it later," he said. "So aside from probing the majority of atoms in the universe, you also end up getting fundamental cosmological information about what were the conditions the instant after the big bang."

If the Atlantis astronauts are successful, Hubble will be more capable than at any point in its history.

"This will be an absolutely, jaw dropping, superb set of scientiﬁc capabilities that we're going to be providing the astronomical community,” said Lekrone. “You've heard it said many time before, and it's absolutely true, if this mission goes nominally, if we're able to accomplish everything we're setting out to do, then Hubble will be at the

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 26 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement apex of its capabilities after the astronauts leave it, it will be better than it's ever been before. And the possibilities that engenders in one's mind are endless, and exciting, and just hard to fathom.”

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 27

STS-125 Mission Priorities

As with every space shuttle ﬂight, NASA has established a set of mission priorities and deﬁned what is required for minimum and full mission success. The priorities, in order, are:

 Three Rate Sensor Unit (six gyroscopes) removal and replacement  Wide Field Camera 3 installed in place of Wide Field Planetary Camera 2  Science Instrument Command & Data Handling System swap out  Cosmic Origins Spectrograph installation  Battery Module replacement installation (Bays 2 and 3)  STIS or ACS repair  Fine Guidance Sensor 2 removal and replacement  Remaining instrument repair (choice will be prioritized based on actual EVA progress)  New Outer Blanket Layer installation (Bays 8, 5 & 7)  Soft Capture Mechanism installation  Reboost Hubble Space Telescope altitude

Minimum Mission Success, i.e., what NASA would focus on if a problem prevents a full-duration mission, is deﬁned as installation of:

 Two Rate Sensor Units (four gyroscopes)  Wide Field Camera 3  Science Instrument Command & Data Handling system  Cosmic Origins Spectrograph  Bay 2 & 3 Battery Module replacements (six new batteries)

Full Mission Success is deﬁned as installation of:

 Three Rate Sensor Units (ﬁve gyroscopes)  Wide Field Camera 3  Science Instrument Command & Data Handling system  Cosmic Origins Spectrograph  Bay 2 & 3 Battery Module replacements (six new batteries)  Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph repair, or Advanced Camera for Surveys repair  Fine Guidance Sensor 2 The ACS repair originally was spread out over two spacewalks, but the addition of the science instrument command and data handling system computer did not leave enough time for the originally envisioned repair. Grunsfeld hopes to complete the ACS work in a single EVA. But if he runs into problems, mission managers will make a realtime decision on how to proceed. NASA managers could opt to defer the ﬁne guidance sensor installation, but the FGS is a higher-priority item than a second instrument repair. Only one instrument repair is required for full mission success.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 28 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 29

STS-125 Spacewalk Overview

Assuming an on-time launch May 11, the Atlantis astronauts will rendezvous with Hubble two days after takeoff. McArthur, operating the shuttle’s robot arm, will latch onto the telescope around 12:54 p.m. on May 13 and mount it on a lazy Susan-type support mechanism at the back of the orbiter’s cargo bay that can tilt and rotate the observatory as required. The first of five back-to-back spacewalks to repair and upgrade the Hubble Space Telescope is scheduled to begin the next day, on May 14, at 8:16 a.m. If all goes well, the final spacewalk will be conducted on May 18 and the astronauts will release the upgraded space telescope at 8:53 a.m. on May 19.

The spacewalks will be orchestrated roughly in synch with NASA’s mission priorities. Here’s a graphic timeline “Pre-decisional:overview of all ﬁve Internal EVAs showing Use the order Only” of the tasks and how much time has been allotted to complete each one, along with where each task is ranked on NASA’s priority list:

2 3 10

1 5

4 6/8

6/8 9

Priority 5 7 9 White Background Minimal Mission Success Criteria

Mission Operations Directorate Flight Director Office CBS News DA8/Ceccacci, Knight, Dye - 125/H ST SM45/10/09 SSP FRR DA8 Charts 4/20/09 8

Page 30 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 31

EVA-1

Astronauts: EV-1: John Grunsfeld (red stripes on suit) EV-2: Andrew Feustel (no markings)

Objectives:  Initial payload bay/tools setup: 0:50  Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC-3) Installation: 2:15  Science Instrument Computer (SI C&DH) Installation: 1:30  Aft Shroud Door Locks, Soft Capture Mechanism (SCM) Installation: 0:55

NASA/Lockheed Martin STS-125/HST SM-4 Media Guide Description:1

During EVA Day 1 (the fourth day of the mission), the ﬁrst team of EVA astronauts, John Grunsfeld and Andrew Feustel, will perform initial setup activities, the planned Day 1 HST servicing activities and some get-ahead tasks for the remaining EVAs.

Feustel, on the shuttle’s robot arm, pulls the Wide Field Camera 3 from its storage box in the shuttle Atlantis’ cargo bay (NASA graphic).

They begin the EVAs by suiting up and passing through the Atlantis airlock into the cargo bay to perform the initial setup. To prevent themselves from accidentally ﬂoating off, they attach safety tethers to a cable running along the cargo bay sills.

Grunsfeld (EV1) does various tasks to prepare for the day’s EVA servicing activities. These include removing the MFR from its stowage location and installing it on the RMS end effector and installing the Berthing and Positioning System (BAPS) Support Post (BSP) on the FSS. The BSP is required to dampen the vibration that servicing activities will induce

1 Word for word from the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 4 Media Reference Guide by NASA and Lockheed Martin (http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/327688main_09_SM4_Media_Guide_rev1.pdf)

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 32 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement into the deployed SAs. The crew then inspects the P105 and P106 umbilical covers for debris, deploys the center translation aid (TA),“Pre-decisional: and installs the LGAPC. Internal Meanwhile, Use Feustel Only” (EV2) brings the CATs out of the airlock and attaches the MFR handle to the MFR on the RMS.

After the initial setup, the EVA crew proceeds with replacingSTS-125/HST WFPC2 with WFC3. EV1, who SM4 is free floating, Mission translates Overview to ORUC and deploys the aft fixture used for temporarily stowing WFPC2 after it is removed from HST. EV2 retrieves the FGS handhold from the forward fixture and installs the handhold on WFPC2. He then disengages the WFPC2 blind mate connector, the WFPC2 ground strap bolt and the A-latch. Next EV2 removes WFPC2 from HST and stows it on the aft fixture.

Science Instrument SICommand C&DH and /Bay Data Handling10 System computer gear (NASA photo) SI C&DH/ MULE The crew then opens the WSIPE and installs the WFPC2 handhold, which was retrieved from the forward ﬁxture, to WFC3. Before removing WFC3 from the WSIPE, the crew disengages two vent valves, a ground strap and the A-latch. When these tasks are complete, EV2 maneuvers the WFC3 to the HST while on the RMS (see Fig. 2-12). EV1 assists with the installation of WFC3 into Missionthe HST aft shroudOperations radial bay. DirectorateEV2 engages the A-latch, ground strap and blind mate connector prior to removing Flightthe WFPC Director handhold for Office EV1 to stow. The crew gives a “go” to the ground to DA8/Ceccacci, Knight, Dye - 125/HST SM4 SSP FRR DA8 Charts 4/20/09 14 proceed with powering up the WFC3 while they proceed with stowing the WFPC2 into the WSIPE for return. EV2 installs WFPC2 into the WSIPE via RMS with assistance from EV1. When both tasks are complete, the crew closes the WSIPE and stows the instrument handholds and the forward and aft ﬁxtures.

Following the WFC3 installation, the EVA crew proceeds to the SI C&DH unit replacement. EV1 translates to the starboard side of the MULE at the aft end of the payload bay, opens an MLI thermal cover on the aft face of the MULE, and disengages seven of eight bolts that secure the SI C&DH-R in place.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 33

Meanwhile, EV2 is maneuvered on the RMS to Bay 10 and opens the door. EV2 then disengages the 10 bolts that secure the SI C&DH unit to the inner surface of the door, and disengages the electrical connection drive stud. After removing the SI C&DH unit, EV2 inspects the door side connector receptacles for damage or foreign object debris.

In concert, EV1 disengages the ﬁnal bolt from the SI C&DH-R unit and removes it from the MULE. EV1 then translates to the swap position atop the MULE starboard tower and hands off the replacement unit to EV2, still aboard the RMS, for installation on the Bay 10 door. EV1 takes the failed unit back to the MULE to store for Earth return.

As EV1 secures the failed unit to the MULE, EV2 returns to Bay 10 on the RMS and inspects the SI C&DH-R connectors. Next EV2 installs the new unit on the door, engages the connector drive stud, verifying that the box moves down evenly and maintains proper alignment, and reinstalls 10 bolts to secure the unit to the inner surface of the Bay 10 door. EV2 then closes and latches the door. If time permits, EV1 performs get-ahead tasks. These include installing LOCKs on the -V2 doors, lubing the +V2 and FGS-2 (+V3) door bolts, and activating the Soft Capture Mechanism (SCM).

Prior to ingressing the crew cabin, EV1 and EV2 complete daily payload bay closeouts to safe the Shuttle in the event they must release HST and terminate the mission early. EV1 inspects the FSS main umbilical mechanism, disengages the two center PIP pins on the BSP, conﬁgures the center TA and takes a tool inventory. Meanwhile EV2 prepares the CATs installed on the MFR handrail for return into the airlock and egresses the MFR. EV1 releases the MFR safety tether from the grapple ﬁxture for contingency Earth return. After completing the EVA Day 1 tasks, both astronauts return to the airlock and perform the airlock ingress procedure.

  

NASA STS-125 Press Kit EVA-1 Overview:2

Feustel will begin the first spacewalk of the STS‐125 mission by making his way to Wide‐field Scientific Instrument Protective Enclosure, in which the telescope’s new equipment was launched, and release some latches. Meanwhile Grunsfeld will set up the foot restraint Feustel (and later in the mission, Good) will use on the shuttle’s robotic arm and install the berthing and positioning system post, which will protect the telescope’s solar arrays from vibration while the spacewalkers are working. He’ll also install a fixture in the cargo bay that will be used to temporarily hold equipment after it is removed.

Feustel will then install a handle on the foot restraint, before climbing on. Inside the station, McArthur will then maneuver him into position for the removal of the Wide Field Planetary Camera 2, or WFPC 2. They’ll replace it with a new wide‐ﬁeld camera that will allow the telescope to take large‐scale, clear and detailed photos over a wide range of colors. Grunsfeld will take advantage of the time it takes Feustel to get into place by installing a protective cover on Hubble’s low‐gain antenna. Once that’s done, he’ll join Feustel at the WFPC 2.

To remove the camera, Feustel will simply release a blind‐mate connector, a grounding strap and a latch, and allow the camera to slide out on some guide rails, while Grunsfeld monitors the camera’s clearance. The camera will be temporarily stored on the ﬁxture Grunsfeld deployed, while the astronauts move on to the installation of the new Wide Field Camera 3.

Feustel will again be doing the heavy lifting with the help of the shuttle’s robotic arm. He and Grunsfeld will install a handle on the new WFC 3 where it’s stowed inside the Wide‐ﬁeld Scientiﬁc Instrument Protective Enclosure, and

2 Word for word from the NASA STS-125 Press Kit: (http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/hst_sm4/index.html)

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 34 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement then Feustel will carefully remove it while Grunsfeld monitors clearances. Before the camera can be removed, Feustel will need to release two vent valves, a ground strap and a latch

Feustel will carry the new camera to the former location of the old camera on the telescope, and slide it into place. He’ll secure it with a latch, a blind‐mate interface and a ground strap that Grunsfeld will install on the telescope. Afterward, Feustel will remove the handle from the camera and hand it off to Grunsfeld for storage, and then permanently stow the WFPC 2 inside the Wide‐ﬁeld Scientiﬁc Instrument Protective Enclosure.

The spacewalkers’ next major task will be the replacement of the Science Instrument Command and Data Handling Unit. The computer sends commands to Hubble’s science instruments and formats science data for transmission to the ground.

The computer will be carried to the telescope inside a multi‐use lightweight equipment carrier in the shuttle’s cargo bay. Grunsfeld will remove the new computer from the carrier by releasing eight bolts, while Feustel removes the old computer from the telescope by releasing 10 bolts. Feustel will carry the old computer to Grunsfeld at the carrier, where the two will swap. Feustel will then carry the new computer back to the telescope and install it, while Grunsfeld stores the old one inside the carrier.

If time permits, Grunsfeld will then install a soft capture mechanism, which will allow future vehicles to attach to the telescope. The mechanism will be attached to the ﬂight support system – or FSS – that connects the shuttle to the telescope. To install it, Grunsfeld will only need to tighten a single bolt, which will both drive latches to attach it to the telescope and release the latches attaching it to the FSS.

As a get‐ahead, Feustel may also go ahead and open the door on the telescope’s Bay 2, where Massimino and Good will be working the following day.

Their ﬁnal scheduled task for the day will be to install three latch‐over‐center kits that will allow for faster opening and closing of the telescope doors during the third spacewalk.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 35

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 36 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

EVA-2

Astronauts: EV-3: Mike Massimino (broken stripes) EV-4: Michael Good (barber pole stripes)

Objectives:  Rate Sensing Units (RSUs) Installation: 3:20  Batteries (bay 2): 1:35

NASA/Lockheed Martin STS-125/HST SM-4 Media Guide Description:

During EVA Day 2, the second team of EVA astronauts, Mike Massimino (EV1) and Mike Good (EV2), will focus on replacing three RSUs (two gyros per RSU) and the Bay 2 NiH2 battery module.

Fewer daily setup tasks are required for EVA Day 2 due to steps taken on EVA Day 1. After completing the airlock egress procedure, EV1 performs the following setup tasks for the EVA: conﬁgure the MFR and BAPS post and deploy the center TA. Meanwhile EV2 exits the airlock with some of the EVA Day 2 required CATs already installed on the MFR toolboard. The crew prepares the MFR and middeck CATS stowed prior to the EVA. Then they install the MFR with the toolboard on the RMS. The remaining CATS needed for the EVAs are stored in various containers known as ORU protective enclosures (OPEs) or auxiliary transport modules (ATMs) in the cargo bay.

Good, on the shuttle’s robot arm, hands a rate sensing unit gyro pack to Massimino (NASA graphic)

To replace the RSUs, the crew needs to open the -V3 side of HST to access the three RSUs for changeout. The EVA crew begins by gathering some more tools and the replacement RSU. The replacement RSUs are stowed in the SOPE. The new RSUs will be installed in the following order: RSU-2R, RSU-3R, RSU-1R.

Together the astronauts retrieve the RSU-2R from the SOPE and the RSU Changeout Tool (RCT)—sometimes referred to as the Pic-Stik—from the SOPE lid. While EV2 conﬁgures his workstation for the task, EV1 assists in preparing

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 37

RSU-2R by removing protective connector caps before EV2 stows it in a thermal protective bag for translation to the HST. The SOPE is temporarily closed by EV1 as he returns for the remaining two RSUs.

The astronauts now move to the -V3 aft shroud doors. From the RMS, EV2 retracts the Fixed Head Star Tracker (FHST) #2 and #3 door seal bolts before opening the doors. EV1 and EV2 then work as a team to disengage the door latch bolts and open the doors. Once secured, they reposition the Cross Aft Shroud Harness (CASH) to a lower angled handrail position in the aft shroud. This allows better access to the RSUs.

The RSU changeout now consists of setting up an STS PFR from which EV1 will secure himself so that he can assist in removal and installation of the RSU. EV1 handles the connector demating and removal/handoff of the RSU-2 being replaced. He also assists in the connector remating after RSU-2R is installed. EV2 focuses on grappling the RSU-2 with the Pic-Stik and releasing the three bolts with the Pistol Grip Tool (PGT). Once released, EV1 is in position to reach and hold the RSU for handoff and stowage on the MFR until the new RSU is installed. Installation of the RSU-2R is a tricky process requiring precise alignment of the RSU onto the mounting plate with EV1 providing visual assistance (see Fig. 2-13). With Pic-Stik in one hand and PGT in the other, EV2 engages the bolts and then removes the Pik-Stik and stows it while EV1 mates the connectors.

Upon completion of the RSU-2 installation, the free ﬂoater EV1 reconﬁgures for the RSU-3 changeout task by stowing RSU-2 back in the SOPE and retrieving RSU-3R. The crew then repeats the process of translation, temporary stowage and installation only this time with RSU-3R. The task is the same and is repeated again for removal of RSU-1 and installation of RSU-1R.

When the RSU-1 tasks are complete, EV1 will have stowed all of the replaced RSUs (RSU-2, -3, and -1) in the SOPE where the replacement units were stored. He also retrieves and stows the STS PFR and RCT.

If time permits, EV1 will retrieve the Power Input Element (PIE) harness from the SOPE and partially install it as a get- ahead task for ACS on EVA Day 3. This is primarily because connector access is better from the -V3 location. Both astronauts then reinstall CASH onto the aft shroud handrails, close the doors and engage the door latch bolts. The task is not complete until the FHST #2 and #3 door seals are reextended. Before leaving the worksite, EV1 reconﬁgures the ASIPE PFR and port TA for COS installation on EVA Day 3.

While EV2 prepares for the Bay 2 battery task, EV1 translates back to the airlock, stows the RSU bag and retrieves the EVA Helmet Interchangeable Portable (EHIP) battery bag and tools. If time permits, EV1 will translate to the SCM EVA interface, install the EHIP battery and operate the SCM single-bolt-driving interface before restowing the EHIP battery. This will leave the SCM attached to HST upon deployment.

Upon completion of the SCM task, EV1 translates back to the SLIC to begin the battery replacement activity. EV2 opens the HST Bay 2 door and installs a manual door stay. Removing the replacement battery from SLIC involves disengaging 14 bolts to disconnect the replacement battery from the battery plate assembly (BPA). Before removing the HST Bay 2 battery, EV2 disconnects the battery harness connections one at a time and installs protective caps over the battery connectors. After all connectors are secured, EV2 disengages the 14 bolts and removes the battery. EV1 and EV2 then swap the old batteries for the new. Both EV crewmembers reverse the procedures to secure the batteries on SLIC and HST. In a ﬁnal step, EV2 rotates the battery isolator switch to the “on” position, thus activating the batteries, before closing the bay door.

The remainder of EVA Day 2 is spent on any get-ahead tasks not performed on EVA Day 1, if time permits. Once again prior to ingressing back into the crew cabin, the EVs complete daily payload bay closeouts to safe the Shuttle in the event they must release HST and terminate the mission early. EV1 inspects the FSS main umbilical mechanism, disengages the two center PIP pins on the BSP, conﬁgures the center TA and takes a tool inventory. Meanwhile EV2 prepares the CATs installed on the MFR handrail for return into the airlock and egresses the MFR. EV1 releases the MFR safety tether from the grapple ﬁxture for contingency Earth return. After completing the EVA Day 2 tasks, both astronauts return to the airlock and perform the airlock ingress procedure.

  

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 38 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

NASA STS-125 Press Kit EVA-2 Overview:

For their ﬁrst spacewalk of the STS‐125 mission, Massimino and Good will spend the bulk of their time replacing three rate sensor units. Each unit is part of a rate gyro assembly, which sense vehicle motion and provide rate data for the telescope. The replacement units will be stored inside a protective enclosure inside the shuttle’s cargo bay. Massimino will open the lid of the enclosure to allow Good, who will be riding the space shuttle’s robotic arm for the spacewalk, to retrieve the ﬁrst unit and carry it to the telescope. Massimino will also retrieve a gripper tool that Good will use to maneuver the units into place.

At the telescope, Good will retract two ﬁxed head star tracker seals, allowing the doors on the telescope bay that the crew will be working in to open. Once open, Good will move a cross aft shroud harness inside the telescope to make room for the foot restraint Massimino will be using. Massimino will retrieve the foot restraint for Good to install, then Good will help Massimino into it. To remove the old rate sensor units, Massimino will disconnect two electrical connectors, while Good removes three bolts. The same connectors and bolts will need to be connected and tightened to install the replacement unit.

The two spacewalkers will repeat this process two more times as they replace the remaining two rate sensor units. If time permits, Massimino and Good will do some get‐ahead work for the third spacewalk of the mission by installing a power input element harness for the advanced camera for survey before they move the cross aft shroud harness back into place and close the doors on the worksite.

After the new rate sensor units are installed, Massimino and Good are scheduled to perform the ﬁrst half of the mission’s battery replacement work. They’ll be working in the telescope’s Bay 2 to replace the ﬁrst of two batteries. Good will retrieve the old battery by disconnecting six electrical connectors and unscrewing 14 bolts, while Massimino retrieves the new battery from its stowage location inside the shuttle’s super lightweight interchangeable carrier. He’ll have to unscrew 12 bolts to remove it. The two astronauts will swap batteries at the carrier, and Good will transport the new battery to the telescope for installation, while Massimino stows the old.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 39

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 40 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

EVA-3

Astronauts: EV-1: John Grunsfeld (red stripes on suit) EV-2: Andrew Feustel (no markings)

Objectives:  Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) Installation: 2:35  Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS) Repair: 2:10

NASA/Lockheed Martin STS-125/HST SM-4 Media Guide Description::

EVA Day 3 will be a challenging and exciting day for astronauts John Grunsfeld (EV1) and Andrew Feustel (EV2). The crewmembers begin their ﬁrst rotation, so this will be the second spacewalk for John and Andrew. They will remove the COSTAR, install the COS in its place and then perform the ACS repair. The planned repair will replace the computer and power supply in an attempt to revive the failed ACS. After the airlock egress procedure, EV1 and EV2 perform the typical tool retrieval and setup of the MFR.

Feustel, on the shuttle’s robot arm, and Grunsfeld install the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (NASA graphic)

When the astronauts have completed the daily setup tasks, EV1 deploys the aft ﬁxture and EV2 opens the -V2 aft shroud doors to access the COSTAR. EV1 and EV2 work together to remove the COSTAR from the telescope. EV1 releases the COSTAR Y-harness from the handrail and repositions it in the restraint tool installed on the center guiderail strut. EV1 then demates the four COSTAR connectors and disconnects the ground strap before they disengage the COSTAR A- and Blatches. While on the RMS, EV2 removes COSTAR from the telescope and temporarily stows it on the aft ﬁxture.

Now the crew can retrieve the COS from the ASIPE. While working from the aft ASIPE PFR, EV1 opens the ASIPE lid, disconnects the COS ground strap and deploys the B-latch alignment aid prior to disengaging the A- and B-latches. EV2 removes the COS while on the RMS. Once it is removed, EV1 closes the ASIPE lid and engages one lid latch to maintain thermal stability inside the ASIPE. The astronauts will return to install COSTAR for Earth return after

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 41

completing the COS installation. They continue to work together to install the COS along guiderails into the telescope aft shroud (see Fig. 2-14). The installation is aided by deployment of the B-latch alignment aid arm. Next the astronauts engage the A- and B-latches, stow the alignment aid, reinstall the HST ground strap and mate the four COS connectors. Together they close the –V2 aft shroud doors.

As they prepare to install COSTAR into the ASIPE, the ground has already been given the “go” to start testing the COS instrument. Installation of the COSTAR into the ASIPE is the reverse of the COS removal. After it is installed, EV2 closes the ASIPE lid and engages the ﬁve lid latches.

Meanwhile EV1 has begun setting up for the ACS repair task, which is also in the –V2 bay of the aft shroud. The ACS repair is a very delicate operation compared to the COS task. Due to limited EVA time on Day 3, the full ACS repair is not planned within one day. The second part will take place on EVA Day 5 unless a “go” is given during the Day 3 EVA to continue the task.

Grunsfeld works to repair the Advanced Camera for Surveys (NASA graphic)

As a free-ﬂoating crewmember, EV1 maneuvers to the LOPE and NOPE to retrieve tools. EV1 ingresses the STS PFR within the aft shroud to perform most of the ACS repair. The ACS task involves many steps and tools. Using the S- band Single Access Transmitter (SSAT) tool, EV2 disengages four non-captive fasteners from the ACS WFC CEB assembly top cover and seats them in a fastener retention block (FRB). Next EV1 installs the electro-magnetic interference (EMI) grid cutter, cuts the grid from ACS WFC CEB assembly and restows the cutter/grid assembly into its transport enclosure.

The grid removal leaves the CEB chassis cover exposed for access to the 32 small fasteners that must be removed to replace the failed computer cards. The fastener capture plate (FCP) is installed for removal of all the captive fasteners. After all fasteners are released, the cover, screws and the FCP assembly are removed.

After EV1 removes the CEB cover, EV1 removes circuit cards #1 and #2 from the CEB chassis and installs the cards in the card stowage enclosure (see Fig. 2-15), thus completing the ACS Part 1 repair. If time permits and the crew is given a “go” to continue, EV1 will proceed with removal of the remaining two cards and installation of the new ﬂight

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 42 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement computer. EV2’s primary duty throughout the task is to assist with the tool retrieval and stowage while EV1 performs the repair. If the crew is unable to complete the ACS Part 2 repair on EVA Day 3, a temporary cover is placed over the CEB open computer chassis as a protection until EVA Day 5. (See Fig. 2-11 EVA timeline “Notes” for details.)

When either one or both parts of the ACS task are complete, depending on time available, the crew proceeds with nominal daily closeouts. EV1 inspects the FSS main umbilical mechanism, disengages the two center PIP pins on the BSP, reconﬁgures the center TA and takes a tool inventory. Meanwhile EV2 prepares the CATs installed on the MFR handrail for return into the airlock and egresses the MFR. EV1 releases the MFR safety tether from the grapple ﬁxture for contingency Earth return. After the completion of the EVA Day 3 tasks, both astronauts return to the airlock and perform the airlock ingress procedure.

  

NASA STS-125 Press Kit EVA-3 Overview:

Grunsfeld and Feustel will be back outside for the third spacewalk of the mission, this time focusing on the installation of the telescope’s new Cosmic Origins Spectrograph, and the ﬁrst part of the advanced camera for survey repair work. Grunsfeld will begin by preparing a temporary storage ﬁxture in the shuttle’s cargo bay, while Feustel opens the doors of the telescope bay he and Grunsfeld will be working in.

Once everything is ready, Grunsfeld will get the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement – or COSTAR – ready for removal by unhooking four connectors, disconnecting one ground strap and unscrewing two latches. Feustel, again on the shuttle’s robotic arm, will actually remove the equipment and attach it to the temporary storage ﬁxture Grunsfeld prepared.

Both crew members will then move to the protective enclosure that the new Cosmic Origins Spectrograph was launched in and work together to remove it. They will need to disconnect a ground strap, disengage locks and release latches before Feustel will be able to remove the equipment from the carrier and make his way via robotic arm back to the telescope for its installation. Feustel will maneuver the equipment into place and engage its two latches. Grunsfeld will then hook up four connectors and a ground strap.

Following that installation, the only thing left to do on the tasks will be to store the COSTAR in the protective enclosure that previously housed the spectrograph. Once that’s done, Grunsfeld and Feustel will begin work on the Advanced Camera for Surveys repair, which may be ﬁnished later in the mission if time permits or the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph repair on the fourth spacewalk is not successful. In that case, the rest of the Advanced Camera for Surveys work would be added to the ﬁfth spacewalk, replacing the Fine Guidance Sensor work.

For this spacewalk, Grunsfeld and Feustel will spend about two hours and 10 minutes working on the camera and remove two of the four electronics cards that need to be replaced. Grunsfeld’s ﬁrst task will be to install four guide studs that will be used later to install tools. Feustel will assist him with that job, and then the two will work together to remove a grid. To do so, Grunsfeld will ﬁt a grid cutter over the grid. Tightening the 12 bolts on the grid cutter will cause a blade to cut off the 12 legs of the grid.

The grid cutter will also trap the pieces of the grid, so that the spacewalkers don’t have to handle the sharp edges created by cutting the grid off. That will give them access to a cover plate, which is the next thing Grunsfeld and Feustel will need to remove. This will require Grunsfeld to unscrew 32 fasteners. Grunsfeld will ﬁrst loosen all the fasteners, and then, to ensure that none of those fasteners are lost, he’ll install a fastener capture plate over the cover plate before he releases the fasteners.

The fastener capture plate will then be removed along with the cover plate. With that, Grunsfeld will ﬁnally be able to access the electronics cards. Feustel will retrieve and hand to him a piece of equipment called a “wishbone” that will be used to mount the tool that will be used to extract the electronic cards from the camera. Feustel also will

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 43 retrieve that tool for Grunsfeld, as well as the protective storage carrier that Grunsfeld will put each card into as it is removed.

To actually remove the card, Grunsfeld will use a card extraction tool that has a jaw to grip the card, which Grunsfeld tightens by tightening bolts, and an elevator block that removes the card when Grunsfeld tightens a different bolt.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 44 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

EVA-4

Astronauts: EV-3: Mike Massimino (broken stripes) EV-4: Michael Good (barber pole stripes)

Objectives:  Space Telescope Infrared Spectrograph (STIS) Repair: 3:35  Insulation: 0:45

NASA/Lockheed Martin STS-125/HST SM-4 Media Guide Description:

On EVA Day 4, astronauts Mike Massimino (EV1) and Mike Good (EV2) are scheduled for their second and ﬁnal EVA. The day will focus on the restoring the failed STIS instrument and installing two NOBLs. The STIS repair will focus on the low-voltage power supply circuit card. This will be similar to the ACS repair task in that the instrument must be opened to access the internal computer boards. A major difference is that STIS requires 111 small fasteners to be removed compared to 32 for ACS.

An insulation panel is installed on the space telescope (NASA graphic)

The egress procedure and tool setup for the Day 4 EVA is similar to that of previous EVAs. After completing the daily setup tasks, the crew is ready to begin the STIS repair. EV1 translates to the ORUC to conﬁgure the ASIPE TA and then opens the ATM to retrieve STIS repair tools. EV1 performs the tool setup while EV2 opens the +V2 aft shroud doors. EV1 ingresses the PFR, which was placed within the HST aft shroud, while EV2 is on the RMS supporting the STIS repair task.

EV1 and EV2 now work in unison performing the delicate surgery on the STIS instrument. EV1 begins by installing the Clamp Removal Tool (CRT) onto the MEB clamp. After removing the clamp by disengaging a few fasteners, EV1 transfers the MEB clamp with the tools to EV2 for stowage into the trash bag.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 45

Now the major challenge is to install the FCP on the MEB cover and remove 107 fasteners. The STIS FCP is much larger than the ACS FCP. While EV1 is working on the fasteners, EV2 egresses the MFR and translates to stow and retrieve tools from the ATM. After all fasteners have been removed, the FCP, screws and cover assembly can be removed. The crew must complete a ﬁnal step by cutting a few thermistor wires to free the FCP/MEB cover assembly from the STIS enclosure. EV2 ingresses the MFR on the RMS and receives the FCP/MEB cover from EV1 and stows it temporarily.

With the MEB cover on the STIS enclosure removed, the astronauts begin the process of replacing the low-voltage power supply-2 (LVPS-2) card. EV1 receives tools from EV2, removes the LVPS-2 from the MEB and stows it in the card soft transport enclosure. EV1 hands off the failed power supply and receives the new LVPS-2R for installation into the MEB. Installation of this circuit card is a very delicate operation and extreme care must be taken with the exposed card. When installation is complete, he veriﬁes that the card is properly installed, egresses the PFR and translates to the ASIPE lid to retrieve MEB-R. The MEB-R cover is much simpler to install with two EVA friendly latches in comparison to the 107 small fasteners. EV2 maneuvers to the ORUC to retrieve the MEB-R cover and hands it off to EV1 to install on the STIS enclosure. After the MEB cover is installed, the instrument is ready for the ground to verify a successful repair. The astronauts then clean up the worksite by stowing the STIS repair tools in the ATM and SOPE, removing the STS PFR from the aft shroud and closing the +V2 aft shroud doors.

After completing the STIS repair task, the EVA crew will install the Bay 8 NOBL, which is stowed within the MINC on the MULE carrier. First, the old MLI must be removed from HST. EV1 retrieves the NOBL while EV2, who is on the RMS, removes the old MLI. EV2 then removes the upper and lower MLI patch kits and stows them in the MLI recovery bag. EV1 translates back to the MINC at the MULE, retrieves the Bay 8 NOBL, NOBL roller tool (NRT) and wire cutter. EV1 hands the NOBL to EV2 and closes the MINC lid. Both astronauts translate to Bay 8 and install the Bay 8 NOBL onto the bay door (see Fig. 2-16). The new NOBL has a radiator that is rolled into place with the NRT.

After completing the EVA Day 4 tasks, the crew performs nominal daily cleanup and both astronauts return to the airlock for ingress.

  

NASA STS-125 Press Kit EVA-4 Overview:

The bulk of Massimino and Good’s second spacewalk will be spent repairing the telescope’s Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph – a task that has been compared to brain surgery. To access the electronics card the spacewalkers intend to replace, they’ll need to remove a cover plate. However, there are several obstacles to doing so. First Massimino will need to remove a clamp from the upper left corner of the cover plate. Then he’ll need to remove a handrail. Both of these tasks require special tools to catch the fasteners currently holding those pieces in place. The clamp removal tool ﬁts over the fasteners of the clamp and catches them as they’re released; the handrail removal tool does the same over the fasteners of the handrail.

The cover plate itself has 111 fasteners that need to be unscrewed. To ensure that none of those small pieces ﬂoat away, another fastener capture plate will be installed. But to install the fastener capture plate, Massimino must ﬁrst install guide studs that will be used to mount the plate onto the instrument. To install the guide studs, Massimino will have to release four fasteners without losing the fasteners or their bits. For that job, he’ll use the retainer installation bit caddy, which uses a retaining ring to go around the head of the fasteners and behind it to trap the washer. Then four fasteners can be removed with a fastener extraction bit, and their washers will stay in place to be removed by a washer extraction tool.

That will leave a place for the guide studs to be installed, allowing for the installation of the fastener capture plate. Once it’s in place, Massimino will be able to unscrew the remaining 107 fasteners and washers safely, and – after Good has cut four wires – remove the cover plate. With it out of the way, Massimino will be able to ﬁnally access the electronics card that he and Good will replace.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 46 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

To actually remove the old card, Massimino will use a card extraction tool, just as Grunsfeld did during the third spacewalk. He’ll then store it in a transport case, detach the extraction tool and use the tool to unpack and install the new card. He’ll also install the new card’s simpler cover, which only requires him to engage two locking pins.

Once the new card is installed, Massimino and Good will wrap up their last spacewalk by installing one of two new protective thermal insulation panels – called New Outer Layer Blankets – delivered by space shuttle Atlantis. This insulation will be installed on the telescope’s bay 8 door, and Good will start the work by ﬁrst removing the existing insulation in that area, including a temporary patch installed during the second Hubble servicing mission. This task will involve removing seven clips and unhooking a wire loop holding the patch in place, and cutting two ground wires to release the original insulation.

The new insulation will be installed using four latches and pressure‐activated adhesive that Good will activate by pressing a roller tool against its surface.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 47

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 48 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

EVA-5

Astronauts: EV-1: John Grunsfeld (red stripes on suit) EV-2: Andrew Feustel (no markings)

Objectives:  Batteries (bay 3): 1:30  Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS Installation): 2:00  Insulation: 0:30  Final closeout: 1:00

NASA/Lockheed Martin STS-125/HST SM-4 Media Guide Description:

During EVA Day 5, which is the ﬁnal planned spacewalk on SM4, astronauts John Grunsfeld (EV1) and Andrew Feustel (EV2) will replace the Bay 3 nickelhydrogen battery module and install the FGS and a ﬁnal NOBL.

Feustel and Grunsfeld install a replacement ﬁne guidance sensor (NASA graphic)

The crew egress procedure for Day 5 is similar to the other EVA days. The crew proceeds with tool retrieval and setup for the day’s tasks. EV1 then translates to the SLIC to start the battery replacement task. EV2 opens the HST Bay 3 door and installs a manual door stay. This task is nearly identical to that planned on EVA Day 2 except that Bay 3 will receive the new battery instead of Bay 2.

The FGS replacement is similar to the WFC3 task in the replacement of a radial instrument. EV2 will install the FGS while on the RMS, which is the nominal mode for instrument installations. EV2 begins the task by being maneuvered to the forward ﬁxture to retrieve the FGS handhold. Both astronauts then open the +V3 FGS-2 doors and de-mate eight FGS connectors and the ground strap. EV2 installs the FGS handhold on FGS-2, disengages the FGS A-latch, removes the FGS-2 from the telescope and stows it on the aft ﬁxture.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 49

Both crewmembers work to retrieve FGS-2R from the FSIPE. EV1 opens the FSIPE lid and disconnects the FGS-2R ground strap while EV2 disengages the A-latch. EV2 removes the FGS-2R from the FSIPE while EV1 assists and closes the FSIPE lid, engaging one lid latch to maintain thermal stability inside the FSIPE. The astronauts then maneuver and install FGS-2R into the telescope aft shroud (see Fig. 2-17). They insert FGS-2R along the guiderails until it is seated. EV2 then engages the A-latch while EV1 mates the ground strap. Both crewmembers reinstall the eight FGS connectors and close the doors. As a contingency, if the FGS door latches exhibit excessive running torque, EV2 will install the Aft Shroud Latch Repair (ASLR) kits on one or both latches, functionally replacing the degraded latches, and then engage the ASLR kit(s).

Installation of FGS-2 into the FSIPE is the reverse of the removal process for FGS-2R. EV2 retrieves FGS-2 from the aft ﬁxture while EV1 re-opens the FSIPE lid. EV2 inserts FGS-2 into the FSIPE guiderails and engages the A-latch. EV1 installs the ground strap, closes the ASIPE lid and engages the three lid latches to complete the FGS-2 installation.

The ﬁnal planned EVA repair is replacement of the Bay 5 NOBL, which is stowed within the MINC on the MULE carrier. As with NOBL 8 installation, the MLI must be removed from HST. EV1 will retrieve the NOBL while EV2, who is on the RMS, removes the old MLI and stows it into a trash bag. EV1 translates back to the MINC at the MULE and retrieves the Bay 5 NOBL. He hands the NOBL to EV2 while closing the MINC lid. Both astronauts translate to Bay 5 and install the Bay 8 NOBL onto the bay door. If there is sufﬁcient EVA time remaining, NOBL 7 may also be retrieved and installed.

The final closeout procedure is all that remains to complete the final EVA. EV1 inspects the FSS main umbilical mechanism and the P105/P106 covers, removes the LGA protective cover from the telescope and reinstalls it on the MULE, disengages the two center PIP pins on the BSP, configures the center TA and takes a tool inventory. Meanwhile EV2 prepares the CATs installed on the MFR handrail for return into the airlock, egresses the MFR and performs the MFR stow procedure. After completing the EVA Day 5 tasks, both astronauts return to the airlock and perform the airlock ingress procedure.

  

NASA STS-125 Press Kit EVA-5 Overview:

For the ﬁnal spacewalk of the mission, Grunsfeld and Feustel will be ﬁnishing both the battery replacement and New Outer Layer Blanket installation tasks, following the same procedures as those of the work on the second and fourth spacewalks.

Between those two jobs, however, they’ll also be replacing the telescope’s ﬁne guidance sensor. To remove the old sensor, Grunsfeld and Feustel will work together to unhook nine connectors. Then Grunsfeld – who will be riding the shuttle’s robotic arm for this spacewalk – will release one latch and install a handle on the equipment that he’ll use to carefully lift the sensor out of the telescope. He’ll carry it to a protective enclosure inside the shuttle’s cargo bay, where Feustel will be waiting to assist him in storing it and removing the new sensor.

Grunsfeld will carry the new sensor back to the worksite, slide it into place and engage its one latch. Then he’ll work with Feustel to hook up its nine connectors.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 50 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Hubble Space Telescope EVA History

Flt STS No. Astronaut HH MM Hubble Space Telescope EVAs in Detail

N/A STS-31 B McCandless 00 00 04/24/90: HST Launch 0 EVAs K Sullivan McCandless and Sullivan were suited up for an EVA when one of Hubble's solar arrays failed to unfurl as expected. Controllers later coaxed it open without needing a spacewalk.

29* STS-61 S Musgrave 07 53 12/02/93: HST Servicing Mission 1 5 EVAs J Hoffman 06 47 07 21 First mision with five spacewalks; astronauts installed the WFPC-2, COSTAR, four gyroscopes, gyro electronics and (*29th US T Akers 06 35 two new solar arrays. All mission objectives were accomplished, correcting HST's flawed optics. flight with an K Thornton 06 50 EVA; STS EVAs = 27) STS-61 TOTAL 35 26

35 STS-82 M Lee 06 42 02/11/97: HST Servicing Mission 2 5 EVAs S Smith 07 11 05 17 Four EVAs originally planned; fifth EVA added to repair peeling and flaking insulation. Objectives included G Harbaugh 07 27 installation of STIS, NICMOS, a fine guidance sensor, a solid-state recorder and a reaction wheel assembly (RWA- J Tanner 06 34 1). All objectives accomplished.

STS-82 TOTAL 33 11

40 STS-103 S Smith* 08 15 12/19/99: HST Servicing Mission 3A 3 EVAs J Grunsfeld 08 08 Servicing Mission 3 was broken into two missions, SM-3A M Foale 08 15 and SM-3B, because of multiple gyroscope failures. C Nicollier Objectives of SM-3A included installation of a new computer, another solid-state recorder, a fine guidance sensor and six gyroscopes. All objectives accomplished. STS-103 TOTAL 24 38

51 STS-109 J Grunsfeld* 07 01 03/01/02: HST Servicing Mission 3B 5 EVAs R Linnehan 06 48 07 20 Objectives included installation of two new solar arrays, diode boxes, a reaction wheel assembly, power control J Newman 07 16 unit, the Advanced Camera for Surveys and an experimental cooler to revive the NICMOS instrument. All M Massimino 07 30 objectives accomplished.

STS-109 TOTAL 35 55 STS SINGLE FLIGHT RECORD

124 STS-125 J Grunsfeld* 5/12/09: HST Servicing Mission 4 5 EVAs planned A Feustel Wide Field Camera 3, the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph, six gyros, six batteries, a refurbished fine guidance M Massimino* sensor, new insulation and a replacement SI C&DH. The crew also plans to fix the Advanced Camera for Surveys M Good and the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph.

STS-125 TOTAL

18 EVAs TOTAL TIME 129 10 By 14 astronauts (*Astronauts with multiple flights)

Compiled by William Harwood

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 51

STS-400: Just in Case

By WILLIAM HARWOOD CBS News Space Consultant

When the space shuttle Atlantis blasts off on NASA’s ﬁnal mission to service the Hubble Space Telescope, the shuttle Endeavour and a four-man crew will be standing by for launch on a mission space agency managers hope will never be needed: an emergency rescue ﬂight to bring the Atlantis astronauts back to Earth if heat shield damage or some other problem prevents a safe re-entry.

Unlike ﬂights to the International Space Station, the Atlantis astronauts, working in a very different orbit, cannot seek "safe haven" aboard the lab complex if Columbia-class damage is incurred during the climb to space or later, due to impact with space debris. In either case, Endeavour could mean the difference between life and death for Atlantis' crew.

Shuttle Atlantis (foreground) on pad 39A with Endeavour on pad 39B for rescue duty (Photo: NASA)

"There are very small odds we would, in fact, have a problem on ascent for which the remedy would be a launch on need shuttle, a rescue shuttle," former NASA Administrator Mike Grifﬁn said the day Hubble Servicing Mission 4 was announced. "But against the very small probability that it could occur, we will carry that rescue option in the manifest. ... The safety of our crew conducting this mission will be as much as we can possibly do."

With post-Columbia improvements to the shuttle's external tank foam insulation, along with improved imaging, damage detection and repair techniques, the odds of any sort of non-repairable damage are believed to be relatively remote. The major concern for the Atlantis astronauts - not counting the main engines, solid-fuel boosters, hydraulic power plants and malfunctions in other critical systems - is the debris environment in low-Earth orbit.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 52 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

At orbital velocities of 5 miles per second, impacts by even small bits of satellite wreckage or even faster micrometeoroids are potentially catastrophic. As a result, the International Space Station is stocked with enough supplies to support a visiting shuttle crew until a rescue mission could be launched.

But that isn't an option for the Atlantis astronauts. They cannot reach the space station and the shuttle can only carry enough supplies to keep the crew alive for 16 to 25 days, depending on when damage is detected and when a decision is made to mount a rescue mission.

In the wake of the 2003 Columbia disaster, then-Administrator Sean O'Keefe canceled the final Hubble servicing mission - the only non-station flight left on NASA's manifest - arguing the threat posed by external tank insulation, the lack of a safe haven option and the absence of reliable repair techniques made the flight too risky. He based his decision in part on a recommendation from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board calling for autonomous inspection and repair capability for non-station flights.

Griffin, O'Keefe's successor, reversed that decision after NASA engineers and astronauts had demonstrated credible heat shield repair techniques and modified the shuttle's external tank to minimize foam shedding. Asked in a recent interview if he still believed the rescue mission, known as STS-400, was necessary, Griffin said yes, but not because of engineering concerns.

“When we made the decision, the odds were 1-in-473 that we would have a problem on the shuttle for which a rescue shuttle was the solution,” Grifﬁn said. “Now, there are a lot of problems you can have on the shuttle, right? There are a lot of ways you can die on the shuttle, which is what gives you the overall shuttle PRA (probabilistic risk assessment) of about 1-in-75 or so. So you're roughly ﬁve-and-a-half, six times likelier to die on the shuttle for some reason that the backup shuttle can't save you from than you are to die from one the backup shuttle can save you from. ... From a statistical point of view, it makes no real sense to have a backup shuttle.

“However, here's the ﬂip side. ... Those numbers cannot be explained to politicians or the general public. And should we have a failure with those 1-in-473 or whatever odds it was, should we have a failure that the rescue shuttle could have saved you from and we had not done it, the consequence to NASA would have been incalculable. We would appear to have been cavalier with human life, we would appear to have not taken every possible precaution, we would appear to have been coldly calculating the odds and rolling the dice with people's lives. And the appearance of behaving that way, in my judgment, was unacceptable. I could not risk that for NASA.”

In short, no matter how unlikely, if a rescue mission was needed and NASA did not have that option, “you could never in a million years explain ... why it was we thought those were good odds,” Grifﬁn said.

But with a launch-on-need mission - no matter how unlikely it is to be needed - post-Columbia inspection techniques and heat shield repair procedures, a ﬂight to the Hubble Space Telescope carries roughly the same risk as ﬂights to the International Space Station.

“There are a lot of shuttle failures that the station can't save you from, also,” Grifﬁn said. “So having the station as a safe haven addresses some issues, but it doesn't address most of the ways in which you can die on shuttle. If you get a debris strike after you undock from the station, you're done. You can have lots of kinds of problems on ascent that the station can't save you from. So when we looked at it on a numerical basis the Hubble mission, with the launch- on-need shuttle, it was just about equivalent to a station mission.”

Atlantis commander Scott Altman said he and the crew agreed with Grifﬁn's assessment of the odds. Even so, he welcomed the addition of a rescue ﬂight.

"There are a lot of numbers out there ﬂoating around about the risk and how do you quantify that and live with it,” he told CBS News. “I look at it kind of as a big picture thing. We've put this mission together and we've tried to have an answer for each part of the problem. Can we keep from having damage by eliminating debris? Have we done the best that we can, if we have debris, can we ﬁnd out where it hit and what damage it did? So we've got an inspection plan for that. Then, if it does damage, can we repair it? And we have a repair plan for that.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 53

“Now you're sort of laying things out and you're saying ‘OK, I'm feeling pretty good, I can do this, this and this. Now what's your answer if the damage is too big to repair?’ And now I have an answer, and that's the launch-on-need mission. I agree that it is a very low probability, but it's nice to know when you go out there to strap that machine to yourself that when you launch, you have all these answers available to you to make sure that we are doing everything possible to look toward our future safety.”

STS-400 Flight Plan Flight Day 1:  Launch  Robot arm checkout  Rendezvous tools checkout  Cabin depressurization to 10.2 psi

Flight Day 2:  Rendezvous with Atlantis  Spacesuit checkout  Spacewalk preparations

Flight Day 3:  EVA-1 (5.5 hours; McArthur, Feustel, Grunsfeld to Endeavour; Grunsfeld also participates in EVA-2)

Flight Day 4:  EVA-2 (2 hours; Johnson, Grunsfeld to Endeavour)  IV activities between EVAs (4 hours 15 minutes)  EVA-3 (2.5 hours; Massimino, Good, Altman to Endeavour)  Release and separation from Atlantis

Flight Day 5:  Option to release and separate if not performed on FD-4  Heat shield inspection

Flight Day 6:  Off duty  Cabin stow  Seat installation

Flight Day 7:  Deorbit/landing

Damage detection, of course, is the key to any decisions regarding repair or rescue.

Columbia was destroyed during re-entry Feb. 1, 2003, when super-heated air entered a hole in a left wing reinforced carbon carbon - RCC - leading edge panel that was caused by impact with falling external tank foam insulation during launch 16 days earlier. In the wake of the mishap, NASA implemented a broad range of upgrades to minimize foam shedding, to spot any damage that might occur anyway and to develop techniques and procedures for spacewalking astronauts to repair damaged heat shield tiles and even reinforced carbon carbon. The RCC nose cap and wing leading edge panels experience the most extreme heating - more than 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit - during re-entry.

NASA now tracks shuttle launchings with high deﬁnition television cameras, C-band radar that can detect falling debris and sensors mounted behind the RCC wing leading edge panels that can record impacts. The day after launch, a 50-foot-long orbiter boom sensor system - OBSS - is mounted on the end of the shuttle’s robot arm for a detailed

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 54 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement inspection of the nose cap and wing leading edge panels using a laser scanner and high-resolution cameras. During approach to the International Space Station, the shuttle is ﬂipped over in a rendezvous pitch maneuver, or RPM, allowing the lab crew to photograph the orbiter’s belly with powerful telephoto lenses capable of spotting any damage signiﬁcant enough to cause problems during re-entry.

All space station assembly mission ﬂight plans now include a block of time reserved for a so-called “focused” inspection if anything unusual is spotted during earlier inspections. Finally, another nose cap/wing leading edge inspection is carried out after the shuttle undocks from the space station to look for any signs of damage from micrometeoroid or space debris impacts that might have occurred since the ﬁrst inspection the day after launch.

If damage is seen during any of these inspections, and if engineers conclude it can be repaired, the astronauts have tools and equipment on board to resurface or ﬁll in damaged tiles and even to patch small cracks or holes in RCC panels. If the damage is not repairable, the astronauts on space station assembly ﬂights can move into the lab complex and await rescue.

The Hubble servicing mission is the only ﬂight on NASA’s shuttle manifest that does not go to the space station. In this one case, a second shuttle - Endeavour - will be prepped and ready for launch to rescue the Atlantis astronauts if necessary, eliminating the need for safe haven aboard the space station.

The only inspection technique that will not be available to the Atlantis crew is the rendezvous pitch maneuver that is carried out during ﬁnal approach to the space station. Instead, a new set of inspection procedures was developed to accomplish the same purpose using Atlantis’ robot arm and the OBSS boom. The additional procedures will take several hours longer than those used for a space station ﬂight, but engineers say the end result will be the same.

The RPM is carried out early in a mission and as such, only provides insight into ascent debris damage. The primary threat for the Atlantis astronauts, given the new techniques that duplicate what is normally achieved with the RPM, is impacts from space debris and micrometeoroids. The space station orbits at an altitude of about 220 miles while Hubble circles the globe at an altitude of 350 miles. The space debris environment - bits of junk from old satellites and rocket bodies - is worse at Hubble’s altitude than the station’s.

"Remember now, the RPM, it's prime purpose is to inspect the bottom of the vehicle for ascent debris damage," said Paul Hill, director of mission operations at the Johnson Space Center. "What we have more of on HST is statistically higher risk of orbital debris because of the higher altitude. So the RPM really isn't designed or placed in the mission to catch that. That's more of a long-duration thing and our greater concern for that kind of damage we pick up with the late inspection."

Lead ﬂight director Tony Ceccacci said the Atlantis astronauts will spend their ﬁrst two days in orbit giving the shuttle a thorough inspection.

"On ﬂight day one, after we do the RMS (robot arm) checkout, we're going to do an upper crew cabin survey just with the RMS end effector, so that'll get everything we need there," Ceccacci said. "And of course, it'll meet the requirement of detection and all that.

"What we're going to do on ﬂight day two is, we added in a belly tile survey. It's an additional two hours 10 minutes of survey ops. ... They've developed the survey that meets all the required detection requirements. So what we'll wind up doing is we'll be doing the starboard wing leading edge and there's a point where we break out of that and then do starboard part of the belly. That takes about 30 minutes or so there.

"After we ﬁnish the belly up, that starboard belly portion, we'll go ahead and ﬁnish up the starboard wing leading edge, go ahead and do the nose cap after that and then go to the port wing leading edge. And there's a point in there that we break out and do about 96 minutes of belly survey. Then after that, we go back into the port wing leading edge survey and get that done and then we're done for the day."

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 55

An analysis of the threat posed by space debris at the Hubble Space Telescope's 350-mile-high altitude shows Altman and his crewmates will not face a dramatically higher risk from orbital debris than previous Hubble missions, NASA ofﬁcials say.

While the overall risk of impact damage is about three times higher for a Hubble mission than a ﬂight to the International Space Station, it is not as bad as ﬂight planners initially feared.

"We know we're accepting a little higher risk for this ﬂight," Steve Stich, manager of the orbiter project ofﬁce at the Johnson Space Center, said in an interview. "That's why we've tracked it very carefully."

Even factoring in debris from a satellite collision in February between a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite and an Iridium telephone relay station, the mean odds of a catastrophic impact during the Hubble mission are on the order of 1-in-229, which is well below the 1-in-200 threshold that requires an executive-level decision by NASA's leadership.

A preliminary analysis put the odds at 1-in-185, but the numbers improved after recent radar observations and consideration of the shuttle's orientation in space during the Hubble mission. The planned orientation, or attitude timeline, reduces the crew's exposure to impacts that could damage critical areas of the ship's heat shield, the coolant loops in the shuttle's cargo bay door radiators and cockpit windows.

"The numbers changed recently from three factors," Stich said. "One, they went back and looked at the radar data and they took some more measurements and they found the debris environment isn't quite as severe. So that led to a reduction in the number.

"Two, we got an attitude timeline update that had higher ﬁdelity breakdowns of the periods of time where we're going to be in attitudes to protect Hubble from the sun, and that was a factor in reducing that number. The third thing was, we actually were able to model HST in the payload bay and sometimes the HST actually provides a shield for the wing leading edge."

Analysts took a conservative approach to the February satellite collisions, factoring in twice the amount of debris predicted by computer models. As it turns out, the amount of wreckage from the Iridium satellite was, in fact, roughly twice the predicted value. But radar tracking shows debris from the Cosmos matches the computer model's prediction. The overall risk was reduced accordingly.

Flight planners also built in an orbit adjustment rocket ﬁring after Hubble is released that will lower one side of the shuttle's orbit. That will effectively lower the risk a bit more.

Taking all that into account, the analysis generated a broad range if risk values, from a maximum of 1-in-173 to a best-case scenario of 1-in-313. The mean value, 1-in-229, assumes a late inspection on ﬂight day nine and a reasonable chance of damage that could be successfully repaired.

"We've looked at Hubble very closely and we've done everything we can to mitigate the risks, the attitudes that we're ﬂying, of course we've got our repair capability, we have launch on need (emergency rescue mission) ready and we've got late inspection," Stich said. "And for late inspection, for the hot (wing leading edge) panels, we've actually improved that inspection to get better resolution for panels 8 through 11 that actually drive the risk. So we've done everything we can to mitigate the risk."

MMOD risks for previous Hubble servicing missions cover a wide range of values, from 1-in-150 for a ﬂight in 1993 to 1-in-761 for a mission in 1999. For the most recent mission in 2002, the MMOD risk was 1-in-365. But those numbers don't take into account post-Columbia inspection procedures and a better understanding of the debris environment in general.

"The bottom line is, since return to ﬂight this one is in the ball park" with past Hubble missions, an ofﬁcial said.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 56 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

The Hubble servicing mission originally was planned for last October, but the ﬂight was delayed to May when a data processing system on the telescope broke down. Going into that launch campaign, shuttle Program Manager John Shannon told reporters NASA planned to do everything possible to reduce exposure to MMOD damage.

"Because we recognize it as a signiﬁcant risk, we have already taken all the actions we can as far as attitude timeline in putting the vehicle in a position where if we get micrometeoroid or orbital debris pieces coming at the vehicle, the come typically along the velocity vector," Shannon said.

"So you'll see with our attitude that we'll typically put the shuttle main engines toward the velocity vector (in the direction of travel). It protects the windows and the payload bay and the Freon loops and the RCC (nose cap and wing leading edge panels). So they have optimized the attitude timeline as much as they can for this mission. And we'll do our inspections, so we will know by the end of the mission if anything is required to go repair or not."

To put the MMOD numbers in perspective, the MMOD risk for the most recent space station assembly ﬂight was 1- in-332. The two ﬂights before that came in at 1-in-333 and 1-in-339 respectively.

"The 1-in-200 is a fairly arbitrary number that was decided upon kind of by consensus to make sure we have the discussion and that the discussion takes place at the right level," Shannon said. "When you get to a risk greater than 1-in-200, it was decided that decision should be made at the agency level."

Based on the latest analysis, that will not be necessary for Atlantis' ﬂight. But the analysis highlights the increased risk the Atlantis astronauts will face because of the unique nature of their mission.

If all else fails, NASA will launch Endeavour on the STS-400 rescue mission. Endeavour was hauled to pad 39B April 17 for work to ready the ship for a quick-response launch. If a rescue mission isn't needed, Endeavour will be moved to pad 39A for launch in June on a space station assembly mission.

But at the moment Atlantis lifts off, Endeavour will be ready for a launch within seven days. If a non-repairable heat shield problem is discovered during the post-launch inspection on ﬂight day one or two, Endeavour could take off within about ﬁve days and be on the scene for a crew rescue within a week of the problem’s discovery.

If no problems are seen during the post-launch inspection, Endeavour’s processing will be put on hold with the shuttle ready for the start of a three-day countdown at any point thereafter. The Atlantis astronauts plan a second heat shield inspection on ﬂight day nine, after Hubble is deployed. A decision on whether a wing leading edge repair might be needed would be expected the next day, after analysis of imagery and laser scan data.

If entry critical damage is seen, the Atlantis astronauts would implement initial electrical power-down procedures, NASA would start Endeavour’s three-day countdown and flight planners would work out the details of a repair attempt. A repair spacewalk would be conducted on flight day 12 and, if the damage turned out to be beyond the crew’s ability to fix, Endeavour would be launched the next day, the thirteenth day of Atlantis’ mission. With Endeavour safely in orbit, the Atlantis crew would implement a so-called Group C+ powerdown, an option that would disable critical heaters and other systems and eliminate any chance of bringing Atlantis safely back to Earth.

The Atlantis crew will only have enough supplies to last about 25 days on their own, but that assumes the extreme Group C+ powerdown was ordered after the initial heat shield inspection. If a non-repairable problem is discovered during the late inspection, only 16 to 19 days of capability would be available. In that case, Endeavour could still reach Atlantis in time to pull off a rescue, but there would be little margin for error in the event of launch delays or other problems.

"You’ve picked the most challenging scenario, and that’s the late inspection,” Altman told CBS News. “The good news is, it's also one of the least likely scenarios to generate a need for a rescue vehicle. But we even have an answer for that. Now, it's not tremendously robust, we only have so much power left at the end of the mission by the time we do that late inspection, but the shuttle is being processed to the point where it could get off the pad quickly

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 57 enough that it could rendezvous with us, even with the orbit adjust, and have a chance to transfer between the two vehicles and come home on the launch-on-need vehicle.”

But it is not a sure thing. While it works on paper, bad weather or launch delays caused by technical problems could prevent Endeavour from reaching Atlantis in time to help. In the worst-case scenario, Endeavour would only have two days or so to get off the pad. After that, it would be too late.

Orientation of Atlantis and Endeavour for initial grapple (NASA graphic)

Shannon said the shuttle team “worked very hard to develop repair capabilities for micrometeoroid/orbital debris damage, we've got plugs we can put in the reinforced carbon carbon (wing leading edge panels), we've got the non- oxide adhesive we can put over any cracks or any kind of holes. I think 400 is there more for an ascent debris kind of situation, some kind of a really gross ascent problem like we had on Columbia. 400 would be very effective for that kind of case.

"For the MMOD case where we saw something during late inspection, if it were a case where we did not think we had repair capability for it, it's questionable whether 400 could get off the pad in time to go do any kind of a rescue. ... I think our protection for MMOD lies in our repair capability. We've spent a lot of time doing hypervelocity impacts on RCC materials, doing our repairs and putting them in the arc jet facility and we've had outstanding results. So we feel very comfortable about what we have.

"It would take a very rare, and very signiﬁcant, large-size damage from MMOD in a critical area to cause us to have to consider 400 for that kind of case."

But what if the unthinkable happened? What if ascent debris or a piece of space junk damaged Atlantis' heat shield beyond the crew's ability to ﬁx it? In that case, Endeavour might be the crew's only hope.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 58 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Only four astronauts would take off aboard Endeavour: Commander Chris Ferguson, pilot Eric Boe, ﬂight engineer Stephen Bowen and Robert Kimbrough, all veterans of recent shuttle ﬂights. Endeavour's lower deck would be rigged with supplies and collapsed seats that would be set up later, four in one row and three in the next, for the Atlantis crew. One extra-large spacesuit would be stowed for use by Altman.

Orientation of Atlantis and Endeavour for crew rescue spacewalks (NASA graphic)

As with Atlantis’ mission, an MMOD analysis was carried out for STS-400. Because a rescue mission would be shorter, the odds are better, from a worst-case 1-in-278 to a best-case of 1-in-503. The mean value is 1-in-367.

Shuttle dockings or satellite rendezvous procedures normally are carried out on the third day of the mission to conserve propellant and give the astronauts time to adjust to weightlessness. But in this case, Ferguson would oversee a hurried two-day rendezvous, approaching the damaged shuttle from below much like a normal space station approach. For planning purposes, Atlantis would be assumed to be disabled and its own robot arm unavailable. Instead, Endeavour's robot arm would be used to lock onto Atlantis to hold the two shuttles together.

"Instead of flight day three, we're going to rendezvous on flight day two," said flight director Paul Dye. "We built this so we could get to (Atlantis) as quickly as possible in case we had a weather delay or anything else, we wanted to make sure we designed the mission to get there as fast as possible. So it's a normal ascent, except right after ascent we'll be making sure we do our rendezvous tools checkout.

"Then, instead of doing the tile inspection on flight day two like we've been doing since return to flight, we'll actually do the rendezvous on flight day two and grapple (Atlantis). Then we'll go ahead on flight day three, do the first EVA where we'll transfer a couple of folks across. Then on the next day after that, we'll do the last (EVA) to get everybody else across. At the end of that day, that's flight day four, we'll release the 125 orbiter and Tony's team will go ahead

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 59 and deorbit that using commands from the ground. Then we'll do an inspection of our vehicle after that ... and folks here on the ground will take a look at that and approve us for entry and we'll be coming home on ﬂight day seven."

Only the Atlantis astronauts would participate in the three spacewalks needed to get the crew members from the crippled orbiter to Endeavour. The spacewalkers would make their way along safety tethers attached to Endeavour’s robot arm to get from the Atlantis airlock to Endeavour’s. All seven of the Atlantis astronauts conducted training runs in NASA’s Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory at the Johnson Space Center to familiarize themselves with the operation.

The rescue plan was designed "to be bomb proof," Dye said. "You don't want to do something fancy on a rescue mission, you want to do what you know. The fact that it's a rescue mission alone is what makes it pretty unique and interesting. But within it, we try and make it built out of components of things that we know how to do all the time."

Atlantis crew seating for re-entry aboard shuttle Endeavour (NASA graphic)

Atlantis will only carry four spacesuits to orbit. To get all seven crew members from Atlantis to Endeavour, the Atlantis crew will have to stage three spacewalks, moving crew members and spacesuits - including Altman’s, carried aloft aboard Endeavour - back and forth as required to get all seven across. Tomas Gonzales-Torres, the lead spacewalk ofﬁcer for Hubble Servicing Mission No. 4, said the ﬁrst spacewalk would involve Megan McArthur, Andrew Feustal and John Grunsfeld.

"The 400 crew will pre-position the extra-large suit in their airlock,” said Gonzales-Torres. “So all three crew members will come out of the (Atlantis) airlock and then they'll go over to the 400 vehicle. At this point, Megan will go inside the airlock on the 400 side and then the crew will retrieve the extra large, spare EMU. Megan will actually repress (Endeavour’s airlock) by herself at this point. Once she's inside the 400 vehicle, that crew will help her get out of the suit and then reconﬁgure that suit to be, again, pre-positioned inside the 400 airlock.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 60 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

"While that's going on, John and Drew will be transferring the extra-large suit back over to the 125 vehicle (Atlantis). Once Megan's suit is ready to go, (Grunsfeld and Feustal) will depress that airlock and retrieve her suit. Then again, the crew will transfer that suit over to the 125 vehicle. They'll close that hatch and then both ingress on the 400 vehicle. So we'll have two suits that will be repressed by themselves on the 125 vehicle and then at the end of the EVA, John, Drew and Megan will be on the 400 vehicle.

STS-400 rescue scenarios (NASA graphic)

"At the start of the second EVA, John will be pre-positioned in the airlock for the 400 vehicle and then (Mike) Massimino and Greg Johnson will be positioned in the 125 vehicle. The (Atlantis) crew will come out. John will have an extra suit, which was Drew's, in the (Endeavour) airlock with him. So Massimino and Ray J (Johnson) will come over to the 400 vehicle and along with John, they'll get the extra spare suit from the 400 vehicle, again, which was Drew's, bring that back to the 125 vehicle and then the crew will split up. Massimino will repress with the one extra suit on the 125 vehicle and John and Ray Jay will repress on the 400 vehicle.

"At this point, we have three suits and three crew members remaining on the 125 vehicle. And we'll have Scooter (Altman) in his extra-large suit, which was launched up on the 400 vehicle, and then we'll have Massimino and Bueno (Mike Good). And all three of them will do that last EVA and all three of them will get transferred over to the 400 vehicle."

Grunsfeld said one major advantage for the Hubble crew "is that we have four very experienced spacewalkers, two of which are going out for the ﬁrst time but have demonstrated in the (training pool) their extremely good qualiﬁcations

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 61 for doing a spacewalk. Four sevenths of the crew is already highly trained for spacewalks. The transfer operations, if we ever did get into a rescue situation, are straightforward compared to anything we're doing on the nominal mission."

For the return to Earth, all seven Atlantis astronauts will strap in on Endeavour's lower deck.

"It's 'lay on the ﬂoor' kind of seating," Dye said. "There are elements of seats that plug onto the ﬂoor, then the harnesses attach down there. You wouldn't really recognize it as seats, but they are. They'll all be on their backs."

Atlantis would be left with its flight deck systems configured for remote operation from the ground. After Endeavour’’s departure, flight controllers would face the unwelcome task of commanding Atlantis to make a steep re-entry over the Pacific Ocean, ensuring an atmospheric breakup well away from any populated areas or shipping lanes.

And with that, the space shuttle program would come to an end. With the program already scheduled for retirement in 2010, NASA would not have time - not to mention political support - for another failure investigation and corrective action.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 62 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 63

A Brief History of the Hubble Space Telescope

Editor’s Note... Portions of this historical review were written for Astronomy Now magazine.

By WILLIAM HARWOOD CBS News Space Consultant

The Hubble Space Telescope has cost U.S. taxpayers some $10 billion in the quarter century since the project was approved. But to astronomers around the world, the high-ﬂying satellite is, in a word, priceless.

Since its famously blurred vision was corrected by spacewalking astronauts in December 1993, the Hubble Space Telescope has become an international icon of science, one of the most productive astronomical observatories ever built and the ﬂagship of NASA's exploration of the universe.

The Hubble Space Telescope

The solar-powered spacecraft has helped astronomers conﬁrm the existence of super massive black holes, pin down the true age of the universe and spot the faint building blocks of the ﬁrst galaxies as they collided, merged and grew just a billion years or so after the birth of the cosmos.

Its mind-bending photographs have charted the life cycles of distant suns in unprecedented detail, providing unmatched views of the vast stellar nurseries where stars are born to the supernova bangs and whimpers marking old age and death.

It has catalogued myriad infant solar systems in the process of forming planets and provided ﬂyby-class views of the outer planets in Earth's own solar system, routinely capturing phenomena as common as dust storms on Mars to once-in-a-lifetime events like the 1994 crash of a comet into the atmosphere of Jupiter.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 64 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

While ever larger, more sophisticated ground-based telescopes now rival and in some areas exceed the power of Hubble's relatively modest 94.5-inch (2-meter) primary mirror, the space telescope, operating high above Earth's turbulent atmosphere, remains in a class by itself.

"Hubble is the most productive science mission, and has had the highest impact, of all NASA science missions in the history of this agency," said Hubble program scientist David Leckrone. "It's a national icon."

Hubble Servicing Mission 3A

It all began at 3:38 p.m. on April 25, 1990, when astronaut Steven Hawley, operating the shuttle Atlantis's robot arm, released the Hubble Space Telescope into open space as the orbiter and its costly payload sailed 381 miles (613 kilometers) above the Paciﬁc Ocean just west of Ecuador.

It was a moment of high drama as the 13-ton observatory, arguably the most important scientiﬁc spacecraft ever built, slowly receded from the space shuttle against the blue-and-white backdrop of planet Earth.

"The telescope really looked great as we ﬂew away from it and we all were remarking about (how) we sure hope it does good work," shuttle commander Loren Shriver radioed ﬂight controllers in Houston.

"Well, it sure is now, Loren," replied astronaut Story Musgrave from the Johnson Space Center. "Thanks for all the great work you've done. Galileo is real proud of you."

Running seven years behind schedule and $1 billion over budget, Hubble's deployment was held up a ﬁnal hour and a half that day because of problems coaxing one of its two electricity producing solar arrays to unfurl.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 65

Astronauts Kathryn Sullivan and Bruce McCandless were within a half-hour or so of beginning an emergency repair spacewalk when the glitch was resolved by ground controllers, clearing the way for Hawley to ﬁnally send Hubble on its way.

"The fun has hardly begun yet," said Richard Truly, NASA's elated administrator. "Because just within a few days and weeks and months she'll begin to return science back to Earth. And it should really be exciting. I think it's a great and historic day for the space program."

Congress approved the space telescope project in 1977, with launch targeted for 1983. But the ﬂight was repeatedly delayed because of problems getting the space shuttle program off the ground and by technical trouble with the telescope itself.

Launch ultimately was retargeted for the fall of 1986, but those plans went up in smoke with Challenger's destruction in January 1986, grounding the shuttle program for nearly three years.

Hubble’s perfectly ﬂawed primary mirror

All of those delays pushed Hubble's price tag to some $1.5 billion, making the observatory one the most expensive civilian science payloads ever launched. Adding in the cost of ground equipment, annual operating expenses for the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore, planning and development of shuttle servicing missions and other factors, the total cost of the telescope project was expected to reach $2.35 billion by the end of the ﬁrst year of operation.

Despite the delays and the high price tag, Hubble's launch marked a major milestone in the history of science.

"We'll be like the little nearsighted child in the classroom who is given a pair of glasses and at last can see what the teacher's been writing on the blackboard," NASA science chief Lennard Fisk said on the eve of launch in 1990.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 66 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

"When Hubble lifts off ... we will witness not just another launch, but rather a turning point in humankind's perception of itself and its place in the universe.

"In the 1500s, Copernicus demonstrated that the Earth was not the center of the universe. In the ﬁrst half of this century (American astronomer) Edwin Hubble revealed the mind-numbing vastness of the universe with its countless galaxies spread over billions of light years.

"I do not know what (the space telescope) will reveal about the origin of the universe and our place in it," Fisk said. "But I am very conﬁdent it will be as profound in its effect on our perception of who we are as such previous revolutions in astronomy."

The Hubble Space Telescope measures 43.5 feet long, 14 feet wide and weighs 25,500 pounds (13.3 meters long, 4.3 meters wide, 11,500 kilograms). Built by Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. of Sunnyvale, California, the telescope was designed to be serviced by spacewalking shuttle astronauts and to operate at least 15 years.

The optical system is built around a 1,827-pound (829-kilogram) mirror built by what was then Perkin-Elmer Corp. of Danbury, Connecticut. It is coated with a highly reﬂective layer of aluminum-magnesium, ensuring that as much light as possible is captured for study.

Small by the standards of major ground-based telescopes, Hubble's mirror is, perhaps, the most perfect ever made, with no peaks or valleys greater than about half a millionth of an inch (0.0000025 centimeters). If the surface of the Earth was that smooth, Mount Everest would be less than 5 inches (12.7 centimeters) tall.

The observatory uses a Cassegrain optical design. Light enters the instrument, bounces off the primary mirror and back up to a smaller, 12.2-inch (31-centimeter) mirror mounted in the center of the telescope tube. That mirror, in turn, sends the light back down the tube and through a 24-inch-wide (61-centimeter-wide) hole in the center of the primary mirror. It is brought to a focus 4.9 feet (1.5 meters) below the surface of the main mirror.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 67

"The human eye can barely detect a firefly at 200 yards (180 meters)," Hubble chief scientist Edward Weiler told reporters before launch. "If your eye was as good as the space telescope, you could see that same firefly 10,000 miles (16,000 kilometers) away, a distance from Washington to Sydney, Australia.

"Another way of looking at it is the human eye can detect a standard ﬂashlight bulb at about 2 miles (3.2 kilometers). With the space telescope, you could see that ﬂashlight bulb on the moon, a distance of a quarter of a million miles (402,000 kilometers). In general, the space telescope is about 10 billion times as sensitive as the human eye."

Overall, the telescope was designed to have 10 times the resolution, or clarity, of ground-based instruments, the difference between being able to read the big letters on the second row of an eye chart and reading the bottom line.

If the human eye could distinguish between two objects with the clarity of the space telescope, Weiler said, "you could read this morning's Miami Herald headlines from the Kennedy Space Center, a distance of about 200 miles (322 kilometers)."

But a big telephoto lens is useless without some way to stabilize it and as one might expect, Hubble's guidance system was one of the most advanced in the world, so accurate it could keep a laser beam focused on a dime at a distance of 200 miles for 24 hours at a time. That's the equivalent of sinking a 1,500-mile (2,400-kilometer) golf putt.

The telescope can be equipped with four telephone-booth-sized instruments mounted behind the focal plane and one side-mounted instrument. It was initially equipped with a pair of light-splitting spectrographs, a photometer and two cameras, the Wide Field Planetary Camera (WFPC), developed at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the Faint Object Camera, provided by the European Space Agency.

The WFPC (pronounced wiff-pick) was perhaps the single most important instrument in the sense that it was expected to provide the ultra-sharp color pictures of astronomical targets that could be easily appreciated by the public. "First light" - the ﬁrst images from the WFPC - were eagerly anticipated.

But in the days and weeks that followed Hubble's launch, engineers working through lengthy calibration procedures ran into a steady stream of hiccups and glitches, many of them software related, that delayed the start of routine scientiﬁc observations.

At the same time, they were struggling to understand a strange, unexpected vibration that rocked the telescope slightly every time it entered Earth's shadow and later moved back into sunlight. More ominously, scientists also were having problems getting Hubble's optical system in focus.

By mid May, the telescope had become the target of increasingly skeptical stories and the butt of jokes on late night television. Comedian David Letterman poked fun at Hubble in his nightly "Top 10 List."

The "Top 10 Hubble Telescope Excuses" included "The guy at Sears promised it would work ﬁne," "Some kids on Earth must be fooling around with a garage door opener," "There's a little doohickey rubbing against the part that looks kind of like a cowboy hat" and "Ran out of quarters."

With Hubble's calibration and checkout about 10 days behind schedule, NASA managers kept a stiff upper lip, calmly explaining that the telescope was a very complicated piece of hardware and that glitches were not unexpected.

"I don't mean to be a Pollyanna," said Leckrone, then deputy project scientist. "But I do know that this time, right after launch, early bugs and early problem-solving are very characteristic. I think we would have been very naive to think it would have been any different."

Said Weiler: "It's not a doom and gloom atmosphere. Things are running pretty smoothly."

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 68 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

But not for long. After repeated failures to focus Hubble's optical system, engineers made an exhaustive series of measurements, moving the motorized secondary mirror in tiny increments to precisely map out the behavior of the optical system. They were left with a staggering discovery.

"We got a very clear and distinct characteristic, a textbook characteristic, of an optical system that had a signiﬁcant amount of spherical aberration," deputy project manager Jean Olivier told reporters at a now-legendary June 27, 1990, news conference. "We are in the process of evaluating the ramiﬁcations of this."

Because of an error that was never caught during the mirror's fabrication, the supposedly perfect primary had been ground into the wrong shape. As a result, its outer edge was about 2 microns lower than it should have been. In other words, the dish-shaped mirror was too shallow by about two-ﬁftieths the width of a human hair.

That prevented light from the outer regions of the mirror coming to a focus at the same point as light from the inner regions, Olivier's "textbook" deﬁnition of spherical aberration.

Hubble's original design speciﬁcation called for 70 percent of a star's light to be concentrated in a very tiny circle. Because of spherical aberration, Hubble could only manage 10 percent to 15 percent.

"It would be dishonest for me to say the mood of the scientists is very happy right now," Weiler said. "We're all very frustrated. But we should be able to ﬁx it."

Outsiders were skeptical. Discovering the supposedly perfect Hubble suffered from such a fundamental ﬂaw was a devastating blow. "If you asked us the night before launch to give you the 100 biggest worries or nightmares, none of us would have come up with spherical aberration," Weiler said later.

Sen. Barbara Mikulski, a Maryland Democrat whose district included NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center - home of the Hubble project - called the space telescope a "techno turkey," a morale-sapping sobriquet that summed up the feelings of many in the space science community.

But the key to Hubble's salvation was the very perfection of its ﬂaw. It was utterly uniform, with no variation across the mirror. In short, the mirror really was near perfect, it had simply been ground to the wrong optical prescription. While the mirror itself could not be ﬁxed, camera and other instruments could be developed with built-in corrective optics to precisely cancel out the aberration. Or so NASA managers hoped.

Olivier said the aberration likely was caused when the telescope's mirrors were being fabricated by Perkin-Elmer Corp.

"What we suspect is that in the ... techniques used to measure the ﬁgure of the mirror and polish it and hold it steady while you're doing that ... somewhere in this chain, there was a mistake or error made that resulted in the mirror being very precisely made but ultimately to the wrong ﬁgure," he said.

A painful investigation would reveal that data from a test rig used to measure the "wave-front error" - the precise shape of the mirror - was thrown off slightly by a speck of paint that had lodged in an opening where reﬂected laser light passed.

Engineers running the test, unaware of the paint chip, tried to adjust the spacing between the mirror and the test equipment to get the expected results. When that failed, instead of stopping and investigating the matter further, washers were inserted to change the spacing even more. As a result of this test, additional glass was ground off the outer portion of the mirror. In effect, the mirror was ground to the wrong prescription.

At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, meanwhile, a second-generation Wide Field-Planetary Camera was already under construction. In the wake of spherical aberration, WFPC-2 was equipped with specially ground internal mirrors to exactly counteract the effects of Hubble's ﬂawed main mirror.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 69

"If you're nearsighted, your eye doesn't have the right curve," Weiler said. "When you put your glasses on, it cancels that curve out. So it's almost exactly like that, except we do it with mirrors, not lenses."

Providing properly focused light to Hubble's other instruments was a more difﬁcult challenge.

In the end, Ball Corp. of Boulder, Colo., came up with the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement, or COSTAR, an instrument that would take the place of the photometer in one of Hubble's four main below-mirror instrument bays.

COSTAR included 10 small coin-sized mirrors mounted on ﬁve motorized arms that could be extended into the light path of the primary mirror, directing properly focused light to the other instruments.

"These mirrors are only about the size of a dime," said Weiler. "They had to be ground so smoothly that if you ground Colorado down to the same level, the largest mountain would be reduced to one inch."

While the new optical systems were being designed and fabricated, engineers identified the source of the unexpected vibrations causing Hubble to rock back and forth when entering or exiting Earth's shadow. Tests showed the observatory's two solar arrays, provided by the European Space Agency, were flexing in response to temperature changes. New arrays were built with modifications to make them less susceptible to flexing.

When all was said and done, it took three-and-a-half years to complete testing and to train a crew of astronauts for what would be the most ambitious shuttle mission ever attempted. A record ﬁve back-to-back spacewalks were planned to replace Hubble's two solar arrays, to correct the telescope's blurry vision and to replace gyroscopes and other equipment that had suffered problems since launch.

The stakes were enormous. By now, NASA's reputation was clearly on the line and along with it, conﬁdence in the agency's ability to build an international space station.

"This is probably one of the most important missions that NASA will ﬂy for years to come until we start putting the ﬁrst elements of the space station up," said former Apollo astronaut Thomas Stafford, chairman of a key Hubble review team. "And if we blow this one, it is really going to be bad news. It is going to affect the attitude towards the space station and the attitude towards NASA."

Said Jeffrey Hoffman, one of the four spacewalkers charged with making the repairs: "Is it difﬁcult to walk on a real narrow ridge when there's a 2,000-foot drop on each side? No, it's not. But if you slip, it's a long way down."

Finally, after years of around-the-clock brainstorming, multiple internal and external reviews and seemingly endless training for the astronauts, the shuttle Endeavour blasted off on mission STS-61 at 9:27 GMT on Dec. 2, 1993. Two days later, Swiss astronaut Claude Nicollier, operating the shuttle's robot arm, plucked Hubble out of open space and mounted it on a rotating cargo bay service platform.

Over the next ﬁve days, Hoffman and fellow spacewalkers Story Musgrave, Kathryn Thornton and Thomas Akers accomplished all of the mission's primary and secondary goals.

"Ah, look at that baby... We'll take some nice pictures with that!" Hoffman said, preparing to install the $24 million Wide Field Planetary Camera 2. Along with installing the $50 million COSTAR package of corrective mirrors, the astronauts also installed:

 Two new solar arrays  Four new stabilizing gyroscopes  Electronic controls for the gyro packs  Additional computer memory  A new solar array drive control system  New electrical fuses

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 70 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

 A new cable to ﬁx an instrument power supply  Two new position-sensing magnetometers

Over the next month, eager scientists and engineers worked through yet another round of calibration and checkout procedures, ﬁne-tuning the telescope's myriad systems and taking test photos to precisely focus its optical system.

Finally, at a heavily attended Jan. 13, 1994, news conference at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, the results were unveiled by Mikulski and NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin.

"The trouble with Hubble is over!" Mikulski declared. "The pictures are remarkable. The science that will come from the pictures is of historical signiﬁcance."

Said Goldin: "This is phase two of a fabulous, two-part success story. The world watched in wonder last month as the astronauts performed an unprecedented and incredibly smooth series of space walks. Now, we see the real fruits of their work and that of the entire NASA team."

Using dramatic before-and-after pictures comparing Hubble's pre- and post-repair eyesight, NASA ofﬁcials demonstrated the telescope's obviously successful overhaul, prompting excited whispers from even the most jaded of space reporters.

In one set of photos, a blurry spiral galaxy became a razor-sharp pinwheel of countless tightly focused stars. In another, a smeared-out blob of light was resolved into a swarm of suns.

"I think Hubble will be viewed as a revolution in astronomy ... going all the way back to Galileo and Tycho Brahe," Leckrone said. "I think Hubble will reveal the clearest possible view of our universe with a telescope of this size and I think we'll have a long list of major breakthroughs in astronomical science."

Weiler agreed, saying "Hubble will accomplish many of its major goals."

STS-61: Restoring Hubble’s vision with corrective optics: Before and after

Among those delayed objectives: Determining the age of the universe to within 10 percent; conﬁrming the existence of supermassive black holes; and charting galactic evolution by looking further back in space and time than ever before.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 71

"I think it will measure the age of the universe to within 10 percent, I think it will tell us a lot about how matter ﬁrst evolved into the galaxies stars and planets we see today," Weiler said. "And I think 50 years from now, spherical aberration will be a footnote because of all these things."

He was right. Since the 1993 repair mission, Hubble has revolutionized optical astronomy, becoming the most signiﬁcant spacecraft ever launched in terms of its overall scientiﬁc impact and its impact on Earth's cultural heritage. Pictures from the Hubble Space Telescope abound in grammar school and high school textbooks. Children are exposed to Hubble's legacy almost from the time they're taught to read.

More important, of course, it has become one of the central tools in the ongoing intellectual struggle to understand the world around us and our place in an evolving universe.

As Weiler predicted, Hubble has played a key role in determining the age of the universe, now thought to be about 13.7 billion years. What Weiler didn't know then was that Hubble also would play a key role in conﬁrming that the expansion of the universe is actually accelerating, not slowing down as common sense would dictate.

As Weiler predicted, Hubble imagery and data show beyond any reasonable doubt that massive black holes exist at the hearts of galaxies across the universe. What he didn't know then was that Hubble would detect galaxies already shining within a billion years of the big bang, far sooner than most astronomers expected.

As Weiler predicted, Hubble has provided razor-sharp views of the outer planets that rival imagery from the Voyager ﬂyby missions. What he didn't know then was that Hubble would provide the best views in the solar system when comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 crashed into Jupiter in 1994.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 72 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

He also could not have predicted Hubble would be the ﬁrst telescope to directly measure the presence of a chemical element in the atmosphere of a planet orbiting another star. Or that Hubble would detect countless potential solar systems - protoplanetary disks, or "proplyds" - embedded in star-forming nebulas.

"Hubble has really opened our eyes to what the universe is made of, its structure, and it has helped us learn how little we know about the universe," said astronaut John Grunsfeld, a veteran Hubble servicing spacewalker. "It's helped us explore the beauty of the universe in a way that we've never been able to before in terms that people can see.

The Hubble Deep Field: In an area of “empty” space the size of a rice grain held at arm’s length, Hubble ﬁnds more than 3,000 galaxies in one of the most remarkable photos ever taken by the space telescope

"When we look back, maybe 30, 40 or 50 years from now, I think we'll see Hubble as the most productive scientiﬁc instrument in human history. It's had that big an impact on people's lives."

Hubble has had that impact in large part because it was designed to be serviced in orbit, allowing NASA to upgrade its instruments and to repair broken equipment.

In February 1997, the crew of shuttle mission STS-82 performed ﬁve back-to-back spacewalks, equipping the telescope with two new science instruments - the Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer (NICMOS) and the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS). NICMOS, chilled to just above absolute zero by a block of

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 73 nitrogen ice, gave Hubble the ability to look through intervening clouds of gas and dust to study phenomena invisible to WFPC-2.

The spacewalkers also installed a new ﬁne guidance sensor, two data recorders, a computer command decoder, new solar array drive electronics and a reaction wheel assembly to help Hubble move from one target to another.

NASA originally planned to launch the third Hubble servicing mission in April 2000. But in early March 1999, NASA managers decided to split that ﬂight into two missions, Servicing Missions 3A and 3B, because of unexpected gyroscope failures. With three of six gyros already out of action, a fourth failed on November 15, 1999, putting Hubble into electronic hibernation.

The Eagle Nebula (detail)

During Servicing Mission 3A in December 1999, the crew of mission STS-103 conducted three back-to-back spacewalks to install a full set of six new gyroscopes, a half-dozen battery regulators, a new computer, a refurbished ﬁne guidance sensor, a solid-state data recorder and a new S-band radio transmitter. The astronauts also installed equipment to help calibrate the ﬁne guidance sensor and attached three insulation panels to keep sensitive equipment from getting too hot or too cold.

In the most recent servicing mission, STS-109 in March 2002, spacewalking astronauts installed a new instrument - the Advanced Camera for Surveys, or ACS, and two new rigid solar arrays that completely eliminated the temperature-induced jitters that hampered earlier operations. The astronauts also installed an innovative xenon refrigerator to revive NICMOS, which ran out of nitrogen ice coolant in 1999.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 74 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Equally important, the spacewalkers replaced Hubble's main electrical distribution system, a "black box" that was not designed to be replaced in space. Again, they were successful, leaving Hubble in better shape than ever before.

"Every year we look at a metric, a way of quantifying how the space science programs of NASA hold up in the whole world of science, all areas of science," said Leckrone. "And by this metric, Hubble is the most productive space mission, science mission, and has had the highest impact of all NASA science missions in the history of this agency.

"Without the servicing that we've done and the refurbishment and the upgrades of the technology on Hubble that we've done, this would not continue to be the case. But it does continue to be the case, year after year. The current demand for the use of Hubble by astronomers all around the world exceeds our ability to satisfy that demand by a factor of eight.

"This factor of eight is a record, it's the highest it's ever been for Hubble and I attribute that to the eager anticipation the community has for using the Advanced Camera for Surveys. We can just hardly wait to get our hands on it."

He did not have long to wait. On April 30, NASA unveiled the ﬁrst images from the new $75 million camera, including a stunning shot showing some 1,500 discernible galaxies, or fragments of galaxies, sprinkled across space like ruddy gemstones on black velvet.

The Sombrero Galaxy

Some of those galactic fragments date back to earlier than a billion years after the big bang. How soon the ﬁrst stars "turned on," ending the so-called dark ages immediately following the big bang - and how long it took them to coalesce into galaxies - is a profound mystery and one of the hottest topics in modern astronomy.

While the spectacular image from Hubble's Advanced Camera for Surveys had not yet resolved the mystery at the time it broke down, it leaves little doubt Hubble will remain at the forefront of astronomy for years to come.

Before the camera's installation, Holland Ford, an astronomer at Johns Hopkins University who is the chief scientist on the ACS project, promised a 10-fold increase in Hubble's ability to ﬁnd faint stars and galaxies.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 75

"I now have the pleasure of reporting to you that we have achieved that 10-fold increase and more," he said when the ﬁrst pictures were unveiled. "The advanced camera gives Hubble and humanity a new window on the universe. This new window is the widest and clearest that Hubble has ever had. I think it is likely that astronomers will use the advanced camera to make discoveries that will change the way we view the universe."

In the wake of the 2003 servicing mission, Hubble's data output was 20 times higher than it was when the telescope was launched in 1990.

"Hubble is the most frequently cited space mission in the scientiﬁc literature, it's also the most frequently cited space science mission in the media," Leckrone said. "It's a national icon."

And that's why NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe's decision in January 2004 to cancel a fourth and ﬁnal shuttle servicing mission to upgrade the telescope set off a storm of controversy and criticism.

O'Keefe told engineers and scientists at NASA's Goddard Spaceﬂight Center that his decision was based on a variety of factors, including a recommendation by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that would require an autonomous tile repair capability for ﬂights not bound for the international space station.

Hubble Servicing Mission 4, or SM-4, was the final flight on NASA's launch manifest that wasn't bound for the space station, where the crew of a crippled shuttle could attempt repairs or await rescue. The CAIB recommendation would have required NASA to develop stand-alone repair techniques for a single flight.

The decision was announced on Jan. 16, 2004, two days after President Bush unveiled a post-Columbia plan to ﬁnish the space station and retire the shuttle by the end of 2010, to develop a new, safer manned spacecraft and to establish a moon base by around 2020.

In a strange twist of fate, John Grunsfeld, the astronomer-astronaut who helped service Hubble in 1999 and 2002, was forced to defend O'Keefe's decision in his new role as NASA's chief scientist.

"This is sort of a sad day that we have to announce this," Grunsfeld said. "But I have to tell you, as somebody very close to the project, I can tell you they made the right decision. It's one that's in the best interests of NASA."

The decision meant that that Wide Field Camera 3 and the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph - both already built - would not be installed. It also left Hubble's continued operation at the mercy of its aging gyroscopes, batteries and other equipment.

"People here are brushing off their resumes," said one ofﬁcial at the Space Telescope Science Institute at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. "Hubble has been such a crown jewel for NASA, I would have hoped it would have tilted the balance the other way. ... It's been a sad day. It was like walking around a funeral home."

O'Keefe's decision was sharply criticized by editorial writers, astronomers and key lawmakers in Washington. O'Keefe eventually authorized a study to explore the feasibility of robotically upgrading Hubble, but it quickly became apparent that any such mission would be extremely complicated and, equally important, expensive.

NASA resumed shuttle ﬂights in 2005 and, independent of any Hubble concerns, devoted considerable resources to developing reliable heat-shield repair techniques. O'Keefe's replacement, Mike Grifﬁn, made no secret of his support for a fourth Hubble servicing mission.

Finally, on Oct. 31, 2006, Griffin officially reinstated a final shuttle mission to service and upgrade the Hubble Space Telescope, deciding the scientific value of the observatory justified the additional cost - and risk - of a stand-alone shuttle flight.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 76 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

"We have conducted a detailed analysis of the performance and procedures necessary to carry out a successful Hubble repair mission over the course of the last three shuttle missions," Grifﬁn said in a statement. "What we have learned has convinced us that we are able to conduct a safe and effective servicing mission to Hubble.

"While there is an inherent risk in all spaceﬂight activities, the desire to preserve a truly international asset like the Hubble Space Telescope makes doing this mission the right course of action."

Mikulski stood up and led a standing ovation.

The Hubble Space Telescope chronicles the impact of a comet on Jupiter

"What an exceptional day today is," she said. "I'm so pleased and so excited that Dr. Grifﬁn has just announced that Hubble will be serviced. ... It's a great day for science. It's a great day for Atlantis. It's a great day for inspiration, because that's one of the things Hubble has meant for so many people."

Said Preston Burch, manager of the Hubble program at Goddard: "We're elated. I have a hard time ﬁnding the right words to express it, but we are extremely pleased, giddy with enthusiasm about this."

At that time, Hubble Servicing Mission No. 4 was slated for the shuttle Discovery and launch was targeted for May 2008. It later was switched to Atlantis and delayed to early October. The, just three weeks before launch, one channel of a two-channel science data formatter aboard Hubble failed. NASA managers ultimately decided to delay launch to give engineers time to check out and certify a replacement science instrument data system computer that will restore full redundancy to the data system. While engineers initially held out hope for a launch in February, the ﬂight slipped to May 12 when all was said and done.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 77

If SM-4 is successful, engineers believe Hubble will remain scientiﬁcally productive at least through 2013, an additional ﬁve years beyond what could be expected based on the current health of its aging batteries and gyroscopes. With any luck at all, the telescope will still be operating when its replacement, the huge infrared- sensitive James Webb Space Telescope, is launched around 2013.

The Hubble Space Telescope after its most recent servicing mission in 2002

In the meantime, Hubble's two new science instruments will help the iconic observatory address some of the most fundamental questions in astrophysics and cosmology, including the nature of the so-called dark energy, believed to be accelerating the expansion of the universe, and the evolution of galaxies in the wake of the big bang.

Huge ground-based telescopes using computer-controlled adaptive optics, which can compensate for turbulence in the atmosphere, rival or exceed Hubble's vision in some areas. But Hubble's resolution, "the sharpness of its vision, is really unparalleled and it will be a long while before that is achieved in the optical by the best adaptive optics," said Mario Livio, a senior astrophysicist at the Space Telescope Science Institute.

"There is some hope it will overlap with the James Webb Space Telescope, which in itself would be incredible. Imagine you would have something (in space observing) from the ultraviolet to the mid-to-far infrared, operating at the same time. This would be incredible."

Grunsfeld, an astronomer by training, said "the biggest discovery that Hubble will make is the next one."

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 78 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

"A lot of folks don't believe that, but from the last mission we were told that and there was this small discussion about something called dark energy, which we now know is about 75 percent of the total energy content of the universe," he said. "Prior to the previous Hubble missions, nobody even knew it existed. So I think that's pretty big. I don't know how we can top that, but I imagine there'll be something."

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 79

Reﬂections on Hubble

Mattias "Matt" Mountain, an engaging astronomer who helped guide the twin 8-meter Gemini telescopes from drawing board to reality, is the director of the Space Telescope Science Institute at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and as such, the man directly in charge of the Hubble Space Telescope. The day after former NASA Administrator Mike Grifﬁn approved a ﬁnal shuttle mission to service and upgrade the space telescope, Mountain discussed the observatory and the prospects for future discoveries with science writer William Harwood, representing Astronomy Now magazine (http://www.astronomynow.com/magazine.shtml).

Astronomy Now: How do you measure the success of an instrument like Hubble?

Mountain: One of the key metrics is, what's the demand for Hubble from the astronomical community? And it's between 5 and 6-to-1. Only 1-in-6 proposals actually gets to the telescope. And we're talking about the top astronomers in the world applying for time. The other metric is how many proposals we get in any one-year cycle. We get about 800 to 1,000 in any one cycle. The other metric is, how many papers get produced? Astronomers like to measure things in discoveries in publications. To date, Hubble has produced something like 6,000 refereed papers, hard-core scientiﬁc papers. That's 12 discoveries per week!

Astronomy Now: That's pretty good for a 94.5-inch mirror. It's amazing how it stacks up against many much larger telescopes on the ground.

Mountain: I used to work on an 8-metre telescope in Hawaii. Gemini, I ran the team that built the Gemini observatory. And from the ground, you can do great things with an 8-metre telescope. But we always looked to Hubble, it set the standard for discovery.

Astronomy Now: But aren't ground telescopes with adaptive optics catching up, or at least closing the gap? How does Hubble stack up against that new technology?

Mountain: Given that I ran one of the world's best adaptive optics groups when I was in Hawaii, I can answer that question in a reasonably qualiﬁed way, actually. Adaptive optics works by correcting for the turbulent atmosphere. The thing is, it's not a perfect correction. Where it works very well is in the near infrared because it's slow enough and the precision with which you have to make those corrections is within the available technology. OK? So we can get reasonably good images in the infrared.

When you do adaptive optics, you have to use a (nearby) star for reference, you have to say 'what does a point source look like' and then you use (a deformable) mirror to correct that. If you think about it, light from a distant galaxy comes comes through the atmosphere in a cylinder to a telescope. The star you're trying to correct comes from a slightly different cylinder. The farther away the star gets, the less perfect your correction gets. Adaptive optics really only works on axis, so we couldn't do something like the Hubble Deep Field, which covered a great area of sky, because we can't make that correction across the whole ﬁeld.

The other thing we can't do, whatever anybody else may say, it's extraordinarily hard to do adaptive optics in the optical. Because you need such enormous computing power to make those very fast corrections and again, we don't know how to do this over any ﬁeld. So in the optical wide ﬁeld, space telescopes are going to remain unique.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 80 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Astronomy Now: What about systems that use lasers to make artiﬁcial stars?

Mountain: Again, they only work on a very narrow ﬁeld of view. You point your laser near the galaxy, you start integrating and you get that one galaxy. But you can't get 10,000 galaxies to the same correction in that same ﬁeld.

Astronomy Now: So you don't see technology closing that gap anytime soon.

Mountain: I see it closing in certain areas. If I can use wavelengths, 1 micron to 2.5 microns is an area where the ground-based adaptive optics will begin to catch up to space. It's going to take a little bit of evolution in the technology, but it will do it. Beyond 1.5 microns, the atmosphere is just too warm, you're looking through a furnace. You have to be out in cold space. There's nothing you can do about that. In the optical and ultraviolet, it's such a hard technology problem we're decades away from solving that problem.

Astronomy Now: Administrator Grifﬁn has said it will cost some $900 million to complete preparations and launch the next servicing mission. That would buy a really big telescope on the ground.

Mountain: It would buy you a really big telescope with blurry seeing. One of the challenges for the ground-based telescopes, the big ones - and I was on one of the 30-metre telescope teams - is to make adaptive optics technology mature enough to use with these very big telescopes. And it's a real technology challenge. But again, there are certain wavelengths like the ultraviolet that will never get down to the ground. In the infrared, there's this middle area where the ground-based guys are trying to compete, around about the 0.9 to the 2.5 micron region. That's where the overlap could be.

But it isn't going to be over wide ﬁelds. You can't scatter lasers all over the sky. Take the Hubble Deep Field. It's an arc minute across. You'd have to put a matrix of lasers on that and then stitch the whole thing together. People are having ideas like that, but it's incredibly complicated and it's certainly not mature technology. NICMOS (an infrared instrument aboard Hubble) working at 1.6 microns on a 2.4 meter telescope does as well as my 8-metre telescope with adaptive optics in Hawaii.

Astronomy Now: So the new Wide Field Camera 3 represents another big step forward.

Mountain: The enormous discovery potential of having a powerful new infrared-optical-UV camera in space gives us an unparalleled capability that we'll never have on the ground for at least two decades. And in the ultraviolet and optical, maybe even longer. You can go so much deeper because there's no atmosphere. It gives us a 10-fold gain in sensitivity over our current Hubble cameras. We're going to see for the very ﬁrst time some of the very ﬁrst galaxies.

Astronomy Now: You mentioned the Hubble Deep Field a few moments ago. That was basically a long time- exposure photograph that captured the light from thousands of galaxies in a tiny part of the sky, some of them dating back to within a billion years of the big bang. Are there any similar plans for the new camera?

Mountain: With Wide Field Camera 3, there's a strong case for doing an infrared ultra deep ﬁeld. The point is, these galaxies, these very distant ones, are getting redder and redder as they get red shifted out of the optical region of the spectrum. What we want to do is capture them in the infrared where we can see farther back. An infrared ultra deep ﬁeld will push us back to the point where the universe was perhaps only half a billion years old. That's an incredible look-back time.

If you look back with Hubble now, there's no light at optical wavelengths (at those distances), it's all gone. And so we will be doing, once we've got the camera up and working and really understand it, an infrared ultra deep ﬁeld. It will look very different, it will look even richer than the one you have on your wall.

Astronomy Now: Hubble has been instrumental in ﬁnding the remote type 1A supernovas that helped conﬁrm the recent discovery that the expansion of the universe is accelerating, not slowing down like everyone once thought. How will the new camera help improve our understanding of this dark energy?

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 81

Mountain: With a much wider ﬁeld camera, we'll be able to pick out many more high-redshift supernovas and really nail down how that expansion is going. We need to be able to characterize it. If you look at these graphs, the error bars are still pretty big.

Astronomy Now: And a larger sample size will help pin sown whether the acceleration is changing in time?

Mountain: Exactly. What we want to do is look back to the time when dark energy is just kicking in. When we look back to a time when dark energy isn't there, we'll get a calibration. Hopefully this should help nail the emergence of dark energy with the camera.

Astronomy Now: Dark energy was present from the beginning, but the thinking is it didn't show up until about ﬁve billion years ago, when the universe thinned out enough for dark energy to overcome gravity. Is that right?

Mountain: Five to six billion years ago.

Astronomy Now: What the hell is it?

Mountain: I wish we knew! That's one of the great things. The other great thing about Hubble is we don't know what else we're going to discover. Every time you put a new camera on and increase your sensitivity by a factor of 10, you get surprises. Of course, the other instrument we're putting on is the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph. That's quite fascinating. It's harder to explain generally, but it's a fascinating idea.

Astronomy Now: Well, let's give it a try. What's it going to do?

Mountain: We expect to have all this baryonic (normal) matter and dark matter between galaxies, these streamers of mass, these networks of spider web construction. The Cosmic Origins Spectrograph will allow us to sample those layers of dark matter like in a core sample looking back in time. You'll get these layers of matter going farther and farther back in time. So what we should actually be able to track is how matter evolved over that period, from very simple matter to how more and more metals came in. We'll get a real handle on how did the matter that you and I are made of today come into existence. I think that's going to be quite fascinating. We'll sample this web of matter and dark matter.

Astronomy Now: The astronauts also plan to ﬁx the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph, which broke down a few years ago. What are you going to do with that?

Mountain: What we were doing just before the STIS failed was that for the very ﬁrst time we were measuring the composition of exo-solar planetary atmospheres. As a planet goes in front of a star, the light dims by some very small fraction, only 1 percent. But because we're in space - you could never do this from the ground - Hubble can measure that so precisely you can actually measure the spectrum of the atmosphere as it moves in front of the sun. You just take the difference. The guys here measured hydrogen, carbon and oxygen in the atmosphere of an extra- solar planet. I mean, oh boy!

Just as we were starting to do that, the spectrograph failed. So one of the big things we're going to be doing with STIS or with COS - we still don't quite know what will be the best spectrograph for this - we're going to start going back to all those planets we've found and actually start looking at the atmospheres and trying to understand what elements exist in the atmospheres of extra-solar planets. Because after all, this is the stuff of life. Now, this will be big planets like Jupiter and so forth, but if we start ﬁnding solar systems out there that have these elements in them, it will change the way we think about extra-solar planetary systems.

Astronomy Now: Especially when you ﬁnd diesel exhaust.

Mountain: Exactly! A little bit of methane and you think, 'oh my God, cows!'

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 82 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Astronomy Now: Joking aside, I guess the point is that with SM-4 you're going to have a state-of-the-art telescope once again.

Mountain: We're going to have a brand new telescope, which will be state of the art. Because we're going to put these new detectors in, this new camera in it, the spectrograph is 10 times more sensitive than any spectrograph we've ever ﬂown before. We're going to have a brand new telescope. It's like taking your old car in and not just giving it a wash and changing the battery and putting some new oil in, we're going to rip out the engine, put a brand new engine in, turbo-charge it and all that kind of stuff.

It hasn't met its full potential yet. We haven't made full use of this really good 2.4-metre mirror. OK, it's ﬂawed, but we know exactly how ﬂawed it is and we can correct for it in the instruments. It still is the biggest mirror up in space by a factor of two. There isn't going to be a bigger one up there until the James Webb Space Telescope launches in 2013. And in the end, size matters.

Astronomy Now: You came on board after Sean O'Keefe canceled SM-4. Why would you leave Gemini for HST if SM-4 was off the table?

Mountain: I was prepared to take the risk. NASA had a new administrator and Mike Griffin himself had said that if there were two good (shuttle) flights he would reconsider it. Mike Griffin was an engineer, he worked with data. And HST still had a very viable life left and we were also going to be doing the JWST. And I felt it was worth the risk. I had a lot of faith that Mike Griffin would make the right decision. Now, we were of course biting our fingernails that the shuttle flights that went up were going to be successful.

Astronomy Now: That makes HST unique, doesn't it, the fact that people risk their lives to work on it.

Mountain: Exactly. We always said we would respect Mike Grifﬁn's decision, that in the end it's his call, he's the NASA administrator. If he had made the counter decision, we always said we would respect that, too. You are putting people's lives at risk.

Astronomy Now: Where does Hubble stand in the history of telescopes at this point?

Mountain: The way I would put it is, what transformed our view of the universe, which telescopes really transformed our view of our place in the universe and where we came from? Let's use some pretty high standards here. OK, so you have Galileo, who discovered the moons of Jupiter and that the Earth's moon was not perfect. Suddenly, he opened up the whole notion that no longer were we the center of the solar system. Edwin Hubble, using the 100- inch telescope at Mount Wilson, told us the universe was far bigger than we ﬁrst thought. We went to an enormous universe, we went to an expanding universe. That is mind blowing from a cultural and scientiﬁc perspective.

Then I would have to put the Hubble Space Telescope because the Hubble has reconﬁrmed all that, it has found transiting planets, it has found dark energy, it's measured the age of the universe and the discoveries keep rolling. Hubble established the fact that most galaxies have black holes and the mass of the black holes is correlated to the mass of the galaxy. So I put Hubble in that league, It has transformed our view of the universe. Before Hubble, we didn't know anything about dark energy, we didn't know how old the universe was. Those are pretty fundamental things. Imagine a textbook written before Hubble and now think of textbooks written after Hubble. I would say that is as transformative as Hubble himself using the 100 inch.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 83

NASA STS-125 Mission Overview3

The STS‐125 mission of space shuttle Atlantis is scheduled for launch at 1:31 p.m. EDT on Tuesday, May 12, from Launch Complex 39A at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, Fla. Atlantis’ crew will service the Hubble Space Telescope for the ﬁfth and ﬁnal time.

Nineteen years since its launch in April 1990, Hubble’s view of the universe again will be dramatically improved with the addition of two new science instruments, the repair of two others, and the replacement of other hardware that will extend the telescope’s life into the next decade.

The mission will be commanded by retired Navy Capt. Scott Altman with retired Navy Capt. Gregory C. Johnson serving as pilot. Megan McArthur is the ﬂight engineer. The remaining four mission specialists will pair off in teams for the ﬁve spacewalks. They are Andrew Feustel, Air Force Col. Michael Good, John Grunsfeld, and Mike Massimino.

Altman will make his fourth ﬂight, Grunsfeld his ﬁfth and Massimino his second. Their last mission was together on the fourth Hubble servicing mission, STS‐109, in March 2002. The other four crew members are rookies.

Grunsfeld will make his third consecutive visit to Hubble, having performed ﬁve spacewalks on his previous missions. On STS‐125, Grunsfeld and Feustel will team on the odd‐numbered spacewalks, while Massimino and Good are paired on spacewalks two and four.

After launch, the crew will oversee the checkout of the robotic arm, which will see extensive action throughout the mission to position spacewalkers in close proximity to worksites. The arm also will be used to survey the outside surfaces of Atlantis’ crew cabin. Additionally, the robotic arm will be used on the second day of the ﬂight to inspect the shuttle’s sensitive thermal protection system using the Orbiter Boom Sensor System. The boom includes sensors that can detect any signiﬁcant damage that may have occurred during the launch and climb to orbit. Imagery experts in Mission Control, Houston, will evaluate that data in near real‐time, to determine the health of the orbiter’s thermal protection system. The boom is tucked along the right sill of the payload bay, which also houses the rest of the mission’s science instruments, protective canisters and hardware.

On Flight Day Three Atlantis will arrive within 35 feet of the telescope, at an altitude of about 350 statute miles. McArthur will carefully extend the robotic arm to capture a grapple ﬁxture on the telescope. She then will carefully place Hubble atop its Flight Support System, or FSS, in the back end of the shuttle’s payload bay.

The FSS serves as a high‐tech “lazy Susan” that can be rotated and tilted to present the desired part of the telescope forward for easy access by spacewalkers, and to offer the best viewing angles for cameras and crew members inside Atlantis. It also provides all electrical and mechanical interfaces between the shuttle and the telescope.

With Atlantis’ payload bay essentially serving as a giant tool box, the stage is set for the first of five spacewalks, known as Extravehicular Activity, or EVA, on consecutive days beginning on Flight Day Four. Each spacewalk is scheduled to last about 6 1/2 hours. Since almost every part of Hubble was designed to be repaired and upgraded by astronauts, training has focused on actual hardware at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md., and underwater mockups at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, where timelines have been refined for each day’s scheduled work.

The actual servicing of Hubble will begin on Flight Day Four with the ﬁrst EVA. Grunsfeld, joined by Feustel initially, will focus on swapping the current Wide Field Planetary Camera 2 with the like‐sized Wide Field Camera 3, which will extend Hubble’s capability not only by seeing deeper into the universe, but also by providing wide‐ﬁeld imagery

3 Word for word from the NASA STS-125 Press Kit, available on line at: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/hst_sm4/index.html

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 84 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement in all three regions of the spectrum – ultraviolet, visible and near infrared. It is this wide‐ﬁeld “panchromatic” coverage that makes WFC3 so unique. The new instrument has a mass of 900 pounds and measures 26 inches high, 74 inches wide, and 87 inches long.

The next task has Grunsfeld and Feustel swapping the Science Instrument Command and Data Handling (SI C&DH) system in Bay 10 with a ground spare called into service when the in‐orbit unit’s “A” side suffered a permanent electronic failure in late September 2008. The unit provides command capability to Hubble’s science instruments from the ground and sends data back. Its criticality dictated a slight shufﬂe to the spacewalk plan to place the removal and replacement of the SI C&DH as the servicing mission’s second major task.

The ﬁrst spacewalk will wrap up with a forward‐looking task requiring installation of a Soft Capture and Rendezvous System, or SCRS, which will enable the future rendezvous, capture, and safe disposal of Hubble by either a crewed or robotic mission.

Comprised of the Soft Capture Mechanism, or SCM, and the Relative Navigation System, or RNS, the SCRS will mount underneath the telescope, using a Low Impact Docking System, or LIDS, interface. LIDS is designed to be compatible with the rendezvous and docking systems that will be used on the nextgeneration space transportation vehicle.

The SCM is about 72 inches in diameter and 24 inches high and will be attached to the telescope by three sets of jaws that clamp onto the existing berthing pins on Hubble’s aft bulkhead.

Alternating EVA days, Massimino and Good will take their turn on Flight Day Five, focusing on the removal and replacement of three pairs of gyroscopes known as Rate Sensor Units, or RSUs. In concert with star trackers and Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS), the RSUs help point the telescope precisely for its science observations.

EVA 2 will end with the swap out of the first of two battery modules behind an equipment bay directly above the WFC3 location. Each module weighs 460 pounds and measures 36 inches long, 32 inches wide, and 11 inches high and contains three batteries. Each nickel hydrogen battery weighs 125 pounds and provides all the electrical power to support Hubble operations during the night portion of its orbit. The second battery module will be installed during the fifth and final EVA.

Designed to last only ﬁve years, Hubble’s batteries have lasted more than 13 years beyond their design life, longer than those in any other spacecraft located in low Earth orbit.

Installation of the second new science instrument, the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph, or COS, will kick off the third spacewalk by Grunsfeld and Feustel on Flight Day Six. The size of a phone booth, COS will effectively restore spectroscopy to Hubble’s scientiﬁc arsenal. It will replace the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement, or COSTAR, instrument that corrected Hubble’s vision during the ﬁrst servicing mission 15 years ago. COS weighs 851 pounds and measures 86 inches long, 35 inches wide, and 35 inches high.

COSTAR included an ingenious design of small mirrors on deployable arms that provided corrected light beams to the ﬁrst generation of Hubble instruments in 1993. With all scientiﬁc instruments designed on the ground to compensate for the primary mirror’s “spherical aberration,” COSTAR is no longer needed and will be placed in a protective canister for its return to Earth.

With the COS task completed, Grunsfeld and Feustel will turn their attention to one of the more delicate tasks of the mission, the restoration of the power supply for the Advanced Camera for Surveys, or ACS, which has been inoperable since January 2007, when its backup power supply system failed.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 85

When all of the screws have been removed, the entire capture plate can be released as one unit, safely taking the access panel and screws with it.

With the ACS power failure likely conﬁned to the instrument’s low‐voltage power supply, a direct repair of that subsystem would require too much time for the spacewalk, so engineers devised a plan to replace the entire electronics box, which will be powered by a separate low‐voltage power supply. The replacement power supply draws power from the Advanced Camera for Surveys’ primary power connectors via an astronaut‐installed splitter cable.

If careful removal of 36 screws weren’t enough, the fourth spacewalk on Flight Day Seven will arguably set the bar higher for access panel removal when Massimino and Good focus on the repair of the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph’s, or STIS, power supply system. They will begin by attaching another fastener capture plate to secure 117 screws, so they will not have to capture them with their pressurized gloved hands.

Repairing the ACS power supply will begin by preparing the worksite for removal and replacement of the failed circuit boards. This requires ﬁrst removing 36 screws from the electronics access panel using a specially designed “fastener capture plate” that will prevent loss of the tiny screws after removal. When all of the screws have been removed, the entire capture plate can be released as one unit, safely taking the access panel and screws with it.

The two astronauts then will remove and replace one of the three Fine Guidance Sensors, FGS‐2, used to provide pointing information for the spacecraft. The sensors also serve as a scientiﬁc instrument for determining the precise position and motion of stars, known as astrometry.

The three Fine Guidance Sensors can hold the telescope steady for scientiﬁc observations over long periods of time. The system serves as the telescope’s pointing control system and has a precision comparable to being able to hold a laser beam focused on a dime 200 miles away, the distance from Washington D.C. to New York City.

The refurbished and improved FGS previously had been returned on the third servicing mission in December 1999. This refurbished unit has an enhanced in‐orbit alignment capability over the original FGS design. It weighs 478 pounds and measures 5.5 feet long, 4 feet wide, and 2 feet high.

Grunsfeld and Feustel’s last task before closing up the telescope for good will be to remove and replace at least one additional thermal blanket (NOBL) protecting Hubble’s electronics.

After the work on Hubble is completed, Altman and Johnson will oversee Atlantis’ reboost of the telescope to a higher altitude, ensuring it will survive the tug of Earth’s gravity for the remainder of its operational lifetime. A ﬁnal decision on how much altitude will be gained by the reboost will be dependent on Atlantis’ available propellant.

Hubble Space Telescope science observations are expected to resume approximately three weeks after the shuttle departs.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 86 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

With servicing completed, the stage will be set for release of Hubble from the shuttle’s robotic arm for the ﬁnal time on Flight Day Nine. Before release, the telescope’s new batteries will be fully charged by placing Atlantis into a position allowing Hubble’s solar arrays “sun time.” The aperture door will be opened and the high‐gain antennas once again will be deployed.

McArthur will release the grapple ﬁxture as Altman and Johnson guide Atlantis carefully away, before subtle thruster ﬁrings place the shuttle a safe distance from Hubble. Later that day, attention will turn to surveys of Atlantis’ thermal protection system, including its wing leading edge panels, nose cap and underside tiles. Imagery experts will evaluate the data to determine the health of the thermal protection system.

A crew off‐duty day on Flight Day 10 will be followed on Flight Day 11 by the standard day‐before‐landing checkout of landing systems, including the ﬂight control system and reaction control system thrusters and accompanying electronics.

Once Atlantis is cleared for entry following the late inspection imagery review, space shuttle Endeavour, on standby at Launch Pad 39B for service as a rescue vehicle, will be released for processing toward its mission to the International Space Station in June. Kennedy ground operations will prepare it for relocation to pad 39A about a week after Atlantis returns to Earth.

STS‐125 will be the 30th for Atlantis, following its previous ﬂight to the International Space Station in February 2008 to deliver the European Space Agency’s Columbus science laboratory. This will be the 126th ﬂight in the history of the shuttle program. Landing is scheduled at about 9:58 a.m. EDT on May 23, at the Kennedy Space Center.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 87

NASA STS-125 Payload Overview4

HUBBLE SERVICING MISSION PAYLOAD BAY HARDWARE

There will be four support structures ﬂying in Atlantis’s cargo bay that will carry the science instruments, ﬂight hardware, support equipment and tools to be used during the mission.

 Flight Support System (FSS)  Super Lightweight Interchangeable Carrier (SLIC)  Multi‐Use Lightweight Equipment (MULE) Carrier  Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier (ORUC)

1. FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM (FSS)

The Flight Support System (FSS) is a reusable equipment system that provides the structural, mechanical, and electrical interfaces between a spacecraft and the orbiter for launch, retrieval, and in‐orbit servicing missions. It also served as the maintenance platform holding Hubble in place while providing a means for rotation about two axes for correct positioning during deployment and in‐orbit servicing.

The FSS conﬁguration for spacecraft deployment or retrieval consists of three structural cradles, mechanisms for spacecraft retention and positioning, and avionics. The cradles provide the structural support for the payload and storage locations for tools and electronics. The mechanisms for retention and positioning allow the spacecraft to be docked to the FSS, serviced, and released. The FSS provides the electrical interface between the orbiter and the Hubble, and between the orbiter and the servicing mission payload elements.

The avionics provide all necessary power, command, control, and data monitoring interfaces to support operational modes of the spacecraft. The avionics also provide for remote control of all FSS mechanisms from the orbiter aft ﬂight deck. The conﬁguration for in‐orbit servicing typically consists of one cradle with Berthing and Positioning System, mechanisms, and avionics.

The FSS has a specific configuration for servicing the Hubble Space Telescope. The Hubble servicing configuration consists of a single cradle, avionics, mechanisms, and the Berthing and Positioning System (BAPS). Once Hubble is berthed to the FSS, the BAPS is used to orient the Hubble for servicing and to react to loads induced by reboosting Hubble to a higher orbit. The avionics and mechanisms used for Hubble servicing are a subset of the full complement available, with additional power capability.

2. SUPER LIGHTWEIGHT INTERCHANGEABLE CARRIER (SLIC)

Each time astronauts upgrade the Hubble Space Telescope, the new equipment rides to orbit on specialized pallets called carriers. The composite Super Lightweight Interchangeable Carrier (SLIC) is a new breed of equipment carrier that will allow the space shuttle to transport a full complement of scientiﬁc instruments and other components to Hubble.

Carriers transport Hubble’s new cargo in the space shuttle’s payload bay, protecting the cargo from the stress of launch and the trip to orbit. They also serve as temporary parking places for hardware during spacewalks.

Once the mission is complete and the new hardware has been installed on Hubble, carriers provide storage space and protection for the old equipment’s journey back to Earth.

4 Word for word from the NASA STS-125 Press Kit, available on line at: http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/hst_sm4/index.html

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 88 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

These large carriers, which span the width of the shuttle’s payload bay, add thousands of pounds to the weight of the shuttle. Since the fully loaded shuttle cannot exceed a speciﬁed maximum weight limit, every pound trimmed from a carrier is one more pound that can be used for additional payload, e.g., science instruments or fuel for maneuvering or reboost.

Anticipating that Servicing Mission 4 will need to carry a full load of instruments and equipment to orbit, in addition to equipment that will be needed to inspect the shuttle’s thermal protection system (TPS), the Hubble Space Telescope team built SLIC using state‐of-the‐ art, lightweight composite materials and a more structurally efﬁcient design. Engineers dramatically increased performance and load carrying capability while signiﬁcantly reducing weight. Compared to aluminum and titanium, which are metals typically used in spacecraft and launch vehicle design, the composites used to build SLIC have greater strength‐to-mass ratios. SLIC features other attractive performance characteristics such as fatigue resistance, which means it is less susceptible to wear and tear.

Made of carbon fiber with a cyanate ester resin and a titanium metal matrix composite, SLIC is the first all‐composite carrier to fly on the shuttle. This flat, reusable pallet looks very different from the carriers flown on previous Hubble servicing missions because of its efficient design. This design plus SLIC’s composite construction makes it much lighter and stronger than traditional aluminum carriers. About half the weight of its predecessors, SLIC shows a dramatic increase in performance over other Hubble equipment carriers, with nearly double the carrying capability.

Weighing in at just 1,750 pounds, SLIC will carry Hubble’s newest camera, the 980‐pound Wide Field Camera 3, which will ride to orbit in a 650‐pound protective enclosure. SLIC also will carry two new batteries, each weighing 460 pounds.

As the pathfinder for the use of composites in human spaceflight, SLIC has established the benchmark for technology required for future space missions, including analysis, testing and verification.

Following in the footsteps of SLIC’s development, future human and robotic exploration missions will beneﬁt from the use of composite materials. Engineers for programs such as the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle are currently in discussions with Goddard engineers to learn how they succeeded with SLIC so they, too, can construct stronger, more efﬁcient composites in decades to come.

SLIC Capabilities and Characteristics

 Structure weight: 1,750 pounds  Load capability: 5,500 pounds  Hubble Servicing Mission payload weight: 3,700 pounds  Performance (Load Capability/Weight): 3.14  Size: 180ʺ x 104ʺ  Structurally interchangeable: Wings can be added to increase deck size  Honeycomb surface can accommodate various payloads using post‐bonded inserts  Compatible with all Hubble carrier avionics

3. ORBITAL REPLACEMENT UNIT CARRIER

The ORUC is centered in Atlantis’ payload bay. It provides safe transport of ORUs to and from orbit.

 The Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) is stored in the Axial Scientific Instrument Protective Enclosure (ASIPE).  The Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) is stored in the Radial Scientific Instrument Protective Enclosure (FSIPE).  Three Rate Sensor Units (RSU) are stored on the starboard side Small ORU Protective Enclosure (SOPE).  The ORUC houses other hardware, including the Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) and WF/PC Handhold stored on the port side Forward Fixture, an Aft Fixture, Scientific Instrument Safety Bar, MLI Repair Tool, two STS PFRs and an Extender, two Translation Aids (TA) and STIS MEB replacement cover. It also carries two Auxiliary Transport Modules

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 89

(ATM), a Large ORU Protective Enclosure (LOPE), a New ORU Protective Enclosure (NOPE) and Fastener Capture Plate (FCP) enclosure to house miscellaneous CATs for the STIS and ACS repair work.

The protective enclosure, its heaters and thermal insulation control the temperature of the new ORUs, providing an environment with normal operating temperatures. Struts between the ASIPE enclosure and the pallet protect science instruments from loads generated at liftoff and during Earth return.

Also on the ORUC will be an IMAX 3D Cargo Bay Camera.

IMAX Hubble 3D Movie

Hubble 3D (working title), from the Space Station 3D ﬁlmmaking team, tells the story of the most important, scientiﬁc instrument since Galileo, and the greatest success in space since the Moon Landing: the Hubble Space Telescope.

Hubble has revealed our universe to us as never before. With Hubble’s amazing treasure trove of imagery brought to life in IMAX 3D, audiences of all ages will be able to explore the grandeur of galaxies, nebulae, birth and death of stars, and the curiosities and mysteries of our celestial surroundings as never before. With its dramatic story of endeavor, near catastrophic failure, and ultimate rescue, Hubble 3D will provide a unique legacy for generations to come, all in amazing IMAX 3D.

Hubble 3D marks the fifth time the IMAX 3D Cargo Bay Camera has flown aboard the space shuttle. The IMAX team has trained the mission’s commander and pilot on the operation of the camera, which is mounted in the optimum position in the shuttle’s cargo bay to capture stunning IMAX 3D images of the historic final servicing mission. The commander and pilot will double as filmmakers as two teams of spacewalking astronauts, working in tandem with the shuttle’s robot arm, perform the most complex and challenging work ever undertaken in space as they replace and refurbish many of the telescope’s delicate precision instruments.

The Hubble 3D movie will be in IMAX and IMAX 3D theaters worldwide beginning spring 2010.

4. MULTI-USE LIGHTWEIGHT EQUIPMENT CARRIER

The MULE is located in Atlantis’ aft payload bay. It has provisions for safe transport of ORUs to orbit:

 The Contingency ORU Protective Enclosure (COPE) contains the spare ORUs and tools.  The MULE Integrated NOBL Container (MINC) contains the new NOBL protective coverings to be installed on the Telescope Support Systems Module Equipment Section (SSM‐ES) bay doors.  The MULE also carries other hardware including eight Aft Shroud Latch Repair Kits and Low Gain Antenna Protective Covers (LGAPC).  The replacement SI C&DH will ride to orbit on the MULE. The unit is a collection of 14 components, arranged in six stacks that are mounted on a tray to create a single Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU).

  

SOFT CAPTURE AND RENDEZVOUS SYSTEM (SCRS)

When the Hubble Space Telescope reaches the end of its life, NASA will need to deorbit it safely using a next‐ generation space transportation vehicle.

Originally planned for Earth return on the shuttle, Hubble’s scientiﬁc life will now extend beyond the planned retirement date of the shuttle in 2010. As part of Servicing Mission 4, engineers have developed the Soft Capture and. Rendezvous System, or SCRS, which will enable the future rendezvous, capture, and safe disposal of Hubble by either a crewed or robotic mission. The SCRS greatly increases the current shuttle capture envelop interfaces on

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 90 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Hubble, therefore signiﬁcantly reducing the rendezvous and capture design complexities associated with the disposal mission.

The SCRS is comprised of the Soft Capture Mechanism (SCM) system and the Relative Navigation System (RNS).

The Soft Capture Mechanism

The Soft Capture Mechanism (SCM) will launch on a turn‐table like piece of equipment called the Flight Support System (FSS) within the cargo bay of the shuttle. The FSS serves as the berthing platform for Hubble and provides all electrical and mechanical interfaces between the shuttle and the telescope while Hubble is docked.

The SCM uses a Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) interface and associated relative navigation targets for future rendezvous, capture, and docking operations. The system’s LIDS interface is designed to be compatible with the rendezvous and docking systems to be used on the next‐generation space transportation vehicle.

During the mission, astronauts will attach the SCM to Hubble. About 72 inches in diameter and 2 feet high, the SCM will sit on the bottom of Hubble, inside the FSS berthing and positioning ring, without affecting the normal FSS‐to‐ Hubble interfaces. It will be attached onto the telescope by three sets of jaws that clamp onto the existing berthing pins on Hubble’s aft bulkhead.

The astronauts will drive a gearbox, and the jaws will release the SCM from the FSS and clamp onto Hubble’s berthing pins. It can be transferred to Hubble at any time during the mission.

The Relative Navigation System

The Relative Navigation System (RNS) is an imaging system consisting of optical and navigation sensors and supporting avionics. It will collect data on Hubble during capture and deployment.

The RNS system will acquire valuable information about Hubble by way of images and video of the telescope’s aft bulkhead as the shuttle releases it back into space.

This information will enable NASA to pursue numerous options for the safe de‐orbit of Hubble.

The RNS system will be carried on the Multi‐ Use Lightweight Equipment (MULE) carrier aboard the shuttle.

  

THE THREE “R’S” OF STS-125

All of the payloads, tools and work on the telescope that will take place during STS‐125 can be thought of as falling into a new version of the Three Rs rule. But instead of Reading, (w)Riting and (a)Rithmithic., the STS‐125 version involves:

 Refurbish – Hardware and activities that will extend Hubble’s operating life by installing new Battery Module Units (BMUs), new Rate Sensor Units (RSUs), New Outer Blanket Layer (NOBL) material and an upgraded Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS).

 Restore – The astronauts will make repairs to two science instruments that have stopped working – Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS) and the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS).

 Renew – Two brand new science instruments – Wide Field Camera‐3 (WFC‐3) and the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) will be installed.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 91

A. REFURBISH ACTIVITIES

1. RATE SENSOR UNITS (RSUs)

During Servicing Mission 4, astronauts will replace all six of Hubble’s gyroscopes, which are needed to point the spacecraft. Gyroscopes, or gyros, measure rates of motion when Hubble is changing its pointing from one target (a star or planet, for example) to another, and they help control the telescope’s pointing while scientists are observing targets.

Each gyro is packaged in a Rate Sensor assembly. The assemblies are packed in pairs inside boxes called Rate Sensor Units (RSUs). It is the RSU that astronauts change when they replace gyros, so gyros are always replaced two at a time.

Previously, Hubble needed three of the six gyros to conduct science, and the other three functioned as spares. However, after substantial changes to Hubble’s pointing control algorithms, only two gyros are now needed.

How Gyros Work

Gyros are used to maintain orientation and provide stability in boats, aircraft and spacecraft. They work by a scientiﬁc principle called the gyroscopic effect. You can demonstrate this effect by holding a bicycle wheel by its axle and asking someone to spin the wheel. If you try to move the axle of the spinning wheel, you will feel a force opposing your attempt to move it. This force is similar to the one produced in the gyros when Hubble moves.

The gyroscopic function is achieved by a wheel inside each gyro that spins at a constant rate of 19,200 rpm on gas bearings. This wheel is mounted in a sealed cylinder, which floats in a thick fluid. Electricity is carried to the motor by thin wires (approximately the size of a human hair) that are immersed in the fluid. Electronics within the gyro detect very small movements of the axis of the wheel and communicate this information to Hubble’s central computer.

The Best Gyros in the World

Several different types of gyros are available, such as the mechanical gyro that uses ball bearings instead of gas. Other gyros use light or the frequency of a resonating hemisphere to detect movement. While all these methods can provide information on the movement of the telescope, only gas‐bearing gyros offer extremely low noise with very high stability and resolution. Gas‐bearing gyros are the most accurate in the world, and Hubble uses the best gas‐ bearing gyros available.

Hubble’s gyros are extraordinarily stable and can detect extremely small movements of the telescope. When used with other ﬁne‐pointing devices, they keep the telescope pointing very precisely for long periods of time, enabling Hubble to produce spectacular images of galaxies, planets and stars and to probe to the farthest reaches of the universe.

The Status of Hubble’s Gyros

Gyros have limited lifetimes and need to be replaced periodically. Currently, three of the six gyros are working.

In 2005 Hubble began operating in two‐gyro mode. With two useable spare gyros, Hubble’s operating life can be extended and thus Hubble’s science observations can continue uninterrupted until the servicing mission.

History of Gyro Replacement

Four new gyros were installed on Hubble in 1993 and all six gyros were replaced in 1999. During the servicing mission in 2009, astronauts will replace all six gyros, which are nearing the end of their projected useful life.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 92 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

2. BATTERY MODULE UNITS (BMUS)

Powering Hubble

When astronauts return to the Hubble Space Telescope during the servicing mission, they will replace all six of the telescope’s 125‐pound nickel hydrogen batteries. These batteries provide all the electrical power to support Hubble operations during the night portion of its orbit.

The telescope’s orbit is approximately 96 minutes long, about 60 minutes of which are in sunlight and 36 minutes are in the Earth’s shadow (night). During Hubble’s sunlight or daytime period, the solar arrays provide power to the onboard electrical equipment. They also charge the spacecraft’s batteries, so that the batteries can power the spacecraft during Hubble’s night.

All six batteries are normally used at the same time. Like the ones they replace, the six new batteries reside in two modules, each containing three batteries. Each module weighs 460 pounds and measures 36 inches long, 32 inches wide, and 11 inches high. Astronauts will remove the old battery modules from equipment bays No. 2 and No. 3, and will install the new modules in the same locations. Each of the six batteries begins its life on the ground with approximately 88 amp‐hrs of capacity. Each battery contains 22 individual cells wired together in series. Due to limitations of Hubble’s thermal control system, the batteries can only be charged to 75 amp‐hrs when installed on Hubble. The six new batteries will begin their life in orbit by delivering a total of over 450 amp‐hrs of capacity to Hubble.

Durable and Reliable

Now 19 years into its mission, Hubble’s nickel hydrogen batteries have lasted more than 13 years longer than their design orbital life – longer than those in any other spacecraft located in low Earth orbit. This was possible partly because the batteries were built to very exacting standards using an extremely robust design. Nickel hydrogen battery chemistry is very stable and is known to exceed in‐orbit performance requirements for long‐duration missions.

Another reason for the batteries’ longevity is that they are very carefully managed on a daily basis by Electrical Power System engineers at Goddard Space Flight Center, which has resulted in improved long‐term in‐orbit performance. This is done by closely monitoring the amount of current that ﬂows into the batteries and their temperature during each charging cycle. Due to aging and cycling, the batteries are showing a slow loss in capacity, a normal and expected trend. If not replaced, they will eventually be unable to support Hubble’s science mission.

The replacement batteries are superior to the old ones in several ways. The new batteries are made using a “wet slurry” process, in which powdered metallic materials mixed in a wet binder agent are poured into a mold and heated until the liquid boils off, leaving a porous solid.

This process produces batteries which are physically stronger and better performing than the “dry sinter” batteries they are replacing.

Metallic materials are mixed dry and pressed into a mold under high pressure in the “dry sinter” manufacturing process. Each new battery also has the added safety feature of battery isolation switch that electrically dead‐faces each connector. “Dead‐face” means no electrical power is present at the connectors while the switch is in the “off” position. This creates a safer environment for astronauts installing the battery modules.

NASA uses nickel hydrogen batteries because they are highly reliable and are able to handle deep discharging better than other types of batteries. Nickel hydrogen batteries also can store more energy than other types of similar size. They perform very well over long missions in low Earth orbit, and have been used on many NASA missions in the past decade.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 93

3. SCIENCE INSTRUMENT COMMAND & DATA HANDLING (SI C&DH) MODULE

When astronauts return to the Hubble during Servicing Mission 4, they will replace the Science Instrument Command and Data Handling, or SI C&DH, module. The SI C&DH provides all of the electronics to command Hubble’s science instruments from the ground and to ﬂow science and engineering data back to the ground.

The SI C&DH works with Hubble’s data management Unit (DMU) to process, format, and temporarily store information on Hubble’s digital recorders or transmit science and engineering data to the ground. The SI C&DH is a collection of 14 components, arranged in six stacks that are mounted on a tray to create a single Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU).

The “brains” of the SI C&DH is the NASA Standard Spacecraft Computer, (NSSC‐1). It contains a Central Processing Module (CPM) that runs the NSSC‐1 software, four memory modules that store software and instrument commands and a Standard Interface (STINT) unit, which serves as the communications interface between the NSSC‐1 and the Control Unit/Science Data Formatter, or CU/SDF. The ﬂight software in the NSSC‐1 computer monitors and controls the science instruments and the NICMOS Cooling System. The “heart” of the SI C&DH is the CU/SDF. It distributes all commands and data to designated destinations on the Hubble spacecraft such as the DMU, the NSSC‐1, and the science instruments. It also translates the engineering and science data it receives into standard formats.

The remaining components of the SI C&DH perform basic housekeeping functions such as distributing and switching power and transmitting system signals. The SI C&DH components are conﬁgured as redundant sets, known as the “A” side and the “B” side. This redundancy allows for recovery from any one failure.

4. FINE GUIDANCE SENSOR

The Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) that will be taken to orbit on the servicing mission is an optical sensor that will be used on the Hubble Space Telescope to provide pointing information for the spacecraft and also as a scientiﬁc instrument for astrometric science. A FGS consists of a large structure housing a collection of mirrors, lenses, servos, prisms, beam splitters and photomultiplier tubes.

There are three ﬁne guidance sensors on Hubble located at 90‐degree intervals around the circumference of the telescope. Along with the gyroscopes, the FGSs are a key component of Hubble’s highly complex but extraordinarily effective “pointing control system.” In this role the FGSs’ job is to acquire and “lock” onto pre‐chosen guide stars, feeding the position signals to the main Hubble computer where small but inevitable drifts in the gyro signals can be corrected. The end result is a rocksteady telescope which can take full advantage of its optics and instrumentation to perform world‐class science on the full gamut of astronomical targets. Typically, two FGSs are used, each one locked onto one guide star.

There is more to the FGS story than “just” pointing control. The third FGS can be used as a scientiﬁc instrument for astrometry – the precise measurement of stellar positions and motions. The FGS chosen to be the “astrometer FGS” is the one which has the best performance. Currently, that role is ﬁlled by FGS1, and it will not be changed out during the servicing mission. The new FGS will take the place of FGS2 and the likelihood is that the new FGS will become the new astrometer.

Pointing Control – How Good?

The pointing requirement for Hubble is that the stability of the telescope – the so‐called “jitter”—be no worse than 0.007 arcsecond (arcsec for short) for 95 percent of the time.

What is an “arcsec”? One arcsecond is the angle created by the diameter of a dime (3/4 inch) at a distance of approximately 2.5 miles (4 km). For example, the diameter of the moon as seen from Earth is roughly 1800 arcseconds. After the FGSs lock onto guide stars, they can measure any apparent motion to an accuracy of 0.0028 arcsec.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 94 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Combination of the FGS and gyro signals in the pointing control software gives Hubble the ability to remain pointed at targets with no more than 0.007 arcsec of deviation over long periods of time. This level of stability and precision is comparable to being able to hold a laser beam focused on a dime that is 200 miles away (the distance from Washington D.C. to New York City).

Astrometry Science

Astrometry is the science that deals with the determination of precise positions and motions of stars. The FGSs can provide star positions that are about 10 times more precise than those observed from a ground‐based telescope.

When used for astrometric science the FGSs will let Hubble:

 Search for wobbles in the motion of nearby stars that could be indicative of planetary companions.  Determine if certain stars really are double stars.  Measure the angular diameter of stars, galaxies and other celestial objects.  Reﬁne the positions, distances and energy output of stars.  Help determine the true distance scale for the universe.

The FGS that was returned on SM3A has been refurbished and upgraded for re‐use on Hubble’s Servicing Mission 4. This refurbished unit has an enhanced in‐orbit alignment capability over the original FGS design.

FGS PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

 Size 5.5 x 4 x 2 feet  Weight 478 pounds  Power 19 Watts

5. NEW OUTER BLANKET LAYERS (NOBLS)

During the Hubble Space Telescope Second Servicing Mission in 1997 and subsequent missions, astronauts observed damage to some of the telescope’s thermal insulation. Years of exposure to the harsh environment of space had taken a toll on Hubble’s protective multi‐layer insulation, and some areas were torn or broken.

This multi‐layer insulation protects the observatory from the severe and rapid temperature changes it experiences as it moves through its 97‐minute orbit from very hot sun to very cold night.

The New Outer Blanket Layer (NOBL) covers protect Hubble’s external blankets. They prevent further degradation of the insulation and maintain normal operating temperatures of Hubble’s electronic equipment. Each NOBL has been tested to ensure that it can withstand exposure to: charged particles, X‐rays, ultraviolet radiation, and thermal cycling for at least 10 years.

The covers are made of specially coated stainless steel foil which is trimmed to ﬁt each particular equipment bay door that is covered. Each cover is supported by a steel pictureframe structure. Expanding plugs, like common kitchen bottle stoppers, ﬁt into door vent holes to allow quick installation by the spacewalking astronauts.

During Servicing Mission 3A in 1999, astronauts installed three NOBLs on damaged areas. During Servicing Mission 3B in March 2002, a fourth NOBL was installed. Up to three additional NOBL panels will be installed during Servicing Mission 4.

  

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 95

B. RESTORE ACTIVITIES

1. REPAIR OF ADVANCED CAMERA FOR SURVEYS

The Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS) was installed on the Hubble Space Telescope during Servicing Mission 3B in 2002. An electronics failure in January 2007 rendered inoperable the two most‐used science channels, and ACS currently runs on one remaining channel. A repair attempt by spacewalking astronauts during Servicing Mission 4 will speciﬁcally target restoration of the Wide Field Channel (WFC), the workhorse responsible for 70 percent of the pre‐2007 ACS science. The goal, however, is to restore both of the inoperable channels while preserving the third, bringing ACS back to full capability.

Instrument and Repair Overview

ACS was primarily designed to survey large areas of the sky at visible and red wavelengths with 10 times greater efficiency than the earlier premier Hubble camera, the Wide Field Planetary Camera 2 (WFPC2). For five years ACS brilliantly lived up to that promise. Many of the most extraordinary images from Hubble were taken with the ACS/ WFC, most famously perhaps the Hubble Ultra Deep Field, still the deepest, most detailed look into the early universe after galaxies had begun to form. The High Resolution Channel (HRC) provided higher angular resolution over a smaller field‐of‐view, and it included an option for corona‐graphic imaging of faint objects around bright stars. The Solar‐Blind Channel (SBC) – the one channel still working—was designed to provide small field‐of‐view imaging in the far ultraviolet region of the spectrum. Following its installation on Hubble, the ACS became the observatory’s most heavily used instrument.

To increase scientiﬁc longevity, Hubble instruments are designed to be electrically redundant. The January 2007 failure was actually on electronics “Side 2,” an earlier power supply failure in 2006 having made Side 1 unable to operate WFC and HRC. With the high currents it generated, the Side 2 short circuit was very energetic, but it was not precisely localized to a particular component part. The failure took down operations on all three science channels, and the SBC is currently running on the portions of Side 1 that were unaffected by the 2006 event. Because of the certainty of greater damage to Side 2 and the more precise knowledge of what happened on Side 1, the Hubble Program settled on Side 1 as offering the greater chance for successful repair.

To restore WFC and HRC, power not now available must somehow be provided to their control electronics. Because neither the partially failed Side 1 power supply nor the cabling which connects it to the control electronics is accessible to the astronauts, direct repair is not possible and a two‐pronged alternative approach must be taken. The electronics boards that control WFC are accessible and will be replaced with modiﬁed boards. Second, a completely new power supply will be mounted to a handrail outside of ACS and mated to the new electronics with external cabling.

HRC also has accessible electronics boards, but there is not enough EVA time available on the mission to allow replacement of the boards for both the WFC and HRC channels. However, inside ACS is wiring connecting the WFC and HRC electronics boxes which is believed to be intact, and by driving the new WFC electronics boards with the external power supply, it is expected, but not guaranteed, that the HRC will be “back‐powered” and become operable.

Astronauts will access the WFC electronics by removing a small panel outside the instrument. They must remove and replace four boards, for which special tools have been developed. To reduce repair time, a cartridge will hold the replacement boards and be mated into the electronics box with a single action. The new boards in their cartridge must be smaller than the originals. The new design incorporates a specialized integrated circuit called an Application‐Speciﬁc Integrated Circuit, or ASIC, that enables an entire circuit board’s worth of electronics to be condensed into a very small package. A great strength of this approach is that the ASIC can be completely re‐ programmed by commands from controllers on the ground, and the WFC can be ﬁne‐tuned for best performance. The ASIC design is the same as the one already developed and tested for the James Webb Space Telescope (to be

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 96 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement launched in 2013), although the electronics packaging is different because of the dissimilar environments for the two missions.

The Instrument

WFC and HRC have Charge Coupled Devices (CCDs) for detectors. WFC has a 4k x 4k pixel format created by two adjacent 2k x 4k devices. The CCDs were optimized for sensitivity in the red region of the spectrum, and spectral coverage extends from about 3500 Angstroms (A) in the blue, up beyond the visible‐red to 1.1 microns (11,000A). The ﬁeld of view is 202 x 202 arcseconds (arcsec).

HRC’s CCD has smaller pixels in a 1k x 1k format. With sensitivity from 1700A to 1.1 microns, HRC has greater spectral range than WFC. The ﬁeld of view is 26 x 29 arcsec.

Within HRC is a coronagraph that can place either of two opaque disks in front of stars so that nearby faint objects, e.g., brown dwarf companions, giant planets, or dusty disks, can be shielded from the stellar glare and be seen.

In the far ultraviolet, SBC uses a Multi‐Anode Microchannel Array (MAMA), also used by the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS) on Hubble. MAMAs are insensitive to visible light and have essentially no electronic noise.

SBC has a 1k x 1k pixel format, a field of 31 x 35 arcsec, and sensitivity from 1150 to 1700A. All the detector channels employ selectable filters mounted on rotating filter wheels to transmit the desired color of light to the detector for any particular image.

The restored ACS will complement the new WFC3, a bonus provided by the decision that WFC3 would not simply be a “carbon copy” of ACS but would have its own unique capabilities. The choice to optimize ACS performance in visible‐to‐red light was ideal for surveying red‐shifted galaxies and clusters of galaxies at moderate‐to‐large distances across the universe. Although its sensitivity in visible‐red wavelengths is good, WFC3’s CCD channel is optimized for high sensitivity, wide field‐of‐view, and high spatial resolution in the ultraviolet, a first for Hubble. A second WFC3 channel provides the high‐sensitivity, wide‐field imaging in the near‐infrared (above 1 micron) which is unavailable on ACS and which greatly surpasses the smaller‐field Near Infrared Camera and Multi‐Object Spectrograph (NICMOS). ACS and WFC3 together enable the “best of all worlds” for astronomers, providing superb wide‐field imaging over a huge range of wavelengths.

Scientiﬁc Future of ACS

Many scientiﬁc programs originally planned for ACS can be continued with WFC3. However, there are especially important areas for which the teaming of a restored ACS and WFC3 would be especially well‐suited, two examples being:

 Dark Energy – The nature of Dark Energy, the mysterious “repulsive gravity” that causes accelerating expansion of the local universe, is one of the most compelling problems in contemporary physics. Dark Energy can be probed with Hubble through observations of Type Ia supernovae, which because of their well‐understood intrinsic brightness can be used to trace the expansion history of the universe over a sizable fraction of cosmic time. The more SN Ia’s that can be observed, the more precise becomes our understanding of Dark Energy’s strength and time variability (if any). ACS and WFC3 working in parallel would detect and make follow‐up observations substantially more rapidly than WFC3 alone. ACS has already proven its remarkable capabilities in the efﬁcient detection of distant supernovae.

 Dark Matter – Approximately 24 percent of the universe’s matter and energy budget consists of a not‐understood form of matter that neither emits nor absorbs light (hence is “dark”), and can only be detected by its gravitational inﬂuence on normal matter and light. By taking many images over large areas of sky (“tiling”), ACS has shown that the slight distortion of distant galaxy shapes produced by dark matter through “gravitational lensing” can be used to

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 97 measure the amount and distribution of the dark matter in the universe. ACS and WFC3 working together would be a formidable team in this crucial area that, in spite of ACS’s tremendous work to‐date, is still in its infancy.

2. REPAIR OF SPACE TELESCOPE IMAGING SPECTROGRAPH

The Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS) was installed on the Hubble Space Telescope during Servicing Mission 2 in 1997. STIS stopped functioning in August 2004 due to a power supply failure, and is currently in “safe mode” pending a repair attempt during Servicing Mission 4.

Instrument and Repair Overview

STIS is a highly versatile instrument with a proven track record. Its main function is spectroscopy – the separation of light into its component colors (or wavelengths) to reveal information about the chemical content, temperature and motion of planets, comets, stars, interstellar gas and galaxies. A key feature of STIS is its ability to produce the spectrum of spatially extended objects, such as galaxies, covering many points across the image simultaneously. This is why it is called an “imaging spectrograph.” The instrument is sensitive to a wide range of wavelengths of light, spanning from the vacuum ultraviolet through the optical to the near infrared, Although spectrographs generally do not produce beautiful images like Hubble’s cameras, the data they provide are absolutely essential to understanding the physical properties of the material universe – they put the “physics” in astrophysics. At the time when operations suspended in August of 2004, STIS science constituted about 30 percent of the Hubble observing program.

To repair STIS, astronauts will perform a spacewalk to replace a low voltage power supply board which contains a failed power converter. The repair is straightforward but requires diligence, and Hubble engineers have designed special tools for the job. If successful, the repair effort will restore one of two fully redundant electronic chains (or “sides”) of the instrument. Both were unusable after August 2004.

The basics of the task involve installing a “fastener capture plate” over the top of a STIS electronics access panel. Astronauts will use a power tool to remove the 111 fasteners (screws) that attach the panel to STIS. The plate will ensure that the small fasteners are captured without astronauts having to grasp and stash them with gloved hands.

After removing the panel (with capture plate and fasteners attached), the astronauts will remove the failed power supply card and click in the new one, much like replacing a circuit board on a computer. A new, simpliﬁed panel will then be installed over the open electronics cavity – only this time 111 fasteners will not be required. By throwing only two levers, the astronauts will latch the new panel securely into place.

The Instrument

STIS has three detectors, each with 1024 x 1024 pixels. There’s a CCD (Charge Coupled Device) for detecting optical and near‐infrared light, and two MAMA (Multi‐Anode Microchannel Array) detectors for detecting near‐(lower energy) and far‐(higher energy) ultraviolet light. A limited ﬁlter set supports imaging, but STIS’s heart is spectroscopy, which is enabled by a diverse set of gratings ahead of the detectors in the optical chain. Gratings, like the more familiar prisms, create a spectrum by separating light into its individual wavelength components. Close examination of the amount of light at each wavelength reveals the presence of absorption and emission lines, which are the “ﬁngerprints” of the chemical composition and physical and dynamical states of stars and gas. The astronomer has a wide choice of gratings according to her/his needs for wavelength coverage and spectral resolution.

A unique feature of STIS is that by having light enter a long, narrow slit before reaching the gratings, a separate spectrum can be recorded simultaneously along each of the 1024 “pixel rows” of the detector. By orienting the long slit, for example, across the nucleus of a galaxy, one can efﬁciently measure how fast the galaxy is rotating at different distances away from its center.

In many respects STIS complements the new Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) to be mounted on Hubble during the servicing mission. COS was designed with one primary purpose, to easily measure exceedingly faint levels of

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 98 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement ultraviolet light emanating from very faint cosmic point sources, e.g., faint stars in our own galaxy and quasars far out across the universe. A repaired STIS will efﬁciently provide spatially resolved spectra of extended objects, spectra at visible and near‐infrared wavelengths, very high (sharply deﬁned) spectral resolution and measurements of the way some spectra vary with time – capabilities for which COS was not designed.

Scientiﬁc Future of STIS

Although it performed brilliantly for 7.5 years before suspending operations in 2004, the scientiﬁc potential of STIS is far from exhausted. Working side by side, the COS‐STIS tandem will offer a full set of spectro‐scopic tools for the astronomer. Each instrument partly backs up the other; each offers something the other doesn’t. Some glimpses into STIS’s scientiﬁc past offer a glimpse of future endeavors:

 Black Holes – The light emitted by stars and gas orbiting around a black hole appears redder when moving away from us (redshift), and bluer when coming toward us (blueshift). By looking for this telltale Doppler shift, STIS has uncovered and weighed several dozen supermassive black holes at the cores of galaxies, but there is still much work to be done. To nail down the relationship between black hole mass and the properties of the host galaxies, more observations of both high‐ and low‐mass black holes are needed.

 Galaxies – STIS can simultaneously record the spectra of up to 50 spatially distinct locations within an extended object such as a galaxy. This is a crucial tool for the efﬁcient mapping of a complex environment. As an example, long‐slit STIS spectra of young star clusters in the merging “Antennae Galaxies” revealed their ages, chemical compositions and velocities, and the slit was crucial for subtraction of the “sky background.” More STIS observations of such merging galaxies are important to our understanding of what happens to galaxies when they collide with each other.

 Stars – At the time it ceased operating, STIS was being used in a continuing survey of the gas and dust blown off by the highly unstable, massive binary star, eta Carinae, which is located in our own galactic neighborhood, about 8000 light years from the sun. Astronomers expect that some day, perhaps a few thousand years from now, eta Carinae may explode as a supernova. STIS provides a unique opportunity to probe the details of the ﬁnal stages of life of such a star before its cataclysmic death.

 Planets Around Other Stars – STIS spectra of the transiting star‐planet system HD209458 resulted in transit light curves so precise that starlight absorption by the planet’s atmosphere was detected, allowing the identiﬁcation of several planetary atmospheric constituents, including hydrogen, oxygen and sodium – a ﬁrst. More examples of bright transiting systems are now known and available for study with a repaired STIS, and the promise of yet more systems being discovered is high.

The STIS Team: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center led the original STIS development and is leading the repair effort. The principal investigator is Dr. Bruce E. Woodgate of NASA Goddard, and Ball Aerospace Systems Group is the prime contractor. The Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore, Md., manages STIS.

  

C. RENEW ACTIVITIES

1. Wide Field Camera 3

After astronauts install the Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3) during the servicing mission, it will continue the pioneering tradition of previous Hubble cameras, but with critical improvements to take the telescope on a new voyage of discovery. Together with the new Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), WFC3 will lead the way to many more exciting scientiﬁc discoveries.

Instrument Overview

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 99

WFC3 will study a diverse range of objects and phenomena, from young and extremely distant galaxies, to much more nearby stellar systems, to objects within our very own solar system. Its key feature is its ability to span the electromagnetic spectrum from the ultraviolet (UV, the kind of radiation that causes sunburn), through visible/optical light (what human eyes can detect), and into the near infrared (NIR, the kind of radiation seen with night‐vision goggles). WFC3 extends Hubble’s capability not only by seeing deeper into the universe but also by providing wide‐ ﬁeld imagery in all three regions of the spectrum – UV‐Visible‐NIR. It is this wide‐ﬁeld “panchromatic” coverage of light that makes WFC3 so unique. As an example, WFC3 will observe young, hot stars (glowing predominantly in UV) and older, cooler stars (glowing predominantly in the red and NIR) in the same galaxy.

Should astronauts successfully repair the Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS), it will complement the WFC3. ACS was optimized for wide‐field imagery in the visible, and although it can detect UV light the field of view is small. ACS also was not designed to go very far into the NIR, a function currently served by the modest field‐of‐view NICMOS instrument.

WFC3 will produce excellent images in the visible, but most importantly it will “fill in” the missing wide‐field coverage in the UV and NIR. In short, WFC3 by itself, and especially WFC3 and ACS working in tandem, will create a new golden age of imaging for Hubble. Moreover, WFC3’s ability to create crisp images of infrared sources makes it a steppingstone to NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope, Hubble’s successor planned for launch next decade. The first stars and galaxies to form in the universe are so old and distant that their light is now relegated to infrared wavelengths. WFC3 could bring us at last to this era.

The Instrument

The WFC3 is conﬁgured as a two‐channel instrument. Its wide‐wavelength coverage with high efﬁciency is made possible by this dual‐channel design using two detector technologies. The incoming light beam from the Hubble telescope is directed into WFC3 using a pick‐off mirror, and is directed to either the Ultraviolet‐Visible (UVIS) channel or the Near‐Infrared (NIR) channel. The light‐sensing detectors in both channels are solid‐state devices. For the UVIS channel a large format Charge Coupled Device (CCD), similar to those found in digital cameras, is used. In the NIR detector the crystalline photosensitive surface is composed of mercury, cadmium and tellurium (HgCdTe).

The high sensitivity to light of the 16 megapixel UVIS CCD, combined with a wide ﬁeld of view (160x160 arcseconds), yields about a 35‐times improvement in discovery power versus Hubble’s current most sensitive ultraviolet imager, the ACS High Resolution Channel. The NIR channel’s HgCdTe detector is a highly advanced and larger (one megapixel) version of the 65,000 pixel detectors in the current near‐infrared instrument, NICMOS. The combination of ﬁeld‐of‐view, sensitivity, and low detector noise results in a 15‐20x enhancement in capability for WFC3 over NICMOS.

An important design innovation for the WFC3 NIR channel results from tailoring its detector to reject infrared light (effectively “heat”) longer in wavelength than 1700 nm. In this way it becomes unnecessary to use a cryogen (e.g., liquid or solid nitrogen) to keep it cold. Instead the detector is chilled with an electrical device called a Thermo‐ Electric Cooler (TEC). This greatly simpliﬁes the design and will give WFC3 a longer operational life.

WFC3 will take the place of Wide Field Planetary Camera 2, which astronauts will bring back to Earth aboard the shuttle. Selected Science Goals Galaxy Evolution – Galaxies with new star formation emit most of their light at ultraviolet and visible wavelengths. Looking farther out across the universe and back in time, however, that light shifts toward red and near‐infrared wavelengths. A young proto‐galaxy in the early universe blazes strongly in ultraviolet. By the time that light has reached us 13 billion years later, its wavelength has been stretched, or red‐shifted, by a factor of 6 to 7 or more.

With the WFC3’s panchromatic imaging, astronomers will be able to follow galaxy evolution backward in time from our nearest neighboring galaxies to the earliest times when galaxies had just begun to form. Detailed Studies of Star Populations in Nearby Galaxies – WFC3’s panchromatic coverage, in particular its high UV‐blue sensitivity over a

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 100 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement wide ﬁeld, will enable astronomers to sort out in detail the various populations of stars in nearby galaxies to learn when they were formed and what their chemical composition is.

Such observations provide clues to the internal history of individual galaxies. They sometimes also reveal a history of collisions and mergers between galaxies.

Dark Energy and Dark Matter – Two mysteries, two approaches.

WFC3’s mapping of gravitational lenses can help determine the character and distribution of dark matter in galaxy clusters. A gravitational lens is a concentration of mass, such as the galaxies and intergalactic gas in a galaxy cluster, whose gravity bends and focuses light from a more distant object, such as a far‐away galaxy, along our line of sight. This phenomenon was predicted by Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity and is frequently observed in Hubble images. WFC3 plus ACS could conduct systematic searches for Type Ia supernovae to measure the expansion history of the universe and get a handle on dark energy. The surveys will be 2‐3 times more efﬁcient than previous methods using ACS and NICMOS.

The Hubble Program at Goddard Space Flight Center jointly developed WFC3 with the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore and Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corporation in Boulder. A community‐based Science Oversight Committee, led by Prof. Robert O’Connell of the University of Virginia, provided scientiﬁc guidance for its development.

2. COSMIC ORIGINS SPECTROGRAPH

Installing the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) during the servicing mission will effectively restore spectroscopy to Hubble’s scientiﬁc arsenal, and at the same time provide the telescope with unique capabilities.

Together with the other new Hubble instrument – the Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3) – COS will journey toward more ground‐breaking scientiﬁc discoveries.

Instrument Overview

COS is designed to study the large‐scale structure of the universe and how galaxies, stars and planets formed and evolved. It will help determine how elements needed for life such as carbon and iron ﬁrst formed and how their abundances have increased over the lifetime of the universe.

As a spectrograph, COS won’t capture the majestic visual images that Hubble is known for, but rather it will perform spectroscopy, the science of breaking up light into its individual components. Any object that absorbs or emits light can be studied with a spectrograph to determine its temperature, density, chemical composition and velocity.

A primary science objective for COS is to measure the structure and composition of the ordinary matter that is concentrated in what scientists call the “cosmic web” – long, narrow filaments of galaxies and intergalactic gas separated by huge voids. The cosmic web is shaped by the gravity of the mysterious, underlying cold dark matter, while ordinary matter serves as a luminous tracery of the filaments. COS will use scores of faint distant quasars as “cosmic flashlights,” whose beams of light have passed through the cosmic web. Absorption of this light by material in the web will reveal the characteristic spectral fingerprints of that material. This will allow Hubble observers to deduce its composition and its specific location in space.

Observations like this, covering vast distances across space and back in time, will illuminate both the large‐scale structure of the universe and the progressive changes in chemical composition of matter, as the universe has grown older.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 101

The Instrument

COS has two channels, the Far Ultraviolet (FUV) channel covering wavelengths from 115 to 177 nm, and the Near Ultraviolet (NUV) channel, covering 175‐300 nm. Ultraviolet light, the type of radiation that causes sunburn, is more energetic than visible, optical light; and “near” UV refers to the part of the UV spectrum closer to the visible, just beyond the color violet.

The light‐sensing detectors of both channels are designed around thin micro‐channel plates comprising thousands of tiny curved glass tubes, all aligned in the same direction. Simply described, incoming photons of light ultimately induce showers of electrons to be emitted from the walls of these tubes. The electron showers are accelerated, captured, and counted in electronic circuitry immediately behind the micro‐channel plates.

A key feature of COS – the one which makes it unique among Hubble spectrographs – is its maximized efﬁciency, or “throughput.” Each bounce of a light beam off an optical surface within an instrument takes some of the light away from the beam, reducing the throughput. This is a problem that is especially acute in the UV, and the COS FUV channel was designed speciﬁcally to minimize the number of light bounces. The incoming FUV beam makes one bounce off a selectable light‐dispersing grating, and goes directly to the detector. An additional advantage within COS is the very low level of scattered light produced by its light‐dispersing gratings.

If astronauts are able to complete the in‐orbit repair of the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS) aboard Hubble, it will serve to complement the COS. The “all purpose” STIS, installed in 1997 during Servicing Mission 2, suffered an electronics failure in 2004 and is currently in safe hold. By design, the COS does not duplicate all of STIS’s capabilities. Possessing more than 30 times the sensitivity of STIS for FUV observations of faint objects such as distant quasars, COS will enable key scientiﬁc programs which would not be possible using STIS. On the other hand, COS is best suited to observing point sources of light such as stars and quasars, while STIS has the unique ability to observe the spectrum of light across spatially extended objects such as galaxies and nebulae. Should STIS be repaired, the two spectrographs working in tandem will provide astronomers with a full set of spectroscopic tools for astrophysical research. COS will be installed in the instrument bay currently occupied by “COSTAR,” the set of corrector mirrors on deployable arms that provided corrected light beams to the ﬁrst generation of Hubble instruments after SM1 in 1993. Astronauts will store the no longer needed COSTAR instrument aboard the shuttle for its return to Earth.

Mission Science Goals

The Origin of Large‐Scale Structure – This goal uses the COS’ superior throughput to obtain absorption line spectra from the faint light of distant quasars as it passes through the nebulous intergalactic medium. The spectra will reveal the structure that is ﬁltering the quasar light, and this will enable scientists to understand the hierarchal structure of the universe at its largest scales. Theories predict (and observations support) the notion of a cosmic web of structure.

The COS will help determine the structure and composition of the ordinary baryonic matter that is concentrated in the cosmic web. Baryonic matter is made up of protons and neutrons, like the atoms in our body. The distribution of baryonic matter over cosmic time can best be detected, ironically, not by how much it glows (in stars and galaxies) but by how much light it blocks.

The Formation, Evolution and Ages of Galaxies – This goal also will use quasar sightline observations. The light serves as a probe of galactic haloes it passes through, sampling their contents. By sampling galaxies near and far, scientists will constrain galaxy evolution models and measure the production of heavy elements over cosmic time. The Origin of Stellar and Planetary Systems – As an ultraviolet‐detecting instrument, the COS can detect young, hot stars (hotter than our sun) embedded in the thick dust clouds that gave rise to their birth, clarifying the phenomenon of star formation. The COS also will be used to study the atmospheres of the outer planets in our solar system.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 102 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 103

STS-125: Quick-Look Mission Data

Position/Age Astronaut/Flights Family/TIS DOB/Seat Shuttle Hardware and Flight Data

Commander Scott D. Altman M/3 08/15/59 STS Mission STS-125 (flight 126) 49 3: STS-90,106,109 38 days Up-1/Up-1 Orbiter Atlantis (30th flight) Pilot Gregory C. Johnson M/5 07/30/54 Payload HST SM04 54 0: Rookie 0.0 Up-2/Up-2 Launch 02:01:49 PM 05.11.09 MS1/EV4 AF Capt. Michael T. Good M/3 10/13/62 Pad/MLP LC-39A/MLP-2 46 0: Rookie 0.0 Up-3/Dn-6 Prime TAL Zaragoza MS2/RMS K. Megan McArthur, Ph.D. M/0 08/30/71 Landing 11:41:00 AM 05.22.09 37 0: Rookie 0.0 Up-4/Dn-4 Landing Site Kennedy Space Center MS3/EV1 John Grunsfeld, Ph.D. M/2 10/10/58 Duration 11 + 0 + 2 days 50 4: STS-67,81,103,109 45.0 Up-5/Dn-5 MS4/EV3 Michael Massimino, Ph.D. M/2 08/19/62 Atlantis 258/07:07:06 46 1: STS-109 10.0 Up-6/Dn-3 STS Program 1195/11:51:46 MS5/EV2 Andrew J. Feustel, Ph.D. M/0 08/25/65 MECO TBD 43 0: Rookie 0.0 Up-7/Dn-7 OMS Ha/Hp 341X125 statute miles HST Capture 350 statute miles ISS-19 CDR Gennady Padalka M/3 06/21/58 Period 91.6 minutes 50 3: Mir E26, ISS-9,ISS-19 418.5 N/A Inclination 28.5 ISS-19 FE-1 Michael Barratt, M.D. M/5 04/16/59 Velocity 17,188 mph 50 1: ISS-19 33.5 N/A EOM Miles 4,333,282 ISS-19 FE-2 Koichi Wakata, Ph.D. M/1 08/01/63 EOM Orbits 165 45 3: STS-72,92,ISS-19 66.0 N/A SSMEs 2059 / 2044 / 2057 ET/SRB 130/Bi137-RSRM 105 STS-125 Patch Hubble Space Telescope Software OI-32 Left OMS LP04/30/F4 Right OMS RP01/37/F4 Forward RCS FRC4/30/F4 OBSS 2 RMS 301 Cryo/GN2 1 Spacesuits 4 Orbiter up 264,165 lbs Orbiter down 226,029 lbs

Flight Plan EDT Flight Control Personnel This will be the…

EVA-1 Norm Knight Ascent 126th Shuttle mission 5/14/09 08:16 AM Tony Ceccacci Orbit 1 FD (lead) 13th Post-Columbia mission EVA-2 Rick Labrode Orbit 2 FD 101st Post-Challenger mission 5/15/09 08:16 AM Paul Dye Planning 30th Flight of Atlantis EVA-3 Norm Knight Entry 94th Day launch 5/16/09 08:16 AM N/A ISS Orbit 1 FD 73rd Launch off pad 39A EVA-4 N/A ISS Orbit 2 FD (lead) 54th Day launch off pad 39A 5/17/09 08:16 AM N/A ISS Orbit 3 FD TBD 28.5-degree inclination EVA-5 Mike Leinbach Launch director 102nd Daylight landing 5/18/09 08:16 AM C Blackwell-Tho. NTD 71st KSC landing HST Release Mike Moses MMT 55th Daylight KSC landing 5/19/09 08:53 AM George Diller Countdown PAO 23.30 Years since STS-51L Kyle Herring Ascent PAO 6.28 Years since STS-107

* Ages as of launch date *Days in space as of: 4/28/09 Compiled by William Harwood

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 104 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

STS-125: Quick-Look Program Statistics

Orbiter D/H:M:S Flights Most Recent Flight Demographics TMA14 125

Challenger* 062/07:56:22 10 STS-51L: 01/28/86 Total Fliers 493 497 Columbia* 300/17:40:22 28 STS-107: 01/16/03 Nations 36 36 Discovery 323/04/19/34 36 STS-119: 03/15/09 Male 443 446 Atlantis 258/07:07:06 29 STS-122: 02/07/08 Female 50 51 Endeavour 150/22:48:22 22 STS-126: 11/14/08 Total Tickets 1,085 1,092 Total 1195/11:51:46 125 * Vehicle lost United States 316 320 Launches LC-39A LC-39B Total United States men 275 278 United States Women 41 42 Night 19 13 32 Daylight: USSR 72 72 Daylight 53 40 93 SR+3 mins USSR Men 70 70 Total 72 53 125 to USSR Women 2 2 Most Recent 3/15/09 12/9/06 SS-3 mins CIS 31 31 CIS Men 30 30 Landings KSC EAFB WSSH Total CIS Women 1 1 Non US/Russian 74 74 Night 16 6 0 22 Men 68 68 Daylight 54 46 1 101 Women 6 6 Total 70 52 1 123 Men with 7 flights 2 2 Most Recent 3/28/09 11/30/08 3/30/82 Men with 6 flights 6 6 Women/6 0 0 STS Aborts Date Time Abort Mission Men/5 14 15 Women/5 6 6 Discovery 6/26/84 T-00:03 RSLS-1 STS-41D Men/4 57 57 Challenger 7/12/85 T-00:03 RSLS-2 STS-51F Women/4 6 6 Challenger 7/29/85 T+05:45 ATO-1 STS-51F Men/3 70 69 Columbia 3/22/93 T-00:03 RSLS-3 STS-55 Women/3 6 6 Discovery 8/12/93 T-00:03 RSLS-4 STS-51 All/2 129 130 Endeavour 8/18/94 T-00:02 RSLS-5 STS-68 All/1 197 200

Increment Launch Land Duration Crew Soyuz Aborts/Failures

ISS-01 10/31/00 03/21/01 136/17:09 2 Soyuz 1 Entry Failure 04/24/67 ISS-02 03/08/01 08/02/01 147:16:43 3 Soyuz 11 Entry Failure 06/30/71 ISS-03 08/10/01 12/17/01 117/02:56 3 ISS-04 12/05/01 06/19/02 181/00:44 3 Soyuz 18A Launch Abort 04/05/75 ISS-05 06/05/02 12/07/02 171/03:33 3 Soyuz T-10A Pad Abort 09/26/83 ISS-06 11/23/02 05/03/03 161/01:17 3 ISS-07 04/26/03 10/28/03 184/21:47 2 Minimum Duration STS Missions ISS-08 10/18/03 04/30/04 194/18:35 2 ISS-09 04/19/04 10/23/04 187/21:17 2 1. Columbia/STS-2 Fuel cell ISS-10 10/14/04 04/24/05 192/19:02 2 11/21/81 MET: 2/06:13 ISS-11 04/15/05 10/11/05 179/23:00 2 ISS-12 10/01/05 04/08/06 189/19:53 2 2. Atlantis/STS-44 IMU ISS-13 03/30/06 09/28/06 182/22:44 2/3 11/19/91 MET: 6/23:52 ISS-14 09/18/06 04/20/07 215/08:23 3 ISS-15 03/07/07 10/21/07 196/17:05 3 3. Columbia/STS-83 Fuel cell ISS-16 10/10/07 04/19/08 191/19:07 3 4/4/97 MET: 3/23:13 ISS-17 04/08/08 10/24/08 198/16:20 3 ISS-18 10/12/08 04/08/09 178/00:15 3

Compiled by William Harwood

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 105

STS-125 NASA Crew Thumbnails

Position/Age Astronaut/Flights/Education Fam/TS DOB/Seat Home/BKG Hobbies/notes

Commander Scott D. Altman M/3 08/15/59 Lincoln, Ill. No hobbies listed; "Top Gun" Age: 49 3: STS-90,106,109 38 days Up-1/Up-1 Navy test pilot graduate; F-14; Operation Master's in aeronautical engineering >5,000 hours Southern Watch

Pilot Gregory C. Johnson M/5 07/30/54 Seattle Running, cycling, swimming; 54 0: Rookie 0.0 Up-2/Up-2 Navy test pilot Naval Weapons Center; A-6 Bachelor's, aerospace engineering >8,700 hours F/A-18A

MS1/EV4 AF Capt. Michael T. Good M/3 10/13/62 Broadview Hgts OH Running, golfing, family; 46 0: Rookie 0.0 Up-3/Dn-6 AF test pilot F-111, B-2 bomber pilot; Master's, aerospace engineering >2,100 hours F-15

MS2/RMS K. Megan McArthur, Ph.D. M/0 08/30/71 Honolulu Scuba diving, backpacking, 37 0: Rookie 0.0 Up-4/Dn-4 Scripps research cooking Oceanography Diver

MS3/EV1 John Grunsfeld, Ph.D. M/2 10/10/58 Chicago Mountaineering, flying 50 4: STS-67,81,103,109 45.0 Up-5/Dn-5 X- gamma-ray sailing, biking and music; Physics astronomy HST servicing veteran

MS4/EV3 Michael Massimino, Ph.D. M/2 08/19/62 Franklin Sq, NY Baseball, camping, family 46 1: STS-109 10.0 Up-6/Dn-3 IBM, robotics; activities, coaching kids' Mechanical engineering Shuttle systems sports

MS5/EV2 Andrew J. Feustel, Ph.D. M/0 08/25/65 Lake Orion, MI Auto restoration, guitar 43 0: Rookie 0.0 Up-7/Dn-7 Auto mechanic; playing, water and snow Geology/seismology Exxon seismology skiing

ISS-19 CDR Gennady Padalka M/3 06/21/58 Krasnodar, Russia Theater, sky diving 50 3: Mir E26, ISS-9,ISS-19 400.9 N/A AF pilot >300 parachute jumps Engineering/ecology >1500 hours

ISS-19 FE-1 Michael Barratt, M.D. M/5 04/16/59 Camas, Wash. Family and church activity, 50 1: ISS-19 15.9 N/A NASA surgeon, writing, sailing, boat MD in aerospace medicine Mir support restoration and maintenance

ISS-19 FE-2 Koichi Wakata, Ph.D. M/1 08/01/63 Saitama, Japan Flying, hang gliding, 45 3: STS-72,92,ISS-19 48.4 N/A JAL engineer baseball, tennis and >2100 hours snow skiing

McArthur, Good, Johnson, Altman, Grunsfeld, Masimino, Feustel Barratt, Padalka, Wakata

*Age, days in space as of: 04/11/09 Compiled by William Harwood

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 106 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Current Space Demographics (post Soyuz TMA-14)

Post TMA-14 Nation No. Rank Space Endurance Days/FLTs

Total Fliers 493 1 Afghanistan 1 1 Sergei Krikalev 803/6 Nations 36 2 Austria 1 2 Sergei Avdeyev 748/3 Men 443 3 Belgium 2 3 Valery Polyakov 679/2 Women 50 4 Brazil 1 4 Anatoly Solovyev 652/5 Total Tickets 1085 5 Britain 1 5 Alexander Kaleri 611/4 6 Bulgaria 2 6 Victor Afanasyev 556/4 United States 316 7 Canada 8 7 Yury Usachev 553/4 US Men 275 8 China 6 8 Musa Manarov 541/2 US Women 41 9 CIS 31 9 Yuri Malenchenko 515/4 10 Cuba 1 10 Alexander Viktorenko 489/4 Soviet Union 72 11 Czech. 1 11 Nikolai Budarin 446/3 USSR Men 70 12 E. Germany 1 12 Yuri Romanenko 430/3 USSR Women 2 13 France 9 13 Alexander Volkov 392/3 CIS 31 14 Germany 9 14 Yury Onufrienko 389/2 CIS Men 30 15 Hungary 1 15 Vladimir Titov 387/4 CIS Women 1 16 India 1 16 Gennady Padalka 387/2 17 Israel 1 17 Vasily Tsibliev 383/2 Others 74 18 Italy 5 18 Valery Korzun 382/2 Other Men 68 19 Japan 7 19 Pavel Vinogradov 381/2 Other Women 6 20 Malaysia 1 20 Peggy Whitson 377/2 21 Mexico 1 21 Leonid Kizim 375/3 Men with 7 flights 2 22 Mongolia 1 22 Mike Foale 374/6 Women with 7 flights 0 23 Netherlands 2 23 Alexander Serebrov 374/4 Men with 6 flights 6 24 N. Vietnam 1 24 Valery Ryumin 372/4 Women with 6 flights 0 25 Poland 1 25 Mike Fincke 366/2 Men with 5 flights 14 26 Romania 1 26 Vladimir Solovyev 362/2 Women with 5 flights 6 27 Saudi Arabia 1 27 Mikhail Tyurin 344/2 Men with 4 flights 57 28 Slovakia 1 28 Talgat Musabayev 342/3 Women with 4 flights 6 29 South Africa 1 Men with 3 flights 70 30 South Korea 1 Rank Top Spacewalkers EVAs/H:M Women with 3 flights 6 31 Spain 1 All with 2 flights 129 32 Sweden 1 1 Anatoly Solovyov 16/82:22 All with 1 flight 197 33 Switzerland 1 2 Mike Lopez-Alegria 10/67:40 34 Syria 1 3 Jerry Ross 9/58:21 TOTAL 493 4 Steven Smith 7/49:48 35 USA 316 5 Scott Parazynski 7/47:05 In-flight Fatalities 18 36 USSR 72 6 Joe Tanner 7/46:29 7 Robert Curbeam 7/45:33 U.S. Fatalities 13 8 Niolai Budarin 8/44:25 Soviet/CIS Fatalities 4 9 James Newman 6/43:13 Other Nations 1 TOTAL 493 10 Yuri Onufrienko 8/42:33

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 107

Projected Space Demographics (post STS-125)

Post STS-125 Nation No. Rank Space Endurance Days/FLTs

Total Fliers 497 1 Afghanistan 1 1 Sergei Krikalev 803/6 Nations 36 2 Austria 1 2 Sergei Avdeyev 748/3 Men 446 3 Belgium 2 3 Valery Polyakov 679/2 Women 51 4 Brazil 1 4 Anatoly Solovyev 652/5 Total Tickets 1092 5 Britain 1 5 Alexander Kaleri 611/4 6 Bulgaria 2 6 Victor Afanasyev 556/4 United States 320 7 Canada 8 7 Yury Usachev 553/4 US Men 278 8 China 6 8 Musa Manarov 541/2 US Women 42 9 CIS 31 9 Yuri Malenchenko 515/4 10 Cuba 1 10 Alexander Viktorenko 489/4 Soviet Union 72 11 Czech. 1 11 Nikolai Budarin 446/3 USSR Men 70 12 E. Germany 1 12 Yuri Romanenko 430/3 USSR Women 2 13 France 9 13 Alexander Volkov 392/3 CIS 31 14 Germany 9 14 Yury Onufrienko 389/2 CIS Men 30 15 Hungary 1 15 Vladimir Titov 387/4 CIS Women 1 16 India 1 16 Gennady Padalka 387/2 17 Israel 1 17 Vasily Tsibliev 383/2 Others 74 18 Italy 5 18 Valery Korzun 382/2 Other Men 68 19 Japan 7 19 Pavel Vinogradov 381/2 Other Women 6 20 Malaysia 1 20 Peggy Whitson 377/2 21 Mexico 1 21 Leonid Kizim 375/3 Men with 7 flights 2 22 Mongolia 1 22 Mike Foale 374/6 Women with 7 flights 0 23 Netherlands 2 23 Alexander Serebrov 374/4 Men with 6 flights 6 24 N. Vietnam 1 24 Valery Ryumin 372/4 Women with 6 flights 0 25 Poland 1 25 Mike Fincke 366/2 Men with 5 flights 15 26 Romania 1 26 Vladimir Solovyev 362/2 Women with 5 flights 6 27 Saudi Arabia 1 27 Mikhail Tyurin 344/2 Men with 4 flights 57 28 Slovakia 1 28 Talgat Musabayev 342/3 Women with 4 flights 6 29 South Africa 1 Men with 3 flights 69 30 South Korea 1 Rank Top Spacewalkers EVAs/H:M Women with 3 flights 6 31 Spain 1 All with 2 flights 130 32 Sweden 1 1 Anatoly Solovyov 16/82:22 All with 1 flight 200 33 Switzerland 1 2 Mike Lopez-Alegria 10/67:40 34 Syria 1 3 Jerry Ross 9/58:21 TOTAL 497 4 Steven Smith 7/49:48 35 USA 320 5 Scott Parazynski 7/47:05 In-flight Fatalities 18 36 USSR 72 6 Joe Tanner 7/46:29 7 Robert Curbeam 7/45:33 U.S. Fatalities 13 8 Niolai Budarin 8/44:25 Soviet/CIS Fatalities 4 9 James Newman 6/43:13 Other Nations 1 TOTAL 497 10 Yuri Onufrienko 8/42:33

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 108 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Space Fatalities

Name Nation Date In-flight Fatalities

Komarov, Vladimir USSR 04/24/67 Soyuz 1 parachute failure

Dobrovolsky, Georgy USSR 06/29/71 Soyuz 11 depressurized during entry Patsayev, Victor USSR 06/29/71 Soyuz 11 depressurized during entry Volkov, Vladislav USSR 06/29/71 Soyuz 11 depressurized during entry

Scobee, Francis US 01/28/86 SRB failure; Challenger, STS-51L Smith, Michael US 01/28/86 SRB failure; Challenger, STS-51L Resnik, Judith US 01/28/86 SRB failure; Challenger, STS-51L Onizuka, Ellison US 01/28/86 SRB failure; Challenger, STS-51L McNair, Ronald US 01/28/86 SRB failure; Challenger, STS-51L Jarvis, Gregory US 01/28/86 SRB failure; Challenger, STS-51L McAuliffe, Christa US 01/28/86 SRB failure; Challenger, STS-51L

Husband, Rick US 02/01/03 Entry breakup; Columbia, STS-107 McCool, William US 02/01/03 Entry breakup; Columbia, STS-107 Chawla, Kalpana US 02/01/03 Entry breakup; Columbia, STS-107 Anderson, Michael US 02/01/03 Entry breakup; Columbia, STS-107 Brown, David US 02/01/03 Entry breakup; Columbia, STS-107 Clark, Laurel US 02/01/03 Entry breakup; Columbia, STS-107 Ramon, Ilan Israel 02/01/03 Entry breakup; Columbia, STS-107

TOTAL: 18

Other Active-Duty Fatalities

Freeman, Theodore US 10/31/64 T-38 jet crash in Houston Bassett, Charles US 02/28/66 T-38 jet crash in St Louis See, Elliott US 02/28/66 T-38 jet crash in St Louis

Grissom, Virgil US 01/27/67 Apollo 1 launch pad fire White, Edward US 01/27/67 Apollo 1 launch pad fire Chaffee, Roger US 01/27/67 Apollo 1 launch pad fire

Givens, Edward US 06/06/67 Houston car crash Williams, Clifton US 10/15/67 Airplane crash near Tallahassee Robert Lawrence US 12/08/67 F-104 crash (MOL AF astronaut) Gagariin, Yuri USSR 03/27/68 MiG jet trainer crash near Star City Belyayev, Pavel USSR 01/10/70 Died during surgery Thorne, Stephen US 05/24/86 Private plane crash near Houston Levchenko, Anatoly USSR 08/06/88 Inoperable brain tumor Shchukin, Alexander USSR 08/18/88 Experimental plane crash Griggs, David US 06/17/89 Plane crash Carter, Manley US 05/04/91 Commuter plane crash in Georgia Veach, Lacy US 10/03/95 Cancer Robertson, Patricia US 05/24/01 Private plane crash near Houston

Compiled by William Harwood

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 109

STS-125/ISS-19 NASA Crew Biographies

1. Commander: Scott D. Altman, 49

PERSONAL DATA: Born August 15, 1959 in Lincoln, Illinois. Married to the former Jill Shannon Loomer of Tucson, Arizona. They have three children. Hometown is Pekin, Illinois, where his parents, Fred and Sharon Altman, currently reside.

EDUCATION: Graduated from Pekin Community High School, Pekin, Illinois in 1977; received bachelor of science degree in aeronautical and astronautical engineering from the University of Illinois in May 1981, and a master of science degree in aeronautical engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School in June 1990.

ORGANIZATIONS: University of Illinois Alumni Association, Sigma Chi Alumni Association, life member Association of Naval Aviation and Military Order of the World Wars.

SPECIAL HONORS: Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Strike/ Flight Air Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, 1987 Award winner for Outstanding Achievement in Tactical Aviation as selected by the Association of Naval Aviation.

EXPERIENCE: Commissioned as an Ensign in the United States Navy in August 1981, received his Navy wings of gold in February 1983. Attached to Fighter Squadron 51 at NAS Miramar, Altman completed two deployments to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean flying the F-14A Tomcat. In August 1987, he was selected for the Naval Postgraduate School-Test Pilot School Coop program and graduated with Test Pilot School Class 97 in June 1990 as a Distinguished Graduate, spending the next two years as a test pilot on various F-14 projects. Deploying withVF-31 and the new F-14D, he was awarded the Navy Air Medal for his role as a strike leader flying over Southern Iraq in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Shortly following his return from this six-month deployment, he was selected for the astronaut program. He has logged over 5000 flight hours in more than 40 types of aircraft.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Altman reported to the Johnson Space Center in March 1995 as an astronaut candidate. He completed a year of training and was initially assigned to work technical aspects of orbiter landing and roll out issues for the Astronaut Office Vehicle Systems Branch. He was the pilot on STS-90 (1998) and STS-106 (2000), and the mission commander on STS-109 (2002). A veteran of three space flights, Altman has logged over 38 days in space. Following two years as Shuttle Branch Chief for the Astronaut Office and lead for the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade, he was assigned on temporary duty to NASA Headquarters as Deputy Director, Requirements Division of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. On returning to Houston, he served as the Deputy Chief of the Exploration Branch of the Astronaut Office. Altman is assigned to command the final Space Shuttle mission to the Hubble Space Telescope. The mission will extend and improve the observatorys capabilities through 2013. Launch is targeted for October 2008.

SPACE FLIGHT EXPERIENCE: STS-90 Neurolab (April 17 to May 3, 1998). During the 16-day Spacelab ﬂight the seven person crew aboard Space Shuttle Columbia served as both experiment subjects and operators for 26 individual life science experiments focusing on the effects of microgravity on the brain and nervous system.

STS-106 Atlantis (September 8-20, 2000). During the 12-day mission, the crew successfully prepared the International Space Station for the arrival of the first permanent crew. Additionally, he handflew two complete flyarounds of the station after undocking.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 110 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

STS-109 Columbia (March 1-12, 2002). STS-109 was the fourth Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission. The STS-109 crew successfully upgraded the Hubble Space Telescope leaving it with a new power unit, a new camera and new solar arrays. HST servicing and upgrade was accomplished by four crewmembers during a total of 5 EVAs in 5 consecutive days. The space walkers were assisted by crewmates inside Space Shuttle Columbia. STS-109 orbited the Earth 165 times, and covered 3.9 million miles in over 262 hours, culminating in a night landing at Kennedy Space Center, Florida.

JUNE 2008

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 111

2. Pilot: Gregory C. Johnson, 54

PERSONAL DATA: Born in Seattle, Washington. Married to Nanette Faget. Greg has two grown sons, Scott and Kent. Nanette has three children, Gregory, Natalie, and Michael. Recreational interests include running, cycling and swimming. His father, Raleigh O. Johnson, resides in Everett, Washington. His mother, Mary Ann Johnson, is deceased.

EDUCATION:West Seattle High School, Seattle, Washington, 1972.B.S., Aerospace Engineering, University of Washington, 1977. USAF Test Pilot School, Edwards AFB California, 1984.

ORGANIZATIONS: Society of Experimental Test Pilots; American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics; Tau Beta Pi Honorary Engineering Society; Naval Reserve Association, Tailhook Association.

SPECIAL HONORS: NASA James A. Korkowski Excellence in Achievement Award, VA-128 Attack Pilot of the Year, Carrier Airwing Fifteen Top Ten Tailhook Pilot, Carrier Airwing Fourteen Top Ten Tailhook Pilot, Navy Meritorious Service Medals (3), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medals (3), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal and numerous other USN decorations.

EXPERIENCE: Johnson received his commission through the Naval Aviation Officer Candidate Program at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Fl. in September 1977. He received his Naval Aviator wings in December 1978 and following training was designated an instructor pilot in TA-4J aircraft. In 1980 he transitioned to A-6E aircraft completing 2 deployments in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. In 1984 he reported to the United States Air Force Test Pilot School at Edwards Air Force Base, California. After graduation he reported to the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California, performing flight tests in A-6E and F/A-18A aircraft. Following his flight test tour he reported to Naval Air Station Whidbey Island Washington as the maintenance department head in an operational A-6 squadron. During this tour he completed another Western Pacific and Indian Ocean deployment as well as a Northern Pacific deployment. He resigned his commission in 1990 and accepted a position at the NASA JSC Aircraft Operations Division. From 1990-2007 Johnson served as a Captain in the United States Navy, reserve component, and was as the Commanding Officer of four Naval Reserve units. He served as a senior research officer in Office of Naval Research 113, a science and technology unit based at the Navy Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He has logged over 9,000 flying hours in 50 aircraft and over 500 carrier landings.

NASA EXPERIENCE: In April 1990, Johnson was accepted as an aerospace engineer and research pilot at the NASA JSC Aircraft Operations Division, Ellington Field, Texas. He qualified as a T-38 instructor, functional check flight and examiner pilot, as well as Gulfstream I aircraft commander, WB-57 high altitude research pilot and KC-135 co-pilot. Additionally, he conducted flight test programs in the T-38 aircraft including JET-A airstart testing, T-38N avionics upgrade testing and the first flight of the T-38 inlet redesign aircraft. In 1994 he assumed duties as the Chief, Maintenance & Engineering Branch responsible for all maintenance and engineering modifications on NASA JSC’s 44 aircraft.

Selected by NASA in June 1998, he reported for training in August 1998. Johnson was the class leader for the seventeenth group of astronauts comprised of 31 U.S. and international members. Astronaut Candidate Training included orientation briefings, tours, numerous scientific and technical briefings, intensive instruction in Shuttle and International Space Station systems, and physiological training and ground school to prepare for T-38 flight training. Johnson was initially assigned as an Astronaut Support Personnel (ASP) responsible for configuring the Orbiter switches prior to launch and strapping astronauts in their seats for launch. More recently he served as the astronaut office representative for all technical aspects of orbiter landing and roll out issues. From June 2004 to November 2005, Johnson served as Manager, Launch Integration, for the Space Shuttle Program at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida. He also served as the astronaut office Deputy, Shuttle Branch and Return to Flight Representative. Johnson is

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 112 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement assigned as the pilot on the ﬁnal Space Shuttle mission to the Hubble Space Telescope. The mission will extend and improve the observatory’s capabilities through 2013. Launch is targeted for 2008.

JULY 2008

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 113

3. MS-1/EV-4: Air Force Capt. Michael T. Good, 46

PERSONAL DATA: Born in Parma, Ohio, but considers Broadview Heights, Ohio his hometown. Married to the former Joan M. Dickinson of Broadview Heights, Ohio. They have three children: Bryan, Jason and Shannon. Recreational interests include running, golﬁng and family activities. Mike’s father and mother, Robert and Carol Good, reside in Brecksville, Ohio. Joan’s mother, Marj Dickinson, resides in Broadview Heights, Ohio. Her father, David Dickinson, is deceased.

EDUCATION:

Brecksville-Broadview Heights High School, Broadview Heights, Ohio, 1980. B.S., Aerospace Engineering, University of Notre Dame, 1984. M.S., Aerospace Engineering, University of Notre Dame, 1986.

ORGANIZATIONS: Sigma Gamma Tau, National Honor Society for Aerospace Engineering.

SPECIAL HONORS/AWARDS: Distinguished Graduate from the University of Notre Dame, Reserve Ofﬁcer Training Corps, 1984; Lead-in Fighter Training, 1989; Squadron Ofﬁcer School, 1993. Top Academic Graduate of Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training, 1989; F-111 Replacement Training Unit, 1989; USAF Test Pilot School, 1994. Aircrew of the Year, 77th Fighter Squadron, 1991. Military decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal (4), Aerial Achievement Medal (2), Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Achievement Medal, Combat Readiness Medal and various other service awards.

EXPERIENCE: Good graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1984 and was commissioned a second lieutenant. After completing a graduate degree he was assigned to the Tactical Air Warfare Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. While at Eglin, he served as a flight test engineer for the Ground Launched Cruise Missile program. He was selected to attend Undergraduate Navigator Training at Mather Air Force Base, California, receiving his wings in January 1989. After Lead-in Fighter Training at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, and transition training in the F-111 at Mt. Home Air Force Base, Idaho, Good was assigned to the 20th Fighter Wing, RAF Upper Heyford, England. He served as an F-111 instructor weapon systems officer. In 1993, he was selected for Air Force Test Pilot School at Edwards Air Force Base, California, graduating in 1994. After graduation, he was assigned to the 420th Flight Test Squadron at Edwards where he flew and tested the B-2 Stealth Bomber. In 1997, he was assigned to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, to attend Air Command and Staff College. After graduation he was assigned to the 46th Operations Support Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. He served as operations officer and F-15 test weapon systems officer.

He has logged over 2,100 hours in more than 30 different aircraft.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Selected as a mission specialist by NASA in July 2000, Good reported for training in August 2000. Following the completion of two years of training and evaluation, he was assigned technical duties in the Astronaut Ofﬁce Advanced Vehicles Branch and the Space Shuttle Branch. Col. Good is assigned to the ﬁnal Space Shuttle mission to the Hubble Space Telescope. The mission will extend and improve the observatory’s capabilities through 2013. Launch is targeted for 2008.

OCTOBER 2006

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 114 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 115

4. MS2/FE/RMS: Megan McArthur, Ph.D., 37

PERSONAL DATA: Born in 1971 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Considers California to be her home state. Her parents, Don & Kit McArthur, reside in San Jose, California. Megan enjoys SCUBA diving, backpacking, and cooking.

EDUCATION: Graduated from St. Francis High School, Mountain View, CA, 1989. B. S. Aerospace Engineering, University of California-Los Angeles, 1993. Ph.D., Oceanography, University of California-San Diego, 2002.

EXPERIENCE: At the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Megan conducted graduate research in nearshore underwater acoustic propagation and digital signal processing. Her research focused on determining geoacoustic models to describe very shallow water waveguides using measured transmission loss data in a genetic algorithm inversion technique. She served as Chief Scientist during at- sea data collection operations, and has planned and led diving operations during sea-ﬂoor instrument deployments and sediment-sample collections. While at Scripps, she participated in a range of in-water instrument testing, deployment, maintenance, and recovery, and collection of marine plants, animals, and sediment. During this time, Megan also volunteered at the Birch Aquarium at Scripps, conducting educational demonstrations for the public from inside a 70,000 gallon exhibit tank of the California Kelp Forest.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Selected as a mission specialist by NASA in July 2000, Megan McArthur reported for training in August 2000. Following the completion of two years of training and evaluation, she was assigned to the Astronaut Ofﬁce Shuttle Operations Branch working technical issues on shuttle systems in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL). Dr. McArthur then served as the Crew Support Astronaut for the Expedition 9 Crew during their six-month mission aboard the International Space Station. She also worked in the Space Station and Space Shuttle Mission Control Centers as a Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM). Dr. McArthur is assigned to the ﬁnal Space Shuttle mission to the Hubble Space Telescope. The mission will extend and improve the observatorys capabilities through 2013. Launch is targeted for 2008.

JANUARY 2008

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 116 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 117

5. MS3/EV1: John Grunsfeld, 50

PERSONAL DATA: Born in Chicago, Illinois. Married to the former Carol E. Schiff. They have two children. John enjoys mountaineering, ﬂying, sailing, bicycling, and music. His father, Ernest A. Grunsfeld III, resides in Highland Park, Illinois. Carol's parents, David and Ruth Schiff, reside in Highland Park, Illinois.

EDUCATION: Graduated from Highland Park High School, Highland Park, Illinois, in 1976; received a bachelor of science degree in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1980; a master of science degree and a doctor of philosophy degree in physics from the University of Chicago in 1984 and 1988, respectively.

ORGANIZATIONS: American Astronomical Society. American Alpine Club. Explorers Club, Experimental Aircraft Association. Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association.

SPECIAL HONORS: W.D. Grainger Fellow in Experimental Physics, 1988-89. NASA Graduate Student Research Fellow, 1985-87. NASA Space Flight Medals (1995, 1997, 1999, 2002). NASA Exceptional Service Medals (1997, 1998, 2000). NASA Distinguished Service Medal (2002). Distinguished Alumni Award, University of Chicago. Alumni Service Award, University of Chicago. Komarov Diploma (1995). Korolov Diploma (1999, 2002). NASA Constellation Award (2004). Society of Logistics Engineers, 2006 Space Logistics Medal.

EXPERIENCE: Dr. Grunsfeld's academic positions include that of Visiting Scientist, University of Tokyo/Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (1980-81); Graduate Research Assistant, University of Chicago (1981-85); NASA Graduate Student Fellow, University of Chicago (1985-87); W.D. Grainger Postdoctoral Fellow in Experimental Physics, University of Chicago (1988-89); and Senior Research Fellow, California Institute of Technology (1989-92). Dr. Grunsfeld's research has covered x-ray and gamma-ray astronomy, high-energy cosmic ray studies, and development of new detectors and instrumentation. Dr. Grunsfeld studied binary pulsars and energetic x-ray and gamma ray sources using the NASA Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, x-ray astronomy satellites, radio telescopes, and optical telescopes including the NASA Hubble Space Telescope.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Dr. Grunsfeld was selected by NASA in March 1992, and reported to the Johnson Space Center in August 1992. He completed one year of training and is qualified for flight selection as a mission specialist. Dr. Grunsfeld was initially detailed to the Astronaut Office Mission Development Branch and was assigned as the lead for portable computers for use in space. Following his first flight, he led a team of engineers and computer programmers tasked with defining and producing the crew displays for command and control of the International Space Station (ISS). As part of this activity he directed an effort combining the resources of the Mission Control Center (MCC) Display Team and the Space Station Training Facility. The result was the creation of the Common Display Development Facility (CDDF), responsible for the onboard and MCC displays for the ISS, using object-oriented programming techniques. Following his second flight, he was assigned as Chief of the Computer Support Branch in the Astronaut Office supporting Space Shuttle and International Space Station Programs and advanced technology development. Following STS-103, he served as Chief of the Extravehicular Activity Branch in the Astronaut Office. Following STS-109 Grunsfeld served as an instructor in the Extravehicular Activity Branch and Robotics Branch and worked on the exploration concepts, and technologies for use beyond low earth orbit in the Advanced Programs Branch. He served as the NASA Chief Scientist detailed to NASA Headquarters in 2003-2004 where he helped develop the President's Vision for Space Exploration. A veteran of four space flights, STS-67 (1995), STS-81 (1997), STS-103 (1999) and STS-109 (2002), Dr. Grunsfeld has logged over 45 days in space, including 5 space walks totaling 37 hours and 32 minutes. Dr. Grunsfeld is assigned as the EVA lead for the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission-4, targeted to fly in 2008 on the Space Shuttle. The mission will add new scientific instruments and extend the observatory's capabilities well into the next decade.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 118 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

SPACE FLIGHT EXPERIENCE: STS-67/Astro-2 Endeavour (March 2-18, 1995) was launched from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, and returned to land at Edwards Air Force Base, California. It was the second ﬂight of the Astro observatory, a unique complement of three ultra-violet telescopes. During this record-setting 16-day mission, the crew conducted observations around the clock to study the far ultraviolet spectra of faint astronomical objects and the polarization of ultraviolet light coming from hot stars and distant galaxies. Mission duration was 399 hours and 9 minutes.

STS-81 Atlantis (January 12-22, 1997) was a 10-day mission, the 5th to dock with Russia's Space Station Mir, and the 2nd to exchange U.S. astronauts. The mission also carried the Spacehab double module providing additional middeck locker space for secondary experiments. In five days of docked operations more than three tons of food, water, experiment equipment and samples were moved back and forth between the two spacecraft. Grunsfeld served as the flight engineer on this flight. Following 160 orbits of the Earth the STS-81 mission concluded with a landing on Kennedy Space Center's Runway 33 ending a 3.9 million mile journey. Mission duration was 244 hours, 56 minutes.

STS-103 Atlantis (December 19-27, 1999) was an 8-day mission during which the crew successfully installed new gyroscopes and scientiﬁc instruments and upgraded systems on the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). Enhancing HST scientiﬁc capabilities required three space walks (EVA). Grunsfeld performed two space walks totaling 16 hours and 23 minutes. The STS-103 mission was accomplished in 120 Earth orbits, traveling 3.2 million miles in 191 hours and 11 minutes.

STS-109 Columbia (March 1-12, 2002) was the fourth Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission. The crew of STS-109 successfully upgraded the Hubble Space Telescope installing a new digital camera, a cooling system for the infrared camera, new solar arrays and a new power system. HST servicing and upgrades were accomplished by four crewmembers during a total of 5 EVAs in 5 consecutive days. Grunsfeld served as the Payload Commander on STS-109 in charge of the space walking activities and the Hubble payload. He also performed 3 space walks totaling 21 hours and 9 minutes, including the installation of the new Power Control Unit. STS-109 orbited the Earth 165 times, and covered 3.9 million miles in over 262 hours.

SEPTEMBER 2007

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 119

6. MS4/EV-3: Michael Massimino, Ph.D., 46

PERSONAL DATA: Born in New York in 1962. His hometown is Franklin Square, New York. Married. Two children. He enjoys baseball, family activities, camping, and coaching kids sports.

EDUCATION: H. Frank Carey High School, Franklin Square, New York, 1980. B.S. Industrial Engineering, Columbia University, 1984. M.S. Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. M.S. Technology and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. Degree of Mechanical Engineer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. Ph.D. Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992.

ORGANIZATIONS: MIT Alumni Association, Columbia University Alumni Association, and the Association of Space Explorers.

SPECIAL HONORS: NASA Space Flight Medal, Order of Sons of Italy in America 2005 Guglielmo Marconi Award, Aviation Week & Space Technology 2002 Laurel Award (awarded to the STS-109 crew), Sergei P. Korolev Diploma (awarded to the STS-109 crew).

EXPERIENCE: Upon completing his B.S. degree from Columbia University, Mike worked for IBM as a systems engineer in New York City from 1984 until 1986. In 1986 he entered graduate school at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he conducted research on human operator control of space robotics systems in the MIT Mechanical Engineering Department's Human-Machine Systems Laboratory. His work resulted in the awarding of two patents. While a student at MIT he worked during the Summer of 1987 as a general engineer at NASA Headquarters in the Ofﬁce of Aeronautics and Space Technology, during the summers of 1988 and 1989 as a research fellow in the Man-Systems Integration Branch at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, and during the summer of 1990 as a visiting research engineer at the German Aerospace Research Establishment (DLR) in Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany. After graduating from MIT in 1992, Mike worked at McDonnell Douglas Aerospace in Houston, Texas as a research engineer where he developed laptop computer displays to assist operators of the Space Shuttle remote manipulator system. These displays included the Manipulator Position Display, which was evaluated on STS-69. From 1992 to 1995 he was also an adjunct assistant professor in the Mechanical Engineering & Material Sciences Department at Rice University, where he taught feedback control of mechanical systems. In September 1995, Mike joined the faculty of the Georgia Institute of Technology as an assistant professor in the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering. At Georgia Tech he taught human-machine systems engineering classes and conducted research on human-machine interfaces for space and aircraft systems in the Center for Human-Machine Systems Research. He is currently an adjunct professor at Rice University and at Georgia Tech. He has published papers in technical journals and in the proceedings of technical conferences.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Selected as an astronaut candidate by NASA in May 1996, Mike reported to the Johnson Space Center in August 1996. He completed two years of initial training and evaluation and is qualified for flight assignment as a mission specialist. Prior to his first space flight assignment, Mike served in the Astronaut Office Robotics Branch, and in the Astronaut Office Extravehicular Activity (EVA or spacewalking) Branch. In March 2002, Massimino flew on STS-109 and has logged over 10 days in space, including 2 EVAs (spacewalks) totaling 14 hours and 46 minutes. Following his first spaceflight, Mike served as a CAPCOM (spacecraft communicator) in Mission Control and as the Astronaut Office Technical Liaison to the Johnson Space Center EVA Program Office. Mike is currently assigned to the final Space Shuttle mission to the Hubble Space Telescope during which his responsibilities will include spacewalking and operating the Space Shuttle’s robotic arm. Launch is targeted for 2008.

SPACE FLIGHT EXPERIENCE: STS-109 Columbia (March 1-12, 2002). STS-109 was the fourth Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission. The crew of STS-109 successfully upgraded the Hubble Space Telescope leaving it with a new power unit, a new camera (the Advanced Camera for Surveys), and new solar arrays. STS-109 set a record for

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 120 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement spacewalk time with 35 hours and 55 minutes during 5 spacewalks. Massimino performed 2 spacewalks totaling 14 hours and 46 minutes. STS-109 orbited the Earth 165 times, and covered 4.5 million statute miles in over 262 hours and 10 minutes.

FEBRUARY 2008

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 121

7. MS5/EV-2: Andrew J. Feustel, Ph.D., 43

PERSONAL DATA: Raised and educated in Lake Orion, Michigan. Married to the former Indira Devi Bhatnagar of Ontario. Drew enjoys auto restoration, guitar, and water and snow skiing. His parents both live in Michigan, and Indira’s parents reside in Ontario.

EDUCATION: Graduated from Lake Orion High School, Michigan. Associate Science degree, Oakland Community College, Michigan. B.S. in Solid Earth Sciences, Purdue University. M.S. in Geophysics, Purdue University. Ph.D. in Geological Sciences specializing in Seismology, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 1995.

ORGANIZATIONS: Society of Exploration Geophysicists, American Geophysical Union, Sigma Phi Epsilon, Indiana Alpha Chapter, Purdue University, USA Water Skiing Association, BMW Car Club of America.

SPECIAL HONORS: Graduated Cum Laude, Oakland Community College, Michigan. Purdue University: C.J. Newby Scholarship Award; Ned Smith Field School Scholarship Award; Amoco Fellowship; Chevron Fellowship. Queen’s University: Thesis Bursary Award, Deans Award, Graduate Award, McLaughlin Fellowship, Reinhardt Fellowship.

EXPERIENCE: While attending Community College, Dr. Feustel worked as an auto mechanic at International Autoworks, Ltd., Farmington Hills, Michigan, restoring 1950’s Jaguars. At Purdue University, Dr. Feustel served as a Residence Hall Counselor for two years at Cary Quadrangle for the Purdue University Student Housing organization. His summers were spent working as a commercial and industrial glazier near his home in Michigan. During his Master‘s degree studies Feustel worked as a Research Assistant and Teaching Assistant in the Earth and Atmospheric Sciences Department of Purdue University. His M.S. thesis investigated physical property measurements of rock specimens under elevated hydrostatic pressures simulating Earth’s deep crustal environments. While at Purdue, Feustel served for three years as Grand Prix Chairman and team Kart driver for Sigma Phi Epsilon Fraternity. In 1991, Feustel moved to Kingston, Ontario, Canada to attend Queen’s University where he worked as a Graduate Research Assistant and Graduate Teaching Assistant. Feustel’s Ph.D. thesis investigated seismic wave attenuation in underground mines and measurement techniques and applications to site characterization. For three years he worked as a Geophysicist for the Engineering Seismology Group, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, installing and operating microseismic monitoring equipment in underground mines throughout Eastern Canada and the United States. In 1997 Feustel began working for the Exxon Mobil Exploration Company, Houston, Texas, as an Exploration Geophysicist designing and providing operational oversight of land, marine, and borehole seismic programs worldwide.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Selected as a Mission Specialist by NASA in July 2000, Dr. Feustel reported for training in August 2000. His training included five weeks of T-34 training at Naval Air Station VT-4, Pensacola, Florida. Following the completion of two years of training and evaluation, he was assigned technical duties in the Astronaut Office Space Shuttle and Space Station Branches. Dr. Feustel is assigned to the final Space Shuttle mission to the Hubble Space Telescope. The mission will extend and improve the observatory’s capabilities through 2013. Launch is targeted for 2008.

JANUARY 2008

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 122 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 123

8. ISS-19 Commander: Gennady Ivanovich Padalka, 50

PERSONAL DATA: Born June 21, 1958, in Krasnodar, Russia. Married to Irina Anatolievna Padalka (Ponomareva). They have three daughters, Yulia, Ekaterina and Sonya. Gennady enjoys the theater, parachute sport and diving.

EDUCATION: Graduated from Eisk Military Aviation College in 1979; in 1994 he left UNESCO International Center of Instruction Systems, where he was an engineer–ecologist.

SPECIAL HONORS: Awarded the Star of Russian Federation Hero, and the title of Russian Federation Test-Cosmonaut.

EXPERIENCE : After graduation from the Military College in 1979, Gennady Padalka served as a pilot and a senior pilot in the Air Force.

He was selected as a cosmonaut candidate to start training at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center in 1989. From June 1989 to January 1991 he attended basic space training. In 1991 Padalka was qualiﬁed as a test- cosmonaut.

Gennady Padalka is a First Class Pilot, has ﬂown 6 types of aircraft, and has logged 1500 hours. He is an Instructor of General Parachute Training, and has performed more than 300 parachute jumps.

From August 28, 1996 to July 30, 1997, he trained for space ﬂight on theSoyuz-TM transport vehicle/Mir orbital complex as a commander of the back up crew for Mir 24/NASA-5, 6 Russian-American program of the 24 th primary Expedition, Pegasus Russian–French program and Euro-Mir program).

October 1997 to August 1998 Padalka attended training for a space a ﬂight aboard the Soyuz-TM/Mir orbital complex as a primary crew commander (Expedition 26 Program).

August 13, 1998 , to February 28, 1999, he served aboard the Soyuz-TM-28/Mir orbital complex as the Expedition 26 crew commander, and logged 198 days in space.

June 1999 through July 2000, Padalka attended training for a space ﬂight on “Soyuz-TM” transport vehicle as an ISS contingency crew commander.

August 2000 to November 2001, Gennady Padalka attended training for a space ﬂight as the ISS-4 back-up crew commander.

In March 2002, Padalka was assigned as station commander of the ISS Expedition-9 crew. Expedition-9 was launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan aboard a Soyuz TMA-4 spacecraft, docking with the International Space Station on April 21, 2004. Following a week of joint operations and handover brieﬁngs, they replaced the Expedition-8 crew who returned to Earth. In a six-month tour of duty aboard the station Padalka continued ISS science operations, maintained Station systems, and performed four spacewalks. The Expedition-9 mission concluded after undocking and landing back in Kazakhstan on October 23, 2004. In completing this mission, Padalka logged an additional 187 days, 21 minutes and 17 seconds in space, and 15 hours, 45 minutes and 22 seconds of EVA time.

Padalka is assigned to command the Expedition-19 mission to the International Space Station. In March 2009 he will command the Soyuz spacecraft that will launch him and astronaut Michael Barratt to the station. They will be joined by Nicole Stott, who will arrive with the crew of STS-128.

FEBRUARY 2008

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 124 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 125

9. ISS-19 FE: Koichi Wakata (Japan), 45

PERSONAL DATA: Born in 1963, in Saitama, Japan. Married and has one child. Enjoys ﬂying, hang-gliding, baseball, tennis, and snow skiing.

EDUCATION: Graduated from Urawa High School, Saitama, in 1982; received a Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering in 1987, a Master of Science degree in Applied Mechanics in 1989, and a Doctorate in Aerospace Engineering in 2004, all from Kyushu University.

ORGANIZATIONS: Member of the Japan Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the Robotics Society of Japan, and the Japanese Society for Biological Sciences in Space.

SPECIAL HONORS: Minister of State for Science and Technology Commendation (1996). Special awards from Saitama Prefecture and Omiya City (1996). National Space Development Agency of Japan Outstanding Service Award (1996). Diplome pilote-cosmonaute de l' URSS V.M. Komarov (1997, 2001). NASA Exceptional Service Medal (2001). Japan Society for Biological Sciences in Space Distinguished Service Award (2001). Foreign Minister's Certiﬁcate of Commendation (2004).

EXPERIENCE: Dr. Wakata joined Japan Airlines (JAL) in April 1989. He was assigned to the Base Maintenance Department, Narita, Chiba, where he was designated as a structural engineer. From July 1991 to May 1992, he was assigned to the Airframe Group, Systems Engineering Ofﬁce, Engineering Department of JAL. During his tenure with JAL, Dr. Wakata was involved in multiple research and engineering projects in the ﬁelds of structural integrity of transport aircraft, fatigue fracture, corrosion prevention, and the environmental effects on fuselage polished aluminum skin on B-747 aircraft. He was selected as an astronaut candidate by the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) in June 1992. A multi-engine and instrument rated pilot, Dr. Wakata has logged over 2100 hours in a variety of aircraft.

NASA/JAXA EXPERIENCE: Dr. Wakata reported to the Johnson Space Center in August 1992. He completed one year of training and was qualified for assignment as a Mission Specialist on the Space Shuttle. Dr. Wakata's technical assignments to date include: payload science support for the Astronaut Office Mission Development Branch (April 1993 to February 1995), Space Shuttle flight software verification testing in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) (April to October 1994), Space Shuttle and Space Station Robotics for the Astronaut Office Robotics Branch (March 1996 to July 2006), and Extravehicular Activities (EVA) development for the Astronaut Office EVA Branch (May 2001 to April 2006). During the STS-85 mission (August 7-19, 1997), Dr. Wakata was the NASDA Assistant Payload Operations Director for the Manipulator Flight Demonstration, a robotic arm experiment for the Japanese Experiment Module of the International Space Station (ISS). He operated the robotic arm system on NASDA’s Engineering Test Satellite VII in the tele-operation robotics experiments in 1999. Since December 2000, he has been a NASA robotics instructor astronaut. Dr. Wakata has been training for a long-duration expedition on the ISS since October 2001. In July 2006, he served as the commander of the 10th NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO) mission, a seven-day undersea expedition at the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration’s Aquarius habitat located off the coast of Florida. In August 2006, he started flight engineer training for Russian Soyuz spacecraft. In February 2007, Dr. Wakata was assigned as a flight engineer to ISS Expedition 18. on Mach 15, 2009 he launched with the crew of STS-119 and became the first resident station crew member from the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). He will return to Earth with the crew of STS-127.

SPACE FLIGHT EXPERIENCE: STS-72, Endeavour (January 11-20, 1996): Dr. Wakata ﬂew as the ﬁrst Japanese Mission Specialist on this 9-day mission during which the six-member crew retrieved the Space Flyer Unit (launched from Japan ten months earlier), deployed and retrieved the OAST-Flyer, and conducted two spacewalks to demonstrate

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 126 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement and evaluate techniques to be used in the assembly of the International Space Station. The STS-72 mission was completed in 142 orbits, traveling 3.7 million miles in 8 days, 22 hours, and 40 seconds.

STS-92, Discovery (October 11-24, 2000): Dr. Wakata became the first Japanese astronaut to work on the ISS assembly on this 13-day mission during which the seven-member crew attached the Z1 Truss and Pressurized Mating Adapter 3 to the ISS using Discovery’s robotic arm and performed four space walks to configure these elements. This expansion of the ISS opened the door for future assembly missions and prepared the station for its first resident crew. The STS-92 mission was accomplished in 202 orbits, traveling 5.3 million miles in 12 days, 21 hours, 40 minutes, and 25 seconds.

Dr. Wakata has logged a total of 21 days, 19 hours, 41 minutes, and 5 seconds in space.

MARCH 2009

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 127

10. ISS-19 FE: Michael Barratt, M.D., 50

PERSONAL DATA: Born on April 16, 1959 in Vancouver, Washington. Considers Camas, Washington, to be his home town. Married to the former Michelle Lynne Sasynuik. They have ﬁve children. His father and mother, Joseph and Donna Barratt, reside in Camas, Washington. Personal and recreational interests include family and church activities, writing, sailing, boat restoration and maintenance.

EDUCATION: Graduated from Camas High School, Camas, WA, 1977. B.S., Zoology, University of Washington, 1981. M.D., Northwestern University, 1985. Completed three year residency in Internal Medicine at Northwestern University 1988, completed Chief Residency year at Veterans Administration Lakeside Hospital in Chicago, 1989; Completed residency and Master’s program in Aerospace Medicine, Wright State University, 1991. Board certiﬁed in Internal and Aerospace Medicine.

ORGANIZATIONS: Aerospace Medical Association; American College of Physicians; Alpha Omega Alpha Medical Honor Society; American Institute for the Advancement of Science.

SPECIAL HONORS: W. Randolph Lovelace Award (1998), Society of NASA Flight Surgeons; Rotary National Award for Space Achievement Foundation Nominee (1998); Melbourne W. Boynton Award (1995), American Astronautical Society; USAF Flight Surgeons Julian Ward Award (1992); Wright State University Outstanding Graduate Student, Aerospace Medicine (1991); Alpha Omega Alpha Medical Honor Society, Northwestern University Medical School, Chicago, IL (1988); Phi Beta Kappa, University of Washington, Seattle, WA (1981).

EXPERIENCE: Dr. Barratt came to NASA JSC in May 1991 employed as aerospace project physician with KRUG Life Sciences. From May 91 to July 92, he served on the Health Maintenance Facility Project as manager of the Hyperbaric and Respiratory Subsystems for Space Station Freedom. In July 92 he was assigned as NASA Flight Surgeon working in Space Shuttle Medical Operations. In January 94 he was assigned to the joint US/Russian Shuttle – Mir Program. He spent over 12 months onsite working and training in the Cosmonaut Training Center, Star City, Russia in support of the Mir-18 / STS-71 mission.

From July 95 through July 98, he served as Medical Operations Lead for the International Space Station (ISS). A frequent traveler to Russia, he worked with counterparts at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center and Institute of Biomedical Problems, as well as other International Partner centers. Dr. Barratt served as lead crew surgeon for ﬁrst expedition crew to ISS from July 98 until selected as an astronaut candidate. He serves as Associate Editor for Space Medicine for the journal Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, and is senior editor of the textbook ‘Principles of Clinical Medicine for Space Flight’.

NASA EXPERIENCE: Selected as a mission specialist by NASA in July 2000, Dr. Barratt reported for training in August 2000. Following the completion of two years of training and evaluation, he was assigned technical duties in the Astronaut Ofﬁce Station Operations Branch. Dr. Barratt is currently assigned to Expedition-19 and scheduled to arrive at the International Space Station in March 2009 aboard a Soyuz spacecraft.

JUNE 2008

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 128 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 129

STS-125 Crew Photographs

CDR Scott Altlman PLT Gregory C. Johnson MS1/EV4 Michael Good

MS2/FE/RMS Megan McArthur MS3/EV1 John Grunsfeld MS4/EV3 Mike Massimino

MS5/EV2 Andrew Feustel

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 130 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

ISS-19 Crew Photographs

ISS-19 CDR Gennady Padalka ISS-19 FE Koichi Wakata ISS-19 FE Michael Barratt, M.D.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 131

STS-125/400 Launch Windows Updated: 05/04/09

The launch window for STS-125 is deﬁned by a requirement to capture HST on ﬂight day three at an altitude of 350 miles. Launch will be targeted for 20 minutes after window open to improve ascent performance margins and to permit more thorough conjunction analysis.

STS-400 Launch Windows

Date Window Open Launch Window Close Hubble Grapple

05/11/09 01:41:49 PM 02:01:49 PM 02:43:41 PM Flight Day 3

05/12/09 01:11:12 PM 01:31:12 PM 02:13:07 PM FD-3

05/13/09 12:40:38 PM 01:00:38 PM 01:46:52 PM FD-3

05/14/09 12:14:24 PM 12:34:24 PM 01:16:14 PM FD-3

05/15/09 11:43:46 AM 12:03:46 PM 12:45:39 PM FD-3

05/16/09 11:13:10 AM 11:33:10 AM 12:19:27 PM FD-3

05/17/09 10:42:35 AM 11:02:35 AM 11:48:48 AM FD-3

05/18/09 10:16:21 AM 10:36:21 AM 11:18:11 AM FD-3

05/19/09 09:45:43 AM 10:05:43 AM 10:47:36 AM FD-3

05/20/09 09:15:07 AM 09:35:07 AM 10:21:23 AM FD-3

05/21/09 08:44:37 AM 09:04:37 AM 09:50:45 AM FD-3

05/22/09 08:18:17 AM 08:38:17 AM 09:20:09 AM FD-3

05/23/09 07:47:40 AM 08:07:40 AM 08:49:34 AM FD-3

05/24/09 07:17:05 AM 07:37:05 AM 08:23:19 AM FD-3

05/25/09 06:50:52 AM 07:10:52 AM 07:52:42 AM FD-3

STS-400 Launch Windows

Date Window Open Launch Window Close Atlantis Grapple

05/18/09 10:12:02 AM 10:20:09 AM 11:01:23 AM FD-2

05/19/09 09:45:52 AM 10:16:25 AM 10:47:39 AM FD-2

05/20/09 09:15:11 AM 09:15:11 AM 10:17:02 AM FD-2

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 132 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

STS-125 Launch and Flight Control Personnel

KSC/LCC Launch Ops LCC PAO Fueling PAO

STS-125 LD Mike Leinbach George Diller N/A STS-125 NTD Charlie B.Thompson STS-125 OTC Teresa Annulis

STS-400 LD Mike Leinbach George Diller N/A STS-400 NTD Jeff Spaulding SSTS-400 OTC TBD

JSC/MCC Flight Ops MCC PAO STS CAPCOM

STS-125

Ascent FD Norm Knight Kyle Herring Greg. H. Johnson Weather Bryan Lunney Eric Boe Orbit 1 FD (ld) Tony Ceccacci Kyle Herring Dan Burbank Orbit 2 FD Rick Labrode Pat Ryan Alan Poindexter Planning FD Paul Dye Josh Byerly Janice Voss Entry FD Norm Knight Kyle Herring Greg H. Johnson Weather Bryan Lunney Eric Boe Team 4 Bryan Lunney

STS-400

Ascent FD Norm Knight Kyle Herring Greg. H. Johnson Weather Bryan Lunney TBD Orbit 1 FD (ld) Paul Dye Kyle Herring Steve Robinson Orbit 2 FD Mike Saraﬁn Pat Ryan Greg. H. Johnson Planning FD Richard Jones Josh Byerly Janic Voss Entry FD Norm Knight Kyle Herring TBD Weather Bryan Lunney Greg. H. Johnson Team 4 Bryan Lunney

Flight Support Prime Backup Backup

Shuttle program John Shannon LeRoy Cain MMT (JSC) LeRoy Cain MMT (KSC) Mike Moses Weather Coord. John Casper Launch STA Steve Lindsey Entry STA (KSC) Steve Lindsey Entry STA (EAFB) Chris Ferguson TAL Zaragoza N/A TAL Istres N/A TAL Moron George Zamka

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 133

JSC PAO at KSC Kylie Clem HQ PAO at KSC Mike Currie Astro Support Kay Hire Family Support Steve Robinson Terry Virts

STS-125 Crew Name Launch Seating Entry Seating

Commander Scott Altman Up-1 Up-1 Pilot Greg. C. Johnson Up-2 Up-2 MS1/EV4 Michael Good Up-3 Down-6 MS2/FE/RMS Megan McArthur Up-4 Up-4 MS3/EV1 John Grunsfeld Down-5 Down-5 MS4/EV3 Mike Massimino Down-6 Up-3 MS5/EV2 Andrew Feustel Down-7 Down-7

Bailout Order (ascent): TBD Bailout Order (entry): TBD

Crew Tasks Detail Prime Backup Backup

HST grapple SRMS McArthur Massimino HST deploy SRMS McArthur Massimino Altman HST systems FSS, etc. Grunsfeld Altman HST survey Imagery McArthur Altman Johnson TPS inspection SRMS/OBSS McArthur Massimino Altman, Good TPS inspection LDRI/IDC McArthur Massimino Altman, Good TPS repair Feustel Massimino ET photo Good Grunsfeld EVA crew Unscheduled Grunsfeld Massimino EVA SRMS McArthur Altman Medical Grunsfeld Johnson

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 134 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

EVAs Crew Suit Markings IV Notes

EVA-1 Grunsfeld Red stripes Massimino WFC-3; SC D&H Feustel No stripes

EVA-2 Good Barber pole Grunsfeld RSU; batteries Massimino Horizontal broken

EVA-3 Grunsfeld Red stripes Good COS; ACS Feustel No stripes

EVA-4 Good Barber pole Feustel STIS repair Massimino Horizontal broken

EVA-5 Grunsfeld Red stripes Good FGS; ACS (2) Feustel No stripes

STS-400 Crew Name Launch Seating Entry Seating

Commander Chris Ferguson Up-1 Up-1 Pilot Eric Boe Up-2 Up-2 MS1/EV4 Robert Kimbrough Up-3 Up-3 MS2/FE/RMS Stephen Bowen Up-4 Up-4 125 CDR Scott Altman Down-8 125 PLT Michael Good Down-7 125 MS2 Megan McArthur Down-9 125 MS3 John Grunsfeld Down-5 125 MS4 Mike Massimino Down-6 125 MS5 Andrew Feustel Down-11

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 135

STS-125 Flight Hardware/Software

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 136 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Atlantis Flight History

Source: NASA

Atlantis (OV-104) was delivered to Kennedy Space Center in April 1985. It lifted off on its maiden voyage on Oct. 3, 1985, on mission 51-J, the second dedicated Department of Defense ﬂight. Later missions included the launch of the Galileo interplanetary probe to Jupiter on STS-34 in October 1989, and STS-37, with the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) as its primary payload, in April 1991.

Atlantis is named after a two-masted sailing ship that was operated for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute from 1930 to 1966.

FLT # STS DD HH MM SS Launch Mission Description

N/A 51J 00 00 00 00 9/12/85 Flight readiness firing 01 21 51J 04 01 44 38 10/3/85 DOD 02 23 61B 06 21 04 49 11/26/85 3 comsats, EASE/ACCESS 03 27 27 04 09 05 37 12/2/88 DOD (Lacrosse?) 04 29 30 04 00 56 27 5/4/89 Magellan Venus probe 05 31 34 04 23 39 21 10/18/89 Galileo Jupiter probe 06 34 36 04 10 18 22 2/28/90 DOD 07 37 38 04 21 54 31 11/15/90 DOD 08 39 37 05 23 32 44 4/5/91 Gamma Ray Observatory 09 42 43 08 21 21 25 8/2/91 TDRS-5 10 44 44 06 22 50 44 11/19/91 DSP 11 46 45 08 22 09 28 3/24/92 ATLAS-1 12 49 46 07 23 15 03 7/31/92 TSS; EURECA deployment 13 66 66 10 22 34 02 11/3/94 ATLAS-3 14 69 71 09 19 22 17 6/27/95 Mir Docking No. 1 15 73 74 08 04 30 46 11/12/95 Mir Docking No. 2 16 76 76 09 05 15 53 3/22/96 Mir Docking No. 3 17 79 79 10 03 19 28 9/16/96 Mir Docking No. 4 18 81 81 10 04 55 21 1/12/97 Mir Docking No. 5 19 84 84 09 05 19 56 5/15/97 Mir Docking No. 6 20 87 86 10 19 20 50 9/25/97 Mir Docking No. 7 21 98 101 09 20 09 08 5/19/00 ISS 2A.2a (Zarya refurb) 22 99 106 11 19 11 01 9/8/00 ISS 2A.2b (outfitting) 23 102 98 12 21 20 03 2/7/01 ISS 5A (Destiny lab module) 24 105 104 12 18 34 56 7/12/01 ISS 7A (Airlock module) 25 109 110 10 19 42 38 4/8/02 ISS 8A (S0 truss) 26 111 112 10 19 57 49 10/7/02 ISS 9A (S1 truss) 27 116 115 11 19 06 35 9/9/06 ISS 12A (P3/P4 truss) 28 118 117 13 20 11 34 6/8/07 ISS-13A (S3/S4) 29 121 122 12 18 21 40 2/7/08 ISS-1E (Columbus)

Vehicle Total 258 07 07 06

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 137

STS-125 Countdown Timeline

Editor's Note… All times up to and including the start of the ﬁnal hold at T-minus nine minutes are targeted for the opening of the planar window. By convention, NASA rounds these times down in all cases.

EDT EVENT

Fri 05/08/09

03:30 PM Call to stations 04:00 PM Countdown begins

Sat 05/09/09

02:00 AM Fuel cell reactant load preps 06:15 AM MEC/SRB power up 06:45 AM Clear crew module

08:00 AM Begin 4-hour built-in hold 08:00 AM Clear blast danger area 08:45 AM Orbiter pyro-initiator controller test 08:55 AM SRB PIC test 09:55 AM Master events controller pre-ﬂight BITE test 12:00 PM Resume countdown

01:30 PM Fuel cell oxygen loading begins 04:00 PM Fuel cell oxygen load complete 04:00 PM Fuel cell hydrogen loading begins 06:30 PM Fuel cell hydrogen loading complete 07:30 PM Pad open; ingress white room

08:00 PM Begin 4-hour built-in hold 08:30 PM OMBUU demate 11:00 PM Crew module clean and vacuum complete 11:30 PM Aft engine compartment purge

Sun 05/10/09

12:00 AM Countdown resumes

12:00 AM Main engine preps 12:00 AM MECs 1 and 2 on; avionics system checkout 01:00 AM SSME pneumatics checkout 01:30 AM Deﬂate RSS dock seals; tile inspection 02:00 AM Tile inspection 06:00 AM TSM prepped for fueling

08:00 AM Begin 13-hour 41-minute hold 09:00 AM Debris inspection 09:30 AM ASP crew module inspection 09:30 AM OIS communications check

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 138 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

EDT EVENT

09:45 AM JSC ﬂight control team on station 11:30 AM Comm activation 12:00 PM Crew module voice checks 12:15 PM Crew weather brieﬁng 01:00 PM Flight crew equipment late stow 05:00 PM RSS to park position 06:00 PM Final TPS, debris inspection 07:00 PM Ascent switch list 09:41 PM Resume countdown

09:41 PM ASP cockpit conﬁg 09:41 PM APU bite test 10:51 PM Fuel cell activation 11:41 PM Pad clear of non-essential personnel 11:41 PM Booster joint heater activation 11:41 PM MCC-H to launch comm

Mon 05/11/09

12:11 AM MEC pre-ﬂight bite test 12:26 AM Tanking weather update 01:41 AM Red crew assembled 01:56 AM Final fueling preps; launch area clear 02:26 AM Fuel cell integrity checks complete

02:41 AM Begin 2-hour built-in hold (T-minus 6 hours) 02:51 AM Safe-and-arm PIC test 03:41 AM External tank ready for loading 04:06 AM Mission management team tanking meeting 04:41 AM Resume countdown (T-minus 6 hours)

04:41 AM LO2, LH2 transfer line chilldown 04:51 AM Main propulsion system chill down 04:51 AM LH2 slow fill 05:21 AM LO2 slow fill 05:26 AM Hydrogen ECO sensors go wet 05:31 AM LO2 fast fill 05:41 AM LH2 fast fill 06:00 AM Crew wakeup 06:56 AM LH2 topping 07:41 AM LH2 replenish 07:41 AM LO2 replenish

07:41 AM Begin 2-hour 30-minute built-in hold (T-minus 3 hours) 07:41 AM Closeout crew to white room 07:56 AM Astronaut support personnel comm checks 08:00 AM NASA TV coverage begins 08:41 AM Pre-ingress switch reconﬁg 09:36 AM Final crew weather brieﬁng 09:46 AM Crew suit up begins 09:56 AM Crew departs O&C building

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 139

EDT EVENT

10:11 AM Resume countdown (T-minus 3 hours)

10:26 AM Crew ingress 11:21 AM Astronaut comm checks 11:41 AM Hatch closure 12:16 PM White room closeout

12:51 PM Begin 10-minute built-in hold (T-minus 20m) 12:53 PM NASA test director countdown brieﬁng 01:01 PM Resume countdown (T-minus 20m)

01:02 PM Backup ﬂight computer to OPS 1 01:06 PM KSC area clear to launch

01:12 PM Begin ﬁnal built-in hold (T-minus 9m) 01:32 PM NTD launch status veriﬁcation 01:41:49 PM Launch window opens 01:52:49 PM Resume countdown (T-minus 9m)

01:54:19 PM Orbiter access arm retraction 01:56:49 PM Hydraulic power system (APU) start 01:56:54 PM Terminate LO2 replenish 01:57:49 PM Purge sequence 4 hydraulic test 01:57:49 PM IMUs to inertial 01:57:54 PM Aerosurface proﬁle 01:58:19 PM Main engine steering test 01:58:54 PM LO2 tank pressurization 01:59:14 PM Fuel cells to internal reactants 01:59:19 PM Clear caution-and-warning memory 01:59:49 PM Crew closes visors 01:59:52 PM LH2 tank pressurization 02:00:59 PM SRB joint heater deactivation 02:01:18 PM Shuttle GPCs take control of countdown 02:01:28 PM SRB steering test 02:01:42 PM Main engine start (T-6.6 seconds) 02:01:49 PM SRB ignition (LAUNCH)

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 140 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 141

STS-125 Weather Guidelines5

Landing Weather Flight Rules All criteria refer to observed and forecast weather conditions except for the ﬁrst day PLS, which is forecast weather only. Weather Flight Rules become more conservative for on-board or ground equipment problems. To launch, the RTLS forecast must be GO and at least one of the TAL sites must be GO.

RTLS / TAL / AOA / PLS Criteria For RTLS (Return To Launch Site) with redundant MLS (Microwave Landing System) capability and a weather reconnaissance aircraft: The RTLS forecast must be GO to launch.

Cloud coverage 4/8 or less below 5,000 feet and a visibility of 4 statute miles or greater are required.

Wind (Peak): Crosswind component may not exceed 15 knots. Headwind may not exceed 25 knots. Tailwind may not exceed 15 knots. Peak winds must not be greater than 10 knots over the average wind.

Turbulence must not be greater than moderate intensity.

No thunderstorms, lightning, or precipitation within 20 nautical miles of the runway, or within 10 nautical miles of the ﬁnal approach path extending outward to 30 nautical miles from the end of the runway. The 20 nautical mile standoff from the runway approximates the 10 nautical mile standoff to approaches at both ends of the runway. Under speciﬁc conditions, light rain showers are permitted within the 20 nautical mile radius providing they meet explicit criteria.

No detached opaque thunderstorm anvils less than three hours old within 15 nautical miles of the runway, or within 5 nautical miles of the ﬁnal approach path extending outward to 30 nautical miles from the end of the runway.

For TAL (Trans-oceanic Abort Landing) sites with redundant MLS (Microwave Landing System) capability and a weather reconnaissance aircraft: To launch, at least one of the TAL sites must be GO.

Cloud coverage 4/8 or less below 5,000 feet and a visibility of 5 statute miles or greater are required.

Wind (Peak): Crosswind component may not exceed 15 knots. Headwind may not exceed 25 knots. Tailwind may not exceed 15 knots. Peak winds must not be greater than 10 knots over the average wind.

Turbulence must not be greater than moderate intensity.

No thunderstorms, lightning, or precipitation within 20 nautical miles of the runway, or within 10 nautical miles of the ﬁnal approach path extending outward to 30 nautical miles from the end of the runway. The 20 nautical mile standoff from the runway approximates the 10 nautical mile standoff along the approaches to both ends of the runway. Under speciﬁc conditions, light rain showers are permitted within the 20 nautical mile radius providing they meet explicit criteria.

5 Source: Spaceﬂight Meteorology Group, Johnson Space Center

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 142 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

For AOA (Abort Once Around) sites:

Cloud coverage 4/8 or less below 8,000 feet and a visibility of 5 statute miles or greater is required.

Wind (Peak): Crosswind component may not exceed 15 knots (PLS night landing crosswind may not exceed 12 knots). Headwind may not exceed 25 knots. Tailwind may not exceed 15 knots. Peak winds must not be greater than 10 knots over the average wind.

Turbulence must not be greater than moderate intensity.

No thunderstorms, lightning, or precipitation within 30 nautical miles of the runway. The 30 nautical mile standoff from the runway approximates the 20 nautical mile standoff along the approaches to both ends of the runway.

No detached opaque thunderstorm anvil cloud less than 3 hours old within 20 nautical miles of the runway or within 10 nautical miles of the ﬁnal approach path extending to 30 nautical miles from the end of the runway.

For ﬁrst day PLS (Primary Landing Sites):

Cloud coverage 4/8 or less below 8,000 feet and a visibility of 5 statute miles or greater is required.

Turbulence must not be greater than moderate intensity.

End-of-Mission Landing Weather Flight Rules:

Cloud coverage of 4/8 or less below 8,000 feet and a visibility of 5 miles or greater required.

Wind (Peak): Daylight crosswind component may not exceed 15 knots (12 knots at night). Headwind may not exceed 25 knots. Tailwind may not exceed 15 knots. Peak winds must not be greater than 10 knots over the average wind. Turbulence must not be greater than moderate intensity.

Detached opaque thunderstorm anvils less than three hours old must not be within 20 nautical miles of the runway or within 10 nautical miles of the ﬂight path when the orbiter is within 30 nautical miles of the runway.

Consideration may be given for landing with a "no go" observation and a "go" forecast if at decision time analysis clearly indicates a continuing trend of improving weather conditions, and the forecast states that all weather criteria will be met at\ landing time.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 143

Weather Terms (Abbreviated Listing)

Cloud Coverage:

SKC Sky Clear (No clouds) FEW Few SCT Scattered (3/8 or 4/8 cloud coverage) BKN* Broken (5/8 through 7/8 cloud coverage) OVC* Overcast (8/8 cloud coverage)

* BKN and OVC are considered cloud ceilings

Cloud Height: Heights in hundreds of feet above ground level (e.g. 025 = 2,500 ft; 250 = 25,000 ft.) Visibility: Distance in statute miles

The speed is in knots (1 knot = 1.15 MPH), typically given in average and peak (e.g. 10P16)

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 144 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 145

STS-125 Ascent Events Summary

Flight Data EST L-MM:SS Terminal Countdown

STS-125 1:12:49 PM L-45:00 T-9 hold begins 11-May-09 1:52:49 PM L-09:00 Resume countdown 02:01:49 PM 1:54:19 PM L-07:30 Orbiter access arm retraction Win Close 1:56:49 PM L-05:00 Auxilliary power unit start 02:43:41 PM 1:56:54 PM L-04:55 Liquid oxygen drainback begins -241:33:52 1:57:49 PM L-03:55 Purge sequence 4 hydraulic test 1:58:54 PM L-02:55 Oxygen tank at flight pressure SLF Max Wind: 1:58:54 PM L-02:55 Gaseous oxygen vent arm retraction TBD 1:59:14 PM L-02:35 Fuel cells to internal Wind Direction: 1:59:52 PM L-01:57 Hydrogen tank at flight pressure TBD 2:00:58 PM L-00:50 Orbiter to internal power SLF Crosswind: 2:01:18 PM L-00:31 Shuttle computers control countdown TBD 2:01:28 PM L-00:21 Booster steering test TBD 2:01:42 PM L-00:06.6 Main engine ignition

Abort Data L+MM:SS Ascent Events Timeline MPH FPS

0:02:50 2:01:49 PM T+0:00 LAUNCH RTLS 2:01:59 PM T+00:10 START ROLL MANEUVER 927 1,360 ONLY 2:02:04 PM T+00:15 END ROLL MANEUVER 989 1,450 2:02:19 PM T+00:30 START THROTTLE DOWN (72%) 1,221 1,790 2:02:40 PM T+00:51 START THROTTLE UP (104.5%) 1,541 2,260 2:02:50 PM T+01:01 MAX Q (754 psf) 1,752 2,570 2:03:51 PM T+02:02 SRB STAGING 3,778 5,540

0:01:10 2:04:39 PM T+02:50 2 ENGINE TAL MORON (104.5%, 2) 4,500 6,600 TAL 2:05:43 PM T+03:54 NEGATIVE RETURN (KSC) (104.5%, 3) 5,728 8,400

0:03:12 2:05:49 PM T+04:00 PRESS TO ATO (104.5%, 2, 500 u/s) 5,932 8,700 ATO 2:07:02 PM T+05:13 PRESS TO MECO (104.5%, 2, 500 u/s) 7,978 11,700 2:07:38 PM T+05:49 ROLL TO HEADSUP 9,246 13,560 2:07:49 PM T+06:00 NEGATIVE MORON (2@104%, 2) 9,683 14,200 MECO Ha/Hp 2:07:49 PM T+06:00 SINGLE ENGINE TAL MORON (109%,0,2EO SEQ,1st EO @6600 VI)11,115 16,300 333.7 X 33.4 sm 2:08:24 PM T+06:35 SINGLE ENGINE PRESS-TO-MECO (104.5%, 2, 1066 u/s) 11,251 16,500 2:09:14 PM T+07:25 3G LIMITING 13,979 20,500 OMS-2 Ha/Hp 2:09:41 PM T+07:52 23K 15,683 23,000 341.8 X 125.4 2:10:00 PM T+08:11 LAST TAL BANJUL 16,911 24,800 2:10:14 PM T+08:25 MECO COMMANDED 17,729 26,000 2:10:20 PM T+08:31 ZERO THRUST 17,789 26,088

Compiled by William Harwood Inertial Velocity

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 146 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

STS-125 Trajectory Data6

Time T+ Thrust Altitude Altitude Mach Vi Vi Acc Gs Range (EDT) MM:SS (%) Feet SM Number MPH FPS MPH (sm)

02:01:49 PM 00:00 100.0 -23 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,341.0 914.4 0.3 0.0 02:01:59 PM 00:10 104.5 823 0.2 0.2 131.6 1,356.0 924.6 1.8 0.0 02:02:09 PM 00:20 104.5 4,184 0.8 0.4 322.5 1,558.0 1,062.4 1.9 0.1 02:02:19 PM 00:30 104.5 9,639 1.8 0.7 512.1 1,788.0 1,219.2 1.9 0.5 02:02:29 PM 00:40 72.0 17,939 3.4 0.9 683.9 2,028.0 1,382.9 1.7 1.2 02:02:39 PM 00:50 72.0 27,052 5.1 1.2 825.1 2,240.0 1,527.4 1.7 2.1

02:02:49 PM 01:00 104.5 37,614 7.1 1.5 1,005.8 2,506.0 1,708.8 2.1 3.3 02:02:59 PM 01:10 104.5 51,655 9.8 2.0 1,286.0 2,926.0 1,995.2 2.4 5.0 02:03:09 PM 01:20 104.5 66,894 12.7 2.5 1,617.4 3,444.0 2,348.4 2.5 7.2 02:03:19 PM 01:30 104.5 86,146 16.3 3.1 2,018.4 4,076.0 2,779.3 2.5 10.6 02:03:29 PM 01:40 104.5 105,502 20.0 3.5 2,401.6 4,674.0 3,187.1 2.5 14.6 02:03:39 PM 01:50 104.5 128,346 24.3 4.0 2,799.1 5,291.0 3,607.8 1.8 20.0

02:03:49 PM 02:00 104.5 149,332 28.3 4.1 2,935.5 5,518.0 3,762.6 0.8 25.7 02:03:59 PM 02:10 104.5 169,919 32.2 4.2 3,032.3 5,685.0 3,876.5 1.0 31.9 02:04:09 PM 02:20 104.5 188,734 35.7 4.4 3,146.2 5,873.0 4,004.7 1.0 38.3 02:04:19 PM 02:30 104.5 208,144 39.4 4.7 3,285.3 6,098.0 4,158.1 1.0 45.8 02:04:29 PM 02:40 104.5 224,628 42.5 5.1 3,424.4 6,317.0 4,307.4 1.0 53.0 02:04:39 PM 02:50 104.5 241,500 45.7 5.5 3,590.1 6,574.0 4,482.7 1.1 61.4

02:04:49 PM 03:00 104.5 255,712 48.4 5.8 3,752.4 6,823.0 4,652.5 1.1 69.5 02:04:59 PM 03:10 104.5 270,132 51.2 6.3 3,942.6 7,112.0 4,849.5 1.1 78.9 02:05:09 PM 03:20 104.5 282,163 53.4 6.7 4,126.7 7,388.0 5,037.7 1.1 87.9 02:05:19 PM 03:30 104.5 293,188 55.5 7.1 4,320.4 7,678.0 5,235.5 1.2 97.4 02:05:29 PM 03:40 104.5 304,185 57.6 7.4 4,544.7 8,012.0 5,463.2 1.2 108.4 02:05:39 PM 03:50 104.5 313,181 59.3 7.6 4,758.8 8,330.0 5,680.1 1.2 118.9

02:05:49 PM 04:00 104.5 322,006 61.0 7.8 5,005.7 8,696.0 5,929.6 1.3 131.1 02:05:59 PM 04:10 104.5 329,086 62.3 8.0 5,240.9 9,043.0 6,166.2 1.3 142.7 02:06:09 PM 04:20 104.5 335,297 63.5 8.2 5,485.7 9,404.0 6,412.4 1.4 154.9 02:06:19 PM 04:30 104.5 341,163 64.6 8.5 5,767.3 9,819.0 6,695.4 1.4 169.0 02:06:29 PM 04:40 104.5 345,652 65.5 8.7 6,034.6 10,211.0 6,962.7 1.4 182.4 02:06:39 PM 04:50 104.5 349,704 66.2 9.1 6,340.8 10,661.0 7,269.5 1.5 197.9

02:06:49 PM 05:00 104.5 352,623 66.8 9.4 6,631.3 11,088.0 7,560.7 1.5 212.6 02:06:59 PM 05:10 104.5 355,045 67.2 9.8 6,964.7 11,577.0 7,894.1 1.6 229.7 02:07:09 PM 05:20 104.5 356,579 67.5 10.2 7,280.4 12,041.0 8,210.5 1.6 245.9 02:07:19 PM 05:30 104.5 357,524 67.7 10.6 7,609.8 12,524.0 8,539.9 1.7 262.8 02:07:29 PM 05:40 104.5 357,940 67.8 11.1 7,988.2 13,079.0 8,918.3 1.8 282.4 02:07:39 PM 05:50 104.5 357,811 67.8 11.7 8,348.2 13,607.0 9,278.3 1.8 301.0

02:07:49 PM 06:00 104.5 357,187 67.6 12.2 8,762.1 14,214.0 9,692.2 1.9 322.4 02:07:59 PM 06:10 104.5 356,312 67.5 12.8 9,154.9 14,789.0 10,084.3 2.0 342.8 02:08:09 PM 06:20 104.5 355,289 67.3 13.4 9,564.7 15,391.0 10,494.8 2.1 364.1 02:08:19 PM 06:30 104.5 354,057 67.1 14.2 10,041.4 16,090.0 10,971.4 2.2 388.6 02:08:29 PM 06:40 104.5 352,782 66.8 14.8 10,500.3 16,763.0 11,430.3 2.3 412.0 02:08:39 PM 06:50 104.5 351,300 66.5 15.7 11,032.8 17,543.0 11,962.2 2.4 439.0

02:08:49 PM 07:00 104.5 350,001 66.3 16.5 11,544.9 18,294.0 12,474.3 2.6 464.7 02:08:59 PM 07:10 104.5 348,792 66.1 17.4 12,142.2 19,170.0 13,071.6 2.7 494.3 02:09:09 PM 07:20 104.5 348,044 65.9 18.3 12,720.5 20,018.0 13,649.9 2.9 522.6 02:09:19 PM 07:30 101.0 347,799 65.9 19.1 13,326.6 20,907.0 14,256.0 3.0 552.3 02:09:29 PM 07:40 94.0 348,276 66.0 20.1 13,999.0 21,893.0 14,928.4 3.0 586.5

6 Predicted data.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 147

Time T+ Thrust Altitude Altitude Mach Vi Vi Acc Gs Range (EDT) MM:SS (%) Feet SM Number MPH FPS MPH (sm)

02:09:39 PM 07:50 88.0 349,498 66.2 20.9 14,609.3 22,788.0 15,538.7 3.0 619.0

02:09:49 PM 08:00 82.0 351,834 66.6 21.7 15,279.5 23,772.0 16,209.6 3.0 656.4 02:09:59 PM 08:10 78.0 355,029 67.2 22.3 15,889.8 24,667.0 16,819.9 3.0 691.9 02:10:09 PM 08:20 67.0 359,682 68.1 22.9 16,534.2 25,611.0 17,463.6 2.8 731.2 02:10:19 PM 08:30 67.0 365,370 69.2 22.7 16,860.1 26,089.0 17,789.5 0.0 770.6 02:10:20 PM 08:31 67.0 365,943 69.3 22.6 16,860.1 26,090.0 17,790.2 0.0 774.4

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 148 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 149

STS-125 Flight Plan

Editor's Note… Current as of 04/11/09

ACRONYMS: OMS: orbital maneuvering system rockets; RMS: shuttle robot arm; SSRMS: station robot arm; EMU: shuttle spacesuits; group B: backup computer powerdown/powerup; SAFER: spacewalk jet backpack; EVA: spacewalk; PMA: pressurized mating adaptor; FGB: Zarya core module; SM: Zvezda command module; PAO: public affairs ofﬁce; FCS: ﬂight control system; RCS: reaction control system rockets

DATE/ET DD HH MM EVENT

Flight Day 1

05/11/09 Mon 02:01 PM 00 00 00 STS-125 launch Mon 02:44 PM 00 00 43 OMS-2 rocket firing Mon 02:51 PM 00 00 50 Post insertion timeline begins Mon 04:31 PM 00 02 30 Laptop computer network setup Mon 04:31 PM 00 02 30 SSE activation; OCAC setup Mon 04:41 PM 00 02 40 SRMS powerup Mon 04:56 PM 00 02 55 SRMS checkout Mon 05:01 PM 00 03 00 BSA install and config Mon 06:00 PM 00 03 59 NC-1 rendezvous rocket firing Mon 06:01 PM 00 04 00 SRMS payload bay survey Mon 06:16 PM 00 04 15 ET video downlink Mon 06:21 PM 00 04 20 GIRA installation Mon 06:21 PM 00 04 20 SRMS crew cabin survey Mon 06:21 PM 00 04 20 Wing leading edge sensor system activation Mon 06:26 PM 00 04 25 SSE checkout Mon 06:41 PM 00 04 40 Umbilical well camera downlink Mon 07:11 PM 00 05 10 HDTV ET video downlink Mon 07:21 PM 00 05 20 SEE setup Mon 07:26 PM 00 05 25 Group B computer powerdown Mon 09:01 PM 00 07 00 Crew sleep begins

Flight Day 2

05/12/09 Tue 05:01 AM 00 15 00 Crew wakeup Tue 06:26 AM 00 16 25 NC-2 rendezvous rocket ﬁring Tue 07:01 AM 00 17 00 SRMS unberths OBSS Tue 07:36 AM 00 17 35 Airlock prepped Tue 08:16 AM 00 18 15 Flight support structure prepped Tue 08:26 AM 00 18 25 Spacesuit checkout Tue 09:01 AM 00 19 00 Starboard RCC survey Tue 09:41 AM 00 19 40 Spacesuit swap Tue 09:51 AM 00 19 50 Starboard belly tile survey Tue 10:11 AM 00 20 10 Spacesuit checkout Tue 10:16 AM 00 20 15 Starboard wing RCC survey Tue 10:26 AM 00 20 25 Crew meals begin Tue 11:31 AM 00 21 30 Nose cap survey Tue 12:21 PM 00 22 20 Port wing RCC survey

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 150 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

DATE/ET DD HH MM EVENT

Tue 12:36 PM 00 22 35 REBA checkout Tue 01:06 PM 00 23 05 EVA tool unstow/config Tue 01:11 PM 00 23 10 Port belly tile survey Tue 01:31 PM 00 23 30 10.2 psi depressurization Tue 02:26 PM 01 00 25 Ergometer setup Tue 02:31 PM 01 00 30 HST: Solid state recorder playback Tue 03:06 PM 01 01 05 Port wing RCC survey Tue 04:06 PM 01 02 05 T-0 umbilical survey Tue 04:21 PM 01 02 20 OBSS berthing Tue 05:21 PM 01 03 20 FCMS ops Tue 05:36 PM 01 03 35 Rendezvous tools checkout Tue 05:36 PM 01 03 35 OMS pod survey Tue 05:51 PM 01 03 50 LDRI downlink Tue 06:01 PM 01 04 00 HST: Aperture door closed Tue 06:41 PM 01 04 40 NC-3 rendezvous rocket firing Tue 09:01 PM 01 07 00 Crew sleep begins Tue 09:36 PM 01 07 35 HST: Maneuver to rendezvous attitude Tue 10:01 PM 01 08 00 HST: Low-gain direct to TDRS Tue 10:26 PM 01 08 25 HST: 3 gyro ops reconfig

05/13/09 Wed 03:26 AM 01 13 25 HST: High gain antenna retraction

Flight Day 3

Wed 05:01 AM 01 15 00 Crew wakeup Wed 07:26 AM 01 17 25 Group B computer powerup Wed 07:41 AM 01 17 40 Rendezvous operations timeline begins Wed 08:11 AM 01 18 10 Middeck preps Wed 08:41 AM 01 18 40 EVA-1; Tools configured Wed 08:51 AM 01 18 50 HST: Solar arrays slewed to 90 degrees Wed 09:02 AM 01 19 01 NC-4 rendezvous rocket firing Wed 10:41 AM 01 20 40 TI rendezvous rocket firing Wed 12:01 PM 01 22 00 HST: Move to capture attitude Wed 12:54 PM 01 22 53 HST capture Wed 01:46 PM 01 23 45 HST berthing Wed 02:01 PM 02 00 00 HST survey Wed 02:16 PM 02 00 15 External power on Wed 02:46 PM 02 00 45 Group B power down Wed 03:56 PM 02 01 55 SRMS park Wed 04:21 PM 02 02 20 HST: Solar arrays slewed to 0 degrees Wed 04:41 PM 02 02 40 EVA-1: Procedures review Wed 06:26 PM 02 04 25 HDTV downlink Wed 08:31 PM 02 06 30 Crew sleep begins Wed 09:21 PM 02 07 20 HST: KU-band checkout Wed 09:46 PM 02 07 45 HST: Engineering data playback

Flight Day 4

05/14/09 Thu 03:01 AM 02 13 00 HST: SSR engineering playback

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 151

DATE/ET DD HH MM EVENT

Thu 04:31 AM 02 14 30 Crew wakeup Thu 05:46 AM 02 15 45 EVA-1: Preparations begin Thu 07:16 AM 02 17 15 EVA-1: Spacesuit purge Thu 07:26 AM 02 17 25 EVA-1: Spacesuit pre-breathe Thu 08:06 AM 02 18 05 EVA-1: Airlock depressurization Thu 08:16 AM 02 18 15 EVA-1: Spacesuits to battery power Thu 08:21 AM 02 18 20 EVA-1: Airlock egress and setup Thu 09:21 AM 02 19 20 EVA-1: WFC 3 installation Thu 09:21 AM 02 19 20 HST: WFC3 aliveness test Thu 11:36 AM 02 21 35 EVA-1: SI C&DH installation Thu 12:56 PM 02 22 55 HST: SI C&DH aliveness test Thu 01:06 PM 02 23 05 EVA-1: SCM and locks Thu 02:01 PM 03 00 00 EVA-1: Cleanup and airlock ingress Thu 02:01 PM 03 00 00 HST: SI C&DH functional test Thu 02:36 PM 03 00 35 HST: Solar array slewed to 90 degrees Thu 02:46 PM 03 00 45 EVA-1: Airlock repressurization Thu 02:56 PM 03 00 55 Spacesuit servicing Thu 03:36 PM 03 01 35 HST: WFC3 functional test Thu 04:01 PM 03 02 00 EVA-2: Tools conﬁgured Thu 04:01 PM 03 02 00 Spacesuit swap Thu 05:01 PM 03 03 00 EVA-2: Procedures review Thu 08:31 PM 03 06 30 Crew sleep begins Thu 09:46 PM 03 07 45 HST: SSR engineering playback

05/15/09 Fri 01:16 AM 03 11 15 HST: SSR engineering playback

Flight Day 5

Fri 03:01 AM 03 13 00 HST: Bay 2 battery discharge Fri 04:31 AM 03 14 30 Crew wakeup Fri 05:46 AM 03 15 45 EVA-2: Preparations begin Fri 07:16 AM 03 17 15 EVA-2: Spacesuit purge Fri 07:26 AM 03 17 25 EVA-2: Spacesuit pre-breathe Fri 08:06 AM 03 18 05 EVA-2: Airlock depressurization Fri 08:16 AM 03 18 15 EVA-2: Spacesuits to battery power Fri 08:21 AM 03 18 20 EVA-2: Airlock egress and setup Fri 09:01 AM 03 19 00 EVA-2: Rate sensing unit replacement Fri 12:21 PM 03 22 20 EVA-2: Bay 2 battery pack Fri 01:56 PM 03 23 55 EVA-2: Cleanup and airlock ingress Fri 02:01 PM 04 00 00 HST: Battery aliveness test Fri 02:36 PM 04 00 35 HST: Solar arrays slewed to 90 degrees Fri 02:41 PM 04 00 40 EVA-2: Airlock repressurization Fri 02:51 PM 04 00 50 Spacesuit servicing Fri 03:01 PM 04 01 00 HST: Battery functional test Fri 03:56 PM 04 01 55 EVA-3: Tools conﬁgured Fri 03:56 PM 04 01 55 LIOH and battery conﬁg Fri 04:16 PM 04 02 15 Spacesuit swap Fri 04:51 PM 04 02 50 HST: Solar arrays slewed to 0 degrees Fri 05:11 PM 04 03 10 HST: RSU functional test Fri 05:21 PM 04 03 20 EVA-3: Procedures review

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 152 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

DATE/ET DD HH MM EVENT

Fri 08:31 PM 04 06 30 Crew sleep begins Fri 08:41 PM 04 06 40 HST: SSR engineering playback

Flight Day 6

05/16/09 Sat 03:26 AM 04 13 25 HST: SSR engineering playback Sat 04:31 AM 04 14 30 Crew wakeup Sat 05:46 AM 04 15 45 EVA-3: Preparations begin Sat 07:16 AM 04 17 15 EVA-3: Spacesuit purge Sat 07:26 AM 04 17 25 EVA-3: Spacesuit pre-breathe Sat 08:06 AM 04 18 05 EVA-3: Airlock depressurization Sat 08:16 AM 04 18 15 EVA-3: Spacesuits to battery power Sat 08:21 AM 04 18 20 EVA-3: Airlock egress and setup Sat 08:46 AM 04 18 45 EVA-3: Cosmic Origins Spectrograph Sat 10:46 AM 04 20 45 HST: COS aliveness test Sat 11:36 AM 04 21 35 EVA-3: ACS repair (part 1) Sat 02:01 PM 05 00 00 EVA-3: Cleanup and airlock ingress Sat 02:46 PM 05 00 45 EVA-3: Airlock repressurization Sat 02:46 PM 05 00 45 HST: COS functional test Sat 02:56 PM 05 00 55 Spacesuit servicing Sat 04:01 PM 05 02 00 EVA-4: Tools conﬁgured Sat 04:01 PM 05 02 00 LIOH and battery conﬁg Sat 04:21 PM 05 02 20 Spacesuit swap Sat 05:21 PM 05 03 20 EVA-4: Procedures review Sat 08:31 PM 05 06 30 Crew sleep begins Sat 09:46 PM 05 07 45 HST: SSR engineering playback

Flight Day 7

05/17/09 Sun 03:31 AM 05 13 30 HST: SSR engineering playback Sun 04:31 AM 05 14 30 Crew wakeup Sun 05:46 AM 05 15 45 EVA-4: Preparations begin Sun 07:16 AM 05 17 15 EVA-4: Spacesuit purge Sun 07:26 AM 05 17 25 EVA-4: Spacesuit pre-breathe Sun 08:06 AM 05 18 05 EVA-4: Airlock depressurization Sun 08:16 AM 05 18 15 EVA-4: Spacesuits to battery power Sun 08:21 AM 05 18 20 EVA-4: Airlock egress and setup Sun 08:46 AM 05 18 45 EVA-4: STIS repair Sun 12:26 PM 05 22 25 HST: STIS aliveness test Sun 12:56 PM 05 22 55 HST: STIS functional test Sun 01:16 PM 05 23 15 EVA-4: NOBL 8 Sun 02:01 PM 06 00 00 EVA-4: Cleanup and airlock ingress Sun 02:46 PM 06 00 45 EVA-4: Airlock repressurization Sun 02:56 PM 06 00 55 Spacesuit servicing Sun 04:01 PM 06 02 00 LIOH and battery conﬁg Sun 04:01 PM 06 02 00 EVA-5: Tool conﬁg Sun 04:21 PM 06 02 20 Spacesuit swap Sun 05:16 PM 06 03 15 EVA-5: Procedures review Sun 08:31 PM 06 06 30 Crew sleep begins

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 153

DATE/ET DD HH MM EVENT

Sun 09:41 PM 06 07 40 HST: SSR engineering playback Sun 11:31 PM 06 09 30 HST: Bay 3 battery discharge

05/18/09 Mon 03:26 AM 06 13 25 HST: SSR engineering playback

Flight Day 8

Mon 04:31 AM 06 14 30 Crew wakeup Mon 05:46 AM 06 15 45 EVA-5: Preparations begin Mon 07:16 AM 06 17 15 EVA-5: Spacesuit purge Mon 07:26 AM 06 17 25 EVA-5: Spacesuit pre-breathe Mon 08:06 AM 06 18 05 EVA-5: Airlock depressurization Mon 08:16 AM 06 18 15 EVA-5: Spacesuits to battery power Mon 08:21 AM 06 18 20 EVA-5: Airlock egress and setup Mon 08:46 AM 06 18 45 EVA-5: Bay 3 battery R&R Mon 10:06 AM 06 20 05 HST: Battery aliveness test Mon 10:16 AM 06 20 15 EVA-5: FGS-2 R&R Mon 11:41 AM 06 21 40 HST: FGS-2 aliveness test Mon 12:16 PM 06 22 15 EVA-5: NOBL 5 Mon 12:46 PM 06 22 45 EVA-5: Cleanup and airlock ingress Mon 01:46 PM 06 23 45 HST high gain antenna deploy (1) Mon 01:56 PM 06 23 55 EVA-5: Airlock repressurization Mon 02:11 PM 07 00 10 Spacesuit servicing Mon 02:21 PM 07 00 20 HST: Solar arrays slewed to 90 degrees Mon 02:41 PM 07 00 40 HST: Battery functional test Mon 03:16 PM 07 01 15 LIOH and battery conﬁg Mon 03:36 PM 07 01 35 Spacesuit swap Mon 04:11 PM 07 02 10 HST high gain antenna deploy (2) Mon 04:21 PM 07 02 20 Rendezvous tools checkout Mon 04:46 PM 07 02 45 HST: FGS-2 functional test Mon 08:31 PM 07 06 30 Crew sleep begins Mon 09:41 PM 07 07 40 HST: SSR engineering playback

Flight Day 9

05/19/09 Tue 03:26 AM 07 13 25 HST: SSR engineering playback Tue 04:31 AM 07 14 30 Crew wakeup Tue 06:01 AM 07 16 00 Group B computer powerup Tue 06:16 AM 07 16 15 SRMS grapples HST Tue 06:56 AM 07 16 55 HST power umbilical disconnect Tue 07:06 AM 07 17 05 HST unberthing maneuver Tue 07:36 AM 07 17 35 EVA prep Tue 07:51 AM 07 17 50 HST release prep Tue 08:16 AM 07 18 15 HST: Aperture door open Tue 08:53 AM 07 18 52 HST release Tue 08:54 AM 07 18 53 Separation burn No. 1 Tue 09:27 AM 07 19 26 Separation burn No. 2 Tue 09:51 AM 07 19 50 FSS stow Tue 10:11 AM 07 20 10 Crew meals

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 154 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

DATE/ET DD HH MM EVENT

Tue 11:02 AM 07 21 01 Orbit adjust rocket ﬁring Tue 11:11 AM 07 21 10 Group B computer powerdown Tue 11:11 AM 07 21 10 SRMS unberths OBSS Tue 12:51 PM 07 22 50 Starboard wing RCC survey Tue 02:31 PM 08 00 30 EVA tools stowed Tue 02:41 PM 08 00 40 Nose cap survey Tue 03:31 PM 08 01 30 Port wing RCC survey Tue 04:31 PM 08 02 30 HST: 2nd ARU attitude Tue 05:51 PM 08 03 50 OBSS ICC RCC survey Tue 06:31 PM 08 04 30 LDRI downlinkn Tue 08:31 PM 08 06 30 Crew sleep begins

Flight Day 10

05/20/09 Wed 04:31 AM 08 14 30 Crew wakeup Wed 07:16 AM 08 17 15 SRMS OBSS stow Wed 08:16 AM 08 18 15 SRMS powerdown Wed 08:31 AM 08 18 30 Crew off duty Wed 10:16 AM 08 20 15 Crew news conference Wed 10:56 AM 08 20 55 Joint crew meal Wed 11:56 AM 08 21 55 Shuttle-to-ISS call Wed 12:11 PM 08 22 10 Crew off duty Wed 08:01 PM 09 06 00 Crew sleep begins

Flight Day 11

05/21/09 Thu 04:01 AM 09 14 00 Crew wakeup Thu 07:01 AM 09 17 00 Cabin stow begins Thu 07:11 AM 09 17 10 Flight control system checkout Thu 08:21 AM 09 18 20 RCS hotﬁre Thu 08:36 AM 09 18 35 PILOT landing practice Thu 10:06 AM 09 20 05 Deorbit review Thu 10:36 AM 09 20 35 Joint crew meal Thu 11:36 AM 09 21 35 Cabin stow resumes Thu 12:36 PM 09 22 35 Crew photo Thu 12:16 PM 09 22 15 PAO event Thu 11:46 AM 09 21 45 L-1 comm check Thu 02:01 PM 10 00 00 PAO event Thu 02:21 PM 10 00 20 Entry video setup Thu 02:41 PM 10 00 40 Wing leading edge sensor system deactivation Thu 04:01 PM 10 02 00 PGSC stow (part 1) Thu 04:01 PM 10 02 00 KU antenna stow Thu 04:01 PM 10 02 00 Ergometer stow Thu 07:31 PM 10 05 30 Crew sleep begins

Flight Day 12

05/22/09 Fri 03:31 AM 10 13 30 Crew wakeup

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 155

DATE/ET DD HH MM EVENT

Fri 05:46 AM 10 15 45 Group B computer powerup Fri 06:01 AM 10 16 00 IMU alignment Fri 06:16 AM 10 16 15 PGSC stow (part 2) Fri 06:36 AM 10 16 35 Deorbit timeline begins Fri 10:35 AM 10 20 34 Deorbit ignition (orbit 166) Fri 11:41 AM 10 21 40 Landing

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 156 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 157

STS-125 Television Schedule

Editor's note: NASA's daily video highlights reel will be replayed on the hour during crew sleep periods. The timeing of actual events is subject to change and some events may or may not be carried live on NASA television.

NASA Note: NASA Television is now carried on an MPEG-2 digital signal accessed via satellite AMC-6, at 72 degrees west longitude, transponder 17C, 4040 MHz, vertical polarization. A Digital Video Broadcast (DVB) - compliant Integrated Receiver Decoder (IRD) with modulation of QPSK/DBV, data rate of 36.86 and FEC 3/4 will be needed for reception. NASA mission coverage will be simulcast digitally on the Public Services Channel (Channel #101); the Education Channel (Channel #102) and the Media Services Channel (Channel #103). Further information is available at: http://www1.nasa.gov/multimedia/nasatv/digital.html. Mission Audio can be accessed on AMC-6, Transponder 13, 3971.3 MHz, horizontal polarization.

ORBIT EVENT MET EDT GMT

FRIDAY, MAY 8 ....COUNTDOWN STATUS BRIEFING...... 10:00 AM...14:00 ....EXPEDITION 19 ISS COMMENTARY...... 11:00 AM...15:00 ....VIDEO FILE...... 12:00 PM...16:00 ....STS-125 CREW ARRIVAL...... 05:00 PM...21:00

SATURDAY, MAY 9.*.COUNTDOWN STATUS BRIEFING...... 11:00 AM...15:00 ....PRELAUNCH NEWS CONFERENCE...... 06:30 PM...22:30

SUNDAY, MAY 10...COUNTDOWN STATUS BRIEFING...... 10:00 AM...14:00 ....STS-125 WEBCAST UPDATE...... 12:30 PM...16:30 ....HST PROGRAM BRIEFING...... 01:00 PM...17:00 ....WFPC RETROSPECTIVE BRIEFING...... 02:00 PM...18:00 ....LAUNCH PAD 39-A RSS RETRACTION...... 05:00 PM...21:00

MONDAY, MAY 11 - FD 1 ....ATLANTIS LAUNCH COVERAGE BEGINS...... 08:30 AM...12:30 ....LAUNCH...... 00/00:00...02:01 PM...18:01 ....MECO...... 00/00:08...02:09 PM...18:09 1...LAUNCH REPLAYS...... 00/00:13...02:14 PM...18:14 1...ADDITIONAL LAUNCH REPLAYS FROM KSC...... 00/00:45...02:46 PM...18:46 1...POST LAUNCH NEWS CONFERENCE...... 00/00:59...03:00 PM...19:00 2...PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPENING...... 00/01:25...03:26 PM...19:26 3...RMS CHECKOUT...... 00/02:55...04:56 PM...20:56 3...ASCENT FLIGHT CONTROL TEAM VIDEO REPLAY..00/03:29...05:30 PM...21:30 3...RMS PAYLOAD BAY SURVEY...... 00/04:00...06:01 PM...22:01 3...RMS CREW CABIN SURVEY...... 00/04:20...06:21 PM...22:21 3...SSE CHECKOUT...... 00/04:25...06:26 PM...22:26 4...LAUNCH ENGINEERING REPLAYS FROM KSC...... 00/04:59...07:00 PM...23:00 4...HDTV ET VIDEO DOWNLINK...... 00/05:10...07:11 PM...23:11 5...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 00/07:00...09:01 PM...01:01 6...FLIGHT DAY 1 HIGHLIGHTS...... 00/07:59...10:00 PM...02:00 7...VIDEO FILE...... 00/08:59...11:00 PM...03:00 7...HD FLIGHT DAY 1 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 00/09:59...12:00 AM...04:00

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 158 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

ORBIT EVENT MET EDT GMT

TUESDAY, MAY 12 - FD 2 10...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 2)...... 00/15:00...05:01 AM...09:01 12...RMS UNBERTH OBSS...... 00/17:00...07:01 AM...11:01 12...FSS PREPARATIONS FOR HST BERTHING...... 00/18:15...08:16 AM...12:16 13...EMU CHECKOUT...... 00/18:25...08:26 AM...12:26 13...RMS/OBSS SURVEY OF ATLANTIS TPS BEGINS..00/19:00...09:01 AM...13:01 17...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 01/00:29...02:30 PM...18:30 17...PROGRESS 33 DOCKING TO ISS...... 01/01:22...03:23 PM...19:23 18...OBSS BERTH...... 01/02:20...04:21 PM...20:21 18...POST-MMT BRIEFING...... 01/02:59...05:00 PM...21:00 18...RMS OMS POD SURVEY...... 01/03:35...05:36 PM...21:36 18...RENDEZVOUS TOOL CHECKOUT...... 01/03:50...05:51 PM...21:51 19...HST APERTURE DOOR CLOSURE...... 01/04:00...06:01 PM...22:01 21...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 01/07:00...09:01 PM...01:01 21...STOCC UPDATE...... 01/07:29...09:30 PM...01:30 21...FLIGHT DAY 2 HIGHLIGHTS...... 01/07:59...10:00 PM...02:00

WEDNESDAY, MAY 13 - FD 3 25...HST HGA RETRACTION...... 01/13:25...03:26 AM...07:26 26...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 3)...... 01/15:00...05:01 AM...09:01 28...HST RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS BEGIN...... 01/17:40...07:41 AM...11:41 30...TI BURN...... 01/20:40...10:41 AM...14:41 31...HST MANEUVERS TO GRAPPLE ATTITUDE...... 01/22:00...12:01 PM...16:01 31...RMS GRAPPLE OF HST...... 01/22:53...12:54 PM...16:54 32...RMS BERTHS HST ON FSS...... 01/23:40...01:41 PM...17:41 32...HST SURVEY BEGINS...... 02/00:00...02:01 PM...18:01 33...MISSION STATUS/POST-MMT BRIEFING...... 02/01:59...04:00 PM...20:00 33...EVA #1 CREW PROCEDURE REVIEW...... 02/02:40...04:41 PM...20:41 34...HD VTR PLAYBACK OF HST CAPTURE & BERTH..02/04:25...06:26 PM...22:26 36...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 02/06:30...08:31 PM...00:31 36...STOCC UPDATE...... 02/06:44...08:45 PM...00:45 36...FLIGHT DAY 3 HIGHLIGHTS...... 02/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 37...VIDEO FILE...... 02/07:59...10:00 PM...02:00 38...HD FLIGHT DAY 3 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 02/09:59...12:00 AM...04:00

THURSDAY, MAY 14 - FD 4 41...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 4)...... 02/14:30...04:31 AM...08:31 42...EVA #1 PREPARATIONS BEGIN...... 02/15:45...05:46 AM...09:46 43...EVA #1 BEGINS (GRUNSFELD & FEUSTEL).....02/18:15...08:16 AM...12:16 44...WFPC-2 REMOVAL/WFC III INSTALLATION.....02/19:25...09:26 AM...13:26 45...SIC & DH REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT BEGINS.....02/21:35...11:36 AM...15:36 46...SIC & DH ALIVENESS TEST...... 02/22:55...12:56 PM...16:56 46...SCM & -V2 DOOR LATCH OVER CENTER KIT....02/23:05...01:06 PM...17:06 47...EVA #1 ENDS...... 03/00:45...02:46 PM...18:46 48...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 03/01:29...03:30 PM...19:30 48...WFC III FUNCTIONAL TEST...... 03/01:35...03:36 PM...19:36 48...HD CREW CHOICE DOWNLINK OPPORTUNITY.....03/02:50...02:50 AM...02:50 49...EVA #2 CREW PROCEDURE REVIEW...... 03/03:00...05:01 PM...21:01 51...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 03/06:30...08:31 PM...00:31 51...STOCC UPDATE...... 03/06:44...08:45 PM...00:45 51...FLIGHT DAY 4 HIGHLIGHTS...... 03/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 52...VIDEO FILE...... 03/07:59...10:00 PM...02:00

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 159

ORBIT EVENT MET EDT GMT

53...HD FLIGHT DAY 4 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 03/09:59...12:00 AM...04:00

FRIDAY, MAY 15 - FD 5 56...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 5)...... 03/14:30...04:31 AM...08:31 56...EVA #2 PREPARATIONS BEGIN...... 03/15:45...05:46 AM...09:46 58...EVA #2 BEGINS (MASSIMINO & GOOD)...... 03/18:15...08:16 AM...12:16 59...RSU REMOVAL & REPLACEMENT BEGINS...... 03/19:00...09:01 AM...13:01 61...BAY #2 BATTERY MODULE REPLACEMENT...... 03/22:20...12:21 PM...16:21 62...BAY #2 BATTERY ALIVENESS TEST...... 03/23:50...01:51 PM...17:51 62...EVA #2 ENDS...... 04/00:45...02:46 PM...18:46 62...BAY #2 BATTERY FUNCTIONAL TEST...... 04/01:00...03:01 PM...19:01 63...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 04/01:29...03:30 PM...19:30 64...RSU FUNCTIONAL TEST...... 04/03:10...05:11 PM...21:11 64...HD CREW CHOICE DOWNLINK OPPORTUNITY.....04/03:15...05:16 PM...21:16 64...EVA #3 CREW PROCEDURE REVIEW...... 04/03:20...05:21 PM...21:21 64...ISS-20 CREW ACTIVITIES...... 00/03:59...06:00 PM...22:00 66...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 04/06:30...08:31 PM...00:31 66...STOCC UPDATE...... 04/06:44...08:45 PM...00:45 66...FLIGHT DAY 5 HIGHLIGHTS...... 04/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 67...VIDEO FILE...... 04/07:59...10:00 PM...02:00 68...ISS-20 CREW ACTIVITIES REPLAY...... 04/08:59...11:00 PM...03:00 68...HD FLIGHT DAY 5 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 04/09:59...12:00 AM...04:00

SATURDAY, MAY 16 - FD 6 71...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 6)...... 04/14:30...04:31 AM...08:31 72...EVA #3 PREPARATIONS BEGIN...... 04/15:45...05:46 AM...09:46 73...EVA #3 BEGINS (GRUNSFELD & FEUSTEL).....04/18:15...08:16 AM...12:16 74...COSTAR REMOVAL/COS INSTALLATION...... 04/18:45...08:46 AM...12:46 75...COS ALIVENESS TEST...... 04/20:45...10:46 AM...14:46 75...ACS REPAIR BEGINS...... 04/21:35...11:36 AM...15:36 76...ACS POWER DOWN...... 04/22:30...12:31 PM...16:31 77...ACS POWER UP...... 04/23:30...01:31 PM...17:31 77...EVA #3 ENDS/COS FUNCTIONAL TEST...... 05/00:45...02:46 PM...18:46 78...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 05/01:29...03:30 PM...19:30 79...HD CREW CHOICE DOWNLINK OPPORTUNITY.....05/03:15...05:16 PM...21:16 79...EVA #4 CREW PROCEDURE REVIEW...... 05/03:20...05:21 PM...21:21 81...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 05/06:30...08:31 PM...00:31 81...STOCC UPDATE...... 05/06:44...08:45 PM...00:45 81...FLIGHT DAY 6 HIGHLIGHTS...... 05/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 83...HD FLIGHT DAY 6 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 05/09:59...12:00 AM...04:00

SUNDAY, MAY 17 - FD 7 86...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 7)...... 05/14:30...04:31 AM...08:31 87...EVA #4 PREPARATIONS BEGIN...... 05/15:45...05:46 AM...09:46 88...EVA #4 BEGINS (MASSIMINO & GOOD)...... 05/18:15...08:16 AM...12:16 88...STIS REPAIR BEGINS...... 05/18:45...08:46 AM...12:46 90...STIS POWERDOWN...... 05/21:00...11:01 AM...15:01 91...STIS ALIVENESS TEST...... 05/22:25...12:26 PM...16:26 91...STIS FUNCTIONAL TEST & SAFING...... 05/23:00...01:01 PM...17:01 91...BAY 8 NOBL INSTALLATION BEGINS...... 05/23:15...01:16 PM...17:16 92...EVA #4 ENDS...... 06/00:45...02:46 PM...18:46 93...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 06/01:29...03:30 PM...19:30

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 160 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

ORBIT EVENT MET EDT GMT

94...HD CREW CHOICE DOWNLINK OPPORTUNITY.....06/03:10...05:11 PM...21:11 94...EVA #5 CREW PROCEDURE REVIEW...... 06/03:15...05:16 PM...21:16 96...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 06/06:30...08:31 PM...00:31 96...STOCC UPDATE...... 06/06:44...08:45 PM...00:45 96...FLIGHT DAY 7 HIGHLIGHTS...... 06/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 98...HD FLIGHT DAY 7 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 06/09:59...12:00 AM...04:00

MONDAY, MAY 18 - FD 8 101...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 8)...... 06/14:30...04:31 AM...08:31 102...EVA #5 PREPARATIONS BEGIN...... 06/15:45...05:46 AM...09:46 103...EVA #5 BEGINS (GRUNSFELD & FEUSTEL)....06/18:15...08:16 AM...12:16 104...BAY 3 BATTERY REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT...... 06/18:45...08:46 AM...12:46 104...BAY 3 BATTERY ALIVENESS TEST...... 06/20:05...10:06 AM...14:06 105...FGS-2 REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT BEGINS...... 06/20:15...10:16 AM...14:16 105...FGS-2 ALIVENESS TEST...... 06/21:40...11:41 AM...15:41 106...BAY 5 NOBL INSTALLATION BEGINS...... 05/22:15...12:16 PM...16:16 107...HST HGA DEPLOY - PART ONE...... 06/23:45...01:46 PM...17:46 107...EVA #5 ENDS...... 07/00:00...02:01 PM...18:01 107...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 07/00:29...02:30 PM...18:30 108...HST HGA DEPLOY - PART TWO...... 07/02:25...04:26 PM...20:26 108...RENDEZVOUS TOOLS CHECKOUT...... 07/02:20...04:21 PM...20:21 109...FGS-2 FUNCTIONAL TEST...... 07/02:45...04:46 PM...20:46 109...HD CREW CHOICE DOWNLINK OPPORTUNITY....07/03:20...05:21 PM...21:21 111...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 07/06:30...08:31 PM...00:31 111...STOCC UPDATE...... 07/06:44...08:45 PM...00:45 111...FLIGHT DAY 8 HIGHLIGHTS...... 07/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 112...VIDEO FILE...... 07/07:59...10:00 PM...02:00 113...HD FLIGHT DAY 8 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 07/09:59...12:00 AM...04:00

TUESDAY, MAY 19 - FD 9 116...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 9)...... 07/14:30...04:31 AM...08:31 117...RMS GRAPPLE OF HST...... 07/16:15...06:16 AM...10:16 118...HST UNBERTH MANEUVER...... 07/17:05...07:06 AM...11:06 118...HST APERTURE DOOR OPENS...... 07/18:15...08:16 AM...12:16 119...HST RELEASE...... 07/18:52...08:53 AM...12:53 119...ATLANTIS FINAL SEPARATION FROM HST.....07/19:25...09:26 AM...13:26 119...FSS STOWAGE...... 07/19:50...09:51 AM...13:51 120...RMS UNBERTHS OBSS...... 07/21:10...11:11 AM...15:11 121...RMS/OBSS SURVEY OF ATLANTIS...... 07/22:50...12:51 PM...16:51 122...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 08/00:29...02:30 PM...18:30 126...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 08/06:30...08:31 PM...00:31 127...FLIGHT DAY 9 HIGHLIGHTS...... 08/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 127...VIDEO FILE...... 08/07:59...10:00 PM...02:00

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20 - FD 10 131...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 10)...... 08/14:30...04:31 AM...08:31 133...OBSS BERTH IN ATLANTIS' PAYLOAD BAY....08/17:15...07:16 AM...11:16 134...ATLANTIS CREW OFF DUTY PERIOD BEGINS...08/18:30...08:31 AM...12:31 135...ATLANTIS HD CREW NEWS CONFERENCE...... 08/21:30...11:31 AM...15:31 136...ATLANTIS-ISS SHIP-TO-SHIP CALL...... 08/22:10...12:11 PM...16:11 137...VIDEO FILE...... 08/22:59...01:00 PM...17:00 138...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 08/23:59...02:00 PM...18:00

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 161

ORBIT EVENT MET EDT GMT

139...POST-MMT BRIEFING...... 09/02:59...05:00 PM...21:00 140...HD CREW CHOICE DOWNLINK OPPORTUNITY....09/03:40...05:41 PM...21:41 141...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 09/06:00...08:01 PM...00:01 142...FLIGHT DAY 10 HIGHLIGHTS...... 09/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 143...HD FLIGHT DAY 10 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 09/08:59...11:00 PM...03:00

THURSDAY, MAY 21 - FD 11 147...ATLANTIS CREW WAKE UP (FD 11)...... 09/14:00...04:01 AM...08:01 148...CABIN STOWAGE BEGINS/RMS SURVEY...... 09/17:00...07:01 AM...11:01 148...FCS CHECKOUT...... 09/17:10...07:11 AM...11:11 149...RCS HOT-FIRE TEST...... 09/18:20...08:21 AM...12:21 150...CREW DEORBIT PREPARATION BRIEFING...... 09/20:05...10:06 AM...14:06 152...ATLANTIS VIP PAO EVENT...... 09/22:30...12:31 PM...16:31 153...ATLANTIS HD PAO EVENT...... 10/00:00...02:01 PM...18:01 154...MISSION STATUS BRIEFING...... 10/00:44...02:45 PM...18:45 154...KU-BAND ANTENNA STOWAGE...... 10/02:15...04:16 PM...20:16 157...ATLANTIS CREW SLEEP BEGINS...... 10/05:30...07:31 PM...23:31 157...FLIGHT DAY 11 HIGHLIGHTS...... 10/05:59...08:00 PM...00:00 157...VIDEO FILE...... 10/06:59...09:00 PM...01:00 159...HD FLIGHT DAY 11 CREW HIGHLIGHTS...... 10/08:59...11:00 PM...03:00

FRIDAY, MAY 22 - FD 12 162...ATLANTIS CREW WAKEUP (FD 12)...... 10/13:30...03:31 AM...07:31 164...DEORBIT PREPARATIONS BEGIN...... 10/16:35...06:36 AM...10:36 164...PAYLOAD BAY DOOR CLOSING...... 10/17:54...07:55 AM...11:55 166...DEORBIT BURN...... 10/20:34...10:35 AM...14:35 167...MILA C-BAND RADAR ACQUISITION...... 10/21:27...11:28 AM...15:28 167...KSC LANDING...... 10/21:40...11:41 AM...15:41

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 162 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 163

Appendix 1: Space Shuttle Flight and Abort Scenarios

The shuttle weighs 4.5 million pounds at launch and it hits 140 mph - going straight up - in about 10 seconds. The shuttle burns its fuel so fast that in less than 100 seconds it weighs half what it did at launch. In eight-and-a-half minutes, the vehicle is traveling some 17,000 mph, or five miles per second. That's about eight times faster than a rifle bullet, fast enough to fly from Los Angeles to New York in 10 minutes. Calling a shuttle launch "routine" misses the mark. The margin for error is very slim indeed and the astronauts face a limited number of survivable abort options.

The shuttle makes the climb to orbit using two solid-fuel boosters and three hydrogen-fueled main engines. Contrary to popular myth, the shuttle pilots do little more than monitor their instruments and computer displays during ascent; the shuttle's four ﬂight computers do all the piloting barring a malfunction of some sort that might force the crew to take manual control.

Based on the type of main engines aboard Atlantis, NASA puts the odds of a catastrophic failure that would destroy the vehicle at about 1-in-438.

The main engines generate a combined 37 million horsepower, which is equivalent to the output of 23 Hoover Dams. They are ignited at 120 millisecond intervals starting 6.6 seconds prior to launch. Computers bolted to each powerplant monitor engine performance 50 times per second and, after all three are running smoothly, the boosters are ignited. Pressure inside the hollow boosters jumps from sea level to more than 900 pounds per square inch in a quarter of a second as the propellant ignites. Liftoff is virtually instantaneous.

The boosters burn for about two minutes and five seconds. They are far more powerful than the three main engines and provide all the shuttle's steering during the initial minutes of flight using hydraulic pistons that move the nozzles at the base of each rocket. After the boosters are jettisoned, the shuttle's three liquid-fueled engines provide steering and flight control.

The engines are throttled down to 65 percent power about 40 seconds into flight to lower the stress on the shuttle as it accelerates through the region of maximum aerodynamic pressure (715 pounds per square foot at 48 seconds). After that, the engines are throttled back up to 104 percent. All three engines shut down about eight and a half minutes after takeoff, putting the shuttle in a preliminary orbit. The empty external fuel tank is then jettisoned and breaks up in the atmosphere over the Indian or Pacific oceans. The initial orbit is highly elliptical and the shuttle's two orbital maneuvering rockets are fired about 43 minutes after launch to put the craft in a circular orbit.

There are no survivable booster failures like the one that destroyed Challenger 73 seconds after liftoff in 1986. Like a holiday bottle rocket, the boosters cannot be shut down once they are ignited. They are rigged with plastic explosives to blow open their cases and eliminate forward thrust should a catastrophic failure send a shuttle veering out of control toward populated areas or sea lanes. In that case, the crew is considered expendable. There is no survivable way to separate from the boosters while they are operating. They simply have to work.

But the shuttle system was designed to safely handle a single main engine failure at any point after startup. In all cases, such "intact" aborts begin after the solid-fuel boosters have been jettisoned. In other words, if an abort is declared 10 seconds after liftoff, it will not actually go into effect until 2 minutes and 30 seconds after launch.

An engine failure during the startup sequence will trigger a "redundant set launch sequencer abort," or RSLS abort. If one or more engine experiences problems during startup, the shuttle's ﬂight computers will issue immediate shutdown commands and stop the countdown before booster ignition. This has happened ﬁve times in shuttle history (the most recent RSLS abort occurred in August 1994).

An RSLS abort does not necessarily threaten the safety of the shuttle crew, but hydrogen gas can be released through the engine nozzles during shutdown. Hydrogen burns without visible sign of ﬂame and it's possible a brief pad ﬁre

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 164 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement can follow the engine cutoff. But the launch pad is equipped with a sophisticated ﬁre extinguishing system and other improvements implemented in the wake of the 1986 Challenger accident that will automatically start spraying the orbiter with water if a ﬁre is detected. Fire detection sensors are located all over the pad.

While in-flight abort regimes overlap to a degree, a return to the launch site (RTLS) is only possible during the first four minutes of flight. Beyond that point, a shuttle has flown too far to make it back to Florida with its remaining fuel. But in practice, an RTLS is only a threat in the first 2.5 minutes or so of flight. After that, a crew can press on to an emergency landing in Spain or Africa, the preferred option if there's a choice because it puts less stress on the shuttle.

A trans-Atlantic abort (TAL) is an option throughout ascent but after about ﬁve minutes, the shuttle is going fast enough to attempt an abort to a lower-than-planned orbit, depending on the shuttle's altitude and velocity at the time of the failure. If the shuttle crew has a choice between an RTLS and a TAL, they will select the TAL option. If the choice is between TAL and ATO, they will select the abort to orbit.

Here are the actual numbers for a recent shuttle ﬂight (velocity includes a contribution from Earth's rotation at 28.5 degrees north latitude):

TIME EVENT MPH

0:10 THE SHUTTLE ROLLS TO "HEADS DOWN" ORIENTATION 920 0:40 START THROTTLE DOWN 1,405 0:48 MAXIMUM AERODYNAMIC PRESSURE 1,520 0:53 START THROTTLE UP TO 104% 1,589 2:04 SOLID-FUEL BOOSTERS ARE JETTISONED 3,818 2:10 THE SHUTTLE CAN NOW ABORT TO SPAIN OR AFRICA 3,955 3:45 THE SHUTTLE CAN NO LONGER RETURN TO KSC 5,591 4:12 THE SHUTTLE CAN NOW ABORT TO ORBIT 6,273 5:13 SHUTTLE CAN REACH NORMAL ORBIT WITH TWO ENGINES 8,045 5:48 THE SHUTTLE ROLLS TO "HEADS UP" ORIENTATION 9,205 6:32 SHUTTLE CAN REACH ORBIT WITH ONE ENGINE 11,114 7:24 ENGINES THROTTLE DOWN TO LIMIT G LOADS ON CREW 13,977 8:24 MAIN ENGINE CUTOFF 17,727

An RTLS abort is considered the riskiest of the abort procedures because the shuttle crew must reverse course to head back for Florida, which puts severe stresses on the vehicle. TAL is the preferred abort mode for early engine failures. A second engine failure during an RTLS makes the chances of a success slim while a TAL abort can be ﬂown in many instances with two failures.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 165

Normal Flight Details7

In the launch conﬁguration, the orbiter and two solid rocket boosters are attached to the external tank in a vertical (nose-up) position on the launch pad. Each solid rocket booster is attached at its aft skirt to the mobile launcher platform by four bolts.

Emergency exit for the ﬂight crew on the launch pad up to 30 seconds before lift-off is by slidewire. There are seven 1,200-foot- long slidewires, each with one basket. Each basket is designed to carry three persons. The baskets, 5 feet in diameter and 42 inches deep, are suspended beneath the slide mechanism by four cables. The slidewires carry the baskets to ground level. Upon departing the basket at ground level, the ﬂight crew progresses to a bunker that is designed to protect it from an explosion on the launch pad.

At launch, the three space shuttle main engines-fed liquid hydrogen fuel and liquid oxygen oxidizer from the external tank-are ignited first. When it has been verified that the engines are operating at the proper thrust level, a signal is sent to ignite the solid rocket boosters. At the proper thrust-to-weight ratio, initiators (small explosives) at eight hold-down bolts on the solid rocket boosters are fired to release the space shuttle for lift-off. All this takes only a few seconds.

Maximum dynamic pressure is reached early in the ascent, nominally approximately 60 seconds after lift-off.

Approximately a minute later (two minutes into the ascent phase), the two solid rocket boosters have consumed their propellant and are jettisoned from the external tank. This is triggered by a separation signal from the orbiter. The boosters brieﬂy continue to ascend, while small motors ﬁre to carry them away from the space shuttle. The boosters then turn and descend, and at a predetermined altitude, parachutes are deployed to decelerate them for a safe splashdown in the ocean. Splashdown occurs approximately 141 nautical miles (162 statute miles) from the launch site. The boosters are recovered and reused.

Meanwhile, the orbiter and external tank continue to ascend, using the thrust of the three space shuttle main engines. Approximately eight minutes after launch and just short of orbital velocity, the three space shuttle engines are shut down (main engine cutoff), and the external tank is jettisoned on command from the orbiter.

The forward and aft reaction control system engines provide attitude (pitch, yaw and roll) and the translation of the orbiter away from the external tank at separation and return to attitude hold prior to the orbital maneuvering system thrusting maneuver.

The external tank continues on a ballistic trajectory and enters the atmosphere, where it disintegrates. Its projected impact is in the Indian Ocean (except for 57-degree inclinations) in the case of equatorial orbits (Kennedy Space Center launch) and in the extreme southern Paciﬁc Ocean in the case of a Vandenberg Air Force Base launch.

Normally, two thrusting maneuvers using the two orbital maneuvering system engines at the aft end of the orbiter are used in a two-step thrusting sequence: to complete insertion into Earth orbit and to circularize the spacecraft's orbit. The orbital maneuvering system engines are also used on orbit for any major velocity changes. In the event of a direct-insertion mission, only one orbital maneuvering system thrusting sequence is used.

The orbital altitude of a mission is dependent upon that mission. The nominal altitude can vary between 100 to 217 nautical miles (115 to 250 statute miles).

The forward and aft reaction control system thrusters (engines) provide attitude control of the orbiter as well as any minor translation maneuvers along a given axis on orbit.

7 The remainder of this appendix, with clearly noted exceptions, is taken directly from shuttle-builder Rockwell International's Shuttle Reference book.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 166 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

At the completion of orbital operations, the orbiter is oriented in a tailﬁrst attitude by the reaction control system. The two orbital maneuvering system engines are commanded to slow the orbiter for deorbit. The reaction control system turns the orbiter's nose forward for entry. The reaction control system controls the orbiter until atmospheric density is sufﬁcient for the pitch and roll aerodynamic control surfaces to become effective.

Entry interface is considered to occur at 400,000 feet altitude approximately 4,400 nautical miles (5,063 statute miles) from the landing site and at approximately 25,000 feet per second velocity. At 400,000 feet altitude, the orbiter is maneuvered to zero degrees roll and yaw (wings level) and at a predetermined angle of attack for entry. The angle of attack is 40 degrees. The ﬂight control system issues the commands to roll, pitch and yaw reaction control system jets for rate damping.

The forward reaction control system engines are inhibited prior to entry interface, and the aft reaction control system engines maneuver the spacecraft until a dynamic pressure of 10 pounds per square foot is sensed, which is when the orbiter's ailerons become effective. The aft reaction control system roll engines are then deactivated. At a dynamic pressure of 20 pounds per square foot, the orbiter's elevators become active, and the aft reaction control system pitch engines are deactivated. The orbiter's speed brake is used below Mach 10 to induce a more positive downward elevator trim deﬂection. At approximately Mach 3.5, the rudder becomes activated, and the aft reaction control system yaw engines are deactivated at 45,000 feet.

Entry guidance must dissipate the tremendous amount of energy the orbiter possesses when it enters the Earth's atmosphere to assure that the orbiter does not either burn up (entry angle too steep) or skip out of the atmosphere (entry angle too shallow) and that the orbiter is properly positioned to reach the desired touchdown point.

During entry, energy is dissipated by the atmospheric drag on the orbiter's surface. Higher atmospheric drag levels enable faster energy dissipation with a steeper trajectory. Normally, the angle of attack and roll angle enable the atmospheric drag of any ﬂight vehicle to be controlled. However, for the orbiter, angle of attack was rejected because it creates surface temperatures above the design speciﬁcation. The angle of attack scheduled during entry is loaded into the orbiter computers as a function of relative velocity, leaving roll angle for energy control. Increasing the roll angle decreases the vertical component of lift, causing a higher sink rate and energy dissipation rate. Increasing the roll rate does raise the surface temperature of the orbiter, but not nearly as drastically as an equal angle of attack command.

If the orbiter is low on energy (current range-to-go much greater than nominal at current velocity), entry guidance will command lower than nominal drag levels. If the orbiter has too much energy (current range-to-go much less than nominal at the current velocity), entry guidance will command higher-than-nominal drag levels to dissipate the extra energy.

Roll angle is used to control cross range. Azimuth error is the angle between the plane containing the orbiter's position vector and the heading alignment cylinder tangency point and the plane containing the orbiter's position vector and velocity vector. When the azimuth error exceeds a computer-loaded number, the orbiter's roll angle is reversed.

Thus, descent rate and downranging are controlled by bank angle. The steeper the bank angle, the greater the descent rate and the greater the drag. Conversely, the minimum drag attitude is wings level. Cross range is controlled by bank reversals.

The entry thermal control phase is designed to keep the backface temperatures within the design limits. A constant heating rate is established until below 19,000 feet per second.

The equilibrium glide phase shifts the orbiter from the rapidly increasing drag levels of the temperature control phase to the constant drag level of the constant drag phase. The equilibrium glide flight is defined as flight in which the flight path angle, the angle between the local horizontal and the local velocity vector, remains constant. Equilibrium glide flight provides the maximum downrange capability. It lasts until the drag acceleration reaches 33 feet per second squared.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 167

The constant drag phase begins at that point. The angle of attack is initially 40 degrees, but it begins to ramp down in this phase to approximately 36 degrees by the end of this phase.

In the transition phase, the angle of attack continues to ramp down, reaching the approximately 14-degree angle of attack at the entry terminal area energy management interface, at approximately 83,000 feet altitude, 2,500 feet per second, Mach 2.5 and 52 nautical miles (59 statute miles) from the landing runway. Control is then transferred to TAEM guidance.

During the entry phases described, the orbiter's roll commands keep the orbiter on the drag proﬁle and control cross range.

TAEM guidance steers the orbiter to the nearest of two heading alignment cylinders, whose radii are approximately 18,000 feet and which are located tangent to and on either side of the runway centerline on the approach end. In TAEM guidance, excess energy is dissipated with an S-turn; and the speed brake can be utilized to modify drag, lift- to-drag ratio and flight path angle in high-energy conditions. This increases the ground track range as the orbiter turns away from the nearest HAC until sufficient energy is dissipated to allow a normal approach and landing guidance phase capture, which begins at 10,000 feet altitude. The orbiter also can be flown near the velocity for maximum lift over drag or wings level for the range stretch case. The spacecraft slows to subsonic velocity at approximately 49,000 feet altitude, about 22 nautical miles (25.3 statute miles) from the landing site.

At TAEM acquisition, the orbiter is turned until it is aimed at a point tangent to the nearest HAC and continues until it reaches way point 1. At WP-1, the TAEM heading alignment phase begins. The HAC is followed until landing runway alignment, plus or minus 20 degrees, has been achieved. In the TAEM preﬁnal phase, the orbiter leaves the HAC; pitches down to acquire the steep glide slope; increases airspeed; banks to acquire the runway centerline; and continues until on the runway centerline, on the outer glide slope and on airspeed. The approach and landing guidance phase begins with the completion of the TAEM preﬁnal phase and ends when the spacecraft comes to a complete stop on the runway.

The approach and landing trajectory capture phase begins at the TAEM interface and continues to guidance lock-on to the steep outer glide slope. The approach and landing phase begins at about 10,000 feet altitude at an equivalent airspeed of 290, plus or minus 12, knots 6.9 nautical miles (7.9 statute miles) from touchdown. Autoland guidance is initiated at this point to guide the orbiter to the minus 19- to 17-degree glide slope (which is over seven times that of a commercial airliner's approach) aimed at a target 0.86 nautical mile (1 statute mile) in front of the runway. The spacecraft's speed brake is positioned to hold the proper velocity. The descent rate in the later portion of TAEM and approach and landing is greater than 10,000 feet per minute (a rate of descent approximately 20 times higher than a commercial airliner's standard 3-degree instrument approach angle).

At 1,750 feet above ground level, a preﬂare maneuver is started to position the spacecraft for a 1.5-degree glide slope in preparation for landing with the speed brake positioned as required. The ﬂight crew deploys the landing gear at this point.

The ﬁnal phase reduces the sink rate of the spacecraft to less than 9 feet per second. Touchdown occurs approximately 2,500 feet past the runway threshold at a speed of 184 to 196 knots (213 to 226 mph).

Intact Aborts

Selection of an ascent abort mode may become necessary if there is a failure that affects vehicle performance, such as the failure of a space shuttle main engine or an orbital maneuvering system. Other failures requiring early termination of a ﬂight, such as a cabin leak, might require the selection of an abort mode.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 168 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

There are two basic types of ascent abort modes for space shuttle missions: intact aborts and contingency aborts. Intact aborts are designed to provide a safe return of the orbiter to a planned landing site. Contingency aborts are designed to permit ﬂight crew survival following more severe failures when an intact abort is not possible. A contingency abort would generally result in a ditch operation.

There are four types of intact aborts: abort to orbit, abort once around, transatlantic landing and return to launch site.

The ATO mode is designed to allow the vehicle to achieve a temporary orbit that is lower than the nominal orbit. This mode requires less performance and allows time to evaluate problems and then choose either an early deorbit maneuver or an orbital maneuvering system thrusting maneuver to raise the orbit and continue the mission.

The AOA is designed to allow the vehicle to ﬂy once around the Earth and make a normal entry and landing. This mode generally involves two orbital maneuvering system thrusting sequences, with the second sequence being a deorbit maneuver. The entry sequence would be similar to a normal entry.

The TAL mode is designed to permit an intact landing on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This mode results in a ballistic trajectory, which does not require an orbital maneuvering system maneuver.

The RTLS mode involves ﬂying downrange to dissipate propellant and then turning around under power to return directly to a landing at or near the launch site.

There is a deﬁnite order of preference for the various abort modes. The type of failure and the time of the failure determine which type of abort is selected. In cases where performance loss is the only factor, the preferred modes would be ATO, AOA, TAL and RTLS, in that order. The mode chosen is the highest one that can be completed with the remaining vehicle performance. In the case of some support system failures, such as cabin leaks or vehicle cooling problems, the preferred mode might be the one that will end the mission most quickly. In these cases, TAL or RTLS might be preferable to AOA or ATO. A contingency abort is never chosen if another abort option exists.

The Mission Control Center-Houston is prime for calling these aborts because it has a more precise knowledge of the orbiter's position than the crew can obtain from onboard systems. Before main engine cutoff, Mission Control makes periodic calls to the crew to tell them which abort mode is (or is not) available. If ground communications are lost, the ﬂight crew has onboard methods, such as cue cards, dedicated displays and display information, to determine the current abort region.

Which abort mode is selected depends on the cause and timing of the failure causing the abort and which mode is safest or improves mission success. If the problem is a space shuttle main engine failure, the ﬂight crew and Mission Control Center select the best option available at the time a space shuttle main engine fails.

If the problem is a system failure that jeopardizes the vehicle, the fastest abort mode that results in the earliest vehicle landing is chosen. RTLS and TAL are the quickest options (35 minutes), whereas an AOA requires approximately 90 minutes. Which of these is selected depends on the time of the failure with three good space shuttle main engines.

The ﬂight crew selects the abort mode by positioning an abort mode switch and depressing an abort push button.

1. Return to Launch Site (RTLS) Abort

The RTLS abort mode is designed to allow the return of the orbiter, crew, and payload to the launch site, Kennedy Space Center, approximately 25 minutes after lift-off. The RTLS proﬁle is designed to accommodate the loss of thrust from one space shuttle main engine between lift-off and approximately four minutes 20 seconds, at which time not enough main propulsion system propellant remains to return to the launch site.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 169

An RTLS can be considered to consist of three stages-a powered stage, during which the space shuttle main engines are still thrusting; an ET separation phase; and the glide phase, during which the orbiter glides to a landing at the Kennedy Space Center. The powered RTLS phase begins with the crew selection of the RTLS abort, which is done after solid rocket booster separation. The crew selects the abort mode by positioning the abort rotary switch to RTLS and depressing the abort push button. The time at which the RTLS is selected depends on the reason for the abort. For example, a three-engine RTLS is selected at the last moment, approximately three minutes 34 seconds into the mission; whereas an RTLS chosen due to an engine out at lift-off is selected at the earliest time, approximately two minutes 20 seconds into the mission (after solid rocket booster separation).

After RTLS is selected, the vehicle continues downrange to dissipate excess main propulsion system propellant. The goal is to leave only enough main propulsion system propellant to be able to turn the vehicle around, ﬂy back towards the Kennedy Space Center and achieve the proper main engine cutoff conditions so the vehicle can glide to the Kennedy Space Center after external tank separation. During the downrange phase, a pitch-around maneuver is initiated (the time depends in part on the time of a space shuttle main engine failure) to orient the orbiter/external tank conﬁguration to a heads up attitude, pointing toward the launch site. At this time, the vehicle is still moving away from the launch site, but the space shuttle main engines are now thrusting to null the downrange velocity. In addition, excess orbital maneuvering system and reaction control system propellants are dumped by continuous orbital maneuvering system and reaction control system engine thrustings to improve the orbiter weight and center of gravity for the glide phase and landing.

The vehicle will reach the desired main engine cutoff point with less than 2 percent excess propellant remaining in the external tank. At main engine cutoff minus 20 seconds, a pitch-down maneuver (called powered pitch-down) takes the mated vehicle to the required external tank separation attitude and pitch rate. After main engine cutoff has been commanded, the external tank separation sequence begins, including a reaction control system translation that ensures that the orbiter does not recontact the external tank and that the orbiter has achieved the necessary pitch attitude to begin the glide phase of the RTLS.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 170 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

After the reaction control system translation maneuver has been completed, the glide phase of the RTLS begins. From then on, the RTLS is handled similarly to a normal entry.

2. Trans-Atlantic Landing (TAL) Abort

The TAL abort mode was developed to improve the options available when a space shuttle main engine fails after the last RTLS opportunity but before the ﬁrst time that an AOA can be accomplished with only two space shuttle main engines or when a major orbiter system failure, for example, a large cabin pressure leak or cooling system failure, occurs after the last RTLS opportunity, making it imperative to land as quickly as possible.

In a TAL abort, the vehicle continues on a ballistic trajectory across the Atlantic Ocean to land at a predetermined runway. Landing occurs approximately 45 minutes after launch. The landing site is selected near the nominal ascent ground track of the orbiter in order to make the most efﬁcient use of space shuttle main engine propellant. The landing site also must have the necessary runway length, weather conditions and U.S. State Department approval. Currently, the three landing sites that have been identiﬁed for a due east launch are Moron,, Spain; Dakar, Senegal; and Ben Guerur, Morocco (on the west coast of Africa).

To select the TAL abort mode, the crew must place the abort rotary switch in the TAL/AOA position and depress the abort push button before main engine cutoff. (Depressing it after main engine cutoff selects the AOA abort mode.) The TAL abort mode begins sending commands to steer the vehicle toward the plane of the landing site. It also rolls the vehicle heads up before main engine cutoff and sends commands to begin an orbital maneuvering system propellant dump (by burning the propellants through the orbital maneuvering system engines and the reaction control system engines). This dump is necessary to increase vehicle performance (by decreasing weight), to place the center of gravity in the proper place for vehicle control, and to decrease the vehicle's landing weight.

TAL is handled like a nominal entry.

3. East-Coast Abort and Landing (ECAL)8 Abort

When the shuttle was originally designed, multiple main engine failures early in ﬂight meant a ditching somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean. After Challenger, the shuttle was rigged with a bailout system to give the crew a better chance of survival. In the space station era, an additional option was implemented to give of a shuttle with multiple engine failures a chance to reach an East Coast runway.

To reach the space station, the shuttle must launch into to the plane of its orbit. That plane is tilted 51.6 degrees to the equator. As a result, shuttles bound for the station take off on a northeasterly trajectory that parallels the East Coast of the United States. Should two or three engines fail before the shuttle is going fast enough to reach Europe or to turn around and return to Florida, the crew would attempt a landing at one of 15 designated East Coast runways, 10 in the United States and ﬁve in Canada.

First, the shuttle's ﬂight computers would pitch the nose up to 60 degrees to burn off fuel and yaw the ship 45 degrees to the left of its ground track to begin moving it closer to the coast. The shuttle also would roll about its vertical axis to put the crew in a "heads up" orientation on top of the external fuel tank. Based on velocity, fuel remaining and other factors, the shuttle eventually would pitch down and jettison the external tank. From there, the ﬂight computers would attempt to steer the ship to the designated runway using angle of attack as the primary means of bleeding off energy.

8 ECALs were not included in the original Rockwell Shuttle Reference. This information is provided by the author.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 171

An ECAL abort is a high-risk, last-resort option and would only be implemented if the only other alternative was to ditch in the ocean.

4. Abort to Orbit (ATO)9 Abort

An ATO is an abort mode used to boost the orbiter to a safe orbital altitude when performance has been lost and it is impossible to reach the planned orbital altitude. If a space shuttle main engine fails in a region that results in a main engine cutoff under speed, the Mission Control Center will determine that an abort mode is necessary and will inform the crew. The orbital maneuvering system engines would be used to place the orbiter in a circular orbit.

5. Abort Once Around (AOA) Abort

The AOA abort mode is used in cases in which vehicle performance has been lost to such an extent that either it is impossible to achieve a viable orbit or not enough orbital maneuvering system propellant is available to accomplish the orbital maneuvering system thrusting maneuver to place the orbiter on orbit and the deorbit thrusting maneuver. In addition, an AOA is used in cases in which a major systems problem (cabin leak, loss of cooling) makes it necessary to land quickly. In the AOA abort mode, one orbital maneuvering system thrusting sequence is made to adjust the post-main engine cutoff orbit so a second orbital maneuvering system thrusting sequence will result in the vehicle deorbiting and landing at the AOA landing site (White Sands, N.M.; Edwards Air Force Base; or the Kennedy Space Center). Thus, an AOA results in the orbiter circling the Earth once and landing approximately 90 minutes after lift-off.

After the deorbit thrusting sequence has been executed, the ﬂight crew ﬂies to a landing at the planned site much as it would for a nominal entry.

6. Contingency Aborts

Contingency aborts are caused by loss of more than one main engine or failures in other systems. Loss of one main engine while another is stuck at a low thrust setting may also necessitate a contingency abort. Such an abort would maintain orbiter integrity for in-ﬂight crew escape if a landing cannot be achieved at a suitable landing ﬁeld.

Contingency aborts due to system failures other than those involving the main engines would normally result in an intact recovery of vehicle and crew. Loss of more than one main engine may, depending on engine failure times, result in a safe runway landing. However, in most three-engine-out cases during ascent, the orbiter would have to be ditched. The in-ﬂight crew escape system would be used before ditching the orbiter.

Editor's Note… Here is a bit of background on the crew's bailout system from an earlier edition of the Space Reporter's Handbook:

During the early phases of ﬂight, two or more engine failures, depending on when they happened, could leave the shuttle without enough power to make it to a runway. In that case, the crew would have to "ditch" the orbiter somewhere in the ocean. Given that shuttles land at more than 200 mph, ditching is not considered a survivable option.

9 Aside from the Jan. 28, 1986, Challenger disaster, the only other in-ﬂight engine shutdown in the history of the shuttle program occurred July 29, 1985, when Challenger's No. 1 engine shut down ﬁve minutes and 45 seconds after liftoff because of a faulty temperature sensor on the engine's high-pressure fuel turbopump. In that case, Challenger was able to abort to a lower-than- planned orbit and, after extensive replanning, complete its Spacelab mission.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 172 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

In the wake of the Challenger disaster, NASA examined several possible escape systems ranging from ejection seats to simply jumping out the side hatch for a parachute descent. The agency ultimately settled on a bail out system that required modiﬁcations to let a crew blow the side hatch safely away from the shuttle during descent.

In the current system, a 248-pound, 8.75-foot telescoping pole is mounted along the ceiling of the crew cabin's lower deck. In a bailout, the pole extends through the open hatch. An astronaut then hooks his or her parachute harness to the pole and slides down it for a safe descent (without the pole, an astronaut probably would be blown into the left wing or the aft rocket pod).

To go along with the system, shuttle crews now take off and land wearing bulky, bright orange spacesuits capable of keeping them alive at altitudes up to 100,000 feet. The 70-pound suits feature a built-in life preserver and air supply with backpacks housing a parachute and a small, collapsible life raft.

To operate the system, an astronaut seated on the shuttle's lower deck pulls a handle that opens a vent at an altitude of about 40,000 feet to let cabin air pressure equalize at around 30,000 feet. The commander then orients the shuttle so that its rate of descent is just right to maintain the proper airspeed of between 185 knots and 195 knots. He then puts the shuttle on autopilot and climbs down to the lower deck.

At that point, the side hatch is jettisoned and the crew begins to bail out. As soon as the astronaut hits the water, the parachute is automatically cut free, a life preserver inflates and the life raft automatically fills with air. Assuming bail out started at 20,000 feet or so, all crew members would be clear of the shuttle by the time it had descended to an altitude of 10,000 feet. Each astronaut would hit the water about a mile apart from each other along the line following the shuttle's flight path.

Orbiter Ground Turnaround

Spacecraft recovery operations at the nominal end-of-mission landing site are supported by approximately 160 space shuttle Launch Operations team members. Ground team members wearing self-contained atmospheric protective ensemble suits that protect them from toxic chemicals approach the spacecraft as soon as it stops rolling. The ground team members take sensor measurements to ensure the atmosphere in the vicinity of the spacecraft is not explosive. In the event of propellant leaks, a wind machine truck carrying a large fan will be moved into the area to create a turbulent airﬂow that will break up gas concentrations and reduce the potential for an explosion.

A ground support equipment air-conditioning purge unit is attached to the right-hand orbiter T-0 umbilical so cool air can be directed through the orbiter's aft fuselage, payload bay, forward fuselage, wings, vertical stabilizer, and orbital maneuvering system/reaction control system pods to dissipate the heat of entry.

A second ground support equipment ground cooling unit is connected to the left-hand orbiter T-0 umbilical spacecraft Freon coolant loops to provide cooling for the ﬂight crew and avionics during the postlanding and system checks. The spacecraft fuel cells remain powered up at this time. The ﬂight crew will then exit the spacecraft, and a ground crew will power down the spacecraft.

At the Kennedy Space Center, the orbiter and ground support equipment convoy move from the runway to the Orbiter Processing Facility.

If the spacecraft lands at Edwards Air Force Base, the same procedures and ground support equipment are used as at the Kennedy Space Center after the orbiter has stopped on the runway. The orbiter and ground support equipment convoy move from the runway to the orbiter mate and demate facility at Edwards Air Force Base. After detailed inspection, the spacecraft is prepared to be ferried atop the shuttle carrier aircraft from Edwards Air Force Base to the Kennedy Space Center. For ferrying, a tail cone is installed over the aft section of the orbiter.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 173

In the event of a landing at an alternate site, a crew of about eight team members will move to the landing site to assist the astronaut crew in preparing the orbiter for loading aboard the shuttle carrier aircraft for transport back to the Kennedy Space Center. For landings outside the U.S., personnel at the contingency landing sites will be provided minimum training on safe handling of the orbiter with emphasis on crash rescue training, how to tow the orbiter to a safe area, and prevention of propellant conﬂagration.

Upon its return to the Orbiter Processing Facility at the Kennedy Space Center, the orbiter is safed (ordnance devices safed), the payload (if any) is removed, and the orbiter payload bay is reconﬁgured from the previous mission for the next mission. Any required maintenance and inspections are also performed while the orbiter is in the OPF. A payload for the orbiter's next mission may be installed in the orbiter's payload bay in the OPF or may be installed in the payload bay when the orbiter is at the launch pad.

The spacecraft is then towed to the Vehicle Assembly Building and mated to the external tank. The external tank and solid rocket boosters are stacked and mated on the mobile launcher platform while the orbiter is being refurbished. Space shuttle orbiter connections are made and the integrated vehicle is checked and ordnance is installed.

The mobile launcher platform moves the entire space shuttle system on four crawlers to the launch pad, where connections are made and servicing and checkout activities begin. If the payload was not installed in the OPF, it will be installed at the launch pad followed by prelaunch activities.

Space shuttle launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base will utilize the Vandenberg launch facility (SL6), which was built but never used for the manned orbital laboratory program. This facility was modiﬁed for space transportation system use.

The runway at Vandenberg was strengthened and lengthened from 8,000 feet to 12,000 feet to accommodate the orbiter returning from space.

When the orbiter lands at Vandenberg Air Force Base, the same procedures and ground support equipment and convoy are used as at Kennedy Space Center after the orbiter stops on the runway. The orbiter and ground support equipment are moved from the runway to the Orbiter Maintenance and Checkout Facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base. The orbiter processing procedures used at this facility are similar to those used at the OPF at the Kennedy Space Center.

Space shuttle buildup at Vandenberg differs from that of the Kennedy Space Center in that the vehicle is integrated on the launch pad. The orbiter is towed overland from the Orbiter Maintenance and Checkout Facility at Vandenberg to launch facility SL6.

SL6 includes the launch mount, access tower, mobile service tower, launch control tower, payload preparation room, payload changeout room, solid rocket booster refurbishment facility, solid rocket booster disassembly facility, and liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen storage tank facilities.

The solid rocket boosters start the on-the-launch-pad buildup followed by the external tank. The orbiter is then mated to the external tank on the launch pad.

The launch processing system at the launch pad is similar to the one used at the Kennedy Space Center.

Kennedy Space Center Launch Operations has responsibility for all mating, prelaunch testing and launch control ground activities until the space shuttle vehicle clears the launch pad tower. Responsibility is then turned over to NASA's Johnson Space Center Mission Control Center-Houston. The Mission Control Center's responsibility includes ascent, on-orbit operations, entry, approach and landing until landing runout completion, at which time the orbiter is handed over to the postlanding operations at the landing site for turnaround and relaunch. At the launch site the solid rocket boosters and external tank are processed for launch and the solid rocket boosters are recycled for reuse.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 174 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 175

Appendix 2: STS-51L and STS-107 Remembering Challenger and Columbia10

An impromptu memorial to the crew of STS-107 at the main entrance to the Johnson Space Center STS-51L: Challenger's Final Flight

The shuttle Challenger, NASA's second manned orbiter, blasted off on its final mission at 11:38 a.m. EST on Jan. 28, 1986. The initial moments of the 25th shuttle flight appeared normal, but just over a minute into flight, Challenger exploded in a terrifying fireball. Here is part of one of the many stories the author wrote that day as Cape Canaveral bureau manager for United Press International (note: breaking news wire service stories are written "on the fly" in real time and readers familiar with Challenger's destruction will spot several inadvertent errors):

NASA says astronauts apparently dead By WILLIAM HARWOOD CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. (UPI) – The space shuttle Challenger exploded shortly after blastoff today and hurtled into the Atlantic Ocean. The seven crew members, including teacher Christa McAuliffe, apparently were killed in the worst disaster in space history.

10 For additional information, including detailed timelines, please see the CBS News "Space Place" website at: http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/SRH_Disasters.htm

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 176 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

"It is a national tragedy," said Jesse Moore, director of the Johnson Space Center. "I regret that I have to report … that searches … did not reveal any evidence that the crew members are alive."

He said data from instruments, launch pad systems and other sources would be impounded for an investigation.

The explosion occurred while two powerful booster rockets were still attached to the shuttle. There was no way for the crew to escape the out-of-control spacecraft, which fell into the ocean 18 miles off the coast. Burning debris falling from the sky kept rescuers from reaching the scene immediately.

"We have a report that the vehicle has exploded," said NASA spokesman Steve Nesbitt. "We are now looking at all the contingency operations awaiting word from any recovery forces downrange."

On board the Challenger were commander Francis "Dick" Scobee, co-pilot Michael Smith, Judith Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, Ronald McNair, satellite engineer Gregory Jarvis and McAuliffe, the Concord, N.H. social studies teacher who was chosen from 11,000 candidates to be the ﬁrst private citizen to ﬂy on a shuttle.

Blow by: In this photo, black smoke can be seen billowing from an O-ring joint at the base of Challenger's right-side solid-fuel booster moments after ignition. The joint resealed itself but eventually reopened, triggering the shuttle's destruction 73 seconds after liftoff.

Unlike the shuttle Columbia during its first flights at the dawn of the shuttle era, Challenger was not equipped with ejection seats or other ways for the crew to get out of the spacecraft. McAuliffe's parents, Edward and Grace Corrigan, watching from the VIP site three miles from the launch pad, hugged each other and sobbed as the fireball erupted in the sky. Students at her school, assembled to watch their teacher's launch, watched in stunned silence.

Other students, friends and fellow teachers in Concord cheered the blastoff and then fell into stony silence as the disaster was brought home to them on television. Mark Letalien, a junior at the Concord high school, said "I didn't believe it happened. They made such a big thing about it. Everyone's watching her and she gets killed."

It was the 25th shuttle flight, the 10th for Challenger and the worst disaster in the nation's space program. It came exactly 19 years and a day from the only previous accident - aboard the first Apollo moon capsule on its launch pad Jan. 27, 1967. Astronauts Virgil "Gus" Grissom, Edward White and Roger Chaffee died in that fire.

NASA said Challenger's launch appeared entirely normal until one minute and 15 seconds after liftoff, when the shuttle had accelerated to a speed of 1,977 mph, three times the speed of sound. It was 4.9 miles up and 18 miles out over the ocean.

"Challenger, go at throttle up," mission control told the spacecraft 52 seconds after launch. Scobee's ﬁnal words to mission control were: "Roger, go at throttle up." Television replays showed close-ups of the speeding ship

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 177

suddenly enveloped in a ball of fire. Its engines continued firing, raising it out of the flames, but it was out of control.

Multiple contrails could be seen streaking through the sky as the $1.1 billion shuttle arced out over the Atlantic and debris fell into the sea.

In Washington, President Reagan was in an Oval Ofﬁce meeting whe4n aides brought him the grim news. He rushed into a study in time to see a television replay of the explosion. His face was creased with horror and anxiety. The House of Representatives recessed in the face of the national tragedy. ❏ ❏ ❏

A panel of outside experts led by former Secretary of State William Rogers concluded Challenger was destroyed by the rupture of an O-ring joint in the shuttle's right-side solid-fuel booster. The resulting "burn through" created a jet of ﬂame that ultimately ate through Challenger's external tank, triggering its collapse 73 seconds after blastoff. Almost simultaneously, Challenger, traveling faster than sound, broke apart after being subjected to aerodynamic forces it was not designed to withstand. The ship's crew cabin broke away from the rest of the shuttle and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean at more than 200 mph (see photo at left).

The Rogers Commission report was delivered on June 6 to Camp David, Md., where President Reagan was spending the weekend. A formal presentation with the members of the commission was hgeld in the Rose Garden at the White House. The 256-page report was divided into nine chapters. The ﬁrst two chapters presented a brief history of the shuttle program and past ﬂights and detailed the events leading up to Challenger's launching on Jan. 28. The commission also presented a detailed timeline of the disaster before getting down to business in Chapter 4.

The Cause of the Accident

The Rogers Commission listed 16 ﬁndings on the primary cause of the accident before stating the following conclusion:

"The commission concluded that the cause of the Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft ﬁeld joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reusability, processing and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading."

A thorough analysis of all available evidence showed no abnormalities with the external fuel tank, Challenger and its three main engines or the shuttle's payload and records showed all the hardware used in flight 51-L met NASA specifications. Launch processing, from the initial stacking of the rocket boosters to work done at the launch pad was normal, but during assembly of the right-side booster, engineers ran into snags. One of the fuel segments that mated at the aft field joint was severely out of round and had to be forced into the proper shape with a high-power

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 178 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement hydraulic tool. In addition, measurements showed that because of previous use, the two fuel segments in question had slightly larger diameters than normal but they still were within speciﬁcations.

Recall for a moment the construction of the joint. The upper rim of the bottom fuel segment, called a clevis, is an upward-facing U-shaped groove. The lower rim of the fuel segment above, called a tang, slides into the clevis and the resulting interlocking joint is bolted together with 177 high-strength steel pins. Running around the interior of the inner leg of the clevis are the two rubber O-ring seals. Because of the larger than normal joint diameters, at the moment of ignition, the tang and clevis had an average gap of .004 inches, which would have compressed the O- rings severely. Because the fuel segments were slightly out of round, the smallest gap was in the area where the rupture occurred during ﬂight, although it is not known if the high compression on the O-ring was present at liftoff.

It was a record 36 degrees when Challenger took off and infrared measurements taken at the launch pad showed the temperature around the circumference of the aft ﬁeld joint was in the neighborhood of 28 degrees in the area where the rupture occurred, the coldest spot on the booster. To understand the signiﬁcance of the temperature factor, consider again the operation of the rocket motor at ignition when internal pressure shoots from zero to nearly 1,000 pounds per square inch. This tremendous force pushes outward and causes the joints to bulge slightly, a phenomenon known as joint rotation. During the ignition transient, the tang and clevis typically separate as much as .017 and .029 inches where the primary and secondary O-rings are located. The gap opening reaches maximum about 600 milliseconds after ignition when the motor reaches full pressure. To keep the joint sealed as the tang-clevis separation increases during ignition, the O-rings must seat properly and the commission said cold O-rings take longer to reach the proper position.

"At the cold launch temperature experienced, the O-ring would be very slow in returning to its normal rounded shape. It would not follow the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. It would remain in its compressed position in the O- ring channel and not provide a space between itself and the upstream channel wall. Thus, it is probable the O-ring would not be pressure actuated to seal the gap in time to preclude joint failure due to blow-by and erosion from hot combustion gases," the report said.

Further, the commission found that experimental evidence showed other factors, such as humidity and the performance of the heat-shielding putty in the joint "can delay pressure application to the joint by 500 milliseconds or more." Records showed that in each shuttle launch in temperature below 61 degrees, one or more booster O-rings showed signs of erosion or the effects of heat. Complicating the picture, there was the possibility of ice in the suspect joint because Challenger had been exposed to seven inches of rainfall during its month on the launch pad prior to blastoff. Research showed ice could have prevented proper sealing by the secondary O-ring.

Launch pad cameras showed puffs of black smoke shooting from the region of the aft field joint beginning about the same time the motor reached full pressure. The commission said two overall failure scenarios were possible: a small leak could have developed at ignition that slowly grew to the point that flame erupted through the joint as photographs indicated some 58 seconds after blastoff. More likely, however, the gap between the burned O-rings and the clevis probably was sealed up by "deposition of a fragile buildup of aluminum oxide and other combustion debris. The resealed section of the joint could have been disturbed by thrust vectoring (steering), space shuttle motion and flight loads induced by changing winds aloft." NASA revealed after the accident that wind shear was higher for Challenger's mission than for any previous shuttle flight.

That the shuttle booster joints were faulty and overly dependent on a variety of factors was clear. The commission's ﬁndings on the secondary causes of the disaster were more subtle but just as damning to the space agency.

The Contributing Cause of the Accident

"The decision to launch the Challenger was ﬂawed," the Rogers Commission said. "Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 179

They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decision makers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986."

Before shuttles are cleared for flight, a formal "flight readiness review" is held by top NASA managers to discuss any open items that might affect a launch. Previous flights are reviewed to make sure any problems had been addressed before commiting the next shuttle for launch. Mulloy testified NASA management was well aware of the O-ring issue and cited the flight readiness review record as proof. He was correct in that during several preceding flight readiness reviews, the O-ring problem was mentioned. But it was only mentioned in the context that it was an acceptable risk and that the boosters had plenty of margin. It was not mentioned at all during the 51-L readiness review.

"It is disturbing to the commission that contrary to the testimony of the solid rocket booster project manager, the seriousness of concern was not conveyed in Flight Readiness Review to Level 1 and the 51-L readiness review was silent."

Keel said later the real turning point in the commission investigation came on Feb. 10 during a closed hearing in Washington. It was there the commission learned of the launch-eve debate over clearing Challenger for launch. Boisjoly would later recall the events of Jan. 27 in this manner:

Boisjoly: "I felt personally that management was under a lot of pressure to launch and that they made a very tough decision, but I didn't agree with it. One of my colleagues that was in the meeting summed it up best. This was a meeting where the determination was to launch and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what the position usually is in a preﬂight conversation or a ﬂight readiness review. It is usually exactly opposite that."

Commission member Arthur B.C. Walker: "Do you know the source of the pressure on management that you alluded to?"

Boisjoly: "Well, the comments made over the [teleconference network] is what I felt, I can't speak for them, but I felt it, I felt the tone of the meeting exactly as I summed up, that we were being put in a position to prove that we should not launch rather then being put in the position and prove that we had enough data for launch. And I felt that very real."

The Rogers Commission concluded that a "well structured" management system with the emphasis on ﬂight safety would have elevated the booster O-ring issue to the status it deserved and that NASA's decision-making process was clearly faulty. One can only wonder how many other launch-eve debates occurred during the previous 24 missions that were never mentioned because the ﬂight turned out to be a success.

"Had these matters been clearly stated and emphasized in the ﬂight readiness process in terms reﬂecting the views of most of the Thiokol engineers and at least some of the Marshall engineers, it seems likely that the launch of 51-L might not have occurred when it did," the commission said.

The commission also determined that the waiving of launch constraints based on previous success came at the expense of ﬂight safety because the waivers did not necessarily reach top-level management for a decision. Finally, the commission charged engineers at the Marshall Space Flight Center where the booster program was managed had a "propensity" for keeping knowledge of potentially serious problems away from other ﬁeld centers in a bid to address them internally.

An Accident Rooted in History

"The Space Shuttle's Solid Rocket Booster problem began with the faulty design of its joint and increased as both NASA and contractor management first failed to recognize it as a problem, then failed to fix it and finally treated it as an acceptable flight risk," the Rogers Commission said.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 180 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Morton Thiokol won the contract to build shuttle boosters in 1973. Of the four competitors, Thiokol ranked at the bottom for design and development but came in ﬁrst in the management category. NASA later said Thiokol was selected because "cost advantages were substantial and consistent throughout all areas evaluated." The result was an $800 million cost-plus-award-fee contract.

Morton Thiokol hoped to keep costs down by borrowing heavily from the design of the Titan 3 solid rocket motors. Both systems, for example, used tang and clevis joints but the shuttle design had major differences as well. Unlike in the Titan, which relied on a single O-ring seal, two rubber O-rings were employed in the shuttle booster and both faced heavy pressure loads at launch. The way the seals worked in the shuttle boosters was elegant in its simplicity. Before fuel joints were to be mated, an asbestos-filled putty would be used to fill in the gap between the two propellant faces of the fuel segments. The putty, then, would serve as a barrier to prevent hot gas from reaching the O-ring seals. But the putty was plastic so when the rocket was ignited, internal pressure would force the putty to flow toward the outside of the joint. In doing so, air between the putty and the O-ring would become pressurized, forcing the O-ring to "extrude" into the minute gap between the clevis and tang. In this manner, the joint would be sealed and even if the primary O-ring failed to operate, the secondary seal would fill in the gap, so to speak. To make sure the O-rings were, in fact, able to seal the joints prior to ignition, Thiokol included a "leak test port" in each booster joint. Once assembled, the space between the two O-rings could be pressurized with 50 psi air. If the pressure stayed steady, engineers would know the joint was airtight and that no path from the propellant to the primary O-ring existed for hot gas or flame.

So much for theory. When testing began, results were not what Thiokol engineers expected.

The design of the joint had led engineers to believe that once pressurized, the gap between the tang and clevis actually would decrease slightly, thereby improving the sealing action of the O-rings. To test the booster's structural integrity, Thiokol conducted "hydroburst" tests in 1977. In these tests, water was pumped inside a booster case and pressurized to 1.5 times actual operating pressure. Careful measurements were made and to their surprise, engineers realized that the tang and clevis joint actually bulged outward, widening the gap between the joint members. While Thiokol tended to downplay the significance of the finding at the time, engineers at Marshall were dismayed by the results. John Q. Miller, a chief booster engineer at the Alabama rocket center, wrote a memo on Jan. 9, 1978, to his superiors, saying, "We see no valid reason for not designing to accepted standards" and that improvements were mandatory "to prevent hot gas leaks and resulting catastrophic failure." This memo and another along the same lines actually were authored by Leon Ray, a Marshall engineer, with Miller's agreement. Other memos followed but the Rogers Commission said Thiokol officials never received copies. In any case, the Thiokol booster design passed its Phase 1 certification review in March 1979. Meanwhile, ground test firings confirmed the clevis-tang gap opening. An independent oversight committee also said pressurization through the leak test port pushed the primary O-ring the wrong way so that when the motor was ignited, the compression from burning propellant had to push the O-ring over its groove in order for it to extrude into the clevis-tang gap. Still, NASA engineers at Marshall concluded "safety factors to be adequate for the current design" and that the secondary O-ring would serve as a redundant backup throughout flight.

On Sept. 15, 1980, the solid rocket booster joints were classified as criticality 1R, meaning the system was redundant because of the secondary O-ring. Even so, the wording of the critical items list left much room for doubt: "Redundancy of the secondary field joint seal cannot be verified after motor case pressure reaches approximately 40 percent of maximum expected operating pressure." The joint was classified as criticality 1R until December 1982 when it was changed to criticality 1. Two events prompted the change: the switch to a non-asbestos insulating putty - the original manufacturer had discontinued production - and the results of tests in May 1982 that finally convinced Marshall management that the secondary O-ring would not function after motor pressurization. Criticality 1 systems are defined as those in which a single failure results in loss of mission, vehicle and crew. Even though the classification was changed, NASA engineers and their counterparts at Morton Thiokol still considered the joint redundant through the ignition transient. The Rogers Commission found this to be a fatal flaw in judgment.

Criticality 1 systems must receive a formal "waiver" to allow ﬂight. On March 28, 1983, Michael Weeks, associate administrator for space ﬂight (technical) signed the document that allowed continued shuttle missions despite the joint concerns.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 181

"We felt at the time, all of the people in the program I think felt that this solid rocket motor in particular ... was probably one of the least worrisome things we had in the program," Weeks said.

Then came the flight of mission 41-B, the 10th shuttle mission, launched Feb. 3, 1984. Prior to that time, only two flights had experienced O-ring damage: the second shuttle mission and the sixth. In both cases, only a single joint was involved. But after 41-B, inspectors found damage to a field joint and a nozzle joint. Marshall engineers were concerned about the unexpected damage, but a problem assessment report concluded: "This is not a constraint to future launches." For the next shuttle flight, 41-C, NASA managers were advised launch should be approved but that there was a possibility of some O-ring erosion. Meanwhile, to make absolutely sure the O-rings were seated properly prior to launch, the leak test pressure was increased to 100 psi and later to 200 psi, even though Marshall engineers realized that increased the possibility of creating blow holes through the insulating putty. Such blow holes, in turn, could provide paths for hot gas to reach the O-rings. In any case, the statistics are simple: of the first nine shuttle flights, when joints were tested with 50 psi or 100 psi pressure, only one field joint problem was noticed. With the 200 psi tests, more than 50 percent of the shuttle missions exhibited some field joint O-ring erosion.

So even though research was underway to improve the joint design, shuttles continued flying. On Jan. 24, 1985, Atlantis took off on the first classified military shuttle mission, flight 51-C. The temperature at launch time was a record 53 degrees and O-ring erosion was noted in both boosters after recovery. Damage was extensive: both booster nozzle primary O-rings showed signs of blow by during ignition and both the primary and secondary seals in the right booster's center segment field joint were affected by heat. Thiokol engineers would later say temperature apparently increased the chances for O-ring damage or erosion by reducing resiliency. Concern mounted after the flight of mission 51-B in April 1985 when engineers discovered a nozzle primary O-ring had been damaged and failed to seat at all and that the secondary seal also was eroded. This was serious and more studies were ordered. Mulloy then instituted a launch constraint, meaning a waiver was required before every succeeding mission. Mulloy signed such waivers six flights in a row before Challenger took off for the last time.

On Aug. 19, 1985, NASA managers in Washington were briefed on the O-ring issue and the next day, Morton Thiokol established an O-ring task force because "the result of a leak at any of the joints would be catastrophic." But company engineers told the commission the task force ran into red tape and a lack of cooperation.

"The genesis of the Challenger accident - the failure of the joint of the right solid rocket motor - began with decisions made in the design of the joint and in the failure by both Thiokol and NASA's solid rocket booster project ofﬁce to understand and respond to facts obtained during testing," the Rogers Commission concluded.

The panel said NASA's testing program was inadequate, that engineers never had a good understanding of the mechanics of joint sealing and that the material presented to NASA management in August 1985 "was sufﬁciently detailed to require corrective action prior to the next ﬂight."

Pressures on the System

"With the 1982 completion of the orbital test flight series, NASA began a planned acceleration of the Space Shuttle launch schedule," the Rogers Commission said. "One early plan contemplated an eventual rate of a mission a week, but realism forced several downward revisions. In 1985, NASA published a projection calling for an annual rate of 24 flights by 1990. Long before the Challenger accident, however, it was becoming obvious that even the modified goal of two flights a month was overambitious."

When the shuttle program was conceived, it was hailed as the answer to the high cost of space flight. By building a reusable space vehicle, the United States would be able to lower the cost of placing a payload into orbit while at the same time, increase its operational capability on the high frontier. The nation's space policy then focused on the shuttle as the premier launcher in the American inventory and expendable rockets were phased out. Once shuttle flights began, NASA quickly fell under pressure to meet a heavy schedule of satellite launches for commercial, military and scientific endeavors. And as the flight rate increased, the space agency's resources became stretched to

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 182 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement the limit. Indeed, the Rogers Commission said evidence indicated even if the 51-L disaster had been avoided, NASA would have been unable to meet the 16-launch schedule planned for 1986.

But NASA's can-do attitude refused to let the agency admit its own limitations as it struggled along against increasingly significant odds and diminishing resources. The Rogers Commission found that astronaut training time was being cut back, that frequent and late payload changes disrupted flight planning and that a lack of spare parts was beginning to manifest itself in flight impacts at the time of the Challenger accident.

The Rogers Commission concluded:

1. "The capabilities of the system were stretched to the limit to support the ﬂight rate in winter 1985/1986," the commission wrote. "Projections into the spring and summer of 1986 showed a clear trend; the system, as it existed, would have been unable to deliver crew training software for scheduled ﬂights by the designated dates. The result would have been an unacceptable compression of the time available for the crews to accomplish their required training.

2. "Spare parts are in short supply. The shuttle program made a conscious decision to postpone spare parts procurements in favor of budget items of perceived higher priority. Lack of spare parts would likely have limited ﬂight operations in 1986.

3. "Stated manifesting policies [rules governing payload assignments] are not enforced. Numerous late manifest changes (after the cargo integration review) have been made to both major payloads and minor payloads throughout the shuttle program.

4. "The scheduled ﬂight rate did not accurately reﬂect the capabilities and resources.

5. "Training simulators may be the limiting factor on the ﬂight rate; the two current simulators cannot train crews for more than 12-15 ﬂights per year.

6. "When flights come in rapid succession, current requirements do not ensure that critical anomalies occurring during one flight are identified and addressed appropriately before the next flight."

Other Safety Considerations

The Rogers Commission also identified a number of safety considerations to be addressed by NASA before the resumption of shuttle flights. The realization that Challenger's crew had no survivable abort options during solid rocket flight prompted the commission to recommend a re-evaluation of all possible abort schemes and escape options.

Two types of shuttle aborts were possible at the time of the Challenger accident: the four intact aborts, in which the shuttle crew attempts an emergency landing on a runway, and contingency aborts, in which the shuttle is not able to make it to a runway and instead "ditches" in the ocean. But the commission said tests at NASA's Langely Research Center showed an impact in the ocean probably would cause major structural damage to the orbiter's crew cabin. In addition, "payloads in the cargo bay are not designed to withstand decelerations as high as those expected and would very possibly break free and travel forward into the crew cabin." Not a pleasant prospect.

"My feeling is so strong that the orbiter will not survive a ditching, and that includes land, water or any unprepared surface," astronaut Weitz told the commission. "I think if we put the crew in a position where they're going to be asked to do a contingency abort, then they need some means to get out of the vehicle before it contacts earth."

If there was a clear "winner" in the Rogers Commission report is was the astronauts. Nearly every concern raised by Young and his colleagues was addressed and NASA managers privately grumbled that with the re-emergence of

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 183

"astronaut power," the agency would become so conservative it would be next to impossible to get a shuttle off the ground.

Recommendations:

The Rogers Commission made nine recommendations to conclude its investigation of the worst disaster in space history.

1. A complete redesign of the solid rocket booster segment joints was required with the emphasis on gaining a complete understanding of the mechanics of seal operation; the joints should be as structurally stiff as the walls of the rockets and thus less susceptible to rotation; and NASA should consider vertical test ﬁrings to ensure duplication of the loads experienced during a shuttle launch. In addition, the panel recommended that NASA ask the National Research Council to set up an independent review committee to oversee the redesign of the booster joints.

2. NASA's shuttle program management system should be reviewed and restructured, with the program manger given more direct control over operations, and NASA should "encourage the transition of qualified astronauts into agency management positions" to utilize their flight experience and to ensure proper attention is paid to flight safety. In addition, the commission said NASA should establish a shuttle safety advisory panel.

3. The commission recommended a complete review of all criticality 1, 1R, 2 and 2R systems before resumption of shuttle ﬂights.

4. NASA was told to set up an ofﬁce of Safety, Reliability and Quality Control under an associate administrator reporting to the administrator of the space agency. This ofﬁce would operate autonomously and have oversight responsibilities for all NASA programs.

5. Communications should be improved to make sure critical information about shuttle systems makes it from the lowest level engineer to the top managers in the program. "The commission found that Marshall Space Flight Center project managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to management isolation, failed to provide full and timely information bearing on the safety of ﬂight 51-L to other vital elements of shuttle program management," the panel said. Astronauts should participate in ﬂight readiness reviews, which should be recorded, and new policies should be developed to "govern the imposition and removal of shuttle launch constraints."

6. NASA should take action to improve safety during shuttle landings by improving the shuttle's brakes, tires and steering system and terminating missions at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., until weather forecasting improvements are made at the Kennedy Space Center.

7. "The commission recommends that NASA make all efforts to provide a crew escape system for use during controlled gliding flight." In addition, NASA was told to "make every effort" to develop software modifications that would allow an intact landing even in the event of multiple engine failures early in flight.

8. Pressure to maintain an overly ambitious ﬂight rate played a role in the Challenger disaster and the Rogers Commission recommended development of new expendable rockets to augment the shuttle ﬂeet.

9. "Installation, test and maintenance procedures must be especially rigorous for space shuttle items designated criticality 1. NASA should establish a system of analyzing and reporting performance trends in such items." In addition, the commission told NASA to end its practice of cannibalizing parts from one orbiter to keep another ﬂying and instead to restore a healthy spare parts program despite the cost.

❏ ❏ ❏

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 184 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Along with redesigning the O-ring booster joints, the agency reviewed the status of the overall shuttle program and ordered hundreds of modiﬁcations and improvements to beef up the safety of the shuttle itself. The shuttle "critical items list," which ranks systems and components according to the results of a failure, underwent a thorough review with far-reaching results. Criticality 1 components are those in which a failure leads to loss of vehicle and crew while criticality 1R systems are those in which a redundant backup is in place. Before the Challenger disaster, NASA listed 617 criticality 1 and 787 criticality 1R systems, a total of 1,404. As a result of the post-Challenger review, 1,514 criticality 1 systems were identiﬁed along with 2,113 criticality 1R components, a total of 3,627.

The numbers increased because NASA took a much harder look at the shuttle and its systems in the wake of Challenger and while at ﬁrst glance they would appear to imply the shuttle is more dangerous than before, in reality they mean NASA simply has a better, more realistic understanding of the ship.

In the shuttle itself, more than 210 changes were ordered for first flight along with about 30 to widen safety margins in the powerful hydrogen-fueled main engines by improving welds and reducing bearing wear and turbine blade cracks, a source of concern in the past. Among the shuttle modifications were landing gear brake improvements and a redesign of the 17-inch valves in the main engine propellant feed lines to prevent premature closure and inadvertent engine shutdown.

Other major changes include installation of ribs to strengthen the structure of the shuttle's airframe, an automatic cutoff system to prevent maneuvering rocket problems and modifications to improve the ability of the nose section of the shuttle to withstand the tremendous heat of atmospheric re-entry. About 100 changes were made in the computer programs that actually fly the shuttle to take into account the performance of modified hardware and to improve safety margins.

NASA re-emphasized safety in mission design, implementing stricter weather criteria, new launch commit criteria and a revamped management structure that gave the ﬁnal responsibility for clearing a shuttle for launch to an astronaut.

Shuttle ﬂights resumed Sept. 29, 1988, and NASA launched 87 successful ﬂights in a row before Columbia returned to Earth on Feb. 1, 2003.

Challenger's crew: Back row, left to right: Ellison Onizuka, Christa McAuliffe, Greg Jarvis, Judy Resnik; Front row, left to right: Mike Smith, Dick Scobee, Ron McNair

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 185

The Fate of Challenger's Crew

"NASA is unable to determine positively the cause of death of the Challenger astronauts but has established that it is possible, but not certain, that loss of consciousness did occur in the seconds following the orbiter breakup." NASA Press Release

"We have now turned our full efforts to the future, but will never forget our seven friends who gave their lives to America's space frontier." - Rear Adm. Richard Truly, Associate Administrator for Space Flight

The Rogers Commission did not discuss the fate of the crew or provide much detail about the crew cabin wreckage. Indeed, all references to "contact 67," the crash site of the crew compartment, were deleted from the ofﬁcial record, including charts that mapped various debris areas. This was done, perhaps, to preclude the possibility that anyone could ﬁnd out the latitude and longitude of the cabin wreck site for diving and personal salvage. But ultimately, it was simply an extension of NASA's policy of no comment when it came to the astronauts. After all, hundreds of reporters knew the exact coordinates by eavesdropping on Navy radio. In any case, while the astronauts were not discussed in the commission report, the crew module was.

Analysis of crew cabin wreckage indicates the shuttle's windows may have survived the explosion. It is thus possible the crew did not experience high altitude decompression. If so, some or all of the astronauts may have been alive and conscious all the way to impact in the Atlantic some 18 miles northeast of the launch pad. The cabin hit the water at better than 200 mph on Scobee's side. The metal posts of the two forward ﬂight deck seats, for example, were bent sharply to the right by force of impact when the cabin disintegrated.

"The internal crew module components recovered were crushed and distorted, but showed no evidence of heat or ﬁre," the commission report said. "A general consistency among the components was a shear deformation from the top of the components toward the +Y (to the right) direction from a force acting from the left. Components crushed or sheared in the above manner included avionics boxes from all three avionics bays, crew lockers, instrument panels and the seat frames from the commander and the pilot. The more extensive and heavier crush damage appeared on components nearer the upper left side of the crew module. The magnitude and direction of the crush damage indicates that the module was in a nose down and steep left bank attitude when it hit the water.

"The fact that pieces of forward fuselage upper shell were recovered with the crew module indicates that the upper shell remained attached to the crew module until water impact. Pieces of upper forward fuselage shell recovered or found with the crew module included cockpit window frames, the ingress/egress hatch, structure around the hatch frame and pieces of the left and right sides. The window glass from all of the windows, including the hatch window, was fractured with only fragments of glass remaining in the frames."

Several large objects were tracked by radar after the shuttle disintegrated. One such object, classiﬁed as "Object D," hit the water 207 seconds after launch about 18 nautical miles east of launch pad 39B. This apparently was the crew cabin. "It left no trail and had a bright white appearance (black and white recording) until about T+175 seconds," an appendix to the Rogers Commission report said. "The image then showed ﬂashes of both white and black until T+187 seconds, after which time it was consistently black. The physical extent of the object was estimated from the TV recording to be about 5 meters." This description is consistent with a slowly spinning crew module, which had black heat-shield tiles on its bottom with white tiles on its side and top.

The largest piece of crew cabin wreckage recovered was a huge chunk of the aft bulkhead containing the airlock hatch that led into the payload bay and one of the two ﬂight deck windows that looked out over the cargo hold. The bulkhead wreckage measured 12 feet by 17 feet.

Here is a chronology of the crew cabin recovery operation and the efforts to determine the fate of the astronauts:

Mid-March Four astronaut "personal egress air packs," called PEAPs, are recovered along with other cabin wreckage.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 186 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

April 18 NASA announced the crew cabin recovery operation was complete and that identifiable remains of all seven astronauts were on shore undergoing analysis. April 25 The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology notified NASA it had been unable to determine a cause of death from analysis of remains. Joseph Kerwin, director of life sciences at the Johnson Space Center, began an in-depth analysis of the wreckage in a search for the answer. May 20 Johnson Space Center crew systems personnel began analysis of the four PEAPs, emergency air packs designed for use if a shuttle crew must attempt an emergency exit on the ground when dangerous vapors might be in the area. May 21 Investigators found evidence some of the PEAPs had been activated. June 4 Investigators determined PEAP activation was not caused by crew cabin impact in the ocean. June 9 Smith's PEAP was identified by serial number. June 25 The PEAPs were sent to th Army Depot in Corpus Christi, Texas, for further analysis. June 27 Scobee's PEAP was identified by serial number; Army investigators determined that three of the four air packs had been activated. July 18 Truly received Kerwin's preliminary report on the fate of the astronauts. On July 24, NASA began informing the astronauts' families about what the investigation had found.

Some of the first wreckage recovered included four flight computers and both the cabin's operational flight recorders, used to record data about various shuttle systems and also used for the cabin's intercom system. It was on this tape that NASA heard Smith say "Uh oh" an instant before the shuttle broke apart, showing that at least some of the astronauts had a brief moment of awareness before the explosion that would claim their lives. On July 28, six months to the day after the disaster, NASA staged a news conference in Washington to discuss the investigation. Kerwin said the cause and time of death remained unknown.

"The ﬁndings are inconclusive," he wrote in a letter to Truly. "The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which followed the explosion was masked. Our ﬁnal conclusions are:

The cause of death of the Challenger astronauts cannot be positively determined;

The forces to which the crew were exposed during orbiter breakup were probably not sufﬁcient to cause death or serious injury; and

The crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the seconds following orbiter breakup due to in-ﬂight loss of crew module pressure."

Accelerometers, instruments that measure the magnitude and direction of forces acting on the shuttle during ﬂight, lost power when the nose section ripped away two tenths of a second after structural break up began. Independent analysis of all recovered data and wreckage concluded the nose pitched down as soon as it broke away and then slowed rapidly from aerodynamic forces. Calculations and analysis of launch photography indicate the acceleration forces the astronauts felt were between 12 and 20 times the force of gravity in a vertical direction, that is, as the cabin broke away, the astronauts were violently pushed down in their seats.

"These accelerations were quite brief," Kerwin wrote. "In two seconds, they were below four G's; in less than 10 seconds, the crew compartment was essentially in free fall. Medical analysis indicates that these accelerations are survivable, and that the probability of major injury to crew members is low."

When Challenger broke up, it was traveling at 1.9 times the speed of sound at an altitude of 48,000 feet. The crew module continued ﬂying upward for some 25 seconds to an altitude of about 65,000 feet before beginning the long fall to the ocean. From breakup to impact took two minutes and 45 seconds. Impact velocity was 207 mph, subjecting the module to a braking force of approximately 200 times the force of gravity. Any astronaut still alive at that moment was killed instantly.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 187

When the cabin ripped away from the fuselage, the crew's oxygen supplies were left behind in the payload bay, "except for a few seconds supply in the lines," Kerwin said. But each astronaut's airtight ﬂight helmet also was connected to a PEAP that contained about six minutes of breathing air. Kerwin said because of the design of the activation switch, it was highly unlikely the PEAPs were turned on by impact. But unlike the oxygen system, the PEAPs did not provide pressurized air and if the cabin lost pressure, they would not have allowed the crew to remain conscious.

"It is possible, but not certain, that the crew lost consciousness due to an in-ﬂight loss of crew module pressure," Kerwin wrote. "Data to support this is:

The accident happened at 48,000 feet and the crew cabin was at that altitude or higher for almost a minute. At that altitude, without an oxygen supply, loss of cabin pressure would have caused rapid loss of consciousness and it would not have been regained before water impact.

PEAP activation could have been an instinctive response to unexpected loss of cabin pressure.

If a leak developed in the crew compartment as a result of structural damage during or after breakup (even if the PEAPs had been activated), the breathing air available would not have prevented rapid loss of consciousness.

The crew seats and restraint harnesses showed patterns of failure which demonstrates that all the seats were in place and occupied at water impact with all harnesses locked. This would likely be the case had rapid loss of consciousness occurred, but it does not constitute proof."

Challenger's crew departs the Kennedy Space Center

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 188 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Despite NASA's best efforts, engineers were never able to determine if cabin pressure was lost. Astronaut Crippen said later he was convinced it did, however, because had the cabin maintained pressure there would have been no need to activate the PEAPs. He said in his view, the astronauts made a "desperate" attempt to survive by activating the PEAPs when pressure was suddenly lost.

Of the four PEAPs recovered, the one that belonged to Scobee had not been activated. Of the other three, one was identiﬁed as Smith's and because of the location of the activation switch on the back of his seat, Truly said he believed Resnik or Onizuka turned the pilot's emergency air supply on in a heroic bid to save his life. The exact sequence of events will never be known.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 189

STS-107: Columbia's Final Voyage

The shuttle Columbia blasted off on mission STS-107 at 10:39 a.m. on Jan. 16, 2003. At the controls were commander Rick Husband, pilot William "Willie" McCool, ﬂight engineer Kalpana Chawla, physician Laurel Clark, payload commander Michael Anderson, physician David Brown and Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon. STS-107 was one of only two ﬂights left on the shuttle manifest that were not bound for the international space station (the other was a Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission).

The goal of the 16-day mission was to carry out space station- class research in a variety of disciplines, ranging from biology to medicine, from materials science to pure physics and technology development, research that, for a variety of reasons, had never made it to the international space station.

Columbia's launching appeared normal, but analysis of tracking camera footage later that day showed a large chunk of foam insulation broke away from the shuttle's external tank about 81 seconds after liftoff. The foam appeared to come from a the left bipod ramp, an aerodynamically shaped ramp of foam built up around one of the two struts holding the nose of the shuttle to the tank. The foam fell along the tank and disappeared under Columbia's left wing. A shower of whitish debris was seen an instant later exiting from under the wing. The foam had obviously struck the wing, but where? And what sort of damage, if any, did it cause?

Engineers ultimately would conclude the impact likely caused no entry-critical damage. Husband and his crew were only informed about the strike in passing, in an email from mission managers who were concerned the astronauts might hear about the strike from reporters during upcoming on-orbit interviews. As it turned out, only a few reporters even knew about the foam strike and no one asked the crew about it. For their part, Husband and company chalked up a near perfect science mission before packing up for the trip back to Earth.

The day before re-entry, ﬂight director LeRoy Cain downplayed the foam strike, saying engineers "took a very thorough look at the situation with the tile on the left wing and we have no concerns whatsoever. We haven't changed anything with respect to our trajectory design. It will be a nominal, standard trajectory."

He was wrong.

Shuttle Columbia destroyed in entry mishap By WILLIAM HARWOOD CBS News

The shuttle Columbia suffered a catastrophic failure returning to Earth Saturday, breaking apart 207,135 feet above Texas en route to a landing at the Kennedy Space Center to close out a 16-day science mission. The shuttle's seven-member crew - two women and five men, including the first Israeli space flier - perished in the disaster, the first loss of life on the high frontier since the 1986 Challenger disaster.

The initial phases of the descent went normally and Columbia crossed above the coast of California just north of San Francisco around 5:51 a.m. local time, or 8:51 a.m. EST, on track for a landing on runway 33 at the Kennedy Space Center just 25 minutes later at 9:16 a.m.

The ﬁrst sign of anything unusual came at 8:53 a.m., when the shuttle was ﬂying high above the heartland of America.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 190 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Telemetry showed a sudden loss of hydraulic system data from the inboard and outboard wing ﬂaps, or elevons, on Columbia's left wing. Three minutes later, sensors in the brake lines and tires of the shuttle's left-side main landing gear suddenly stopped providing data.

The shuttle continued to ﬂy in a normal manner with no hint that a catastrophic failure was imminent.

Then at 8:58 a.m., sensors that monitor temperatures where the shuttle's protective thermal tiles are glued or bonded to the airframe suddenly dropped out followed one minute later by loss of data from landing gear pressure sensors on the left side tires. Columbia's ﬂight computers alerted the astronauts to the pressure indication and one of the crew members acknowledged the alert in a brief call to mission control.

That was the ﬁnal transmission from the space shuttle. Moments later, all data were lost and the vehicle broke up while traveling 18.3 times the speed of sound. Mission duration to that point was 15 days 22 hours 20 minutes and 22 seconds, translating to 8:59:22 a.m. EST (Editor's note: This time was later amended; see the detailed timeline below for exact timing). Wreckage was soon found strewn over a debris "footprint" stretching across eastern Texas and into Louisiana. There was no immediate word on where Columbia's reinforced crew module might have crashed to Earth.

In a brief address to the nation, President Bush said "this day has brought terrible news and great sadness to our country. ... Columbia is lost. There are no survivors."

"The same creator who names the stars also knows the names of the seven souls we mourn today," he said. "The crew of the shuttle Columbia did not return safely to Earth. Yet we can pray they are all safely home."

Said NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe: "The loss of this valiant crew is something we will never be able to get over."

Family members were standing by at the shuttle runway to welcome their loved ones back to Earth. William Readdy, NASA's associate administrator for space ﬂight and a veteran shuttle commander, praised the astronauts' families for showing an "incredible amount of dignity considering their loss."

"They knew the crew was absolutely dedicated to the mission they were performing," he said, barely able to control his emotions. "They believed in what they were doing and in the conversations with the families, they said we must find what happened, fix it and move on. We can't let their sacrifice be in vain.

"Today was a very stark reminder this is a very risky endevour, pushing back the frontiers in outer space. Unfortunately, people have a tendency to look at it as something that is more or less routine. I can assure you, it is not.

"I have to say as the one responsible for shuttle and (space) station within NASA, I know the people in NASA did everything possible preparing for this flight to make it as perfect as possible," Readdy said. "My promise to the crew and the crew families is the investigation we just launched will find the cause. We'll fix it. And then we'll move on."

The goal of mission STS-107 was to carry out space station-class research in a variety of disciplines, ranging from biology to medicine, from materials science to pure physics and technology development, research that cannot yet be accommodated on the still-unﬁnished international space station.

More than 80 experiments were on board, most of them in a Spacehab research module in Columbia's cargo bay. To collect as much data as possible, the astronauts worked around the clock in two 12-hour shifts. By all accounts, the crew accomplished all of their major objectives.

At an afternoon news conference, shuttle program manager Ronald Dittemore and senior ﬂight director Milt Heﬂin reviewed the telemetry from the shuttle and answered as many questions as possible. NASA's openness

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 191

during the immediate aftermath of a devastating day was in stark contrast to the strict "no comment" policy implemented in the wake of the 1986 Challenger disaster that frustrated the public and tarnished the agency's reputation for openness.

10:40:22 a.m., Jan. 16, 2003: A briefcase-size chunk of foam breaks away from the left bi-pod ramp of Columbia's external fuel tank 81.7 seconds after liftoff as seen in these enhanced video frames from a NASA tracking camera. The shuttle's velocity is 1,568 mph and the foam breaks into several pieces as it tumbles in the airstream. In two-tenths of a second, the largest piece of debris slows to 1,022 mph as it disappears behind Columbia's left wing (photo 3). It emerges in a powdery looking shower of debris after hitting the wing at a relative velocity of about 545 mph.

"We're devastated because of the events that unfolded this morning," Dittemore said. "There's a certain amount of shock in our system because we have suffered the loss of seven family members. And we're learning to deal with that. Certainly, a somber mood in our teams as we continue to try to understand the events that occurred, but our thoughts and our prayers go out to the families.

"As difﬁcult as this is for us, we wanted to meet with you and be as fair and open with you (as possible), given the facts as we understand them today," he said. "We will certainly be learning more as we go through the coming hours, days and weeks. We'll tell you as much as we know, we'll be as honest as we can with you and certainly we'll try to ﬁll in the blanks over the coming days and weeks."

An internal NASA team of senior managers was named to handle the initial investigation into the disaster. An independent team of experts also was named to ensure objectivity. All ﬂight control data and shuttle telemetry was impounded and "tiger teams" were formed to begin the painful tasks of sifting the data and coordinating the recovery of debris.

Dittemore said the shuttle ﬂeet will remain grounded until engineers pinpoint what went wrong with Columbia and determine what corrections might be necessary.

Columbia's ﬂight was one of only two remaining on NASA's long term launch schedule that does not involve the international space station. NASA had planned to launch the shuttle Atlantis around March 6 to ferry a fresh crew to the station and to bring the lab's current occupants back to Earth after 114 days in space.

Around 9:30 a.m. Saturday, flight controllers informed Expedition 6 commander Kenneth Bowersox, flight engineer Nikolai Budarin and science officer Donald Pettit that

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 192 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Columbia had been lost during re-entry.

Bowersox and his crewmates have enough on-board supplies to remain aloft aboard the station through June. In fact, an unmanned Russian Progress supply ship is scheduled for launch Sunday from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakstan. That launch will proceed as planned, ofﬁcials said.

If the shuttle fleet remains grounded through June, the station crew could be forced to abandon the station and return to Earth aboard a Russian Soyuz lifeboat. Fresh lifeboats are delivered to the station every six months to ensure the crew has a way to bail out in case of problems with the shuttle fleet or some other in-flight emergency.

With enough supplies on board to last Bowersox and his crewmates until late June, "there's some time for us to work through this," Dittemore said. "Right now, certainly there is a hold on future ﬂights until we get ourselves established and understand the root cause of this disaster."

Dittemore provided a sense of the loss felt by NASA and its contractors when he said "it's an emotional event, when we work together, we work together as family member and we treat each other that way. ... It's a sad loss for us.

"We understand the risks that are involved in human spaceﬂight and we know these risks are manageable and we also know they're serious and can have deadly consequences," he said. "So we are bound together with the threat of disaster all the time. ... We all rely on each other to make each spaceﬂight successful. So when we have an event like today, when we lose seven family members, it's just devastating to us."

Columbia blasted off on the 113th shuttle mission Jan. 16. The climb to space appeared uneventful, but about one minute and 20 seconds after liftoff, long-range tracking cameras showed a piece of foam insulation from the shuttle's external tank breaking away and hitting Columbia's left wing. The foam came from near the area where a forward bipod assembly attaches the nose of the shuttle to the tank. The debris hit the left wing near its leading edge.

Entry ﬂight director Leroy Cain said Friday a detailed analysis of the debris impact led engineers to believe there was no serious damage. Columbia was not equipped with a robot arm for this Spacehab research mission and the impact area was not visible from the shuttle's crew cabin.

Whether the debris caused enough damage to compromise the integrity of the wing's thermal protection system is not yet known. But when the failure occurred, the shuttle was experiencing maximum heat loads of nearly 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit.

"If we did have a structural problem or a thermal problem, you would expect to get it at the peak heating," he said. "The most extreme thermal environment was right at mach 18 and that's where we lost the vehicle."

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 193

The shuttle Challenger was destroyed in 1986 by the failure of an O-ring seal in one of the ship's two solid-fuel boosters. All seven crew members perished, including New Hampshire social studies teacher Christa McAuliffe. McAuliffe's backup, Idaho teacher Barbara Morgan, witnessed the disaster from the NASA press site 4.2 miles from Challenger's launch pad.

In a painful footnote to Saturday tragedy, Morgan was once again at the Kennedy Space Center, this time as a full-time astronaut awaiting launch in November on Columbia's next mission. Morgan is the ﬁrst member of a new class of educator astronauts, part of a program initiated by O'Keefe to help generate more student interest in science and technology.

Since the educator-astronaut program was announced last month, more than 1,000 teachers have expressed interest or been nominated as potential candidates by students, family members or friends. The status of that program, and the impact of Columbia's loss on Morgan's ﬂight, is not yet known.

But as President Bush promised family members and the nation Saturday, "the cause for which they died will continue. ... Our journey into space will go on."

❏ ❏ ❏

In the days, weeks and months ahead, an investigation of the disaster revealed echoes of Challenger: a long history of foam insulation problems that represented an unrecognized risk; bureaucratic inertia; slipshod internal communications and ineffective management at the top levels of NASA. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, lead by retired Navy Adm. Harold Gehman, issued its report Aug. 28, 2005, concluding the so-called "NASA culture" was deeply ﬂawed and in need of major modiﬁcations to prevent a repeat of the Columbia disaster in the years ahead.

"Based on NASA's history of ignoring external recommendations, or making improvements that atrophy with time, the Board has no conﬁdence that the space shuttle can be safely operated for more than a few years based solely on renewed post-accident vigilance," the report stated.

Photographer Gene Blevins captured this shot of Columbia streaking high above California minutes before its destruction. By this point, Columbia's left wing was in the process of melting from the inside out.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 194 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Continuing, the report said that unless NASA took strong action to change its management culture to enhance safety margins in shuttle operations, "we have no conﬁdence that other 'corrective actions' will improve the safety of shuttle operations. The changes we recommend will be difﬁcult to accomplish - and they will be internally resisted."

For an agency with such a proud tradition - sending 12 men to the surface of the moon, establishing a permanent presence in low Earth orbit, exploring the solar system with unmanned robots and launching scientiﬁc sentinels to probe the depths of space and time - the criticism levied by the accident board seemed extreme in its harshness.

Columbia's ﬂight deck, as captured by a videocamera operated by Laurel Clark, 15 minutes before the shuttle's destruction Feb. 1, 2003. In the top left frame, the heat of re-entry is evident out the windows in front of commander Rick Husband and pilot Willie McCool. In the top right frame, Chawla smiles for the camera. Bottom right: Clark turns the camera on herself.

But the accident investigation board members and their investigators clearly believed the sharp tone was appropriate, in their view essential to ensuring that wide-ranging corrective actions would be actually implemented. The board's investigation found that "management decisions made during Columbia's final flight reflect missed opportunities, blocked or ineffective communications channels, flawed analysis and ineffective leadership."

In the end, the report concluded, NASA managers never really understood the lessons of the 1986 Challenger disaster and "echoes of Challenger" abounded in the miscues that led to Columbia's destruction.

"Connecting the parts of NASA's organizational system and drawing the parallels with Challenger demonstrate three things," the board found. "First, despite all the post-Challenger changes at NASA and the agency's notable achievements since, the causes of the institutional failure responsible for Challenger have not been ﬁxed.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 195

"Second, the Board strongly believes that if these persistent, systemic flaws are not resolved, the scene is set for another accident. Therefore, the recommendations for change are not only for fixing the shuttle's technical system, but also for fixing each part of the organizational system that produced Columbia's failure.

"Third, the Board's focus on the context in which decision making occurred does not mean that individuals are not responsible and accountable. To the contrary, individuals always must assume responsibility for their actions. What it does mean is that NASA's problems cannot be solved simply by retirements, resignations, or transferring personnel."

The 13-member Columbia Accident Investigation Board spent seven months investigating the Feb. 1 Columbia disaster, reviewing more than 30,000 documents, conducting more than 200 formal interviews and collecting testimony from expert witnesses. The board also oversaw debris recovery efforts in Texas and Louisiana that involved more than 25,000 searchers. The investigation was expected to cost $19.8 million when all was said and done.

The board's 248-page report was released at the National Transportation and Safety Board in Washington. Reporters were allowed to review the report ahead of time, surrendering cell phones and wireless laptop network cards before entering a closed off "reading room" at 6 a.m. Gehman and other members of the panel discussed the report during a news conference.

"The people of NASA have accomplished great things," Dana Rohrabacher, D-Calif., chairman of a key House space committee, told CBS News. "They've put a man on the moon within a very short period of time, the people of NASA have been a source of great pride ... for the people of the United States.

"But for far too long, they've been resting on their laurels and bathing in past glories, nostalgic about the glory days," he continued. "It's time to look to the future and it's time to recapture a tough, hard-working body of people who have new challenges and are not just looking at the past but looking to the future. And that means Congress and the president have got to act on the Gehman report."

The CAIB report focused on two broad themes: The direct cause of the disaster - falling external fuel tank foam insulation that blasted a deadly hole in the leading edge of Columbia's left wing 82 seconds after liftoff - and the management system that failed to recognize frequent foam shedding as a potentially lethal defect before Columbia even took off.

The report also focuses on how NASA's mission management team, a panel of senior agency managers responsible for the day-to-day conduct of Columbia's mission, failed to recognize the severity of the foam strike that actually occurred, virtually eliminating any chance to save the shuttle's crew, either by attempting repairs in orbit or launching a rescue mission.

The report made 29 recommendations, 15 of which were to be implemented before shuttle ﬂights resumed. Five of those were released earlier, requiring NASA to eliminate foam shedding to the maximum extent possible; to obtain better imagery from the ground and in orbit to identify any problems with the shuttle's thermal protection system; and development of tools and procedures to repair any such damage in space.

The more difﬁcult recommendations addressed management changes and the establishment of an independent Technical Engineering Authority to verify launch readiness, oversee and coordinate requests for waivers and to "decide what is and is not an anomalous event." The TEA "should have no connection to or responsibility for schedule and program cost." In addition, the report concluded, NASA's Ofﬁce of Safety and Mission Assurance should have direct authority over all shuttle safety programs and be independently funded.

"It is the Board's opinion that good leadership can direct a culture to adapt to new realities," the panel wrote. "NASA's culture must change, and the Board intends (its) recommendations to be steps toward effecting this change."

The foam strike that doomed Columbia was not seen until the day after launch when engineers began reviewing tracking camera footage as they do after every launching. A ﬁlm camera in Cocoa Beach that could have photographed the impact on the underside of the left wing was out of focus. A video camera at the same site was

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 196 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement properly focused, but it lacked the resolution, or clarity, to show exactly where the foam hit or whether it caused any damage. A third camera at a different site showed the foam disappearing under the left wing and emerging as a cloud of debris after striking the underside. Again, the exact impact point could not be seen. Stunned engineers immediately began analyzing the available ﬁlm and video and ultimately determined the foam had struck heat shield tiles on the underside of the wing, perhaps near the left main landing gear door. No one ever seriously considered a direct heat on the reinforced carbon carbon panels making up the wing leading edge because no trace of foam debris was ever seen crossing the top of the wing. As the board ultimately concluded, however, the foam did, in fact, strike the leading edge on the lower side of RCC panel No. 8.

In hindsight, it's difﬁcult to understand why the possibility of a leading edge impact didn't receive more attention. The board concluded that was due at least in part to the inﬂuential role of Calvin Schomburg, a senior engineer at the Johnson Space Center with expertise in the shuttle's heat-shield tiles.

"Shuttle program managers regarded Schomburg as an expert on the thermal protection system," the board wrote. "However, the board notes that Schomburg as not an expert on reinforced carbon carbon (RCC), which initial debris analysis indicated the foam may have struck. Because neither Schomburg nor shuttle management rigorously differentiated between tiles and RCC panels, the bounds of Schomburg's expertise were never properly qualiﬁed or questioned."

In any case, a team of Boeing engineers at the Johnson Space Center, under direction of NASA's mission management team, ultimately concluded the foam strike did not pose a safety of ﬂight issue. Their analysis, using a computer program called CRATER, predicted areas of localized, possibly severe damage to the underside of the left wing, but no catastrophic breach. The concern, rather, was that any damage likely would require extensive repairs before Columbia could ﬂy again.

While the damage assessment was getting under way, at least three different attempts were made to obtain spy satellite photography of the impact site to resolve the matter one way or the other. But in a series of communications miscues, the efforts ultimately were quashed by the MMT, under the direction of former ﬂight director Linda Ham.

Ham said she was never able to ﬁnd out who wanted such photographs and, without a formal requirement, had no reason to proceed. As for the debris assessment, Ham and other members of the MMT never challenged the hurried analysis or questioned the conclusion Columbia could safely return to Earth as is.

Many mid-level engineers said later they had serious misgivings about the debris assessment and heavy email trafﬁc indicated fairly widespread concern about potentially serious problems if the foam strike had compromised Columbia's left main landing gear. Yet those concerns never percolated up the Ham, Dittemore or other members of the mission management team.

Ham and Dittemore both have said they were always open for questions or comments from lower-level engineers and that everyone on the team was encouraged, even duty bound, to bring any serious concerns to the attention of senior management.

But the CAIB disagreed.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 197

"Communication did not flow effectively up to or down from program managers," the board wrote. "After the accident, program managers stated privately and publicly that if engineers had a safety concern, they were obligated to communicate their concerns to management. Managers did not seem to understand that as leaders they had a corresponding and perhaps greater obligation to create viable routes for the engineering community to express their views and receive information. This barrier to communications not only blocked the flow of information to managers but it also prevented the downstream flow of information from managers to engineers, leaving Debris Assessment Team members no basis for understanding the reasoning behind Mission Management Team decisions."

As for not hearing any dissent, the board wrote, "managers' claims that they didn't hear the engineers' concerns were due in part to their not asking or listening."

"Management decisions made during Columbia's final flight reflect missed opportunities, blocked or ineffective communications channels, flawed analysis and ineffective leadership," the board wrote. "Perhaps most striking is the fact that management - including Shuttle Program, Mission Management Team, Mission Evaluation Room (personnel) and flight director and mission control - displayed no interest in understanding a problem and its implications.

"Because managers failed to avail themselves of the wide range of expertise and opinion necessary to achieve the best answer to the debris strike question - 'Was this a safety-of-ﬂight concern?' - some space shuttle program managers failed to fulﬁll the implicit contract to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew. In fact, their management techniques unknowingly imposed barriers that kept at bay both engineering concerns and dissenting views and ultimately helped create 'blind spots' that prevented them from seeing the danger the foam strike posed."

Shuttle program manager Dittemore and members of the mission management team "had, over the course of the space shuttle program, gradually become inured to external tank foam losses and on a fundamental level did not believe foam striking the vehicle posed a critical threat to the orbiter," the board wrote.

In the end, it was a moot point. Once the foam breached the leading edge of Columbia's left wing, the crew was doomed. The astronauts had no way to repair the breach - no robot arm and no tile repair equipment - and there was no realistic chance another shuttle could be readied in time for a rescue mission.

Maybe so. But NASA's ﬂawed management system never gave the agency a chance to prove it still had the "right stuff." And it was that institutional system, or "culture," at NASA that must be changed, the board said, to prevent another accident.

"An organization system failure calls for corrective measures that address all relevant levels of the organization, but the Board's investigation shows that for all its cutting-edge technologies, 'diving-catch' rescues and imaginative plans for the technology and the future of space exploration, NASA has shown very little understanding of the inner workings of its own organization," the report states.

"NASA's bureaucratic structure kept important information from reaching engineers and managers alike. The same NASA whose engineers showed initiative and a solid working knowledge of how to get things done fast had a managerial culture with an allegiance to bureaucracy and cost-efﬁciency that squelched the engineers' efforts.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 198 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

"When it came to managers' own actions, however, a different set of rules prevailed. The Board found that Mission Management Team decision-making operated outside the rules even as it held its engineers to a stiﬂing protocol. Management was not able to recognize that in unprecedented conditions, when lives are on the line, ﬂexibility and democratic process should take priority over bureaucratic response."

NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe said the space agency would use the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's ﬁnal report as a blueprint for correcting the problems that led to Columbia's demise.

"We have accepted the findings and will comply with the recommendations to the best of our ability," O'Keefe said in a statement. "The board has provided NASA with an important road map as we determine when we will be 'fit to fly' again.

"Due to the comprehensive, timely and open public communication displayed by the Board throughout the investigative process, we already have begun to take action on the earlier issued recommendations, and we intend to comply with the full range of recommendations released today."

Gehman told CBS News after the CAIB report was released that NASA had little choice. In the panel's view, he said, NASA could not safely operate the space shuttle program without major changes in its management system.

"I think there's a little bit of denial that NASA, at least in the shuttle program, that NASA has modiﬁed its organizational structure over the years into one that no longer contains the attributes that they built their reputations on," Gehman said. "There may be some people who deny that, but the board is absolutely convinced, we think there's no room for any doubt whatsoever, the management system they have right now is not capable of safely operating the shuttle over the long term. That's the bottom line."

Gehman also said Congress and the White House must share blame for the Columbia disaster with NASA. Asked what he might tell President Bush about NASA and the agency's second in-ﬂight tragedy, Gehman said he would point out that "NASA is a great organization that he and the country can have a lot of pride in. And that they are operating under and unrealistic set of rules and guidelines."

"Exploring space on a ﬁxed cost basis is not realistic," the retired admiral said. "Launching shuttles on a calendar basis instead of an event-driven basis is not realistic. Demanding that you save money and run this thing in an efﬁcient and effective way and that you get graded on schedule and things like that is not realistic. That the whole nation and Congress and the White House has an unrealistic view of how we do space exploration."

In addition, the board's report "clearly speciﬁes that there is responsibility at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue for this that are shared with NASA," Gehman said. "Now in some cases, NASA over markets what they can do. They promise more than they can deliver and they promise they can deliver it at a price that is less than it's really going to cost. But in some cases, it is demanded of them, in order to get a program approved, that they agree to unrealistic schedules and unrealistic price tags. So there's blame at both ends here."

The CAIB report focused heavily on decisions made by NASA's mission management team. But Gehman told CBS News the space agency's management system was so dysfunctional it hardly mattered who was in charge.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 199

"We believe very, very strongly that you could substitute almost anybody in those positions and operate under the guidelines and rules and precedents that were being used in NASA and they would make the same errors," he said.

"Let me give you a speciﬁc case in point. Much has been made of the fact that the MMT didn't meet every day. NASA regulations require that they meet every day. So I had my board go back and see what were the meetings scheduled for the previous two shuttle missions? Guess what? They met every third day.

"So Linda Ham was doing her job according to the standards and precedents that were set by the establishment," he continued. "Even though the rules say you have to meet every day, you don't really have to. So that's an organizational ﬂaw and she was performing her duties in that respect in accordance with the standards and precedents that had been previously established by her predecessors. And her predecessor's bosses had let that go on.

"So we feel very, very strongly that just moving the people around won't ﬁx that problem. Unfortunately, we live in a town here in Washington, DC, in which they frequently demand someone pay. But we on the board were not inﬂuenced by that" and the board did not assign personal blame for any real or perceived errors in judgment.

Could a more experienced or proactive program manager or MMT chairman have made a different in Columbia's case?

"We feel there's some part of this, maybe even a lot of these problems, could have been mitigated by a stronger, a more suspicious, nervous kind of a person," Gehman said of the MMT and its chairman. "But our conclusion, our very, very strong conclusion is even if you had really brilliant people, really spectacular people, if you had the very, very best person you could get, that it would be a low probability bet that you could count on them to overcome the ﬂaws in the organization. That is a low probability course of action."

Asked if NASA was "in denial" about serious management ﬂaws and defects, Gehman said "in a lot of cases, they will deny that they have a basic organizational ﬂaw which is dangerous. I think they'll deny that, some of them. Others will applaud it. It kind of depends on where you sit."

The CAIB's criticism of NASA drew an unusual response from Stephen Feldman, president of The Astronauts Memorial Foundation.

"One of the great risks of the Columbia tragedy and the subsequent report and commentary is that outstanding scientists and engineers may feel so criticized and unappreciated that they will leave NASA and the space program for higher paying and often less stressful jobs in the private sector," he said in a statement. "The outstanding safety record that NASA has compiled over the years shouldn't be forgotten because of one terrible accident on February 1, 2003."

But O'Keefe's promise to full implement the CAIB recommendations drew praise from the National Space Society, a nonproﬁt advocacy group founded by German rocket scientist Wernher von Braun.

"The National Space Society urges NASA to embrace the recommendations of the CAIB and work diligently to fundamentally reform its decision-making processes and safety organizations so that we can safely return the Space Shuttle ﬂeet to service," said Executive Director Brian Chase. "However, in order for NASA to fully implement the CAIB recommendations and continue the exploration of space, the agency will need appropriate funding to accomplish those tasks.

"The White House and the U.S. Congress must accept their share of responsibility for the future of our nation's space exploration efforts and provide the necessary leadership.

"Perhaps most importantly, NASA and our nation's leaders need to take this opportunity to foster development of new space transportation systems and renew a long-term commitment to human space exploration."

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 200 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Four and a half months after the CAIB report was released, President Bush gave a speech at NASA Headquarters in Washington in which he called for retirement of the shuttle by 2010; development of a new manned "crew exploration vehicle; the establishment of a permanent base on the moon by 2020 and eventual manned ﬂights to Mars.

Recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

PART ONE – THE ACCIDENT Thermal Protection System 1 Initiate an aggressive program to eliminate all External Tank Thermal Protection System debris-shedding at the source with particular emphasis on the region where the bipod struts attach to the External Tank. [RTF] 2 Initiate a program designed to increase the Orbiter's ability to sustain minor debris damage by measures such as improved impact-resistant Reinforced Carbon-Carbon and acreage tiles. This program should determine the actual impact resistance of current materials and the effect of likely debris strikes. [RTF] 3 Develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon system components. This inspection plan should take advantage of advanced non-destructive inspection technology. [RTF] 4 For missions to the International Space Station, develop a practicable capability to inspect and effect emergency repairs to the widest possible range of damage to the Thermal Protection System, including both tile and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon, taking advantage of the additional capabilities available when near to or docked at the International Space Station.

For non-Station missions, develop a comprehensive autonomous (independent of Station) inspection and repair capability to cover the widest possible range of damage scenarios.

Accomplish an on-orbit Thermal Protection System inspection, using appropriate assets and capabilities, early in all missions. The ultimate objective should be a fully autonomous capability for all missions to address the possibility that an International Space Station mission fails to achieve the correct orbit, fails to dock successfully, or is damaged during or after undocking. [RTF]

5 To the extent possible, increase the Orbiter's ability to successfully re-enter Earth's atmosphere with minor leading edge structural sub-system damage. 6 In order to understand the true material characteristics of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon components, develop a comprehensive database of flown Rein-forced Carbon-Carbon material characteristics by destructive testing and evaluation. 7 Improve the maintenance of launch pad structures to minimize the leaching of zinc primer onto Reinforced Carbon-Carbon components. 8 Obtain sufficient spare Reinforced Carbon-Car-bon panel assemblies and associated support components to ensure that decisions on Rein-forced Carbon-Carbon maintenance are made on the basis of component specifications, free of external pressures relating to schedules, costs, or other considerations.

9 Develop, validate, and maintain physics-based computer models to evaluate Thermal Protection System damage from debris impacts. These tools should provide realistic and timely estimates of any impact damage from possible debris from any source that may ultimately impact the Orbiter. Establish impact damage thresholds that trigger responsive corrective action, such as on-orbit inspection and repair, when indicated.

Imaging

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 201

10 Upgrade the imaging system to be capable of providing a minimum of three useful views of the Space Shuttle from liftoff to at least Solid Rocket Booster separation, along any expected ascent azimuth. The operational status of these assets should be included in the Launch Commit Criteria for future launches. Consider using ships or aircraft to provide additional views of the Shuttle during ascent. [RTF]

11 Provide a capability to obtain and downlink high-resolution images of the External Tank after it separates. [RTF] 12 Provide a capability to obtain and downlink high-resolution images of the underside of the Orbiter wing leading edge and forward section of both wings' Thermal Protection System. [RTF] 13 Modify the Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to make the imaging of each Shuttle ﬂight while on orbit a standard requirement. [RTF]

Orbiter Sensor Data 14 The Modular Auxiliary Data System instrumentation and sensor suite on each Orbiter should be maintained and updated to include current sensor and data acquisition technologies.

15 The Modular Auxiliary Data System should be redesigned to include engineering performance and vehicle health information, and have the ability to be reconﬁgured during ﬂight in order to allow certain data to be recorded, telemetered, or both as needs change.

Wiring 16 As part of the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program and potential 40-year service life, develop a state-of- the-art means to inspect all Orbiter wiring, including that which is inaccessible

Bolt Catchers 17 Test and qualify the ﬂight hardware bolt catchers. [RTF]

Closeouts 18 Require that at least two employees attend all ﬁnal closeouts and intertank area hand-spraying procedures. [RTF]

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 19 Require the Space Shuttle to be operated with the same degree of safety for micrometeoroid and orbital debris as the degree of safety calculated for the International Space Station. Change the micrometeoroid and orbital debris safety criteria from guidelines to requirements.

Foreign Object Debris 20 Kennedy Space Center Quality Assurance and United Space Alliance must return to the straightforward, industry-standard deﬁnition of “Foreign Object Debris” and eliminate any al-ternate or statistically deceptive deﬁnitions like “processing debris.” [RTF]

PART TWO – WHY THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED

Scheduling 21 Adopt and maintain a Shuttle ﬂight schedule that is consistent with available resources. Although schedule deadlines are an important management tool, those deadlines must be regularly evaluated to ensure that any additional risk incurred to meet the schedule is recognized, understood, and acceptable. [RTF]

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 202 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Training 22 Implement an expanded training program in which the Mission Management Team faces potential crew and vehicle safety contingencies beyond launch and ascent. These contingencies should involve potential loss of Shuttle or crew, contain numerous uncertainties and unknowns, and require the Mission Management Team to assemble and interact with support organizations across NASA/Contractor lines and in various locations. [RTF]

Organization

23 Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, and will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System. The independent technical authority does the following as a minimum:

• Develop and maintain technical standards for all Space Shuttle Program projects and elements

• Be the sole waiver-granting authority for all technical standards

• Conduct trend and risk analysis at the sub-system, system, and enterprise levels

• Own the failure mode, effects analysis and hazard reporting systems

• Conduct integrated hazard analysis

• Decide what is and is not an anomalous event

• Independently verify launch readiness

• Approve the provisions of the recertiﬁcation program called for in Recommendation R9.1-1. The Technical Engineering Authority should be funded directly from NASA Headquarters, and should have no connection to or responsibility for schedule or program cost.

24 NASA Headquarters Ofﬁce of Safety and Mission Assurance should have direct line authority over the entire Space Shuttle Program safety organization and should be independently re-sourced.

25 Reorganize the Space Shuttle Integration Ofﬁce to make it capable of integrating all elements of the Space Shuttle Program, including the Or-biter.

PART THREE – A LOOK AHEAD

Organization

26 Prepare a detailed plan for deﬁning, establishing, transitioning, and implementing an independent Technical Engineering Authority, independent safety program, and a reorganized Space Shuttle Integration Ofﬁce as described in R7.5-1, R7.5-2, and R7.5-3. In addition, NASA should submit annual reports to Congress, as part of the budget review process, on its implementation activities. [RTF]

Recertiﬁcation

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 203

27 Prior to operating the Shuttle beyond 2010, develop and conduct a vehicle recertiﬁcation at the material, component, subsystem, and system levels. Recertiﬁcation requirements should be included in the Service Life Extension Program.

Closeout Photos/Drawing System 28 Develop an interim program of closeout photographs for all critical sub-systems that differ from engineering drawings. Digitize the close-out photograph system so that images are immediately available for on-orbit troubleshooting. [RTF] 29 Provide adequate resources for a long-term pro-gram to upgrade the Shuttle engineering draw-ing system including:

• Reviewing drawings for accuracy • Converting all drawings to a computer-aided drafting system • Incorporating engineering changes

❏ ❏ ❏

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 204 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

The Fate of Columbia's Crew

NASA released a detailed engineering study Dec. 30, 2008, outlining lessons learned about astronaut survival based on an analysis of the 2003 Columbia disaster. The study does not provide any signiﬁcant new details about the fate of Columbia's crew - investigators earlier concluded the seven astronauts died of sudden oxygen loss and blunt force trauma as the crew module broke up - but a new timeline provides a wealth of data showing the pilots attempted to troubleshoot a cascade of problems in the ﬁnal moments before the spacecraft's computers lost control.

The timeline also shows, in grim detail, the forces acting on the shuttle's crew module in the ﬁnal seconds before it broke apart, subjecting the astronauts to a sudden loss of air pressure that occurred so rapidly they did not have time to close their helmet visors.

The study, the most detailed astronaut survival analysis ever conducted, includes 30 recommendations for improving crew safety on future ﬂights based on a review of the safety equipment and procedures used during Columbia's mission.

"I call on spacecraft designers from all the other nations of the world, as well as the commercial and personal spacecraft designers here at home to read this report and apply these hard lessons, which have been paid for so dearly," said former shuttle Program Manager Wayne Hale, now serving as a NASA associate administrator. "This report conﬁrms that although the valiant Columbia crew tried every possible way to maintain control of their vehicle, the accident was not ultimately survivable."

As part of its support for the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, NASA set up a Crew Survival Working Group in the wake of the Feb. 1, 2003, disaster that later evolved into the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team. The crew survival team began its study in October 2004 with the goals of expanding the earlier working group analysis and making recommendations to improve safety on future vehicles.

The Columbia breakup was not survivable, but the new report sheds light on how various shuttle safety systems performed and what sort of changes may be needed to improve safety in future spacecraft like the Orion capsules that will replace the shuttle after the ﬂeet is retired in 2010.

The report was completed in December 2008, but its release was delayed "out of respect for the Columbia crew families," said veteran shuttle commander Pam Melroy, deputy project manager of the investigation. "At their request, we released it after Christmas but while the children were still out of school and home with their family members so they could discuss the ﬁndings and the elements of the report with some privacy. That's what drove the timing of today."

Columbia was destroyed by a breach in the leading edge of the shuttle's left wing that was caused by the impact of foam insulation from the ship's external tank during launch 16 days earlier. The wing melted from the inside out and eventually failed, either folding over or breaking away. The shuttle's ﬂight computers then lost control and the crippled spacecraft went into a catastrophic spin. The nose section housing the crew module ripped away from the fuselage relatively intact, but the module broke apart within a few moments due to thermal stress and aerodynamic forces.

The analysis of Columbia's breakup identiﬁed ﬁve "lethal events:"

1. Depressurization: Shortly after Columbia's ﬂight computers lost control due to the failure of the shuttle's heat- damaged left wing, the crew module broke away from the fuselage. The astronauts are believed to have survived the initial breakup. But within a few moments, the crew module lost pressure "so rapidly that the crew members were incapacitated within seconds, before they could conﬁgure the (pressure) suit for full protection from loss of cabin pressure," the new study concluded. "Although circulatory systems functioned for a brief time, the effects of the depressurization were severe enough that the crew could not have regained consciousness. This event was lethal to the crew."

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 205

Recommendations: Improve crew training to increase emphasis on the transition between problem solving and survival operations; future spacecraft must integrate pressure suit operations into the design of the vehicle.

2. Exposure of the unconscious or deceased astronauts to unexpected rotating forces without sufﬁcient upper body restraints and helmets: When Columbia lost control, the resulting motion was not violent enough, in and of itself, to be lethal. The crew module separated from the fuselage "and continued to rotate," the study concluded. "After the crew lost consciousness due to the loss of cabin pressure, the seat inertial reel mechanisms on the crews' shoulder harnesses did not lock. As a result, the unconscious or deceased crew was exposed to cyclical rotational motion while restrained only at the lower body. Crew helmets do not conform to the head. Consequently, lethal trauma occurred to the unconscious or desceased crew due to the lack of upper body support and restraint."

Recommendations: Re-evaluate crew procedures; future seats and suits should be "integrated to ensure proper restraint of the crew in off-nominal situations."

3. Separation of the crew from the crew module and the seat: "The breakup of the crew module and the crew's subsequent exposure to hypersonic entry conditions was not survivable by any currently existing capability," the study says. ... "The lethal-type consequences of exposure to entry conditions included traumatic injury due to seat restraints, high loads associated with deceleration due to a change in ballistic number, aerodynamic loads, and thermal events. Crew circulatory functions ceased shortly before or during this event."

Recommendation: Optimize future spacecraft design for "the most graceful degradaton of vehicle systems and structure to enhance chances for crew survival."

4. Exposure to near vacuum, aerodynamic acceleration and low temperatures: Shuttle pressure suits are certiﬁed to a maximum altitude of 100,000 feet and a velocity of about 560 knots. "It is uncertain whether it can protect a crew member at higher altitudes and air speeds," the study says.

Recommendation: Pressure suits should be evaluated to determine weak points; improvements should be made as warranted.

5. Ground impact: The current parachute system requires manual action by the astronauts.

Recommendation: "Future spacecraft crew survival systems should not rely on manual activation to protect the crew."

The new study also made recommendations to improve future crew survival investigations.

"The SCSIIT investigation was performed with the belief that a comprehensive, respectful investigation could provide knowledge that would improve the safety of future space flight crews and explorers," the group wrote. "By learning these lessons and ensuring that we continue the journey begun by the crews of Apollo 1, Challenger and Columbia, we help to give meaning to their sacrifice and the sacrifice of their families. it is for them, and for the future generations of explorers, that we strive to be better and go farther."

The 400-page report is posted on line at: http://www.nasa.gov/reports

One striking aspect of the initial 2003 accident board study was similarities between how the shuttle Challenger broke up during launch in 1986 and how Columbia met its fate during re-entry in 2003. In both cases, the reinforced crew modules broke away from the shuttle fuselage relatively intact. And in both cases, the astronauts are believed to have survived the initial breakup.

In an appendix to the Columbia accident board report, investigators concluded "acceleration levels seen by the crew module prior to its catastrophic failure were not lethal. LOS (loss of signal) occurred at 8:59:32 (a.m. EST). The death of the crew members was due to blunt force trauma and hypoxia. The exact time of death - sometime after 9:00:19 a.m. Eastern Standard Time - cannot be determined because of the lack of direct physical or recorded evidence."

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 206 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

"Failure of crew module was precipitated by thermal degradation of structural properties that resulted in a catastrophic sequential structural failure that happened very rapidly as opposed to a catastrophic instantaneous 'explosive' failure," the report said. "Crew module separation from the forward fuselage is not an anomalous condition in the case of a vehicle loss of control as has been the case in both 51-L (Challenger) and STS-107 (Columbia)."

Columbia Accident Investigation Board summary of critical events

But the shuttle crew module, on its own, has no power and no systems were present that could have saved either crew after breakup occurred.

Even so, "it is irrefutable, as conclusively demonstrated by items that were recovered in pristine condition whose locations were within close proximity to some crew members, that it was possible to attenuate the potentially hostile environment that was present during CM (crew module) break-up to the point where physically and thermally induced harmful effects were virtually eliminated," the CAIB concluded.

"This physical evidence makes a compelling argument that crew survival under environmental circumstances seen in this mishap could be possible given the appropriate level of physiological and environmental protection."

The CAIB went on to recommend that NASA "investigate techniques that will prevent the structural failure of the CM due to thermal degradation of structural properties to determine the feasibility for application. Future crewed vehicles should incorporate the knowledge gained from the (Challenger) and (Columbia) mishaps in assessing the feasibility of designing vehicles that will provide for crew survival even in the face of a mishap that results in the loss of the vehicle."

Columbia blasted off on mission STS-107 on Jan. 16, 2003. On board were commander Rick Husband, pilot William "Willie" McCool, Michael Anderson, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Laurel Clark and Ilan Ramon, the ﬁrst Israeli to ﬂy in space.

Some 81.7 seconds after liftoff, a briefcase-size chunk of foam insulation broke away from Columbia's external tank. Long-range tracking cameras showed the foam disappearing under the left wing and a cloud of debris emerging an instant later.

No one knew it at the time, but the foam had hit the underside of the left wing's reinforced carbon carbon leading edge, punching a ragged hole four to six inches across. During re-entry 16 days later, superheated air entered the breach and melted the wing from the inside out.

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 207

In the moments leading up the catastrophic failure, telemetry from the damaged shuttle indicated problems with the left wing, including loss of data from hydraulic line sensors and temperature probes and left main landing gear pressure readings. The astronauts - Husband, McCool, Chawla and Clark strapped in on the upper ﬂight deck, Anderson, Brown and Ramon seated on the lower deck - presumably were unaware of anything unusual until just before the left wing either folded over or broke away and the vehicle's ﬂight computers lost control.

The ﬁnal words from Columbia's crew came at 8:59:32 a.m. when Husband, presumably responding to a tire alarm acknowledgement from mission control, said "Roger, uh, buh..." At that point, the shuttle was nearly 38 miles above Central Texas and traveling at 18 times the speed of sound. No more voice transmissions were received. But telemetry, some of it garbled, continued to ﬂow for a few more moments.

That data, combined with stored telemetry on a data recorder that was found in the shuttle's wreckage and analysis of recovered debris, eventually allowed engineers to develop a rough timeline of events after the initial loss of signal.

In the new study, data show the crew received multiple indications of problems in the minute prior to loss of control, which probably occurred right around the time of Husband's last transmission. Fifty-eight seconds before that event, the ﬁrst of four tire pressure alert messages was displayed. Thirty-one seconds before loss of control, the left main landing gear indicator changed state. Seven seconds before LOC, a pulsing yaw thruster light came on as the jets began ﬁring continuously to keep the shuttle properly oriented. Less than one second before LOC, aileron trim exceeded 3 degrees.

"For the crew, the first strong indications of the LOC would be lighting and horizon changes seen through the windows and changes on the vehicle attitude displays," the report says. "Additionally, the forces experienced by the crew changed significantly and began to differ from the nominal, expected accelerations. The accelerations were translational (due to aerodynamic drag) and angular (due to rotation of the orbiter). The translational acceleration due to drag was dominant, and the direction was changing as the orbiter attitude changed relative to the velocity vector (along the direction of flight).

"Results of a shuttle LOC simulation show that the motion of the orbiter in this timeframe is best described as a highly oscillatory slow (30 to 40 degrees per second) ﬂat spin, with the orbiter's belly generally facing into the velocity vector. It is important to note that the velocity vector was still nearly parallel to the ground as the vehicle was moving along its trajectory in excess of Mach 15. The crew experienced a swaying motion to the left and right (Y-axis) combined with a pull forward (X-axis) away from the seatback. The Z-axis accelerations pushed the crew members down into their seats. These motions might induce nausea, dizziness, and disorientation in crew members, but they were not incapacitating. The total acceleration experienced by the crew increased from approximately 0.8 G at LOC to slightly more than 3 G by the CE (catastrophic event).

"The onset of this highly oscillatory flat spin likely resulted in the need for crew members to brace as they attempted to diagnose and correct the orbiter systems. ... One middeck crew member had not completed seat ingress and strap- in at the beginning of this phase. Seat debris and medical analyses indicate that this crew member was not fully restrained before loss of consciousness. Only the shoulder and crotch straps appear to have been connected. The normal sequence for strap-in is to attach the lap belts to the crotch strap first, followed by the shoulder straps. Analysis of the seven recovered helmets indicated that this same crew member was the only one not wearing a helmet. Additionally, this crew member was tasked with post-deorbit burn duties. This suggests that this crew member was preparing to become seated and restrained when the LOC dynamics began. During a dynamic flight condition, the lap belts hanging down between the closely space seats would be difficult to grasp due to the motion of the orbiter, which may be why only the shoulder straps were connected."

Recovered cockpit switch panels indicate McCool attempted to troubleshoot hydraulic system problems. Either Husband or McCool also returned the shuttle's autopilot to the automatic setting at 9:00:03 a.m. after one of the two hand controllers apparently was inadvertently bumped. "These actions indicate that the CDR or the PLT was still mentally and physically capable of processing display information and executing commands and that the orbiter dynamics were still within human performance limitations," the study concludes.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 208 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

"It was a very short time," Hale said. "We know it was very disorienting motion that was going on. There were a number of alarms that went off simultaneously. And the crews, of course, are trained to maintain or regain control in a number of different ways and we have evidence from (recovered debris that they) were trying very hard to regain control. We're talking about a very brief time, in a crisis situation, and I'd hate to go any further than that."

Said Melroy: "I'd just like to add we found that those actions really showed the crew was relying on their training in problem solving and problem resolution and that they were focused on attempting to recover the vehicle when they did detect there was something off nominal. They showed remarkable systems knowledge and problem resolution techniques. Unfortunately, of course, there was no way for them to know with the information they had that that was going to be impossible. But we were impressed with the training, certainly, and the crew."

From the point the crew cabin broke away from the fuselage to the point where depressurization occurred "can be narrowed to a range of 17 seconds, from between GMT 14:00:18 (9:00:18 a.m.) to GMT 14:00:35," the report states. "Crew module debris items recovered west of the main crew module debris field were 8 inches in diameter or smaller, were not comprised of crew module primary structure, and originated from areas above and below the middeck floor. This indicates that the crew module depressurization was due to multiple breaches (above and below the floor), and that these breaches were initially small.

"When the forebody separated from the midbody, the crew members experienced three dramatic changes in their environment: 1. all power was lost, 2. the motion and acceleration environment changed; and 3. crew cabin depressurization began within 0 to 17 seconds. With the loss of power, all of the lights and displays went dark (although each astronaut already had individual chem-lights activated). The intercom system was no longer functional and the orbiter O2 system was no longer available for use, although individual, crew worn Emergency Oxygen System (EOS) bottles were still available.

"As the forebody broke free from the rest of the orbiter, its ballistic number underwent a sharp change from an average ballistic number of 41.7 pounds per square foot (psf) (out of control intact orbiter) to 122 psf (free-ﬂying forebody). The aerodynamic drag of the forebody instantaneously decreased, resulting in a reduction in the translational deceleration from approximately 3.5 G to about 1 G."

As experienced by the astronauts, the change from a normal re-entry to loss of control and separation of the crew module from the fuselage "all occurred in approximately 40 seconds. Experience shows that this is not sufﬁcient time to don gloves and helmets."

"Histological (tissue) examination of all crew member remains showed the effects of depressurization. Neither the effects of CE nor the accelerations immediately post-CE would preclude the crew members who were wearing helmets from closing and locking their visors at the ﬁrst indication of a cabin depressurization. This action can be accomplished in seconds. This strongly suggests that the depressurization rate was rapid enough to be nearly immediately incapacitating. The exact rate of cabin depressurization could not be determined, but based on video evidence complete loss of pressure was reached no later than (NLT) GMT 14:00:59 (9:00:59 a.m.), and was likely much earlier. The medical ﬁndings show that the crew could not have regained consciousness after this event. Additionally, respiration ceased after the depressurization, but circulatory functions could still have existed for a short period of time for at least some crew members."

For background, here are the results of the original Crew Survival Working Group's assessment, as reported in "Comm Check: The Final Flight of Shuttle Columbia" by Michael Cabbage and William Harwood (Free Press, 2004; some of the conclusions may change based on the new study):

At the CAIB's request, NASA formed a Crew Survivability Working Group to determine, if possible, the cause of crew death. Here is what the group concluded (taken from page 77 of the Columbia Accident Investigation Report):

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 209

Medical and Life Sciences

The Working Group found no irregularities in its extensive review of all applicable medical records and crew health data. The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted forensic analyses on the remains of the crew of Columbia after they were recovered. It was determined that the acceleration levels the crew module experienced prior to its catastrophic failure were not lethal. The death of the crew members was due to blunt trauma and hypoxia. The exact time of death sometime after 9:00:19 a.m. Eastern Standard Time cannot be determined because of the lack of direct physical or recorded evidence.

Failure of the Crew Module

The forensic evaluation of all recovered crew module/forward fuselage components did not show any evidence of over-pressurization or explosion. This conclusion is supported by both the lack of forensic evidence and a credible source for either sort of event. The failure of the crew module resulted from the thermal degradation of structural properties, which resulted in a rapid catastrophic sequential structural breakdown rather than an instantaneous "explosive" failure.

Separation of the crew module/forward fuselage assembly from the rest of the Orbiter likely occurred immediately in front of the payload bay (between Xo576 and Xo582 bulkheads). Subsequent breakup of the assembly was a result of ballistic heating and dynamic loading. Evaluations of fractures on both primary and secondary structure elements suggest that structural failures occurred at high temperatures and in some cases at high strain rates. An extensive trajectory reconstruction established the most likely breakup sequence, shown below (page 77 of the CAIB report).

The load and heat rate calculations are shown for the crew module along its reconstructed trajectory. The band superimposed on the trajectory (starting about 9:00:58 a.m. EST) represents the window where all the evaluated debris originated. It appears that the destruction of the crew module took place over a period of 24 seconds beginning at an altitude of approximately 140,000 feet and ending at 105,000 feet. These ﬁgures are consistent with the results of independent thermal re-entry and aerodynamic models. The debris footprint proved consistent with the results of these trajectory analyses and models. Approximately 40 to 50 percent, by weight, of the crew module was recovered.

The Working Group's results signiﬁcantly add to the knowledge gained from the loss of Challenger in 1986. Such knowledge is critical to efforts to improve crew survivability when designing new vehicles and identifying feasible improvements to the existing Orbiters.

Crew Worn Equipment

Videos of the crew during re-entry that have been made public demonstrate that prescribed procedures for use of equipment such as full-pressure suits, gloves, and helmets were not strictly followed. This is conﬁrmed by the Working Group's conclusions that three crew members were not wearing gloves, and one was not wearing a helmet. However, under these circumstances, this did not affect their chances of survival.

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 210 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Columbia's crew Blue shirts (left to right): David Brown, Willie McCool, Michael Anderson Red shirts (left to right): Kalpana Chawla, Rick Husband, Laurel Clark, Ilan Ramon

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 211

Appendix 3: NASA Acronyms11

Acronym Meaning

A/D Analog‐to‐Digital ac Alternating Current ACP Astronaut Control Panel ACS Advanced Camera for Surveys ACTR 5 Actuator 5 AFD Aft Flight Deck AID Analog Input Differential AKA Active Keel Actuator ALC Automatic Light Control AMSB Advanced Mechanism Selection Box APE Auxiliary PFR Extender ASIPE Axial Science Instrument Protective Enclosure ASLR Aft Shroud Latch Repair ATM Auxiliary Transport Module

BAPS Berthing and Positioning System BAR Berthing Assist and Restraint BITE Built‐In Test Equipment BOT Beginning of Travel BSP BAPS Support Post BSR BITE Status Register BTU Bus Terminal Unit

CAB Cabin CASH Cross Aft Shroud Harness CAT Crew Aids and Tools CCTV Closed Circuit Television CDU Common Drive Unit CEP Containment Environmental Package CNTL Control COPE Contingency ORU Protective Enclosure COS Cosmic Origins Spectrograph CPC Cyro Port Cover CPT Comprehensive Performance Test CPUA Clamp Pickup Assembly CRES Corrosion‐Resistant Steel CSM Cargo Systems Manual CSS Center Support Structure

D/R Deploy/Return DBA Diode Box Assembly DBC Diode Box Controller DBC Data Bus Coupler dc Direct Current DI/DO Discrete Input/Discrete Output DIH Discrete Input High DIL Discrete Input Low DOF Degree of Freedom DOH Discrete Output High DOL Discrete Output Low DPC Direct Power Converter DPST Double Pole, Single throw

ECU Electronic Control Unit

11 From the NASA STS-125 Press Kit: (http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/hst_sm4/index.html)

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 212 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Acronym Meaning

EGSE Electrical Ground Support Equipment EMU Extravehicular Mobility Unit ENA Enable EOT End of Travel EPDSU Enhanced Power Distribution and Switching Unit EPDU Electrical Power Distribution Unit ESM Electronic Support Module ESS Essential ET External Tank EURM Emergency Umbilical Retract Mechanism EVA Extravehicular Activity EXT External

FD Flight Day FDA Failure Detection/Annunciation FGS Fine Guidance Sensor FHST Fixed Head Star Tracker FMDM Flexible Multiplexer/Demultiplexer FOC Faint Object Camera FSS Flight Support System FWD Forward FXC Forward X‐Constraint

GPC General Purpose Computer GSE Ground Support Equipment GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center

HOST Hubble‐On‐Orbit Space Test HPGSCA HST Payload General Support Computer Assembly HRD Harness Restraint Device HST Hubble Space Telescope HTR Heater

I/F Interface I/O Input/Output ICD Interface Control Document IND indicator IOM Input/Output Module IPCU Interface Power Control Unit IVA Intravehicular Activity

J‐BOX Junction Box JSC Johnson Space Center

L/A Latch Assist LAT Latch LIS Load Isolation System LOPE Large ORU Protective Enclosure LPS Light and Particle Shield LRU Line Replaceable Unit

MCA Motor Control Assembly MCC Mission Control Center MDI Magnetically Damped Isolator MDM Multiplexer/Demultiplexer MET Mission Elapsed Time MGSE Mechanical Ground Support Equipment MIA Multiplexer Interface Adapter MLI Multilayer Insulation MMC Mid‐Motor Controller MMCA Mid‐Motor Control Assembly

5/10/09 CBS News CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement Page 213

Acronym Meaning

MNA Main A MNB Main B MOD Mission Operations Directorate MOPE Multi‐Mission ORU Protective Enclosure MSID Measurement Stimulus Identiﬁcation M‐STRUT Magnetic Strut MULE Multi‐Use Lightweight Equipment

NBL Neutral Buoyancy Lab NCC NICMOS CryoCooler NCS NICMOS Cooling System NICMOS Near Infrared Camera and Multi‐Object Spectrometer NOBL New Outer Blanket Layer NRZ‐L Non‐Return‐to‐Zero Level NT NOBL Transporter

OPA ORU Plate Assembly ORB Orbiter ORU Orbital Replacement Unit ORUC Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier

PA Pallet Assembly PBM Payload Bay Mechanical PCM Pulse‐Code Modulation PCN Page Change Notice PCU Power Control Unit PCU Power Conditioning Unit PDI Payload Data Interleaver PDIP Payload Data Interface Panel PDRS Payload Deployment and Retrieval System PDSU Power Distribution and Switching Unit PE Protective Enclosure PFR Portable Foot Restraint PGT Pistol Grip Tool PI Payload Interrogator PL Payload PLB Payload Bay PLBD Payload Bay Door POH Pulse Output High PPCU Port Power Conditioning Unit PRB Preload Release Bracket PRCS Primary Reaction Control System PRLA Payload Retention Latch Actuator PROM Programmable Read‐Only Memory PRT Power Ratchet Tool PSP Payload Signal Processor PWR Power

RAC Rigid Array Carrier REL Released RF Radio Frequency RL Retention Latch RMS Remote Manipulator System RNS Relative Navigation System RSIPE Radial Science Instrument Protective Enclosure RSU Rate Sensing Unit RWA Reaction Wheel Assembly

SA Solar Array SAC Second Axial Carrier SADA Solar Array Drive Adapter

CBS News 5/10/09 Page 214 CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook - Mission Supplement

Acronym Meaning

SADM Solar Array Drive Mechanism SAP SAC Adapter Plate SCM Soft Capture Mechanism SCRS Soft Capture and Rendezvous System SCU Sequence Control Unit SI Science Instrument SI C&DH Science Instrument Command and Data Handling SIP Standard Interface Panel SLIC Super Lightweight Interchangeable Carrier SLP SpaceLab Pallet SM Servicing Mission SM Systems Management SMEL Servicing Mission Equipment List SOPE Small ORU Protective Enclosure SORU Small Orbital Replaceable Unit SPCU Starboard Power Conditioning Unit SSE Space Support Equipment SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine SSP Standard Switch Panel SSPC Solid State Power Controller SSSH Space Shuttle Systems Handbook STBD Starboard STIS Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph STOCC Space Telescope Operations Control Center STS Space Transportation System SURV Survival

TA Translation Aid tb Talkback TM Transport Module TVAC Thermal Vacuum

UA Umbilical Actuator UARS Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite UASE UARS Airborne Structure Equipment UDM Umbilical Disconnect Mechanism UPS Under Pallet Storage USA United Space Alliance

VCU Video Control Unit VIK Voltage Improvement Kit

WFC Wide Field Camera WFPC Wide Field Planetary Camera WRKLT Worklight

5/10/09 CBS News