Chicago-Kent Law Review Volume 78 Issue 1 Symposium: Private Law, Punishment, Article 3 and Disgorgement April 2003 Restitution's Outlaws Andrew Kull Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Andrew Kull, Restitution's Outlaws, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 17 (2003). Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol78/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
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[email protected]. RESTITUTION'S OUTLAWS ANDREW KULL* INTRODUCTION Restitution, meaning the law of unjust enrichment, is not sup- posed to be punitive in purpose or effect., The first Restatement of Restitution treats this proposition as axiomatic: Actions for restitution have for their primary purpose taking from the defendant and restoring to the plaintiff something to which the plaintiff is entitled, or if this is not done, causing the de- fendant to pay the plaintiff an amount which will restore the plain- tiff to the position in which he was before the defendant received the benefit. If the value of what was received and what was lost were always equal, there would be no substantial problem as to the amount of recovery, since actions of restitution are not punitive.2 As an observation this is much more true than false, and in the contexts where it is typically repeated it conveys a useful reminder.