Gabriel Bonnot De Mably and the “Philosophie Économique”: Connections and Disconnections
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Gabriel Bonnot de Mably and the “philosophie économique”: connections and disconnections Julie Ferrand PHARE ***** Preliminary version Introduction Of the opponents to physiocracy, Gabriel Bonnot de Mably’s name is one of the most quoted. As pointed out by J.K. Wright, his Doutes proposés aux philosophes économistes sur l’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques (1768) and Du commerce des grains (1775) are unique among his works. They provide the only opportunity we have of seeing Mably arguing against an opposing system of thought (Wright 1997, 109). However, the Abbé says that he is the follower of the Economists regarding taxation, agricultural and commerce issues (Mably 1794-5 [1768], 2). This statement is often either quote without analysis or is considered as a reminiscence of an agricultural model in ancient Greece (see Wright 1997). Yet Mably is far from arguing against modern commercial society as a whole. In a previous works, we demonstrated that throughout his life, he stresses the necessity to develop the agricultural sector based on free circulation of goods inside the Kingdom and an export control system (see Ferrand and Orain 2017). And when he attacks the liberalization of grain trade promoted by the ministry of Turgot, it is to denounce the nefarious consequences of the continual rise in corn prices for the lower classes that followed the two liberalizations (1764 and 1774). Nevertheless, Mably does not for this reason question the primacy of agricultural trade, and not totally even the liberalization of the grain market (see Ferrand 2013). On the other hand, the opposition is more evident with regard to the political theory advocated by Lemercier de la Rivière. In 1767, he published L’Ordre naturel et essentiels des sociétés politiques, in which he develops the philosophical and political theory of the physiocratic doctrine (May 1975, Herencia 2011). The following year, Mably tried to refute part of his theses in Doutes 1 proposés aux philosophes économistes sur l’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques (1768), presented in the form of ten letters addressed to abbé Baudeau, director of the periodical of physiocracy, Les Éphémérides du citoyen. Firstly, Mably criticizes on every point the concept of évidence by which Lemercier defines the natural order of the society and the laws that govern it. Secondly, Mably attacks the model of legal despostism arguing that only a republican form of government can secure the social stability. On a more general level, Mably attacks the “philosophie rurale” (rural philosophy) which goes back to “the first principles of society” and serves as “foundations for the entire political order, that is to say, for the happiness of men.” (Mably 1794- 5 [1768], 2) In an article entitled “Interest, sensationism and the science of the legislator: French ‘philosophie économique’, 1695-1830”, G. Faccaello and P. Steiner (2008) generalize this concept of philosophie rurale in an ‘ideal-type’ named philosophie économique. Throughout the eighteenth century in France a political theory develops highlighting the belief in the self-regulation of civil society thanks to the virtues of the market. This philosophie économique organized around a theory of self-interested action in society, a theory of knowledge based on sensationism and a precise conception of the efficient action of a legislator (Faccarello and Steiner 2008, 7). It is generally assumed that the birth of modern economic science was one of the most significant manifestations of the triumph of the “interest paradigm” (see Hirschman 1980, Force 2003). Economic activities spontaneously create a harmony of interests thanks to a free-market competition (Faccarello and Steiner 2008, 11-13). As for sensationism, it led to the idea that it is the utility of an action (the agreeable or disagreeable sensations) that determined behavior. People make choices between alternative courses of action in a rational manner. Then the legislator can modify the context of self-interested behaviors (Faccarello and Steiner 2008, 14-16). Moreover, he becomes an educator of public opinion. The dissemination of the principles of the new economic science is fundamental so that the measures taken by the legislator be accepted by all the members of the society (Faccarello and Steiner 2008, 16-18). Although Mably takes part in some debates of his time as the management of trade policy, he is not a part of the development of economic science as an autonomous science. In the physiocratic doctrine, the idea that everything is physical in nature expresses the concept of natural economic laws. But Mably clearly distinguishes what are the physical science and the moral sciences: “there are no moral and political truths as geometrical truths, and our author [Lermercier] was wrong to confuse.” (Mably 1794-5 [1768], 47) Mably makes economic science dependent on politics. He 2 invokes the experience of the ancients and the record of history against the metaphysics of physiocracy. History must serve as model for appreciating the political and economic issues in the society of the eighteenth century. This permanent use of history build Mably’s reputation that of an classical republican, an “ancient” lost in the modern age (Coste 1975, 64-5 ; Wright 1997, 125- 161 ; Baker 1999, 98-9). His contributions to agricultural policy and trade policy are considered marginal. They would show his incomprehension regarding the development of the “new science”. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that it is clearly not the case. Mably’s choice to make economics science dependent on politics follows from a deep thought around the three basic elements which characterized the philosophie économique. Mably shares the hypothesis that individual behavior is driven by self-interest. This explains the human cooperation. Too weak to satisfy their primarily needs, individuals find only in their union the ability to survive. The consequence of the mutual dependence of men is commerce i.e. the exchange of goods and services (part 1). However, cooperation induced by self-interest is fragile because the primary dictate of self-interest remains a refusal to cooperate. Following the sensationist philosophy of his brother Condillac, Mably explains that this error of choice (the refusal to cooperate) results from a dysfunction of an operation of the understanding i.e. the imagination. This error comes down to the satisfaction of unnecessary needs instead of primary needs. Although pleasures derive from the satisfaction of needs, multiply them doesn’t mean increase the first, quite the opposite (part 2). Mably warns about the resources used to satisfy unnecessary needs. Useful arts and agriculture fall into disuse and subsistence production with them. To fight the disorder of the imagination, the action of the legislator appears fundamental. He must act as a true partner of Nature, “the more the laws teach us to be satisfied with little, the more they will strengthen the bonds of the society” (Mably 1794-5 [1776], 31). Taking the tree basic elements of the philosophie économique, Mably relates another story than that of individuals driven by a desire for enrichment in which free-market competition enables the harmonization of interests (part 3). 1. A self-interested conception of human behavior According to Mably and the physiocrats, setting aside the Chinese origins of the physiocratic doctrine, the history of mankind appears to record a long series of errors. However, the theory of primitive societies (i.e. prehistory) sets out the conditions that should govern any society. Mably and the Economists did not consider the state of nature as of a higher order than that belonging to 3 society. But society must perfect the state of nature, that is, harness the nature laws in order to enable humans to attain the greatest possible amount of wellbeing. It therefore appears that human beings get closer not to escape a state of war (Mably 1794-5 [1778], 11) but to improve the satisfaction of their needs: “Hurry to satisfy the basic needs of our existence because of the attraction of physical pleasure, and providing us only thanks to society the things for those very needs, it is obvious that our union in a society is a natural and necessary consequence of the appetite of pleasures.” (Lemercier de la Rivière 1767, I:10)1 Human beings are intended to gather in society because they are too weak to survive alone: As soon as I think, it is an evidence that I must love myself; that is to say, looking for my happiness. It is impossible for me to separate myself from this love of myself; and I must flee pain, as I shoot towards the pleasure which calls me. (…) Weak amid the dangers of whom I am threatened, and hurry by the needs always renascent which harass me; I cannot be self-sufficient; everything around me becomes necessary. (…) I run in front of anything that allows me to contribute to the happiness that I miss and I’m looking for. This is because man derives pleasure from approaching his fellows that he seeks their society. (Mably 1794-5 [1784], 253-4)2 Two important remarks need to be highlighted. Firstly, Mably and the physiocrats shared the same theory of human action called “sensationism”.3 Our knowledge comes from our agreeable or disagreeable sensations. Thus, pleasure and pain are the driving force of human action. Mably is “frightened to think that our soul tied up in our body languishes in continual apathy if it is not aroused from it by the tickling of pleasure or the wrenching of pain. There we have […] the whip or the spur that make me walk, the bridle that forces me to go right or left” (Mably 1794-5 [1778], 25).4 The need requires an action. A satisfied need causes a pleasure and creates the hope that new needs will be satisfied.