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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School
2005 Nursultan Nazarbayev's Influence on the Relocation of the Kazakh Capital Deborah Jean Cassidy Whetstone
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVESITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV’S INFLUENCE ON THE RELOCATION
OF THE KAZAKH CAPITAL
By
DEBORAH JEAN CASSIDY WHETSTONE
A Thesis submitted to the Interdisciplinary Program in Russian and East European Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2005
The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Deborah Jean Cassidy
Whetstone defended on 1 July 2005.
______
Jonathan A. Grant Professor Directing Thesis
______
Ljubisa S. Adamovich Committee Member
______
Lee Metcalf Committee Member
The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.
ii
In Memory of My Parents for the love and support they always gave
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are numerous people whose assistance, guidance, and support were instrumental to the completion of this thesis. My foremost thanks go to the members of my committee, who have been so patient. Dr. Grant’s guidance and direction proved especially beneficial and was appreciated. I would like to thank my friend, Jessica Bhuvasorakul, whose own experience with this process helped keep me sane. Additionally, her input and editorial advice were very much welcomed. I would also like to thank my friends and family, especially my sister, who showed their support by understanding my inability to multitask, as well as listening to endless information about a subject they did not care very much for in order to help me. To save the best for last, my unending thanks to my husband, Tony, and son, Andrew, for their love and understanding. They both now know more about Kazakhstan than either ever wanted, and I could not have done this without them.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Transliteration Conventions vi List of Figures vii Abstract viii
INTRODUCTION 1
1. ETHNIC DISCORD IN NORTHERN KAZAKHSTAN 14
2. INTERNATIONAL MOTIVES 28
3. DOMESTIC CONCERNS 37
4. NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV 47
CONCLUSION 56
BIBLIOGRAPHY 61
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 71
v
TRANSLITERATION CONVENTIONS
There is no official transliteration system for transferring from Kazakh to English. However, most scholars and analysts do follow the same transliteration pattern for names of people and places, the only exception being the name of the subject of this study, Nursultan Nazarbayev. There are a number of works which utilize the spelling of ‘Nazarbaev.’ Upon review though, more works include the ‘y’ in the president’s last name than do not. Therefore in the interest of consistency, that is the spelling that was chosen for use in this study. For all other names (e.g., place names in the Former Soviet Republics and names of famous Russians), there is very little discrepancy in their transliteration. Hence the commonly excepted spelling was used for this work. The few names where there is irregularity in the transliteration between various sources (as with Nazarbayev), the version used more frequently was selected, again for the sake of consistency.
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Map of Kazakhstan 2
Figure 2 : Dominant Russian Areas of Kazakhstan 15
Figure 3: Viktor Vasnetsov, “Bogatyrs” 57
vii
ABSTRACT
In 1994, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan announced a decision to relocate the capital of the country from the southeast corner to a more centralized location. Various theories have been suggested, both officially and unofficially for the move. The most widely accepted reason centers around concern for possible inter-ethnic tensions in the northern part of the country, where the new capital is. This work analyzes the authenticity of the stated motives: inter-ethnic concerns, as well as centrality, proximity to China and fundamental Islam, earthquakes, pollution, and expansion. Further attention is then given to the influence of the president himself in the decision. Due to the contemporary nature of the topic, numerous internet databases proved to be of particular importance during the research, including Eurasianet and Jamestown Foundation, as well as the works of specific scholars specializing in the region. The multitude of subject areas covered by this topic enhances its relevance: history, politics, geography, economics, international affairs, religion, psychology, Russian studies, Chinese studies, Central Asian studies, and Kazakhstan itself. A thorough understanding of the country and its leader is necessary as various agendas develop, both internally and externally.
viii
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, proposed relocating the capital of the country from Almaty to Astana.1 There were four official reasons given to justify this move: 1) Almaty is located in an area prone to seismic activity; 2) there is little room left for expansion; 3) the unhealthy levels of pollution in the city; and 4) Astana is more central for the rest of the country.2 However, various unofficial reasons for the move are routinely discussed as more pertinent to the decision. These include inter-clan politics, Almaty’s proximity to radical Islam and China, and a determination to make Kazakhstan the ‘center’ of Central Asia as well as the Asian continent. The most popular and well-documented unofficial reason was the desire of the Kazakh government, Nazarbayev specifically, to stabilize the Russian- dominated northern region of Kazakhstan by impeding the ability of those wanting to secede from Kazakhstan. It is an unlikely coincidence that the official motives for the transfer are domestic concerns, while the unofficial motives are, with the exception of inter-clan politics, internationally based. In that regard, one issue not often mentioned concerning the relocation of the capital is President Nazarbayev himself. There are occasional references to Nazarbayev’s ambition and ego, more often than not in relation to his various maneuvers to incorporate increasing power in the office of president. Indeed, Nazarbayev’s desire to establish his legacy within Kazakhstan (possibly even have the capital renamed for him at a distant point in the future) is well known.3 Few, however, name this aspect as a factor in the capital’s transfer, let alone the deciding cause. Despite this oversight, it was precisely Nazarbayev’s resolve to become his country’s founding father, as well as achieve recognition as both a regional and world leader, that was the primary motivation to relocate the capital. This is patently why the official reasons follow domestic lines and the unofficial reasons adhere to international lines. It was in Nazarbayev’s interests to try to convince the people of Kazakhstan that
1 his focus was on the good of the country. Further, it would have created tension with other world leaders to admit to any of the unofficial explanations. Historically, relocating the capital is not altogether unusual in Kazakhstan, or world-wide for that matter. According to Edward Schatz, there are thirteen instances of countries moving their capitals in the latter half of the twentieth century alone.4 Although most of those thirteen were in Africa and Asia, the United States has also experienced the relocation of the capital from New York City to Philadelphia, and then to the newly created Washington D.C. in the early years of its history.5 Similarly, in 1920, Orenburg was the first capital of what is now known as Kazakhstan. Five years later a historical precedent was set by relocating the capital to Kzyl-Orda, followed by a move in 1929 to Almaty.6 The most recent transfer to Astana occurred in 1997 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Map of Kazakhstan7
As with these examples, most capital relocations occur during the first few years of either a new country or a new leader, and are almost invariably met with resistance and controversy. The most notable basis for this opposition is the enormous cost
2 associated with such a massive undertaking. Factor in the disruption of the status quo for everyone, most especially the political elite, and logically, such proposals would not be looked upon favorably. Accordingly, leaders are unlikely to decide to switch capitals arbitrarily. It is also unlikely, though not unheard of, for them to base their decision on a single factor. For Kazakhstan, simply wanting the capital to be more central, or concerns over pollution do not seem to warrant the turmoil inherent in transferring the capital. That is perhaps why most scholars and journalists familiar with the subject either mention the official reasons in passing, as an introduction to inter-ethnic relations, or ignore them altogether. The fact that many of the other former Soviet republics are experiencing varying degrees of ethnic tension, similar to Kazakhstan, also allows those questioning the wisdom of the relocation a viable alternative explanation. Furthermore, the relative absence of any discussion regarding why Astana was chosen as the new capital clearly illustrates the prevalence of the majority opinion that Nazarbayev’s true motive behind the relocation was the inter-ethnic tension in the north. That is not even considered an issue. A few scholars pose rhetorical questions concerning the move from a beautiful city to a “wasteland”, including references to “baseball-sized mosquitoes”; however none bring up other possible cities to address the issue of the actual choice of Astana.8 Some scholars cast aspersion on the veracity of wanting the capital to be more central by noting there are other cities even more centrally located than Astana.9 Unfortunately they do not follow through with that query to examine why the other cities were not chosen, but instead fall back on the fail-safe issue of ethnic Russians in the north. For instance, in the context of verifying the level of pollution in Almaty, the research also showed that all of the other possible options that are more central than Astana contain similar levels of pollution.10 Taking that into consideration, Nazarbayev was too experienced a politician to have chosen a new capital that has some of the same problems as the old. To do so would have rendered the move, and therefore the cost, entirely illegitimate to those mentioned above. As far as the city of Astana is concerned, other issues in its favor include its founding by the Russians as the unofficial capital of Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands Program
3 (its name at that time was Tselinograd, or the City of the Virgin Lands). More cynical scholars use this to justify their theory of inter-ethnic relations being the cause of the move. They argue that by choosing Astana, the government is trying to lay claim to anything Russian and make it Kazakh, “. . . Akmola . . . became the centre for what many Kazakhs saw as a crude Russification drive. The proposed transfer of the capital there symbolizes Kazakh reclaiming of the territory.”11 However, it can also be argued that the town not having a history as a Kazakh city is a way of acknowledging the contribution of the Russians. Additionally, moving the capital could be a way of trying to make the government more accessible to those feeling alienated due to the capital being tucked away in a corner. After all, even though the official reasons are not given much credit, there is some truth to them as the government would not have chanced presenting blatant fallacies. To do so would risk alienating the foreign investors appraising the region’s stability. The other most notable feature of this subject’s literature is its scarcity. Although there is certainly plenty of information concerning Kazakhstan in general, and the government’s relations with both ethnic Russians in the north and Russia as a whole, researchers still have to sort through extraneous information for material specific to their topic. That fact is not too surprising since it was mainly after the events of September 11th in the United States that specialists outside the oil and gas industries began to examine Kazakhstan more closely. While Kazakhstan did receive more attention than the other Central Asian countries, that was only because of the said oil and gas industries, as well as the nuclear weapons and facilities, and the Baikonur Space Center, both in Kazakhstan as a result of Soviet policies. Overall though, the areas of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) that received the most attention were those with actual inter-ethnic fighting or secessionist movements such as Chechnya in southern Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Trans- Dneister in Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Since northern Kazakhstan was thought to have the potential to reach that level of unrest, it was usually included in works concerned with that issue. The potential similarity to these other regions is why most scholars attribute the relocation of Kazakhstan’s capital to inter-ethnic tensions.
4 The vast majority of information involving Kazakhstan and the inter-ethnic tension in the north is primarily in newspaper and journal articles, rather than books. There are only a handful of texts devoted to Kazakhstan alone. Most of the works that contribute information to this topic do so in the context of discussing the region as a whole, either Central Asia or post-Soviet issues, or the other aforementioned areas, with no more than one chapter focused on Kazakhstan. Any research project on Kazakhstan should start with the work of Martha Brill Olcott, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment who specializes in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In an area of study with few published books, she has written two texts devoted entirely to Kazakhstan: The Kazakhs (1987, 1995) and Kazakhstan – Unfulfilled Promise (2002). She also has dozens of other publications regarding Central Asia in general. Although writing from a western perspective, Dr. Olcott’s research includes Western, Russian, and Kazakh sources from an array of time periods, as well as insights garnered from extensive travel within Kazakhstan. Dr. Olcott goes to great lengths to present a balanced account of Kazakh history, as well as events and activities since independence. To that end, Dr. Olcott is very successful at not favoring either the Kazakhs or the Russians in her portrayal of their interactions. However, in Kazakhstan – Unfulfilled Promise, Olcott does not present Nazarbayev in a positive manner. Her opinion is even evident in the title, “Unfulfilled Promise”, as well as the first page of the text. Professor Olcott likened the situation in Kazakhstan to a statement from Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe concerning his country:
The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example, which are hallmarks of true leadership.12
Of the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan was widely viewed by most experts to have the most potential for development after independence. Olcott does not believe Kazakhstan has lived up to those expectations during the past decade of independence and places the blame for that with President Nazarbayev.
5 Unfortunately, despite dedicating her second text to Nazarbayev’s consolidation of power and the resulting consequences for Kazakhstan, Olcott makes only one comment relating Nazarbayev’s behavior to the capital’s relocation, “. . . the change of the capital went ahead because it was something that the president saw as necessary to demonstrate his authority . . .”13 However no further detail is provided by Olcott within the context of the capital relocation to support that statement. To be fair though, there is also only one statement regarding the common theory behind the move, “The decision was certainly in part a strategy to root the northern section of the country firmly under Kazakh control.”14 Altogether, she devotes one page to the transfer and makes no mention of the official reasons, instead being more concerned with the cost of the move and the sources of its funding than with the actual move and the reasons for it. Regardless, Dr. Olcott’s lack of attention to the relocation of the capital is no reflection on the rest of the content in her texts. In terms of overall perception, accuracy, and depth of coverage, Professor Olcott’s works on Kazakhstan are without equal. One of the only other actual texts dedicated solely to the issue of Russian- Kazakh relations, Mikhail Alexandrov’s Uneasy Alliance: Relations Between Russia and Kazakhstan in the Post-Soviet Era, 1992-1997 attempts to present an impartial picture. Unfortunately, as an ethnic Russian (though based in Australia), his predisposition toward Russia is evident throughout the book. “Kazakh diplomacy had a long tradition of using such diplomatic maneuvering to exploit rivalry between Russia and China in the eighteenth century” and “. . . dynamics were very reminiscent of methods and techniques used by Kazakhs previously, when they wanted their way and were opposed by Moscow” are just two examples of M. Alexandrov’s partiality.15 He even accuses Nazarbayev of having a policy of trying to influence ethnic Russians to leave Kazakhstan.16 An additional concern with an inconsistency in chronology throughout the text, in conjunction with Alexandrov’s Russian inclination, may be why this text is not often cited in other scholarship.17 Despite these issues though, Alexandrov’s use of primary sources such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the BBC Monitoring Service, as well as a multitude of Russian language sources, including both Russian and Kazakh newspapers, makes
6 Uneasy Alliance a very relevant text for the subject area. As a result of this research, Alexandrov provides an accurate account of Russian-Kazakh relations, the issues between them, and efforts on both sides either to correct misunderstandings or to use those misunderstandings to further political goals. In relation to the relocation of the capital, one interesting point made by Alexandrov in his historiography is the lack of Russian scholarship concerning Kazakhstan and Russian-Kazakh relations. According to Alexandrov, the Russian government is not interested in increasing funding for such research.18 This assertion leads to a question of whether that reflects a genuine lack of interest for the subject in Russia, or is instead a deliberate ploy to keep attention away from what could become a potential problem. If either one of those theories is true, the next question is why? Why would Russia not show more interest in their largest neighbor to the south, especially given their economic interdependence; or why would they try to keep attention away from Kazakhstan and the ethnic-Russians there? The answer is there simply was not that much to be troubled by in terms of inter- ethnic problems in northern Kazakhstan or even in relations between the two countries. Considering Russia’s prominent role in the other five areas of the FSU with actual inter- ethnic tension, it is evident they had too many other things with which to be concerned. This lack of priority by Russia for the ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan helps to illustrate the relative calmness of the situation there, as opposed to the accepted theory. Also, rather unfortunately, the leading Kazakh experts Alexandrov references do not seem to be widely known in the west. No mention could be found anywhere of Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies (KISI) director U. T. Kasenov, whom Alexandrov contends is the foremost Kazakh scholar.19 This has a negative impact in several ways. It severely limits the input into the subject of people actually living in the country and dealing with the issues of possible inter-ethnic tension daily. Additionally, as Alexandrov explains, most of Kasenov’s works likely adhere to official Kazakh government policy which simultaneously provides certain insights and is inherently limiting. The most significant loss is that “. . . Kasenov can say publicly what Nazarbayev cannot, which gives a clear hint of what Kazakhstan’s president and government are thinking.”20 In other words, Kasenov is not constrained by the political
7 correctness that constrains Nazarbayev as president. Accordingly, his input would have been invaluable. In lieu of Alexandrov’s contribution, there are a few other well-known western experts on Central Asia and Kazakhstan, specifically Ian Bremmer, Sally Cummings, Bhavna Dave, and Pauline Jones Luong. These scholars are frequently cited in discussions of the region. The majority of their works, as stated previously, consist of articles and chapters in edited texts as opposed to complete texts of their own.21 However, that does not in anyway detract from their contribution to the field of Central Asian studies. Instead, that fact can be regarded as an indication of the level of interest in the subject as whole in the West. A further reason for the small number of texts on the subject of Russian-Kazakh and inter-ethnic relations is that they are true social science topics. Articles and texts on the region and its various issues contain political, economic, social, geographic, psychological, and historical perspectives. This wide range of subject areas creates an enclave of experts whose objective is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the region, rather than specific events. For example, the above scholars, as well as others not mentioned, do not concern themselves with the decision to move the capital any more than Olcott or Alexandrov. When or if the capital is mentioned, it is more often in the context of illustrating inter-ethnic tension in northern Kazakhstan than of examining the actual motives behind the move. Virtually every article, paper or text concerned with Kazakhstan or Russian-Kazakh relations is organized around language, citizenship, and center/periphery or access to government for the people of Kazakhstan. Accordingly Chapter 2, which addresses this facet of the research, is also organized in terms of those three issues, in the context of explaining why ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan was not the primary reason for Nazarbayev’s decision. The specialists in Russia and her ‘Near-abroad’ provide further confirmation of the lack of concern for northern Kazakhstan and the relocation of the capital to Astana. The emphasis of virtually every text on the subject places significant importance on other FSU countries such as the previously mentioned Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, and the Baltic States and Ukraine. This is understandable given that most
8 of these other areas have actual fighting, whereas northern Kazakhstan simply has (perceivably) the potential to disintegrate to that level. As most of these scholars point out, Ukraine is the only FSU with more ethnic Russians in its borders than Kazakhstan. Contrary to that statistic, Kazakhstan is usually the last chapter in texts on the subject, as well as the smallest. The ethnic tension in the northern region is simply not on the same level as these other areas mentioned, and is treated accordingly. Scholars such as Neil Melvin and Anatoly M. Khazanov do not question the fact of ethnic tension in Kazakhstan. However, seemingly as a result of the extreme economic interdependence between Russia and Kazakhstan, they assume the issue will be resolved with a union of sorts between the two, as opposed to the fighting in other countries.22 This assumption may be why some Kazakhs have concerns about Russian intentions in northern Kazakhstan; however the lack of attention in comparison to other Former Soviet Republics makes their fears unnecessary. Any mention of the capital’s move from these Russian-perspective texts follows the same theory as the Central Asian specialists; it was done because of the ethnic problems in the north. Melvin’s only comment concerning the relocation of the capital to Astana (Akmola) in Russians Beyond Russia is “ . . . Akmola . . . became the center for what many Kazakhs saw as a crude Russification drive. The proposed transfer of the capital there symbolizes Kazakh reclaiming of the territory.”23 This statement is followed by an endnote which succinctly states prevailing opinion on the matter: “Despite the official reasons . . . there can be no doubt that the move is a political gesture designed to reinforce the territorial integrity of the country.”24 Regardless of whether the scholars wrote from a Central Asian, Russian, or even Western perspective, this is the almost universal view. Considering this milieu of the research, previously mentioned Edward Schatz of Southern Illinois University Carbondale is remarkable. He is the only scholar to discuss the capital’s transfer from Almaty in detail. Schatz’s What Capital Cities Say About State and Nation Building uses the example of Kazakhstan to examine the various
9 reasons behind capital relocation in general. In the context of examining these reasons, Schatz concentrates on both the official and unofficial motives pertaining to Kazakhstan’s decision. Unsurprisingly, given that he is the only scholar to devote substantial space to the relocation, Schatz is also the only one to present an alternative to the prevailing assumption. According to the phrases used in his title, Schatz acknowledges the ethnic issues in the north as a factor in the decision through the concept of ‘Nation Building”. Before that though, he discusses “State Building” which includes efforts by leaders to build a personal network of support, while alienating those questioning them.25 This aspect of Schatz’s argument is unique in the subject area and of great significance for the purposes of this work. As stated previously, it is the contention of this work that the ethnic problems in the north, while a factor, were not the primary cause of the move. Instead, as Schatz states in Modern Clan Politics: The Power of “Blood” in Kazakhstan and Beyond, “Thus, the general pattern since 1991 was the entrenchment of Nazarbayev’s power. . . . The transfer of the capital from Almaty to Astana was a further chance to keep close tabs on actors whose offices were moved and to shut down the operations of others.”26 The relocation of the capital provided President Nazarbayev with an opportunity to consolidate his power and authority, with his preferred end result of becoming known as the ‘founder’ of modern Kazakhstan. Although the other justifications given, both officially and unofficially, were legitimate, Nazarbayev’s aspirations provided the actual impetus to the transfer. Again though, most of the articles and texts which do mention the capital’s transfer draw a distinction between official reasons and unofficial. However, the fact that overall, most of the official reasons have a domestic focus, and most of the unofficial issues focus on international factors is mentioned by no one. This paper will examine the reasons given from the international and domestic perspectives first, then within each of these the official and unofficial reasons. Chapter 2 discusses the prevalent theory of inter-ethnic concerns for the transfer of the capital. Because the majority of the scholarship focuses on the inter-ethnic relations in the north and the inherent Russian-Kazakh concerns, it is more reasonable
10 to have it as its own chapter. Additionally, because the problem in Northern Kazakhstan involves Russia, it is both an international and domestic issue. Therefore, it belongs in both chapters, and will consequently be treated separately. Chapter 3 then moves to the predominately unofficial international reasons behind the move. Since all of the unofficial reasons receive more attention in both media and scholarship than the official domestic ones, they will be covered first. Chapter 4 will focus attention on the domestic concerns listed by the Kazakhstan government website as the official reasons for relocating the capital. The second half of this chapter will address the unofficial domestic reasons. However, the majority of the detail on the unofficial domestic reasons will be provided in Chapter 5. This chapter will explain why President Nazarbayev’s aspirations were the motivating factor behind moving the capital from Almaty to Astana.
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ENDNOTES FOR INTRODUCTION
1 Almaty’s former name of Alma-Ata was from Soviet times. It was changed to Almaty after independence to be more in keeping with the traditional Kazakh name. Astana on the other hand was known as Tselinograd during Soviet times, then became Aqmola after independence. The name was changed to Astana after the transfer of the capital because Aqmola was mistakenly translated as ‘white grave’ or ‘white tomb’ and so was seen negatively. To avoid confusion, both cities will be referred to by their current name throughout the paper.
2 “Modern and Recent History of Kazakhstan,” n.d.,
3 “Astana Guide, Meaning, Facts, Information and Description,” n.d.,
4 Schatz, 5
5 “Philadelphia: The Capital City,” in The National Park Service, n.d.,
6 “Modern and Recent History of Kazakhstan,” n.d.,
7 “Map of Kazakhstan,” from the Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, n.d.,
8 Kim Iskyan, “Trading Places: What Drives a Country to Switch its Capital City?”, March 2004,
9 Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 285
10 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, Environmental Monitoring in Central Asia, 28 February-1 March 2002,
11 Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia – The Politics of National Identity (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 118
12 Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, (London: Heinemann, 1983), 1, quoted in Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 1
13 Olcott, 101
14 Ibid, 101
12
15 M. Alexandrov, 77 and 82
16 Ibid, 87
17 Seemingly in an effort to strengthen his commentary on various issues between Russia and Kazakhstan, and the concerns of ethnic-Russians in the north, Alexandrov has a tendency to use sources from various dates with unrelated events. For example, at one point Alexandrov makes reference to May 1994, then the next date mentioned is in April with no year given, followed in the next paragraph by June 1992. (Alexandrov, p. 88) Also, in recounting the reasons offered for the transfer of the capital in 1994, Alexandrov uses the example of renaming Russian settlements in 1992 to justify the ethnic-Russian theory for the proposal. When considered in context, there is a connection between these particular events. However, this habit of irregular date sequence can lead to confusion in terms of following the order of his remarks.
18 Ibid, xii (Introduction)
19 Ibid, xiii (Introduction)
20 Ibid, xiii (Introduction)
21 Bhavna Dave has a text in publication, Post-Soviet Kazakhstan (Routledge Press). It is part of the Central Asian Studies Series. There is no doubt it would be an invaluable resource for this paper. Unfortunately it is not due to be released for another five months (October 2005) after the completion of this work.
22 Melvin, 123; and Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States ( Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 156-173
23 Melvin, 118
24 Ibid, 167
25 Schatz, What Capital Cities Say,” 120
26 Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics: The Power of “Blood” in Kazakhstan and Beyond (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 87
13
CHAPTER 1
ETHNIC DISCORD IN NORTHERN KAZAKHSTAN
For various reasons, the subject of this chapter - ethnic tensions in northern Kazakhstan - has garnered substantial attention amongst scholars and journalists since independence. Some experts are concerned with this topic because it is a recurring theme in post-Soviet reality, others because of the percentages of the ethnicities in question. Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s outspoken pronouncements in the early 1990s concerning the ‘plight’ in which Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russians found themselves also engendered considerable media coverage.1 In addition to the level of interest expressed by others, this subject is accorded its own chapter in this work because it involves both international and domestic contexts. While clearly a domestic issue, the proximity of the area in question to Russia and the recurring rumors of secession also make it an international issue. It therefore belongs in neither of those chapters and instead leads into the other two. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new nation of Kazakhstan (like most of the former Soviet Republics) had an ethnically diverse population. Although there were many nationalities in Kazakhstan as a result of Soviet policy, ethnic Russians comprised the largest non-Kazakh group.2 A further result of Soviet policy placed the ethnic Russians predominately in northern and eastern Kazakhstan (as well as the largest city and former capital of Almaty in the southeast corner of the country). It is this large population of ethnic Russians in the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan especially that is overwhelmingly cited as central to President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s decision to relocate the capital, and in particular to relocate it to Astana (See Figure 2).3 However, while this situation was a factor in the decision, it was not in itself a sufficient reason to undertake such a massive project.
14
Figure 2: Map of Kazakhstan with Dominant Russian Areas4
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s demise, the ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan found themselves in relative numerical parity with the titular group, providing a unique situation from the rest of the former republics. Whether or not this arrangement would make it easier or harder to negotiate the specifics of independence remained to be seen. Most of the ethnic Russians who instantly found themselves residents of a foreign country had definite concerns about their situation, especially given perceived maneuvers towards favoritism of ethnic Kazakhs. Accordingly, inter-ethnic tension between Russians and Kazakhs quickly became the most prominent domestic issue (albeit not the most important considering the economic situation). Typically though, when one hears the phrase “inter-ethnic dispute”, places such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda come to mind; places where there is actual conflict between ethnic groups. That, however, is not an accurate description of the situation in northern Kazakhstan. Although there were certainly strong tensions in Russian dominant northern Kazakhstan after independence, it did not follow the
15 stereotype of an inter-ethnic dispute. There are no reports of problems between Kazakhs and Russians on a day-to-day basis. In fact, the few disagreements discussed are predominantly between the ethnic Russians and the government of the country, not the people.5 Specifically, the most controversial topics that developed were language, dual citizenship, and access for ethnic Russians.6 These are the issues most commonly addressed in the vast majority of works on the subject of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, and possible irredentism of the northern oblasts. Therefore, the rest of this chapter will assess the relevancy of these three issues in terms of the relocation of the capital.
Language The status of the Russian language in Kazakhstan has been the focal point of ethnic Russians’ complaints since independence. However, the language debate actually began prior to independence. Shortly after being elected first secretary in June of 1989, Nazarbayev, along with the Supreme Soviet, approved the Law on Languages making Kazakh the official language of the republic, and Russian a step below it (from the ethnic Russians’ perspective) as the “language of interethnic communication”.7 The state’s position on language was then reaffirmed in the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted in 1993.8 In 1995, the new Constitution elevated Kazakh from the ‘Official’ language to the ‘State’ language, providing the opportunity to pass an amendment in 1996 making Russian the ‘Official’ language.9 This was followed by a further clarification on language in 1997’s On Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan. This law stipulated numerous specifics on language, as the title indicates; however the point most discussed was that all television, radio, and newspapers had to broadcast or publish at least half of their programs in Kazakh.10 This semantic maneuvering concerning language was caused by Nazarbayev and his government trying to balance the disparate objectives of the nationalistic Kazakhs (who believed the laws did not go far enough to promote the Kazakh language) and the nationalistic Russians, both in Kazakhstan as well as Russia (who believed the Russian language was the subject of official discrimination).
16 By the end of the 1980s, the Kazakh language was near dead (very few Kazakhs even spoke it, especially outside of the home). Consequently, nationalistic-minded Kazakhs focused their energy on resurrecting the Kazakh language to regular usage. They were sorely disappointed when President Nazarbayev declined to make language tests mandatory for all governmental positions, amongst various other demands. The actions of some of the more ‘patriotic’ among this group in denying employment or promotions on the basis of language led to an additional clause in the 1993 Constitution that specifically forbade such discrimination.11 Conversely, the ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, especially in the north, felt slighted. They could not comprehend why, living and working where they always had, they suddenly had to learn a new language. Their ire specifically focused on the law itself, rather than the actual enforcement of the law, which was minimal. In actuality, the fact that a law had to be passed (seven years after Kazakh was made the official language) to reduce Russian-language media to no more than half of all media output detracts from ethnic Russians’ allegations of discrimination. Neither side of the debate, however, acknowledged Nazarbayev’s attempts to address their concerns. Scholars, though, do note his efforts. According to Kolstoe, “He tried to champion the cause of Kazakh culture and language in Kazakhstani society without alienating the large non-titular communities.”12 Olcott also notes, “In fact, President Nazarbayev has taken pains to demonstrate sensitivity on the language issue, delaying or slowing down implementation of portions of the law.”13 According to the 1989 language law and 1993 Constitution, the Kazakh language would be incorporated into government and education through a measured process, beginning with Kazakh-dominant regions. The other regions were given until January 2000 to become suitably proficient in Kazakh so as to make their transition smoother.14 Additionally, this law also allowed regions with other dominant ethnic groups to elevate that language to an official level. Consequently, unless looked at from the Russian nationalist perspective, the Russian language was unlikely to fall from general use quickly. Nor was that outcome the objective of Nazarbayev and the government, contrary to public opinion in the north. Again, through the years of Soviet rule, Russian had become so dominant, the Kazakh
17 language was being lost. The Law on Languages was the only way to prevent Kazakh from becoming extinct.15 Making the two languages legally equal would have meant no one needed to learn Kazakh; it would be an official language on paper only, as evidenced by ethnic Russians’ displeasure. The steps taken by Nazarbayev were to help Kazakh return as a main language, while understanding that Russian was spoken by more people. This understanding was further demonstrated in 1997 when the deadline to learn Kazakh was extended from 2000 to 2006.16 The issue of education illustrates the divergent perspectives regarding the language situation in Kazakhstan. In the years after independence, the number of actual secondary schools in either language, as well as the number of students enrolled in classes for each language gradually shifted from a majority of Russian to a majority of Kazakh.17 This shift also reflected an increase in mixed language schools, where both Russian and Kazakh are taught. Rationally, this result demonstrates the leadership’s effort to equalize the two languages. However, nationalist-minded Russians, and Russian-Kazakhs tend to see this alteration more negatively. Their focus is solely on the decrease in Russian schools and classes in order to establish their case for official discrimination by the government.18 Those in the latter category even take issue with the Kazakh government having the audacity to rename cities, towns, and streets with traditional Kazakh names and heros.19 They disregard the fact that native Kazakhs had to accept the same treatment when Imperial Russia took over. Martha Brill Olcott explains the lack of empathy for each other’s circumstances as, “. . . this hypersensitivity [for ethnic communities] has locked the people of Kazakhstan in a kind of zero-sum game in which the advance of one ethnic group are understood as losses by the other.”20 Kazakhs cannot try to improve their country’s sense of culture and history without the ethnic-Russians feeling slighted.
Access for Ethnic Russians This ‘zero-sum game’ can also be seen in language’s ancillary dilemma: access for ethnic Russians and the perceived lack thereof. Ethnic Russians believe the language policy is a first step toward what they discern is the government’s ultimate
18 objective of marginalizing their access to elite positions in government, management, and schools.21 There are in fact certain positions within the public sector and management which require knowledge of Kazakh, lending credence to this assertion by ethnic Russians. Additionally, the government does recommend the use of Kazakh language to conduct business in general.22 Unfortunately, overly enthusiastic people can impair the best of intentions. There were some reports of agencies unnecessarily basing promotions on knowledge of the Kazakh language.23 In such situations, ethnic Russian angst concerning language and access is understandable. According to Alexandrov, throughout the first years of independence, the percentage of Kazakhs in power as compared to ethnic Russians shifted in favor of Kazakhs at both the national and regional levels.24 Both Alexandrov and Khazanov argue that the ratios of Kazakhs to ethnic Russians in leadership positions do not reflect the actual ratios regarding the general population in certain oblasts.25 One ethnic Russian official claims that between 1985 and 1992 (beginning prior to independence, and during Kolbin’s tenure), the number of Kazakh officials increased by 420, whereas the number of non-Kazakhs stayed steady.26 Access to higher education also became a point of contention. Here too throughout the country (both urban and rural) the percentages of Kazakhs applying, and being admitted to universities vary greatly from the actual number of Kazakhs in the general population. In Almaty specifically, 79.5% of Kazakhs were admitted compared to 14.6% of ethnic Russians (as opposed to 22% and 59% of the general population respectively).27 These numbers by themselves present a disconcerting trend, especially from ethnic Russians’ perspectives. One possible theory is that the percentages for the general population do not account for the greater number of Kazakhs younger than thirty.28 Unfortunately, while the numbers illustrate probable bias, the majority of courses at universities continue to be taught in Russian, detracting from the language discrimination allegation. As with the law mandating the use of Kazakh language for half of television and radio broadcasts though, claims of discrimination are in the eye of the beholder. The constitution does indeed stipulate an understanding of Kazakh for certain professions.
19 However that requirement is only for the position of President and the head of the cabinet of ministers.29 Since those are the two highest positions in the government of Kazakhstan, knowledge of the Kazakh language does not seem unreasonable. In reality though, very few offices in either government or the private sector operate in Kazakh rather than Russian. Also, while some statistics seem to support the allegations of official inequity, it still needs to be determined how much is discrimination, and how much is attempting to equalize the employment demographics left over from the Soviet Union. Other statistics show up to two times more ethnic Russians than ethnic Kazakhs employed in industry, communication, and construction, as well as management.30 Furthermore, a Kazakh diplomat stated, “one should not talk about abusing the rights of Russians in Kazakhstan, but about Kazakhs getting the same rights as Russians . . . All office work in the government is in Russian . . . the Russian language is dominant over Kazakh.”31 With the above in mind, Nazarbayev is very familiar with (and according to some, responsible for) the frustration of ethnic Kazakhs to Soviet/Russian dominance. In 1986, Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic Russian who did not even live in Kazakhstan, was appointed as head of Kazakhstan’s Communist Party.32 Kazakhs in Almaty (Alma Ata at the time) revolted against the indignity of not being allowed to have a Kazakh even nominally in charge. Numerous people died as a result of this uprising. The lesson taken from this reaction was that Kazakhs wanted a greater share of responsibility for their republic. Nazarbayev understood this and has been trying to address it since independence. Unfortunately, as stated, it is not possible to improve the status of ethnic Kazakhs without ethnic Russians feeling unjustly persecuted. Ever conscious of his reputation, Nazarbayev realized the perceptions ethnic Russians had of official bias and took steps to redress access in all areas more appropriately.33
Dual Citizenship Contrary to the issue of languages and access, dual citizenship obviously did not become an issue until after independence. Although the language debate appears to be the more controversial topic of the two, ethnic Russians actually began the dual citizenship argument on firmer ground than language.
20 For a brief time, Kazakhs were permitted dual citizenship if they chose, but other ethnicities were not. As part of the Law on Citizenship from 1991, not only did Russians not have the option of dual citizenship, Kazakhs born and living outside of Kazakhstan were allowed to hold dual citizenship with their country of residence and Kazakhstan.34 As expected, the ethnic Russians, as well as the Russian government in Moscow did not view this double standard favorably. It is probable there would have been arguments in favor of dual citizenship for ethnic Russians regardless; however the inherent injustice of the Kazakh government’s policy likely exacerbated the situation. Strikingly, Nazarbayev’s perspective on the matter was actually based on the well-being of the country, contrary to Russian opinion. First, Nazarbayev believed granting ethnic Russians dual citizenship would divide loyalties. If dual citizenship were permitted, it could enhance the probability of an attempted secession by the northern oblasts if they decided they did not agree with Kazakh government policy. Furthermore, the people in question also being Russian citizens would put Russia in a position of having to intervene on behalf of their citizens if anything should happen.35 Although nationalist Russians welcomed this possibility, the government in Moscow understood that intervention on their part would have negative results.36 Second, although seemingly offensive in its hypocrisy, there is historical basis for allowing Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan to become citizens so easily. In fact, not only was citizenship for these Kazakhs encouraged, but so was repatriation. Many Kazakhs living abroad were forced out as a result of Stalinist policies.37 Those ethnic Russians with nationalist thoughts believed the policy to be a not very discreet manner of trying to push them out. For the overzealous Kazakhs previously mentioned, that might be true. In reality though, the apparent favoritism towards ethnic Kazakhs was simply trying to open the door for those who would not have left originally were it not for Soviet policies.38 Also, many of the ethnic Kazakhs in question left for Mongolia. Therefore when it was possible to return, the closest locations were the predominantly Russian regions, leading ethnic Russians there to feel threatened. Given the above concerns, Nazarbayev’s stance on the issue of dual citizenship, as it pertains to ethnic Russians, has been much firmer than that on language. Although even with these legitimate fears, Nazarbayev does continue to extend the
21 deadline for non-Kazakhs to choose one nationality or the other.39 Extending the deadline reinforces Jeff Chinn’s and Robert Kaiser’s argument against forcing ethnic Russians to choose a single citizenship. They believe it could result in an inadvertent secession given the density of ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan, with the same negative consequences mentioned previously.40 Nazarbayev was so firm in his conviction that ethnic Russians not have dual citizenship, that an article in the new constitution in 1995 removed the disparity, but not as the Russian community intended. Ethnic Kazakhs were no longer able to hold dual citizenship either (although the process of relocating to Kazakhstan was extremely uncomplicated in terms of emigration).41 This step effectively neutralized Moscow’s and ethnic Russian’s most persuasive argument for dual citizenship.
Leadership/Mobilization A fourth subject regarding possible irredentism and ethnic Russian dissatisfaction is Leadership, or Mobilization. Although most scholars and media discuss information pertaining to the topic, it is not considered a subject in the manner of Language, Access, and Dual Citizenship. Considering the amount of attention given inter-ethnic tension and separatist feelings in Kazakhstan, leadership to organize ethnic Russians seems rather relevant. Quite simply, there is very little leadership or mobilization, which may be why it is not covered in the same manner as the other three. For all of the complaints and agitation against various governmental policies, for all of the attention given to ethnic concerns, the only group to truly organize is the Cossacks. Even they, however, have not been very successful in their objectives as the Kazakh government took advantage of differences of opinion amongst themselves.42 Despite the support of a Russian icon, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and his assertions that northern Kazakhstan is ‘historically’ part of Russia, in terms of a separatist movement, there are very few people in either the Russian government, or the ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan who actively want to secede.43 The Russian community may be unhappy and dissatisfied at their change in status. However, most of those who were most likely to assume leadership and mobilize the ethnic Russians
22 towards action were so discontented with the situation that they returned to Russia. Those who stayed had been there long enough to consider where they were home, or to believe it was at least better than the uncertainty of returning to Russia. Bhavna Dave asserts, “A major problem faced . . . by the Russians . . . is the sheer absence or weakness of ethnic leaders . . . ” which “. . . sheds light on the overall apathy or inability . . . to mobilize their claims.”44 According to most scholars and journalists though, the main argument for relocating the capital to Astana was the fear of separatist attempts. Olcott also mentions, “There has never been strong evidence that Russian nationalist groups (including the Cossacks) pose a serious threat to the Kazakh state.”45 The key words in the above quotes are ‘inability’ and ‘serious’. There are still those in northern Kazakhstan who would like to see either an autonomous Cossack region, or full secession into Russia. Otherwise there would not be so much attention given to inter-ethnic tensions. However, not only was there no authentic leadership from the Russian community, they also did not have the support of the Russian government to attempt secession. Boris Yeltsin said, “. . . there can be no question of our tolerating the seizing of any territory of Kazakhstan in favor of Russia.”46 While there were outspoken Russian nationalists such as Solzhenitsyn and Zhirinovsky, overall, the Russian government believed it was in Russia’s interests for ethnic Russians to stay part of Kazakhstan. Perpetuating a colonial mindset, a sizeable ethnic Russian population in Kazakhstan would result in better relations between the two countries, as well as maintain a friendly buffer between Russia and radical Islam.47 Additionally, Russia was already involved in true inter-ethnic conflicts, such as Chechnya, and did not want to add another area to defend militarily. Realistically, the issue of inter-ethnic tension in northern Kazakhstan received most of its attention as a result of events in other former republics and regions of Russia. It is also the type of story that appeals to newspapers and magazines. However, the reality is that those who could have been leaders of the Russian community left, leaving behind ethnic Russians who were not happy, but not enough to mobilize themselves to seriously address their concerns.
23 Overall, although there are obvious issues of concern, these issues are not the divisive factors many believe them to be. Yes, ethnic-Russians are concerned for their future, as they should be given situations in other republics. However, taking those situations into consideration, Kazakhstan’s outlook is not as bleak as many reporters (mainly Russians) imagine: “Certain statements in the Russian media advance the idea of discrimina- tion against the Russian speaking population; they are repeated over and over again and add to the problem. The media engages in anti-Kazakh, anti- government, irredentist propaganda, which in turn threatens the existence of national stability in the republic. . . the authors . . . superficially simplify the facts, trying to create a “witch hunt” atmosphere.”48 In fact, one leading Kazakh, albeit in opposition to Nazarbayev and therefore suspect regarding motives, states unequivocally: “There is no real ethnic tensions with Russians in Kazakhstan. This tale was invented (and at times, staged) by the regime to scare the West . . . You just go to Kazakhstan and speak with the ordinary people – both Russians and Kazakhs are suffering from the regime equally. There is no separatist movement in Kazakhstan.”49 At the risk of trivializing legitimate causes of distress, none of the main issues between ethnic Russians and the Kazakh government are sufficient to necessitate relocating the capital. Indeed, as of 1995, after the relocation was actually proposed, Nazarbayev still had the support of the people, both Kazakhs and Russians.50 Support from both groups calls into question reports of tension and discrimination. Most of the discussion surrounding irredentist tendencies in the north was not going to result in serious efforts to do so.51 The complaints were serious, and Nazarbayev obviously had to take allegations of discrimination into consideration. Moving the capital to Astana did help to address some of the concerns on both sides of the debate. Nevertheless, the issues of language, access, and dual citizenship were not enough to overcome lack of leadership or support, and Nazarbayev knew this.52 Inter- ethnic problems merely gave Nazarbayev another reason to consider the feasibility of relocating. The rumors of possible secession were not legitimate enough to justify the expense of moving the capital.
24
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 1
1 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “The Russian Question” At The End of The Twentieth Century, trans. Yermolai Solzhenitsyn (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995); Melvin, 18 and 121-2
2 There are some differences of opinion among scholars concerning the appropriate title for this group. Some works make reference to the ‘ethnic Russians’. Others believe that phrase does not fully encompass the group in question and a more suitable label is ‘Russian-speakers’, as it is not just the Russians who feel alienated, but all of those who consider Russian their native language, or have lived so long with Russian dominance, they relate more to that group than to the titular Kazakhs. The most general title is simply non-Kazakhs, however for the purposes of this work that is too ambiguous. To avoid confusion, the phrase ‘ethnic Russians’ will be used throughout this work as it is my opinion that it most adequately describes the group in question, both Russians, and those who identify with the Russian culture.
3 When the decision was made to relocate the capital in 1994, the city’s name was Aqmola. After Aqmola was officially declared the capital, the name was changed to Astana. Aqmola was frequently mistranslated as ‘White Grave’ and was thought to give a negative impression of the city. At the request of numerous politicians, the name was changed to Astana, or ‘Capital’. To avoid confusion, the city will be referred to as Astana regardless of time period.
4 Alexandrov, Map A.3, “Kazakhstan: Ethnic-Geographical Division,” 318
5 While the government is principally Kazakh, it seems there is a difference for the ethnic Russians between the government and the Kazakh people. There is no indication of retribution towards the general public for government policies.
6 Alexandrov, 125
7 Bhavna Dave, Minorities and Participation in Public Life: Kazakhstan, (Commission on Human Rights 12-16 May 2003, 10-11),
8 Berik Abdigaliev, “Russians in Kazakhstan: Problems, Myths, and Realities,” The Eisenhower Institute, n.d., 2,
9 Dave, (Minorities and Participation in Public Life), 10; “Modern and Recent History of Kazakhstan,” n.d.,
10 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 73; Alexandrov, 138
11 Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Union, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 248
12 Ibid, 245
25
13 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 180
14 Kolstoe, 246; Martha Brill Olcott, in Kazakhs: Unfulfilled Promise wrote that the areas with predominantly non-Kazakh would have up to fifteen years to transition to Kazakh (32). That number is inclusive of all of the language laws passed in the mid-1990s.
15 Alexandrov, 102
16 “Kazakhstan’s Language Law Seeks to Equalize Native Language with Russian,” Monitor Vol.2, Issue 222, November 1996),
17 Alexandrov, 103-104; Tables 3.1 and 3.2; Markus et al, 14-15
18 Alexandrov, 103
19 Sally M. Cummings, Kazakhstan: Centre-Periphery Relations, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 30
20 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 55
21 Alexandrov, 102
22 Ian Bremmer, “Nazarbaev and the north: state-building and ethnic relations in Kazakhstan,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 17, no. 4 (1994): 624
23 Kolstoe, 247-8
24 Alexandrov, 108
25 Alexandrov, 108; Khazanov, 169
26 David Nissman, “Ethnic Minorities Suffer in Central Asia”, Prism 1, no. 15, August 11, 1995, 4
27 Alexandrov, p. 104
28 Ibid, 104
29 David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998), 110
30 Abdigaliev, 3
31 Charles Carlson, “Kazakhstan: Minority Report – Russians Claim They Are Still Discriminated Against,” 22 August 2003,
32 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 13 and 28
33 Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 560
34 Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 199
26
35 Alexandrov, 128
36 Alexandrov, 59-62
37 Abdigaliev, 4
38 Unfortunately, for many of those repatriated Kazakhs, too much had changed in their homeland during the time they were gone. For a sizable number, the transition proved too difficult, resulting in their deciding to return to what had become home for them. Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, eds., Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 145
39 Olcott, The Kazakhs, 2nd Edition, (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1995), 290
40 Chinn and Kaiser, 200
41 Alexandrov, 134
42 Dave, Minorities and Participation in Public Life, 23
43 Solzhenitsyn
44 Ibid, 24
45 Olcott, (2002), 76
46 Alexandrov, 39
47 Ibid, 124
48 Abdigaliev, 1-2
49 Rachid Nougmanov, “Astana – New Capital of Kazakhstan: A Profile,” Telegraphic Report from the American Embassy in Almaty, cited by FT Asia Intelligence Wire, 15 September 1998, quoted in Sarah Prosser, “Capital Movement: Kazakhstan’s New Center,” Central Asia Monitor, No. 5 (2000), endnote #77
50 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 108
51 A report in World Press.org demonstrates the level of seriousness of secessionist moves. In November of 1999, 22 people were arrested for planning to secede from Kazakhstan. However, their ‘aresenal’ to accomplish this task was rather too small to have actually been a threat. Indeed, the arsenal was so small that some question whether it was a real threat or a set-up by the government to convince people there was problem. Steven Shabad, “Coup or Provocation?”, February 2000, World Press Review 47, no. 2,
52 From Nazarbayev’s perspective, “How could there be a separate problem of the Russian-speaking population, when all Kazakhstani people are Russian speakers?” Nazarbayev acknowledged there were problems, but also minimalized them by reminding people that all Kazakhstanis have problems, not just the ethnic Russians. It also served to remind those complaining about language discrimination that everyone in Kazakhstan spoke Russian.; Markus et al, p. 14
27
CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL MOTIVES
As an astute politician, President Nazarbayev has not given much public attention to the internationally motivated aspects of relocating the capital. He knows the people of his country are focused on conditions within the country such as the economy and ethnic relations, more so than international issues. However, as president, Nazarbayev must pay attention to international maneuverings, as well as domestic concerns. That is why there are those who believe there was some consideration of international factors in relation to the capital’s transfer. As it concerns the relocation of the capital from Almaty to Astana, the Kazakh government does not address any ‘official’ reasons which could be considered internationally aligned. However, after the popular inter-ethnic tension theory, most scholars focus on three unofficial points: Nazarbayev’s aspiration to be the geographic center of both Central Asia and Asia in general, the proximity of Almaty to China, and the proximity of Almaty to radical Islam. Some scholars label these three issues as official due either to the amount of coverage they receive, or how important they consider them to be in Nazarbayev’s decision to reposition the capital.1
Regional and Continental Centrality The first unofficial/official reason is President Nazarbayev’s desire for Kazakhstan to be the ‘Center’ of Central Asia as well as Asia as a whole. To that end, most maps show Kazakhstan to be centrally located within Central Asia, as much due to its size as its location. More generally, it is also at the heart of the Asian continent itself. One source specifies the location of Astana as being within a few hundred kilometers of the actual geographic mid-point (diagonally) of the continent.2 Logistics aside though, Nazarbayev’s interest lies more with being the symbolic center of the region and
28 continent. By moving the capital to Astana, it was possible to envision a future where ‘all roads lead to Astana’.3 Nazarabyev even stated, “[Astana] . . . was one of the geographical centers of Eurasia . . . the economic, technological, and information streams . . . will intersect in our new capital . . .”4 Although Nazarbayev’s primary focus was to be seen as the ‘Father’ of Kazakhstan, as a politician he also harbored aspirations for Kazakhstan, and therefore himself, to be the ‘Center’ of Central Asia, and even possibly all of Asia.5 Ideally, Kazakhstan would position itself so that the other Central Asian countries would look to Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev for transportation, finance, security, guidance, etc. In effect, Nazarbayev was trying to create a ‘Eurasian’ sense of self with Kazakhstan as the example.6 In an effort to inspire Kazakhstanis and their neighbors, Nazarbayev likened Kazakhstan to the South Asian ‘Tigers’ with the comparable ‘Kazakhstani Leopard’.7 In Nazarbayev’s ‘Kazakhstan 2030’ outline for development, he believes that by the year 2030, “Kazakhstan will have turned into the economic and cultural centre of Eurasia, and its people . . . will be among the richest, most educated, and most developed nations in the world.”8 In order to facilitate this objective, the possibility of having your capital at the ‘crossroads’ of the continent would be very appealing. As alluring as this possibility was though, especially for someone with Nazarbayev’s ambitions, the potential to be the ‘Center’ of Asia was not in and of itself sufficient reason to undertake the time, energy, and money of such a massive shift. There are those leaders in the world who would not hesitate to commit their country to such an enterprise, usually for less idealistic reasons. Nazarbayev however, is not one of them. His goal of becoming Asia’s center was certainly a factor in the decision to move from Alamty to Astana. Nevertheless, Nazarbayev is too pragmatic to make that the basis for the relocation.
Proximity to China An equally appealing option for such a move would be the opportunity to distance your capital from an ally you do not quite trust, i.e., China. Many see the move away from the border with China as a means of increasing security. Almaty is incredibly close
29 to a border with China that has at times been the subject of negotiations between them. Being that close to a potentially debatable border, with the largest army in the world on the other side would understandably be disconcerting. Fortunately for Kazakhstan, China does not want to claim the land they believe tsarist Russia took from them that now lies in Kazakhstan (e.g., Lake Balkash).9 China actually seems to be conscious of how it is perceived and is taking pains to not be seen as a threat. In fact, in 1995 both countries agreed to a demilitarized area of over 300 feet along their border.10 There are two potentially contentious issues between China and Kazakhstan. The most worrisome is the Uighurs in the Xinjiang province of Eastern China. The Chinese Uighurs are actually ethnically Kazakh and Muslim.11 Just as some ethnic Russians would like to secede back to Russia, there are Uighurs who would prefer to separate from Marxist China. Like most countries, neither Kazakhstan, nor China would be willing to accept such an occurrence. The difference between Kazakhstan and China though is that there is more vocal support of Uighurs and irredentist efforts. China’s main concern regarding the Xinjiang province is not that Kazakhstan might try to assist in their efforts, because that will not happen; at least not overtly. China’s anxiety is caused simply by the proximity of Central Asia and the events leading to and since independence. One scholar stated: “. . . there is no reason to believe that China will remain immune to the forces that have affected nearly all post-Communist empires and multi-ethnic groups . . .The model of political independence lies just over the border in former Soviet Central Asia.”12 This puts Nazarbayev and his government in an awkward position of turning away from their ethnic and linguistic brothers, and actually even supporting China against the Uighurs.13 If they were to show even tacit support for the Uighurs, with a result in secession, they would have no basis to prevent ethnic Russians in the north from doing the same. Additionally, there would certainly be a reaction from China were Kazakhstan to assist the secession of parts of the Xinjiang Province. The second major issue concerns water rights. Both countries have development plans for the Irtysh River which begins in China, then flows through Kazakhstan before ending in Russia.14 China needs the water to open oil fields in the western part of the country which are desert. Kazakhstan is working on plans to use
30 some of the rivers waters for the new capital.15 They need to work together on a plan to prevent the destruction of the river, which is necessary for both countries. Aside from the issue of the Uighurs and water usage, both China and Kazakhstan are wary of each other as a result of historical relations between the two, as well as current political standings. Neither one wants to create problems, so both are being cautious in their relations. Nazarbayev and his counterpart, Hu Jintao understand they are better off working together than arguing. For example, China is helping to finance a 3200 kilometer oil pipeline to transport oil from the Caspian Sea east to China. This would help alleviate dependence on the Middle East.16 Since China is generally considered to have the fastest growing economy, and their electricity usage is increasingly quickly, they have a vested interest in maintaining friendly relations with Kazakhstan. Even if they wanted to physically take over parts of Central Asia, their economy can not afford to risk alienating the rest of the world with imperialistic moves.17 China also wants Kazakhstan to buffer Islamic fundamentalism and activities of the United States as a result of the war on terrorism.18 Nazarbayev too is very interested in trade relations with China, as it gives Kazakhstan a viable alternative to Russia should those relations deteriorate. It also provides some leverage for Kazakhstan in its dealings with Russia, who still has a ‘big brother’ mentality towards Kazakhstan. Additionally, it is well documented that Kazakhstan’s economy is dependent on selling its oil. At its most basic, China needs oil, and Kazakhstan needs to sell its oil. Essentially, while many mention the desire to distance themselves from such close proximity to China as a reason to relocate the capital, there is not enough tension between the two to validate the transfer. Some could argue that the objective to move away from the border is a way of making sure there are no accidental ruptures to the relationship, such as diplomatic situations that could occur with Uighur emigrants. Realistically though, if relations were to deteriorate to the point where China felt the need to invade, the capital being in Astana as opposed to Almaty would be an unlikely deterrent. Again, China has the largest army, in terms of personnel, in the world. Once they were across the Tien Shan Mountains, having to travel across a flat, steppe plain to Astana would do no more than delay their arrival by a few days, if that long.
31 Even more disconcerting than the imagined possibility of an invasion is an emerging pattern referred to as “peaceful Sinification.”19 With so many Chinese immigrating into eastern Kazakhstan (again, an area once considered part of China) that Nazarbayev was compelled to institute a visa process, moving the capital away from the area seems an unlikely option. Such a move could have the unintended consequence of sending a subliminal message yielding the area to the Chinese. Overall, more so than with any of the other considerations discussed thus far, fear of being too close to China is the least likely to result in Nazarbayev’s decision to relocate. Unless it was in the form of ‘better to be safe’, it is doubtful this concern mentioned by so many was even part of the decision-making process. While there is some level of distrust on both sides, there is too much at stake for both China and Kazakhstan for either one to risk damaging their relations.
Proximity to Radical Islam A more realistic subject for international motives behind the relocation of the capital is the nearness of radical Islam to Kazakhstan’s south. Although Kazakhstan as a whole is considered a Muslim country, they too are worried about the fundamentalist aspect of Islam commonly associated with terrorism at present. The other Central Asian countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) do provide a buffer between Kazakhstan and the well-known fundamentalist Islamic nations such as Afghanistan and Iran. However, that buffer is for all intents irrelevant given the inroads made by radical Islam in those countries. And unlike the relationship Kazakhstan has with China, there is no need on the part of the fundamentalists to work with the Kazakh government. Quite the opposite, the Muslims that Kazakhstan is concerned with tend to have more success when there is persecution from the government. In fact, radical Islam in the Xinjiang province of China is a further reason why it would not be in Kazakhstan’s interest to assist the Uighurs. Not only have some Uighurs attended Islamic training camps in Afghanistan and Chechnya, two of the foremost Uighur groups, the World Uighur Kurultai and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, have actively called for the establishment of Eastern Turkestan (presently Xinjiang) by violent means if necessary.20 It is unlikely Nazarbayev would consider
32 such a prospect appealing, given the involvement of radical Islam. Moreover, they are also working to establish groups sympathetic to their cause in the Central Asian states as a form of support.21 This effort would also not find favor with Nazarbayev, as it could result in an instability within Kazakhstan that he has gone to great lengths to prevent. The task of importing fundamental Islam sympathetic to their cause will be more difficult in Kazakhstan. Of the five countries of Central Asia, Kazakhstan is the only one where Islam is not dominant. This is not surprising since it was the last of the five to be introduced to Islam. Combine that with Russian influence in Kazakhstan as compared to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and it is apparent why there are fewer issues. However, that is not to say that there are no problems within Kazakhstan. They too have Muslim groups such as Alash and Azat who favor the establishment of Shariah law.22 Currently though, they do not have the support of the people of Kazakhstan. As with the irredentist movement in the north, the majority of Kazakhs are appear to be too apathetic for these issues to affect daily life. Half of the country consider themselves Muslim, yet seldom attend a mosque. A poll taken in 1998 in southern Kazakhstan (an area more commonly associated with Islam) showed that 76% only attend a mosque once or twice a year.23 Between this noticeable lack of traditional Islam, and a certain degree of religious tolerance shown by Nazarbayev, it does not seem that radical Islam constitutes enough of a problem to result in a decision to transfer the capital.24 However, despite allowing some religious tolerance, Nazarbayev does not allow for the extreme aspects of religions. In the short-term, that policy has helped Kazakhstan. Those agitating for an Islamic state and system are at risk of being arrested and the parties they are associated with becoming banned.25 Nazarbayev has no tolerance for individuals or groups who could potentially divide loyalty to the state. He is after all a product of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, some argue that these policies, by all of the Central Asian states, create the same atmosphere in which radical Islam found a home in Iran and Afghanistan. As stated earlier, fundamentalist Muslims tend to find people more receptive in areas where the governments are more repressive. Fiona Hill argued: “. . .
33 harsh government repression of dissent is as much, if not more of, a threat to Central Asian stability today and in the . . . future as the radical Islamic movements . . . “.26 Given the current international climate, there is certainly ample reason for Kazakhstan to be concerned about radical Islam and their proximity to it. Do the fundamentalist Muslims to the south pose enough of a threat to decide to relocate the capital? The answer is both yes and no. This issue, more than the others, is a legitimate source of uneasiness for the government. However, it is debatable how effective moving the capital to Astana will be in countering the threat. It does not seem moving would prevent the incursion of these Muslims. The only practical result is to distance the capital from the countries immediately to Kazakhstan’s south in case radical Islam finds a new home there. In general, all three issues: desire to be the ‘Center’ of Asia, proximity to China, and proximity to Islam were likely factors in Nazarbayev’s decision to move from Almaty to Astana. Despite efforts to give these conditions substantial importance, none were sufficient reasons by themselves to defend the expense and time required to facilitate the change in locations.
34
ENDNOTED FOR CHAPTER 2
1 There are various articles and texts that refer to these three factors (individually) as official, however the official Kazakhstan website,
2 Irina Bektiyarova, “About Akmola,” n.d.,
3 Bektiyarova, 2
4 Sarah Prosser, “Capital Movement: Kazakhstan’s New Center,” Central Asian Monitor, no. 5 (2000), 6
5 Nazarbayev’s desire to confirm his position as the ‘Father’ of Kazakhstan will be discussed in more detail in the next two chapters as it is more of a domestic factor.
6 Edward Schatz, “What Capital Cities Say, 130
7 Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne, n.d.,
8 Ibid
9 Dianne L. Smith, “Central Asia: A New Great Game? Part V,” June 1996,
10 Smith, 5 (endnote #101)
11 Ibid, 1
12 Ibid, 3
13 There is another reason why Nazarbayev would not want to assist the Uighurs, however, that falls under the issue of radical Islam, which will be discussed next.
14 Bruce Pannier and Edige Magauin, “Kazakhstan: China Discusses Future of Irtysh River,” 28 May 1999,
15 Ibid
16 Michael Lelyveld, “Kazakhstan: China Seeks Oil Investment With an Eye on Pipeline,” 11 March 2003,
35
17 James P. Dorian, Brett H. Wigdortz, and Dru C. Gladney, “China and Central Asia’s Volatile Mix: Energy, Trade, and Ethnic Relations,” Asia Pacific Issues, no. 31, May 1997,
18 Escobar, 7
19 Ibid, 3
20 Ibid, 4
21 Paul Goble, “Russia: Analysis From Washington – Another Islamic Threat in Inner Asia?”, RFE/RL, 5 June 2001,
22 Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam & Politics in Central Asia, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 114-115
23 Ismagambetov, 4
24 Haghayeghi, xxi
25 Daniel Kimmage, ed., “Radical Islam in Central Asia: New Reports and Familiar Questions,” RFE/RL Central Asia Report 4, no. 10, 8 March 2004,
26 Ibid, 4
36
CHAPTER 3
DOMESTIC CONCERNS
The actual official reasons for moving the capital, as listed by the Kazakh government all center around domestic interests. Again, Nazarbayev understands the focus of his countrymen and addressed the relocation to Astana according to their domestic outlook. Surprisingly, the official reasons are not given much attention by scholars and media; perhaps because they are listed as official, and are therefore suspect as subterfuge for the actual reasons, typically assumed to be the inter-ethnic tension in the north. While there is a certain amount of variety in the international, unofficial reasons, there are four official, domestic issues which focus on problems with Almaty itself. Specifically, 1) Almaty is located in a region of seismic activity, 2) there is substantial pollution around the city, 3) there is little room left in which to expand, and 4) it is too remote from the majority of the country. All four points are indeed factual, if not as interesting as inter-ethnic tension, China, and radical Islam. In contrast to the previous chapter, there are unofficial, domestic reasons along with the official ones. The first addresses the influence of traditional Kazakh clan interaction on the relocation. Initially, this facet of the debate received very little coverage, however that is now increasing. The second unofficial, domestic concern receives very little individualized attention: the objectives of Nursultan Nazarbayev himself. It is the official domestic issues though which likely led Nazarbayev to begin considering relocating the capital, therefore those considerations will be discussed first. The unofficial reasons, specifically the catalyst of Nazarbayev’s ambitions will follow.
37 Seismic Activity
The first concern, the likelihood of earthquakes, probably has the most scientific studies to support it. For example, scientists are aware that major earthquakes occur in southern Kazakhstan and Almaty in particular approximately every 100 years.1 The last massive earthquakes to strike Almaty happened in 1887 and 1911, making the probability of another major quake in the region within the next twenty years extremely good.2 The 1887 and 1911 earthquakes caused extensive damage in the city. The 1887 quake in particular had a magnitude between 7.5 and 10.0.3 It resulted in the deaths of 322 people and destroyed over 1700 buildings, mostly made of stone, which resulted in many structures being built with wood in the ensuing years.4 In addition to the obvious statistics that illustrate the destructiveness of these two earthquakes, there was an interesting study conducted in 1991 with the objective of finding more evidence of the strength of the quakes. R. R. Yadav and P. Kulieshius studied tree rings on the mountains surrounding Almaty to determine the effect of earthquakes on the growth of trees.5 They found that tree growth significantly slowed down after 1887, and stayed that way for as long as fifteen years after the quake.6 If the number of deaths and destroyed buildings did not sufficiently illustrate the potential power of the seismic activity in the area, perhaps hampered tree growth for that long of a time period will. Numerous earthquakes over the past few years lend credence to assertions that there could be a major earthquake in the not so distant future. In 1999 there was a 7.0 earthquake near the Chinese border, in 2003 there was a 6.5 magnitude earthquake near Zhambyl in southern Kazakhstan, and in 2005 there was a minor 4.0-4.5 earthquake near Almaty.7 Though only the 2003 earthquake caused numerous injuries and damages, the effect of a major earthquake striking close to Almaty can easily be imagined. The potential for a natural disaster is not in itself a reason to move a capital. However, if such a move is already being considered for various
38 reasons, such as those discussed thus far, knowing there is a possibility the capital could be destroyed within the next 20 years could be a powerful case for relocating.
Pollution Secondly, and also with many scientific studies supporting it, is the issue of pollution around Almaty. Those who have not traveled abroad may not be able to fully conceive of pollution so bad leaders would consider changing capital cities because there is no easy or quick way to correct the problem. As an example, there are reports that when driving in the mountains, the smog from Almaty’s pollution can be so thick that the city is not visible through it.8 Unfortunately, the same geography that makes Almaty such a beautiful city, being surrounded on three sides by mountains, is also a factor in what keeps the city so polluted. The contaminated air has no where to go. It is not just the air that is polluted though, so is the groundwater, which could develop into a major problem quickly if not addressed.9 As a result of the extremely high level of pollution, there are a myriad of health related problems. Part of the reason the pollution has become so extreme in Almaty is because of the increase in the number of cars and amount of industry with no emission standards comparable to what American factories have to adhere to. Also contributing to the levels of pollution are common occurrences such as people burning garbage, which can smolder for lengthy periods of time, because there are not enough cars and workers to collect the trash.10 Again, when people in a city the size of Almaty have to burn their trash, the resulting smoke has no where to go. It is enclosed above the city by the mountains. As demonstrated with the above examples, Almaty clearly has a major pollution problem, to the extent that Nazarbayev would be completely justified in considering a relocation of the capital. The choice of Astana though does raise questions as there are a number of cities more centrally located than Astana, most notably Temirtau and Zhezkazgan (See Figure 2).
39 However, of the sizeable cities more centralized than Almaty, Astana is the only one not listed on a United Nations report on environmental monitoring as having similar levels of pollution to Almaty.11 Nazarbayev would have lost all credibility if he had tried to move the capital to a city with comparable levels of pollution, while citing pollution as a reason to relocate, regardless of whether it was more centrally situated. Therefore, those other cities cited were not options.
Ability to Expand A lack of room in which the city can expand is the third, official reason for moving. This issue though is not as definite as the first two. Also contrary to the first two points, there is very little information, scientific or not, on possible avenues of growth for the city. The only scholar to mention this particular explanation, Edward Schatz, does so succinctly, stating that the mountains hamper future development.12 In speaking with someone who traveled to Almaty, there actually is still room to expand, though the areas where people would like to move are up in the mountains which surround the city and is prohibitively expensive. To the north, at the opening of the horseshoe shape that Almaty sits in, there is ample room for growth.13 However, when you have a country as big and open as Kazakhstan, and you have a list of problems needing a response which a new capital could solve, why limit expansion? Pick a place where growth would not have to be in one direction, and that answers the other problems as well. Nazarbayev’s choice of Astana fulfills this solution.
Centrality within Kazakhstan Nazarbayev’s desire to have Kazakhstan become the ‘center’ of Asia was discussed in the previous chapter. However this chapter is concerned with domestic issues. In this case, as the last official concern, Nazarbayev wanted a new capital that would be the ‘Center’ of Kazakhstan. Edward Schatz explains the connection between the international and domestic objectives of being more central: “. . . just as Kazakhstan was uniquely situated at the crossroads of
40 cultures, Astana enjoyed a singular location at the heart of Kazakhstan and could ensure stable and effective transportation, communication, and defense.”14 It was for these issues, to improve stability and effectiveness, that Nazarbayev acknowledged the intent to be more centrally located. Some, though, question the veracity of this objective as too idealistically simplistic. First and foremost, as explained in Chapter 2, experts consider the inter-ethnic tension to be the motivating factor behind moving to a more central location. It is thought that by moving to a more central locale, Nazarbayev could more easily keep a symbolic eye on the entire country. It also served to prevent any secessionist movements because now the capital was in the area that might try to break away. However, the desire for a better location from which to observe the country was not based solely on the ethnic Russians in the north. Nazarbayev was also in a better position to keep an eye on Kazakhstan’s natural resources, as well as her neighbors to the west.15 It was also believed that bringing the capital to the center would serve to improve the economic outlook of a greater portion of the country, through new opportunities and investment.16 Nazarbayev is convinced, and had posters made to this effect, that “Astana’s renaissance is Kazakhstan’s renaissance.”17 As a first step in this direction, new buildings were needed, which created construction jobs.18 Also, once the government offices actually moved, there should be a plethora of jobs available for those in the new capital, as well as all of the mechanisms needed to support the government personnel.19 Unfortunately, the converse of a positive situation for Astana meant a corresponding loss of jobs for Almaty. As the commercial capital though, Almaty is in no danger of dying out. From both a historical and poetic perspective, Sarah Prosser theorizes that choosing to move the capital to the steppe could be a way of reclaiming the Kazakhs nomadic past through modern means: “To create a new capital on the steppe is a link to the near-mythic, wild Kazakh horsemen and a challenge to the forces of nature.”20 The extreme climate, or forces of nature, of Astana is well- documented, and a source of considerable consternation to those forced to
41 relocate. Prosser also sees the possibility of the move as a slight against Russia and her imperialistic past.21 All four of the official reasons for the move are legitimate concerns (earthquakes, pollution, expansion) or objectives (location). It is unfortunate that scholars and journalists do not devote more than a brief sentence to these issues, as they are likely what actually began the process of investigating the possibility of relocating. As with all of the points of consideration discussed thus far though, none have provided adequate incentive singularly to defend such a massive project, especially given the economic needs of the country.
Clan/Horde Influence As stated at the beginning of the chapter, there are two unofficial domestic reasons for the move as well. The first of these two is the influence of the traditional horde, or clan structure. This aspect of the relocation is fairly new in terms of coverage, perhaps because the clan system is so entrenched in Kazakh psyche it is not often spoken of. It took some time for scholars, mainly those in the west, to realize how much influence the clans still had. There are three hordes: Great, Middle, and Small. The Great Horde is predominantly located in the south and east of Kazakhstan. The Middle Horde can be found principally in the northern part of the country. The Small Horde (sometimes referred to as the Lesser Horde) is associated with western Kazakhstan.22 While a system of clan identity has always been a part of Kazakh life, the Great, Middle, and Small hordes as they are recognized currently took shape after the Mongol invasion, hence the term ‘horde’. The actual Kazakh term for each grouping is ‘zhuz’.23 It is also important to remember that there are many layers within each horde, a hierarchy. As the hordes pertain to the transfer of the capital to Astana, there are a few different theories. Nazarbayev is a member of the Great Horde. Just as there are those who believe the relocation was to keep closer tabs on ethnic Russians, some also think it was a means of doing the same for the Middle
42 Horde. This theory is a form of ‘keeping your friends close, and your enemies closer’. Initially, this resulted in members of the Middle Horde appointed to positions by Nazarbayev. However, those positions were typically positions with no real authority. Also, only members of the smallest division within the Middle Horde were chosen, so that they would not have as much support.24 If any of them began to acquire too much power, they had a tendency to become ambassadors in order to be removed from the political scene.25 Another possible theory with regard to horde relations concerns the Small Horde specifically. The majority of Kazakhstan’s natural resources, and hence the potential wealth of the country is located in the area of the Small Horde. With Nazarbayev’s thirst for total control, Schatz contends a closer relationship with the Middle Horde might have been attractive in order to keep the increasing aspirations of the Small Horde in check.26 The more idealistic theory is that Astana is located at the juncture where all three hordes meet. This fact, when considered with the choice of three statues of Kazakh heroes in Astana, one from each horde, does have merit.27 However, with the political mind of Nazarbayev, it is probable that all of the above theories were thought-out. As with every consideration for the transfer discussed, the prevalence of the clan system in the governmental bureaucracy was not enough of a problem on which to base a decision to move. The final unofficial reason, Nazarbayev’s personal objectives, did provide the final impetus in the decision to relocate. This issue with be discussed only briefly here, as it is the subject of the next chapter.
Ambitions of Nazarbayev Many experts discuss Nazarbayev’s character and its effect on his leadership of Kazakhstan. Few, however, connect his controlling nature and desire for power with the choice to move the capital. This does not refer to the theories concerning his attempt to manage the northern area of the country by moving there. Instead it is about Nazarbayev himself and what he wants to be known for historically.
43 As an example, in terms of his personal objectives related to relocating the capital, an important consideration was the opportunity to rid the government apparatus of those thought to be extraneous. Basically, government employees had two choices, either accept the changes and adapt, or leave.28 Nazarbayev has a very clear idea of how he wants his government organized, as well as the legacy he would like to leave. Anything that might interfere with that plan is superfluous. He believes that relocating the capital will achieve his objective. Again though, this deciding factor of the transfer will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter. Though widely ignored, the official, domestic issues that faced Nazarbayev in the first few years of independence were crucially important to his decision to move to Astana. As stated repeatedly, no one factor was enough of a distraction that such a burdensome choice would become attractive. However, the issues of earthquakes, pollution, and expansion are what ultimately set in motion the course that would lead to a new capital.
44
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 3
1 “Kazakhstan: Interview on Almaty earthquake preparedness,” 30 November 2004, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
2 Ibid, 1
3 Irina Zhirnova, “Almaty means ‘Apple Place’,” n.d.,
4 “Almaty,” n.d.,
5 Yadav and Kulieshius, 295
6 Ibid, 297
7 “World: Asia-Pacific Earthquake shakes Kazakhstan,” 27 February 1999, BBC News Online Network, 8 “Kazakhstan,” 31 March 2003, U. S. Department of State Post Reports, 9 “U.S.-Kazakhstan Partnership to Secure Safe Drinking Water for Almaty City,” 12 September 2000, 10 “The Town of the XXI Century: Citizens Have More Rights in a Legal State,” 2003, 11 “Environmental Monitoring in Central Asia,” 2 January 2002, United Nations: Economic and Social Council, 12 Schatz, “What Capital Cities Say,” 122 45 13 Dr. Michael Launer, interview conducted by author in person, 26 January 2005 14 Schatz, “What Capital Cities Say”, 131 15 Prosser, 10 16 Schatz, “What Capital Cities Say,” 121 17 Escobar, 6 18 Judith Matloff, “Puzzle over capital move in Central Asia,” 3 February 1999, The Christian Science Monitor, 30, 19 Prosser, 10 20 Ibid, 9 21 Ibid, 9 22 Askat Dukenbaev and Valimjan Tanyrykov, “Tribes, Clans, Hordes – Traditional Bonds Shape Political Cultures and Attitudes in Central Asia,” 2001, The World Bank Group, 23 Nurbulat E. Masanov, “The Role of Clans in Kazakhstan Today,” 6 February 1998, Prism 4, no. 3, 24 Ibid, 3 25 Ibid, 3 26 Schatz, “What Capital Cities Say,” 129 27 Prosser, 9 28 Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 87 46 CHAPTER 4 NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV The one reason, above all of the others, that was the actual deciding factor for moving the capital from Almaty to Astana was President Nazarbayev himself; specifically, his confidence in his ability to transform Kazakhstan into a model nation, and receive proper acknowledgement for the achievement. As one analyst explains, ego is a common motivating factor in many leaders’ decision to change capitals.1 In particular, Nazarbayev is quoted as saying, “. . . It is a matter of honor – to make the state capital a real capital, and I will do this no matter what people say.”2 His primary concern was to gain the recognition of his people, and in the course of doing so, the world, ultimately resulting in establishing his place in Kazakhstan’s history. Creating a new capital was the most viable manner of accomplishing this goal. References to Nazarbayev’s life and career portray him as a consummate politician. Growing up in the Soviet Union, he was a proto-typical communist. He completed his education and worked as an engineer in a metallurgical factory, before devoting himself to the Party full-time, eventually becoming a member of the Soviet politburo and President of the Kazakh Republic.3 Despite a rather rapid ascent to the upper echelons of the Party, especially for a non- Russian, Nazarbayev’s course did not always progress according to calculations. In the 1980s, the man who was Nazarbayev’s mentor and helped him in his rise through the local levels of the party, Dinmuhammad Kunayev (First Secretary of Communist Party of Kazakhstan) became a target of Mikhail Gorbachev’s during an anti-corruption campaign.4 Demonstrating his political acumen on a national level, Nazarbayev supported Gorbachev and his reforms, and so had distanced himself from Kunayev. The commonly accepted theory 47 behind Nazarbayev’s abandonment of his former mentor was undoubtedly to better position himself to be named Kunayev’s replacement. That, unfortunately for Nazarbayev and the Kazakh republic, was not to be. Instead Gorbachev appointed Gennady Kolbin, who not only was not Kazakh, but did not even live in the Kazakh republic at the time of his appointment.5 The consequence of what the people perceived as an insult to the Kazakh people was an uprising against the government in Almaty that lasted for a few days before being suppressed.6 This chain of events provided another opportunity to observe Nazarbayev’s sense of self-preservation. Although unquestionably insulted himself at being passed over for the promotion, especially for someone like Kolbin, he kept his council and accepted the situation. By this time, Nazarbayev already had a reputation as someone who would do what was needed to reach his career aspirations, “ . . . he played for one side, his own.”7 He understood that working with Kolbin, however personally humiliating, would reflect well on him the next time the position became available.8 Indeed, three years later in 1989 Nazarbayev was chosen by Gorbachev to replace Kolbin. It is in this manner that Nazarbayev unknowingly managed to be in a perfect position to achieve even higher goals than imagined when the Soviet Union dissolved. Like many others, Nazarbayev initially resisted the collapse, first through denial, then by exploring avenues of alternative unions.9 Simultaneously, he also began the process of organizing his newly independent country. The astute politician that he is, Nazarbayev realized the opportunity in front of him. However for most people in the former Soviet Union, it was incomprehensible that the communist nation was truly gone. Many were not willing to trust in the demise of the country for fear it would return. Therefore it might not be considered unusual in this particular instance that Nazarbayev did not initially commit himself either way. Many analysts though did not see his actions as the natural effect of understandable prudence. Professor Nurbulat Masanov, a well known Kazakh 48 analyst, contends, “Nazarbayev stands out . . . because he has no principles he can betray . . . [and] has an extraordinary capacity for mimicry depending on the environment he is in . . .”10 There was an increasing number of observers who understood Nazarbayev’s motivations, even if they did not connect these primarily to the transfer. Despite, or because of, these chameleon-like tendencies, Nazarbayev was fortunate to encounter wide support within Kazakhstan. Similar to almost all of the former Soviet republics, as stated in Chapter 2, potential inter-ethnic tensions caused a great deal of concern. For Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev was able to appease both ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians.11 Nazarbayev was Kazakh so Kazakhs felt confident he would restore their sense of culture and history. The Russians felt they could trust him because of his role in the Soviet Union. Consequently, Nazarbayev found himself in an ideal situation even he could not have foreseen. In the first few years of Kazakhstan’s independence, Nazarbayev became the symbol of Kazakhstan.12 The trust of the majority of the population in Nazarbayev, regardless of ethnicity, was such that what he thought was best for the country became the state’s policy, not dissimilar from the patriarchal rule of the tsars.13 The people implicitly trusted Nazarbayev to protect them. He was the only one the majority of the population believed could solve the problems of the new country. Even those who did not trust him as the only one who could lead acknowledged the strength of his leadership was key to preventing the inter- ethnic problems experienced elsewhere and so feared there.14 Regarding the decision to relocate to Astana though, it is possible that some of the shine had worn off of the new president. Unaccustomed to criticism, or even head-to-head competition, Nazarbayev began resorting to the type of authoritarianism in which he had been raised. Opposition parties and candidates faced difficult, if not impossible criteria to become eligible to participate in elections, if they were not openly banned.15 If any one person began to gain too much authority, they were frequently assigned to less noticeable roles with fewer responsibilities.16 Journalists were arrested and newspapers shut down, if not 49 simply attacked, if it was thought they had ‘insulted the dignity of officials.’17 Additionally, Nazarbayev’s daughter was awarded a contract that essentially gave her control over the media.18 It is likely that it was in this atmosphere of transition from the respect and admiration of his countrymen, to being questioned by some that Nazarbayev truly began to consider moving the capital. He was well aware of the numerous problems explained throughout the course of this work. Every issue was one that had existed since independence, if not before. As explained, while those concerns were undoubtedly part of his consideration process, the deciding factor was, as Olcott describes, “. . . a hunger for personal recognition as a great and strong president . . .”19 Those experts who make reference to Nazarbayev’s career in relation to the move (as a side-note to what is considered the real reason) usually contend his decision was based on wanting a fresh start, away from what had been the center of government and the networks inherent thereof.20 Since Nazarbayev’s actions harkens back to the days of the tsars, it is appropriate that his objectives mimic those of Peter the Great. Beginning in 1703, Peter the Great ordered St. Petersburg built out of a swamp at the mouth of the Neva River.21 He was an ardent sailor who loved the water, which explains his choice of location (as well as ongoing battles with the Sweden). Additionally, it had an openness that Peter had to appreciate, or even need, after the claustrophobic atmosphere of Moscow. Peter was still young when his father, Tsar Alexis died. Shortly thereafter he was introduced to the harsh realities of court life and the intrigues that accompany it. His half-sister Sophia incited the Streltsy guard to riot against the nobles by means of a prevarication, in order to gain control of the government herself as regent. In the ensuing insurgence, many of Peter’s relatives were not only killed but dismembered. For three days the guard hunted for those they believed responsible for crimes against the state. Peter, his mother, and sister only survived because even in the grips of mob mentality, the guard could not contemplate taking the life of those closest to God.22 50 Without question, Nazarbayev’s desire to distance himself from the capital was in no way due to anything like the horror Peter the Great experienced. Regardless, their variant experiences with the entrenched bureaucracy of their governments, does not detract from the similarity of their decisions. Moving the capital provided both leaders with an opportunity to rid themselves and their governments of those resistant to change, as well as those willing to undermine the government as they see fit. Again, although only one expert, Schatz, claims Nazarbayev’s personal objectives were the more probable primary focus, numerous analysts mention the allure of being able to create his own government as opposed to working with the remnants of the Soviet republic’s rule: “The Astana move thus provided a dual opportunity – to eliminate rivals and bolster supporters . . .,”23 “Nazarbayev could use the capital move to consolidate his power and remove himself from the self-serving elite of Almaty. Those who would challenge his power could be conveniently left behind in Almaty during the big move,”24 and “. . . the change of the capital went ahead because it was something the president saw as necessary to demonstrate his authority . . .”25 It is clear from the number of experts who mention this aspect of the decision that the influence of Nazarbayev is considered important. However, that facet of the decision-making process is patently determined as secondary, as the above quotes represent the majority of the comments devoted to Nazarbayev’s ambitions. Also in common was the widespread bewilderment in both Peter the Great’s and Nazarbayev’s choice of location for their new capital. A legend was created around the formation of St. Petersburg to help explain the bareness of its location prior to the city.26 St. Petersburg experienced frequent floods and poor harvests as a result of the location of a veritable swamp for the city. Similarly, Nazarbayev’s choice to move to the barren steppe as opposed to the scenic mountains of Almaty was seen as ‘puzzling’ and ‘mystifying’.27 While flooding 51 was not a concern for Astana, poor harvests were, as well as bitingly cold winters. From the inception to the completion of St. Petersburg and Astana an ‘iron will’ was required on the part of both men to make what they deemed necessary happen.28 For Peter, Matisse states, “No obstacle was great enough to prevent his carrying out his design.”29 One could easily imagine that statement in a present-day article or work concerning Nazarbayev. For Nazarbayev, creating a new capital was too enticing a prospect to overlook, “To be remembered as the first president of both a new republic and a new capital can also not be ignored.”30 First and foremost for Nazarbayev was the opportunity to create a legacy above and beyond that of simply being Kazakhstan’s first president. More than a few analysts of the region hypothesize that the generic name of ‘Astana,’ or ‘Capital’ is intentional so that in years to come someone can suggest renaming the city after Nazarbayev vis-à-vis Washington D.C.31 Whereas during the last years of the Soviet Union the amount of power and authority Nazarbayev managed to accrue would have seemed extraordinarily improbable, now he could contemplate a lasting heritage as the Father of Kazakhstan and one of the preeminent leaders of his generation in the world. Olcott further develops his concern for world opinion with, “[Nazarbayev] wants to attract international attention to the new Kazakhstan he hopes to build.”32 More to the point, he wants the world leaders to recognize him as the builder. Though not to a level frequently depicted with Hitler or Stalin, it could be said that Nazarbayev has created a small-scale cult of personality in the course of pursuing his goal. Many Kazakhs refer to him as ‘Papa’. At one end of the main street in Astana there is a monument called the Tree of Life that is dedicated to the Kazakh steppe horsemen of old. Part of the monument though includes a handprint of Nazarbayev. The people who come through on tours have the honor of putting their hands in his while a song written by him plays in the background. Tour guides will not countenance questions referring to what will happen to Nazarbayev’s handprint and song after he is no longer president. 52 He is their only president. Taken together, this anecdote33 is easily translatable to something one might have read about Stalin during his reign, even including the nickname of ‘Papa’ A further example of the stature of Nazarbayev is found in a BBC News Report submitted during the actual relocation. Monica Whitlock describes ‘an air of gloom’ in Almaty, but that the officials “have no choice but to board the train [to Astana]. The move has been ordered by President Nazarbayev and there is no higher authority.”34 This compliance with Nazarbayev’s will, and adoration of (most) of the people, coincides well with his adherence to the Enlightenment philosophy of “the President stands above society, parties, parliament, and all institutions of power, coordinating and directing their activities . . . He is . . . the actual epitome of state sovereignty.”35 That statement succinctly demonstrates Nazarbayev’s opinion of his position and leadership; he considers himself the embodiment of Kazakhstan. Having the political capacity to build a new capital reassures those that trust Nazarbayev, and gives those that do not a reason to reconsider. 53 ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4 1 Iskyan, 1 2 “New English Capital to cost $650 million this year,” Reuters English News Service, 10 February 2000, quoted in Prosser, 12 3 “Nazarbayev, Nursultan,” n.d., Encyclopedia.com, 4 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 28 5 Ibid 6 As mentioned earlier, although at the time of the uprisings, the city was called Alma-ata, for the sake of consistency it will be referred to as Almaty throughout this work. 7 Alexandrov, 34; Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 29 8 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 28 9 Ibid, 25 10 Nubulat Masanov, “Kazakhskaia politicheskaia I intellektualnaia elita:klanovaia prinadlezhnost’ Ivnutrietnicheskoe sopernichestvo,” Vestnik Evrazil, No. 1(2), 1996, p.55, quoted in n.d., 11 Olcott, “Kazakhstan pushing for Eurasia,” eds., Bremmer and Taras, 549 12 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 26 13 Ibid; Robert K. Masie, Peter the Great: His Life and World, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 9-10 14 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 26 15 Ibid, 99, 102-104 16 Ibid, 91 17 Ibid, 104-106; Bruce Pannier, “Kazakhstan: Press Said To Insult Dignity Of Officials – Part 1,” 8 March 2001, 18 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 105 19 Ibid, 30 54 20 “Akmola Officially Instated as New Capital of Kazakhstan,” 12 November 1997, Monitor 3, No. 212, 21 Massie, 356 22 Ibid, 41-52; The information in the paragraph as a whole is based on the pages listed. 23 Schatz, “What Capital Cities Say”, 126 24 Dorothea Huelsmeier, “Kazakhstan’s unloved new capital city on the steppes,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 December 1997, quoted in Prosser, 15 25 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 101 26 Ibid, 602 27 Matloff, “Puzzle over capital move in Central Asia” 28 Massie, 602 29 Ibid, 365 30 Pannier 31 “Astana,” n.d., 32 Olcott, Unfulfilled Promise, 101 33 Yeoman, 1; Escobar, 2. Articles from both authors discuss the monument and the handprint. Yeoman’s article specifically addresses the name of the monument, Tree of Life, and the fact that Nazarbayev is referred to by the people as Papa. Escobar’s article has a more facetious angle with the description of the handprint and song, and the reference to the tour guide’s response of there being no other president. 34 Monica Whitlock, “Monica Whitlock reports from Almaty,” 6 December 1997, 35 n.d., 55 CONCLUSION The single, most important factor in Nazarbayev’s decision to relocate the capital was his personal agenda, although there are a multitude of reasons considered credible. In order of importance according to scholars, based on amount of text devoted to each topic, those reasons are: ethnic discord in the north demonstrated through the specific subjects of language, access to professional advancement, and dual citizenship; motivations from an international perspective in the form of aspiration to be the center of Asia, and proximity to both China and radical Islam; and domestic considerations such as earthquakes, pollution, possible expansion, centrality within the country, and clan politics. The order of importance is significant in that those issues considered most important by observers (internationally-based concerns), are not deemed to be official by the government. Conversely, those issues actually considered official (domestic-based concerns) are generally considered too unimportant to devote considerable time to explaining in articles or other works. Schatz contends this, as well as the governing style of Nazarbayev, is a universal aspect of capital city relocation: “A non-democratic leadership that seeks to justify a radical policy- decision will promulgate any number of explanations that are superficially plausible, but hide deeper agendas.”1 Most experts consider the international premises the deeper agendas to which Schatz refers. Although the popular inter-ethnic tension assertion was put forward by most as the most plausible motivation behind the transfer of the capital, it was simply one of the considerations. To be sure, every issue discussed has merit concerning the relocation. None however were sufficient in and of themselves to convince Nazarbayev that this move was the wisest course of action. For 56 example, scholars have devoted great deal of print to the economic legacy of the Soviet Union as it concerns Russia and Kazakhstan. If neither of these countries are capable of fully separating their economies from each other, how would a potential secessionist region be able to separate its economy from Kazakhstan? And taking that into consideration, how likely is it that Kazakhstan would be willing to continue to work with a region that just separated from the country?2 More likely given the substantial reports of Nazarbayev’s character, he reviewed all of the issues facing him and his government, and realized that relocation would solve the majority of these issues, while providing him an opportunity to create a lasting legacy for himself. Support for this theory is again provided by Schatz: “. . . I do not mean to imply that capital relocation is an effective tool to serve the needs of state and nation building. Those needs are too diverse and the costs involved in a move are too high to draw such an implication. If there is a functionalist argument to be made, it is not about utility vis-à-vis state and nation building imper- atives, but rather vis-à-vis the political agenda of an authoritarian leader.”3 Nazarbayev was well aware of the numerous problems explained throughout the course of this work. Every issue was one that had existed since independence, if not before. If any one of these issues were his true motivation, or even any combination of them, then waiting for three years after independence to make an announcement regarding a move would have been illogical. Equally illogical as it concerns the most popular issue of inter-ethnic tensions, is why the relocation was then scheduled for three years later. Obviously some time was necessary to enable Astana to prepare for her new role. However, if there was truly a movement with sufficient strength to attempt secession, or even one close to such strength, the interim in between the announcement and the official transfer was the time to do so. The fact that no such effort was made is testament to the level of tension not being as high or as unstable as commonly reported. Schatz suggests that the “official reasons give an incomplete picture of the decision calculus.”4 In actuality, the unofficial reasons give an equally 57 incomplete picture, especially in view of the time lapse between independence and announcing the transfer. The connection that completes the picture is Nazarbayev. Above all other concerns, Nazarbayev had his reputation and potential legacy as his top priority. The validity of this assertion is further supported by said time lapse. The timing of the decision to relocate correlates strongly with Nazarbayev’s increasing authoritarianism, and the associated criticisms from his opponents. Something had to be done to maintain his vision for himself and Kazakhstan. Sarah Prosser offers a seemingly alternative theory that could be combined with inter-ethnic tension, clan politics, or centrality for the country. She contends that by moving the capital to the center of the country, it could be seen as a return to its identity as a people of the steppe, “The mounted horseman is a powerful image in the Kazakh mythos.”5 Figure 3: Viktor Vasnetsov, “Bogatyrs” 6 58 Indeed it is a powerful image. That is why it is more reasonably linked to Nazarbayev, as with the agenda for the relocation in general. Nazarbayev sees himself as the mounted horseman, reminiscent of the painting by Victor Vasnetsov, Bogatyrs (See Figure 3). Admittedly, the Bogatyrs were Russian, however their objective was the protection of the people, and the painting provides a dramatic visual both for how Nazarbayev sees himself, as well as how he would like others to see him. Although it is usually more commonly associated with scientific experiments, the theory of Occam’s Razor is applicable to this scenario: “when multiple explanations are available for a phenomenon, the simplest version is preferred.”7 When one considers the expense of transferring a capital city in terms of money, time, and energy, each of the preferred explanations, as well as the typically disregarded reasons, are insufficient justification. Some might argue that the possibility of the city being destroyed in an earthquake is as simple an explanation as there is. Or that since inter-ethnic conflict was a problem virtually everywhere else in the Former Soviet Union it is the most logical explanation. Yet a further explanation of Occam’s Razor states, “. . . one should make no more assumptions than needed.”8 The theory that inter-ethnic tension was a primary motivation for moving the capital makes the assumption that the situation in Kazakhstan was similar to that in other FSU’s where such tension proved to be, at the very least, disruptive. However, after fourteen years of independence with no discernible, disruptive conflict, it is perhaps time to accept that while the potential for inter-ethnic conflict was certainly a concern in the initial years, time has proven that this concern was overstated. Hence, attention should be directed elsewhere to explain the relocation, as opposed to assuming all of the former republics are identical. 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IRINnews.org. “Kazakhstan: Interview on Almaty earthquake preparedness.” 30 November 2004. “U.S.-Kazakhstan Partnership to Secure Safe Drinking Water for Almaty City.” 12 September 2000. The Washington Times. “Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev pushes Democracy, prosperity.” 20 December 1999. 69 Yadav R.R. and P. Kulieshius. “Dating of Earthquakes: Tree Ring Responses to the Catastrophic Earthquake of 1887 in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan.” The Geographical Journal 158, no. 3 (Nov. 1992): 295-299. Yeomans, Matthew. “Dispatch From Kazakhstan: Astana, city of black gold.” 19 July 2004. 70 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Deborah Jean Cassidy Whetstone was born in Stuart, Florida on 5 December 1972. She earned a B.A. degree in International Affairs in April, 1994 and currently teaches World History at James S. Rickards High School in Tallahassee, Florida. Mrs. Whetstone completed a M.A. degree in Russian and East European Studies at The Florida State University in August 2005. 71