Instability and Interrelated Conflict: Evolving Security Dynamics in the Middle East

INSTABILITY AND INTERRELATED CONFLICT:

EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS

IN THE MIDDLE EAST All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Authors: Dr. Aaron Stein and Ms. Leah Pedro

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung or the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute is a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy- oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

Editing: Thomas J. Shattuck Design: Leah Pedro

© 2021 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

April 2021 INSTABILITY AND INTERRELATED CONFLICT: EVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Syria/Iraq office convened a two-day virtual dialogue that brought together experts and policymakers from the United States, European Union, and Middle East to discuss developments in the region. A follow-up to a 2019 conference held in Iraq, this dialogue focused on the challenges posed by the conflict in Syria, the role of the Russian Federation in the Middle East, and the future of Iranian-American tensions. Each half-day seminar featured two panels and a moderated discussion led by FPRI Director of Research Dr. Aaron Stein. What follows is a summary of the debates and actionable conclusions.

Key Conclusions

America’s regional adversaries Great powers compete differently use the U.S. military presence in in the Middle East. Russia and the region to try to drive a wedge China have differing interests in between Washington and its the Middle East, but each share allies and undermine faith in the an interest in decreasing regional American security guarantee. trust in the United States as a trustworthy ally.

Cessation of the conflict in Syria is detrimental to the country’s The Turkish-Russian relationship population. Achieving this will likely remains of great interest for require bilateral talks between the Trans-Atlantic alliance, and the United States and Russia, but it remains to be seen how this Moscow remains committed to cooperative and competitive undermining Western interests in relationship will impact U.S. and the Middle East. allied interests.

The Biden administration has Iran remains a critical country for the expressed clear interest in United States, but disagreement deprioritizing the Middle East, continues about how to best choosing instead to focus the approach managing U.S. relations brunt of U.S. resources on the Indo- with the Islamic Republic. Pacific and Europe. Policymakers must remain engaged in supporting post-conflict nation-building efforts to prevent the relapse of violence.

3 be to first stop the fighting. Considering Panel 1: the recent history of conflict in the The New Security Landscape region, there is significant evidence that in the Middle East: Trends and intervention is not ideal for stopping war, Challenges with “Syria as the poster child.” Rather than continuing the pursuit of military Following war against the Islamic State’s support and weapons sales to foreign territorial caliphate, new tensions have militias, the panelist suggested a focus on emerged in the Middle East. In Syria, economic assistance and nation-building Russia and Iran remain diplomatically and is necessary, particularly as the foreign militarily committed to the success of the policy focus shifts to Asia. Bashar al Assad regime, all but ensuring that the regime will remain intact and be AN INITIAL able to govern well into the 2020s. The concurrent deterioration in9 American- REQUIREMENT FOR Iranian relations has raised questions PERMANENTLY CEASING about the viability of the ongoing, but narrowly defined, war against the Islamic THE CONFLICT MUST State and whether the U.S. presence can BE TO FIRST STOP THE be sustained. Iran, too, faces questions about its role in the region after years of FIGHTING. isolation during the Trump administration and support for sub-national allies in Iraq The Biden administration has frozen and Yemen. sanctions and has sought to tamp down tensions with Iran after four years of Presenters and participants convened the Trump administration’s pursuit of a to discuss regional trends and how they “maximum pressure” policy of sanctions impact American and European interests. and military action. Progress on the Joint The first panelist addressed broader Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) trends within the region, noting two major has remained stagnant, and the focus on trends that have endured: governments reaching an agreement on a return to the have been unable to meet the needs nuclear deal will have to move quickly, lest of their people (often authoritarian, otherwise risk the election of a hardline non-democratic regimes), and state- leader in Iran’s upcoming presidential on-state competition has been fueled election. by competing Russian and American security interests. An initial requirement for permanently ceasing the conflict must

4 U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken join NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg for a joint news conference in Brussels on April 14, 2020. (defense.gov)

The panelist concluded that it is likely that short of war,” is being carried out as an the United States will continue to seek to attempt to stress the Iranian system and recalibrate its regional policy to better weaken alliances, with the goal of forcing fit with the greater priority American capitulation or regime collapse in the leaders are placing on competition with country. Iran has withstood the campaign China. This emphasis on great power and imposed costs of its own on the United competition may decrease U.S. appetite States for its economic sanctions. These to play a large role in regional civil sanctions, a panelist noted, have not led wars, given that such involvement risks to a decrease in Iranian asymmetric action distracting from more poignant threats in the Persian Gulf, and Iran has worked to U.S. national security interests. These through its regional clients to attack U.S. “internal civil wars,” the speaker argued, allies and partners. As one participant “turn to large-scale proxy wars,” and noted, the role non-state actors play in these conflicts are not synched up with the region may continue in the near-to- the Biden administration’s priorities. medium term, even if Washington and Tehran agree to a detente. In Iraq, for The second panelist began by noting example, non-state actors could continue that the local conflicts have continued to to harass U.S. and NATO forces for their occur at the regional level, and Turkey own parochial reasons. However, as and Russia are the key accelerators that other participants argued, Iran may be integrated local conflicts into bilateral able to clamp down on many of its clients, dynamics and split them into two spheres and a modicum of stability could spread of influence. The U.S. campaign of from the state-to-state level to the state- maximum pressure on Iran, or “all means to-nonstate level.

5 SYRIA IS A NEW KIND The discussion turned to the broader, positive trends in the Levant stemming OF HUMANITARIAN from the Trump administration’s SUFFERING AND facilitation of the Abraham Accords and the normalization of relations between DISSOLUTION NOT SEEN much of the Gulf Arab states and BEFORE, ONE WHOSE Israel. Though the Accords were seen as a step in the right direction, there PROLONGED POVERTY are further steps necessary to move AND PROFOUND toward genuinely effective policies in the region, rather than “the same old HUNGER COULD LEAVE A habits with different language,” as one participant characterized the status quo DELETERIOUS IMPACT. policy approach in the Middle East. The remaining question with the Accords is More broadly, other non-state actors the way to instrumentalize them. One in the greater Levant area have more member of the conversation pointed out closely aligned with state actors for that a locally driven approach to economic support and political legitimacy. As a problems would likely be more effective participant argued, in Syria, the Syrian than attempting to find one regional fix-all Democratic Forces (SDF) are dependent approach. on the United States for protection from hostile actors, including Turkey and the Most participants expressed some Russian Federation. Al Qaeda and its discontent with the amount of action former affiliates, in contrast, have had taken by the Biden administration on more trouble working with regional states, addressing the situation in the Middle and therefore its power has abated. East, especially with Iran. Much of this The regional conditions, however, have conversation revolved around the JPCOA continued to deteriorate, and the more and American inaction. One panelist fundamental concern is that the war in Syria made the argument that the Biden and its convergence with the economic administration has made an effort to crisis brought on by the COVID-19 show that the Middle East is no longer pandemic have negatively impacted the the top priority, and that message has region. As a participant noted, “Syria is a materialized through inaction. new kind of humanitarian suffering and dissolution not seen before, one whose prolonged poverty and profound hunger could leave a deleterious impact.”

6 Countries Hosting Syrian Refugees

Europe 1.1M

Turkey 3.6M

Lebanon Iraq 880K 240K

Jordan Egypt 660K 130K

(Data: UNHCR/OCHA, March 2021)

This early policy choice, this same panelist acknowledged similarities between Iran noted, has disappointed EU members and the North Korea, in which aggression because the bloc is waiting for the new attracts its own “leverage” in dealing with administration to clarify its position on the the United States. Iran nuclear deal and expressed concern that the Biden administration was moving too slowly on formulating its Iran policy. Panel 2: Enduring Challenges: The An American participant argued against Syrian Civil War this perception, suggesting that all signals from the Biden administration The Syrian civil war continues without indicate that the administration is moving end. The tenuous, country-wide decrease quickly to clarify its position on the in violence could fall apart at any moment, JCPOA. Another panelist elaborated on leading to violence in Idlib and the mass the challenges facing current and past displacement of innocent civilians. The U.S. administrations; both the Obama United States is also balancing its broader, and Trump administrations wanted to geostrategic effort to prioritize the threat get out of the Middle East, and the Biden from China as Washington grapples with administration is trying to figure out the enduring challenges stemming from how it can take necessary action rather the war against the Islamic State. This than only make statements. The long- war, too, has strained ties with Turkey term, strategic approach for Asia has and led to frictions with Russia and Iran. been effective, and its core difference This panel discussed the Syrian civil war from Middle East policy is the proactive and options to manage the violence, as moves taken instead of consistently well as efforts to reach agreement to end reacting to new problems. In the closing the war. remarks of the discussion, one participant

7 A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) trailer used in cross-border humanitarian operations to Syria. (unhcr.org)

The second panel began with an overview The panel also evaluated American of the current situation in Syria. The first foreign policy in Syria and identified speakers noted that Idlib has not seen potential outcomes. Identifying the overall much violence recently, but the situation policy goals in Syria continues to be a remains dire because of challenges challenge for Washington. The presence stemming from delivering food across the of Russians and Iranians poses a question shared border with Turkey. Food insecurity for political debates in Washington about among the Syrian population is increasing, U.S. policy and how it is formulated, given with sanctions and unstable humanitarian the emphasis on planning for war with aid worsening the situation. The looming a peer adversary: Is Syria a venue for issue is that the United Nations Security challenging Russia in the Middle East, or Council will vote in July on extending the is it a distraction? This question, a panelist cross-border authorization to deliver aid noted, is accompanied by the underlying via borders outside direct Syrian regime view that the Syrian state is failed and control. The panel agreed that Russia is broken, and restitution would require expected to veto the resolution, as it did significant investment, one not likely to in 2020, arguing that any relief should be supported by the United States and be distributed via Damascus and not its allies. For the current administration, from points outside of the country. If the a panelist argued that President Joseph resolution does not pass, then it is unclear Biden is averse to open-ended conflicts to what extent the Biden administration and is committing to focusing the bulk plans to engage diplomatically. of U.S. resources on the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Both panelists noted that one enduring challenge the United States

8 United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe address current challenges with foreign terrorist fighters at a February, 2020 conference. (osce.usmission.gov) faces in Syria is the continued presence of may require circumventing a NATO Ally to foreign detainees held in SDF detention work with an adversary. camps. The United States has sought to pressure Middle Eastern and European governments to take back their fighters, Panel 3: but have failed to find a durable solution. The Iran Question: To Engage The presence of these fighters is certain to influence U.S. deliberations about its or Not Engage? options in Syria and hinder any effort The Biden administration has signaled to move forward. Another problem left a willingness to return to the JCPOA, a behind by the previous administration proposal that is certain to have support concerns foreign fighters and repatriation. from the EU-2 (France and Germany) and A panelist concluded by acknowledging Great Britain. The region’s reaction may the severity of the situation in Syria and differ, with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the the necessity for bilateral talks with United Arab Emirates hesitant to fully Russia. endorse any rapprochement with the A large portion of the subsequent Islamic Republic. The American-Iranian discussion evaluated the Russian relationship has considerable impact presence in Syria. Now seen as “very on broader regional security dynamics. much a player” in the Middle East, This panel explored the broader Iranian Russia’s prevalence in the region has question and the role that Washington changed significantly since 2015. Turkey’s and Europe should consider during any discontent with the U.S.-backed SDF has potential engagement with Tehran. only made a relationship with Russia more opportunistic, and Turkish-American The first panelist addressed the maximum relations are not likely to improve. The pressure campaign that the Trump discussion reached a consensus that administration pursued against Iran, bilateral talks with Russia regarding the arguing that the policy has had a negative Syria conflict are becoming inevitable and impact on regional stability and security. In particular, Iran’s policy of exacting a

9 An attack on a Norwegian-owned oil tanker in June of 2019 is one of several in the Persian Gulf. (share.america.gov)

cost on the United States and its regional no longer the end goal, but the starting partners for the imposition of sanctions point for further negotiations. The second has led to a series of escalatory actions in panelist began by noting that Iran is acting the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq, and Yemen. The more aggressively than the historical Gulf States have also sought to respond norm and cautioned against treating the to Iranian actions, especially regarding firing of missiles and the mining of ships as the conflict in Yemen and deepening the “normal acts.” The panelist underscored U.S. military presence in the region. that Iran is pursuing such policies during a time of state-to-state peace—a The panelist argued that the Gulf States fact that cannot be overlooked when have internalized the shifts occurring in outsiders judge Iran’s regional policies U.S. domestic politics and understand and national security decision-making. that Washington is likely to prioritize its Iran’s intent, the panelist suggested, is to interests in Asia in the near-to-medium make the Arab states more apprehensive term. This realization is driving some states about supporting U.S. sanctions and to to recalibrate their approach to Iran. This punish these states for close ties with realization, the panelist argued, is in part Washington. Iran’s use of non-state actors driven by recognition in Gulf Arab capitals drives down its costs because “those that that their assertive policy in Yemen has are dying are not Iranian.” This policy also led to pushback in Washington, leading to benefits Iran because it makes attribution calls to decrease U.S. support for the war. more difficult, giving Iran the means to The concern is that the maximum pressure deny involvement and to obfuscate any policy has been deleterious for U.S. and collective response. Arab interests in the region. In particular, the concern now is that Iran has the upper hand and that a return to the JCPOA is

10 TEHRAN IS ALSO States should act with more urgency because the JCPOA could ensure a return ATTUNED TO U.S. to a “cold detente” with Iran that lowers DOMESTIC DEBATES regional tensions and contributes to the broader American goal of ensuring Iran ABOUT ITS FUTURE cannot develop nuclear weapons without PRESENCE IN THE being detected. The June 2021 Iranian presidential election could hamper talks, MIDDLE EAST. particularly if a hardliner is elected and the window for a return to the JCPOA Tehran is also attuned to U.S. domestic closes. debates about its future presence in the Middle East. Therefore, one prong A participant challenged the idea that of Iran’s regional strategy is to drive up Iran was committed to pushing the United the cost of the American presence, with States out of the region entirely, arguing the intent of pushing out the U.S. military. that Iran derives some benefits from the This policy, the panelist noted, is driven continued U.S. presence. This participant by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards suggested that the American presence Corps (IRGC), which “has a firm hold on has become a crutch for Iran to justify strategic policy for Iran.” The IRGC has its foreign policy and its support of non- also managed to keep the politics of the state actors. A complete U.S. withdrawal, JCPOA at arm’s length inside Iran and a participant noted, could fracture has let the moderate, civilian-led wing of Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and upset the government take the blame for the elements of Tehran’s foreign policy. The U.S. withdrawal, without offering a viable conversation then shifted to a broader alternative to ease sanctions. According discussion about the impact of a U.S. to the panelist, “The [IRGC] had no withdrawal for regional stability and, in ownership in negotiating or ‘owning’ the particular, American interests in Iraq. A diplomatic process. Furthermore, the participant suggested the “IRGC and its IRGC is not in need of sanctions relief proxies are ‘soul searching’ to reshape from a political standpoint: they are strategy in Iraq and Syria” and that not already applying pressure, and basically all aspects of Iranian foreign policy have have free reign in the region in the been successful in the Middle East. meantime.” Both panelists believed that a return to the JCPOA would eventually “get done,” but only after the Supreme Leader is convinced of a need to return. A few participants noted that the United

11 IRAN AND ITS NON- tangential effort to reach detente. STATE ALLIES IN IRAQ PANEL 4: HAVE SOUGHT TO Great Power Competition: The CAPITALIZE ON U.S. Role of External Actors

ACTIONS TO PORTRAY The defeat of the Islamic State’s territorial AN IMAGE OF SUCCESS. caliphate and the transfer of power in the United States has raised questions Iran and its non-state allies in Iraq have about American policy, along with those sought to capitalize on U.S. actions to of its closest allies in Europe. The Syrian portray an image of success. As one conflict has also led to Russia’s return participant suggested, the withdrawal to the Middle East, prompting broader of some forces from Iraq allowed for the discussions about Moscow’s visions for groups to suggest that their actions were the region. Turkey, too, has expanded the reason for Washington’s withdrawal, its regional footprint, using a coercive portraying independent U.S. actions as a policy that mixes military intervention victory. This portrayal, a participant noted, and aggressive rhetoric to carve out a stemmed from Iran’s broader support for regional role. This panel focused on the “causing havoc in Iraq with rocket fire.” The role of external actors in the Middle East participants disagreed about the extent to and whether the region could become which Iran was directly responsible for all a venue for great power competition of the actions of the proxies it supports in between rival states or return to a pre- Iraq, but there was a consensus that “Iraqi Syrian civil war status quo. rocket attacks were coordinated with Iran and the Iranian leadership most probably This panel touched on the role of great gave these groups a green light.” These power rivalry and its impact on the Middle actions, participants noted, give Iran a tool East. The first panelist began by stating to further increase pressure on the United the obvious: Great power competition is States, especially given the broader focused on America’s relationship with efforts to increase Iranian leverage before Russia and China and the competition any talks with Washington about a return for global influence. In the Middle East, to the JCPOA. Any such return, a panelist the panelist suggested that Russia and argued, would likely also entail briefing China define interests differently. Russia, America’s Arab partners and the Israelis, the panelist argued, was more security- both of which have expressed skepticism focused, while China was more focused about the nuclear deal and the implied on its economic interests. Russia has been the “alternative weapons provider

12 Iranian President Rouhani discussing economic opportunities with members of the Chinese governement in March and April of 2021. (president.ir)

to conflict in the Middle East,” and China F-16. The panelist pointed out that has been the financial support for projects following this incident, Ankara appealed in the Gulf and Israel, in particular those to NATO for support. However, after which enhance port access. Both Russia a June 2016 rapprochement, Ankara and China, the panelist noted, seek to and Moscow have sought to manage undermine elements of U.S. policy in disputes on a bilateral basis without the region and undermine regional trust Western involvement. The two sides in the American security commitment. have also deepened military cooperation, The second panelist examined Turkey’s the panelist noted, pointing to Turkey’s relationship with Russia and their purchase of a Russian air and missile engagement over shared interests in defense system. After the purchase, Syria. The panelist began by noting how Turkey has resisted Western pressure to much the Turkish-Russian relationship cancel the deal, repeatedly saying that the has changed over the past five years and agreement with Russia is a “done deal.” In that the conditions are now favorable for other regional conflicts, such as Libya and a cooperative relationship, given shared Nagorno-Karabakh, the two sides pursued distrust of the West. This cooperative a similar formula. While Russia and Turkey relationship does not, the panelist noted, favored different actors, they negotiated mean that the two sides are perfectly directly to manage the conflict and to aligned, but that they have prioritized keep Western actors at arm’s length. This cooperation over competition. The low dynamic, the panelist argued in her final point for the Turkish-Russian relationship remarks, comports with each country’s came in November 2015, following the domestic politics and the desire to have downing of Russian Su-24 by a Turkish regional responses to regional problems.

13 RUSSIA IS MORE LIKELY As another participant noted, the geographic dynamics inherent to the TO ENGAGE WITH A Cold War have changed since 1991. COERCIVE TURKEY Turkey, he argued, was no longer the lone U.S. allied state on the Black Sea RATHER THAN A and that Ankara’s geography was not as HOSTILE U.S. valuable as it once was. This reality, he argued, should reframe how European A plurality of the participants expressed and American policymakers view Turkey concerns about the Russian-Turkish vis-à-vis its importance to Western relationship and whether Ankara’s foreign security structures. A panelist contested policy decisions undermined American this point, arguing that Ankara’s location interests in the Middle East and broader was important for elements of Operation Eastern Mediterranean region. Similarly, Inherent Resolve. The two participants participants suggested that Moscow had agreed that retaining basing access to modified its Soviet-era policy of trying Turkey was in the West’s interests, but that to split NATO by pitting member states Ankara had its own parallel interests that against one another. In this case, Turkey necessitates “planning around Turkey” has emerged as a useful foil for collective for certain military contingencies in the burden-sharing precisely because it has Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. run afoul of much of its traditional allies. For some of the Turkish participants, there was general agreement that the current cooperative relationship with Moscow has an “expiration date” and that tensions inherent in the bilateral relationship could re-emerge. One participant argued, “Russia is more likely to engage with a coercive Turkey rather than a hostile U.S.” One participant pointed out, “the greatest challenge for the U.S. in the region which remains is the actions of allies in the region,” as relationships with some regional actors have deteriorated and threatened the ability for Washington to “win” the great power competition.

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