Bachelor’s Thesis
Israel’s Best Offense is a Good Defense Assessing defensive realism as applied to the Six-Day-War and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties
Author: Alexander Brännlund Supervisor: Brigitte Pircher Examinator: Anders Persson Term: Autumn-2020 Subject: Political Science Level: Bachelor Course Code: 2SK31E
Abstract
In the form of a theory testing case study based upon the seminal works of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, this thesis seeks to uncover whether defensive realism can be applied with focus on Israeli international conduct. This is defined by their wartime actions as well as their peacekeeping efforts. The paper analyses two major historical events; namely the six-day-war and the recent Israeli-Arab peace treaties. Thereafter it delves into the preexisting conditions of each combattant in the war, then reviews the events unfolding during the conflict in the first part of the analysis, followed by the second part examining the contents of the Abraham Accords, as well as the official statements of Bahrain and Sudan regarding peace with Israel.
Following this, the thesis examines the details and terms of the Abraham Accords and treaties between Israel, Bahrain and Sudan. A hypothesis is presented predicting that both tenets of defensive realism will be applicable to their respective parts of Israeli history. It is subsequently found that the first tenet of defensive realism has explanatory value with regards to the six-day-war, the second tenet of defensive realism that follows also proves to hold significant merit, and the thesis concludes that the given hypothesis therefore is correct. Both tenets of defensive realism are applicable to respective units of analysis on Israel, which therefore suggests that the theory of defensive realism offers a good framework for explaining the actions of the Israeli state.
Keywords: Israel, Six-Day-War, Abraham Accords, International Conduct, defensive realism
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Table of Content
1. Introduction 4 1.1. Presentation 4 1.2. Formulation of scientific quandary 5 1.3. Research questions 6
2. Theory and previous research 7 2.1. Presentation of theoretical framework 8 2.2. Previous research 8 2.2.1. Clive Jones, Tore T. Petersen: “Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies” 9 2.2.2. Marcel Serr: “Struggle for Existence or Urge for Expansion?” 9 2.2.3. Falk Ophir: “The Middle East Accords: an Israeli Perspective” 10 2.2.4. Imad K. Harb: “The Middle East Accords: an Arab Perspective” 10 2.2.5. Kenneth Waltz: A theory of International Politics 11 2.2.6. Stephen Walt: The Origin of Alliances 11 2.2.7. Theoretical relevance 12 2.2.8. Defensive realism 12 2.2.9. Offensive realism 13 2.2.10. Applying defensive realism 14 2.2.11. Hypotheses 14
3. Method and Material 16 3.1. Choosing cases 16 3.2. Operationalisation of theories 18 3.3. Delimitation, Validity & Reliability 20
4. Analysis, Conclusions & Results 21 4.1. The Six-Day-War 21 4.2. The Abraham Accords 27
5. Conclusion 35
6. Bibliography 37
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1. Introduction
1.1. Presentation
Israel as a fledgling nation has experienced more ravaging conflicts and a tearing back and forth for sovereignty than most nations on earth, (Cahill, 1988, p.17; Gilbert, 2014, p. 11; see also Shindler, 2013 & Gartman, 2015). Presently, Israel is subject to massive political controversy and opposing stances within the west (See Gilbert, 2014 & Shindler, 2013), the EU and the US’ foreign policies. Although surrounded by hostile states, Israel has ferociously and effectively fought for their place in the Middle East, (Rubner, 2017; Machairas, 2017; Shindler, 2013, pp.38-41; see also Gartman, 2015). Most famously Israel displayed their prowess during the six-day-war where a joint Arab attempt from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria was swiftly neutralized by Israeli forces, adding the Golan heights between Israel and Syria into their domain among other things, (Kochavi, 2018; Rodman, 2020; Goldstein, 2018; Machairas, 2017; Rubner, 2017; Wolf, 2015; Bryant, 2001, p.17; See also Gilbert, 2014). We have however, in recent time experienced an unprecedented feat of diplomacy wherein Israel has struck an accord of peace, mediated by the United States of America under the Trump administration, with several Arab nations, most prominently the United Arab Emirates, (The Abraham Accords Peace Treaty, 2020, p.1; see also Ophir 2020, Harb 2020). This has given rise to a brand new era within Israeli international relations.
This study is relevant due to the pressing issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in contemporary politics. To be able to analyze and categorize Israeli international conduct contributes to understanding not just the issue of Palestine, but also the previous altercations between Israel and her surrounding Arab neighbours.
This essay will take the form of a theory testing case study, or a comparative case study, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, p.109) and will be centered around the purpose of applying the theory of structural realism or, neorealism, as defined by Kenneth Waltz, which in turn will give attention to the subschool of defensive realism, which is the theory propagated by Waltz. The aim is to assess if the
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tenets of defensive realism can explain the actions of the Israelic state with regards to its conduct in international relations. A hypothesis will be formulated regarding the applicability of the theory on the chosen cases of study, whereby two research questions will also be erected.
To do so, a case study revolving the six-day war and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties will be analysed. In further defining what is meant by Israel’s international relationships and conduct, I will elect to focus on Israel’s military actions, and their peacekeeping efforts in the form of offered or accepted peace treaties. Thus there will be two aspects to Israeli conduct; wartime actions and peacekeeping efforts.
1.2. Formulation of scientific quandary
The issue of Israel’s international motives and causal mechanisms has not been touched upon extensively by researchers, although research on the Israeli state as such is abundant. Previous research has endeavoured to provide an account of Israeli history in international affairs (Jones & Petersen, 2013; Karsh, 2017; Goldstein, 2018; see also Cahill, 1988, & Gilbert, 2014), without any attempt to apply international theory. The political discourse revolving Israel, its formation, existence, and conduct towards neighbouring states and alleged states1 is rife with opposing stances. To understand why a politically controversial country like Israel acts in the way it does is therefore a relevant scientific subject with which to enlarge the theoretical archive of political science, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, pp.32-34).
A theoretical testing of defensive realism upon Israel’s actions as a state, if proven to correspond well, can also serve to normalise popular opinion on the nation state, as it is well known that quite a large number of politicians and supporters of Palestine in contemporary discourse label Israel as villainous, not to mention its adversaries such as Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran who dubbed Israel a “cancerous growth”, (Khamenei, 2020). This view can be challenged with international theory in the school of structural realism that deals in the two notions of defensive and offensive realism, as it will serve to point to a
1 The contested view of Palestine as a legitimate state, not recognized by all countries of the EU. 5 (40)
commonality, if proven applicable, the Israeli state shares with other nations, as actors within an anarchic system and bound by their relative power in relation to other states, (Waltz, 1979, p.109).
This subject is rendered relevant for political science, for what is called “inomvetenskaplig relevans” (Esaiasson, et. al. 2017, p.32) as it becomes of interest to be able to categorize the conduct of the Israeli state in a new way, related to international theory. Whereas there are studies that have concluded on offensive realism with regards to Israeli conduct, studies that exclusively apply tenets of defensive realism are far less popular. Thus this constitutes a gap in political science and a subject which this thesis can aim to fill, (Esaiasson, et. al. 2017, p.32). As we have currently observed globally geopolitics are shifting, there is an economical war raging between the US and China, and the Abraham Accords have altered the firmly cemented expectations of many regarding the conflicts of the Middle East. Political science concerns itself with the historic and contemporary affairs of state, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, pp.32-34) and a case study of Israeli foreign relations connected to both a tumultuous past, and unprecedented present, is thus of the highest appropriateness. This is why I deem this subject to offer relevancy as a contribution to our scientific knowledge on the Israeli state.
In the general sense, beyond the scopes of political science, what is referred to as “utomvetenskaplig relevans”, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, pp.32) it is of interest to broaden the knowledge on the state of Israel and its history as it is a hotly debated topic among many, this constitutes therefore the relevancy outside scientific study in politics, (Esaiasson, et. al. 2017, p.32).
1.3. Research questions
The research questions will draw from the two tenets of defensive realism as stipulated by Waltz and wield these as the questions in applying them to the case study of Israel. Each research question will also correspond with each section of analysis, where the first tenet of defensive realism will be tested against the six-day-war, and the second tenet against the Israeli-Arab peace treaties. Two indicators will also be established for respective questions as to be able to
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discern from the empirical analysis, whether or not the actions of the Israeli states match the tenets. The first indicator ascertains that states form alliances in responses to the balance against threats, meaning that if states pursue actions based on their relative power against other states, this should be evidenced by how alliances are formed in times of perceived danger. The second indicator stipulates that moderation is encouraged by the international system, which states adheres to when in war or politics, this it acts as a pointer towards the second tenet that all states are constrained by an anarchic international system, which by all logic ought to want to promote moderate policies to prevent major conflicts.
Research questions 1. Does the first tenet of defensive realism; any course of action a state pursues is based on their relative power when measured against other states, apply to Israel’s international conduct in the Six-day-war?
2. Does the second tenet of defensive realism; all states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system, apply to Israel’s international conduct in the Abraham Accords?
2. Theory and previous research
In the following episode there will be a brief outline of the discipline of structural realism within international theory, then a presentation of the theoretical foundation for how structural realism is defined by Kenneth Waltz, as well as an explanation for the premise for defensive realism and how it differs from offensive realism. An account will be given for previous research in the field of Israelic international relationships as to further ascertain that the chosen subject offers to fill a scientific gap in political science and solicit what the study contributes with.
Scientific studies carried out with the express purpose of categorizing Israelic conduct internationally are not abundant. With that said, there is no shortage of scientific works analysing the historic dealings of the Israeli state with regards to foreign policy, and there does exist a study carried out with regards to offensive and defensive realism.
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2.1. Presentation of theoretical framework
The theoretical construction of this essay will base itself upon the definition and tenets of defensive realism as put forth by Kenneth Waltz’ work in “Theory of International Politics” with which a comparative analysis of these tenets will be performed as they relate to Israel’s international conduct in war and in peace, which in turn will be based upon both the six-day-war, and the recent Israeli-Arab peace treaties as mediated by the United States of America under the Trump administration.
Structural realism deals in striving to explain the workings of international relations based on the “structural pressures”, that are induced by anarchy, (Pashakhanlou, 2018, p. 29). Structural realism, wherein defensive realism exists, as defined by Waltz can be also summarized into the following passage, “the anarchic system and the distribution of capabilities are powerful constraints and inducements which produce ‘sameness’ in the behaviour of states”, (Lobell, 2017; Serr, 2017, pp. 55-66).
Waltz indicates that states abide by an anarchic system in international relations rather than a hierarchical one, and that this system is composed of functionally similar units, units being states. States function in similar ways and all adhere to the same “gameplay”, so to speak, of an international arena that is anarchistic. Within this principle, Waltz writes concerning states that “[I]n defining international-political structures we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires and forms of government they may have. (...) We ask what range of expectations arises merely from looking at the type of order that prevails among them and the distribution of capabilities”, (Waltz, 1979, p. 98). This quotation exemplifies the principal element of structural realism that states abide by an anarchic system that isn’t intentionally created and plays by the rules of distribution of capabilities.
2.2. Previous research
As mentioned earlier, foregoing research into Israeli international relations which focuses on theory testing are not overflowing, though they exist. However, there exists substantial research on historic analyses of Israeli foreign policies. The following scientific work will be presented as previous research done on the subject of Israeli
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international relations providing two books revolving its history and on the matter of the six-day-war. Secondly two works dedicated to the Abraham Accords are presented, followed by my evaluation of Kenneth Waltz’ “A Theory of International Politics”, as well as of Stephen Walt’s “Origin of Alliances” which will serve to clarify the theoretical relevance for applying defensive realism on the chosen units of analysis regarding Israel.
2.2.1. Clive Jones, Tore T. Petersen: “Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies” In their published book, “Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies”, Jones and Petersen argue for a theoretical categorization of Israel’s history in foreign policies. They present a timeline where they identify three major periods of Israeli relations; the statist period (1948-1973), the ethno-nationalist and statist period, (1973-1985) and the globalized, ethno-nationalist and declining statist period (1985-present day).
It is noted that these periods act as ideal types to clarify “salient trends” (Jones, Petersen, 2013, p. 13), rather than presenting objective categorization. The professed aim of the authors is to answer three main issues on Israeli policies: the composition of the domestic arena, the social make-up of the foreign policy elite and the conflicting approaches that shape the conduct of Israel’s foreign affairs.
Reading further unto the analysis some noteworthy observations made are of relevance to highlight. Some scholars, Efraim Inbar being one of them, have emphasised the relentless hostility of the Middle East towards the very concept of Israel’s existence as a state. It is argued that this compelled Israel to predicate its foreign policy on military force and subordinate it to its defense requirements, (Jones, Petersen, 2013, p. 14). Such issues related to motives behind Israeli foreign relations will be valuable as they come into play in the later analysis of this essay.
2.2.2. Marcel Serr: “Struggle for Existence or Urge for Expansion?”
Serr has in his work focused upon applying both offensive and defensive realism on the case of the six-day war. Serr concerns himself with the question of Israeli motives in his evaluation of the conflict, did Israel act in accordance with defense of their right to exist or did they seek to maximize their power as aligned with offensive realist principles.
Serr evaluates the main principles as given by Waltz for defensive realism, and by
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Mearshheimer for offensive realism. The main difference is stated to be that while Waltz believed that states act in accordance with “balance of power”, (Serr, 2017) in building alliances, and refrain from taking the risk of power-maximizing, Mearsheimer believes that the balance is inefficient and that powerful states have incentive to act aggressively.
Serr proceeds to apply the theories upon the six day war in the form of how both Waltz and Mearsheimer would explain Israeli actions based on their respective theories. Serr concludes that offensive realism is optimal to apply upon Israeli actions in the six-day-war.
2.2.3. Falk Ophir: “The Middle East Accords: an Israeli Perspective”
Ophir in his article offers a view into the Abraham Accords and what the interpretation of signing these treaties are from an Israeli perspective. According to Ophir, the prime motivation for the Accords is peace and the United Arab Emirates along with Israel “decided to officially normalize their relations for the best common interest of their people”, (Ophir, 2020).
Further Ophir states that by signing the Accords, prime minister Netanyahu is said to have been “willing to suspend the extension of Israel’s sovereignty, as sanctioned by the U.S. peace plan” (Ophir 2020), and that Netanyahu thus made it “peace for peace”, rather than “land for peace”, (Ophir 2020). It is thought of as a historic compromise between the Arab nations and Israel given their long and blood stained feuding, especially for the Palestinians, which Ophir claims have the most to gain from the peace, (Ophir 2020).
Ophier proceeds to analyze the many benefits the Accords will yield for both countries and all who would share in it, and he concludes that all peace seeking nations of the Middle East will have a “strong interest in the success of the White House proposal”, (Ophir, 2020).
2.2.4. Imad K. Harb: “The Middle East Accords: an Arab Perspective”
Like Ophier, Harb discusses the meanings and consequences of the Abraham Accords, though in his article based upon an Arab perspective. Contrary to the Israeli perspective this article boldly declares that the Accords won’t secure regional peace, (Harb 2020).
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Harb writes that the only concrete path towards peaceful progression in the Middle East will be an established treaty between Israel and the Palestinians, and that the Arab nations that have joined the Accords have already normalized their relations with Israel for quite some time economically and politically, (Harb 2020).
Harb further writes that the Accords violate an earlier treaty from 2002 called the “Arab Peace Initiative”, (Harb 2020), and that this commitment included an end of hostilities between the Arab nations and Israel provided that they withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza strip, (Harb 2020).
He continues by analyzing perceived dangers among the general Arab populace where he finds that a great majority still view Israel as the greatest regional threat, and conclusively states that the Accords aren’t founded on good terms and is likely to cause more conflict in the Middle East rather than less, (Harb, 2020).
2.2.5. Kenneth Waltz: A theory of International Politics In his work Kenneth Waltz dedicates analysis to a particular strand of international relations theory named structural realism, or neorealism. Within this school Waltz is an advocate for defensive realism. In his endeavour to make clear sense of this theory, Waltz construes two major principles of what constitutes defensive realism in the international arena of politics.
These are; All states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system, (Waltz, 1979, p. 103) and that any course of action a state pursues is based on their relative power when measured against other states, (Waltz 1979, p.105). These two theoretical pointers serve to paint an image of states as unitary actors who all act in the interest of survival, and that the international political system is generated unpromptedly, that is, unintended.
2.2.6. Stephen Walt: The Origin of Alliances In Stephen Walt’s work the author aims to analyse the aspect of the formation of alliances in international relations and how they affect the balance of power. Key questions that the author poses are; What cause is there to find for one state to support another states’ territorial integrity or foreign policy, what kind of selection process do great powers go through in choosing which weak states to safeguard, and what reasons
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do weaker states have for the protection they accept? This culminates into the main research question for Walt, namely what forms alliances in international relations.
This is partly exemplified by including Israel’s six-day-war where the author focuses on the failed pan-arabic ambitions of egyptian president Nasser, and the alliances made between Israel, France and Great Britain due to a common enemy in Egypt. Walt finds that Nasser’s original ambitions (which were unsuccessful) to unite the Arab world under egyptian leadership at least in part predestined his actions in closing the Aqaba bay to Israel and nationalizing the Suez canal, thereby affronting three nations in two strokes, Great Britain, France and Israel, whereby two were great powers, (Walt, 1987, p. 50).
Walt also proposes the “Balance of Threat” theory, which is the notion that, “alliance behaviour”, that is the forming of alliances between states, is based upon the threat that they perceive from other states, (Walt, 1987, p. 5). This is partially presented as an alternative to the notion that states form alliances to balance against power alone, as was the standard stance of balancing power theorists. Walt also posits three additional motives for states forming alliances in relation to the level of threat that is experience, that are of significance; geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions.
2.2.7. Theoretical relevance For my chosen topic of analysis, the theoretical relevance of including Jones and Petersen’s “Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies” is based upon the fact that a historic evaluation of the Israeli state’s conduct in international affairs aligns well with testing this history against the precepts of defensive realism, thus it is a prime example of previous research and a suitable source of material for a backdrop against the empirical analysis. Kenneth Waltz furthermore is by all regards the foremost promoter of the theory, defensive realism, and has the most substantial revision on the subject presented in his work.
2.2.8. Defensive realism Defensive realism is a subschool of the structural realist discipline within international theory. Defensive realism stands as an opposing theory towards offensive realism, (Lobell, 2017).
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Waltz, who is the foremost proponent of defensive realism considers states to exist juxtaposed with a constant risk of war brewing beneath the surface, that “contact without at least occasional conflict is inconceivable”, (Waltz, 1979, p.103). As this presents an element of ubiquitous uncertainty, Waltz deduces it to be an element of the anarchic system in the international arena, (Waltz, 1979, p.103). This heeds the first creed of defensive realism that all states are constrained by an anarchic international system.
Defensive realism suggests that security in the international anarchic system is plentiful, which is also something that Waltz touches upon as an occurring states of affairs, “Among some states at some times, the actual or expected occurrence of violence is low”, (Waltz, 1979, p. 103).
That the leading powers or states seek to maximize their safety by defending the existing balance of power is central here, which is the second tenet of defensive realism, that the actions of states are based upon their relative power against each other. One important distinction made in defensive realism is that of the necessity of violence in the case of aggressor states, (Lobell, 2017).
2.2.9. Offensive realism In contrast to defensive realism, the main difference of offensive realism as according to Mershheimer, holds that the international anarchic system prompts states to maximize safety through their increased power, (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.2) rather than simply maximizing their safety without disclosing how, which is the main critique aimed at defensive realists. The two terms of defensive and offensive realism can thus be understood as a division between states seeking safety in defense, and power in offense2 which marks how the two deviate from each other.
In further looking at the assumptions of offensive realism, it stipulates that security in the international anarchic system is scarce, and therefore the goal of becoming the hegemon is the primary concern of every state. The red thread of reasoning here is that being the most powerful state in the anarchic system dissuades other states from making
2 My own formulation. 13 (40)
a target out of it, and therefore states act in accordance with what will guarantee survival, (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.2; Lobell, 2017).
2.2.10. Applying defensive realism Building upon these definitions I therefore base my analysis upon the presuppositions, and present two tenets for defensive realism which will be tested against two units of analysis in Israel’s international conduct; the six-day war, and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties of modern time.
The motivation for choosing defensive realism as opposed to offensive realism is fairly simple in its rationale. As a suggestive premise, a case can be made to say that the assumptions and/or principles of offensive realism have seen more or most examples in pre-World War times, but have since decreased in overt observations. This could be given the completely altered international system abiding by a majority of democracies and “soft power”3, entities such as the EU.
During the 2500 years of the Roman Republic/Empire for example, (27 AD-1453 BC.), it was far more common to pursue expansionist policies to shield against encroaching enemies of different cultures and religions. And indeed, even during the zenit of Roman power in Europe, the assumption of offensive realism that the most powerful states aspire to be less likely a target of other states doesn’t ring true, as the Romans had constant enemies battering their northern, eastern and western borders and eventually lost their capital to sacking Goths in 410 AD, (Kerrigan, 2017). In modern days however this has changed as imperial hegemons no longer exist which drastically reduces the level of insecurity for states globally, and the international anarchic system abides by political entities that promote democracy and human rights. It therefore becomes more logical to assume that a small nation state only just formed in modern time would rather act in accordance with defensive realism, aspiring towards maximizing safety rather than power.
2.2.11. Hypotheses Based upon the evaluation of previous research, a series of hypotheses for the possible outcomes of the analysis can be derived from the preceding conclusions made by earlier
3 “The use of a country’s cultural or economic influence to persuade other countries to do something, rather than the use of military power.” https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/soft-power (Accessed 2020-11-26) 14 (40)
works, regarding defensive realism and Israeli international relations.
H1: Defensive realism is applicable to Israel’s conduct in international relations with regards to both tenets.
It will be argued that following the execution of the empirical analysis, it will be found that H1 is correct, Israel’s International conduct will correspond with both tenets. This is because we can look to the inferences made by Jones and Petersen in their work on Israel’s clandestine diplomacy.
Israel’s international conduct within the period of 1948-1973 is described as the statist period, meaning that Israel during this period pursued a heavily state-centrist policy wherein the state of the Jewish people, or the state of Israel, was elevated to the position of prime symbol and representative of the nation and its people. Jones and Petersen writes that “the political economy of Israel derived from a collectivist ethos highlighting the challenges of arming and defending the country, settling the waves of new immigrants, penetrating the frontier regions where Arabs were living or which bordered Arab countries”, (Jones & Petersen, 2013, p.16; see also Gilbert 2014). The information gleaned here is that the Israeli state sought to maximize safety, through military defense of the country and through the integration and/or assimilation of immigrants. While the penetrating of frontier regions doesn’t outright declare a defensive realist position, it can equally be argued that this was pursued preemptively for safety as it can be argued to have been a striving for power in offensive realism.
In Waltz’ work furthermore, it is stated that states in their foundation are unitary players who act in the interest of their own survival (Waltz, 1979, p.103), which leans towards both defensive and offensive realism as both a defensive realist state and an offensive one seeks survival, the defensive by maximizing security, the offensive through maximizing power. Waltz work does therefore not offer any partisan information.
In Walt’s work, it is brought up regarding the balance of threat theory, that rather than to act to form alliances to balance against threats, states engage in alliances to balance against threats they perceive from other states. This aligns well with the second tenet of defensive realism, that all actions pursued by states are based on their relative power as measured against other states, which exemplifies a focus on that which presents a threat
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against maximizing security for states rather than opportunities for maximizing power as per offensive realism.
3. Method and Material
This thesis will take the form of a theory testing case study, or as it can also be called a comparative case study, performed on the nation of Israel, with a qualitative method, (Esaiasson et. al. p.109). The comparative case study concerns the use of at least two units of analysis as applied to a studied case and is the more commonly seen method as opposed to “purebred” case studies, (Esaiasson et. al. p.109).
3.1. Choosing cases
The two chosen units for analysis are, the Six-Day War and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties. This selection of analysis units has been made to be able to draw relevant empirical data from cases related to the chosen theory of defensive realism. I have also based these choices in light of my own definition of Israel’s international conduct, which will concern their wartime actions and peacekeeping efforts. Therefore, the Six-Day War will represent the military spectrum whereas the Israeli-Arab peace treaties will stand for the peacekeeping side. In opting for analysing the Six-Day War, the logic behind it is that this conflict which ensued not long after the creation of Israel was pivotal to determine the future of the state, its existence or nonexistence. This war is therefore of great use in terms of extracting material for assessing defensive realism as a theory with regards to how a state acts in war. The Abraham Accords furthermore, represent a milestone that contrasts with the six-day-war, where once Israel faced assured enmity from the Arab world, it now faces assured amity from several of these nations. Therefore it too stands as an appropriate unit of analysis for assessing defensive realism in how it claims that states act in peacetimes, in accordance with the international anarchic system.
One critique of the chosen cases is that there already exists a plethora of conducted research upon the Six-Day War (Machairas, 2017; Goldstein, 2018; Rodman, 2020; Wolf, 2015; Rubner, 2017; Kochavi, 2018; Bar-On, 2012; Shindler, 2013; Cahill, 2018; Zisser, 2017; Yossef, 2018; see also Sagi & Schwartz 2020 & see also Gilbert 2014) which means that including it doesn’t yield an understudied subject, (Esaiasson, et.al. 2017, pp.32-33). Other possible cases that could’ve represented the wartime unit of analysis include the First Arab-Israeli war of 1948, (see Gartman, 2015 & Gilbert,
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2014) or the October war of 1973, (Shindler, 2013; Cahill, 1988; see also Gilbert 2014). The First Arab-Israeli war like the Six-Day War, concerned the fate of the Israeli state as surrounded by the encroaching Arab League where Israel needed to respond to a direct change in the Balance of Threats (see Gartman, 2015 & Gilbert, 2014). And the October War involved as many combattants as the Six-Day War which placed Israel in a defensive position.
However, one notable difference is that the Six-Day War unlike the war of 1948 is the duration. The Six-Day War whose namesake discloses its length, provides the perfect frame for analysis using defensive realism, which avoids the risk of engaging in subtracks when evaluating the conflict. The essay is a theory testing study rather than theory consuming (Esaiasson, et. al. 2017, pp.41-42), meaning the theory is more so in focus and not the cases. A war which spans a full year such as the First-Arab Israeli war (see Gartman, 2015 & Gilbert, 2014), could run the risk of becoming entangled with the minute details and happenings rather than with the analysis.
The October War of 1973 is less suitable due to the involvement of the US and the Soviet Union some time into the conflict, which turned the war into an indirect clash between superpowers in defense of their allies, (Encyclopedia Britannica). Thus it shifts focus from Israeli conduct, the expressed purpose of the essay. which here was centered around negotiations with the US as mediators (Encyclopedia Britannica) .
Analyzing the Six-Day War using defensive realism as an exclusive theoretical tool may not appear to provide new knowledge on its own. But joined with the Abraham Accords it presents a new perspective wherein we can see successive defensive realist actions by the state of Israel in a “before and after” (George and Benett, 2005, p.67) scenario in wartimes and peacetimes. Applied to a case which more popularly is said to correspond with offensive realism, this creates a somewhat controversial but also challenging research design, (Esaiasson, et. al. 2017, pp.31-35; George & Benett, 2005, p.63).
To further substantiate my theoretical foundation, I will also elect to base my research upon the method of a “disciplined configurative case study” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 62), as defined by George & Bennett. This selection is relevant as per the definition a disciplined configurative study deals in the following: “Disciplined configurative case
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studies use established theories to explain a case. The emphasis may be on explaining a historically important case, or a study may use a case to exemplify a theory for pedagogical purposes”, (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 62).
The utilized material consists of a fair mix of literature and official governmental reports that form the empirical analysis. Primary literature consists of books and academic articles both, while secondary literature revolves around smaller articles as put forth by reputable platforms of history such as Britannica.com. The main bulk of the theory is centered around the works of Kenneth Waltz’, as used to define the basis for the theory of realism and defensive realism (Waltz, 1979. p.103). Added to this I also make use of Stephen Walt’s “Origin of Alliances” which also delves into defensive realism as pertaining to the “Balance against Threats” theory, (Walt, 1987, p.5).
In order to pen down the second spectrum of the analysis, the Israeli-Arab peace treaties, the official documents of the treaties as available on the White House’s website will be reviewed. This due to the fact that the Trump Administration who has hitherto led the US were mediators of these treaties. In being able to account for the six-day-war, the main use of sources will firstly make use of academic articles which will serve to introduce the subject. Furthermore, Stephen Walt’s “Origin of Alliances” offers good insight into the conflict with a particular focus upon international relations. In addition a sample of scientific articles will be utilized to further bring nuance to the evaluation of the war.
3.2. Operationalisation of theories
The operationalisation of my thesis is established as follows: The thesis is based upon a theory testing case study, which is defined as a study that “assesses the validity and scope conditions of single or competing theories” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 62). But can also be said to follow the logic of a disciplined configurative case study as it is defined by examining historically important cases by applying theories, (George & Bennett, 2005, p.62). The accumulated material is methodologically reviewed to ensure its appropriateness for the topic. The thesis is based upon a systematic method that seeks out relevant literature and articles, and critically analyses and scrutinizes the results (George & Bennett, 2005, p.69) .
I will base the theory of defensive realism upon two tenets that is most widely
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associated with its explanation of the actions of states as put forth by Waltz, (Lobell, 2017, Walt, 1987, p.7). These are firstly that any course of action a state pursues is based on their relative power when measured against other states, (Lobell, 2017), and secondly that all states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system, (Lobell, 2017). I will operationalize these two principles into two indicators which will be used to identify correlation with the units of analysis and the tenets of defensive realism. These will be states form alliances in responses to the balance against threats (Walt, 1987, p. 9), for the first tenet, and the second indicator that moderation is encouraged by the international system (Lobell, 2017), which will correspond with the second tenet. By doing this I can then divide the units of analysis to correspond with my definition of Israeli international conduct, that is their wartime actions and their peacekeeping efforts, represented by the six-day war and the Abraham Accords respectively. The research questions will then be designated to answer both cases, the first tenet and its indicator will be tested against the six-day war and the second tenet against the Abraham Accords.
Then proceeds the evaluation of my theoretical foundation that clarifies the discipline of structural realism as well as its subschools, defensive realism and offensive realism. When this is done, and following a brief motivation for the choice of defensive realism, the empirical analysis is divided into a total of four sections, the analysis of the six-day-war, the conclusions drawn from it, the Israeli-Arab peace treaties and the conclusions derived from there. A finishing discussion will critically assess the findings and results as well as include reasoning for future research on the subject.
The empirical analysis will follow a systemic logic wherein it accounts for the political background of all combattants in the war followed by a review of the conflict itself, (George & Bennett, 2005, p.69). The latter part of the analysis dealing in the Israeli-Arab peace treaties will examine the foremost accessible document, the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, and the available official utterances made by the United States with regards to the Kingdom of Bahrain and Sudan.
A section on conclusions will follow both analyses wherein results are deduced from the research, and is followed by a general discussion on thesis’ execution and possibilities for future research. The first conclusions drawn on the six-day-war will be
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corresponded with the first tenet on defensive realism to be able to gain results on Israeli international conduct in war, whereas the conclusions in the Israeli-Arab peace treaties will be compared with the second tenet revolving around Israel’s peacekeeping efforts.
3.3. Delimitation, Validity & Reliability
The delimitation of my thesis has been based on the principles of a concise and coherent structure for theory and purpose. In order to sufficiently focus my work I will limit myself in two major ways. Firstly, my theoretical base will consist of the two commonly recognized criteria for what constitutes defensive realism as according to Waltz (Waltz, 1979, pp.100-109; Lobell, 2017 & Walt, 1987). This is done in order for my analysis to be clear cut, which I will achieve with a concise theory on the terms I use and apply, (Esaiasson et.al. 2017, p.37). Secondly, I will limit the number of analysis units to revolve around two major events, the six-day war and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties. This I do in order for the analysis to not be too broad and inconclusive in its results (Esaiasson et.al. 2017, pp.33-37). Including too many research questions would pose the risk of an unclear trajectory for the essay, whereas too many units of analysis could derail the connection between analysis and theory or risk putting too much emphasis on analysis and forego the theoretical foundation. With the chosen delimitation my purpose and methodology will be readily comprehensible, my research question focused and my units of analysis feasible for the given space of my bachelor’s thesis.
The conceptual validity of this essay lies in the use of the established theory of defensive realism, well acclaimed within IR-theory and academia, which I operationalize into two principles to be tested against two cases of Israeli history, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, pp.61-62. These two tenets permeate the paper’s analysis and thus creates not only conceptual validity but also ensures that the essay stays away from conceptual stretching, that is the overextension of theoretical concepts that achieves the opposite effect and blurs any discernible definition, (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 19-20). The advantage of case studies is that they allow for an easier translation of theoretical concepts unto chosen empirical units of analysis (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 19-20), and allows for a selection of a limited set of cases to examine which lends to clarity in the purpose of an essay. In order to also achieve validity of quality for the thesis furthermore, a combination of conceptual validity and reliability is needed. The
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reliability of a thesis revolves around the absence of random and unsystematic errors, which is to be avoided by way of performing the empirical analysis of this thesis in a systematic and clear manner thus rendering the results as derived from the analysis correct and reliable, (Esaiasson et. al., 2017, pp. 64-65).
4. Analysis, Conclusions & Results
The Middle Eastern strip of land adjacent to the mediterranean known today as Israel, boasts a history that has its genesis 2000 years back, (Gilbert, 2014, p.11; Cahill, 1988, p.17). But the rule of Israel has been torn between an array of different powers from the Jews to the Arabs, to the crusaders, to once more being controlled by Arabic caliphates, to the Ottoman Empire and finally after being under the domain of the British Empire, return to Jewish/Israeli control, (Cahill, 1988, pp.11-17; Gilbert, 2014, p.11).
Following the end of WWII the global empire of that time, Great Britain, oversaw the historic edict of the Balfour Declaration in 1917. This edict in effect absolved British control over the province of Palestine, and granted the Jewish diaspora all over North America and Europe a national home for themselves. Returning to their ancient lands in a massive migration, the modern Israeli state was thus formed in 1948, (Bryant, 2001, p.16; Lorch; Shindler, 2013, p.38; see also Gilbert 2014).
4.1. The Six-Day-War The six-day-war, was an extremely brief altercation between June 5-10, 1967, between the fledgling nation of Israel and a coalition of Arab countries, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Also known as the “June War”, (Kochavi, 2018) or alternatively the “Third Arab-Israeli War” (Machairas, 2017), at its conclusion, Israel had incapacitated all her enemies and won a decisive victory, capuring the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights on the Syrian border, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem, (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020).
Israel itself was structured as a parliamentary democracy wherein “significant religious influence”, (Walt, 1987, p.57; see also Sagi & Schwartz, 2018), was detectable, as well as a unique form of a welfare-state. Internationally, following the establishment of the
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Israeli state in 1947 which were the results of zionist4 efforts spanning decades and with the support of both superpowers, (Walt, 1987, p.57; see also Sagi & Schwartz, 2018) Israel began its international conduct with a nonalignment policy5. This however, changed as of the 1950’s where Israeli foreign policy now held a strong pro-western stance, which was largely due to growing tensions with the Soviet Union who backed hostile Israeli neighbours and thus created a clear threat against the balance of threats, (Walt, 1987, p.57; Yossef, 2018, p.115; see also Gilbert, 2014).
The main concern of the young state that was Israel had been military security, (Walt, 1987, p.104; Serr, 2017; see also Gilbert 2014) rather than expansionism or power maximization in “altering the distribution of power in their favor”, as posited by Mearsheimer, (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.3). Israel had been successful in asserting and establishing military superiority since its foundation, via utilizing their own domestic assets, and by support from both France and the US, (Karsh, 2018, pp.114-117; see also Gilbert 2014). Regional control was therefore assured, and Israel had therefore despite its relatively small size and populus in comparison, been the foremost military power in the Middle East throughout the majority of the examined period, (Serr, 2017; Rodman, 2020; Walt, 1987, p. 57). Israel’s main approach in international conduct was the employment of preemption and reprisal strategies against their opponents, (Walt, 1987, p.105; see also Gilbert 2014 & Shindler, 2013) . At the same time, Israel also worked towards international recognition as a legitimate nation-state, and for peace settlements with their ubiquitous foes, the Arabs, (Walt, 1987, p.104; see also Gilbert 2014). According to Walt, the existence of a Jewish state and the threat it posed was one issue that the Arab world, publicly at the very least agreed upon, even as they bickered internally on how to formalise their opposition towards it, (Walt, 1987, p.105).
Of this period leading up to, and during, the six-day-war it is stated that it was marked by the aggravated regional rivalries due to rapid social change taking place within all states, (Kochavi, 2018; Tal, 2009; see also Gilbert 2014). Many nations also faced issues regarding domestic legitimacy, which yielded a condition in the Middle East wherein military foreign successes could result in huge gain, but foreign defeat could result in complete undoing, (Walt, 1987, p. 58).
4 “Jewish nationalist movement that has had as its goal the creation and support of a Jewish national state in Palestine, the ancient homeland of the Jews.” https://www-britannica-com.proxy.lnu.se/topic/Zionism (Accessed 2020-12-05). 5 “A national policy repudiating political or military alliance with a world power.” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/nonalignment (Accessed 2020-12-05). 22 (40)
Diplomatic relations between Great Britain, Syria and Iraq were suspended during the weeks leading up to the war, wherein both Syria and Iraq followed the lead of Egypt who had seized diplomatic contact a couple of years prior due to president Nasser’s accusation of British fighting on behalf of Israel, seen as a threat from western powers colluding with the Jewish state against the Arab world, (Kochavi, 2018; Machairas, 2017).
In spring of 1967, president Nasser swayed the general secretary of the UN to withdraw the international peacekeeping forces in Sinai, (Goldstein, 2018; Wolf, 2015; Machairas, 2017; Tal, 2009; Gartman, 2015, p.178; see also Gilbert, 2014). The Aqaba bay then once more flung its gates shut, which as soon as perceived by Israel stirred immediate military mobilization of the IDF reserves when their cargo trade faced grave threat, (Goldstein, 2018, Wolf, 2015, Kochavi, 2018; Kurtulus, 2007; Bryant, 2001, p.17; Gartman, 2015, p.179). Considerable Egyptian ground troops following the closing of the bay mobilized on the Sinai Peninsula, (Gilbert, 2014, p.320; Goldstein, 2018, Wolf, 2015, Machairas, 2017; Bar-On, 2012; Lorch, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Serr, 2017; Gartman, 2015, p.178; Yossef, 2018, p.117; Tal, 2009) however according to sources, Egypt and Syria were responding to a false Intel sent by the Soviet Union disclosing that Israel was amassing forces along the Syrian border preparing for an offensive, (Gilbert, 2014, p.320; Goldstein, 2018, Wolf, 2015, Machairas, 2017; Serr, 2017; Karsh, 2017, p.6; Gartman, 2015, p.178). Nasser’s original motivation therefore being responding to a direct military threat and by mobilizing Egyptian troops on the Sinai Peninsula, dissuading Israel from the alleged attack, (Karsh, 2017, p.6; Goldstein, 2018; Rubner, 2017; Serr, 2017; Yossef, 2018, pp.114-115 ). What also can be said to have sealed the deal for an Israeli perception of threat against its existence was the signing of a joint defense treaty by Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan just before the war, (Kurtulus, 2007; Machairas, 2017; see also Gilbert 2014).
Of Israel’s own responses to the closing of the Aqaba bay and the blocking of Israeli cargo, Sagi & Schwartz writes that internal politics in Israel had strong inclinations towards caution and moderation, (2020). Front figures of the National Religious Party such as Yosef Shapira had “adamantly insisted that all moves should be exhausted before going to battle” (Sagi & Schwartz, 2020, p.7) and prime minister Levi Eshkol
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was quoted stating “we do not want war”, (Bar-On, 2012). Shapira had furthermore pushed for international support pending every move made by the Israeli state before and during the Six-Day War (Sagi & Schwartz, 2020,p.7), and reasoned that it was not only a legitimate but an existential need for Israel. While Israel might be capable of handling one Arab country such as Syria, if they were to receieve Soviet support Israel “would be risking suicide” (Sagi & Schwartz, 2020, p.7), referring evidently to a clear need for alliance building.
Nonetheless, the offensives made by Egypt against the Aqaba bay prompted a decisive military move from Israel who hitherto had not massed any military strength along any border, and the Israeli state struck first on June 5, 1967. With astounding speed the Egyptian air force which had still been stationed on ground was wiped out, (Wolf, 2015; Goldstein, 2018; Rubner, 2017; Karsh, 2017, p.11; Lorch, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Bar-On, 2012, Gilbert, 2014, p.336; Cahill, 1988, p.39). Israeli ground forces then moved in on the Sinai Peninsula and after a mere three days, held dominion over it, closing in on the Suez canal, (Wolf, 2015, Rodman, 2020; Machairas, 2017; Rubner, 2017; Zisser, 2017; Bar-On, 2012; Gilbert 2014, p.336). The Golan heights along the Israeli-Syrian border furthermore, was a target of special importance for Israel as they saw Syrian military presence in the area as an incontrovertible threat against the Israeli settlements in the Jordan valley, which hitherto had already suffered harassment by Syrian offensives, given their expressed ambitions to expand into a “greater Syria” encompassing both Israel and Jordan, (Zisser, 2017; Machairas, 2017; Gilbert, 2014, p.337).
Simultaneously with acting against Egyptian hostility, Israel now possessing air superiority had altered their relative power against the other states and then also moved to occupy the Jordanian part of Jerusalem and pushed on eastward, past the so called West bank unto the river Jordan, (Yossef, 2018, p.117; Tal, 2009; Wolf, 2015, Machairas, 2017, Gilbert, 2014, p.339). The king of Jordan, Hussein, then pressed for a ceasefire following the destruction of his army by Israel, likewise did Syria in the north vye for peace as Israel successfully had moved to occupy the Golan heights, (Rodman, 2020; Machairas, 2017; Goldstein, 2018; Tal, 2009; Lorch, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs). During the span of six days, Israel had secured every front and doubled their territories, (Machairas, 2017; Goldstein, 2018; Wolf, 2015; Rubner, 2017; Lorch, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Cahill, 1988, p.40; see also Gilbert 2014). The prime
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minister of the time, Golda Meir, refused to rescind an inch of the gained regions, and despite being continuously condemned by the security council for doing so, Israel, now controlling the entirety of Jerusalem made it its national capital, (Rodman, 2020; Karsh, 2017; Gilbert, 2014, p.339). Despite this, Rodman writes that Israel had prior to the offensive against Jordan urged the kingdom to not enter the war and hoped for Syrian neutrality, (2020). And the Israeli Defense Forces, despite having all the resources to, did not desire to fight on multiple fronts, and only launched an offensive against Jordan when the kingdom entered the conflict in support of Egypt on June 5, (Rodman, 2020; Machairas see also Gilbert 2014)
Results that spawned from the six-day-war for the defeated included a greater need for reliance upon Soviet support for Syria and Egypt, (Wolf, 2015; Kochavi, 2018). Soviet intervention in the region escalated heavily following the war, and the Soviet president Nikolai Podgorny personally traveled to Cairo to replenish the military resources of Egypt with the Soviet Union’s own means, although the Soviet Union was hesitant to fully arm Egypt once more in fear of another conflict, (Wolf, 2015, Kochavi, 2018). The first of these will in this section be examined with regards to the analysis on the six-day-war and Israeli international conduct in war.
1. Does the first tenet of defensive realism; any course of action a state pursues is based on their relative power when measured against other states, apply to Israel’s international conduct? Indicator: States form alliances in responses to threats against the balance of power.
In the section of the six-day-war, we firstly observe the tenet of the international power relations between nations and their alliance building, guided by the indicator that in war and politics, states act in forming alliances in accordance with perceived threats to the balance of power. At the first stage of the war, we can detect that Nasser opting to shut off the Aqaba Bay for Israeli ships prompted a reactionary response from Israel, (Goldstein, 2018, Wolf, 2015, Kochavi, 2018). As Israel found themselves cut off from a vital part of their maritime trade and also witnessed Egyptian troops massing on the Sinai Peninsula,(Wolf, 2015; Kochavi, 2018; Rodman, 2020; Goldstein, 2018; Wolf, 2015; see also Gilbert 2014) the subsequent retaliation in incapacitating Egyptian aircrafts and occupying Sinai corresponds well with the principle of defensive realism in a state acting in relation with their relative power against other states. We learn that
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Israel despite its size and population had upheld a superb and superior military around their encroaching Arab neighbours, (Serr, 2017; Rodman, 2020; Walt, 1987, p. 57) and therefore had the capacity to strike preemptively, to make the first move and thus instigate official hostilities. We also see one of Walt’s stipulated principles on defensive realism in that Egypt possessed geographical proximity towards Israel and the Suez canal it guarded which in Walt’s own words “increased its power relative to that of its neighbours”, (Walt, 1987, p. 53). Thus we discover another aspect of the six-day-war that aligns with the tenet of defensive realism.
When examining further the topic of threats and how they drive alliances, it is stated that Syria’s known aspirations leading up to the war included the creation of “great Syria”, which territorially was to encompass Lebanon, Jordan and most importantly, Israel. With the knowledge that Israel gradually shifted towards a pro-western stance that allied themselves with both Great Britain and France, we find a preceding pretext in the Syrian threat of swallowing the Israeli nation up in their expansionist foreign policy which eventually culminated in Syria losing the strategic Golan Heights to Israel, (Zisser, 2017; Machairas, 2017; Wolf, 2015; Kochavi, 2018; Goldstein, 2018; Tal, 2009; Gilbert, 2014, p.337). This does thus yield yet another point for the indicator for the first tenets, that states form alliances in responses to threats, and therefore that they act in accordance with their relative power against other states.
The genesis of hostilities in the six-day-war can be seen as having come about due to the actions of Egypt under president Nasser. What prompted military action from Israel’s side was the closing of Aqaba bay, (Machairas, 2017; Goldstein, 2018; Rodman, 2020; Wolf, 2015; Rubner, 2017; Kochavi, 2018; Bar-On, 2012; see also Gilbert 2014) which directly blockaded Israeli maritime trade and threatened their commerce. Official instigation of the six-day-war culminated once more in Egypt’s actions as Nasser, following the mobilization of Egyptian troops on the Sinai peninsula and signing of the joint defense act, then once more shut down the Aqaba bay, (Wolf, 2015; Kochavi, 2018; Rodman, 2020; Goldstein, 2018; Wolf, 2015; Rubner, 2017; Yossef, 2018, pp.116-117; see also Gilbert 2014). An added course of action here was that Egypt mobilized considerable ground troops on the Sinai Peninsula, this time implying full scale war with Israel. Such a move resulted in a devastating first blow by Israel who incapacitated Egyptian air force with remarkable speed and conquered the Sinai Peninsula with their own ground troops over the span of three days, (Wolf, 2015;
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Goldstein, 2018; Rubner, 2017; Rodman, 2020, Gilbert, 2014, p.336).
The last noteworthy observation is this “Israel also moved to occupy the Jordanian part of Jerusalem and pushed on eastward, past the so called West bank unto the river Jordan”, (Wolf, 2015, Machairas, 2017, Gilbert, 2014, p.339) as this prompted both Jordan and Syria to vye for peace with Israel who now controlled the entirety of Jerusalem as well as the Golan Heights on the border of Syria, ( Kochavi, 2018; Wolf, 2015; Rodman, 2020; Goldstein, 2018; Rubner, 2017; see also Gilbert 2014) . Here we see a sort of inverse example of forming alliances, though a term loosely used in this example, in response to threats as Israeli military superiority drove Syria and Jordan to broker peace and withdraw from the war in direct response to threats against the sovereignty of their states. What is also of importance is Israel’s initial plea that both Syria and Jordan would stay out of the war, and that political voices within Israel wished to exhaust evert avenue before engaging in battle, (Sagi & Schwartz, 2020, p.7), and were averse to fight a multiple-front offensive even as they possessed full abilities to do so, only beginning their attacks once Jordan decidedly sided with Egypt, (Rodman, 2020; Machairas, 2017; Yossef, 2018, p.117).
Conclusively it is deduced that the first tenet of defensive realism, that states act in accordance with their relative power measured against other states, is applicable on a satisfactory level when examining the six-day-war. Numerous examples of forming alliances in response to threats between Israel and western powers, as well as Egypt under Nasser seeking Arab alliances, can be identified as the very sparks that started the six-day-war, which validates the indicator of the first tenet. The first research question has therefore been answered with a positive result.
4.2. The Abraham Accords
The Israeli-Arab peace treaties are officially dubbed the Abraham Accords, and denote the agreement between the state of Israel and The United Arab Emirates. Adding to this there has also been initiation to diplomatic normalization between Israel, Bahrain and Sudan to make relationships amicable and allow trade to ensue.
The Abraham Accords begins by declaring for the vision of a peaceful, stabilized and prosperous Middle East, for the benefit of all its states and peoples. The Abraham Accord also aims to foster good cooperation between the two states. The Accord notes
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most noteworthily: “Believing that the further developments of friendly relations meets the interests of lasting peace in the Middle East and that challenges can only be effectively addressed by cooperation and not by conflict”, (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 1; Feuer, 2020; see also Ophir, 2020).
The Accord also makes mention of the Christians, Jews and Muslims as common ancestors of Abraham as per the Abrahamitic belief, and thus recognizes the aim to engender peaceful coexistence for all faiths, denominations and nationalities in the region. The Accord finalizes its introduction by also noting the mutual desire of Israel and the United Arab Emirates, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to work towards a “negotiated solution” (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 2; see also Harb 2020), to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that observes the needs and visions of both parties.
Then comes the official guidelines to which the parties much conform in a numeric system. The first tenet of the Accord introduces the establishment of diplomatic relations and normalization between the United Emirates and Israel, as well as the enactment of bilateral ties, (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 2; Feuer, 2020) . The second point outlines the general principles, or guidelines of the terms of the Accord. Firstly, the relations between the two states shall be guided by the charter of the United Nations and they shall both abide by international law. Most prominently both states will recognize the sovereignty of the other and respect their right to peace and security, (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 2). All disputes and quarrels furthermore, are to be settled in peaceful manners. In line with these principles the third point ascertains that embassies are to be erected in both states and resident ambassadors be exchanged.
As a more concrete measure towards the goal of peace and stability between the nations, Israel and the United Arab Emirates are stipulated in the Accord to establish bilateral cooperation in spheres of national affairs. These include such areas as finance and investment, healthcare, visas and consular advice, maritime agreements, legal cooperation as well as science, technology and “Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”, (The Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 3; see also Ophir, 2020).
In the section of mutual understanding and coexistence it is outlined that both parties
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are to work towards cultivating people-to-people programs, interfaith dialogues and various exchanges of cultural, academic, youth and scientific natures. Both parties are also to work towards combating extremism, most prominently in the form of terrorism which is stated to promote nothing but, “hatred and division”, (The Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 3). Both parties are to prevent radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations, and combat discrimination and incitements of extremist/radical natures. The two parties are conclusively on this point, to establish a “High-Level Joint Forum for Peace and Co-Existence”, purposed to advance and realise these goals.
There is also a strategic agenda for the Middle East as a whole. In this section, Israel and the United Arab Emirates are to align with the United States with the aim of expanding regional diplomacy, trade, stability and other forms of cooperation. Both parties are to be committed to work with the United States “and others, as appropriate” (The Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 3), in order to pursue the goals of peace, stability and prosperity both in the bilateral relations between themselves and for the region of the Middle East as a whole, (The Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 3, see also Harb, 2020). In this commitment, both Israel and the United Arab Emirates are also to seize upon regional economic opportunities, “promote a culture of peace across the region”, and consider joint aid and developmental programs with other nations of the Middle East.
Conclusively the Accord cements respect for the obligation. Neither party is to involve themself in nor sign a treaty or agreement that violates the existing treaty. Both parties are subject to article 103 of the charter of the United Nations6 and in the event of conflict between the obligations of the parties under the treaty and any other given obligation, the terms and obligations of the treaty shall be “binding and implemented”, (The Abraham Accords Peace Treaty, 2020, p. 4).
Apart from the Abraham Accords proper, there is also an endorsement of the treaty issued as a “joint statement”, between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Kingdom of Bahrain. Israel and Bahrain herein signed a “joint communique”
6 “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” https://legal.un.org/repertory/art103.shtml (Accessed 2020-12-05). 29 (40)
aimed at the establishment of “Diplomatic, Peaceful and Friendly relations”, (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020).
Bahrain furthermore signed the “Memorandums of Understanding”, revolving around cooperation with trade and economy, air services, postal and telecommunication, agriculture and financial services with the state of Israel. The state of Israel and the Kingdom of Bahrain are described in the statement as “two of the most dynamic nations in the Middle East”, (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020), and that their agreement will contribute to a more secure and prosperous future for the parties and for the Middle East as a region, (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020, Feuer, 2020).
The statement follows that the two parties signed a Peace Declaration in Washington that endorsed the principles of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. The “chapter”, of this peace treaty is described as the continuation of the regional and international determination to further peace in the Middle East, and that the three countries now face an array of interdependent challenges which will mutually benefit them all.
Alike the United Emirates, Bahrain will join in with Israel and the United States in the strategic agenda for peace in the Middle East, as well as “expand avenues for cooperation that are anchored within shared values and interests”, (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020). It is also stated that the three nations share the same view on the challenges, threats and opportunities present in the region of the Middle East and that through closer cooperation on security, public diplomacy and economic engagement, they can together “unlock the potential of the region”, which is to be understood as the general development of peace, stability, cooperation developmental and military aid, (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020). Bahrain will also aspire towards an enduring resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alongside the other nations of the Accord.
The last concerned party of the Accord, Sudan, has thus far confirmed that a peace settlement with the state of Israel is to take place. Like in the case of Israel and the
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United Emirates, it is expressed that the long term foes are now agreed to foster normalization between each other, (Remarks by President Trump Announcing Normalization of Relations Between Sudan and Israel, 2020). An official treaty has not been signed as of yet but is by all indications underway.
The Israeli-Arab peace treaties will now be examined in relation to the second tenet of defensive realism.
2. Does the second tenet of defensive realism; all states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system, apply to Israel’s international conduct? - Indicator: States act in war and politics in accordance with the international system encouraging moderation.
When diving into the Abraham Accords, we can firstly observe that the treaty stipulates the principle of cooperation in preference to any sort of conflict, key words also include peace, stability and prosperity not merely for the concerned parties but for the Middle East as a whole, (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p. 1; Feuer, 2020; see also Ophir, 2020). An example of striving for moderation as encouraged by the international system, comes first in that both parties are to recognize their common ancestor of Abraham as semitic peoples, and that Christians, Muslims and Jews alike are to coexist peacefully, neither side with larger influence than the other.
Following this the treaty establishes that all concerned states, that is Israel, the United Emirates, as well as Egypt and the kingdom of Jordan, who subscribe to the accord are to work towards a “negotiated solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that “observes the needs and visions of both parties”, (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.2; see also Ophir 2020 & Harb 2020). Given the ferocity of this conflict, it could’ve been in Israel’s interest to push for favorable terms in this accord, yet the treaty speaks of a balanced approach that doesn’t demand any immediate concessions from any of the warring states, which yields another example of encouraged moderation.
Both parties are also by the terms of the accord bound to the charter of the UN, which entails that international law will abide in both Israel and the Emirates, and all disputes and potential conflicts are to be settled peacefully, (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.2). Bilateral relations that follow due to this includes cooperation in
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a significant amount of spheres ranging from healthcare, finance, maritime trade and consular advice (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.2; see also Ophir 2020 & Harb 2020), so that neither side need compete with each other in the advancement of these categories, another nod towards the international system being desirous of moderation, and the two states of Israel and the Emirates therefore being constrained by such an international anarchic order. Another point on the agenda of bilateral relations mentions the joint efforts of the states to combat extremism and terrorism, to pursue interfaith dialogues and people-to-people programs, (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.3) . This will pave the way towards preventing radicalization of the general populace and recruitment into terrorist ranks, which is a concrete example of moderate policies that the accord ascertains, that Israel readily agrees to.
In the next part of the treaty and in further evidencing moderate encouragement, the affected parties are to align themselves with American interests in pursuing regional diplomacy, trade, stability and various other forms of cooperation within the entirety of the Middle East region,(Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.4; see also Ophir 2020 & Harb 2020). The edict that both Israel and the Emirates are to “seize upon regional economic opportunities”,(Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.3) as well as “promote a culture of peace across the region” (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.3), speaks further of the international systems heavy inclination towards erecting an order of moderation wherein an overall frame of peace guides equal opportunities to economic relations and bilateral cooperation. This substantiated by the closing passage in this section of the accord that both parties are to consider “joint aid and developmental programs”, with other nations of the Middle East as to not in any way imply that a hegemony between a set of allies accrues in the region.
Then follows that the treaty isn’t to be violated by other preexisting or upcoming obligations or concords between the parties and other nations (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.4), as well as both states being tied by article 103 of the UN charter that dictates “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail” (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020, p.4). Thus we can derive from this stipulation that the international anarchic system, which encourages moderation, demands that its laws and terms take precedence over any other obligation or eventual
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dispute within the national affairs and international relations of Israel and the Emirates.
The kingdom of Bahrain supports the Abraham Accords and in a joint statement between it, the United States of America and Israel, they too put forth to establish “diplomatic, peaceful and friendly relations” (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020) with the state of Israel. Bahrain furthermore will establish cooperation with Israel regarding several spheres of national business including trade, economy, air and postal services, which is stipulated in what is called the “Memorandums of Understanding” (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020). This keeps in line with the aspirations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates as further examples of Israel agreeing to moderate policies with other states. This especially as the agreement is described as a “continuation of the regional and international determination to further peace” (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020) in the region of the Middle East, signalling its adherence to the wishes of the international system. The interdependence of the three countries as it is expressed, will face an array of challenges that are to be mutually beneficial for all. The key words of interdependence and mutual benefit marks strong moderation in the international conduct between Israel, the Emirates and Bahrain as it describes a situation wherein neither part is to have a significant upper hand in any way whether regarding economy, technology, military or otherwise (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020). All three countries are also expected to reap equal benefits from the future challenges which they face with a dependence upon each other.
Bahrain also joins the American strategic agenda that aims to further peace, prosperity and stability in the Middle East as guided by the principles and charter of the UN (Joint Statement by the United States, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the State of Israel, 2020), which frames the conduct of the nation within moderation both in relations to Israel and to other nations of the region.
Lastly, Sudan has officially declared its intention to normalize relations with Israel. Although an actual treaty hasn’t been formalised, it is likely to be underway, but cannot speak for any eventual moderation encouraged by the international anarchic system that Israel agrees to (Remarks by President Trump Announcing Normalization of Relations
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Between Sudan and Israel, 2020).
In conclusion of this second part of the analysis, there has yet again been strong support for defensive realism. This time with regards to the second tenet, we see various substantial examples of states being constrained by an international anarchic system as evidenced by numerous moderate policies being both enforced and encouraged. Israel has unreservedly signed and ratified the Abraham Accords and welcomed supporting nations to its terms, thus we find the outcome here that the second tenet of defensive realism has had a positive result.
The purpose of this thesis has been to assess defensive realism based on two tenets that defines the theory. Subsequently the theory has been applied to the case study of Israeli history revolving around the six-day-war and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties. The two research questions concerned whether the tenets of defensive realism were applicable to the respective parts of Israeli history. The results gained from the performed analysis and subsequent conclusions has shown that the following hypothesis H1: Defensive realism is applicable to Israel’s conduct in international relations with regards to both tenets, out of the three posed possibilities has been accurate. H1 has proven itself correct as both units of analysis yielded positive results for the two tenets of defensive realism, which in turn gives support for the original theorem of the thesis that defensive realism is applicable to the international conduct of Israel.
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5. Conclusion
This thesis has examined the appliance of theory, defensive realism, upon the case of Israel with regards to the six-day-war and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties. In doing so it has aimed to test two tenets of defensive realism’s theory as based on the works of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, and see whether or not it can categorize the state of Israel’s international conduct with regards to the two spectra, wartime actions and peacekeeping efforts. The ensuing analysis has brought forth a positive result regarding both research questions, the first of which being if the first tenet of defensive realism; any course of action a state pursues is based on their relative power when measured against other states, apply to Israel’s international conduct. The Indicator for this question was: States form alliances in responses to threats against the balance of power. The results displayed numerous concrete examples of alliances formed in response to an array of threats from the Israeli-western alliances, to the pan-Arabist alliances.
The second research question concerned the second tenet of defensive realism; all states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system, and if this applied to Israel’s international conduct. For an indicator here we had: States act in war and politics in accordance with the international system encouraging moderation. The Abraham Accords presented yet again, many examples of moderation as prompted by the international system and endorsed by Israel who readily signed the accord. As a consequence the presented hypothesis has also been proven accurate which predicted both tenets of defensive realism to be applicable on the six-day-war and the Israeli-Arab Peace treaties respectively, and thus on the case study of Israel as a whole.
On the subject of the given operationalisation of the thesis, it can be stated that this paper has followed the established frames successfully and subsequently reached results based on it. The two units of analysis, the six-day-war and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties, have systematically been examined in relation to respective research questions. Conclusions on respective units of analysis, the war and the peace treaties, have afterwards methodically reviewed the relevant information and derived the results. The theoretical foundation has consistently been part of the empirical analysis as a red thread and has been a bulk in deriving the results from both units of analysis. The results that have shown from the analysis have in the first section shown many examples of both Israel and other nations of the Middle East acting in relation with their relative power against other states. Israel utilized a superior military to strike
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preemptively against Egypt, Syria and Jordan, Egypt used its position over the Suez Canal to close the adjacent Aqaba Bay. Also in response to perceived threats as a consequence of this, states are shown reacting in war with alliance building, as Egypt with Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The latter two when threatened by a vastly superior Israeli military, resigned to peace and withdrawal from the war, an indirect nod towards responding to the balance of threats in terms of what alliances a state possesses.
In the second section we also find numerous displays of how Israel agrees to moderation as encouraged by the international anarchic system. A prominent example being the strategic agenda to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict non-violently with consideration given to the needs of both parties rather than one. The treaty also binds all parties to have the charter of the UN take precedence over any internal or regional obligations or conflicts, therefore signalling willing adherence to the international system. Added to this we see many stipulations of cooperation within spheres such as economy, tourism and technology, and the combatment of extremism from all sides, terrorist and religious in nature, so that neither side stands free to gain advantage or advance ahead of the other, thus, moderation.
Based on the findings of this thesis, future research could include an established format for dealing with defensive and offensive realism and apply the same tenets, and additional ones to other nations and contexts. It is also possible based on this work to delve deeper into the actions of the Israeli state in the following years of peace and assess whether defensive realism or offensive realism applies to future Israeli conduct, then this thesis acts as a precedent for advancing knowledge on Israeli international relations. The methodology of the thesis can also contribute to larger research into IR-theory as applied to other nations or political organisations and entities.
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