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Bachelor's Thesis Bachelor’s Thesis Israel’s Best Offense is a Good Defense Assessing defensive realism as applied to the Six-Day-War and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties Author: Alexander Brännlund ​ Supervisor: Brigitte Pircher ​ Examinator: Anders Persson ​ Term: Autumn-2020 ​ Subject: Political Science ​ Level: Bachelor ​ Course Code: 2SK31E ​ Abstract In the form of a theory testing case study based upon the seminal works of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, this thesis seeks to uncover whether defensive realism can be applied with focus on Israeli international conduct. This is defined by their wartime actions as well as their peacekeeping efforts. The paper analyses two major historical events; namely the six-day-war and the recent Israeli-Arab peace treaties. Thereafter it delves into the preexisting conditions of each combattant in the war, then reviews the events unfolding during the conflict in the first part of the analysis, followed by the second part examining the contents of the Abraham Accords, as well as the official statements of Bahrain and Sudan regarding peace with Israel. Following this, the thesis examines the details and terms of the Abraham Accords and treaties between Israel, Bahrain and Sudan. A hypothesis is presented predicting that both tenets of defensive realism will be applicable to their respective parts of Israeli history. It is subsequently found that the first tenet of defensive realism has explanatory value with regards to the six-day-war, the second tenet of defensive realism that follows also proves to hold significant merit, and the thesis concludes that the given hypothesis therefore is correct. Both tenets of defensive realism are applicable to respective units of analysis on Israel, which therefore suggests that the theory of defensive realism offers a good framework for explaining the actions of the Israeli state. Keywords: Israel, Six-Day-War, Abraham Accords, International Conduct, defensive realism 2 (40) Table of Content 1. Introduction 4 1.1. Presentation 4 1.2. Formulation of scientific quandary 5 1.3. Research questions 6 2. Theory and previous research 7 2.1. Presentation of theoretical framework 8 2.2. Previous research 8 2.2.1. Clive Jones, Tore T. Petersen: “Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies” 9 2.2.2. Marcel Serr: “Struggle for Existence or Urge for Expansion?” 9 2.2.3. Falk Ophir: “The Middle East Accords: an Israeli Perspective” 10 2.2.4. Imad K. Harb: “The Middle East Accords: an Arab Perspective” 10 2.2.5. Kenneth Waltz: A theory of International Politics 11 2.2.6. Stephen Walt: The Origin of Alliances 11 2.2.7. Theoretical relevance 12 2.2.8. Defensive realism 12 2.2.9. Offensive realism 13 2.2.10. Applying defensive realism 14 2.2.11. Hypotheses 14 3. Method and Material 16 3.1. Choosing cases 16 3.2. Operationalisation of theories 18 3.3. Delimitation, Validity & Reliability 20 4. Analysis, Conclusions & Results 21 4.1. The Six-Day-War 21 4.2. The Abraham Accords 27 5. Conclusion 35 6. Bibliography 37 3 (40) 1. Introduction 1.1. Presentation Israel as a fledgling nation has experienced more ravaging conflicts and a tearing back and forth for sovereignty than most nations on earth, (Cahill, 1988, p.17; Gilbert, 2014, p. 11; see also Shindler, 2013 & Gartman, 2015). Presently, Israel is subject to massive political controversy and opposing stances within the west (See Gilbert, 2014 & Shindler, 2013), the EU and the US’ foreign policies. Although surrounded by hostile states, Israel has ferociously and effectively fought for their place in the Middle East, (Rubner, 2017; Machairas, 2017; Shindler, 2013, pp.38-41; see also Gartman, 2015). Most famously Israel displayed their prowess during the six-day-war where a joint Arab attempt from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria was swiftly neutralized by Israeli forces, adding the Golan heights between Israel and Syria into their domain among other things, (Kochavi, 2018; Rodman, 2020; Goldstein, 2018; Machairas, 2017; Rubner, 2017; Wolf, 2015; Bryant, 2001, p.17; See also Gilbert, 2014). We have however, in recent time experienced an unprecedented feat of diplomacy wherein Israel has struck an accord of peace, mediated by the United States of America under the Trump administration, with several Arab nations, most prominently the United Arab Emirates, (The Abraham Accords Peace Treaty, 2020, p.1; see also Ophir 2020, Harb 2020). This has given rise to a brand new era within Israeli international relations. This study is relevant due to the pressing issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in contemporary politics. To be able to analyze and categorize Israeli international conduct contributes to understanding not just the issue of Palestine, but also the previous altercations between Israel and her surrounding Arab neighbours. This essay will take the form of a theory testing case study, or a comparative case study, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, p.109) and will be centered around the purpose of applying the theory of structural realism or, neorealism, as defined by Kenneth Waltz, which in turn will give attention to the subschool of defensive realism, which is the theory propagated by Waltz. The aim is to assess if the 4 (40) tenets of defensive realism can explain the actions of the Israelic state with regards to its conduct in international relations. A hypothesis will be formulated regarding the applicability of the theory on the chosen cases of study, whereby two research questions will also be erected. To do so, a case study revolving the six-day war and the Israeli-Arab peace treaties will be analysed. In further defining what is meant by Israel’s international relationships and conduct, I will elect to focus on Israel’s military actions, and their peacekeeping efforts in the form of offered or accepted peace treaties. Thus there will be two aspects to Israeli conduct; wartime actions and peacekeeping efforts. 1.2. Formulation of scientific quandary The issue of Israel’s international motives and causal mechanisms has not been touched upon extensively by researchers, although research on the Israeli state as such is abundant. Previous research has endeavoured to provide an account of Israeli history in international affairs (Jones & Petersen, 2013; Karsh, 2017; Goldstein, 2018; see also Cahill, 1988, & Gilbert, 2014), without any attempt to apply international theory. The political discourse revolving Israel, its formation, existence, and conduct towards neighbouring states and alleged states1 is rife with opposing stances. To understand why a politically controversial country like Israel acts in the way it does is therefore a relevant scientific subject with which to enlarge the theoretical archive of political science, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, pp.32-34). A theoretical testing of defensive realism upon Israel’s actions as a state, if proven to correspond well, can also serve to normalise popular opinion on the nation state, as it is well known that quite a large number of politicians and supporters of Palestine in contemporary discourse label Israel as villainous, not to mention its adversaries such as Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran who dubbed Israel a “cancerous growth”, (Khamenei, 2020). This view can be challenged with international theory in the school of structural realism that deals in the two notions of defensive and offensive realism, as it will serve to point to a 1 The contested view of Palestine as a legitimate state, not recognized by all countries of the EU. 5 (40) commonality, if proven applicable, the Israeli state shares with other nations, as actors within an anarchic system and bound by their relative power in relation to other states, (Waltz, 1979, p.109). This subject is rendered relevant for political science, for what is called “inomvetenskaplig relevans” (Esaiasson, et. al. 2017, p.32) as it becomes of interest to be able to categorize the conduct of the Israeli state in a new way, related to international theory. Whereas there are studies that have concluded on offensive realism with regards to Israeli conduct, studies that exclusively apply tenets of defensive realism are far less popular. Thus this constitutes a gap in political science and a subject which this thesis can aim to fill, (Esaiasson, et. al. 2017, p.32). As we have currently observed globally geopolitics are shifting, there is an economical war raging between the US and China, and the Abraham Accords have altered the firmly cemented expectations of many regarding the conflicts of the Middle East. Political science concerns itself with the historic and contemporary affairs of state, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, pp.32-34) and a case study of Israeli foreign relations connected to both a tumultuous past, and unprecedented present, is thus of the highest appropriateness. This is why I deem this subject to offer relevancy as a contribution to our scientific knowledge on the Israeli state. In the general sense, beyond the scopes of political science, what is referred to as “utomvetenskaplig relevans”, (Esaiasson et. al. 2017, pp.32) it is of interest to broaden the knowledge on the state of Israel and its history as it is a hotly debated topic among many, this constitutes therefore the relevancy outside scientific study in politics, (Esaiasson, et. al. 2017, p.32). 1.3. Research questions The research questions will draw from the two tenets of defensive realism as stipulated by Waltz and wield these as the questions in applying them to the case study of Israel. Each research question will also correspond with each section of analysis, where the first tenet of defensive realism will be tested against the six-day-war, and the second tenet against the Israeli-Arab peace treaties. Two indicators will also be established for respective questions as to be able to 6 (40) discern from the empirical analysis, whether or not the actions of the Israeli states match the tenets.
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