Memo to President Biden: Please Don't Mess up The
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Jews in Sports
Non-Profit Org. U.S. POSTAGE PAID Pittsfield, MA Berkshire Permit No. 19 JEWISHA publication of the Jewish Federation of the Berkshires, serving V the Berkshires and surrounding ICE NY, CT and VT Vol. 28, No. 8 Tishri/Cheshvan/Kislev 5781 October 12 to November 22, 2020 jewishberkshires.org Middle East Update 2020 Zooming Into Fall “Is there light at the end of the Middle East tunnel?” Federation connected families from across the with Dennis Ross and David Makovsky Berkshires online over the holidays On Wednesday, November 18 at About Our Speakers 7:30 p.m., the Jewish Federation of David Makovsky is the Ziegler the Berkshires welcomes two distin- Distinguished Fellow and Director of guished guests to our Middle East the Project on the Middle East Peace Update 2020, Dennis Ross and Process at The Washington Institute for David Makovsky, both fellows at The Near East Policy. He is also an adjunct Washington Institute for Near East professor in Middle East studies at Policy. Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. In light of the recent ground- Nitze School of Advanced International breaking treaties brokered by the Studies. Trump administration between Israel Author of numerous Washington and Persian Gulf states the United Institute publications on issues related Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well to the Middle East peace process as with the European Muslim nation and the Arab-Israeli conflict, he also of Kosovo, Ross and Makovsky’s topic co-authored the 2009 Washington Post will be, “Is there light at the end of the bestseller Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Middle East tunnel?” Finding a New Direction for America At press time, all Jewish Federation in the Middle East with Ambassador of the Berkshires programs were Dennis Ross. -
Guía COL MUN 2021
CNCMUN IV Background Guide Council of Leaders COL Presidents: Gabriel Hernández and Isabella Ospina Gabriela Conde and Tomás Ortiz Executive editors Gabriel Hernández Isabella Ospina Sub-editor Sub-editor Table of contents I. Letter from the chair II. Introduction to the committee III. First agenda: Middle East and Israel Conflict A. Introduction B. History C. Current Situation i. Right of return ii. Security and Terrorism D. Different Perspectives IV Second agenda: Iran and USA crisis A. Introduction B. History i. Precedents of the Iran-U.S.A. relation ii. Incidents iii. Nuclear weapons development C. Current Situation D. Different Perspectives V. Information of Mandatory Revision VI. QARMA’S (Questions a Resolution Must Answer) VII. Bibliography I. Letter from the chair Estimated delegates, We are Gabriel Hernández and Isabella Ospina, and as presidents of the committee of Council of Leaders, we’d like to extend to you a warm welcome to the 4th edition of CNCMUN. This time, the topics to be discussed are related to the Middle East conflict with other countries such as Israel and the United States - Iran crisis. We are appreciative to receive delegates that are open to an active participation and take this as learning and enriching experience. We are looking forward to achieve this committee's goals and make this a joyful experience for everyone. We are expecting to see you soon. II. Introduction to the committee Council of leaders is an experimental committee in the Model of United Nations that consists in setting out a scene in which world leaders with greater significance discuss and debate about current controversial and important issues. -
Iran's Gray Zone Strategy
Iran’s Gray Zone Strategy Cornerstone of its Asymmetric Way of War By Michael Eisenstadt* ince the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has distinguished itself (along with Russia and China) as one of the world’s foremost “gray zone” actors.1 For nearly four decades, however, the United States has struggled to respond effectively to this asymmetric “way of war.” Washington has often Streated Tehran with caution and granted it significant leeway in the conduct of its gray zone activities due to fears that U.S. pushback would lead to “all-out” war—fears that the Islamic Republic actively encourages. Yet, the very purpose of this modus operandi is to enable Iran to pursue its interests and advance its anti-status quo agenda while avoiding escalation that could lead to a wider conflict. Because of the potentially high costs of war—especially in a proliferated world—gray zone conflicts are likely to become increasingly common in the years to come. For this reason, it is more important than ever for the United States to understand the logic underpinning these types of activities, in all their manifestations. Gray Zone, Asymmetric, and Hybrid “Ways of War” in Iran’s Strategy Gray zone warfare, asymmetric warfare, and hybrid warfare are terms that are often used interchangeably, but they refer neither to discrete forms of warfare, nor should they be used interchangeably—as they often (incor- rectly) are. Rather, these terms refer to that aspect of strategy that concerns how states employ ways and means to achieve national security policy ends.2 Means refer to the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and cyber instruments of national power; ways describe how these means are employed to achieve the ends of strategy. -
The Mossawa Center's Briefing on the 'Deal of the Century' 1. Political
The Mossawa Center’s Briefing on the ‘Deal of the Century’ 1. Political Background Following two inconclusive rounds of elections in April and September 2019, Israel is set to hold an unprecedented third consecutive election in March 2020. With no clear frontrunner between Benny Gantz of Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) and Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud, the leaders are locked in a frantic and unrestrained race to the bottom. Trump’s announcement that he would launch the political section of his ‘Peace to Prosperity’ document before the Israeli election has fanned the flames of this right-wing one-upmanship. The timing of the announcement was criticized as a political ploy to benefit his close ally Netanyahu which, against the backdrop of his alleged interference in Ukraine at the crux of his impeachment trial, he was eager to avoid. In the end, both Netanyahu and Gantz visited the White House, but there was only one winner: the sitting prime minister – who, on the day of the announcement, was indicted all three counts of bribery, fraud and breach of trust after withdrawing his request for immunity. It was Netanyahu who unveiled the document alongside the President, forcing Gantz’s hand: in his earlier attempts to cannibalize Netanyahu’s voter base in his pledge to annex the Jordan Valley, he had no choice but to endorse the plan, which could come before the Knesset before the March 2020 election. However, Gantz’s rightward shift has dire ramifications for the next election. Between the April and September elections, turnout among the Palestinian Arab community increased by twelve points, and polls are predicting a further increase. -
The Coming Iran Nuclear Talks Openings and Obstacles
The Coming Iran Nuclear Talks Openings and Obstacles DENNIS ROSS January 2021 he Middle East will not be a priority in the Biden administration’s approach to foreign policy. But the T Iranian nuclear program will require a response.* With the Iranian parliament having adopted legislation mandating uranium enrichment to 20 percent and suspension of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections if sanctions are not lifted by February 2020 in response to the targeted killing of Iranian scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh— and with Iran now having accumulated twelve times the low-enriched uranium permitted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the administration will have to deal with the Iranian challenge.1 To be sure, the nuclear program and its potential to make Iran a nuclear weapons state are not the only challenges the Islamic Republic poses: the regime’s ballistic missile program and destabilizing and aggressive behavior in the region threaten conflicts that can escalate both vertically and horizontally. But it is the nuclear program that is most pressing. *The author would like to thank a number of his Washington Institute colleagues—Katherine Bauer, Patrick Clawson, Michael Eisenstadt, Barbara Leaf, Matthew Levitt, David Makovsky, David Pollock, Robert Satloff, and Michael Singh—for the helpful comments they provided as he prepared this paper. He also wants to give special thanks to several people outside the Institute—Robert Einhorn, Richard Nephew, David Petraeus, Norman Roule, and Karim Sadjadpour—for the thoughtful comments -
Iran and Israel's National Security in the Aftermath of 2003 Regime Change in Iraq
Durham E-Theses IRAN AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF 2003 REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ ALOTHAIMIN, IBRAHIM,ABDULRAHMAN,I How to cite: ALOTHAIMIN, IBRAHIM,ABDULRAHMAN,I (2012) IRAN AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF 2003 REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ , Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4445/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 . IRAN AND ISRAEL’S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF 2003 REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ BY: IBRAHIM A. ALOTHAIMIN A thesis submitted to Durham University in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy DURHAM UNIVERSITY GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS March 2012 1 2 Abstract Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has continued to pose a serious security threat to Israel. -
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Updated January 27, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44245 SUMMARY R44245 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief January 27, 2021 The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations. Jim Zanotti Domestic issues: March 2021 election. After the collapse of its power-sharing Specialist in Middle government in December 2020, Israel is scheduled to hold another election for its Eastern Affairs Knesset (parliament) on March 23, 2021. The election will be Israel’s fourth in the past two years—a frequency without parallel in the country’s history. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has managed to maintain power despite an ongoing criminal trial on corruption charges that is set to resume in February 2021. Netanyahu apparently hopes to create a coalition government that will grant him legal immunity or to remain indefinitely as caretaker prime minister (as he did from December 2018 to May 2020) by preventing anyone from forming a coalition without him and his Likud party. Palestinians and Arab state normalization. On the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump Administration policies largely sided with Israeli positions, thus alienating Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. In the second half of 2020, the Administration pivoted from its January 2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal to helping Israel reach agreements—known as the Abraham Accords—on normalizing its relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank, though announcements related to settlement activity have accelerated since then. -
Issue No. 486 AUGUST 2021
Issue Brief ISSUE NO. 486 AUGUST 2021 © 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. The Limits of Military Coercion in Halting Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programme Kunal Singh Abstract Israel believes that the use of force is essential to stopping Iran from making the nuclear bomb. A vocal section of the strategic affairs community in the United States agrees with the proposition. This brief argues that military means are unlikely to sabotage the nuclear weapons programme of an advanced-stage bomb-seeker like Iran. Moreover, use of force could be counterproductive as it can incentivise Iran’s pursuit of the bomb, and it may erode the confidence required for diplomatic negotiations that can possibly help cease the weapons programme. Attribution: Kunal Singh, “The Limits of Military Coercion in Halting Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” ORF Issue Brief No. 486, August 2021, Observer Research Foundation. 01 n early April in Vienna, the Biden administration initiated efforts with Iran to reinstate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, from which the United States (US) had exited during the tenure of former US President Donald Trump. A week later, an explosion at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment Ifacility caused a power blackout. Israel, the state most vocally opposed to the JCPOA, is widely believed to have -
News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (November 25 – December 1, 2020)
רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו ר News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (November 25 – December 1, 2020) Overview In the Gaza Strip, as well as in Judea and Samaria the sharp rise in the number of active Covid-19 cases continues. As of December 1, 2020, there were 9,627 active cases in the Gaza Strip and 11,692 in Judea and Samaria. While Hamas continues implementing local and regional preventive measures, the Palestinian Authority (PA) announced it would again impose a full lockdown throughout its territories over the coming weekend. So far the preventive measures taken by Hamas and the PA do not appear to be effective, mainly because the local populations violate them extensively. This past week the Gaza Strip was quiet. In Judea and Samaria a ramming attack was carried out at the al-Za'im roadblock, east of Jerusalem. The terrorist was shot and killed. On the roads in Judea and Samaria there has been a considerable increase in the number of stones, rocks and Molotov cocktails thrown at civilian vehicles, including civilian buses. Following the renewal of civilian and security coordination between the PA and Israel, the PA has been looking for creative ways to circumvent Israel's objection to the transfer of salaries to Palestinian terrorist prisoners and the families of shaheeds. In the meantime the Israeli media reported that on November 29, 2020, Israel's political-security cabinet authorized the transfer of 2.5 billion shekels (about $760 million) to the PA. -
Reimagining US Strategy in the Middle East
REIMAGININGR I A I I G U.S.S STRATEGYT A E Y IIN THET E MMIDDLED L EEASTS Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments Dalia Dassa Kaye, Linda Robinson, Jeffrey Martini, Nathan Vest, Ashley L. Rhoades C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA958-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0662-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover composite design: Jessica Arana Image: wael alreweie / Getty Images Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface U.S. -
INSS Insight No. 1409, December 2, 2020 the Assassination of Fakhrizadeh: Considerations and Consequences
INSS Insight No. 1409, December 2, 2020 The Assassination of Fakhrizadeh: Considerations and Consequences Amos Yadlin and Assaf Orion The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizada invites six questions: Who is responsible for the act? What was the objective? Why now? What are the consequences of the assassination? How will Iran respond? What is the recommended policy for Israel in light of this development? This article contends that barring narrow political considerations, whoever ordered Fakhrizadeh's assassination apparently tried to achieve three strategic objectives: damage Iran's nuclear program; obstruct the Biden administration's return to the nuclear agreement; and perhaps, though less likely, encourage an escalation that would result in a US attack on Iran's nuclear sites. The first objective seems to have been achieved, although the response to the assassination is still ahead and may exact a costly price. Attainment of the other two goals depends heavily on the Iranian response, but in any case, these are far- reaching objectives with slimmer chances of realization. The year 2020 began with the assassination of Revolutionary Guards General Qassem Soleimani, and approached its close with the assassination of Revolutionary Guards General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Soleimani was the commander of the Quds Force and led Iran's strategic effort for regional hegemony, primarily through subversive diplomacy, proxy warfare, and arms proliferation. Fakhrizadeh led Iran's second strategic effort – the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The assassination of Fakhrizadeh invites six questions: Who is responsible for the act? What was the objective? Why now? What are the consequences of the assassination? How will Iran respond? What is the recommended policy for Israel in light of this development? The United States took public responsibility for the killing of General Qassem Soleimani and in response suffered an Iranian barrage of missiles fired at an American base in Iraq. -
Israel 2020 Human Rights Report
ISRAEL 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy. Although it has no constitution, its parliament, the unicameral 120-member Knesset, has enacted a series of “Basic Laws” that enumerate fundamental rights. Certain fundamental laws, orders, and regulations legally depend on the existence of a “state of emergency,” which has been in effect since 1948. Under the Basic Laws, the Knesset has the power to dissolve itself and mandate elections. On March 2, Israel held its third general election within a year, which resulted in a coalition government. On December 23, following the government’s failure to pass a budget, the Knesset dissolved itself, which paved the way for new elections scheduled for March 23, 2021. Under the authority of the prime minister, the Israeli Security Agency combats terrorism and espionage in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. The national police, including the border police and the immigration police, are under the authority of the Ministry of Public Security. The Israeli Defense Forces are responsible for external security but also have some domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Defense. Israeli Security Agency forces operating in the West Bank fall under the Israeli Defense Forces for operations and operational debriefing. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security services. The Israeli military and civilian justice systems have on occasion found members of the security forces to have committed abuses. Significant human