Normalisation and Realignment in the Middle East. a New, Conflict-Prone
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NO. 45 JULY 2021 Introduction Normalisation and Realignment in the Middle East A New, Conflict-Prone Regional Order Takes Shape Muriel Asseburg and Sarah Ch. Henkel Between 2020 and 2021, Israel concluded normalisation agreements with four Arab states. They were celebrated internationally as a breakthrough. Meanwhile, since 2018, and largely unnoticed by the public, Arab states have started repairing their relations with Syria. Finally, in January 2021, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ended their boycott of Qatar during the meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. Changing assessments of the regional security situation and converging interests have enabled these rap- prochements. However, these developments do not mean that the region is moving towards peace and stability; on the contrary, long-lasting conflicts remain unresolved and the threat perceptions of third actors are being exacerbated. Germany and its partners in the EU should avoid being co-opted by local and regional conflicting par- ties and should instead focus on supporting regional conflict management. Several rapprochements are currently their relations by signing the so-called taking place between countries in the con- Abraham Accords. Israel also concluded flict-torn Middle East. They are decisively agreements with Morocco and Sudan on driven by the Arab Gulf States, especially 22 December 2020 and 6 January 2021, the UAE, and are largely a symptom of the respectively. All four agreements stipulate regional power shifts emerging from the mutual recognition and the establishment so-called Arab Spring. Another contributing of diplomatic relations. factor can be seen in the fickle nature of However, the depth of the relationships the US’s Middle East policy as its focus envisaged in the individual agreements increasingly shifts away from the region. varies significantly. Israel’s agreements with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco build upon the Israeli-Arab normalisation of the Israeli-Arab Normalisation 1990s, which was made possible by the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Pales- On 15 September 2020, Israel and the UAE, tine Liberation Organization (PLO). At the as well as Bahrain, agreed to normalise time, this rapprochement facilitated trade and tourism between Israel and a number campaigns, and specific national interests of Gulf and Maghreb states, albeit to that played the most prominent roles. varying degrees, and enabled the establish- US President Trump sought to distinguish ment of bilateral diplomatic or trade repre- himself as a peacemaker in the Middle East, sentations. Yet, these relations suffered especially after his so-called “deal of the massive setbacks as a result of the Second century” to settle the Israeli-Palestinian Intifada from 2000 to 2005. conflict remained unsuccessful after being Today’s rapprochements with the three put forward in January 2020. He also in- states were possible because none of them tended to mobilise regional support for his had bilateral conflicts with Israel; nor had maximum pressure campaign against Iran any of them ever been significantly in- and to strengthen the US economy through volved in wars with Israel. Israel and the arms deals. UAE had already developed close intelli- Israel prioritised closing the ranks against gence, military and civilian ties in recent Iran, while also seeking to establish a new years. With the agreement, these arrange- paradigm in which the Palestinian leader- ments are now official, and attempts will ship would no longer have veto power be made to deepen and expand them to over Israel’s regional relations. In addition, include a societal dimension. In view of the Israel sought to broaden its economic rela- previous ties, these accords hardly qualify tions and expand its presence in the Horn as “peace agreements” – as framed by of Africa. The US’s arms deliveries to Arab then-US President Donald Trump – but states were offset by its commitments to rather a “coming out”. maintaining Israel’s qualitative military The agreement between Israel and Sudan edge. should be judged differently, as the two The UAE was primarily interested in countries had been in a state of war up accessing modern weapons systems and until that point. Sudanese contingents establishing a long-term bond with the US fought in wars against Israel, and under through extensive arms cooperation. The Omar al-Bashir (1989–2019), Khartoum Trump administration promised the UAE maintained close relations with opponents 50 F35 fighter jets and 18 reaper drones for of Israel, especially Iran and Hamas. Israel their normalisation with Israel. In mid- had repeatedly attacked convoys in Sudan January 2021, it also designated the UAE that were transporting weapons to Hamas. and Bahrain as major US security partners. This agreement, therefore, is in fact a In addition, the UAE was interested in “peace agreement”, albeit still awaiting improving its reputation following its con- implementation. troversial involvement in the Yemen war. Further, Abu Dhabi sought to diversify its Transactional Agreements economy and develop the country into a technology hub. The agreement between The recent normalisations comprise prime Israel and Bahrain, on the other hand, was examples of transactional agreements. The not so much the result of specific Bahraini Trump administration played a crucial interests as it was a signal of Saudi support mediating role in their conclusion, placing for closer cooperation between Bahrain and Sudan under massive pressure and offering Israel, seeing that Manama has hardly any the UAE and Morocco additional incentives independent decision-making capacity vis-à- to sweeten the deal. After all, for all actors vis Riyadh. involved, interests, not the settlement of Sudan, under de facto President Abdelfat- conflict, took centre stage. Apart from the tah al-Burhan, had motives for the agree- convergence of the threat perceptions of ment that actually bore no relation to Israel and the Arab states, it was the per- Israel at all. Rather, Washington had made sonal motives of Trump and Netanyahu, Sudan’s removal from its terror list and who were both in the middle of election immunisation against lawsuits brought by SWP Comment 45 July 2021 2 terror victims conditional upon Khartoum’s In this vein, the Arab “normalisers” can- normalisation of relations with Israel. This not be expected to exert significant pressure was crucial for the leadership in Khartoum, on Israel to settle the Israeli-Palestinian because it not only paved the way for the conflict or Israel’s bilateral conflicts with receipt of US developmental aid, but also Syria and Lebanon. On the contrary, the helped Sudan rid itself of the tarnished im- UAE is even falling behind European posi- age that had been left behind by the Bashir tions on the matter, for example by failing regime, thereby allowing it to regain access to differentiate between Israel proper and to international loans. Israeli settlements in occupied or annexed Morocco was incentivised by US recogni- territories. Emirati companies have even tion of Moroccan sovereignty over Western concluded agreements with companies Sahara and the promise that negotiations active in Israeli settlements. While Morocco on a settlement of the conflict there would criticises Israel’s actions, including those take place on the basis of Morocco’s autono- that endanger the status quo on the Temple my plan. As a result, not only the US, but Mount/Haram al-Sharif, it is unlikely to also the UAE, Bahrain and Jordan opened use its political capital to actively counter consulates in Western Sahara. In addition, Israel’s occupation and annexation policies. the US promised to supply Morocco with The Trump administration’s stance, drones and other precision weapons, as the Israeli-Moroccan agreement and the well as extensive aid and investment. growing recognition of Moroccan sovereign- ty over Western Sahara have also led to Problematic Side Effects both a hardening of Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara issue and to increasing As a result of the agreement between Israel tensions between Morocco and Algeria. and the UAE, a large number of cooperative Algiers feels threatened by the (potential) ventures have since been agreed upon, not expansion of Israeli-Moroccan cooperation only at the state level, but also between and sees itself as even more isolated in the private and civil society actors. Thus, for region, especially due to its support for the the first time, a “warm peace” is emerging; Polisario. already, Israel’s relations with the UAE Beyond these direct effects, three factors have clearly outpaced those with Egypt and in particular are likely to exacerbate con- Jordan. Israel’s existence is not only being flict in the region. First, the Trump admin- recognised as a reality, the country is also istration undermined principles of inter- increasingly accepted as a partner and a national law – above all the prohibition of part of the region. the acquisition of territory by force – and However, this shift should not be con- this is made abundantly clear in its prom- fused with progress towards a settlement of ises to Israel and Morocco. The second fac- the conflicts between Israel and its neigh- tor is the intensification of Tehran’s threat bours. In the context of the agreements, perception as it fears “strategic encircle- Israel did commit to the Gulf States and the ment”. The US’s commitments to deliver US not to carry out the formal annexation arms could thus trigger a new arms race in of parts of the West Bank that it had an- the region and prompt Iran to work to nounced in May 2020. However, the secure its strategic depth by expanding its Abraham Accords make reference to the network of (violent) non-state actors. Third, Trump plan, thus legitimising the Israeli Israel’s intelligence and IT cooperation with right’s claim to parts of the West Bank as authoritarian states in the region threatens well as permanent, overarching Israeli to further restrict the scope of action of control over Israel and the occupied Pales- opposition and civil society actors in these tinian territories.