The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies Volume 5, Fall 2019, pp. 5-31 DOI: https://doi.org/10.26351/JIMES/5/1 ISSN: 2522-347X (print); 2522-6959 (online)

The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social- Humanitarian Security Zone as a Means to Reduce Regional Hostility: Two Case Studies from Warzones in the Middle East

Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

Abstract This article examines the idea of buffer zones as a vehicle for dialogue and coexistence. In particular, it raises an assumption that bottom-up developments, rather than top-down policies, are liable to turn buffer zones into bridges for coexistence between rival parties. We examine two Middle Eastern case studies: The Good Fence policy that practiced in South during the 1970s, and the Israeli Good Neighbor Administration that was in effect along the Syrian border from 2016 to 2018. These case studies reveal a peculiar model: the social-humanitarian buffer zone, which was located where combat took place, and evolved through decisions that were made by the official leadership, but were actually dictated by lower- ranked social agents. We conclude that a social-humanitarian buffer zone, advancing in a bottom-up direction, has the capacity to reduce regional violence and to weaken hostility.

Keywords: buffer zones, peace zones, Lebanon, Syria, Israel

5 Dr. Dan Naor – Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Ariel University; [email protected]

Dr. Eyal Lewin – Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Ariel University; [email protected]

6 The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 7

Introduction

There is accumulating evidence that it is merely a matter of time before Israel and Iran have a violent collision on the Syrian border. Combative rhetoric from both sides has become a common occurrence, suggesting winds of war in the Middle East. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in March 2011, Israel and Iran have been on an escalation track. With Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps determined to use Syrian territory as a platform for a future war against Israel, and a political Israeli leadership that has outspokenly tried to prevent such a possibility, a future clash seems to be almost inevitable. By 2018, Iran, seeing Syria as a territory for terror actions against Israel, had initiated numerous cross- border incidents along the Golan Heights, and the Israeli Air Force had struck dozens of weapon shipments to Hezbollah and Iranian arms-production facilities located deep in the Syrian desert. Some of these clashes were lethal, resulting in dead Iranian soldiers and officers.1 Throughout most of the long years of civil war, Jerusalem refrained from direct intervention. Israeli leadership remained reluctant to enter the Syrian quagmire and to risk the possibility of exposing Israeli citizens to retaliatory fire from across the border. Focusing primarily on maintaining security and repelling threats posed by the war in Syria, Israel avoided pursuing whatever opportunities lay in linking up even with relatively moderate actors. Consequently, Syrian rebels’ pleas for armament were constantly rejected, even when presented by non-jihadist factions who were desperate to fight Assad’s forces and Iranian sponsored militias.2 Thus, in spite of often refraining from action or acting carefully, Israeli policy regarding Syria led to failure. During the last couple of years, the spillover attacks of mortar shells landing in the Golan Heights have increased and fighting

1 Maya Hadar, “The War in Syria: An Israeli Perspective,” IFK Monitor International, October 2017, www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/ifk_monitor_44_int_hadar_israel_oktober_ 17_web.pdf (Accessed on September 17, 2019); Ehud Yaari, “Bracing for an Israel-Iran Confrontation,” The American Interest, April 30, 2018. 2 Nir Boms, “Israel’s Policy on the Syrian Civil War: Risks and Opportunities,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2017), pp. 323-336; Yaari, “Bracing for an Israel-Iran Confrontation.” 8 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

between rival factions have continued to draw closer to Israel’s border. Moreover, Hezbollah and other Shi’ite militias might approach the 1974 armistice line and set up offensive infrastructure in its vicinity, where they could launch attacks from an area in which no Lebanese civilian constituencies would have to suffer Israeli counterattacks. With Assad’s revival and his debt to his Iranian allies, in the near future Israel will be coping on a daily basis with a strengthened Hezbollah military force, and above all – a constant encroachment of Iran toward its border.3 The question remains, however, what the decision makers in Jerusalem can do in order to deal with this problematic situation. What tools does the Israeli government, or the IDF for that matter, possess in order to handle the growing danger coming from the north? How can Jerusalem manage the growing threat from Tehran to turn Syria into a new haven for terrorist groups, and an inferno for Israel? In search of possible political or military tools, this paper concentrates on a specific pattern: the security belt. First, we integrate common knowledge about buffer areas in general, trying to convey the typical, basic qualities of their political and military arrangements. We then analyze various types of buffer zones, mainly to follow their dynamics in relation to reduction of hostilities. Next, we examine two case studies. Although these case studies have already been investigated,4 they are presented here with new and updated details. The first one is the historic experience of the IDF’s security zone in Lebanon. Relying on testimonies of Lebanese and Israeli officers, gathered by the authors, we verify two basic assumptions. The first is that the Israeli experience, due to relative stability and low-cost conflict management, was a positive one. The second assumption is that the Israeli security zone in Lebanon should not be seen as merely involving security, but rather as a social construct too − based on civilian activity and having evolved from the Israeli humanitarian assistance in during the late 1970s (“The Good Fence policy”).

3 Ibid. 4 See for example Gideon Bigger (ed.), The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Publishing House, 1995). The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 9

The second case study is “The Good Neighbor Administration,” which explores Israel’s humanitarian aid in Syria, where in the midst of an internal Syrian civil war, Israel admitted medical aid and initiated contact with the local population that resided near the international borders. Finally, we raise the question of whether, after conducting the two case studies, one could extract a model that could turn out to be the key to eliminating the risks of a coming war. We notice that in both case studies we witnessed two important factors: (1) The existence of a specific form of security zone, which we call “The Social Security Belt.” This model is based on military protection, but at the same time is guaranteed by civilian humanitarian and social activities. (2) The development of such a regional belt in a bottom-up process, not directly dictated by decision makers. In understanding and fostering the mechanisms of such a model lie prospects for a more peaceful future – not only on the plateaus of the Golan Heights, but also in other places, all over the world, where conflict and distress reside.

Buffer Zones

Buffer zones are major instruments often used to calm violent conflicts. They may be by-products of peace management efforts, or formed where peacekeeping forces are at work. These zones are given diverse names, such as buffer zones, demilitarized zones, buffer belts, security belts, and other linguistic combinations. The idea of a security zone probably originated in the psychological literature, where one can read about the importance of space in reference to a personal buffer zone. It is widely believed that individuals have their own corporeal buffer zones, that is, certain areas around their physical bodies, whose violation produces anxiety and may lead to aggression. This personal space applies to different regions for different kinds of social interactions, and it changes according to one’s social circumstances. People have diverse levels of spatial comfort in their interpersonal interactions, and some of those levels originate in people’s cultural backgrounds. 10 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

Empirical evidence across different groups shows that sustaining personal space enables disputants to avoid existing or latent conflicts.5 The concept of space between individuals on the personal level minimizing potential violence between disputants has proven to be true also at the larger social level. For example, buffer zones are a tool in the management of disputes over land development, where the natural biosphere often needs protection from the hazards of human growth and technological advances. Industrialization and the accelerated rate of human population growth have destructive effects on the environment. Buffer zones are therefore often created in order to protect ecological reserves and to preserve natural resources such as water sources, forests, and endangered species. Similarly, buffer zones are used by governments to preserve age-old civilizations threatened by modernization and by globalization, usually as an effort to sustain indigenous societies or in order to preserve symbolic evidence of the national and ethnic origins of political entities.6 Accordingly, in international relations, the defining aspect of any buffer zone is the existence of a physical area that separates opposing forces. In order to maintain such a neutral area, certain rules are set and followed by all parties to a conflict (or

5 Stephen F. Curran, Robert J. Blatchley and Thomas E. Hanlon, “The Relationship Between Body Buffer Zone and Violence as Assessed by Subjective and Objective Techniques,” Criminal Justice and Behavior, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1978), pp. 53-62; Arthur M. Hildrethe, Leonard R. Derogatis and Ken McCusker, “Body Buffer Zone and Violence: A Reassessment and Confirmation,”American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 127 (1971), pp. 77-81; Mardi J. Horowitz et al., “Body-Buffer Zone: Exploration of Personal Space,” Archives of General Psychology, Vol. 1, No. 6 (1964), pp. 651-656; Shane M. Smith, “Buffer Zones,” in Guy Bergess and Heidi Burgess (eds.), Beyond Intractability (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press and Conflict Information Center, 2003); Yun Li, Experimental Research of Improving College Students’ Interpersonal Communicative Ability and their Social Relationship by Exercising Theory of Body Buffer Zone (People’s Republic of China: Wuhan University, Proquest Dissertations Publishing, 2008). 6 Diane Bates and Thomas K. Rudel, “The Political Ecology of Conserving Tropical Rain Forests: A Cross-National Analysis,” Society & Natural Resources, Vol. 13, No. 7 (2000), pp. 619-634; Stuart Chape, Jerry Harrison, Mark Spalding and Igor Lysenko, “Measuring the Extent and Effectiveness of Protected Areas as an Indicator for Meeting Global Biodiversity Targets,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol. 360 (2005), pp. 443-455; Anthony D. Smith, “Towards a Global Culture?” Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 7 (1990), pp. 171-191. The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 11

a potential one), as a guarantee of avoiding hostilities. The idea of a neutralized cordon sanitaire is connected with the practice of conflict management. Buffer zones serve different purposes, sometimes combining two functions or more. In order to comprehend the traits that turn buffer zones into positive arrangements, a brief review of the different types is essential. Hence, we shall closely examine five types of arrangements, referring to their specific historical function: the spillover buffer zone, the demilitarized area, the humanitarian corridor, the land claim deactivating buffer zone, and the offensive buffer zone.

The Spillover Buffer Zone The neutralized area between states sometimes serves to contain a civil conflict within a state and to prevent it from spilling over into a neighboring country. The spillover buffer zone could be a jointly patrolled security belt between the two neighboring states to prevent violent and social destabilizing elements from leaking across borders. Like the demilitarized area model, the spillover buffer zone is primarily defensive, and in most cases based on agreements. In its ideal form, it can act as a confidence-building vehicle and as a tool for the development of cooperation between states. As an example of the spillover buffer zone model, one can take the Turkish troops that in recent years crossed the border and entered Iraq, in order to make sure that ISIS forces – which at the time appeared to be growing ever stronger – did not reach Turkish territory. Likewise, Turkey has been very active in internal Iraqi quarrels between different political, ethnic, and national groups. Turkey does its very best militarily, with boots on the ground, to make sure that the desire of the Kurdistan Regional Government to achieve greater autonomy does not spill over into Turkey and incite unrest among Turkey’s own Kurdish population.7

7 “Turkish Presence in Northern Iraq: A Situation with Broad Regional Implications,” al-Bayan, February 17, 2016, www.bayancenter.org/en/2016/02/601/ (Accessed on December 28, 2018); Hassan Turunc, Turkey’s Global Strategy: Turkey and Iraq (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011). 12 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

The Demilitarized Area In addition to socio-psychological factors, there is also a physical logic to maintaining space between rival fighting forces: The distance between an attacker and a victim dictates either side’s ability to launch an assault. Military forces that are positioned face-to-face do not need much time to attack, whereas remote rival military forces need plenty of time in order to mount a military offensive. Thus, distance creates barriers to violent interactions. Consequently, the larger the physical area between rivals, the longer the warning time for each of them of an imminent military confrontation. Enlarging the area between disputants facilitates cooperative behavior and reduces tensions. The greater the distance between opposing military forces, the less likely they are to reach the point of a violent clash. Establishing large, non-military areas between rival states is therefore bound to eliminate violent activities. Such demilitarized areas are regularly monitored by a third party, whose role is to legitimize, institutionalize, and strengthen the existence of the violence-free zone. The third party often facilitates the arrangements regarding the piece of land that is designated as a buffer, and thus encourages cooperation between the rivals − which in time might lead to a resolution of the conflict.8 A good example of such a demilitarized area is the stretch of land dividing North Korea and South Korea. In this case, the two sides have been holding onto opposing land claims for years. Each of the rival governments claimed to be the legitimate leadership of the whole of Korea, and both saw the division as temporary. The Korean Demilitarized Zone enables monitoring of military activities in the area between the armed forces. It reduces tensions, decreases the risk of violent encounters, and creates a chance for peace procedures that may lead to a resolution of the Korean conflict.9

8 Andrei Demurenko and Alexander Nikitin, “Concepts in International Peacekeeping,” Military Review (May-June 1997), pp. 67-71. 9 Adrian Buzo, The Making of Modern Korea (London: Routledge, 2002); Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005). The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 13

The Humanitarian Corridor This form is also called a safe zone, safe area, or better yet – safe haven. The purpose of this type of buffer is to protect civilians, in many cases refugees, from violence inflicted by any of the conflicting parties. Such an endeavor is in most cases implemented by a third party that is not part of the conflict and is motivated by benevolence and compassion.10 A typical example of such an activity would be the 1994 humanitarian project in Rwanda. When genocidal violence developed in Rwanda, international aid was provided in massive form by UN-associated organizations, bilateral conduits such as the US Agency for International Development, and independent organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Several NGOs were involved in supporting the woeful survivors of the civil war, providing any necessary immediate relief from the effects of the calamities, but also building physical infrastructure and teaching agricultural techniques.11 However, it is important to clarify that history also provides quite a number of examples where the safe haven initiated by well-intentioned third parties has failed to fulfill its goals. Perhaps the most tragic and extreme example of such a case is the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Three years into the civil war in Bosnia, the UN created in the town of Srebrenica an area where Muslim refugees could find safety from the onslaught of the Bosnian Serbs. However, the Serbs overran the UN safe zone, which was staffed by no more than 700 lightly armed Dutch peacekeeping troops. Before the atrocity, Serbian military units took over the villages surrounding the Srebrenica safe zone and forced thousands of refugees into the area, forming a large concentration of helpless citizens. They also kidnapped some of the peacekeepers, and eventually encountered no difficulties at all in invading Srebrenica, meeting minor resistance from the Dutch UN troops. Inside the failed safe zone, the Serbs separated the Muslim men and boys from the

10 Barry. R. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth. N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), pp. 427-447. 11 Peter Uvin, Development, Aid and Conflict: Reflections from the Case of Rwanda (Helsinki: UN University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1996). 14 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

women and children and led them into the fields that surrounded the city, where they executed thousands of men and raped the women. Thus, the worst atrocity in Europe since World War II took place in a UN-established safe zone.12

The Land Claim Deactivating Buffer Zone Violent conflicts are often the result of land claims, where sovereign control over a certain territory is considered to be the defining goal of specific states. In such cases, disagreements over determining boundaries – where one state’s control begins and another’s ends – may lead to open violence. This is where the creation of buffer zones functions as a factor that sets aside, even if only temporarily, the dispute over certain parts of the land.13 A good example of the solution of a peaceful dispute over land claims is the May 1990 Kuala Lumpur agreement between the government of Malaysia and the government of Thailand relating, among other matters, to the establishment of a joint authority over a 7,250 square kilometer area in the Gulf of Thailand. This stretch of land, also referred to as the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area, was formed as a measure to exploit the natural resources (mostly large gas reserves) in the seabed claimed by the two countries and to share the profits equally. The settlement between the two countries enabled them to share goods, but it did not overshadow the legal right to claims by either of the opposing countries over the area.14

The Offensive Buffer Zone States, of course, are forbidden to militarily enter one another’s territory in the absence of an armed attack. Consequently, a one-sided buffer zone might allow a government to pursue rebels or terrorists within a neighboring land. In this model,

12 Joyce Van de Bildt, “Srebrenica: A Dutch National Trauma,” Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development, Vol. 21 (2015), pp. 115-145. 13 Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer, “Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict,” in Alexander Wendt (ed.), Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 134-152. 14 John Funston, “Malaysia and Thailand’s Southern Conflict: Reconciling Security and Ethnicity,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2010), pp. 234-257. The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 15

the outside state that imposes the buffer zone patrols a contested area along the border between the two countries, where the invaded state failed to ascertain a monopoly on violence within its sovereign territory. A good example of this model is the South African apartheid government and its war against Zambia and Angola, and above all its years-long effort, from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, to prevent Namibia from becoming an independent state in southwest Africa. The entire war, which eventually turned South West Africa into Namibia, was waged between the South African Defense Force and various military groups, and took place beyond the South African border, deep in its neighbors’ territory.15 However, none of these models refer to a situation where a buffer zone is social, in the sense that it takes care of welfare issues, is humanitarian, in the sense that it involves feeding and medical care, or, especially – is one that emerges in bottom- up dynamics rather than dictated top-down. We suggest that such a model arises, surprisingly, from the two case studies of this research, as will be presently shown.

Case Study 1: The Good Fence

In 1975, Lebanon descended into a devastating civil war that led to the collapse of the Lebanese state. Lebanon’s territories became a battlefield between two camps: the Right camp, which adhered to preserving the Lebanese communal system and was comprised of Maronite militias, and the Left camp, headed by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, that wished to abolish the communal system and the privileges given to the Maronites, and was comprised of Muslim militias and Palestinian organizations. While the Right camp ruled in east Beirut and Mount Lebanon, the Left camp ruled from west Beirut southward to the Lebanese-Israeli border.16

15 Richard Dale, The Namibian War of Independence, 1966-1989: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Campaigns (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2014). 16 James A. Reilly, “Israel in Lebanon, 1975-82,” MERIP Reports, No. 108/109 (1982), p. 14. For the definitions of Left and Right in Lebanon see, Farid el Khazen, “Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2003), pp. 605-624. 16 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

The led to the flight of refugees from Beirut to the south. Christians and Maronite elements in Israel and all over the world turned to the Israeli Defense Minister, Shimon Peres, urging him to let refugees enter Israel for refuge. On January 26, 1976, Peres ordered IDF soldiers on the Israeli-Lebanese frontier to allow the entrance of refugees. The purpose was to shelter them. However, at that time, conditions in South Lebanon were relatively calm, and only a few refugees entered Israel.17 In the months to come, the situation in South Lebanon deteriorated rapidly. Wounded and sick Lebanese citizens approached the border, near the Israeli town Metula, seeking medical treatment. The IDF set up a military medical clinic providing services to patients, some of whom were even hospitalized in Israeli hospitals. The military clinic mostly served the Lebanese villages near Metula. Soon, Israel opened another clinic near the Israeli border communities of Dovev (southwest of Metula) and Hanita (west of Dovev) for the benefit of Lebanese from other regions in the south. It should be mentioned that Israel aided not only the Lebanese refugees, but also assisted the Lebanese residents of the villages on the frontier by providing them with medical treatment and shelter when necessary. These villages were disconnected from other parts of Lebanon, and Israel turned out to be their last resort.18 Although the Israeli activities on the northern border were no secret to the Lebanese residents, some journalists, and the Israeli residents in the northern towns and cities, the majority of the Israeli public was not aware of these activities. It was not until June 17, 1976, that the Israeli government allowed Israeli and foreign journalists to approach the border and report on the ongoing humanitarian activity. A month later, Defense Minister Peres named the Israeli policy “The Good Fence.” He declared that Israel considered its activity a humanitarian act,

17 “Peres Ordered the IDF Forces to Enable the Entrance of Refugees from Lebanon,” Davar (Tel Aviv), January 27, 1976; “A Druze Family Escaped from Lebanon to Israel,” Davar, January 30, 1976; Yoel Darr, “A Lebanese Boy from Damour Found Refuge in Israel,” Davar, February 13, 1976. 18 “Battles in the Lebanese Villages near the Border,” Davar, March 18, 1976; Yishayahou Ashani, “The Lebanese Refugee Gave Birth in Safed,” Davar, March 18, 1976; “Medical Treatments near the Fence in the Northern Border,” Davar, June 11, 1976. The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 17

aimed at paving the way for peace between the two countries. According to Peres, under the Good Fence policy, Israel was delivering free medical treatment to all those who sought it, regardless of their religion.19 At first, the installations of the Good Fence were interim structures, such as military medical tents on the borders. As time went by, Israel replaced the interim structures with more permanent ones. Moreover, some in Israel even called for improving the services of the Good Fence’s clinics by reducing the waiting period for treatments and replacing military personnel with civilians.20 In addition to medical treatment, Israel provided other services through the Good Fence policy. Lebanese villagers crossed the border in order to work in Israel in agriculture, the hotel industry, and in factories. Commercial ties were formed between southern Lebanese and Israelis. Lebanese traders brought goods into northern Israel and sold Lebanese products there. The Israeli tobacco industry, for instance, bought tobacco from Lebanese farmers, since the farmers could not sell their crops in Lebanon due to the civil war. The agricultural ties between the two sides were strengthened after Israel established immunization and farming guidance centers at the borders. Lebanese agriculturalists were trained in these centers, and some even participated in agriculture conferences in Israel. Moreover, Israel established postal services for the South Lebanese villagers, so that they could send and receive mail and packages to and from Israel. The post office had a special “Good Fence” stamp.21 Israeli public and political responses to the new policy were favorable. Israeli citizens expressed their enthusiasm for helping the Lebanese neighbors, and the hotels and guesthouses in north Israel were fully booked by Israelis who wished to see with their own eyes the Lebanese workers and the Good Fence installations.

19 “Reporters Were Allowed to Survey the Israeli Medical Treatment given to the Lebanese People,” Davar, June 18, 1976; “Peres Surveyed the ‘Good Fence’ Policy,” Davar, July 12, 1976; David Shalev, “Peres: The Open Bridges toward Lebanon may Pave the Way for Peace,” Davar, July 20, 1976. 20 “May the ‘Good Fence’ Become Really Good,” Davar, July 23, 1976. 21 Menachem Rahat, “The Lebanese Workers Will Start to Work Today at the Israeli Tobacco Factory,” Maariv (Tel Aviv), August 1, 1976; “Relatives Meeting in Dovev,” Davar, September 3, 1976. 18 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

Moreover, residents of north Israel who in the past had to travel in order to receive medical treatment for various ailments were now being treated by IDF doctors near their homes. It appears that a sort of “brotherhood of the fringes” was formed between the South Lebanese and northern Israelis. Israelis were not the only ones who visited the border; foreigners did so as well. Formal visitors to the Israeli government were brought to the border and talked with both Lebanese and Israelis. The Good Fence was an important tool for improving the image of the State of Israel in the eyes of the world.22 What was the Lebanese response? A differentiation should be made between the official responses, namely those of the Lebanese president and prime minister, and those of the residents of South Lebanon. Lebanese officials believed that Israel was exploiting South Lebanon and the southerners in order to destabilize both Lebanon and Syria.23 However, Morris Draper, who served in the US State Department Foreign Service, drew a different picture. According to Draper, the Lebanese president at that time, Elias Sarkis, was aware of the Good Fence’s contributions to South Lebanon’s economy. Someone in Sarkis’s administration calculated that the annual economic contribution was approximately 7.5 million dollars.24 As for the residents’ responses, some believed that the Good Fence policy would last forever and that Israel would finally annex the territories between its borders and the Litany River. The local residents, according to this belief, would become Israeli citizens.25 Others claimed that it was not just the locals who wanted to receive the Israeli services, but also people outside of the region.26 Although the Israeli Good Fence policy began as a humanitarian service for the residents of South Lebanon, things soon changed. Gradually, security concerns

22 “Reporters Were Allowed to Survey the Israeli Medical Treatment for the Lebanese People,” Davar, June 18, 1976; Meir Hareuveni, “Lebanese Workers Employed in Metula,” Maariv, August 3, 1976. 23 Karim Pakradouni, HaShalom HaAvud (Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1986), p. 147 (In Hebrew). 24 Israel State Archive (Jerusalem), A 4321-1: “Lebanon,” October 29, 1977. 25 An interview with George Rizq, an ex-officer in the , February 26, 2017, Nahariya, Israel. 26 An interview with Fares al-Qasis, an ex-officer in the South Lebanon Army, June 12, 2017, Nahariya, Israel. The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 19

rose to the surface, and Israel had to make some tough decisions. For example, what should Israel do if the installations at the Good Fence or the people attending them were attacked? Should Israel stand passively on the sidelines while villages that had ties with Israel were attacked? Whereas Israel had to consider these questions, it appears that for the South Lebanese people, the answers were quite clear. As one Lebanese worker said to an Israeli journalist:

I decided to come to work this morning regardless of the [Palestinian] terrorist’s threats because I know that they will not dare to attack us for fear of Israel. We are not so afraid of them anymore. We trust Israel. Had we listened to them [the terrorists], we would have been starving already.27

Hence, alongside the civic services, Israel began cultivating military ties with villages in South Lebanon. Israel supplied weapons and military aid to the villagers, especially Christians, in their struggle against the Left groups and the Palestinians. By doing so, Israel created an armed ally in a critical area. In fact, in order to enjoy the social services of the Good Fence, the southern villagers, or members of their families, now had to take part in the military defense of their villages and their close surroundings.28 A kind of local militia that was tied to Israel was created in South Lebanon. In later periods this militia would become the South Lebanese Army (SLA). In 1985, after a limited withdrawal of Israeli forces, Israel created the security zone, controlled by both the IDF and the SLA. It was not until May 2000 that Israel withdrew its soldiers from the security zone in South Lebanon to the international border.29

27 Menachem Rahat, “‘I Went 35 Kilometers to Israel’ said a Lebanese Worker,” Maariv, August 3, 1976. 28 Beate Hamizrachi, The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt – Major Saad Haddad and the Ties with Israel, 1975-1978 (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. 54-57; Ahmad Beydoun, “The South Lebanon Border Zone: A Local Perspective,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1992), pp. 40-41. 29 Brendan O’Shea, “Lebanon’s ‘:’ A New International Border or Just another Cease- fire Zone?”Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2004), p. 21. 20 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

Case Study 2: The Good Neighbor Administration

In order to fully understand the unique character of the humanitarian safe zone that emerged on the Israeli-Syrian border, it is important to follow its evolution and the way it was eventually formed and institutionalized. Syria and Israel have been in a state of war for decades. More than any other of the Arab states, the leadership in Damascus maintained and cultivated demonization, fear, and mistrust toward Israel. Under these circumstances, it was unexpected and unthinkable that Syrian men and women would approach the heavily guarded border and seek Israeli assistance. However, since the beginning of the civil war in Syria in March 2011, the local health system failed to adequately cope with the enormous numbers of wounded soldiers and civilians of all ages. Like the rest of the civilian infrastructure, the medical care system in Syria has been demolished. Two-thirds of Syria’s hospitals have been damaged or ruined and nearly half the doctors have fled the country.30 Consequently, between 2011 and 2013, ten different Israeli civil society organizations, particularly aid associations, spearheaded humanitarian actions that gradually received more formal, official recognition. This activity was carried out in a number of places, including Jordan, Turkey, Europe, and of course Syria itself, especially on the Golan Heights. Tens of thousands of Israelis participated in several public campaigns in refugee camps in Jordan. Israelis were active in food distribution inside Syria itself, transferring over 50,000 tons of supplies, in an unprecedented collaboration between Israeli and Syrian NGOs. Israelis were also involved in the rescue of Syrian refugees on the Greek coast and in the establishment of an Israeli field hospital for treating Syrian refugees in Europe. The Council of Youth Movements in Israel initiated a mass mobilization to collect food and winter clothing, and to distribute them with emergency equipment in refugee camps in Jordan.31

30 Hani Bahouth et al., “Helping Hands Across a War-Torn Border: The Israeli Medical Effort Treating Casualties of the Syrian Civil War,” Viewpoint, Vol. 389, No. 10088 (2017), pp. 2579- 2583; Yuval Bitterman et al., “Role 1 Pediatric Trauma Care on the Israeli-Syrian Border – First Year of the Humanitarian Effort,” Military Medicine, Vol. 181, No. 8 (2016), pp. 849-853. 31 Boms, “Israel’s Policy on the Syrian Civil War.” The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 21

Starting in February 2013, with growing numbers of casualties, the wretched Syrian war victims had no choice other than to turn to their neighboring enemy, and some of them indeed came up to the Israeli border fence to ask for help. According to various testimonies, the initial request for help was from no more than seven Syrians who dared to approach the border. IDF units that patrolled along the border identified the casualties and alerted the army’s medical teams. These teams provided immediate life-saving interventions to the injured civilians, subsequently evacuating them to the nearest civilian medical center.32 Very soon, the number of Syrian war victims who realized that the Israeli enemy, counter to what they had been taught by their leaders for years, would support rather than harm them, grew, and IDF medical teams were occupied with treating men, women and children who suffered not only from trauma or war injuries but also from sickness. There were casualties who had undergone prior treatment in Syria, usually procedures that included intubation, chest drainage, laparotomy, fixation of fractures, wound closure, and amputation. Information regarding such treatment was obtained from the patient’s history and physical examination; the patients seldom brought along their medical documentation.33 At that point, to the best of our understanding, there was no Israeli governmental policy nor any institutionalized order regarding how to act with the Syrian civilians who approached the border and asked for help. The provision of medical care is a prime ethical obligation of all medical professionals, and is one of the foundations underlying humanitarian undertakings.34 Hence, the army medical personnel just did what they thought was the right thing to do. As the number of Syrian aid seekers grew, the IDF set up a field hospital right on the Syrian-Israeli border. At first, it was a small hospital, where only life-saving interventions and surgical procedures were performed. As time passed, it was obvious that treatment capabilities were restricted to immediate medical care, and that the position of the hospital close to the front endangered both patients and

32 Bahouth et al., “Helping Hands across a War-Torn Border”; Bitterman et al., “Role 1 Pediatric Trauma Care on the Israeli-Syrian Border.” 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 22 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

staff. Mortar and anti-tank missiles fired from within Syria made it only a matter of time before civilians as well as IDF medical teams were injured. This was when the decision was made in Jerusalem to allow the removal of Syrian patients, once initial stabilization and security checks were completed, straight to civilian hospitals inside Israel. In fact, the decision was to level the health care given to the Syrian patients with the treatment that any Israeli civilian, soldier, or tourist receives in case of injury and illness.35 It is important to mention at this stage that the whole procedure, later an officially authorized one, started and functioned at first as a local initiative of lower ranked commanders and medical officers. In an in-depth interview with the authors of this paper, Major (res.) U.G.,36 a military doctor in reserves, stated:

It is true that during my years of military service I have always been in infantry units, and I have also had the doubtful privilege to participate in combat in Lebanon. However, I am first of all a medical doctor, I have to save lives. So once we ran across wounded Syrians near the border – we didn’t ask for confirmation, we didn’t need any order from one of our commanders. We just did what we had to do, and took care of Syrian civilians – taking them, at times, into Israeli territory […] Acting outside the scope of an official order is not obvious, even when you are a doctor. But you should also bear in mind that perhaps it was easier for me, because I was then already in my forties, so I was expected anyway to be exempt from additional periods of time as reserves officer. I still think, however, that this is just technical. The IDF high command would have accepted our actions anyhow if we had asked for approval in time, we just had to act quickly, that’s all. 37

We turned to Brigadier General Tarif Bader, IDF Medical Corps Chief, who from 2011 to 2014 served as Surgeon General of the Northern Command. Bader did

35 Bahouth et al., “Helping Hands across a War-Torn Border.” 36 U.G. is invited from time to time to lecture in the medical corps and therefore asked to remain anonymous in this paper, except for his initials. 37 The interview took place on May 21, 2018. The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 23

not confirm the exact details, but he refrained from denying them. Furthermore, he said that when you deal with thousands of injured men, women, and children – nobody expects every life-saving action, where time is crucial, to be approved by any high command.38 It is therefore quite clear that the whole operation, where thousands of Syrian citizens were hospitalized in Israel in the course of several years, started as a bottom-up venture before it became Israeli policy. The entry of Syrians seeking medical care, as well as the aid deliveries across the border, occurred at night, and were coordinated by Israeli intelligence officials with the organizational support of rebel commanders and community leaders on the other side of the border.39 What started as a local initiative in 2013 became official Israeli policy, though unpublicized. Consequently, in May 2016, the IDF established The Good Neighbors Administration, a military command that specialized in relations with the Syrian civilian population and in coordinating the various relief efforts, including the civilian ones. The establishment of this unit can be seen as a further step in the recognition of the need to integrate the efforts on the northern border and to coordinate civilian and military actions. Additionally, during 2017, Israel established collaborative partnerships with several international organizations.40 One example, just to give a notion of the significance of such cooperation, can be seen in an information sheet distributed on the Internet by an organization called Friend Ships. This organization is dedicated to helping people in times of need and to encouraging others to do the same. Based in Port Mercy, Louisiana, this group collects, delivers, and distributes food, medical supplies, clothing, and building materials for areas of disaster within the US and all over the globe. Operating with volunteers, Friend Ships manages programs that aid people of all nationalities. In its July 2017 Activities Report, the organizers state:

It has been an exciting month as we make final preparations to serve patients at the field clinic in Syria. […] The Israelis have provided us a first-class

38 The interview took place on July 18, 2018. 39 Yaari, “Bracing for an Israel-Iran Confrontation.” 40 Boms, “Israel’s Policy on the Syrian Civil War.” 24 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

facility with amazing security and a regular supply of fuel and clean water. They have received, stored and transported all our equipment and supplies, at no cost at all to us and [have] been an outstanding partner in every way.41

The cooperation with international groups also included Syrian organizations that had begun to collaborate with Israel in transferring aid across the border. Israeli connections with Christian, Muslim, and Syrian organizations are particularly significant in terms of their diplomatic ramifications. The actors operating in southern Syria included militias, local groups, and communities, that sought to represent a population that numbered over one million people. These groups have different ideologies, different ethnic origins, and diverse sources of influence. Overall, the potential partners of Israel on the Syrian side shared certain objectives and interests, and, above all, common enemies.42 Since the operation started in early 2013, thousands of men, women, and children of all ages have arrived at the Israeli border, after suffering combat- related injuries, as well as neglected medical conditions. The Israeli authorities implemented a strategy of treating everybody unreservedly without any political considerations. IDF medical staff provides initial life-saving interventions, and the national civilian medical system offers free, advanced in-hospital medical care.43 At the peak of its expansion, the humanitarian-aid program for rebel-held villages close to the border reached some 300,000 inhabitants of the Quneitra and Deraa provinces.44 It is important to refer also to the reactions of the Syrian population, because these reactions show vividly how this model can indeed promote peaceful attitudes in the region. The Syrian patients who shared their experiences spoke always on condition of anonymity, out of fear that they or their families would be targeted in Syria once they return – if their stay in Israel was made public. Somewhat

41 “Friend Ships July 2017 Activities Report,” www.friendships.org/Downloads/activities_ report/Activities%202017/AR_July2017_4%20pgs.pdf (Accessed on October 1, 2018) 42 Boms, “Israel’s Policy on the Syrian Civil War.” 43 Bahouth et al., “Helping Hands across a War-Torn Border.” 44 Yaari, “Bracing for an Israel-Iran Confrontation.” The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 25

cautiously, then, a 26-year-old patient, still in a wheelchair with his legs bandaged and gripped in metal casts, said to Independent reporter:

Back then when there were no incidents in Syria, no revolution, no nothing – the greatest enemy in the world was Israel. It was the first enemy. [But] Israel is not the enemy!45

This indeed can be strengthened by the testimony of a wounded young Syrian from Aleppo in northwest Syria, who reached a refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, where he was saved and taken care of by Israelis. Twenty-year-old H. said:

My whole life, all through my childhood in Syrian schools, I was taught that the Israelis are the enemy, and then the first thing I see when I approach the Greek coast is the Star of David on the shirts of Israelis who reach out and place me on the ground.46

A more official testimony was, no doubt, that given by Dr. Kamal Al-Labwani, one of the most prominent members of the Syrian opposition movement, who visited Israel to meet some of the Syrian casualties staying in hospitals in the north. Al-Labwani, a medical doctor himself, is sometimes referred to as “the Syrian Nelson Mandela.” Regarding his stay in Israel, he said:

I am filled with appreciation for the devoted medical care that [the Israeli medical center] is providing for the Syrian casualties, people from my nation, who have been injured in the war. This is a touching humanitarian gesture and an opportunity to bridge between the nations and a hope for

45 Sam McNeil, “Israel Treating Thousands of Syrians Injured in War,” Independent, April 8, 2017, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-syria-assad-treating-airstrikes- military-wounded-injured-war-a7673771.html (Accessed on September 17, 2019). 46 Liad Osmo, “For Syrian Refugees in Greece, Israel is No Longer the Enemy,” Ynet Magazine, April 3, 2019, www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5473381,00.html (Accessed on September 1, 2019). 26 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

peace in more quiet times. […] I came [here] to thank the hospital for treating hundreds of men, women and children, who have received the highest quality treatment, and emotional support […]. This treatment is not only for the wounded children and women, it is for the entire Syrian people, this is how we feel and everyone knows this and is talking about it. In Syria, Bashar Al- Assad claims that the Israelis are the enemies, and, here, at the hospital we see who the real Israel is.47

These testimonies, from the wounded civilians and all the way up to the opposition leader, strengthen the notion that this case study represents a different model, where seeds of peace are more likely to be planted.

The Bottom-up Emergence of the Social-Humanitarian Buffer Zone

The case studies of this research are curious, in the sense that they do not seem to fall into any of the buffer zone categories: a strange hybrid model of the humanitarian corridor that seems, surprisingly, to take place within the combat zone – deep inside regions where violence takes place. Furthermore, the creation of both regional belts was in its essence a project that started from the seeds of a face-to-face meeting of people with people. In both cases, we are dealing with bottom-up social processes that eventually dictated formal policies later to be fostered by decision makers. Looking into the two case studies, particularly with the updated events at the Syrian-Israeli border, we can actually define a sixth type of buffer zone where the humanitarian corridor, usually implemented once violence decreases, is created within an undefined zone. Such a zone can be located either in a combat zone

47 Viva Sarah Press, “Syrian Opposition Chief Thanks Israeli Doctors for Medical Aid,” ISRAEL21c, September 21, 2014, www.israel21c.org/syrian-oppositionist-thanks-israeli- doctors-for-medical-aid/ (Accessed on September 1, 2019). The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 27

or in a non-combat zone, within the territory of one of the countries in conflict. In the Lebanese example, by applying the Good Fence policy in the midst of Lebanon’s bloody civil war, Israel provided the Lebanese civil population with medical treatment as well as employment in agriculture, tourism, industry, and commerce within Israel. In the case study of the activity along the Syrian-Israeli border, direct trips from the battlefields of Syria to civilian hospitals in mainland Israel became a daily routine. These two examples call for recognition, within the conceptual framework of buffer zone theories, of an additional possible type: the model of a social-humanitarian buffer zone. The Israeli healthcare assistance and welfare support that was crystalized through the Good Neighbor Administration along the Israeli-Syrian border – particularly in the case of the Good Fence policy in Lebanon − was exceptional not only in the sense that it was social-humanitarian, that is, a corridor for medical aid as well as for occupations and welfare. It was exceptional also in the way in which it emerged, relying in its initial stages on local initiatives and then gaining momentum in a bottom-up process. In order to understand the improbability of such a process, one has to bear in mind four major aspects of the two case studies: (a) aiding the populace of an enemy state; (b) risking the safety of IDF troops as well as Israeli civilians in an effort to save Syrians and Lebanese; (c) relying on the host country’s social healthcare system; and (d) public consensus about giving aid to Israel’s former enemy populations. The following is a discussion of these four aspects. a. Aiding the populace of an enemy state: Professional medical literature covering ethical dilemmas contains little about case studies of cross-national healthcare assistance, when the initial relationship is one of rivalry and conflict. History supplies many examples of enemy states providing help to wounded prisoners of war or to civilians, while occupying forces remain on enemy soil − but this case is entirely different. One ought to bear in mind that the Syrian leadership has consistently declared itself to be in a state of war with Israel, in spite of the multiple contacts over recent decades to attain peace. Furthermore, many of the Syrian patients still see Israel as an enemy, and some have even sworn to turn their weapons against it and continue the 28 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

Jihad once their civil war is over. Their arrival in Israel was not a result of free choice; rather, they were desperate and in crucial need of medical care. Indeed, once medical treatment is completed, they all prefer to return to their homes.48 b. Risking the safety of IDF troops and Israeli civilians: First, there is a potential threat to the safety of the military medical teams, who are exposed to possible terror attacks as well as accidental crossfire. There was in fact a case where an IDF battalion surgeon was wounded in the chest by a stray bullet during one of the rescue operations. Additionally, there is danger of exposing patients in Israeli civilian hospitals to the multiple resistant bacteria brought in by the wounded non-Israeli patients, as a result of widespread and uncontrolled use of antibiotics across the border.49 c. Relying on the host country’s social healthcare system: In these unique case studies, Israeli authorities made the political decision that the Israeli healthcare system would voluntarily absorb the costs and supply the manpower needed in order to take care of all the foreign citizens who asked for help, no matter the ramifications. Notably, medical considerations and security checks remained the only criteria for full governmental support and complete funding by Israel’s ministry of health. Relying on the Israeli national civilian healthcare system to provide the platform for this humanitarian effort carried additional challenges beyond the unexpected burden to the local hospitals and staff. By definition, even in the wealthiest nations, advanced medical capabilities are restricted. With increasing medical care costs and growing reliance on intensive care and technologies, sophisticated surgical procedures and transplantations are managed and budgeted at the national level. In Israel, as in many other countries, the population funds its own care via taxes, and

48 Bahouth et al., “Helping Hands Across a War-Torn Border”; Savannah S. Young et al., “Conflict and Care: Israeli Healthcare Providers and Syrian Patients and Caregivers in Israel,” Global Qualitative Nursing Research, Vol. 3 (2016), pp. 1-15. 49 Anat Lerner et al., “Detection and Characterization of Carbapenemase-Producing Enterbacteriaceae in Wounded Syrian Patients Admitted to Hospitals in Northern Israel,” European Journal of Clinical Microbiology & Infectious Diseases, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2016), pp. 149-154. The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 29

provides both implicit and explicit permission for their government to decide on the division of national resources. This is one of the reasons why, when providing humanitarian aid to populations in catastrophes, choosing whom to help and resource allocation limits for each case is heartbreaking but unavoidable. However, since the Syrian patients are immediately entered into the Israeli healthcare system, the service that they receive is from a large and sophisticated pool of resources, wholly sponsored by Israel.50 d. Public consensus: Once information about each of the projects had been gradually released to the press, there were no negative comments doubting or objecting to the projects. This lack of disagreement, in a society where almost everything is political and therefore subject to debate, certainly implies that the Israeli public as a whole fully accepted the humanitarian policies of its leadership.51

Conclusions

The two case studies converge into one model that is characterized by its substance and by how it is created: the social-humanitarian buffer zone that evolves in a bottom-up manner. From an optimistic point of view, the great advantage of a social-humanitarian buffer zone is its capacity to engage factors that promote coexistence. Where social and medical assistance is applied, the winds of war are bound to decline. When humanitarian help is distributed sincerely, human trust may replace hatred. The opportunity for people to meet with each other on charitable grounds can dismantle generations of mutual enmity. In this sense, perhaps the case studies that we have examined here encapsulate a formula for solutions to protracted conflicts. In both case studies, the Lebanese and the Syrian one, psychological barriers were dismantled, and friendship between former rival societies flourished.

50 Bahouth et al., “Helping Hands across a War-Torn Border.” 51 Ibid. 30 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin

Israel, the eternal demon in the eyes of its northern neighbors, could suddenly be appreciated as a savior. Despite various testimonies claiming that Syrian patients in Israeli hospitals had promised to sustain the struggle against Zionism once they recovered and returned to their homes, most commentators tend to believe that the population as a whole will remain grateful. In order to sustain social-humanitarian buffer zones as such, for the sake of a chance at coexistence, certain practical conditions should be considered by the country that supplies aid, as well as by the civilians in need. For instance, the country that assists should refrain from any military aid, either by arming foreign forces or by any other military intervention. The activity should concentrate solely on civil considerations. On the other hand, the civilians who receive humanitarian aid have to be aware of the purely humanitarian basis of their relations with the providers. Therefore, they should feel as safe as possible once they are outside of their homeland territory, but fully responsible for their own security once they return to their homes. Although not ideal, these principles ought to be maintained in order to allow the social-humanitarian model to decrease violence and calm ferocious enmity. It is noteworthy that the case studies we have examined took place in the heart of violent occurrences. We may be witnessing an extraordinary model where coexistence can arise out of bloodbaths. This model is not merely one more method of separating fighting forces; it is a way of implementing actions that may manage violence under hostile conditions. The uniqueness of a social-humanitarian buffer zone, which emerges from the ground and in a bottom-up direction, will reach the decision makers, who, in future wars, may turn the idea into a tool for lowering flames and diminishing violent conflicts.

Acknowledgement

The authors wish to thank the Middle East & Central Asia Research Center in Ariel University, for supporting this research. The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 31

About the Authors

Dr. Dan Naor, a lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Ariel University in Israel, is a researcher of Lebanese history, politics, and society and Lebanese-Syrian relations. Among his publications are: “The Path to Syrian Intervention in Lebanon on the Eve of Civil War, 1970-1975,” The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2014); “The Ehden Massacre of 1978 in Lebanon – The Creation of a Resistance Myth,” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa (2016); “The Power of Neutrality: Lebanon as an Oil Transit Country,” Middle East Policy (2019).

Dr. Eyal Lewin is Assistant Professor (Senior Lecturer) at Ariel University. He is also a research fellow at the Kinneret Center on Peace, Security and Society. Serves as Academic Advisor for the MA program at the National Security College of the IDF. Lewin is the author of academic papers and monographs and the editor of books focusing on general socio-political phenomena, such as patriotism, national resilience, national ethos, and Israel studies.