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The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies Volume 5, Fall 2019, pp. 5-31 DOI: https://doi.org/10.26351/JIMES/5/1 ISSN: 2522-347X (print); 2522-6959 (online) The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social- Humanitarian Security Zone as a Means to Reduce Regional Hostility: Two Case Studies from Warzones in the Middle East Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin Abstract This article examines the idea of buffer zones as a vehicle for dialogue and coexistence. In particular, it raises an assumption that bottom-up developments, rather than top-down policies, are liable to turn buffer zones into bridges for coexistence between rival parties. We examine two Middle Eastern case studies: The Good Fence policy that Israel practiced in South Lebanon during the 1970s, and the Israeli Good Neighbor Administration that was in effect along the Syrian border from 2016 to 2018. These case studies reveal a peculiar model: the social-humanitarian buffer zone, which was located where combat took place, and evolved through decisions that were made by the official leadership, but were actually dictated by lower- ranked social agents. We conclude that a social-humanitarian buffer zone, advancing in a bottom-up direction, has the capacity to reduce regional violence and to weaken hostility. Keywords: buffer zones, peace zones, Lebanon, Syria, Israel 5 Dr. Dan Naor – Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Ariel University; [email protected] Dr. Eyal Lewin – Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Ariel University; [email protected] 6 The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 7 Introduction There is accumulating evidence that it is merely a matter of time before Israel and Iran have a violent collision on the Syrian border. Combative rhetoric from both sides has become a common occurrence, suggesting winds of war in the Middle East. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in March 2011, Israel and Iran have been on an escalation track. With Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps determined to use Syrian territory as a platform for a future war against Israel, and a political Israeli leadership that has outspokenly tried to prevent such a possibility, a future clash seems to be almost inevitable. By 2018, Iran, seeing Syria as a territory for terror actions against Israel, had initiated numerous cross- border incidents along the Golan Heights, and the Israeli Air Force had struck dozens of weapon shipments to Hezbollah and Iranian arms-production facilities located deep in the Syrian desert. Some of these clashes were lethal, resulting in dead Iranian soldiers and officers.1 Throughout most of the long years of civil war, Jerusalem refrained from direct intervention. Israeli leadership remained reluctant to enter the Syrian quagmire and to risk the possibility of exposing Israeli citizens to retaliatory fire from across the border. Focusing primarily on maintaining security and repelling threats posed by the war in Syria, Israel avoided pursuing whatever opportunities lay in linking up even with relatively moderate actors. Consequently, Syrian rebels’ pleas for armament were constantly rejected, even when presented by non-jihadist factions who were desperate to fight Assad’s forces and Iranian sponsored militias.2 Thus, in spite of often refraining from action or acting carefully, Israeli policy regarding Syria led to failure. During the last couple of years, the spillover attacks of mortar shells landing in the Golan Heights have increased and fighting 1 Maya Hadar, “The War in Syria: An Israeli Perspective,” IFK Monitor International, October 2017, www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/ifk_monitor_44_int_hadar_israel_oktober_ 17_web.pdf (Accessed on September 17, 2019); Ehud Yaari, “Bracing for an Israel-Iran Confrontation,” The American Interest, April 30, 2018. 2 Nir Boms, “Israel’s Policy on the Syrian Civil War: Risks and Opportunities,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2017), pp. 323-336; Yaari, “Bracing for an Israel-Iran Confrontation.” 8 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin between rival factions have continued to draw closer to Israel’s border. Moreover, Hezbollah and other Shi’ite militias might approach the 1974 armistice line and set up offensive infrastructure in its vicinity, where they could launch attacks from an area in which no Lebanese civilian constituencies would have to suffer Israeli counterattacks. With Assad’s revival and his debt to his Iranian allies, in the near future Israel will be coping on a daily basis with a strengthened Hezbollah military force, and above all – a constant encroachment of Iran toward its border.3 The question remains, however, what the decision makers in Jerusalem can do in order to deal with this problematic situation. What tools does the Israeli government, or the IDF for that matter, possess in order to handle the growing danger coming from the north? How can Jerusalem manage the growing threat from Tehran to turn Syria into a new haven for terrorist groups, and an inferno for Israel? In search of possible political or military tools, this paper concentrates on a specific pattern: the security belt. First, we integrate common knowledge about buffer areas in general, trying to convey the typical, basic qualities of their political and military arrangements. We then analyze various types of buffer zones, mainly to follow their dynamics in relation to reduction of hostilities. Next, we examine two case studies. Although these case studies have already been investigated,4 they are presented here with new and updated details. The first one is the historic experience of the IDF’s security zone in Lebanon. Relying on testimonies of Lebanese and Israeli officers, gathered by the authors, we verify two basic assumptions. The first is that the Israeli experience, due to relative stability and low-cost conflict management, was a positive one. The second assumption is that the Israeli security zone in Lebanon should not be seen as merely involving security, but rather as a social construct too − based on civilian activity and having evolved from the Israeli humanitarian assistance in Southern Lebanon during the late 1970s (“The Good Fence policy”). 3 Ibid. 4 See for example Gideon Bigger (ed.), The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Publishing House, 1995). The Bottom-up Evolution of a Social-Humanitarian Security Zone 9 The second case study is “The Good Neighbor Administration,” which explores Israel’s humanitarian aid in Syria, where in the midst of an internal Syrian civil war, Israel admitted medical aid and initiated contact with the local population that resided near the international borders. Finally, we raise the question of whether, after conducting the two case studies, one could extract a model that could turn out to be the key to eliminating the risks of a coming war. We notice that in both case studies we witnessed two important factors: (1) The existence of a specific form of security zone, which we call “The Social Security Belt.” This model is based on military protection, but at the same time is guaranteed by civilian humanitarian and social activities. (2) The development of such a regional belt in a bottom-up process, not directly dictated by decision makers. In understanding and fostering the mechanisms of such a model lie prospects for a more peaceful future – not only on the plateaus of the Golan Heights, but also in other places, all over the world, where conflict and distress reside. Buffer Zones Buffer zones are major instruments often used to calm violent conflicts. They may be by-products of peace management efforts, or formed where peacekeeping forces are at work. These zones are given diverse names, such as buffer zones, demilitarized zones, buffer belts, security belts, and other linguistic combinations. The idea of a security zone probably originated in the psychological literature, where one can read about the importance of space in reference to a personal buffer zone. It is widely believed that individuals have their own corporeal buffer zones, that is, certain areas around their physical bodies, whose violation produces anxiety and may lead to aggression. This personal space applies to different regions for different kinds of social interactions, and it changes according to one’s social circumstances. People have diverse levels of spatial comfort in their interpersonal interactions, and some of those levels originate in people’s cultural backgrounds. 10 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin Empirical evidence across different groups shows that sustaining personal space enables disputants to avoid existing or latent conflicts.5 The concept of space between individuals on the personal level minimizing potential violence between disputants has proven to be true also at the larger social level. For example, buffer zones are a tool in the management of disputes over land development, where the natural biosphere often needs protection from the hazards of human growth and technological advances. Industrialization and the accelerated rate of human population growth have destructive effects on the environment. Buffer zones are therefore often created in order to protect ecological reserves and to preserve natural resources such as water sources, forests, and endangered species. Similarly, buffer zones are used by governments to preserve age-old civilizations threatened by modernization and by globalization, usually as an effort to sustain indigenous societies or in order to preserve symbolic evidence of the national and ethnic origins of political entities.6 Accordingly, in international relations, the defining aspect of any buffer zone is the existence of a physical area that separates opposing forces. In order to maintain such a neutral area, certain rules are set and followed by all parties to a conflict (or 5 Stephen F. Curran, Robert J. Blatchley and Thomas E. Hanlon, “The Relationship Between Body Buffer Zone and Violence as Assessed by Subjective and Objective Techniques,” Criminal Justice and Behavior, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1978), pp. 53-62; Arthur M.