RESTRICTED PEW r rA.n,5r_ FERMlrJ tUf XAW18 Vol. 7

| hsreport was prepaired' for use~~~~~~~~Wti I II ithntetLe Dankn cind its aff'll,iteu~?tJ orgunizarilons. Public Disclosure Authorized They do not accept responsibility for its accuracy or completeness. The report may nof be pubi5hed nor may it oe quoted as represenring their views.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT' INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION Public Disclosure Authorized

THE CURRENT ECONOMIC POSITION

AND PROSPFCTS

GHANA

(in ten volumes) Public Disclosure Authorized

VOLUMEV VII

TRANSPOR TATION

OJctober 26, 1970 Public Disclosure Authorized

western Afirica Department CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

1 New Cedi = US$0.98

1 dollar = N, 1.02 THE MISSION

This annex is based on the findings of a mission in April and May 1970 to Ghana comoosed of:

Mr- Barend A. de Vries Chief of Mission

Mr- Fateh Chaudhri General Economist

M1.r Thom,si Klein Balance of Pavments & External Debt

Miss Ka

Mr. 14M Taher Daiani* PiQrqi

M-r UVed !'-andhi

Mr. Nake Ka.mrany Social Sector

Mr. itvat Thadani Industry

MI A1lfV,2 onto T-nnn-rr

Mr. Ha nr.sSchult -ranstort

M.r. Charles Metcalfe Agriculture

Mr. Bruce Johnston.* Agriculture

Mr Merrill,1 Bateman" Cocoa

Mr. H.erm*an Nisse.baum. 04Prject List

Mr. Jn r.Tohn .b.,ectr4c Eln Dower

Mr. Edward Minnig

Mr. S. Rangac0 har Resnear-ch

Mlss Beverltey Baxter Secretary

* Sco d by1-. te ItAeAT r-.aional on. Monetay ** Concultants

This report has been prepareA by m-asrat. Y.ans Schulte andA Al fredo .i';oto during their mission to Ghana in May 1970 and a follow-up visit by Mr.

SJ ..chlte1+L 6t4 JLC4-c_ioLJ. J LCLIIUCLW--Ie..e, 1970± I UJl anAant ~Adraws w consieal.ALntu ±7JCWJ. on-1,.Vih LLLCthe finin8L LL&AU±L%Z UtofAJ- L.L&tthe~ Transport Sector Study by the Nathan Consortium for Sector Studies (April 10.\ .L7I IUJj TABLE JF CONTENTS

Page No.

T. HT(GWAY, ...... 1.I A. General. 1 B. Highway Administration and Planning 2 C. Highway Maintenance. 3 D. The Investment Program. 5 E. Highway Financing and Taxation 8 F. State Transport Corporation 9 G. Omnibus Services Authority. 9 II. GHANA RAILWAYS .. 11 A. General .11 B. Infrastructure .11 C. Rolling Stock .12 D. Traffic .13 E. Tariffs .14 F. Financial Situation .15 G. Ghana Railway's 1970/71 Investment Budget .17 H. Some General Comments on Ghana Railways' Performance .17 I. The Future of Ghana Railways 18 J. Summary and Conclusions .19 III. PORTS .21 A. General .21 B. Infrastructure .21 C. Traffic .22 D. Performance of Port Administration 23 E. 1970/71 Investment Budget of Ghana Ports .24 F. Some Special Problems .24 G. Conclusions and Recommendations 26 IV. CIVIL AVIATION .. 28 A. General .28 B. Administration and Organization 28 C. Infrastructure .28 D. Traffic .29 E. Aviation Charges .30 F. Ghana Airways .30 V. BLACK STAR LINE .34 A. General .34 B. Onprationns 3 C. Main Problems and Recommendations 36 VI. LAKE TRANSPORT .37 TABLES Table No.

Length and Condition of the Road Network 1

Motor Fuel Consumption 2

Vehicle Registration 3

Annual Budget of the Ministry of Works and Housing (Puilic Work Departmtent) 4

Reueyriiiu ftrnm Ronti 1Uscer Rpe1ted l'xypes S

Typical Vehic:le Operatir.g Costs6

Traffic -r.a Railways 7

Tonnages of MaJ4r Conmmodities 8 Railway and E'ort-s Ad .nsta n Co-mbie Income Statement 9

Railway Incorne Statement - July 1958-September

D A X1 @D~~A 1 7/ 7 1 T -._-.- - D .. A-- I 11 1 O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Q in~~~~~~~~~~~~~~11

Tlrafic a; Port of 'ema 13

CHARTS

Organization Chart of Ghana Railway and Ports Administration

ThLe Trarsport System I. HITCI1.AYVc

A. General

1. The highway network in Ghana totals about 20,000 miles, of which -70 mdles ha-ve conLcrete or asphalt-concrete weariLng course, 2400 are biu.L.men surfaced, 6800 are gravel or laterite surfaced and the remainder are un- impruv=U'mroe CULeart- LLI L UdUt,od. k,dU(_~__ Tabl 1).I,LJ * .Jt4549lr,>l-es U 1LLL.L~ ~J of m,a-inL _ Luaroad.4s ar-e .he"LL=L-- L~-OFULALOLesponsi= bility of the Public Works Department (PWD) of the Ministry of Works the rema'Lnder 'alls unduer thle Jurisdiction of' regiLonaL co. -LUissionersand municipal councils. The network provides a basic grid pattern of communi- -- ~~~~~~~~ _, ..~_L--- A _ J - cation LUn the sparsely settled northenL ILar L. LoLt LcUULLLry. A L aU.Ld± pattern around the principal urban centers and the areas of intense agricultural production (cocoa) characteristizes the denser southern network. Partial results of an inventory of PWD roads currently under way indicate that around 21% of the roads do not require any work at the present time, 42% need normal maintenance including regravelling and 37% or some 2000 miles require complete restoration.

2. There were about 54,000 vehicles in 1969, 55% of which were automobiles, 21% trucks, including the typically Ghanaian "mammy wagon" used for combined goods and passenger transport, and the rest were buses and special purpose vehicles. Both, the vehicle fleet and the motor fuel consumption grew at an average annual rate of 2.0% in the 1960-68 perioa (See Tables 2 and 3), low in comparison with a GDP rate of growth of about 2.4% for the same period. Only private cars and buses have an average age of less than five years; the average age for trucks is around 5.6 years. In 1968 and 1969 the rate of growth of the vehicle fleet increased, princi- pally due to the import of an appreciable amount of private passenger cars. The proportion of trucks appears low in relation to the transport needs of the country, and consideration should be given to changing present policies in order to promote the purchase of trucks. According to estimates of the Transport Sector Study, between No 50 and No 64 million (at 1968 prices) would be the foreign exchange cost of vehicles, spare parts, fuel and lubricants between 1971 and 1975 to obtain a 6% growth of the fleet during that period. The estimates assume a change in the fleet composition which would reduce the percentage of cars to 50 and increase that for trucks to 31 by 1975. Although 6% appears to be too high for the required growth of the vehicle fleet in the next five years, it will certainly have to grow faster than in the 1960's and the mission agrees on the need to change the fleet composition in favor of a larger truck share.

3. Road transport moves about 3.6 million tons of goods per year or almost two-thirds of total inter-zonal land traffic. Road transport also accounts for some 3200 million passenger miles annually. There are no restrictions on the number, size and operations of road transport companies. -2-

Traffic volumes are in general very low with the highest figures in the Accrr-Kusmocas.-Taknr2tif slrpA (rnIlepn TY4Ancylp) w-herj. ROn tn IROO AADT hAue been recorded. Only 10% of PWD's network (550 miles) carries traffic in excess of 600 vehicles per danyj an,1ndoutaside t-he main inte,-iirian rniut-sa in the southern third of the country there are practically no roads with an average daily- trffir of over 300. The Transport Sector Study estimates that vehicle operating costs per ton-mile vary from NP 4.5 for a 3-ton 9 Imnimmy t r to.plrtn MP 9.2 fo.r a 1 -torn truiiik (D-a.eaae fvr all urface type:. and at 1002% load factors). However, trucks are not efficiently used in Ghana and at …resent,avera…e load factors ranging from 38% for "mammy" trucks to 69% for 12-ton trucks increase the operating costs per ton mile to NP 11.8 and NP 3.1 respectively. Load factors for buses are consider- ably higher (82%) and at those levels of occupancy the cost per passenger- i-s around NP 11.0. Table- shows m.ile *fl,t~'~aL tAAf~ *J. .* A a ehceoeti. ---ot *A__ .a~ A.*SW A. V A. 1 J A. 'XrLU S..L~O for passenger cars and 7-ton trucks under three different road surface cond4tior.-1.-d - W - T.o.A-,J&O*~ -- 7------.ral -*=La.L.Y11.,t. 1osts*L6L JC tLL t.I- J. eflecCL A.=%L U %LLUth# cridraltJ W U I U 5 6 deterioration of road, the infrastructure and the inefficient use of the existing veha-icle fleet. e Tran.sport1 Sector Sudy contains c

ALL~ A. A Li IC L O.J LAUY L.%&LCL.L~L0 CL %ULLZ .LU=LCILJ.t: 1IIZUUL&L. Ul01 information pertaining to road transport characteristics, organization ofA1. the_6LLI 2.%iCU.---ad trnprLLCILAC)JUL%U. A.L&Uindustry " .CLL anCULU-- LLL eI.; JL=0.LL.0reut CtLLUnaaye CLL4CL.LY0= UXf L 4-erLI&LrL zonal origin and destination traffic surveys conducted in 1969 by the

N_.LAIU, A. C1jJSJLA5 _.U.C rA. UL.L I LI Li LAOU.LU s er v a basis for future planning and policy. Previous to the Transport Sector Study, L..L.LL u only-AL.Ly~~ partial L..Ld A. studlesL.UJ.~ U. LiLla'L beenv U.AJAUconducteud oni IL.L±ILW~highway useUi Udata. L. Available PWD traffic count series show extreme fluctuations attributed to inadequa,te cour.tiLng moi'lo'ust sdg processingdanu oL Uata. IUprovemenLt of date collection procedures is of utmost importance for highway planning andu mair.te.,iance, and fLor transport taxationl and' coord'inatLorn. A - … J _1_ - … d.IUWLlLwLiIWL. dLU LULLLLduLr.ULL LWi.L±ULdLUAUr1IaLO B. Hig.hway Udmin'st-Lat'o. d Planning

5. .1'~Several agencci'Les participateL .LIL Li.hL.I-Wy pF.L1ULiLLr, UOL.WLLUUL1UI and maintenance. The Public Works Department (PWD) and the regional com- 1miss-ioners anr.d local r-uun.iciLp '. cun-1ci'Ll .s are- r e spUo.L- s iDble 'orUL .the -a. LLL ItLnaIv.ce of the entire network and the execution of construction projects. Starting

'nZ ri 19071, sery of YouthLtheILIi anI R ura Development will gradually take over from PWD the responsibility of feeder road construction. The Ministry of Transport and Communications has jurisdiction over road transport matters and policy. Of minor importance is the role of other institutioms such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Forestry, tne Voilta River Authority, the Cocoa Marketing Bloard and private timber companies. - 3 -

6. The PWD is responsible for the planning, design and supervision of road prMo4ects There 4S no adeately safffeA techn1cal unit in charge of highway planning and of studies on the economic feasibility of consotruction pro4ects. For .s40r pro4ecto hig.h.way design ha boon contracted with consultants, whereas minor roads are directly designed by the Department. PhJD undertakes conetruction supe,mri4sion .-A ontrol, '3t their own central and regional soils and materials laboratories which generally suffer from inadequate staffing and equipment. Th-e DTn feeder -A --ga constitutes an exception to the extent that economic studies were carried out for Jhe original schem.e co-nfsult1 ants have helped s upemrise con struction (see Section D below). The Quantity Surveying Branch of PWD is Gharged.na.~,.,. with.. 4LL4 thenI.. prepjarato fl ofJLn teJ ~Ander docu.ufnUtsA .. ,nl O DT.T1a..Dis A. alvsoA.L ~ res, poribleu for the maintenance of government buildings and runways, the latter delegated byV UIthUe %,.LVCiv £1.. il AvitoMV±GL.LJIL DeprtrentW'~jaA.LLULUL&6.

'7 le ne- Guvennt elctd 1 10n 13-i- eJ A J_ _1ecer _ra I . J.&Lc Law wJJv~. LZILL X ± ULn 1L 9, d cL dUcU 6LV Ue.cLLaC.L 'ze.C number of Government agencies including PWD. There are now nine regional PWDJ offices, Lheded uy sen'orL.LUL eLng r WLLV WLA..L i, tLeLr ciCLClS enjoy a large degree of autonomy. It is not clear at this stage to what extent centra- 'lizedu coorAinatior, and control will b-e maintain.ed o-ver cert-air.n functions ofr .L±L~~~~~~~~Ui.VJj. ~~~~~~~~~~~U.LILO-L.LLJL Ld U J1 hL, J L .L.L.&. UV UaLI LO.L U V .LLdLA U4I LLLO LI national interest. Though there are clear advantages in favor of active

.LLd lclparticipationd .LL.pLLL L A. inLIALL~&pLa.jL trarnsport promotionU LUJ.LUU CL0Land L~Ltechnic1al .LLLn ca.l O.LU_.d JL.LL1M&II.~Ld.Li.ca assistance to regional and local road authorities, central control over

Lhigh&way p±'LaL1iug, mair.er.ar.ce and construction Of tLthe t runk road s-ystem should be retained.

8. In spite of recent efforts to solve the acute staffing problems, there is still a serious sulortage of qualiried personnel throughout PWD's organization. Continued efforts to strengthen present staff and to improve training of personnel must be undertaken. Special attention must be given to the creation of a planning and programming unit within the Roads Branch of PWD which would prepare annual budgets, revise them periodically and study matters affecting road construction costs, road maintenance costs, and collect and analyze highway data for transport planning and policy purposes. Carefully prepared training programs are recommended, partic- ularly in areas relating to accounting, store keeping, and equipment and road maintenance procedures. Temporary expatriate expertise assistance could be sought for these tasks.

C. Highway Maintenance

9. Soon after independence in 1957, the highway network was improved by a major paving and upgrading program which made Ghana's road system one of the best on the West African coast. During the 1960's some new roads were built or improved, but the system in general underwent severe deteri- oration and today is in serious disrepair. - 4 -

10. The deterioration of the road system resulted from many causes such as extremely low budget allocations, late release of approved funds, lack of equipment and spare parts and the understaffing of PWD. Inadequate drainage structures coupled with severe floods (especially in 1968) and roads built to standards not suited for present traffic, contributed to tile problems. Established systems for planning, scheduling and reporting on the progress of road maintenance have generally fallen into disuse. Reliable accounting records of costs incurred on road maintenance are not available. The Transport Sector Study estimated that around NO 7.5 million would be required annually for the adequate maintenance of PWD's network. Annual budget allocations, however, averaged only No 5.1 million during the period 1955-1960, and were reduced to an even more inadequate NO 2.2 million during the period 1961-1.965. Allocations have increased to an average of NO 7.4 million in subsequent years (1966-1970; Table 4), but the large backlog of deferred maintenance and the late release of funds towards the end of fiscal years, which coincides with the rainy season when works cannot. be carried out, have reduced the benefits from higher allocat- ions. Actual expenditures on road maintenance apparently have fluctuated between 60 and 80% of budgeted amounts.

11. One of the reasons for the late release of PWD's maintenance funds is the fact that since two years allocaLtions have been transferred from the Government's current budget to the development budget. Funds from the development budget are released at the discretion of the Minister of Finance subiect to overall budgetary considerat.ions. To improve the situation, the mission recommends to abandon the present system - which was reportedly introduced to underline the "development" effect of a stepped-up maintenance program - and to transfer allocations for current maintenance operations back to the Government's current budget; genuine "capital" expenditures such as the purchase of additional equipment, construction of workshops, etc. could remain in the development budget. A more radical solution would be to revitalise the former Road Fund (abandoned in the early 60's) which would be fed by earmarked road user taxes and managed more or less indenend- ently by PWDP.

12. There is no complete and reliable inventory of PWD's maintenance equipment. Though adequately built and. kept tidy; the yards and shons of Regional and. District Offices visited by the mission are occupied with scrap and eauinment awaiting repairs. Relatively new equipment is idle for lnng periods, and distribution of basic spare parts sometimes takes excessively long time: numerous new npeees are "eartnibalized" in order to obtain hadly needed supplies. The lack of sufficiently skilled personnel, of operatio:nal manuals and nrocedures and of basic everyday maintenance tools and equipm,nt further enhance PWD.'s problems. A recent proposal by a private company to repnair PWD'ls entire epninment est_mated the eost of thin onperstion at US$4 to 5 million. A study is required to inventorize PWD's maintenance eqnu4nment anA ahnnQ nAntn nasess the reedA for renpa4ar nr npurohoaes nf now equipment, together with overall recommendations for the improvement of mainte.r..- operations. The Roads .Rehabjljt3tjonprogram recom endAeA 1la, would include financing of the equipment needs which would be identified in that, inv.ntory. - 5 -

13. The mission agrees with PWD that top priority has to be given to a major program of rehabl±tatlon of r-hana's trunk road network and to the improvement of current maintenance operations. Some pre- paratory work to define such a program has been done in the fvmmaT^rk of the Transport Sector Study. The U.K. Ministry of Overseas Development (0DM) hnas agreed to n ' onnultns1 F Se-riices to perepare ar- prog of rehabilitation of some 1,500 miles of main roads (1,000 miles paved, 500 gravel roa(As) ir.cluding det-41-ailed-- eg _4 e for a fs gu o- 500 m4 1l- of road. ODM will also provide a team of experts to study PWD's maintenance operations and Lto recomm.W,en.d a m.ain.ten.ar,ce p-4a.i , suitable-. externa financing. The total cost of both programs is estimated at about US$ 20 millionL with a foreign. exchar.ge com..poner.t of abut US$ 14 mitior.;14- t wil.. be submitted for financing to the Bank.

D. The Investment Program

14. The investment program during the 1960's in general placed too much emphasis on extending and improving the trunk road system beyond required standards justified by present or foreseeable traffic volumes. None OL the recent corUstructiLon proJects were prLecedUed by eLoULLULLnoL feasibility studies. On the other hand, very small amounts were allotted for maiuteuance of the systerLi anu plant renewal. .Considerable emphasis has also been given to the construction Of feeder roads throughout the country. A program of some 1,100 miles of feeder roads has been prepared, sponsored financially by USAID, OL which over 700 miles have been constructed since 1968 at a total cost of about $10.5 million. Costs are fairly ligh due to the relatively gen.erurO uesign standards chosen and due to the fact that relatively small lots were awarded to a large number of Ghanaian contractors, most of wnom were not sufficiently equipped for the job and had to incur high initial costs for new equipment, etc.

16. Tne Government wants to continued the feeder roads program at a rate of about 500 miles per year. In order to put future feeder road construction on a sound basis and to coordinate it more closely with agri- cultural development programs and rural needs, the Government is planning to engage consultants during FY 1970/7L to work out a new master plan ot feeder roads for the whole country. Management of the program which so far has been assured by PWD, will gradually be absorbed by the Ministry of Youth and Rural Development. It is not yet clear to what extent PWD will continue to participate in the feeder road program. There are obvious advantages to carrying out this program within the framework of agricultural and rural objectives, but the experience of PWD in managing and controlling the construction of feeder roads should not be overlooked. The program has high priority in Ghana's overall development program. -6-

17. Starting in FY 1969/70, the Government initiated a second feeder road program aiming at the improvemenl: and construction of village access roads, which is to be undertaken with the help of voluntary local labor, with the Government: contributing the costs of materials and the minimum of equipment required, and under the :initiative and direction of the rural development authorities, and the Community Development Department of the Ministry of Youth and Rural Development. Obviously, there is no clear-cut separation between the two feeder road programs and more planning and preparation will be necessary before Lncreasing present levels of expendi- tures. Furthermore, a thorough long-term planning and economic analysis must be undertaken in the light of agricultural and rural development objectives and a reasonable balance should be achieved between feeder road construction and investments in the trunk road system.

18. A generaL trends to rationalise investment has underline the last annual capital development budgets. The FY 1969/70 PWD budget included NO 5.3 million for the upgrading of 21 different trunk road sections, NO 10.4 for road maintenance, No 4.0 for the PWD's feeder road program, NO 1.0 for the self-help feeder road program, and NO 3.2 million for other purposes, especially ferry services and hydrological works. The main features of that budget were large increases in the appropriation for maintenance wcrk (40%) and feeder roads (269%) as compared with FY 1968/69 (Table 4).

19. The 1970/71 budget of PWD again reflects the priority given by the Government to road maintenance and feeder road construction: NO 11.8 and NO 5 million respectively have been budgeted for these purposes. The allocation for road maintenance and rehabilitation appears unrealistically high. Given the failure of programs planned in past years (purchase of equipment, construction of workshops, etc.) and given the staffing prob].ems of PWD a more appropriate figure would have been of the order of No 8 to NO 9 million. The total amount for trunk road construction is NO 7.7 million, over 40% higher than in FY 1969/70. It concludes continuation of some 23 projects, most of which have already been contracted, and one new project: the paving of the Techiman-Wenchi road (NO 0.9 million), the economic justification of which appears doubtful. Several of the ongoing projects are nearing completion and should, therefore, be finished. Others, however, have either just started or very slow progress has been made so far, and considerable time and investment are required before completion. SLnce top priority should be given to the program of road rehabilitation the mission recommends that, to the extent possible, new or recently started proiects should be postponed or discontinued unless their economic justification can be clearly demonstrated.

20. The mission could not make a comprehensive evaluation of all Lhe projects included in the budget list for FY 1970/71 since for most of them no feasibility or other economic studies are available. Following are the mission's prelimirLary conclusions with regard to some of the major projects in the liight of available information. -7 - 7 -

(Accra) - Nsawan-Bunso-(Kumasi) (170 miles)

There is no significant difference in length between this route and the old one via Koforidua, but the difference in aligrment and gradients is substantial. While the road via Koforidua runs partly over the Mampong Scarpment, the only mountainous range in Ghana, the road via Nsawam borders the Scarpment through topography ranging from flat to rolling terrain, permitting an acceptable alignment. The narrow and winding road wnicn existed at the time of the Golden Triangle Project study and appraisal (the route via Nsawan was one of the alternative alignemtns between Accra and Kumasi evaluated by consultants Kjessler and Mannerstrale AB in 1968) has been considerably widened and reconstructed in nearly half of its length. Three contractors are working in the 52 mile sector. Revised estimates set the completion date for the entire sector around the end of 1971. NO 2 million have been allocated for this project in the 1970/71 budget. The Nsawam-Bunso section constituted the only serious bottleneck of the existing road between Accra and Kumasi. Upon completion of the three contracts, the improvement of the remaining sectors, especially the narrow, poorly aligned Accra-Nsawam portion envisaged under the prospective rehabilitation project (see paragraph 13), should yield an adequate road connection between Accra and Kumasi. The mission believes that a re- evaluation of the Golden Triangle Accra-Kumasi project deserves attention in the light of current improvements and new traffic information, and in principle estimates that the beginning of construction should be deferred untill about 1974.

Ho - Denu (66 miles)

This road close to the border with Togo connects the capital of the Volta Region, Ho, with the Ghana Coastal Road at a point near the border. The two contractors working on its reconstruction should finish their job in FY 1970/71. The standards of the 24-feet paved surface road will become characteristic of all trunk roads in Ghana according to PWD officials. The total cost of the project is around NO 4.7 million (NO 1.4 million are allocated for 1970/71), and it will serve only approximately 110 vehicles daily. The mission does not believe that the design standards adopted for this road could be economically justified.

Kumasi-Bibiani (58 miles)

Similar to the Hlo-Denu project, this road was not preceded by an economic study. Around 26 miles have been completed to the same 24-feet wide paved surface standard. Government officials declared their decision to stop present reconstruction at the end of the current contract, by which time around 35 miles will be completed. Present traffic is also of the order of 110 vehicles per day, which clearly does not justify the level of improvement under way. -8-

Outh'er Pro ecJts:;L

The Accra-ITemL1a Miotorway Phase II an.d the Brewery-Liberi a Road constitute urban traLnsport projects in the Accra area. The first comprises LHLe eXteUisOn OL l tht Accra-Teu-a 'rutor-way as Lar as .he ';ersectior. w,ht.Li the road to Nsawam. Work on the two roads, especially on the second one, is almost completea. uLner projecLs suLch as Lte DoLgatanlga-Navrongo-raga road (close to the border with Upper Volta) have been practically completed or will be discontirnued, as in the case oI the Axim-Half Assini project which aimed at providing a road link wiLth the neighboring Ivory Coast.

E. Highway Financing and Taxation

21. Earlier at:tempts to earmark road users revenues for expenditures on highways did not succeed and were abandoned in 1960. Capitai develop- ment and recurrent expenditures have been financed via 'the regular Central Government budget. Road maintenance expenditures were financed from the recurrent expenditure budget which is given first priority over the develop- ment budget in case of shortage ot funds. however, a tew years ago main- tenance was transferred to the capital development budget in view of the considerablie investment required to rehabilitate the road network. This has contributed to a delay in the release of resources for maintenance, due to the priorities mentioned before.

22. Tlhe princiLpal road user taxes are (i) import duties on motor vehicles, fuel, lubricants, tires and parts; (ii) purchase tax on motor vehicles and parts (

23. Tables 4 and 5 allow an approximate comparison between expenditure on the road system and revenue from road user taxation. Based on available evidence, road user charges considerably exceeded investment in road trans- port infrastructure., especially during the period 1963-68 when revenues more than doubled expenditures. However, the increase of investment in road infrastructure in recent years, together with a decreasing trend in revenues since 1966., have narrowed the disproportionate gap considerably and a balanced situation is expected for FY 1970/71 when revenues and expenditures of the order of NO 26 million are estimated. As investment steps up in the future with the prospected Road Rehabilitation Program (See para. 13), there might be a need for a revision of road user taxes. As can be seen in the other chapters, the Government, while spending little on roads, has subsidized several other modes, especially ports, maritime navigation and aviation by covering the costs of investments in infrastructure, equipment and sometimes even yearly operating deficits of the Government-owned agencies. These subsidies should be avoided since t:hey upset the real comparative economic advantages between modes of transport:, or between transport and other areas of economic activity. -9-

F. Otate Lr-anLpoUrt pU-L-U----

24. The State Transport Corporation becamne LhL suLccssor to the Government Transport Department in 1966. It has grown from an agency whose function was to operate motor transport services for the rest of the Central Goverrment into a corporation which operates intercity road trans- port services tnroughout the country. Besides bus service and trucking, State Transport provides petroleum distribution, car hire, and ports' forwarding and clearing services. It also has entered the field of vehicle metal body building and metal works.

25. State Transport Corporation owns a fleet of 69 buses, 115 trucks and 52 cars, and has bus depots in all important cities, together with adequate workshops and maintenance facilities. During 1967 and 1968, the Corporation moved an average of 706,000 passengers with 88.7 million passenger miles traveled or 2.8% of total passenger miles traveled by road in Ghana, according to the Transport Sector Study estimates. It also moved an average of 53,000 tons or 1.8% of total annual tonnage during the two years.

26. Although the Corporation is expected to operate at a profit, its net earnings have declined yearly; in 1968 it incurred a deficit of a little over N114,000. Complete results for 1969 were not available at the time of the mission, but apparently they show another deficit. Several reasons accounted for the deficits, particularly the excessive scope of activities which the Government has assigned to the Corporation, some of which represent indirect subsidies to the road users or to specific sectors. Such is the case of petroleum distribution. if the Corporation is to pay its way, Central Government interference should be avoided, and the commercial division of the Corporation must be clearly separated from any subsidized operations.

27. In summary, the objectives behind the creation of the State Transport Corporation are rather confusing. There is a large degree of private competition for the provision of both bus and trucking transport services and there was no clear need for Government participation in this area. The State may, for social reasons, provide transport service that is not commercially feasible but only on an emergency or temporary basis. Apparently, the Corporation also serves as a means of regulating prices in the transport industry and preventing rates from being raised unduly. However, the operations of the Corporation should be kept apart from sub- sidies or privileges so that it would be able to pay its own way on a straight commercial basis. In order to accomplish this, several of the fast growing additional activities of the Corporation will have to be discontinued or assigned to other agencies in Government.

G. Omnibus Services Authority

28. This Government agency under the Ministry of Local Administration is charged with providing intra-city bus services in competition with private buses. The Omnibus Services Authority (OSA) received all the - 10 - facilities and the bus fleets of the municipal and local councils after 1966. Most of the buses were in poor condition and in April 1969 the OSA received a loan of NO 1.7 million by a private bank, guaranteed by the Government, to rehabilitate 247 buses in a period of 15 months. Import licences were also granted to purchase 72 new buses which, together with 130 operational buses at that time, should provide a total fleet of 449 units considered sufficient to fulfill its task. At the end of May 1970, however, only 12 buses had been repaired as against a target of 215, and some of the 130 in good order one year before had become unserviceable. As a result the OSA has only 90 vehicles in good operational condition. Moreover, its services have extended well beyond city boundaries, and it is also competing in the field of inter-city passenger transport in several areas. By current Government policy the Omnibus Services Authority is exempt from payment of duties and should not use these privileges to compete in the inter-city transport sector. Careful attention must be given to solving the causes of its poor performance, with particular re- gard to the management, staffing and operations of the agency. - 11 -

II. GHANA RAILWAYS

A. General

29. Ghana Railways are Government-owned and managed by the Ghana Railway and Ports Administration, which reports to the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The Administration also operates the ports of Ghana without a clear separation of both activities, either in manage- ment organization or in budgeting and accounting. Chart 1 shows the present organization of the Railway and Ports Administration.

30. The Administration has a fairly large degree of autonomy. It has a separate budget which must, however, be approved by the Minister of Trans- port and Communications and the cabinet, and handles its accounts independ- ently. Day-to-day operations are the responsibility of the General Manager. The railway is supposed to be run on a commercial basis within the confines of Government organization and civil service regulations.

31. Railway construction started in 1898 to serve gold mining activ- ities near Tarkwa. The network was gradually extended during the first half of this century and completed by 1957. It now covers 594 miles of rail route forming a triangle between the city of Kumasi and the country's two maior ports, Takoradi and Accra-Tema; with a number of branch lines linking with bauxite, manganese and gold mining sites.

32. Ports and railways were split into two separate organizations for a period of 18 months in 1966/67. At present, plans to separate again both activities and to give both ports and railways a corporate status are tunder consideratinn. The mi4sson. in nrincinle; favours such a separation. There is no obvious reason why ports and railways, whose technical and operat4inal nrobhlms are vastly different, should be run under ioint management. A separation would permit a better control of the performance and the financial siltation of both aaencies, Finally olving both ports and railways an independent, corporate status would be in line with the mis-ion's general recommendations concerning publi- transnort nagncire (see main report, Chapter VIII). On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that suc'h reorganization would not automatircall solve the various oper- ational and financial problems of the two agencies mentioned later in this report.

B. rfrastructure . _

33. All lines of the G-hana Rai1- a 3'6" gauge and single track, except for a 19-mile double track section near Takoradi. Track on the western line between Takoradi and Vuma -4, w,hi4 ch bears the heaviest traffic, is laid in 80 lb. rail. The rest of the system consists of either 60 lb. or 80 lb. ra4l - 12 -

34. Track is characterized by severe curvature limiting operating speeds to 40 m.p.h. for passenger trains and 35 m.p.h. for goods and mixed trains. Trains not fully vacuum-braked must operate 10 m.p.h. slower. About 40% of the track has curvature ranging between about 1 and 13 degrees. Gradients generally do not exceed 1.25% except for a 0.5-mile section on the Tarkwa-Prestea branch which bears, however, only light traffic.

35. The difficult alignment of the track has accounted for consid-- erable wear of rails, many of which were laid 30 or more years ago. The railways have laid, on the average, about 8.7 miles of new rails annualLy during the last 10 years which has, however, been insufficient to keep pace with wear. The Transport Sector Study recommends that an additional 10 miles of rail should be relaid during the next two or three years and that from then on a minimum of 10 miles should be relaid each year.

36. The rather unfavorable characteristics of the track obviously account for high operating costs of Ghana Railways. However, an improve- ment of the alignmient would most probably imply a complete relocation and reconstruction of the track at a very high cost that would, at present traffic volumes, be out of proportion with the benefits that could be obtained. Major realignments have, therefore, to be ruled out.

37. The railiway's signalling and telecommunications system, present- ly largely inadequate, unreliable and severely hampering operations, is going to be rehabilitated under a project prepared and to be financed by the Administration at a cost of N¢1.75 million. The proiect, which will include training oE Ghanaian staff, setting up of repair shops, etc., Was about to start at the time of the mission. According to the Chief Signall- ing Engineer, a complete resignalling of the Western line will be required a few years from now to increase the line's capacity. The mission reconimends a careful study of the feasibility of this operation which could be sub- mitted to international financing.

C. Rolline Stock

38. The rolling stock owned by the Railway presently consists of :L93 locomotives, of which 118 are steam and 75 diesel units, about 240 coaching cars- some 3.000 goods cars and 23 cranes. Most of this equipment is very old. Most steam locomotives (average age 29 years) have reached the endl of their denreciable life: diesel units are 11 years old on average. The average age of passenger and freight cars is 20 and 17 years, respectively.

39. The present condition of the rolling stock reflects both the atge of this eauinment and the lack of efficient maintenance- The number of units of all types of equipment in bad order and out of service is exceEl- s;velv hioh- Tn M.av 1969- 353^ nf lnomotives and 217 nf wgonnsQ were un - serviceable. Tlere appear to be two main reasons for the excessive bad-- order ratinc: the lack of foreign exchange and/or the tardy nrnriurpment of - 13 - spare parts through the Ghana Supply Commission; and the lack of adequate routine and preventive maintenance together with the inefficient management of the otherwise adequate repair shop facilities.

40. The Transport Sector Study undertook a fairly detailed analysis of the capacity of the Railway's rolling stock to carry present and future traffic volumes. Their general conclusion is that it is fully sufficient to meet present and foreseeable future traffic demand, assuming a general rehabilitation of the existing fleet, regular replacement of obsolete equipment in the future and efficient scheduling of train operations.

D. Traffic

41. Table 7 summarizes the evolution of goods and passenger traffic on the Ghana Rnilwav in nast years. The mnot striking feature is the steady decline of goods traffic from a level of about 2 million tons during the period 1960/65 to -inut nvpr 1-5 million tons in 1468!6F9 Tn fact, the volume of goods traffic in 1968/69 was the lowest since 1949. Passenger traffic, on the other hand, has gromn steadily cinte the earlyv sities and reached a level of 7 to 7.5 million passengers per annum in recent years.

42. Table 8 shows that four principal commodities, namely, timber, man-qngpa p bhniuxitp nnd coroa,, repnresnt the bulk of the Railways,' gonaq traffic (94% in 1968/69). The Table also shows that the decrease in total traff4crof about 560,000 tons since 1965 is mninly due to A dron in manganeeP and cocoa tonnages handled (minus 430,000 tons), and to a lower volume of general traffic. Tn the raep of rocoa tonnages it can hp saiA cafely that the Railways have lost traffic to the road since total cocoa shipments through the ports of Toma and Takordldi rdereansed hbr about 70, 0nn0ton lace th: n tho drop of cocoa traffic on the railway. The drop in general railway traffic 13,00o to.s since 1965) most probably also represents a loss of traffic to the highways since general economic indicators show that overall transport volumes in.Ghana have continued to increase durirthe 19Q65/69 period, though at a slow rate. Exports of manganese, for which the railway

*t o.nl c ar ie r., Apen.A hn world .. m a. . condi to sO, ad lwer ra f f4. C volumes cannot thus be imputed to the railway.

43. The loss of traffic to the highways can be attributed to the folluwing maLnL f Uactors:±LncreasedU capac'Lty andU efficenLcy of the roadU trans- port industry; unreliability and slowness of railway service; and a lack of "-marketing" efforts by the raidlway auI,IllALstaL±UlI. Also, ln11 t: c of cocoa, fairly high railway tariffs may have facilitated increasing competition from the road.

44. The distribution of traffic over the system is very uneven. During the last years, 83% of total railway traffic was destined for exports, which means that trains leave the ports practically without return freight. A breakdown of traffic by lines shows that the Western line (Kumasi-Takoradi) carries about 80% of total goods traffic. Passenger traffic is more evenly distributed, being only somewhat heavier on the Accra-Kumasi link. - 14 -

45. Traffic prospects are not particularly bright for Ghana Railways in the years ahead. Manganese shipments are expected to decrease sharply after 1973/74 since high grade ores are being depleted. As for bauxite, there are plans to increase production to about 450,000 tons by 1972/73 which could partly compensate for the drop in manganese tonnages. Cocoa export volumes are expected to grow by about 4% per annum during the next years, but the railways will have to make particular efforts to re- capture the cocoa traffic lost to the roadls so far or even to increase its share in total tonnages. Timber exports are expected to remain at about their present level, and here again efforts will have to be made by the railways to successfully compete with road transport. There are some possibilities of finding new sources of traffic, especially for the empty return hauls, such as fuel and cement from Tema and Takoradi up-country. On the whole, however, no spectacular increase in railway traffic is to be expected, and considerable efforts will have to be made to keep or moderately increase present volumes.

E. Tariffs

46. Ghana Railways do not have a consistent tariff policy nor do they have alcost accounting system which would permit adequate costing oE their various services. Present tarif'fs have been fixed for many years and appear to have been set with the criteria of "what the commodity can bear" for freight haulage and to provide cheap public transport for passenger service. 47. The consuitants wno carried out the Gnana Transport Sector Study have undertaken an analysis of train operating costs and revenues which gives a clue to the adequacy of present railway rates. Tneir analysis, which is based on current average load factors, can be summarized as follows: Type of train Train Operating Cost Train Revenue (Ne-) (N¢) 523-ton bauxite train 1,305 899 Awaso-Takoradi anld empty return 720-ton manganese train 487 900 Nsuta-Takoradi and empty return 411-ton log train 1,799 1,912 Kumasi-Takoradi and empty return 660=t~qon rcicoa tra4n 2,24 8,29 Kumasi-Takoradi anA eMpr.y A.turr Pa§isenger, tgai, 971 473

Express Passenger train 1,237 482 Accra-Takoradi and return - 15 -

48. The above comp-4 son ashowf,s ntat cocoa rates are nearly four ti4es higher than the corresponding full cost; manganese rates are also well 1A.ove c h auled1 substan t4a1l-1os+ bel- * T; - rates are more or less in line with costs. Revenue from passenger trains covers less th.-,an h.alf of LLOth.ecost of this service.

4. VWL.L.LLe there i obviously l1i.tle rationale .n Glhlana present tariff structure, it is extremely difficult to make recommendations for a "proper" rate policy iLn a situation whlere t.h'e raiAlways (kat present rates and traffic volumes) incur deficits on the order of N¢3-4 million per a.-..-.ur.C.. Cearl, ratesh su U1 t b.e set orL..he basis of the present le-vel of inefficiency of the railway. An improvement of the railway's overall performance and operations is quite obviously the first priority. Simul- taneously, however, rates should be adjusted to reflect more realistically the cost of operations. Two particular inconsistencies stand out: the 'nigh rates charged for cocoa which have most probably caused part of the shift- ing of cocoa transport to the road and the very low-priced passenger transport which we find no reason to subsidize at the present scale. The large number of passenger trains - about 40% of total daily trains - whicn are generally given priority over goods trains in scheduling and operations, seriously interfere with t-herailway's a-Lin task OI eflliciently hauling the country's export products.

50. Two accounting experts provided under British technical assistance have recently been engaged by Ghana Railways for 1O montns to introauce an appropriate cost accounting system and to train railway staff in this field. It is to be hoped that with their assistance Ghana Railways will be able to develop a more rational tariff policy.

F. Financial Situation

51. An evaluation of Ghana Railway's financial position is difficult in view of the rather sketchy accounting system of the Administration and the fact that generally railway and port accounts are not clearly separated.

52. Table 9 summarizes the combined income account of the Ghana Rail- way and Ports Administration for 1958/59 - 1967/68, based on figures compiled in the Transport Sector Study. It shows that sizeable overall surpluses were achieved throughout this period except for the last year. Railway operations alone developed as follows (a detailed income statement is shown in Table 10): - 16 -

Accounting Revenue Expenses Net Earnings Operating Ratio (in 1000 NO)

1958/59 9,594i 9,671 (77) 101 1959/60 10,92:L 9,765 1,156 89 1960/61 12,498 10,199 2,299 82 1961/62 12,43:3 10,241 2,192 82 1962/63 12,84L 11,272 1,569 88 1963/64 13,13.1 11,786 1,345 90 1965 11,9210 9,851 2,069 83 1966/67 9,606 10,661 (1,055) 111 1967/68 8,928 11,823 (2,895) 133

More recent figures were not available at the time of the mission, but the Transport Sector Study estimates that the 1968/69 deficit would be about N¢4.5 million, and railway officials confirmed that it continues to run at a high level in 1970.

53. Ihe deterioration of the Railway's operating results since 1965 is striking. Quite obviously, revenues declined along with decreasing traffic volumes whereas expenditures have remained at about the same level. One of the major reasons for the continuously high level of expenditures is the Railway's employment policy. In spite of the decrease in traffic volumes, total. railway staff has continued to grow at about 5% p.a. since 1965 and now stands at about: 11,000 employees. Labor costs in 1967/68 were about 68% of total expenditures. Another major fixed item are the contributions to the renewal and betterment funds of over N¢2 million p.a. or about 20% of total expenditures in recent years. The adequacy of this amount cannot be judged since the value of the Railway's fixed assets is not known. (A firm of chartered accountants has reportedly prepared a balance sheet for 1968, but this was not available for the mission). In any case, renewals' contributions do not represent actual cash outflows since only part of the amounts could actually be spent. Total present reserves in the renewal funds are estimatedl at about N¢15 million.

54. Cocoa andi timber have been the railway's main revenue earners up to 1968/69 when passenger traffic became the main source of income for the railway as shown in the following table: Railway Traffic Revenue (lin iO00 NO) Total Goods traffic Total goods passenger Grand Year cocoa timber manganese bauxite other traffic traffic Total i965 4,452 2,853 687 4+45 772 9,209 2,175 11,384 1966/67 3,012 2,259 770 574 533 7,148 1,957 9,105 1967/68 2,529 2,158 564 523 552 6,326 2,007 8,333 1968/69 1,757 1,985 907 431 294 5,374 2,139 7,513 - 17 -

55. In spite of the recent heavy losses of the railways, the overaii financial position of the Railway and Ports Administration is still very strong. As shown in Table 10, very substantiai surpiuses were achieved in the mid-sixties, and according to the acting General Manager of the Adminis- tration, accumulated profits still amount to about N0l5 million. Together with about the same amount in the renewal funds, total reserves thus are about NW30 million, ield partly in casn ana partly in Government securities and bonds. The figure of N¢40 million of reserves put forward by some Government officials could not be ascertained. Reserves are used to cover the current railway deficits which, therefore, do not burden the general Government budget for the time being.

G. Ghana Railway's 1970j7i investment Budget

56. The proposed 1970/71 capital budget of Ghana Railways contains investments totaling N¢8.7 million, most of which cover operations started and sanctioned by the Government in earlier years (for details see Table 11). The most important items are track renewal, purchase of locomotives (part of the payment for the 16 new diesel units being delivered at present), freight cars and various minor construction jobs in Tema port. Expenditures are to be financed out of the Railway's reserve funds (over 80%) and by a Government loan. Most of the "investments" actually represent replacement or renewal of existing equipment and will thus not result in an increase in net assets. Though no detailed analysis of the various items has been possible they appear, on the whole, reasonable.

H. Some General Comments on Ghana Railways' Performance

57. There is no doubt that Railway management has to be blamed for many of the agency's present difficulties. However, there are a number of factors adversely affecting the railway's operating performance that have been beyond its control. As mentioned earlier not all of the decrease in railway traffic in recent years is attributable to the railway's inefficiency or poor service.

58. The fact that Ghana Railways, as all othier Government agencies, have to order all supplies involving foreign exchange expenditure through the Ghana Supply Commission severely hampers its operations. Procedures of the Commission seem to be slow and cumbersome, and it often takes deci- sions contrary to the technical judgement of the railway's experts. Besides, the fact that railway personnel has full civil service status has limited management's flexibility in salary and disciplinary policies.

59. The main areas where management has clearly failed and where more efficient and dynamic direction could substantially improve the situation can be summarized as follows: - 18 -

.i repair slhlops , .marshalliLg yards and a nur.ber of stations are congested with equipment either awraiting repair or com[;letely out' of use wII.Ahlich seriously hA.Lnduers repaiLr andLL maintenance works and normal train operations. Systematic scrapping of obsolete stock and a general "cleaning=up' operation are necessary;

(ii) train operations could be improved by better planning and coocdination eULween tlle various railway dlepart.,,ents. F reasons not quite understandable, priority is always given to passenger trains, a money-1.obig servce, over goods trains. This has increased the unreliability of goods service and may have contributed to traffLic losses in recent years;

(iii) staff has been steadily increased in spite of declining transport volumes. Th'e generai impression is that the railways are over-staffed by about 20-30%. On the other hand, many senior positions are vacant, partly because of unattractive salaries and promotional policies, partly because qualified staff is not promoted into positions corresponding to their level of training and experience; and

(iv) the general lack of cost accounting, modern business methods, and appropriate marketing policies is another reason for the present plight of Ghana Railways.

1. The Future of Ghana Railways

60. At present, the railways still play an essential role in Ghana's transport system, handling some 30% of Ghana's total goods movements and about 85% of export products; its share in total passenger transport is estimated at about 12%. This present: importance of the railways should not, nowever, prevent the Government from studying carefully what the proper long-term function of Ghana Railways should be.

61. Ghana RaLilways operate in a relatively small area connecting the country's three major cities by an approximately equilateral triangle of 170 to 200 miles con each side. it has some small additional feeder lines, but in general, it can be said that long-distance traffic travels no more than 200 miles only. This means that, except for special bulk freight such as mineral ores (manganese and bauxite) and probably for part of timber and cocoa production, most of the cargo can probably be transported more economically by road. The same would appear to hold true for passenger movements. The large volumes of traffic transported by the railways in the past can be explained by a traditional preference for railway transport, tne location of production areas close to the railway lines (cocoa/timber), particularly low tariffs in the case of passenger transport, and the inadequacy of the road network and the insufficient capacity of the road transport industry. - 19 -

62. At least three to five years will be needed to rehabilitate Ghana's basic network of trunk and other main roads to an adequate level of service. During this period, Ghana Railways will presumably continue to nlav a maior role. and it is, therefore, justified to make efforts to improve its performance and services. Once the rehabilitation of the highwav Avstem has been comnleted. however, it can be expected that the importance of railway traffic will decrease considerably. As mentioned before- there is no doubt about the continuing need for railway services to haul Ghana's mineral ore production to the ports; but for other commodities and for nassenger traffic; a careful analysis of the relative economics of road and rail transport should be undertaken, and decisions on the scale and the nature of future railway onerations should be based on the results of this analysis.

J. Summary and Conclusions

63. Based on the above considerations, the mission makes the follow- ing r rnTnmhndati2nn with regard to Ch2na Railways:

(i) Chana Railways will continue to carry sizeable volumes of goods and passenger traffic for a number of years to come. Efforts to reduce the cost of railway services by imnroving the efficiency of operations and management are, therefore, -i,,st-ified Tt should; however- he kent in mind that once the condition of tihe road network in the area served by the railway has heen restored to an adeniiate level, the eronomic role of rail transport may be substantially reduced. No in-rr:con itn rAiltjv -:n,ritv ChniO1l- thPreforP_ he rnmcidered

(ii) a program of repair an. ryehabilitatinn of existing rolling stork and infrastructure is required. The mission is not in a position to estimate the cost of such a nprnram hiut in view o%f its considerable foreign exchange cost, the possibility of ,,hfto-nin ;nt4rn-vnni1 f nor,rnn fnr, thic niii.nnc!o ahrilAt he investigated;

(iii) a program for the rehabilitation of the railway's signalling and telecomr.ur.ications system is unde ay. Accordingt t-h Railway Administration, a complete resignalling of the res tern line might be required in about three years. The feasibility of this project should be studied carefully and, if us-f4.4,-4 it could again be subr.itted to international financing;

(iv) Ghana Railways should be held to achieve full financial viabilit41y. Proper cost accounting and b-ookkleep-ing have to be introduced, and a general review of tariffs is required; andU - 20 -

(v) finally, and perhaps most importantly, measures are required to improve management efficiency. Expatriate expert assiLst- ance for a number of years appears indispensable to achieve this goal. Two approaches could be envisaged. Ghana Rail- ways could seek an association with an experienced foreign railway company who would second management personnel for training of Ghanaian counterparts and for assistance in improving operations. The arrangements between the Nigerian Railways and Canadian National Railways might serve as an example. Alternatively, a firm of railway management co01- sultants could be engaged. Financing of such services could be sought from bilateral or international aid donors. ') I

III. Ports

A. General

64. As mentioned in the Dreceding chaDter on Ghana Railwavs, the ports of Ghana are managed by the Railway and Ports Administration (see also Chart 1). Besides the two commercial ports of Tema and Takoradi, the Administration is responsible for the dormant ports of Accra, Winneba, and Cape Coast. and for the lighthouses along the Ghanaian coast. The newly constructed port of Sekondi, at present exclusively used by the Navy, comes under the resnonsibilitv of the Ministry of DefenRe. Each nort in headed by a port manager who seems to enjoy a fair degree of independence in dav-tn-dav onpratinnR.

65= The nprt administratinn is rponnnsihlp for nnrt nnpratinns, maintenance of the port infrastructure and port development. Cargo hand- lina is crrieA nit by specialized agencies. Tn Tama, practically all general cargo is handled by the Ghana Cargo Handling Company, a mainly Government-owned cnmnanv. It also onpratsp in Takoradi- where it shares a substantial part of cargo handling with the Joint Lighterage Venture.

B. Infrastructure

66. Takoradi is the older of the two Ghanaian ports. It was constructepd in 1928, and seann atrurturesare reproinrrtei t hahnw signs of decay. The Transport Sector Study recommends that an engineering survey be carried out as soon na ntoaail detearmine th e degreenf deterioratinn and to recommend remedial action.

67. Port facilities at Takoradi include a main wharf with five berths, specialized irstallations to han-le bauxi te and mananganese exportns, a special clinker jetty as well as nine mooring stations inside the port basin where 4-p -n S 1 ^oAA At A4-ch-re_A Sow 14 nq)F ra * A -n id4A bA_le part of the port area is taken up by a floating timber yard (all of Ghana's #timker eports are sbipped through Takoradi).

68. po o a `e t 18 ,miles eastL oI AccrLa, 'Ls a r,oderr. a.

00.I 1L1I FU0LL V1. LILIuL, CIU0U LU L. LJ.~ L IL uOL0.F.L0IL LU well-designed new facility, constructed in 1954/61 and opened to traffic in 1762. .LI.hIe L L LIhas 12 greLICL± LtL U LL LIc , WiLtLL a LULCL qUai. le,ngtLII of 7,200 feet, as well as two specialized berths for unloading crude oil

Lor thle Il'L'l-akgAV IeL11IeL) LIIU fr.LUI.LLIIUL thle Vyalco a3lJU.-Lnum plar.t. vle of the general cargo berths at present is exclusively used for unloading clinker. Besides, Tema 'nas various ship repair facilities, including a large dry dock, the most modern facility of this kind on the West African coast (see also section F(b)). - 22 -

69. Supporting land installations, i.e. transit and storage sheds, cranes, etc., are adequate in both Tema and Takoradi. Both ports have special sheds for storing of cocoa, Ghana's main export product. in general, the capacity of the two ports appears sufficient for foreseeable traffic volumes. Hlandling facilities for bulk export and import commodities have capacities well beyond present traffic: volumes. Takoradi could easily handle some 675,000 tons of general cargo per year compared to a volume of less than 200,0()0 tons in 1968. Tema's general cargo handling facilities have a potential capacity of 1,200,000 tons per year (average annual volume handled during 1967/69:350,000 tons).

70. A special problem exists with regard to timber handling in Takoradi as a result of inadequate access for the increasing volume of timber arriving by truck, inappropriat:e handling equipment and existing marketing patterns accounting for excessive storage of timber in the port. This has led to periodic congestion and closure of the timber yard. The port admin:lstration is presently constructing a new timber yard outside the port which should solve most of the storage problems experienced in the port. This, together with the construction of new quay facilities for unloading timber arriving by truck, and the purchase of modern handling equipment also under way at present can be expected to eliminate most of the presenit difficulties.

C. Traffic

71. Tema and Takoradi together have handled about 4 million tons of goods in recent years. Tables 12 and 13 summarize the volumes of import: and export trade tlhrough both ports in recent years. The figures show a general decline in total port throughput in the last 5-8 years. Both ports had about an equal share in total traffic in the early sixties but more recently traffic at Tema (54% of total in 1968) has surpassed tonnages handled in Takoradi.

72. Takoradi is Ghana's major export port. Practically all of the country's bulk commodity exports (timber, manganese, bauxite and a sub- stantial though declining share of cocoa exports) are shipped through Takoradi. Tema receives most of Ghana's general cargo imports as well as bulk commodities such as crude oil (for the refinery at Tema) and, more recently, clinker and alumina, also for industrial plants established at Tema.

73. As for future traffic, the comments made in para. 45 in the pre- ceding chapter on Ghana Railways also hold true for the ports, i.e. no maior increase in Ghana's bulk commoditv exports is to be expected in the near future. General cargo tonnages and imports of bulk commodities such an clinker and crude oil will erow in line with the general economic and industrial growth of Ghana. This means that clearly there will be no port canarivt problem in Mhana for a long time. - 23 -

D. Performance of Port Administration

74. Generally speaking, the services provided by the ports of Ghana (physical facilities, cargo handling and storage, etc.) compare favorably with those of other major ports on the West African Coast. Port charges are also generally in line with those levied in other ports. A comparison of operating costs per ton handled at Tema and Takoradi. with the ports of Lagos, Douala and Abidjan, reveals about the same level of cost efficiency.

75. Some deficiencies, such as the inadequacy of timber handling in Takoradi, have already been mentioned. Also, there are complaints from port users about long delays in goods handling, partly due to slow clearance of goods through customs, partly due to the lack of efficiency of the Ghana Cargo Handling Company. Storage in transit sheds is often excessive; the situation could be improved by increasing penalty fees. Generally; however,. the mission has the impression that, compared to other public transport agencies in Ghana. the management of nort onerations is relativelv satisfactory.

76. A major problem - already mentioned in the preceding railway chanter - is the absence of proper cost accounting. The latest available balance sheet for the ports dates back to 1965. Financial operating results appear to have been very good during the mid-sixties iudging from the com- bined railway/ports income statement (see Table 10), and are still favor- anhe at nresent. The Transnort Sector Study has comniled a tentative in- come account for the ports for 1968/69 which shows the following results:

Ghana Ports Income Account 1968/69

('000 NC)

Total Operating Ren al Net Gross earnings Expenses Contribution Earnings

Takoradi 2,640 2,035 381 224

Tema 3,400 2.049 214 1,137

Total 6,040 4,048 595 1,367

77. Assuming the renewal contributions to be adequate, the above resultsL~~ULL~ indicate.LILUj.aLL a satisfactory operatingUpLLLI A. ratio%.LJ ofU LLLMthe pot9j9IL %_ . Nteanig1=4 C4%LLL.LL1rM would, however, yield only a marginal return of about 1% on the capital 'nvested ir. the port estr,atd a som-wha ov rNI#100 r.114,o. '.h-; wou ±L VCb LU JLII LILI jUL Lb t: L.LIIIaLLCU lL. Z2UULt:WL~LCL %JV=. LIY7..L'JU L.L.L.LUIJL. LICiY WUU± also probably be insufficient to cover debt service which at present is not borne by the ports but fLinancedU out of genera'l Gover-Luent Lfunds. AL iL.IrLUv- ment in operating results would have to be achieved by increasing efficiency since port charges could not be raised substantially without bringing them out of line with other West African ports. - 24 -

E. 1970/71. Investment Budget of Ghana Ports

78. Investments proposed by the Port Administration for 1970/71 total NO 2.8 million, mainly for small works such as quays and wharves renairs; construction of buildings. as well as the nurchase of floating craft and miccellaneous equipment. All investments will be financed fromn the A_ministration's reserve funds and annear. on the whole- iustified.

F. ',ome Special Frob1ems (a) The Port of Sekondi

79. The port of Sekondi, about five miles East of Takoradi, was constrQdtdpr in the 1960'R with finannrinl anti te-hniral asitance from Yugoslavia. Though it is nearly as large as the ports of Takoradi and Tpm:a And though it hAq Ri1ffiriont dionth qiuav length anrd snarp fnr ~--~~--~~-~o ------r -- w -- ;------r ------constructing sheds and storage facilities, it is not used commercially at present- Tt exl,clusely seves shina nf the Ghanaian Navy and is administered by the Ministry of Defense. Under present circumstances it. appears difficult for the Gover-nent to be to u this modern facility for commercial purposes, e.g. timber exports or as a fishing port.

(b) Tema Drv Dock

80. The dry dock at Tema, constructed a few years ago at an estimated Co0t - U S$P 15-2 0 r,.illon, is the largest snd -ot moderr. faciiity of i::s kind between South Africa and Europe. The dock, 910 feet long and 149 feet wide, is desigr.ed tCo service vessels of up to 100,n00 tons anA has almost all, of the basic equipment and workshops needed to perform precise repa'Lr wu Lot-s

°15.. FULor unkI.kW,wI L=r.reson, thisL. Va.LUabUl asse;L hasb b0 Lfar Ueen r,ore or less ignored by the Government. The dry dock is being maintained and ru5n on a sm.all-scale, ad-hoc UasiLs uy a team of eng-ineerff from th'Le BritishLtL.I firm that constructed it a few years ago. Full commercial operation has n-o t: been possible dLue tCo the "lackm oil Governm",ent interest, t-he abusen.ce oLg adequate contractual and legal arrangements, and, in particular, due to the! ad.inistrat-ion to provide to the6LIL refICusaIL.1 LOI ofL1 L.LLO OLULLJ.10 #_5. L±IJL LI) V.U the151. A.gunAs U necessarLyL040QL . purchase a minimum of materials to start normal operations of the dock. A_co;rdlng lo -le ebngineer responsible 'or -le Aock- a, present, abbout tIL. LIJU.LLL L)510 L5.L LLOJ L L .AL 5.5LOJPL...O UII.' dL. j9 01 ~ J L_ US$ 1.8-2 million worth of materials would be required initially.

82. There appears to be a good market for Ghana's dry docking facilities.

ULy UUL.k5. XUU.LU SV±ILg ±110 xiLeLL0uLe qu.LLI5.±y UeOLUILOU11 a LULILOLLl 01UU LIJUVLU1 particular, earn sizeable amounts of much needed foreign exchange. Many requests L.or shiL'p repaiLrs andu overhaul h'ave haad to0 be turnCed downl ar.d only small jobs can be carried out at present unless shippers provide spares andu mater1L Is Lther,sl-ves. In spite of Ltese difficulties, Lhe improvised operation of the dry dock so far has permitted accumulating a small cash reserve. - 25 -

83. A maO4r problecm th-at would have to be solved beforfe the dry, dock's full capacity could be utilized is the limited water depth in front of the dock gates which at present is no more than 18-22 feet. A minimum depth of 28 feet would be required if large ships were to be received in the dock. The grneral question eo%f th 0e dredging of the phort -f Tema is discussed in more detail below.

84. The mission recommends that the Government seriously and urgently consider finding ways and means for better utilization of the Tema dry dock. Several possibilities have been mentioned. First, the unit might be leased to a fri co .., !t Asrotn A t_at e1 _ oAn company has expressed interest in such an arrangement. Alternatively, a 4o4nt G-ha.naian-foreign company couldf be set=up to run thL4e dry=dock, or a purely Ghanaian outfit supported by experienced expatriate personnel. It+would also b-e advisable to see', Nigerian participation in such venture, *% -- U U ~U CLO~LJ O~i *.L~ .JLLjJ L L..L J &..LUL .JtUL. la ~L.L L since Nigeria does not have comparable docking facilities and could easily use near v. UTem A fo r le s e_icing of its SIL±A __4_1 A_..91 _* (.A-UL. U.. an experienced docking expert would be required to determine the amount kir.d of u.aterials neededA to start lock-ing operations, to establish con- a,d dLI LN±LU U~L~ L~O L~~UU L. OL. L. U Mi.LI j L L Ii, LI. L ) L.,U.L.L0L L 1 tacts with foreign docking companies and shipping lines, and to make reco.mm.enAdations for the most appropriate organizational set=u forth future docking venture.

(c) Port dredging

85. The proposal has been put forward by a number of parties concerned w';Ll port operat'ons iLn Tea to deepen the porL entrance andU thle access channels to the three bulk commodity berths (oil, clinker and alumina) and the dry dock. The suggest'ion has been supported by the Transport Sector Study who recommends that a study of the feasibility of dredging Tema port be carriLed out.

06. Present aepth of Lne port entrance is 3- feet; it is 3 eet at the oil and Valco (alumina) berths and 25.6 feet at the. clinker berth. In front of the dry dock, depth is as low as 17 or 18 feet. Thus at present only small vessels can use this facility, and maximum ship tonnages at the three specialized berths are limited to 14,000 tons at the Vaico berth, 18,000 tons at the oil berth, and about 17,500 tons at the clinker berth.

87. Deepening the port would have the advantage that larger ships could be used with a consequent reduction in shipping costs. One estimate puts savings in shipping costs for Valco at US$480,000 (US$2 per ton for an expected average import of 240,000 tons of alumina per year) if ships with a capacity of 40,000 tons could be accommodated. For oil imports, savings in maritime freight are put at about -US$.75 per ton or over US$uu,U000 per year (imports in recent years averaged over 700,000 tons) if 40,000 ton tankers could be used. No estimates could be obtained of savings on clinker trans- port costs due to the use of larger carriers nor of benefits to be derived from a better utilization of the dry-dock. - 26 -

88. The cost of a major dredging operation in the port of Tema is very difficult to assess since no precise information exists on the hydro- logical conditions of the port basin. 'Port officials estimate that to carry out the program outlined above, and assuminR dredging to a general depth of 36 feet, a total volume of some 400,000 cubic yards would have to be dredged. Assuming a cost of US$ 10-15 per cubic yard dredged. depending upon the amount of rocky material encountered, the cost of this project would thus be between US$ 5 and 6 million. If, in order to obtain substan- tial benefits, dredg:Lng to a general depth of 40 feet were required, the cost might well go uip to US$ 10 million. Since however. benefits of at least US$ 1 million per year may be obtained by the dredging operation the mission believes that a feasibility study is warranted.

89. The study would have to ascertain the technical. financial and economic feasibility of dredging the port entrance and the access channels to the bulk commoditv berths and the dry dock. Since the cost of the pro-- ject would probably be borne by the Government, the question of the proper distrih,it4on of henefits (savings in shipp4ng rosts) between nort users and the Administration would have to be given particular attention. Though dredging for general rnrgo traffir does not appear nrgent for the inmiedial:e future, the study should also contain a general hydrological survey of the entire nnrt hnbin and make a nrelm4inAry assessment of the fepaihility of a dredging program for the general cargo berths, and its appropriate timing.

90. No mention has been made in the Transport Sector Study of the possibility or need of dredging at Takoradi. However, problems there are more or less identical to those in Tema: limited water depth and shipping Of bulk commodities f-p and,,aor P14-1,o.c k Tf foofea4414tty study on a dredging project in Tema were carried out, the consultants shnould also be aked to make a reconna 4 ssance of Aredg4ng needs a- t-h port of Takoradi.

G. Conclusions and Recommendations

91. The mission's conclusions and. recommendations can be summarized foil----:

(i) apart from a few excepti.4 ons, ot facilities 4n Gh- -- adequate; port capacity is ample for present and foreseeable transport neelUs;

(.L) portLL LLLr,=M=g1UsLL L gra=LCLC.L±y satisfctLorLy ILrCasOLurO to improve specific port operations such as timber handling

iLn larordU.L, anLU gene1rlca. L haLILdL1U.Ling n uy thLe GnLaI Carg Handling Company should be studied;

(iii) a feasibility study on it dredging project in the port of Tema is warranted; the study s'nould also include a recon- naissance of dredging needs in Takoradi; and (iv) possibilities for making better use of the existing dry- docking facilities in Tema should bDe investigated. - 28 -

IV. CIVIL AV:[ATION

A. General

92. The Department of Civil Aviation which comes under the Ministry' of Transport and Cormnunications is responsible for the provision, main- tenance and operation of air fields and the control and direction of air traffic. It is also charged with investigating aviation accidents and certifying air worthiness of aircraft operating over the air routes of Ghana. The Kotoka International Airport at Accra is the only location built to accommodate long-distance jet aircraft. The country's four commercial airports: Accra, Takoradi, Kumasi and Tamale provide the basic infrastructure required for domestic service. Existing airstrips at Sunyani, Yendi, Navrongo, Wa and Nim have not been regularly used by scheduled civil aviation. The improvement and maintenance of runways is delegated to PWD.

93. Sixteen airlines, including Ghana Airways, operate regular scheduled international services to the country, while domestic traffic is servedl exclusively by the Government-awned national aviation enterprise.

B. Administration and Organization

94. The Department of Civil Aviation seems properly organized to carry out its functLons, but is somewhat generously staffed (1,200 employees). Regula:r training abroad has enabled the all-Ghanaian staff to provide the servLces required. A continuation of these training programs is required to help the Department to keep pace with the develop- ment of modern aeronautical techniques.

C. Infrasturcture

95. In 1959 the Government started the construction of the new 9!600- ft long main runway at Kotoka Airport. In 1964 two contracts were awarded for the construction of a new terminal building and the provision of modern telecommunication and navigation facilities at a cost of N02.2 million and N93.8 million. resnectivelv. A subsidiarv 5.000-ft runwav was also built: and is now partially used as a parking ramp by the Air Force. The main runway has a strength classification of LCN65 and with nroner traffic corn- trol should be able to handle not less than 30 movements per hour. The radio and navigation aids will be adequate when the eauipment still on order is installed. The taxiways, ramps and hardstands would probably re- quire some strengthening to accommodate DC-10 and B-747 tvnpe eauioment. but are sufficient for DC8 type of aircraft. Present terminal facilities are not Adeqnuate1v used, andi there is amnle rFoom for imnrovement in passengpr handling operations. Cargo storage and handling facilities are inadequat:e, but existing old buildings could easilybeconverted into crgo handling terminals. In general, Kotoka Airport will be able to handle expected Wes.at Affrican aviatio. traffic during, the9IQ70's without mm4nr evnannson; - 29 -

96. The airports at Kumasi, Takoradi and Tamale provide adequate facilities for medium-sized, two-engine turbo-prop aircraft. According to the Transport Sector Study, their runways should be able to handle at least from five to ten times the present daily aircraft movements. The runway at Tamale however, requires a new surface course, since inadequate maintenance has led to excessive surface wear; the runway at Takoradi, on the other hand, has been recently reconstructed. The three airport term- inals are sufficient for present traffic, but might require expansions after 1975, particularly the one at Tamale.

97. In 1960, the construction of a large new military airport started 10 miles north of Tamale. Some Ne 7 to 8 million have been spent in the 11,000-ft long main runway, together with parallel taxiways, aprons, maneuvering areas, etc. At the time of the mission the contractor was completing drainage structures and plans were under way to protect the existing runway structure with an asphaltic seal coat. It is estimated that at least N015 million more would be required to complete paving, construct terminals and supply navigational aids and traffic control equip- ment. Obviously, there is no justification for such expenditure from the civil aviation point of view, since present facilities are more than sufficient for current turbo-prop service once a day and no development in the area can be envisaged to justify the need for international jet services. By the same token, the enlargement of the Sunyani airfield some 80 miles from Kumasi should be kept to the minimum required to guarantee the safe operation of medium-size turbo-prop aircraft.

98. In general, existing airport capacity is adequate for the country's needs in the 1970's, with the possible exception of the minor improvements mentioned above, and the mission is very skeptical about recommendations on major enlargements and/or new airports at Kumasi and Tamale. However, as mentioned in Chapter VIII, J of the main report, the Government now appears decided to carry out both projects.

D. Traffic

99. During 1969, 276,000 passengers were transported by airplane in Ghana. Kotoka airport alone handled 191,000, 65% of which comprised passengers with origin or destination outside Ghana. The International volume of passengers has increased at a rate of 1.4% annually, between 1965/69. Passengers fly principally to the rest of the West African Coast (47%), to Europe (35%) and to other African countries (9%).

100. Domestic traffic has grown at the rate of 11.5% between 1965 and 1968. In 1969 there was a decrease of 3.2% due to the closure of Takoradi's airport between AuRust and December. The largest sinRle increase since 1965 occurred also at Takoradi between 1967 and 1968 (130%), followed by the continuous increase in Tamale for the entire 1965/69 period (18.4%). - 30 -

E. Aviation Charges

101. There are two main sources of revenue from aviation services. Income from aeronauLicai activity such as landing, parking and housing fees of aircraft, which averages 15-20% of the airport's total gross income, and income derived from non-aeronautical activity, such as office! rental for airlines, rnetal of commercial areas, restaurants, car parking lots, etc. Airport taxes amounting to N41.00 per international service passenger and N00.50 per domestic service passenger are collected directly by the Central Revenue Department and are not included in the accounts of the Department of Civil Aviation. Except for a few local charges at Kotcoka Airport, all revenues go to the Central Government. For FY 1970/71, the expected aviation charges will be around N40.8 million, and the Civil Aviation preliminary budget totals N03.0 million, including improvements of several airfields and the partial payment on two new aircraft for Ghana Airways, which are purchased by the Government (see paras 100 and 104). However, the breakdown between the investment in airplanes and infrastructure was not clear at the time of the mission; the investment in infrastructure should be clearly separated from any Government subsidies to Ghana Airways and should serve as a basis to judge the adequacy of present airport revenues. In general, the mission believes that charges are low and should be reviEsed. This is particularly true of the airport passenger taxes mentioned above, which are considera'bly lower than in most other West African countries.

F. Ghana Airways

102. In 1947, the West African Airways Corporation (WAAC) which had been formed a year 'before with headquarters in Lagos, Nigeria, introduced internal services in the Gold Coast. Ghana Airways Corporation, created after independence in 1957, has been running separately ever since, in spite of occasional efforts to recreate the previously existing corporation with Nigerian Airways and other former British colonies in West Africa.

103. Ghana Airways (GH) is operated as a state corporation. Apparently all major decisions concerning purchase or lease of aircraft and route servicing are taken by the Government. The Government owns the airplanesi and leases them to the corporation; it has covered all capital and interest payments for existing aircraft and substantial yearly operational deficits. Ghana Airways appears to be seriously over-staffed, and cost accounting iLs too disorganized to permit proper financial management.

104. The corporation operates three types of aircraft: one VC-10 for the Europe and Middle East international services, two Viscount 838's for the West African Coast services and one wet-leased F-27 for the domestic lines. It also has two old stand-by Dakotas, one of which is being trans- formed into a fully instrumented airplane. 105. In fiscal year 1969, Ghana Airways carried 121,000 passengers,

_ J _ _ <: r _ J 1~~~~1 I - __J I _____I J n_J11 generat'LnLg U67 miLlion rCVeeUe ptrLLgL - lIl.L.L 11U / UL.ULVI Lt:VtL1UC LUlt- miles. The corporation maintains 7,700 route miles, 500 of which are domestic, 1,500 along the West Afr'can Coast and 5,700 iLtercontinental. The latter service handles a high share (70%) of the passenger traffic Lrom Ghana tUo thCe Cities it eVteS, but hlUdsU a substantiall.y smUal.Ler share of all traffic to the general areas served (northern Europe and Middle East).*Moreover, passenger load factors are generally very low. The average load factor for the first three-quarters of 1969 was 51% for the European line (once weekly non-stop Accra-London-Accra and twice weekly Accra-Rome-London-Accra flights) and 27% for the Middle East line (once weekly to Beirut via Lagos). On tne West African Coast, Ghana Airways nas eleven scheduled round trips per week between Accra and Lagos, three between Accra and Dakar and two between Accra and Freetown with intermediate stops in major coastal cities. The West African Coast traffic accounted for 19% of all passengers and 8% of all revenue passenger miles carried in FY 1969, with a load factor of around 60%. In general, load factors for inter- national service have been very low (38% average during 1960/68), and even if they improved, operational results would be poor because of the extremely low utilization of the planes and the increasing maintenance and operating costs of the VC-10 and the Viscounts which have been used by Ghana Airways for seven and ten years respectively. The Transport Sector Study group feels that Ghana Airways should maintain and improve her position in the West African Coast service. In fact, according to figures given in the study, GH carried during the second quarter of 1969 the bulk of all West Aftican Coast traffic, ranging from 45% of the Accra-Dakar traffic to 99% of the Accra-Lagos traffic (in pool with Nigerian Airways). Furthermore, a downward trend in eastward traffic from 1965 through 1968, attributable to internal difficulties in Ghana and Nigeria, is expected to reverse in coming years and a normal growth pattern should be resumed. Obviously, if that is the case, the unreliable, slow and costly Viscounts will have to be replaced. Before a decision on new aircraft is reached, however, the mission believes that the whole international operation must be carefully scrutinized, and serious consideration must be given to the potential gains involved in a merger with other airlines, as suggested in para. 108 below.

106. The domestic traffic is handled by the F-27 wet-leased from Nigeria Airways since 1967, over three domestic routes linking the commercial centers of Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and Tamale by 42 flights weekly. The F-27 operated in 1969 at a load factor of 69%, better than the 55% average for the period 1960/68 for domestic passenger service. Higher capacity utilization of this aircraft, however, is not practicable. Currently, passengers are often turned away, and overbooking is common. As described before, various reasons, especially current extremely low rates have en- couraged the rapidly growing demand. From Accra to Kumasi (about 120 miles) the air fare is NC8.00 compared to N04.75 by railway first-class, or N02.10 by State Transnnrt Cnrnnratinn bunse Thhe cnnt bv nrivate car would he N016.90 at NP 10 per passenger mile. Similar comparisons can be made foir the rest nf the rnntes. The Trarkpnnrt Spet-nr Stidy has shown that under present rate structure and leasing costs (N¢492.45 per flight hour), Ghana Ai-rwn r nnn t rnvPr nnPrntino nctcn nT anv nf tho inTmnPtir rontieps Pvern at 100% load factor. A rate increase of the order of 100% might thus be

107. Tt 4a somewyhat diff4icult tn asaea the need for dnmestir air transport in Ghana in the next decade. Population densities important enough,h to reat dema fr ai trtnsport car, only be four.f around Tanual a and in the Golden Triangle area. Distances between cities are relatively short (fro,L 100 to 300.h mls-theW_- exception of T,wial*e Accra,a4 miles via Yeji-Kumasi), and highways should provide an appropriate means of communication once the rehabilitation progrz has be~1en carried o. The substantial increase in air traffic demand during the 1960's has largely bieen triggered buy LtLle unrealistically l.ow rates U ioLe before and by the progressive deterioration of overland transport. The rehabili-

aUtion andU LI1LjLUVrLIILt. Vf th.L hLLLhlyi LLt:LwrLk, pa&LrLtcU±LaLly JLI LL'te wU.LdUenI Triangle area, and the required rate increase should reduce current ex- cessiLve utanu pressures or a'Lr seLviCes. CoLnseqUeUL.ly, a c1arLLU± LVreI,W of the future demand for domestic aviattion services would have been required be1'ore tak'.ng investL1Lent dUecis'onLs on new a'Lrcrai't. This hals InVot bDPeen the case. The Government decided in August 1970 to buy two Hawker Siddley r. -A a sLi. J...I. 1 turbo prop aircraft at a total cost 0f No17.3.1 millionfor domest'c service. It is reported that Ghana Airways itself does not consider these planes to be the most suitable for their purposes.

1O8. A major effort to revitalize management and solve existing account- ing deficiencies should be encouraged by the Government. There is need for a general review of Ghana Airways' operations, financial status, and long- term role End strategy. A priori, there seems to be a case for abandoning intercont'inental services, at least OnL tne Miadle-East route. Ghana could rely entirely upon foreign airlines for all international services. Alter- natively, various degrees of common participation with other foreign national companies could be considered, ranging from selective pooling agreements similar to the existing one with Nigerian Airways for the West African Coast service, to a complete merger into a larger aviation company with other West African countries. Nigerian Airways or Air Afrique could be possible candidates for the merger. Ghana and Nigeria were already partners in the West: African Aviation Corporation in former colonial times; twelve French speaking nations have participated in the apparently successful operation of Air Afrique. They might be interested in Ghana Airways; traffic volumes andl operating rights. - 33 -

.LV7109. * Judiluu'g5ig frmLLrom avaid.L±L±v Wlbe ~VLUevidence, LLLM, GharI'JLL&LLa .aA.LLWJyb l,waLys 8Z$aXca a losing concern. The size of their loss is obscured by lack of detailed and accurate accounts, but the 'LLttLe .nLHorFlatL'or contaiLned' in thfe Transport Sector Study and the declaration of Government officials indicate an annual loss on the order of No 2 to 3 million during the last few years. Ghana Airways representatives spoke of an estimated slight gross-operating profit on the order of Ny400 thousand for the second semester of 19069, but the mission is doubtful of such an improvement, since the basic causes for the sizeable deficits of previous years have not been corrected. Tney are:

(i) Very low load factors and excessively high operating costs. The operating costs of VC-l0's are about 15% higher than those of DC-81s or B-7O0's. The old Viscounts and the wet-lease on the F-27 also contribute to increased operating expenses beyond reasonable levels;

(ii) Uneconomically low domestic fares;

(iii) Excessively high station costs per passenger;

(iv) Overstaffing at all levels. GH has 1,124 employees to operate the four aircraft and run the company. It has about twice as many employees as any other company its size per passenger carried; and

(v) Poor managerial and operational procedures. The absence of cost accounting, operational data analysis, marketing studies, etc., contribute to the inefficiency of the operations.

110. Finally, another adverse effect of Ghana Airways' operations has been its negative contribution to the country's foreign exchange situation. The Transport Sector Study estimated that the foreign exchange cost of the corporation in FY 1968/69 was around N09.1 million, consisting of Nl.l million for commercial (station) expenses, NE1.6 million for flight operations, N02.9 million for technical engineering and N03.5 million for repayment of loans. Ghana Airways earned foreign exchange revenue of Nt 3.7 million, leaving a net annual foreign exchange loss of N05.3 million. An approximate estimate on the cost to the Ghanaian economy of paying foreign companies for the transportation services of Ghanaians to other countries, made by the Transport Sector Study, shows a total cost of the order of N04.1 million, which suggests that savings probably larger than N41 million would be obtained if international services were discontinued.

111. In conclusion, there is an important function which Ghana Air- ways can fulfill in the provision of domestic air transport services. How- ever, a revision of existing rates is necessary in order to bring tariffs in line with costs, and the effect of such increase on the traffic demand together with the improvement and rehabilitation of the road network must - 34 -

be kept in mind when studying the long-term role of Ghana Airways. The situation is less clear in regard to international services. A thorough review of such services is required, and either their discontinuation or some form of closer cooperation with other airlines will be the probable solutions. Consultants with experience in civil aviation and operation of commercial airlines should be engaged to study the situation and prospects of the corporation and help to achieve sound investment decisions and to improve overall performance.

V. BLACK STAR LINE

A. General

112. Ghana's maritime shipping needs are served by a large number oi international shipping lines as well as by its national company, the Black Star Line. Up to the time of Independence, British lines provided more than one half of Ghana's maritime transport. Nowadays, they still have the largest share with somewhat over 20 percent, the rest being distribul:ed among various lines from all over the world. Most general cargo imports into Ghana are brought by companies adhering to one of the West African Shipping Conferences. Bulk commodity exports and imports are generallv transported by tramp or charter vessels.

113. The decision to create a national maritime shipping line was taken in 1957. the vear of Ghana's independence. Initiallv. Black Star Line (BSL) was established as a joint venture with a foreign shipping comnanv (Zim Navigation Comnanv of Israel) holding 40 nercent of the shaires and the Government of Ghana holding 60 percent. Management of the line was exercined by the foreign rnmpany under an onerational agreement. In 196:L the Government acquired all of the company's shares, and management links with Zim were evuered graditallyv In 1963, n Ghannsin tnnk oner as General Manager, and since 1967 Black Star Line has been run as a purely Ghanaian comnanv.

114. BSL now owns 16 shins; all of 9-000-10fl00 tons deadweight, as well as 12 lighters and 4 tugs operating in the port of Takoradi. The shins are ahntit vears onld nn average.. All ships have been bought on suppliers' credits generally to be repaid over 10 years (20 years for two shinp bought from Janan) Purchane aoreements are signted by BSL and the ship-building company and payments are made by drafts on the Bank of Ghana for whirh the anvernment aceepts reonnnnihility. In nrinciple; BST. has been held to make a down-payment of 10 percent on the purchase price of ships to the Gvernment; this percentage was recentlv rniaed to 20 percent. Actual payments have, however, been less thanr 10 percent up to 1970 (Nt4 million - 35 - towards a total book value of ships owned of N452.3 million). There are no arrangements so far on the reimbursement by BSL of the Government's expenditures for ships purchased for the company nor on BSL's contribution for interest pavments.

115. BSL is managed by a Board of Directors with the Minister of Transport and Communications as chairman. Day-to-day operations are the resnonsibilitv of a Mana2ing Director. There have been frequent changes in recent years both in the composition of the Board and in the position of the Managing Director which have severely affected the company's effectiveness. The present Director was appointed in July 1969.

B. Operations

116. Black Star Line's head office is in Accra; there are branch offices in TemA and Taknradi, and a suinerintendent's nffire in LTndnnn With its 16 vessels, which are supplemented, as necessary by chartered ships, the company serves the fnllnwing routes:

United Kingdom and Northern Eurone! the East Coast and Gulf ports of the United States; the port-s along the St= T.nrenwne River in ranadn and the Great Lakes, Canada and the U.S.; and the North Mediterranean ports.

117. Tonnnages shipped by Black Star Line have averaged 330,000 in recent years, or about 6 percent of Ghana's total maritime traffic. The main commodities shipp-ed by the c'm-anny are cocoa (132,00 t-nna in 1QAR nr well over 30 percent of that year's exports), logs and sawn timber as well as ---neral cargo imports. Present tonnages are clearl- belu,w BSL's potential capacity.

118. The financial results of BSL's operations are not fully known, ar.d thLe few 'figures com.pilled ir.the Transport Seto Study- do-Ar.o -pe.. an adequate evaluation of the company's present financial situation. The .LL0L. anetaI.rnual &iUaJ. statemnentP0 LUI L.L pulshed .LGLU byteI~LI co..pa,.y'ISjOLy coversLU LJUJL0 theL year 19655 w-hen.WLL~i an operating surplus of N115,000 was recorded. For 1969/70, company operatiLng accountLs shlOoLw a credit bUa'Lance oil X JU0,0'J0.Or.U ote-the ar., sizeable bank overdrafts have been incurred in the last four years (over I'4J6U'J,'JU' aL LatLteenU of. L.9u6 andl 197I, ar.d over I Ann,UUUthe er,d ofIC 1968 and 1969). The two sets of figures are difficult to reconcile, partic- ularly silnce, as stated to the mLLiLssiLon uy DBS ULL±L.U: a b, pFLUV.E .EULL mauidue for depreciation in the company's accounts. The probable explanation is that depreciation allowances are too low and that 8'izeable dUwn-pa-yments had to be made in recent years on new ships that could only be financed by Bank overdraft. - 36 -

119. The small operating "surplus" recorded by BSL may thus, at least partly, be the result of inadequate provision for depreciation of assets. Even if this were not the case, surpluses would not be sufficient to cover interest payments, let alone repayment of principal, on out- standing suppliers' credits. A rough estimate shows that if BSL were charged the interest due on its outstanding debt it would be running a sizeable deficit each year. Though, judging from the decrease in Bank overdraft in the last four years, the situation seems to have improved somewhat, the company's financial performance is still anything but satis- factory.

C. Main Proble-ms and Recommendations

120. IJnless there is a radical irmprovement in operating performance the Government should consider whether it is worthwhile to continue the operations of Black Star Line. There is no doubt that at the company's present level of efficiency its services are more costly to the Ghanaian economy than if foreign companies were used for the goods now shipped with BSL. Since BSL is bound to charge Ghanaian shippers the official Confer- ence (or tramp) rat:es and since at these rates BSL covers little more than mere operal:ing expenditures, the transport bill has so-to-speak to be paid twice: by paying the official market freight rates and at the same time the debt service for BSL's vessel fleet. The balance for the Ghanaian economy is most probably negative, too, in terms of foreign exchange even thoueh no precise analysis was possible on the basis of available information. Debt service for ships is obviously in foreign exchange, as is the maior part of expenditures for ship operations (repairs and spare parts, fuel, port fees, etc.). Wages for ship crews, for example, which are paid in local currency, represent only about 10 percent of total shipping charge expenditures. Prima facie. the services of BSL would thus annear to result in a net drain on Ghana's foreign exchange resources.

121. On the other hand, there is little doubt that there can be certain advantages to Ghana's ownine a national shipping line. If it were effi- ciently run and were made to pay its way, it could effectively contribute to reducing the country's foreign exchanee cost of international maritime transport. Also, as a member of the West African Shipping Conferences, BSL notild exert some ilnfluence in keenine freight rates between Western Afrleca Europe and the U.S. at a reasonable level, and perhaps help reduce the cost of coastal shipping for the regional trade. Finallyv by increasing its marketing efforts, BSL could try to compete for shipments to and from ot:her countries and thus earn additional foreign exchange for G.hana.

122. Considerable investments have hepn mAde in vessels and other assets, and a basic organizational and commercial structure has been esl:ab- lished which couild make the company a potent.Ially profI4table concern. However, the Government will have to enforce serious measures to improve the perform.ance of BST* The Transport Sector Study has made an mber oif - 37- detailed recommendations with respect to BSL;s organization and operations which should be implemented as soon as possible. A deadline should be set for the Government's subsidizing BSL's debt service obligations, and no new investments in vessels should be approved unless the company can show that these are economically and financially justified and that it would be able to service the resulting financial obligations.

VI. LAKE TRANSPORT

123. The construction of the Volta River dam at Akosombo in the early 1960's and the subsequent gradual filling-up of the Volta Lake, which reached its full level some two to three years ago, has had a considerable impact on the transport system and transport flows of Ghana. The most important consequence was the disruption of the main North-South road axis, the paved road between Kumasi and Tamale. The road is now submerged by the lake over an 8-mile stretch near Yeji, and ferry service had to be introduced to en- sure the continued use of this link. Due to this inconvenience - the aver- age delay for crossing the lake at Yeji is 2-3 hours - the Government decided to create a new paved road between Kumasi and Tamale further West which has been paved up to Kintampo (see also Chapter I on highways).

124. Another consequence of the creation of the lake was that certain areas, like those on the northern and eastern shores of the lake, have been cut off from their traditional transport connections with economic centres in the South and the West. To solve this problem the Government has been working on the construction of another new North-South road connection running just east of the Volta Lake and the Golokuati-Dodipapase sector of that connection has been improved.

125. There are plans to use the lake itself for inland transport pur- poses. This idea has been under consideration for a number of years, main- ly developed and supported by the semi-autonomous Volta River Authority (VRA). but also favoured by some Government agencies. They believe that lake trans- nort could play a maior role as an additional North-South transport facility complementing the road network.

126. Several studies have been made on the feasibility of a water transnport system on the Volta Lake. A Rer1pe of studies carried out in 1961 and 1964 estimated potential lake traffic volumes at more than 900,000 tons in 1970 - a comnletely unrealistic forecast- A mnre recent studl eom- pleted in 1969 forecasted traffic volumes of 260,000 tons in 1975 and 425,000 tons in 1985 and recommaenAA n fnlrly sophisticated Lae trnannrt vavtem involving investments in vessels and shore installations totaling N11.4 m4114on asp Adove: tIhm pei4oA 1Q9Q95.'r -- 38 -

127. The mission is highly skeptical of the findings and recommendations of the 1969 Lake Transport Study, and so are the consultants who carried out the Transport Sector Study. Some of the traffic forecasts made in this study appear over-optimistic. Also, it is not clear whether the technical diffi- culties and the cost of removing trees which would be required to open ship- ping routes on the lake have been fully taken into account. Most important, however, the consultants' analysis of the relative costs of road versus lake transport, on which their assumptions about the future volume of lake trans- port are based, is questionable. The mission has undertaken an analysis of relative economic transport costs for an assumed shipment between Accra and Tamale by road alone or by road/lake based on the information contained in the 1969 Lake Transport Study and recent studies on road transport costs in Ghana. This analysis shows that the c:osts of the road/lake alternative would be only margin.ally lower than transport by road alone. If the addi- tional. cost of transshipments or of barging loaded trucks (the solution proposed by the 1969 study) and the loss of time were taken into account. the economic cost of the road/lake alternative would most probably be higher than the cost of transport exclusively by road.

128. Investments in lake transnort with a view to creating a new maior North-South transport system would thus at best yield marginal economic benefits and are. therefore; in the oninion of the mission, not iustified. This does not exclude, however, the feasibility of or the need for lake transnnrt on a mucah mnre l1imi tel crale_ . ai a mnans of transnnrt, serving areaLs isolated by the creation of the lake and with limited and inaAequiate road connections. For trade! flnw8 hbetween the Accra region and, for example, Kete Krachi (located on a peninsula at the northern end of the lake), transport by lake wtould c:learly be ain arnomn c proposition. Also, for trade flows between areas on the western and eastern shores of #4.nhe lake,1asIs wa…tersn,tp. tbe$'s,a.n.1 .wlA Up a,ltt4toM Ths w.4aa4^.. fxaple thnt- nn%, efforts to develop a.system of lake transport on the Volta Lake should be r4iented in this direetion.

129. Preasnt taspr non the lake 4a fai4r1y 14m4iteA TheaUA has been operating a so-called Pilot Lake 1'ransport Scheme since 1967 pro- vidirn for one daily departure ir.each directonr between Ak.osombo and Kete Krachi of a 100-ton capacity barge, pulled by a tug. Total transport vol ue Wa 2,8"4. tons .Ln 1968. Besidea Lthics PilLot SJchefme a nrm.aber of mi&r.U vessels are operating on the lake transporting goods and passengers over short- dis tan.ces. 1I I. Tn early 1970, the '30lta Take Tr------. wa ca--

.L.JUJ. A.A ..LAU 9 I LP L.LL VLFJ.La JLdL6 I.. L,%AJu.j&1LFLLY WC&O L.L CLL WA . LA the VRA holding 51% of the shares and two Ghanaian subsidiaries of inter- national" shi.pir. -opre4t;e-man.g49%. T,.e -4pywlloe:t the existing vessel of the VRA and intends to purchase more and to estab-

g11shLC6UgLaS serV._C Ube-WCCII £ItU5UIUUU Canlu LYapei, Lhe clOCSt. A.LLU%A .L1, jJVA.LLLL near Tamale at the northern-most tip of the lake. - 39 -

131. The company has obtained assurances from the Government that financing for certain shore installations will be provided by the latter, and an amount of NO0.5 million has been provided in the 1970/71 budget for this purpose. NO0.2 million were also included for the provision of navi- gational aids on the lake and for further engineering studies on specific port site locations and detailed engineering designs. The company conse- quently hopes for further Government financed investments in the future.

132. The mission is of the opinion that the decision to leave lake transport to a private, profit-oriented company is perhaps the soundest approach since the operating results of the private venture will be the best measure of the feasibility of such a transport system. The Govern- ment, however, should limit its infrastructure investments, for the use of which an appropriate fee should be levied from the company, to the strict minimum necessary in the initial phase and plan further investments only after some experience has been gained with lake transport operations and a more solid assessment can be made of the potential demand for and the economic merits of this mode of transport. -. 40 -

TABLE 1: LENGTH AND CONDITION OF THE ROAD NET W ORK_mies

Total Inventorizedl/ Condition of Length Length - Inventorizecl roads - I/2'2/

Unimproved Earth Roads 10,730 - -

Laterite and Gravel Roads 6,800 1,756 199 826 731

Bitumein Roads 2,400 991 382 330 279

Concreite and Asphalt.-Concrete Roa(ds 70

TOTAL 20.000 2.7h7- 81 1.156 1.010

1/ Only 549C miles of roads come under the responsibilitv nf PWD. 2?7 miles of these were contracted to be inventorized and 2747 miles of compleced inventor,, were received in tim.e by the Transport Sector Study.

2/ Adequate

3/ Require normal maintenance

4/ Require restoration

I/ Included in bitumen roads.

SmnirnA! Tr'ansnort SActor Study by Nathan Consortium Ministry of Works and Housing, Public Works lenpnrtment (PWnI).

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TABELE 3: VEHICLE REGISTRATION

,j Year Cars Buses frucks Others Total 1956 13,391 545 13,678 4,920 32,537

1957 14,518 784 14,026 5,290 34,618

1958 15,5146 1,270 13,205 5,846 35,867 1959 17,59() 1,952 13,471 6,731 39,744 1960 20,663 2,779 13,747 7,589 44,778 1961 23, 439 3,237 14,043 8,332 49,G51 1962 25,179 3,125 13,364 7,474 49,142

1963 27,1425 3,330 13,911 6,834 51, 500

1964 26,317 2,842 12,916 6,063 48,138 1965 27,382 2,960 13,818 7,078 51,238 1966 26,250) 2,761 11,873 5,309 46,193 1967 27,551 3,460 14,872 5,540 51,4,23

19682 27,955 18,52'9/ 5 , 630 52,114 19699" 29.571i 18.7623'Y 5,7291 54,065

1/ Thle figures incJLude trailers and caravans, special purpose vehicles, public service rehicles and motorcycles.

2/ The figures for 1968 and 1969 were preDared by the mission based on data supplied by the Ministry of Finance and Planning. However these data are unclear and the above firgres must therefore be considered tentati ve.

3/ Total of buses amd trucks.

4/ Only new special. purpose vehicles have been added.

Sources: Transport Sector Study by Nathan Consortium. M iniyt^5-1 19f 7nnn0 nti Plnning May 1970 - 4L3 -

Mn 4 . A1hTT AT BTMTr'T1 1/ OF rfLTn' 1ISrkr LMO OF WORKS AND HOUSING (PUBLIC WORKS umr.ltIl A n±Xriil,ifl m If ST mI

______o .L0O/f(V ______f

Trunk Road Construction 3,924 5,265 7,682

Feeder Road Construction 2/ 1,350 4,982 - 5,000

Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation 7,426 10,396 11,784

Technical Services (Consultants) 160 1,318 930 Other Road Transport investment W 1.262 1,961 2,424

Total: 14,122 23,922 27,820

1/ The figures given represent budget allocations but do not necessarily reflect actual expenditures.

2/ Roads financed by the Cocoa Marketing Boards are not included.

3/ The original PWD budget for FY 1969/70 included only Ne3,952,000. NM3O,000 for feeder roads studies carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture (Economic Division) and NC1,000,000 additionally allotted for rural development feeder roads have been added.

4/ This item includes ferry services, hydrological works, and community development programs.

Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning TABLE 5: REVENUE FROM ROAD USER RELATRD TAXES-i (N0 milllon)

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

Gasoline

Import Duty 6.9 8.0 9.2 10.7 11.3 14.0 12.7 9.4 9.3

Sales Tax - - - - i 0.2 2.2 1.0 2.0

Gas-Oil

3Import Duty _ 1.0 1.7 2.3 5.7 6.o 5.8 4.6 4.6

Sales Tax - - - - O.6_/ 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5

Lubricants

Import Du1ty 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 o.4 o .4 0.3 V..L4 4

Sales Tax - - - - - 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2

Tires

Dmport Daty 0.5 0.5 04 0.3 04 2.2 1-4 1.3 0.8 5/ 2/ 2/ 2/ Sales Tax - o.4-' o.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 o.4 0.5 0.3

Import Duty 1.6 2.3 0.9 3.2 2.8 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.2

Purchase Tax - o.4 1.9 5.0 3.2 1.2 2.2 2.1 2.1

Sales Tax - - - - - o.4 o.6 0.6 o.6

License Plates, Registation and Driving aicenses 1.2 2.9 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.0

Ferry, Bridge and Road Tolls 0.1 0.2 o.4 o.4 0.3 o.4 0.7 0.6 o.4

1/totheT S-evtoSt-- the mr' of An -sm fI-0es 'bayb extreme:.y large.

I/ AJJUVVL-L41 UU IdIU ILCLOIWhJULI O4VUI.~ AJ .AUJ, ..4La ,VSm4L ~ 0U-1L-4J Li UUVIU A4kLLU.L UIO.Y OUSLI~J.0 For example, the Central Bureau ofStatisties Annual Report indicates that the purchase tax on motor vehicles in 1963 was N02.4 million, while the Customs and Eccise information reports N¶5.0 million for the same item and year. From 1963 onwards, the Transport Sector Study relied principal:Ly on the second source.

2/ These figures correspond to purchase tax which was replaced in following years by the current sales tax.

Source: Transport Sector Study by Nathan Consortium. May 1 970. - 45 -

TABLE 6: TYPICAL VEHICLE OPERATING COSTS-

(Pesewas per vehicle mile on rolling terrain - taxex excluded)

For Passenger Cars For 2-axle 7-ton Truck Paved Gravel Earth Paved Gravel Earth

Fuel 0.685 0.742 0.827 2.217 2.786 3.609

Lubricants 0.074 0.088 0.118 0.154 0.200 0.292

Tires 0.248 0.527 0.842 0.929 2.246 5.139

Maintenance:

Labor 0.265 0.345 0.468 0.998 1.615 2.705

Parts 0.488 0.624 0.841 1.652 2.738 4.531

Driver's Wages 1.000 1.250 1.665 1.315 1.615 2.175

Depreciation 2.414 3.146 4.339 2.360 3.540 5.900

Interest 0.834 1.043 1.391 0.522 0.639 0.862

Insurance 0.459 0.573 0.764 0.337 0.413 0.556

TOTAL 6.467 8.338 11.255 10.484 15.792 25.769

1/ The figures represent 1969 costs.

Source: The Transport Sector Study by Nathan Consortium

May 1970 TABLE 7: TRAFFIC OF GHANA RAILWAYS

Goods traffic Number of Year ('000 toni!) passengers

1958/59 1,695 n.a.

1959/60 1,932

1960/61 2,099

1961/62 1,893 "

1962/63 1,957 5,789,939

1964164 1,927 6,437,021

19165 2,081 7,797,961

1966/67 1,835 7,304,879

1967/68 1,677 7,233,232

19658/69 1,523 7,542,843

Source: The Transport Sector Study by Nathan Consortium

May 1970 Tab-Le 8: WjLU."Ljja(1 t>NNAGES OF MAJOR COMMODITIES ('COO tons)

Subtotal % Major mnajor com- Other Com- Commodities 1anganese Bauixite Cocoa Timber modities modities Total of Total _

1950/51 727 145 202 195 1,269 426 1,695 75

196o/61 566 179 :226 736 1,707 223 1,930 88

1965 598 277 419 564 1,858 223 2,081 89 1966/67 616 345 290 447 1,698 137 1,835 93 1967/68 45-L 304 232 521 1,508 170 1,678 90 1968/69 412 :244 176 595 1,427 96 1,523 94

Source: The Transport Sector Study by Nathan Consortium

May 1970 TABLE 9: GHANA RAILWAYI:ANDi PORTS ADMINISTRATION C(MBIED INC;CE STATEMEIIT F

1958/59 1.959/60 19560/61 1961/62' 1962'/63 1L963/64 1965 1965/67 1967/68

Revenues 13,524 1.5,607 17,673 20,330 21,606 22,8'58 22,87L 17,875 17,375 Expenditures:

Operating Expenses 9,809 9;,742 10,394 11,071 11,912 12,274 1(,82'; 6,692 13,095 Contributions to renewals fund 2,139 2,532 2,534 2,535 3,299 2,7114 2,706 2,889 4,016 Miscellaneous expendi- trues net 90 631 82 120 306 528 174 1L88 355 Total expenditures 12,038 1.2,905 13,010' 13,726 15,'517 15,516 13,705 14,769 17,1466

Balances 1,486 2,702 4.,663 6,604 6,089 7,31t2 9,166 3,:L06 (91)

Source: Ghana Railway and Ports Administration, Accounts Department.

May 1970 - 49 -

TABLE 10: GHA3RAQWAY INCOME STATEMENT- JUL19 - SEPTEMBER 1968

YEARS 1958/59 1L959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962 1962/63 1963/61. :1964 1965 1966 1966/67 1967/68 1968 ACCOUNTING PERIOD JUL-JUN JuL-JUN JUL-JUN JUL-JUN JUL-JUN OCT-SEP OCT-SEP OCT-DEC JAN-DEC JAN-JUN JUL-JUN JUL-JUN JUL-SEP NUMBER OF MONTHS 12 12 12 12 3 12 12 3 12 6 12 12 3

Revenues:

Coaching 1,474 1,4.59 1,610 1,442 409 1,B14 2,099 647 2,320 1,260 2,114 2,198 451

Goods 7,762 9',106 10,490 10,660 2,003 10,61B 10,571 2,353 9,209 5,761 7,148 6,326 821

Miscellaneous 358 356 398 331 79 409 461 97 391 216 344 404 74

Total 9,594 10,921 12,498 12,433 2,491 12,841 13,131 3,097 11,920 7,327 9,606 8,928 1,346

Expenditutres:

Maintenance of Way and Works 1,645 1.,675 1,915 2,022 524 2,072 2,044 545 1,69j 1,129 1,756 1,937 470

Locomotives, Carriages & Wagorm 3,698 3,790 3, 780 3,660 898 3,785 4,061 944 3,343 2,510 3,787 4,471 1,048

Trafiic 984 1,002 1,142 1,170 288 1,1_18 1,170 287 1,035 732 1,049 1,142 258

General Expenditur es- Administration 322 330 386 385 101 403 41h 127 367 277 381 489 119

General Expenditur es- Pernsion 1,180 905 912 941 188 1,111 1,313 216 1,137 832 1,411 1,h46 317

Total operating expenditures 7,829 7 ,702 8,135 8,178 .1,999 8,489 9`002 2,119 7,577 5,480 8,384 9,485 2,212

Renewrals contributions 1,842 2,063 2,o64 2,063 516 2,783 2,784 696 2,2714 1,367 2,278 2,338 584

Total expenditures 9,671 9,765 lO,L99 10,241 2,515 11,272 11,786 2,815 9,851 6,847 1ic,661 11,823 2,796

Net Earnings (77) 1,156 2,299 2,192 (24) 1,569 1,345 282 2,069 390 (1,055) (2,895) (1,450)

Operating, ratio 101 89 82 82 101 8B 90 91 83 95 111 133 207

Source: Ghana Railway and Ports AdministrationJ Accounting Detpartment.

May 1970 TABLE ll: GHANA RAILWAYS:PROPOSED 1970/71 INVESTMENT BUDGET (in Ni)

Item Works Already Sanctioned New Works Total

Existing lines 1,688,270 68,100 1.,756,370

Locomotives 1,504,560 - 1.,504,560

Goods rolling stock 1,282,020 696,ooo 1,978,070

Coaches 211,640 222,000 433,640

Stations and buildings 510,61.0 44,500 555,110

Machinery and plant 783,910 6,600 790,510

Ancillary services 283,150 65,200 348,350

Tema. Harbour 1,370,000 - 1,370,000

Unforeseen works - 125,000 125,000

TOTAL 7,634,160 1,227,400 8,86i1,560

Sourge The Transport Sector Study by Nathan Consortium

May 1970) TABLE 12: TRAFFTC AT PORT OF TAKORAnT ('000 Tons)

1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1965 1966 1967 1968 Imports

General 827 629 456 435 413 180 1,3 152

Coal 62 29 37 44 24 57 28 32

Petrol/Fuel 241 209 212 49 10 10 - 68

Cement n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 172 89 43

Total:11 1 1/ I/ 1/ 1 (1,130) (867) (705) (528) (447) 417 270 295

Exports

-, - - - 177- -- % '7n.'l ns16a -I % - Cocoa 17vc 257 2vo 215 L23J

Timber 857 535 587 648 534 473 593 557

Manganese 497 479 430 440 593 608 458 453

Bauxite 235 234 245 238 285 295 276 269

General 62 76 58 65 64 68 29 32

Total 1,828 1,581 1,540 1,593 1,714 1,652 1,531 1,469

GRAND TOTAL 2,069 1,801 1,764

1/ Excluding imports of cement; figures for these years not avaiiable.

Source: The Transport Sector Study by Nathan Consortium

May 1970 MT1r E 13: rTPICMA1'r' AfTl POfThM OF MT.IMA (1000 tons)

Imports 1964 1%5 1966 1967 1968

Crude oil 803 735 617 729 723 ALiunina - - 18 110 189 Cement 429 3^54 302 132 37 Clinker - 48 64 126 193 Miscellaneous 465 557 453 310 256

Total 1,697 1,694 1,454 1,407 1,398

Cocoa 193 29Q 219Q 18 0n 20)0 Refined oil 327 -,42 325 337 338 ,MI Escellaneous 36 21 23 48 86

Total 556 656 567 565 624

Gr nd Total 2e23 2 352 2jOl21 1,972 2,022

Source: The Transport Sector Study by Nathan Consortiwn

May 197() Chart 1

GH-ANA

THE TR.ANSPOPT SFETOnR

Organization Chart of -hnr.saJ aiuy and Ports Adn.inis-tratior.

General Manager

Deputy General Manager Deputy GlTneral Manager

Railway Ports

Chi~~~ef Accu.a. UL1L-L L t LA'' U- LI La IistaLr iv 'Lr

I\,I Lle~~~b[JL t~UItI± LbX: LI aL L ~LVt: LJL :LCLL y

Personnel Man-ager

Chief Civil 'Engineer UCILefL hrourMs

Chief Mechanical Engineer HarlaoLur Master - Te-La

Traffic Manager Harbour Master - Takordi

Chief Signalling Engineer Port Manager - Temita

Senior Electrical Engineet C i,Z C=

II~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U

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