How States Respond to the Human Rights Violations of a Past Dictatorship: the Cases of Argentina and Chile
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Trinity College Trinity College Digital Repository Senior Theses and Projects Student Scholarship Spring 2020 How States Respond to the Human Rights Violations of a Past Dictatorship: The Cases of Argentina and Chile Michaela Drucker [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Latin American Studies Commons Recommended Citation Drucker, Michaela, "How States Respond to the Human Rights Violations of a Past Dictatorship: The Cases of Argentina and Chile". Senior Theses, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 2020. Trinity College Digital Repository, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/810 HOW STATES RESPOND TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF A PAST DICTATORSHIP: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE _______________________ An Honors Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Human Rights Studies Program Trinity College _______________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts _______________________ by Michaela S. Drucker May 2020 Drucker 2 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 3 INTRODUCTION 4 LITERATURE REVIEW 5 TYPE OF TRANSITION 5 DEMOCRACY 10 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 18 HYPOTHESES 22 METHODS 27 CASES 32 ARGENTINA 33 CHILE 45 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 62 TESTING HYPOTHESES 73 HYPOTHESIS 1 73 HYPOTHESIS 2 78 HYPOTHESIS 3 78 HYPOTHESIS 4 82 HYPOTHESIS 5 84 HYPOTHESIS 6 86 CONCLUSION 89 BIBLIOGRPAHY 91 Drucker 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I could not have completed this thesis without the help and support of so many people. First and foremost, I must thank my advisor Professor Benjamin Carbonetti for guiding me during this process. He allowed me to struggle and think through my ideas as well as support all of my academic endeavors. I would also like to thank my professors for teaching me the tools and information that culminated in this thesis. I owe my gratitude to my friends for supporting me throughout everything—letting me rant, staying with me in the library, motivating me, and checking in on my mental health. They gave me everything I could have needed in this stressful time. I also need to thank my parents. With all of the changes that happened as a result of COVID-19, I came home and had my own workspace. They let me talk through ideas with them and allowed me to work at my own pace. Lastly, my trips to Argentina and Chile greatly inspired and guided this work. Therefore, I must thank all of the people I met while abroad who have been there for me emotionally throughout this process. My Individual Study Project through my semester with SIT-Argentina helped me tremendously as I navigated this process. Drucker 4 INTRODUCTION “The respect for human rights is nowadays not so much a matter of having international standards, but rather questions of compliance with those standards.” (Michelle Bachelet, Former President of Chile) The Southern Cone—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay—endured some of the most devastating dictatorships in world history. Thirty-thousand men, women, and children disappeared during the Argentine dictatorship while the Chilean population faced 17 years under Augusto Pinochet’s commanding military rule. While 30 years have passed since the end of these long-lasting dictatorships, the effects linger in the lives of the victims, their family members, and the societies as a whole. Extensive and gruesome human rights violations occurred throughout the institutionalized state violence during these dictatorships. Some examples include the illegal kidnapping and detention of individuals, physical torture, sexual abuse, psychological manipulation, disappearances, and executions. The abuse continues to the present day as countless individuals live with the perpetual mental anguish of unanswered questions regarding the whereabouts of loved ones and, in the case of Argentina, the lost children of those captured. When the dictatorships ended in Argentina and Chile, in 1982 and 1990 respectively, the first civilian governments faced many challenges of confronting these abuses. As will be highlighted throughout this paper, the governments had drastically different approaches to this task as a result of varying circumstances, history, societal responses, and international pressures. Using Argentina and Chile as case studies, this essay will articulate such differences, propose and analyze certain hypotheses that might explain the distinctions, and provide a comprehensive Drucker 5 answer to the question: Why do civilian governments of newly democratic countries respond differently to the human rights violations that occurred during their dictatorships? Newly democratic countries respond to the human rights violations that occurred during its past dictatorship according to a variety of factors, specifically the severity of violence during the dictatorial period, the type of transition to democracy, the legal status post-dictatorship, the power of the executive, international pressure, and the justice policies elsewhere. Therefore, this paper ultimately argues that countries vary in their responses as a result of differences in any one of these variables. This thesis also acknowledges that other factors not evaluated may also impact the responses of governments. LITERATURE REVIEW Scholars have debated similar questions regarding how countries transition from periods of authoritarianism to democracy, specifically after dictatorships; the type of democracy that emerges; the potential paths to justice after human rights violations during these periods; and the influence of the international community in searching for justice. One must first understand the previous literature and findings of scholars in order to analyze specific cases. Type of Transitions One important factor in this field of study regards the type of transition to democracy. Guillermo O’Donnell divided the possibilities in two: with a pact, also called a consensus, or without a pact referred to as by force or collapse.1 A transition by consensus implies one where the ruling armed forces negotiate their terms for their exit from power with the civil society and 1 Daniel Mazzei, “Reflexiones sobre la transición democrática argentina,” PolHis 4, no. 7 (2011): 11. Drucker 6 political parties that will soon retake the government. Therefore, by contrast, the armed forces do not have this ability in a transition by collapse. Many scholars have expanded on this duality, discussing the implications of this division and what might influence which path a departing dictatorship takes. Daniel Mazzei and Carlos Santiago Nino emphasize the etiology, or “the types of factors that ignite the transition process,” as important to distinguishing the modality or which transition occurs. The etiology of a transition may be endogenous or exogenous depending on the factors—internal or external—that triggered the democratization.2 Mazzei states, “A transition by collapse is produced… after an external military defeat or after a profound internal crisis of the authoritarian regime,” signifying mainly exogenous factors.3 Scholars have discovered that transitions via consensus result in “a continuity of the structures, elites, and political practices of the authoritarian regimes” who can then help rebuild the new democracy and “direct the pace of transition and preserve the prerogatives they have obtained” whereas transitions by collapse result in a defeated armed forces with little to no power who must work within the newly created system.4 Regarding a transition by consensus, Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo discuss the benefits of creating a constitution to negotiate the authoritarian regime’s terms of removal. As mentioned above, scholars argue that a consensus transition results in minimal prosecutions because of the continued existence of the authoritarian elites in institutions. These authors further articulate this argument regarding the decreased likelihood of punishment of dictators when the 2 Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996): 107. 3 Daniel Mazzei, 11. 4 Daniel Mazzei, 11; David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Tipping the Civil-Military Balance: Institutions and Human Rights Policy in Democratic Argentina and Chile,” Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 5 (October 1, 1998): 636, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414098031005004; Carlos H Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, “Adjusting the Armed Forces to Democracy: Successes, Failures, and Ambiguities in the Southern Cone,” in Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America, ed. Elizabth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 33. Drucker 7 new government inherits constitutions from the prior regime: “once a constitution is promulgated, the commitment to former elites’ interests can be ensured through several channels: over-representing holdover elites in political institutions, inducing political gridlock, imposing military veto power over policy, and enshrining elite dominance over local politics.”5 This effectively prevents the former dictatorial elites from prosecution and enshrines their power in the new democracy, making any meaningful change to the system more difficult. Additionally, the role of the military in the new democracy greatly depends on the etiology and modality of the transition. Carlos Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz address the direct effect of the relative success of the military regime during the dictatorship and its role