Global Net 21Forum

North Korea and the Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime Global Net 21 Forum April 5, 2011

Presenter North Korea has long been a challenge to the next target of the if it hung onto

Amb. Robert Joseph Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime by pur- its WMD program.

suing nuclear weapons, withdrawing from the Exposure of the WMD Program In late Moderator NPT, and twice testing nuclear device. On 2003, the Libyans were caught red-handed Young-Sun Ha March 28, 2011, the East Asia Institute invited importing uranium centrifuges from Malaysia.

Discussants Ambassador Robert Joseph, former Under Sec- This public exposure by the U.S. and UK intel-

Kang Choi retary of State for Arms Control and Interna- ligence services provoked the Gaddafi regime Jaechun Kim Young Ho Kim tional Security under the Bush administration. to be more open about its WMD program Ho Kwon Sang-Hyun Lee He considered some key questions related to Disruption of the A.Q. Khan Network Sook-Jong Lee Seongji Woo the North Korean nuclear crisis such as why ’s WMD program was dependent upon a

the Six-Party Talks have not worked, what les- single foreign network run by the Pakistani

sons can be learnt from previous successful nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. Having cut off

disarmament experiences such as Libya, and this crucial link, the Libyan WMD program

what the prospects for the future are. was disrupted.

The following is a summary of the pres- Reform and Opening The Gaddafi regime

entation by Ambassador Joseph and the at the time was interested in pursuing reforms

roundtable discussion with leading South Ko- and opening, including supporting the U.S.

rean scholars and experts. Ambassador Jo- War on Terror.

seph’s remarks are his own expressed opinions While it is true that all states have differ-

and views. ent circumstances, the lessons learned from

this case can be applied to others including

North Korea. These successes can be effective- This product presents a policy-oriented sum- Summary of the Forum ly applied when the failures of the past are mary of the Global Net 21 Forum. taken into account.

The case of Libya’s decision to give up its Wea- Amb. Joseph stated that the Six-Party

pons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program in Talks have ended up in failure, but that does

The East Asia Institute 2003 has been considered a non-proliferation not mean that the framework of the Talks is at 909 Sampoong B/D 310-68 Euljiro 4-ga success story and held up by policy experts as a fault. Bringing together all the related coun- Jung-gu Seoul 100-786 model for the denuclearization of North Korea. tries with North Korea is the right way to ap- Republic of Korea Understanding the causes and motivations of proach the problem. However, it has been the © EAI 2011 the Libyan government in making this strategic policy and actions of various countries, in- decision is important and a closer analysis of cluding the United States which has resulted the events at the time indicates four factors in North Korea expanding and enhancing its involved in Libya’s decision. nuclear capability as opposed to giving it up. Invasion of There was great fear The Six-Party Talks have achieved nothing www.eai.or.kr within the Gaddafi regime that it would be the because of its repeated cycle of provocation,

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negotiation, lack of verification, withdrawal, About the Speaker and again provocation. In fact, this cycle has Amb. Robert Joseph worked in North Korea’s favor to the extent Robert Joseph is Senior Scholar at the Nation- that it views possession of nuclear weapons as al Institute for Public Policy and Professor in a golden goose that it will not give up. Moving the Graduate Department of Defense and on from the failures of the past and applying Strategic Studies (Missouri State University). these lessons, there are three ways to make the Prior to July 2007, Ambassador Joseph served Six-Party Talks a success. as U.S. Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonprolife- Resolute Approach The United States ration, Under Secretary of State for Arms needs to be perceived as serious when nego- Control and International Security, and Spe- tiating in the Six-Party Talks. cial Assistant to the President and Senior Di- Multiple Instruments of Power Skilled use rector for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproli- of multiples instruments of state power will feration and Homeland Defense in the Na- help apply real pressure on North Korea; this tional Security Council. Amb. Joseph received includes diplomacy, economic tools, intelli- his M.A. from the and gence, and military force. Ph.D. from . Amb. Jo- The Right Strategy There is a need for a seph authored a book recounting and assess- clear strategy to denuclearize North Korea, ing some of his counterproliferation expe- simply participating in the Six-Party Talk rience, Countering WMD: The Libyan Expe- themselves is not a strategy. rience (National Institute Press, 2009). In addition to a new approach to the Six- Party Talks, the role of China is critical for Moderator pressuring North Korea. Following North Ko- Young-Sun Ha rea’s nuclear test in 2006, Beijing showed a - Seoul National University willingness to pressure Pyongyang through supporting UN sanctions. This stands in con- Discussants trast to the situation following the sinking of Kang Choi Cheonan in 2010 where China has shown little - Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security interest in pressuring the North Korean re- Jaechun Kim gime. Currently, there are no consequences for - Sogang University China if they do not pressure the North. What Young Ho Kim will be required are coordinated efforts to en- - Korea National Defense University courage China to back efforts to pressure Ho Kwon

North Korea. ■ - JoongAng Ilbo Sang-Hyun Lee - Sejong Institute Sook-Jong Lee - East Asia Institute Seongji Woo - Kyunghee University

Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute ac- knowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this event possible. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. This report is produced by Jina Kim and Stephen Ranger. 2