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To Shoot Or Not to Shoot: an Ethical Decision Major Andrew Brayshaw Staff Officer Grade 2 Capstone Doctrine Army Knowledge Centre, Australian Army1
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS To shoot or not to shoot: an ethical decision Major Andrew Brayshaw Staff Officer Grade 2 Capstone Doctrine Army Knowledge Centre, Australian Army1 This paper looks at two incidents that took place during the 1982 Falklands War and whether or not the actions they took were ethical. Both incidents involved a combat medical technician shooting an unarmed soldier who was ablaze. In Incident A, at Goose Green, a British soldier shot an Argentine prisoner. In Incident B, in the Logistic Ship Landing Sir Galahad at Bluff Cove, a different British soldier shot another British soldier. The author does not judge the ethics of either action. Key words: ethics; combat medical technician; 1982 Falklands War. During armed conflict, military personnel can be faced wounded and 11,313 taken prisoner. Additional Argentine with situations where they have to make an ethical losses included 9 ships, 25 helicopters and 100 aircraft3. decision which at times may be contrary to the Laws of Armed Conflict. This is more poignant now with the current Incident A: Battle for Goose Green investigations into incidents involving Australian, United The first incident, in which an unarmed Argentine States and British armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq prisoner-of-war (POW) was shot dead, took place in the and the British Army’s involvement in Northern Ireland. hours following the Battle of Goose Green. Goose Green This paper will look at two incidents that took place is located on a neck of land about 20km south of where the during the Falklands War in 1982 and whether or not the initial British amphibious landings took place at San Carlos actions taken by the individuals concerned were ethical. -
Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982
ACLARACION DE www.radarmalvinas.com.ar El presente escrito en PDF es transcripción de la versión para internet del libro BATTLE ATLAS OF THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982 by Land, Sea, and Air de GORDON SMITH, publicado por Ian Allan en 1989, y revisado en 2006 Usted puede acceder al mismo en el sitio www.naval-history.com Ha sido transcripto a PDF y colocado en el sitio del radar Malvinas al sólo efecto de preservarlo como documento histórico y asegurar su acceso en caso de que su archivo o su sitio no continúen en internet, ya que la información que contiene sobre los desplazamientos de los medios británicos y su cronología resultan sumamente útiles como información británica a confrontar al analizar lo expresado en los diferentes informes argentinos. A efectos de preservar los derechos de edición, se puede bajar y guardar para leerlo en pantalla como si fuera un libro prestado por una biblioteca, pero no se puede copiar, editar o imprimir. Copyright © Penarth: Naval–History.Net, 2006, International Journal of Naval History, 2008 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BATTLE ATLAS OF THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982 NAVAL-HISTORY.NET GORDON SMITH BATTLE ATLAS of the FALKLANDS WAR 1982 by Land, Sea and Air by Gordon Smith HMS Plymouth, frigate (Courtesy MOD (Navy) PAG Introduction & Original Introduction & Note to 006 Based Notes Internet Page on the Reading notes & abbreviations 008 book People, places, events, forces 012 by Gordon Smith, Argentine 1. Falkland Islands 021 Invasion and British 2. Argentina 022 published by Ian Allan 1989 Response 3. History of Falklands dispute 023 4. South Georgia invasion 025 5. -
Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08
Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2007-2008 Volume I: Annual Performance Report Presented pursuant to the GRA Act 2000 c.20, s.6 Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts Volume I including the Annual Performance Report and Consolidated Departmental Resource Accounts 2007-08 (For the year ended 31 March 2008) Laid in accordance with the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 21 July 2008 London: The Stationery Office 21 July 2008 HC 850-I £51.45 Not to be sold separately © Crown Copyright 2008 The text in this document (excluding the Royal Arms and other departmental or agency logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium providing it is reproduced accurately and not used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and the title of the document specified. Where we have identified any third party copyright material you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. For any other use of this material please write to Office of Public Sector Information, Information Policy Team, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU or e-mail: [email protected] ISBN: 978 0 10 295509 5 Introduction i. The Ministry of Defence’s Annual Report and Accounts is a comprehensive overview of Defence and how the Department has used the resources authorised by Parliament from April 2007 to March 2008. It has two main sections: the first comprises the Department’s Annual Performance Report for 2007-08, including performance against our Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets. -
Polnotektovyy Variant Dissertacii.Pdf
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ АВТОНОМНОЕ ОБРАЗОВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ ВЫСШЕГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ «НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ ТОМСКИЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ» На правах рукописи ШЕВЧЕНКО Михаил Александрович МЕТОДИКА ОБУЧЕНИЯ ВОЕННЫХ ПЕРЕВОДЧИКОВ ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНОМУ ИНОЯЗЫЧНОМУ ДИСКУРСУ НА ОСНОВЕ КОМПЕТЕНТНОСТНОГО ПОДХОДА 13.00.02 – «Теория и методика обучения и воспитания (иностранные языки, уровень профессионального образования)» ДИССЕРТАЦИЯ на соискание ученой степени кандидата педагогических наук Научный руководитель: доктор педагогических наук, профессор С.К. Гураль Томск – 2017 ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ ВВЕДЕНИЕ ............................................................................................................ 3 ГЛАВА I ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ ЯЗЫКОВОГО И ПРЕДМЕТНОГО СОДЕРЖАНИЯ В ОБУЧЕНИИ ВОЕННЫХ ПЕРЕВОДЧИКОВ ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНОМУ ИНОЯЗЫЧНОМУ ДИСКУРСУ. ......................................................................................................... 21 1.1 ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ВОЕННОГО ПЕРЕВОДА ..................................................... 21 1.2. МЕСТО ВОЕННОГО ДИСКУРСА В СТРУКТУРЕ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ .......................................................................................................................... 28 1.3. РОЛЬ ИНОЯЗЫЧНОГО ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНОГО ДИСКУРСА В ОБУЧЕНИИ ВОЕННЫХ ПЕРЕВОДЧИКОВ В СВЕТЕ КОМПЕТЕНТНОСТНОГО ПОДХОДА. ............. 50 1.4 ЦЕЛИ, ЗАДАЧИ, ПРИНЦИПЫ И СОДЕРЖАНИЕ ОБУЧЕНИЯ ВОЕННЫХ ПЕРЕВОДЧИКОВ ИНОЯЗЫЧНОМУ ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНОМУ ДИСКУРСУ. ................ 73 ВЫВОДЫ ПО ПЕРВОЙ ГЛАВЕ ................................................................... -
Warwick.Ac.Uk/Lib-Publications
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick Permanent WRAP URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/116776 Copyright and reuse: This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright. Please scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page. For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [email protected] warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications Stages of the Sea 20th Century Theatrical Entertainment in the Royal Navy by Sarah Penny A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theatre Studies University of Warwick, School of Theatre & Performance Studies and Cultural & Media Policy Studies May 2018 1 Table of Contents Title Page .................................................................................................................................. 1 Table of Contents ................................................................................................................. 2 List of Illustrations ................................................................................................................ 3 Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 5 Declaration ........................................................................................................................... 7 Abstract ............................................................................................................................... -
'Hit Hard, Move Fast and Sustain Action' the Replacement of The
The Mariner’s Mirror 97:3 (August 2011), 177–200 ‘Hit hard, move fast and sustain action’ The Replacement of the Royal Navy’s Amphibious Warfare Squadron and the Rationale for HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid Ian Speller1 This article examines the circumstances in which the old ships and craft of the post-1945 Royal Navy’s Amphibious Warfare Squadron were replaced by the new assault ships HMS Fearless and Intrepid. It analyses the impact on the requirement for amphibious forces of the change in emphasis in the late 1950s from major war contingencies to a new focus on mobile and flexible forces capable of responding to limited crises overseas. This called for a radically different type of capability than had been provided by the Amphibious Warfare Squadron and eventually resulted in a force built around two commando carriers, two new assault ships and six logistic landing ships. The article analyses alternative plans for the shape and size of the new amphibious force and examines the different design studies that resulted. It identifies a number of different ship types that were considered and demonstrates that the requirement to be able to land a joint all-arms force of up to a brigade group, supported by tanks and artillery, was key to the eventual decision to build Fearless and Intrepid and establishes the strategic rationale that underpinned the construction of these ships and demonstrates why they were built as amphibious transport docks in favour of the other design options. n the late 1950s the Royal Navy sought to replace the worn out ships and craft Ithat had constituted its post-war amphibious fleet. -
SEA-BASED LOG1 STI CS and LESSONS from the FALKLANDS
NPS-IJWA-00-002 SEA-BASED LOG1STI CS And LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS D. A. Schrady May 2000 Sponsored by The Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California N PS-IJ WA-00-002 SEA-BASED LOG ISTICS And LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS D. A. Schrady May 2000 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL INSTITUTE FOR JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) - The Naval Postgraduate School mission is to increase the combat effectiveness of U.S. and Allied armed forces and enhance the security of the USA through advanced education and research programs focused on the technical, analytical, and managerial tools needed to confront defense-related challenges. Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis (IJWA) The Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis was founded in 1994 with the mission of addressing the problems of the joint defense arena with the academic disciplines resident at NPS. It sponsors a wide ranging research program, curriculum development focused on joint warfare, and interaction with numerous services and DoD organizations. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense or any other U.S. Government agency. Reprints are available by contacting: Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis 589 Dyer Road, Room 200A Monterey, California 93943-5000 Telephone: (831) 656-3243 FAX: (831) 656-3541 E-mail: [email protected] Form approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No 0704-0188 May 2000 Technical ’LE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING :a-Based Logistics and Lessons from the Falklands ITHOR(S) avid A. -
An Overview of the Falklands War1: Politics, Strategy and Operations
Badsey An Overview of the Falkland War AN OVERVIEW OF THE FALKLANDS WAR1: POLITICS, STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS Stephen Badsey The Falklands War began on Friday 2 April 1982, when an amphibious landing in the very early hours of the morning (local time) by a marine brigade of the Argentinean Navy seized Port Stanley, the capital of the Falkland Islands (known to Argentina as the Islas Malvinas), forcing the surrender after a firefight of three hours of the small British garrison, which consisted chiefly of a force of about 75 Royal Marines known as Naval Party 8901. Despite the destruction of some buildings, there were no British casualties; but one Argentinean officer was killed and some Argentineans wounded. Argentina’s attempts to present the invasion to the world as intentionally peaceful and bloodless were ruined almost at once, as photographs smuggled out of the islands showed the destruction of the British barracks, and the humiliation of the garrison. This was the first in a series of Argentinean failures to connect their political, propaganda and military strategies with their military operations, failures that contributed to their defeat in the war just over eleven weeks later. In 1982 the Falkland Islands were classed as one of the self-governing British Dependent Territories. The British administration of the Falklands included the Falklands Islands Dependencies, some smaller islands several hundred kilometres to the south-east, of which the largest is South Georgia where a small British base was also seized by Argentinean forces on 3 April, together with the uninhabited South Sandwich Islands, and Southern Thule. -
821213 C(82) 43 (129-215-393).Pdf
CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL PUBLISHED THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT C(82) 43 COPY NO 13 December 1982 CABINET THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN: THE LESSONS Note by the Secretary of State for Defence 1 attach for the information of Cabinet our White Paper on the Falklands conflict ^title d "The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons". As I explained at our last m e e ting, it will be published at 3.30 tomorrow afternoon when I shall also make a brief statement in the House. JN Mi n istry of Def ence 13 December 1982 CONFIDENTIAL r • is document mil not b>: published until j <j 5 Q Jjrs ^ 0 f jC Hoidors are reminded that until this time it is ,fied Th© CONFIDENTIALan d that P'™ature release Falklafflrrampaign: The Lessons Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty December 1982 LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE £3-95 net • Cmnd. 8758 The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty December 1982 LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE £3-95 net Cmnd. 8758 Contents Part 1. The Operation Deployment From South Georgia to San Carlos From San Carlos to Fitzroy Advance on Port Stanley Chronology Part 2. The Lessons Introduction Crisis Management and Command and Control Men Maritime Operations Land Operations Special Forces Equipment Procurement and Improvisation Logistics and Personnel Public Relations Part 3. The Future Conclusion Annexes A. Composition of the task force and supporting elements: Table 1—Ships of the Royal Navy Table 2—Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm Table 3—Ships of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service Table 4—Ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Table 5—Ships taken up from trade Table 6—Royal Marines Table 7—Army Units Table 8—Royal Air Force Units B.