No end to ’s MaoistMaoist rrebellionebellion

Joanna Pfaff -Czarnecka

Abstract: Since 1996, Nepal has increasingly been drawn into a violent confl ict between Maoist rebels and the state, leading to a severe crisis. Th ousands of civil- ians have been killed, and most people in the countryside live in constant fear. Economic hardship has seriously increased. Despite repeated eff orts to bring the parties together for peace talks, there is little hope that the violent situation will be resolved in the near future. Th is article analyzes the complex causes of the emergence of the Maoist insurrection and its success, and sketches the problems impeding a democratic solution to the current situation. Keywords: democratization, governance, Nepal, social disparities, violent confl ict

During the last century and a half, Nepal has ex- decreased. Traveling in Nepal has become a per- perienced comparatively few situations of overt ilous endeavor as motorways are oft en blocked confl ict. Since 1996 however, this trend has been and there is the danger of bombs placed by Mao- signifi cantly reversed as a civil war emerged be- ist soldiers. All over the country check posts have tween an expanding Maoist movement and the been established, not only by the state, but also by state, taking about 12,000 lives until today (July the Maoists. While visitors from Western coun- 2005). Most of the population is caught in the tries are usually allowed to pass, many Nepalese crossfi re between the two opposing sides—the have been harassed and detained. state’s armed forces and the Maoists. Interna- The public sphere has been considerably tional organizations, notably Amnesty Interna- restricted. Increasingly, the governmental con- tional, have repeatedly reported serious human trol of mass media has impeded the availabil- rights abuses. Tremendous insecurity and fear ity of information and the exchange of opinion. have become an everyday-life experience for Most international development agencies have many Nepalese.1 reduced their projects outside the Kathmandu During this comparatively short period of Valley. Th e scope of academic research has been time, the country has changed visibly. Th e urban reduced as well. Especially American colleagues centers have grown in size, taking in people who are reluctant to face confrontations with Maoist abandoned their homesteads in rural areas in warriors, fearing their resentment. Since the turn search of protection in the city. Especially the of the millennium (according to the Western cal- country’s capital, Kathmandu, is booming for this endar), the situation has changed from bad to reason. Simultaneously, tourism has drastically worse. Short periods of ceasefi re and attempts at

Focaal—European Journal of Anthropology 46 (2005): 158– 68 No end to Nepal’s MMaoistaoist rrebellionebellion | 159 peace talks have been interspersed by prolonged with Indian support. Celebrated as a ‘hero of periods of escalating violence and the tighten- ’, King Tribhuvan became the leading ing of the Maoists’ grip over the countryside. fi gure in a political transition toward democ- Political forces have been caught in an impasse ratization—which however paradoxically co- for several years now and there is little reason to incided with a strengthening of the . assume that the situation will be resolved in the During the 1950s, most exiled oppositional near future. forces returned to Nepal. While in India, the oppositional politicians had formed political parties, notably the and the Historical context of Nepal. Aft er the death of King Tribhuvan in 1955, his son King Mahen- Nepal, situated at the southern slopes of the Hi- dra initially tolerated eff orts toward establishing malayan range between the borders of China and a pluralist democratic system. However, aft er India, has historically been a country of intense the fi rst popular elections were held in the year religious and ethnic hierarchies. More than sixty 1959, he dissolved the parliament only eighteen ethnic groups live on Nepalese territory, along months later, introducing a party-less with the dominant Hindu Parbatiya popula- system that was to last until 1990. tion. Th e country came about in its present size It was King Mahendra (on the throne from when in the mid-eighteenth century the House 1955 to 1972) who initiated the modernization of Gorkha started its military expansion. Until of Nepal, attracting development agencies, skill- 1814, about sixty principalities and ethnic re- fully harnessing political rivalries during the gions came under the sway of the , Cold War, and exploiting Nepal’s delicate geopo- whose conquests however came to a halt when litical position. He embarked upon the strategy they were confronted with the British colonial of state-driven development, following fi ve-year forces. Nepal never came under British colonial plans, and promoted assimilationist policies. rule; it remained closed to the outside world, by His cultural style was depicted as ‘Nepalization’: and large, especially aft er the Rana family seized imposing cultural-religious elements of the power in 1846. Th roughout the nineteenth and high-caste elite, while declaring ethnic cultures the fi rst half of the twentieth century the rulers as backward and their promotion as dissident. managed to centralize their kingdom, establish- Although his government cannot be called en- ing direct rule in most areas of the country and tirely autocratic, King Mahendra, and his suc- bringing a large share of the fertile land under cessor son King Birendra (1972–2001), did man- their control. By facilitating the migration of the age to combine all powers upon themselves and Parbatiya population to the ethnic territories, seriously curtailed human rights—most notably they actively contributed to ethnic lands shift - the right to information and to organization. Po- ing hands to the rulers and their political allies litical opposition had to go underground, or into and clients. In 1854 the Ranas promulgated the exile, once again. However, popular protest never fi rst civil code (Muluki Ain), formalizing the hi- ceased to exist. In the late 1970s and throughout erarchically ordered caste society with clear-cut the 1980s civic protest gained momentum in ranks. To a large extent, membership in a rank Nepal, escalating in the spring of 1990. decided about one’s rights and duties. Aft er forty persons were killed by the armed Nepal opened to the world in the year 1951 forces in April 1990 in Kathmandu, King Bi- when the Rana regime was overthrown. Grow- rendra faced serious criticism, both internally ing popular protest had won momentum when and from the international community. Conse- the powerless King Tribhuvan of the Shah dy- quently, he agreed to give up some of his pow- nasty, stripped of most power prerogatives by the ers, to reintroduce a multi-party political sys- Ranas but still kept in offi ce, managed to escape tem, and to promulgate a new constitution that to India and to come back shortly aft erwards for the fi rst time in Nepal’s history declared the 160 | Joanna Pfaff -Czarnecka population, rather than the king, sovereign. He Singh Shrestha, and Girija Prashad Korala could formed an interim government to be headed not be prevented. Turbulent disagreements and by members of the Congress Party and in May realignments were a central feature in the Com- 1991 general elections were held. Th e political munist parties’ dynamics as well. process was strongly dominated by elder po- In 1994, following the prime minister’s rec- litical fi gures within the Congress Party and ommendation, the king had to dissolve parlia- numerous Communist leaders who had spent ment. Aft er new elections, a Communist govern- large portions of their lives in exile, oft en in ment was formed. Th is government was however prison, and whose charisma derived from pro- also not to last. In eff ect, between 1991 and 2002, longed oppositional battles. eleven subsequent governments were formed In the fi rst popular elections since 1959, the and dissolved. On 1 June 2001, the king and Rashtriya Prajatantra Party that was closely as- most of his closest relatives were killed by King sociated with the royal house and the former Birendra’s son Crown Prince Dipendra, who Panchayat system therefore lost severely, gain- most probably was under the infl uence of drugs ing only 12.5 percent of the total seats. Instead, and alcohol. Th e assassination of the royal family the elections were won by the Party of Congress brought about a considerable shift in the gov- with 39.5 percent, followed closely by Commu- ernment’s stance vis-à-vis the Maoists. Aft er the nist parties that together won 38.1 percent (the royal massacre, King Birendra’s younger brother, 29.3 percent; the Gyanendra was enthroned. While King Birendra United People’s Front 5 percent; the Communist had been reluctant to deploy the army against the Party of Nepal (Democratic) 2.5 percent; and Maoist movement, King Gyanendra perceived the Nepal Worker’s and Peasant’s Party 1.3 per- the involvement of the armed forces as a serious cent). By and large, this election “demonstrated option in bringing the Maoist movement to a the dramatic growth of Nepali as halt. With this aim, the Nepalese army was sub- an electoral force, at a time when communist stantially enlarged and trained. Simultaneously parties worldwide appeared to be in rapid de- however the Maoist movement gained strength. cline in the wake of the collapse of communism Th ough the Maoists reduced their public pres- in Eastern Europe” (Nickson 2003: 24). One of ence during the weeks aft er 11 September 2001, the Communist parties, the Masal Party, which when they had to fear external interference, their later transformed into the Communist Party of violent actions reappeared in a reinforced man- Nepal (Maoist), however, boycotted the elec- ner from late 2001 onward. In the course of the tions. It was this party that carried forward the new millennium, the number of attacks and the Maoist movement. loss of lives has increased considerably. As in many other parts of the world, the early 1990s seemed a hopeful beginning of democra- tization that was expected to expand in scope Th e Maoist movement’s expansion and depth. Th e ‘spring awakening’, as this short period was called in Nepal, raised high hopes Th e complex trajectory of the formation of the and expectations throughout the country. Th is Masal Party can only be roughly sketched here. joyous and dynamic mood was not to last. Al- In the years 1989 and 1990, an alliance of par- ready shortly aft er the fi rst general elections, ties had been formed striving to overthrow the rift s within the major Nepalese political parties Panchayat regime. , one of became noticeable, matched by the persistence the masterminds of the Maoist movement, was of hierarchical tendencies such as subordination, then the leader of the Mashal Party (note that nepotism, as well as a strong cult of elevated per- ‘Masal’ and ‘Mashal’ are not identical). Imme- sonalities within the party ranks. In the Nepali diately aft er the Panchayat overthrow, he voiced Congress, a split between its three charismatic severe criticism vis-à-vis fellow parties united leaders Krishna Prasad Bhataraj, Ganesh Man in the movement for prematurely terminating No end to Nepal’s MMaoistaoist rrebellionebellion | 161 the People’s Movement rather than wresting armed force, actively preventing local elections greater concessions from the monarchy. He lead and forcing elected representatives to resign. several instances of protest, for instance fi ercely Wherever a power vacuum was created, the criticizing the king’s attempt to form a Consti- Maoists started establishing their own govern- tution Recommendation Commission without ments. In February 1998, the Maoists launched consulting the interim government, and loudly their central military commission. From Octo- opposing the India-Nepal treaty on trade. Along ber 1998 until August 1999, during the fourth with other communist parties, the Mashal was plan, the movement followed the slogan “Let’s particularly against the inscription of Nepal as embark on the great path of creating base areas,” a constitutional monarchy in the new constitu- conducting simultaneous attacks in many dis- tion. Baburam Bhattarai moreover denounced tricts of the country. A rally in New Delhi in the upcoming elections as illegitimate and on February 1998 revealed the support of six In- this ground dissociated himself from ‘main- dian organizations. In Nepal, the Maoists raided stream’ Communist parties. Eventually Mashal police posts more frequently than before in broke up. Th e more moderate wing joined the order to seize arms and ammunition. Th ey also electoral process under the banner of the United repeatedly attacked telephone towers and banks People’s Front, whereas Baburam Bhattarai’s and blasted government offi ces in the district Masal fraction boycotted the elections and trav- headquarters. Under the fi ft h plan, enacted eled particularly to western Nepalese districts from August 1999 until July 2000, the move- in order to build up their support base. Between ment continued building up its bases in a grow- 1991 and 1996, they prepared the ground for the ing number of districts. In September 1999, the armed movement to gain momentum. Maoist army was capable of carrying out simul- From the very beginning, the Maoist lead- taneous attacks in twenty-fi ve districts (out of ers’ declared objective was to gradually grow seventy-fi ve Nepalese districts in total). In Oc- and expand their armed force to such an extent tober 1999, the movement organized its fi rst that battling the country’s security forces and Nepal Bandh (total strike), enforcing the closure taking over power would become possible. In of offi ces and shops and restricting movement. order to achieve this goal, they designed a six- Finally, the sixth plan, lasting from July 2000 point plan, according to which action was car- until February 2001, went under the slogan of ried out (Sharma 2004: 373f.). Th e period of the “Raise to new heights the guerrilla war and the fi rst plan, which started in 1996 and lasted for a people’s resistance struggle.” During this period, month, was called “Let’s move ahead on the path positions were reinforced, imposing a tight grip of the People’s War to establish the new people’s over large parts of the countryside. On the oc- democratic state by destroying the reactionary casion of their second national conference, the state.” It put the movement’s activities in motion Maoists revised their objectives, abandoning the and made it acquire public attention through narrow path of the ‘People’s War’ and adopting various publications and acts of destruction. Th e instead the ‘Prachanda Path’ with the program period of the second plan lasted from March “Let us consolidate and expand our base areas 1996 to June 1997, following the slogan “De- and move forward towards a people’s govern- velop the People’s War in an organized way.” By ment in the center” (Sharma 2004: 375). attacking police stations, the Maoists were able With their success in establishing people’s to capture weapons. Directed killings of selected governments in several Nepalese districts and enemies, the fi rst being two policemen in the in enclosing the , the Maoists district of Rukum in May 1996, also started. rendered the movement more successful than Th en came the third plan, lasting from June they had probably dared to hope for (Th apa and 1997 until October 1998. Under the motto “Rais- Sijapati 2003). Th ough they did not manage to ing the development of to new occupy any of the district capitals, the tight grip heights,” the Maoists continued to expand their over the Kathmandu Valley that the Maoists 162 | Joanna Pfaff -Czarnecka achieved through blocking access roads, and and concentrated in district headquarters, with thus impeding transport to the capital, had a the Royal Nepalese Army becoming more and far-reaching material and symbolical eff ect on more in charge of security and certain develop- the country. From the very beginning the Mao- ment programs, especially those in the fi eld of ists managed to mark out their political space infrastructure. While the state increasingly de- in the country through violence. Th ey demon- ployed the Royal Nepal Army to control the in- strated remarkable logistic skills and military surgency, the Maoists continued to develop their strength by staging attacks on police headquar- military organization. Th e strength of the Maoist ters, the fi rst in October 2000 at a district police army is currently estimated at between 10,000 offi ce and a district jail in Dunai (Dolpa dis- and 15,000 well-trained fi ghters, known as the trict), the second in Ghorahi (Dang district), the movement’s ‘hard core’, and an additional 50,000 third in Syangja, and the fourth, in November militia. Around 40 percent of Nepal’s territory is 2001, in Salleri (Solukhumbu district). On the believed to be under Maoist control at present. occasion of these attacks, policemen (and sol- Aft er its impressive expansion, the movement diers in Ghorahi) were killed and abducted and put forward a strong political party named the abundant arms, ammunition, vehicles, and cash Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), captured. Th e Maoists also repeatedly attacked formed according to ’s principle, rich rural households and abducted thousands which states that of mostly young men and women. Many of them were incorporated into the ranks of the “the party, the people’s army and the unifi ed Maoist army aft er having undergone ideologi- front are the three weapons for a people’s revo- cal and martial training. Others were abducted lution … While the party itself is involved in for a short period of time, in which they mainly spreading the party’s ideology as well as formu- received Maoist teachings. Yet another pattern lating policies related to the ‘people’s war’, the obtains where villagers were incorporated into people’s army is responsible for attacking ‘ene- the Maoist ranks as helpers (for the transporta- mies’ and defending the areas under its control” tion of ammunition and of wounded Maoist sol- (Sharma 2003: 362). diers, the preparation of food, etc.). Th e move- ment thus managed to considerably expand Th e CPN was formed with the ‘standing com- its resource base through its attacks, capturing mittee’ at the top, and below it the politburo, cen- money and weapons, which were in turn used tral committee, regional bureaus, sub-regional to stage subsequent attacks. bureaus, district committees, area committees, Maoist violence met with state violence par- and cell committees. When the central commit- ticularly from 1998 onward when the govern- tees cannot hold a meeting, the party’s chair- ment launched its counter-insurgency police man Prachanda, takes all decisions (Sharma operation called ‘Kilo Sierra 2’. Aft er the Salleri 2003: 362). attack, in November 2001, the government de- Many explanations have been given for the clared a ‘state of emergency’ across the country Maoist movement’s success in Nepal. One rea- and deployed its police force in full scale against son lies in the organizational capabilities of its the Maoists. Under the state of emergency, which leaders. Both key fi gures, Baburam Bhattarai and lasted for nine months, the Maoists carried out Comrade Prachanda, have developed impressive their largest action till then in western Nepal. skills in promoting Maoist ideology and mobi- In February 2002, some two to three thousand lizing protest in the Nepalese context. Th eir suc- Maoists surrounded Mangalsen, the district cess lies partly in their ability to establish a broad headquarters of Acham, and attacked the army and direct base among the population, starting garrison and the district police offi ce. Aft er the from the western Nepalese regions (especially in attack at Dunai, the army was deployed to sixteen the districts of Rolpa and Rukum). Unlike most district centers. Police were signifi cantly reduced political and administrative personnel, who are No end to Nepal’s MMaoistaoist rrebellionebellion | 163 used to keep a social distance from their con- the elections of 12 May 1991, it called for a Peo- stituencies, both these leaders have been able ple’s War in Nepal and willing to interact directly with the local population. Such intimate contacts have helped “along the path shown by the Communist Party them gain legitimacy by enabling them to grasp of Peru, which has been fi ghting against US im- local grievances as well as popular ideas on le- perialism, Soviet social , and local gitimacy. Th ey have also been very successful in reactionary forces and is attaining victory in adopting Chinese and Soviet models of armed the new people’s revolution. All this indicates struggle and of organizing armed insurrection. a bright future for the international communist By 1996, the leaders had established a hierarchi- movement” (according to Masal’s politburo, cally ranked and effi cient ‘Maoist army’ whose quoted in Nickson 2003: 31). central features included obedience and dedica- tion. Th e thread and use of force was deployed, Nepal’s Maoist movement has also been deci- moreover, side-by-side with local reforms that sively privileged by the country’s rugged terrain met certain local grievances. Th us, the leaders (comparisons with Afghanistan and Peru come managed to convey their seriousness vis-à-vis to mind). Th e Maoist armed forces have been the , the government, as well as able to withdraw into the woods on many oc- the international community (Th apa 2004). casions, aft er their attacks. Given Nepal’s rug- Th e ideologies that the Maoists embrace are ged topography and the great lack of roads, it by no means new to the population in Nepal seems impossible to stop the Maoist movement or South Asia in general. Leaders resort to re- by means of armed struggle. Th e successful use gional (i.e., South Asian) repertoires of left ist of force by the Maoists has certainly contrib- ideologies and models of action that have been uted to their infl uence over the population, but, deployed all over the Indian sub-continent for during the fi rst years of its operation at least, decades. Indeed, South Asia—including Nepal, the movement’s catering to local grievances and particularly its southern and eastern regions— aspirations also played a decisive factor. has seen various instances of left -wing mobiliza- tion, desperate forms of civil disobedience, and prolonged periods of armed confl ict. Th e infl u- Th e Maoist movement—addressing ence of the movement (active especially people’s grievances in north-east India) is particularly prominent, but by no means unique (Ramirez 2004). Previ- With the all too frequent elections and votes of ous movements have left a rich legacy behind, mistrust, political instability in Nepal was obvi- providing guidance on how to organize and ous. By the mid-1990s, most of the population suggesting discourses on injustice and modes also came to realize that political transition had of self-representation. Th e People’s revolution failed to bring about noticeable social or eco- in China continues to provide an important role nomic changes. High hopes and expectations re- model. (However, the Chinese government has garding democratization could not be sustained made it explicit on several occasions that it did (Pfaff -Czarnecka 2004). From the very beginning not support the movement in Nepal.) when the Maoist movement started its activities Additionally, the manifold global patterns of in 1996 in western Nepal, its leaders Baburam left -wing insurrection have provided the lead- Bhattarai and Comrade Prachanda decried the ers with a roadmap of how to organize their fact that the poor majority of the population, no- army, which ideological means to embrace, and tably the ‘untouchable’ (today: ‘dalit’) and ethnic which symbolic elements to deploy. Inspiration groups, had not gained in any respect under the from Peru’s Sendero Luminoso is obvious in this new system. Th ey accused the political elites in respect (see Mikesell 2003).2 When the Masal Kathmandu of protecting and expanding their Party went to the streets in protest shortly aft er own interests without introducing any signifi cant 164 | Joanna Pfaff -Czarnecka reforms to elevate the wanting socio-economic administrators. Aft er 1990, expectations had conditions prevailing in the country at large. risen signifi cantly and people assumed that de- Nepal’s poverty, its pronounced hierarchical velopment eff orts would speed up. At the ini- social order, and its multiple forms of margin- tial stage of the democratization process, many alization and exclusion clearly form the back- changes were introduced. Th e most remarkable ground if not to the movement’s coming to life, among them were the constitutional reforms, in- then certainly at least to its initial attractive- cluding the division of powers, the protection of ness for many people. Th e diverse attempts of diverse political and civic freedoms, the multi- the Maoists at social reform were important culturalist orientation of society newly inscribed incentives for the local population to turn to into the 1990 constitution, and the reintroduc- the movement. In the same vein, the Maoist tion of a multi-party system. Additionally sev- movement is a young people’s movement (Onta eral administrative reforms took place, notably 2004). Especially crucial in this respect is the renewed attempts at decentralization and the perception of many young people that they streamlining of the state apparatus. As in many lack opportunities given the wanting economic other countries, the Nepalese democratization situation in their country. With the very slow process however coincided with global pressures pace of development many young people had for ‘structural adjustment’. Th e idea that public little hope of being incorporated into the labor social services would improve through anti-cor- market. Literacy rates had increased over the ruption laws and the reduction of bureaucracy, preceding decades. During the 1990s, however, which would make them more effi cient and the number of school drop-outs increased. For less nepotistic, seemed attractive to the general a growing number of young men and women public. Mixed feelings emerged, however, as the engagement in the Maoist movement seemed an reality of a reduction in cherished employment alternative, given the scarcity of governmental opportunities in the civil service, to which many and industrial jobs. young people had aspired, became obvious. Th e Maoist leaders are seen to have addressed High expectations for political were many burning popular issues. Th e leaders have thus confronted with exclusionary and centraliz- repeatedly stated their commitment to reducing ing economic policies, with particularly serious rural disparities and have denounced bonded consequences for the rural population. labor, untouchability, and irregular housing. Th e pretence of greater effi ciency in service On several occasions, the Maoists have attacked delivery moreover proved hollow as local lead- caste inequalities as well as women’s oppression. ers continued to misappropriate the available Equal access to education and to health are par- development funds and still lacked the ability ticularly prominent objectives. Ethnic oppres- to carry out development activities in an effi - sion and ethnicity-based disparities likewise cient manner. Despite liberal reforms, the old have a prominent place in Maoist mobilization hierarchies and elite networks centered on the (Sales 2003). Th e leaders have endorsed many capital reproduced themselves in the new po- of the objectives formulated by ethnic organiza- litical networks and social and regional spoils tions, being particularly supportive of the plan aft er the 1990 ‘revolution’. Th e state remained to establish eight ethnic autonomous regions the overriding mechanism of accumulation and on Nepalese territory. Furthermore, the Mao- vehicle for private enrichment. Th e intermedi- ists have adopted nationalist discourses, seek- ary structures involved can be grasped through ing to reduce the Indian infl uence on Nepal’s the concept of ‘distributional coalitions’ (Pfaff - economy, politics, and society. Czarnecka 2004). Distributional coalitions can Another reason for the Maoist movement’s be seen as a modality of capture which politi- success, at least in its initial stage, lies in the cians, bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs exert in massive disappointment among people all over order to channel money and services allotted Nepal with the performance of politicians and to local into their own pockets. Th e No end to Nepal’s MMaoistaoist rrebellionebellion | 165 analysis of these intermediary structures re- Maoist control, up to diff erent degrees, while veals the problematic of state-society relations in six districts (Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, in democratization processes: partners forming Pyuthan, and Kalikot) government presence re- distributional coalitions can exploit the want- mains restricted to the district headquarters as ing accountability system, while drawing upon Maoists have taken over the rest. old established social models of patronage and In the areas under their rule, Maoists man- clique-building (Shaha 2003). By doing so, they aged to force out elected village committees and feed popular mistrust and take advantage of the established their own structures. An important local sense of helplessness vis-à-vis the state. layer in this design are people’s committees at Disappointment both in the fi eld of economic the ward, village, area, and district levels. Th ese well-being and political reform made local are divided into particular categories such as people open to political alternatives. Indeed, as janjatis (ethnic groups), dalits, women, intellec- persistent economic stagnation combined with tuals, guerrillas, businessmen, and others. Th ey defi ciencies in political development, it became are elected from their own ranks. Land-own- impossible for the vast majority of Nepal’s people ing families and those involved in surplus ap- to participate in public political processes and propriation are not allowed to participate in the institutions. Many of them looked for an alterna- people’s government. Th e local committees are tive vision of political transition, which Maoist organized according to three dimensions: po- leaders provided. Th ey criticized the detrimental litical, economic, and socio-cultural. Politically, eff ects of externally induced reforms upon the the people’s committees came to completely re- well-being of a marginalized population and place the elected village development commit- accused local politicians and contractors (oft en tees (VDCs). People’s courts were created where the same persons or persons belonging to the judgments and sentences are passed—in a highly same family) of corruption, nepotism, and deal arbitrary manner, according to many reports. making with state administrators in charge of An important aim stated by the Maoists is to allocating development and other public funds. render the communes’ economy self-suffi cient. Th e disenchantment of many people all over the Among the major Maoist economic reforms country with the path Nepalese politics had been are diverse new forms of taxation and money taking is thus crucial in explaining the appeal of lending. Persons earning salaries, such as local the Maoist movement. Th is trend may not be ap- teachers and bureaucrats, have to contribute a parent among the inhabitants of the Kathmandu share of their salaries, up to a month’s salary per valley, but it certainly shows up in less accessible year. But also people in menial positions—such areas of the country where the success of the as fi rewood collectors—need to make contribu- Maoist movement is inevitably linked to the fail- tions to the Maoist treasure. (As a consequence, ure of the project of democratization. hardly any taxes fl ow from these areas into the state’s treasure.) In those districts where land was captured from ‘feudal landlords’, communal Th e eff ects of the Maoist insurrection enterprises have been started. In some villages the Maoists even began land registration. Little is known about the eff ects of the new modes All over the country, the Maoists have actively of Maoist governance. By 2003, Maoists had es- engaged themselves in instigating social and cul- tablished Jan sarkars (Maoist governments) in tural reforms, or have claimed to do so. Th e provi- twenty-one districts (see, e.g., Shneiderman and sion of health services ranks high on the Maoists Turin 2004). A few years ago, the government agendas—which means above all that develop- created a list of sensitive areas (dividing them ment projects aiming at health care have not been according to the assessed risks into A, B, and targeted so far. Th is measure is also conditioned C) comprising thirty-fi ve districts—out of sev- by the Maoist interest in being able to take care enty-fi ve districts in total. Th ese areas are under of wounded soldiers. Especially prominent in the 166 | Joanna Pfaff -Czarnecka

Maoists’ programs is schooling. Th ere is some have been abandoned, and fi elds lie fallow. On un- evidence that in certain Maoist areas the level of countable occasions, civilians have been caught in education, and especially the awareness among the crossfi re between governmental armed forces women, has gone up (Sharma 2004: 369). Teach- and Maoists. Besides loss of life, there has been ers however work under extremely diffi cult con- a serious destruction of infrastructure. In several ditions, oft en targeted by both police and Mao- districts, administrative buildings and bridges have ists. Within the school curriculum Communist been destroyed by the Maoists. A few instances doctrines have been introduced, while Sanskrit of protest against these destructions have been lessons have been banned. Several social reforms reported. A local women’s protest in the district have been introduced in the Maoist areas. Ap- of Dailekh made big headlines by mid-2004: the parently, alcoholism, gambling, and crime have women fi ercely opposed the Maoists and man- been signifi cantly reduced in villages under the aged to drive them out of the village, but continue Jan sarkars (Sharma 2004: 369). to fear retaliation. Local customs have been actively discour- Nepal’s economy is going from bad to worse aged. Th e Maoists have especially opposed cel- and foreign infl ows of money, including from ebrating the important Hindu festivals Dasain tourism and international development agen- and . In their place new celebrations have cies, have fallen. Strangely, life in the capital come about, such as those to commemorate seems to be largely unaff ected by the economic people fallen in the People’s War—especially on deterioration: Kathmandu is booming due to the occasion of Martyr’s Day. Th e Maoists have the very high infl ux of population fl eeing the repeatedly been reported as forcing Brahmins Maoists. Civil society activists, politicians, and to cook pork in their kitchens—a severe trans- civil servants have repeatedly expressed their gression to the rule of ritual purity. Th e Maoists concern over the situation in the countryside. actively discourage villagers from bearing high Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the strong im- costs to conduct rituals or generally investing pression that life in Kathmandu is going on as overtly in religious activities. usual despite the tremendous suff ering through- From the very beginning of the Maoist insur- out the countryside. Th is impression is matched rection, the local population has come to suff er by a villager’s opinion: severely. Repeatedly, villagers—especially young men but also their families—have been accused “Th ere may be an indefi nite banda (strike) in by police forces of either being Maoists them- Doti, all schools may be closed in Kailali, health selves, or helping the Maoist movement. On posts in Bajura may be without medicine, there the other hand, entire families and villages were may be a food shortage in Humla. But who put under pressure by the movement to provide cares? Th e people of Western Nepal stopped them with food and shelter. Also, many people expecting anything from Kathmandu long ago” have been abducted. Th ey either had to undergo (Nepali Times Online, 13 July 2005). Maoist training before being set free, or had to remain in the movement. If it started initially as an all-male movement, increasingly young Outlook women have been drawn into it (Gautam, Ban- skota, and Manchanda 2003). Concomitantly, On 1 February 2005, King Gyanendra dissolved violence against women went up signifi cantly. the parliament and sent Prime Minister Sher Ba- Vulnerable groups, such as porters, are oft en hadur Deuba out of offi ce. He sacked the gov- harassed at Maoist check-posts where they have ernment and assumed direct powers. He more- to leave part of their load behind (Centre for over imposed a three-month state of emergency, Investigative Journalism 2004: 77ff .). legitimizing this step by claiming that the gov- Many land-owning families had to abandon ernment had not been able to resolve the Maoist their homes and settle in town. Many homesteads confl ict. Notably, the king accused Prime Minister No end to Nepal’s MMaoistaoist rrebellionebellion | 167

Deuba’s government of failing to win the sup- political system dominated by a monarch. King port of Maoist rebels for a January deadline for Gyanendra’s coup of 1 February has moreover peace talks and of failing to prepare the ground created a lot of criticism in Nepal, South Asia, for elections in spring. Most observers assume, as well as among the international community. however, that an important driving force has A reintroduction of the division of powers will been the king’s hidden agenda to strengthen therefore most certainly be an important mini- his own role in Nepalese politics. An important mal condition put forward vis-à-vis the mon- consequence is the censorship imposed upon arch (Roka 2004). the media as well as the impediment of free Most Nepalese seem to hope for a return to movement in the country. Furthermore, many the spirit of the constitutional reforms initiated party leaders have been put under house arrest in 1991, for an end to the hostilities, and for a (some of them have even been thrown into jail), national dialogue toward a negotiated solution. and are threatened by the Royal Commission of It remains to be seen whether an acceptable Corruption Control, which is widely believed to mode of governance, binding together state and be an instrument of political control under the societal forces and ameliorating the striking so- current situation. cial cleavages and processes of marginalization Following his initial announcement, King and social exclusion persisting in the country, Gyanendra lifted the state of emergency after can emerge in the near future. three months, but still retained his powers. There is no sign of upcoming elections, which is not surprising, given the Maoist dominance in much of the countryside. The prospects for Joanna Pfaff -Czarnecka has been chair of the peace talks in the near future are not large. So Social Anthropology Department at the Uni- far, the parties have not yet even been able to versity of Bielefeld, Germany, since 2001. She agree who is to participate in them. The state’s obtained her Habilitation degree in social an- main precondition in order to initiate talks on thropology at the University of Zurich, where the Maoists’ future role in the formal politi- she studied social anthropology, l law,aw, mediamedia cal system is a ceasefire. The Maoists on the studies, and European anthropology. Her in- other hand made their claims known already terests focus on political transformation in in 1996 by issuing a forty-point demand let- South Asia and minority studies. Her publica- ter to the prime minister.3 It remains to been tions include Ethnic futures: state and identity seen which demands will be an object of com- in four Asian countries with Ashis Nandy, Da- promise. With an impasse between the Mao- rini Rajasingham, and Terence Gomez; Rituale ists, the king, and the political parties, there is heute: Th eorien, Kontroversen, Entwürfe, with also no agreement on accepting international Corina Caduff ; and Nationalism and ethnicity intermediaries. Since February, the Maoists in a Hindu kingdom: the politics of culture in have not ceased to conduct violent action. For contemporary Nepal, with David Gellner. the first time they have even directly targeted E-mail: joanna.pfaff @uni-bielefeld.de. civilians, blowing up a bus and killing over forty passengers. Given the complexity of the causes that have Notes enabled the emergence and the expansion of the Maoist movement (Hachhethu 2004; Shah 1. For more information, see particularly Dixit and 2004), no simple solution to the violent confl ict Ramachandaran (2003), Hutt (2004), Th apa and is likely. Nepal’s continuing existence as a con- Sijapati (2003), and Th apa (2003). stitutional monarchy however seems particu- 2. On a discussion of the parallels between Sen- larly problematic. Maoist leaders have repeat- dero Luminoso and the Maoists in Nepal see edly reiterated that they would not agree to a Nickson (2003). 168 | Joanna Pfaff -Czarnecka

3. Th e forty-point demand list, formulated by the Nickson, R. Andrew. 2003. Democratisation and the Maoist leaders and presented to the prime minister growth of communism in Nepal: a Peruvian sce- in 1996, included demands concerning nationality nario in the making? In Th apa, 2003, –3 34. (points 1–9, e.g., point 1 “allall ddiscriminatoryiscriminatory ttrea-rea- Onta, Pratyoush. 2004. Democracy and duplicity: ties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should the Maoists and their interlocutors in Nepal. In be abrogated”), concerning people’s ddemocracyemocracy Hutt, 2004, 136–51. (points 10–26, e.g., point 10 “a newnew cconstitutiononstitution Pfaff -Czarnecka, Joanna. 2004. High expectations, should be draft ed by representatives elected for deep disappointment: politics, state and society the establishment of a people’s democraticdemocratic sys-sys- in Nepal aft er 1990. In Hutt, 2004, 166–91. tem”) and concerning livelihood (points 27–40, Ramirez, Philippe. 2004. in Nepal: to- e.g., point 27 “land should belong to ‘tenants’. wards a comparative perspective. In Hutt, 2004, Land under the control of the feudal system 225–42. should be confi scated and distributed to the Roka, Hari. 2004. Th e emergency and Nepal’s ppoliti-oliti- landless and the homeless”). cal future. In Hutt, 2004, 243–60. Sales, Anne de. 2003. Th e Kham Magar country, Nepal: between ethnic claims and Maoism. In Th apa, 2003, 59–88. References Shah, Saubhagya. 2004. A Himalayan Red Herring? Maoist revolution in the shadow of the legacy Centre for Investigative Journalism. 2004. People in Raj. In Hutt, 2004, 192–224. the ‘people’s war’. Kathmandu: Himal Books. Shaha, Rishikesh. 2003. Idea and reality, Nepal and Dixit, Kanak Mani, and Shastri Ramachandaran, Rolpa. In Th apa, 2003, 49–52. eds. 2003. State of Nepal. Patan Dhoka, Lalitpur, Sharma, Sudheer 2004. Th e Maoist movement: an Nepal: Himal Books. evolutionary perspective. In Hutt, 2004, 38–57. Gautam, Shobha, Amrita Banskota, and Rita Man- Shneiderman, Sara, and Mark Turin. 2004. Th e path chanda. 2003. Where there are no men: women to Jan Sarkar in Dolakha district: towards an in the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. In Th apa, ethnography of the Maoist movement. In Hutt, 2003, 93–124. 2004, 79–111. Hachhethu, Krishna. 2004. Th e Nepali State and the Th apa, Deepak, ed. 2003.Understanding the Maoist Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2001. In Hutt, 2004, movement of Nepal. Jamal, Kathmandu: Modern 58–78. Printing Press. Hutt, Michael, ed. 2004. Himalayan ‘PeoplePeople’s WWarar’: NNe-e- ______. 2004. Radicalism and the emergence of the pal’s MMaoistaoist rrebellionebellion. London: Hurst and Company. Maoists. In Hutt, 2004, 21–37. Mikesell, Stephen L. 2003. Th e paradoxical support Th apa, Deepak, and Bandita Sijapati. 2003.A king- of Nepal’s LeftLeft f oforr C oComrademrade G oGonzalo.nzalo. I nIn Th Thap aapa,, dom under siege: Nepal’s MaoistMaoist iinsurgency,nsurgency, 2003, 35–42. 1996–2003. Kathmandu: Printhouse.