Fear and Revolution in Libya

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Fear and Revolution in Libya Testimony Fear and Revolution in Libya Elephant in the Room in life under Gaddafi’s regime. In Libya, fear is Recently, I was chatting on Skype to a Libyan pervasive and borders on the paranoia. friend in Tripoli when halfway through the We never discussed politics or the regime stilted conversation – inevitable when the raging when I was growing up in Libya or during the violence and bloodshed threatening that friend’s different periods of my life when I lived there. I very existence is the elephant in the room – I did not even know if my friends supported the panicked. What if the person on the screen regime or were critical of it. So when I first read Hisham Matar’s novel, In the Country of Men, a few years ago, I cried. It was the first time Like me, most people I grew I had read or heard another person’s account up with were raised to not open of events I had lived through. Suleiman, the their mouths in public, and protagonist in the novel, was roughly the some not even in private. same age as I was during the late 1970s and early 80s, and the events he witnessed were eerily familiar. I too had witnessed televised wasn’t really who I thought he was? What if some interrogations and executions. I too had security apparatus had hacked his account? relatives who disappeared – a second cousin Should I really be chatting to him? Not sure what working in Libya was jailed for three years for a to do, I kept the conversation mundane, avoiding passing remark he made among coworkers on mentioning names of common friends and the country’s involvement in the war in Chad. navigated the conversation towards harmless And I too had been hushed by my parents in topics. We even discussed the weather! case I said something in public. And like me, Thankfully, I don’t think he noticed and we most people I grew up with were raised to not signed off with his invitation to come and enjoy open their mouths in public, and some not even the glorious weather on the beach in Tripoli this in private. While the extreme paranoia of the summer, “inshallah” (so God will), wink, wink. A 1980s gave way to more relaxed attitudes in the few days later, I was chatting to another friend 1990s, criticism extended only to corruption who had emigrated from Libya several years and nepotism in the country, and then only Nahla Daoud ago in search of better opportunities, and I among close circles of family and friends. Gone Nahla Daoud is a Syrian found myself in the same situation. Only this were the public hangings and assassinations expatriate who grew up time, I was the one whose identity was suspect. of the 1970s and 1980s, but people were still in Libya and continues to consider the country In the middle of the conversation, my friend picked up and jailed for even a whiff of dissent home, having returned panicked about discussing what was going on and many people lost their lives under torture. to live and work there at different periods of her in Libya with me, and half-jokingly asked me if We continued to watch the news on television life. She currently works I was really who I claimed to be. I half-jokingly with the windows closed, if there was anything as a research specialist, reminded him of a favorite meal we had shared broadcast which was critical of Libya. with emphasis on social development, and resides over a decade ago and he relaxed slightly. Those in Dubai. two incidents sum up the environment of fear 208 Heinrich Böll Stiftung Timid Calls for Change Everyone’s attention had been focused on That profound, ingrained fear among the older uprisings and potential uprisings elsewhere in generation, and to a lesser degree among the Arab world, and people predicted Algeria or the younger generation, continued to grip Yemen would be next in line for regime change, while Libya would be one of the last places to rise. After all, there had been no blatant While most of the Arab world signs of social or political turmoil, but to those was unaware of the events familiar with the Libyan situation, Benghazi and playing out across Tunisia, the eastern region had long been a thorn in Libyans were following the Gaddafi’s side. On February 15, two days before uprising there very closely Libya’s scheduled day of rage, security forces arrested Fathi Terbil, a prominent lawyer from and contemplating their own Benghazi who represented the families of some actions. 1,200 prisoners massacred in Tripoli’s Bu’sleem prison in 1996. Most of those killed in Bu’sleem Libyan society until the start of the uprising in were from Benghazi and the eastern region. neighboring Tunisia in late 2010. While most of Terbil’s arrest sparked widespread protests in the Arab world was unaware of the events playing Benghazi’s main square and the rest is history. out across Tunisia, Libyans were following the This time, unlike previous uprisings in the uprising there very closely and contemplating country, Libyans everywhere and not just in their own actions. Emboldened by the protests the eastern region, rose. On February 20, across the border, and plagued by the same the protests reached the capital, Tripoli. Four rampant unemployment, soaring living costs decades of pent-up fear and anger erupted and endemic corruption, Libyan activists began on the streets across the country and were to set up groups on Facebook calling for reform mirrored abroad as Libyan émigrés, long in Libya and an end to corruption. Naturally, cowed by Gaddafi’s spies in Europe and most of the activists operated under aliases and the United States, demonstrated in front of not their real names. Libyan embassies and consulates, denouncing The overthrow of Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Gaddafi’s oppressive rule in solidarity with Ben Ali and the start of the Egyptian revolution their countrymen under siege. Online, Libyans on January 25 served to heighten the calls for intensified their contributions on online social reform in Libya and in early February, Libyan media, and Facebook and Twitter became the activists set a date for their uprising – still platforms from which they petitioned the world under the umbrella of reform – for the 17th of to stand up and take note of their struggle. February. In an unprecedented and surprise These platforms served the revolutionaries move, Gaddafi reportedly met with a number of in Libya well in the first days of the uprising, the activists on February 8 in Tripoli to reassure given the absence of any independent media them that their demands would be met and presence in the country. While Gaddafi and his to convince them to close down their pages associates denied that any protests were taking on social media platforms, namely Facebook. place, hundreds of video clips were uploaded Gaddafi’s calls went unheeded and the number and news was shared on Facebook and Twitter, of members on the Facebook pages swelled. discrediting the regime’s lies. Libyans were still united in fear, inside the country and abroad, The Unthinkable Happens but the need to speak up on behalf of friends While few outside Libya had taken the calls and family being massacred in large cities for demonstrations seriously, the events that and small towns across Libya prevailed over unfolded in Benghazi surprised everyone. their fear. Numerous threatening speeches Heinrich Böll Stiftung 209 by Gaddafi and his son Saif al-Islam served to armed militiamen. An untimely heart attack fan that fear but also made the Libyans more almost got a friend killed twice – beseeched by determined to push forward and overthrow neighbors to transport their dying father to the Gaddafi. There was no doubt in anyone’s’ hospital in the middle of the night, the friend mind anymore that to back down now was a found himself staring down the barrel of a guaranteed death sentence for most Libyans machine gun when Gaddafi’s troops stationed and their family members who had taken part in the hospital insisted he was there with in the protests or voiced their support for the someone injured from the demonstrations. Only revolution online or on television. when the troops barged into the operating room and made sure for themselves that the patient An Emerging War had indeed suffered a heart attack and was not The international community, which had injured did they let my friend go. Making their previously known Libya only through the bizarre way back home at dawn, my friend’s car came antics of its leader or for its indictment in under fire. When he finally managed to stop terrorist plots, began to pay attention to Libya’s the car, my friend found himself staring down rebels. Emboldened by widespread defections the barrel of a machine gun once again. He from the army and political leadership in the does not know if it was divine intervention or eastern region and the element of surprise, the the sight of his neighbor’s wife and daughters rebels launched a number of critical attacks wailing and imploring the soldiers not to shoot on Gaddafi’s troops, forcing them to beat a that saved them, but they were allowed to pass. hasty retreat out of Benghazi and the eastern While other smaller cities and towns in province of Cyrenaica. The rebels announced Libya’s western region such as Misrata and that the latter had been liberated, albeit at a Zawya continued to challenge Gaddafi’s cost of hundreds of civilian deaths and much control, Tripoli, lacking weapons and supply destruction to the region’s infrastructure, and lines to the rest of the country, was terrorized called on their countrymen in the west to do the into submission.
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