Strategic Uncertainty in National Security
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1 Strategic Uncertainty in National Security Conflicting and Complementary Approaches to Managing Deep Uncertainty in Strategic Affairs for National Security 26 June 2018 Samuel Neaman Institute Haifa, Israel Organizing committee. Prof. Yakov Ben-Haim, co-chair, Yitzhak Moda'i Chair in Technology and Economics, Technion. Dr. Eitan Shamir, co-chair, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA). Brig. General (ret.) Dr. Meir Finkel, IDF Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies. Dr. Chuck Freilich, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. Dr. Eado Hecht, IDF Command and Staff College. Auspices. This workshop is organized under the auspices of: Samuel Neaman Institute for National Policy Research IDF Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies Yitzhak Moda'i Chair in Technology and Economics, Technion Sponsorship. This workshop is funded by the Samuel Neaman Institute and the Yitzhak Moda'i Chair in Technology and Economics, Technion. Website: https://info-gap.technion.ac.il/strategic-uncertainty-in-national-security/ 2 Table of Contents Background of the Workshop . 3 Biographies of the Speakers . 4 Doug Macgregor: Uncertainty in an Age of Persistent ISR . 8 Discussion of Macgregor's presentation . 15 Doron Avital: no essay. Discussion of Avital's presentation . 22 Milo Jones: Strategic Uncertainty, Digital Technology and Formal Cause . 28 Discussion of Jones' presentation . 38 Meir Finkel: Conservatism by Choice (Stability), Innovation and Adaptation in Force Design – a Reexamination . 42 Discussion of Finkel’s essay . 48 Rob Johnson: Decision-making in ‘An Age of Uncertainty’: A Critical Analysis of the British Approach to Full-Spectrum Challenges . 54 Discussion of Johnson's presentation . 68 Yakov Ben-Haim: What Strategic Planners Need to Know . 75 Discussion of Ben-Haim's presentation . 87 Concluding remarks . 91 3 Background of the Workshop Conference Theses and Approaches. The following approaches, among others, for managing strategic uncertainty will be presented. 1. Flexibility. One cannot plan for what one cannot anticipate, so one must plan for agility in responding to surprise. The emphasis is bottom-up: initiative in responding to surprise must come from the locus of action. Centralized planning or control are of limited value. 2. Diversity. Joint operations of diverse highly trained and carefully chosen specialists can respond to diverse challenges. The emphasis is top-down: centralized planning of specialities, thorough training for inter-operability, and coordination of their actions in real time underlie the comprehensive response to surprise. 3. Technology. Technological advantage, supported by sophisticated training, is the basis for Western countries to prevail over non-Western and especially non-state adversaries, regardless of the surprises they initiate. 4. Robustness. Strategic uncertainty is managed by identifying critical goals and formulating security policy to achieve those goals over the widest range of surprise. The goal is to optimize the confidence in achieving good enough outcomes, rather than to optimize the outcomes. Background questions about strategic uncertainty for national security. 1. What is it? (a) What is strategic uncertainty? What is new about it? Did Alexander or Napoleon or Rommel face strategic uncertainty in the contemporary sense? (b) Can strategic uncertainty arise from small armed units, or does it only result from large military threats? In this age of instant global information and powerful weapons, isn’t strategic uncertainty essentially tactical? (c) What are the geo-political or non-military dimensions of strategic uncertainty? (d) How does the assessment of strategic uncertainty impact government defense policy? How should it impact policy? (e) What are the strategic threats today? Terrorism, insurgency, conventional warfare? Are there regional differences: Europe, Middle East, North America, etc? 2. What to do about it? (a) Doctrinal responses to strategic uncertainty. Is new doctrine needed? If so, what should it be? (b) Force build up. What type of force is needed? Should the emphasis be on joint special operations, or on conventional broad-capability forces (land, air, marine, naval)? (c) What is the role of intelligence assessment in managing strategic uncertainty? Emphasis on early warning, or emphasis on situational awareness and contextual understanding? (d) Who is responsible for identifying strategic uncertainty? What training do they need? What authority should they have? Should they be centralized or dispersed? How do military and civilian elements interact? (e) Organizational responses. What are the organizational implications of strategic uncertainty? What organizational structures are needed? What communication, control, and command protocols are appropriate? What are the roles of organizational learning and planning? (f) Methodological responses. The sources of strategic uncertainty are themselves highly uncertain. For instance, cyber is a new strategic threat. The future hides other (as yet unknown) innovations with strategic implications. What are methodologies for managing the strategically unknown future? 4 Biographies of the Speakers Douglas Macgregor Douglas Macgregor is a decorated combat veteran, the author of five books, a PhD and the executive VP of Burke-Macgregor Group LLC, a defense and foreign policy consulting firm in Reston, VA. He was commissioned in the Regular Army in 1976 after 1 year at VMI and 4 years at West Point. Macgregor retired with the rank of Colonel in 2004. He holds an MA in comparative politics and a PhD in international relations from the University of Virginia. Macgregor is widely known inside the U.S., Europe, Israel, China and Korea for both his leadership in the Battle of 73 Easting, the U.S. Army's largest tank battle since World War II, and for his ground breaking books on military transformation: Breaking the Phalanx (Praeger, 1997) and Transformation under Fire (Praeger, 2003). His book, Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Naval Institute Press, 2009) describes the 1991 action for which he was awarded a Bronze Star with “V” device for valor. His books have been translated into Hebrew, Chinese, Russian and Korean. His fifth book, Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War, is currently available from Naval Institute Press. http://www.usni.org/store/books/history/margin-victory In 28 years of service Macgregor taught in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, commanded the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and served as the Director of the Joint Operations Center at SHAPE in 1999 during the Kosovo Air Campaign. He was awarded the Defense Superior Service medal for his role in the Kosovo Air Campaign. In January 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld insisted that General “Tommy” Franks meet with Colonel Macgregor on 16-17 January 2002 to hear Macgregor's concept for the attack to Baghdad. Though Macgregor's offensive concept assumed the rapid restoration of control to the Iraqi Army and no occupation his offensive scheme of maneuver was largely adopted. Macgregor has worked as a consultant for the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Joint Staff, Bell Laboratories, and Raytheon Corporation on strategic roadmaps and the integration of disruptive technologies. He has testified as an expert witness before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and appears on Fox News, BBC, CNN and PBS. Contact: [email protected] Doron Avital Dr Doron Avital has a celebrated military history from the time he commanded a leading paratroopers company in the Lebanon war of 1982, to the planning and commanding of numerous complex special operations in Israel elite Special Forces unit, Sayeeret Matckal – also known as “The Unit” – all the way to holding the position of chief-commanding-officer of “The Unit” in the early 1990s. His tenure as a commander is registered as one of the most complex and shaping chapters in the history of the unit. During his service Doron Avital received numerous IDF military and special operations awards. He is considered a commander and a thinker who shaped an overall philosophy and strategy of planning, execution and command – if in the battlefield and if in the domain of special and secretive operations – that stands to this day as a leading point of reference to commanders of the IDF and to the classified security establishment of Israel. In many respects, Doron Avital's book, Logic in Action (in Hebrew), carries – alongside his more philosophical and political insights --- the main tenets of his philosophy and strategy of action. 5 In 1995, after completing his tenure as a commander of “The Unit” and equipped with a letter of recommendation from the late prime minister of Israel, Yitzchak Rabin, Doron Avital enrolled in a PhD program with the School of Philosophy of Columbia University in the City of New York, where after a few years he completed his Doctoral thesis in Logic and Philosophy. He was awarded Columbia University's Presidential Fellowship for the years 1995-2001 and taught there classes in advanced logic and analytic philosophy. Dr Avital holds in addition a BSc in Mathematics and Computer Science (1985) as well as MA (Summa Cum Laude) from the Cohen Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas (1996), both from Tel Aviv University. Upon returning to Israel, Dr. Avital headed the Georges Leven High-Tech Management School at Tel Aviv University, and