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Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine April 3-12, 2014

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Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine April 3-12, 2014 Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine April 3-12, 2014 International Republican Institute Detailed Methodology • The survey was conducted by the public opinion and market research company Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of the International Republican Institute. The field work was carried out by Rating Group Ukraine. • Data was collected throughout Ukraine April 3–12, 2014, through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ home. Due to Russia’s occupation of the peninsula, resident’s of Crimea were unable to be included in this poll. • The sample consisted of 1,200 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote. It is representative for the general population by age, gender, education, region and size of the settlement. • Multistage probability sampling method was used with the random route and next birthday respondent’s selection procedures. • Stage one: 25 official administrative regions of Ukraine were defined (24 regions of Ukraine and Kyiv). All regions of Ukraine were surveyed except Crimea. • Stage two: selection of the settlements - towns and villages. Towns were grouped into subtypes according to the size: • City more than one million residents • City 500,000-999,000 residents • City 100,000-499,000 residents • City 50,000-99,000 residents • City to 50,000 residents • Village • Settlements were selected at random. The number of selected settlements in each region was proportional to the share of population living in a particular type of the settlement in each region. • Stage three: primary sampling units were described. • • The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent. • Response rate was 65 percent. • Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. • The survey was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. 2 Opposition to Russian Military Intervention Strong in all Regions International Republican Institute Do you support the decision of the Russian Federation to send its army into Ukraine under the pretext of protecting Russian- speaking citizens? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer April 2014 4% 5% 12% 73% 6% March 2014 7% 6% 9% 72% 6% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 4 Do you support the decision of the Russian Federation to send its army into Ukraine under the pretext of protecting Russian- speaking citizens? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer 1% West 5% 92% 2% 2% Center 1% 10% 84% 2% South 5% 8% 14% 61% 12% East 8% 11% 17% 52% 12% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 5 Do you support the decision of the Russian Federation to send its army into Ukraine under the pretext of protecting Russian- speaking citizens? By age and gender Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer 18-29 6% 4% 14% 71% 4% 30-49 4% 5% 11% 74% 7% 50+ 3% 6% 12% 73% 7% Male 4% 6% 11% 73% 6% Female 4% 4% 13% 73% 7% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 6 Do you support the decision of the Russian Federation to send its army into Ukraine under the pretext of protecting Russian- speaking citizens? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer 2% Ukrainian- 3% 10% 82% 3% speaking citizens Russian-speaking 9% 10% 16% 52% 13% citizens 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 7 Is it necessary for the Russian military to come into eastern and/or southern Ukraine to protect the Russian speakers and ethnic Russians? 5% 3% 4% 12% Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer 76% 8 Is it necessary for the Russian military to come into eastern and/or southern Ukraine to protect the Russian speakers and ethnic Russians? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer West 7% 91% 1% 1% Center 1% 7% 88% 3% 2% South 3% 13% 73% 9% East 7% 10% 21% 52% 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 9 Is it necessary for the Russian military to come into eastern and/or southern Ukraine to protect the Russian speakers and ethnic Russians? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer 1% Ukrainian-speaking citizens 2% 9% 85% 3% Russian-speaking citizens 8% 8% 19% 54% 11% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 10 How do you evaluate Russia’s actions in Crimea? In your opinion, are they aimed at… 54% Invasion and occupation of independent Ukraine 55% 17% Threat to new Ukrainian political leaders 15% 13% Protection of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine 9% Response to the new Crimea leaders asking for 5% March 2014 help 7% April 2014 4% Protection of Russian military base in Sevastopol 4% 1% Other 3% 6% Don't know/Refused to answer 7% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 11 Ukraine Should Remain a United Country International Republican Institute In you opinion, should Ukraine… ? Remain a unitary country Remain a unitary country, but without Crimea Become a federal country Be divided into several countries Other Difficult to answer/No answer 1% April 2014 66% 7% 17% 2% 7% 1% March 2014 64% 10% 14% 1% 10% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 13 In you opinion, should Ukraine… ? Remain a unitary country Remain a unitary country, but without Crimea Become a federal country Be divided into several countries Other Difficult to answer/No answer West 89% 4% 4% 2% Center 77% 11% 5% 7% 2% South 58% 3% 26% 9% 2% East 40% 9% 35% 3% 8% 5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 14 Do you support the idea of replacing oblast and rayon state administration with executive committees which would be appointed by the oblast and rayon councils? Fully support 23% 29% Rather support Rather don't support Totally don't support Don't know/Refused to answer 14% 25% 9% 15 In your opinion, what should be the status of Crimea? Autonomous republic within Ukraine Crimean-Tatar autonomous republic within Ukraine Should become part of Russia Become an oblast of Ukraine Should become an independent state Should become part of Turkey Other Don't know/Refused to answer April 2014 42% 20% 13% 8% 4% 10% 2% 1% March 2014 50% 13% 13% 8% 5% 1% 9% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 16 Voter Enthusiasm for Election High International Republican Institute Are you going to vote in the presidential election to be held on May 25, 2014? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer April 2014 55% 29% 2% 10% 4% March 2014 48% 31% 4% 12% 5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 18 Are you going to vote in the presidential election to be held on May 25, 2014? Definitely yes Rather yes Rather no Definitely no Don't know/Refused to answer West 17% 4% 74% 5% Center 58% 34% 1% 5% 2% South 29% 33% 3% 25% 10% East 47% 32% 4% 13% 4% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 19 Who are you going to vote for in the presidential election to be held on May 25, 2014? All respondents; First choice Petro Poroshenko 29% Yuliya Tymoshenko 13% Serhiy Tihipko 6% Mykhaylo Dobkin 5% Oleh Lyashko 4% Petro Symonenko 4% Anatoliy Hrytsenko 3% Olha Bohomolets 3% Oleh Tyahnybok 3% Dmytro Yarosh 1% Nataliya Korolevska 1% Other 3% Against all 3% I would not vote 11% Difficult to answer/Don’t know 12% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 20 Who are you going to vote for in the presidential election to be held on May 25, 2014? Likely voters, n=1,005; First choice Petro Poroshenko 34% Yuliya Tymoshenko 15% Serhiy Tihipko 7% Mykhaylo Dobkin 6% Oleh Lyashko 5% Petro Symonenko 5% Anatoliy Hrytsenko 3% Olha Bohomolets 3% Oleh Tyahnybok 3% Dmytro Yarosh 2% Nataliya Korolevska 1% Other 3% Against all 3% Difficult to answer/Don’t know 11% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 21 Who are you going to vote for in the presidential election to be held on May 25, 2014? All respondents, Second choice Petro Poroshenko 15% Yuliya Tymoshenko 7% Anatoliy Hrytsenko 7% Serhiy Tihipko 5% Oleh Lyashko 4% Olha Bohomolets 4% Mykhaylo Dobkin 3% Oleh Tyahnybok 2% Petro Symonenko 1% Dmytro Yarosh 1% Nataliya Korolevska 1% Yuriy Boyko 1% Other 3% Against all 8% I would not vote 13% Difficult to answer/Don’t know 26% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 22 If the following candidates are in the second round of the presidential election, for whom would you vote? Petro Poroshenko Yuliya Tymoshenko Against both I would not vote Difficult to answer/Don’t know 41% 15% 21% 12% 11% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 23 If the following candidates are in the second round of the presidential election, for whom would you vote? Petro Poroshenko Mykhaylo Dobkin Against both I would not vote Difficult to answer/Don’t know 51% 12% 14% 12% 10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 24 If the following candidates are in the second round of the presidential election, for whom would you vote? Petro Poroshenko Serhiy Tihipko Against both I would not vote Difficult to answer/Don’t know 50% 13% 14% 12% 11% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 25 If the following candidates are in the second round of the presidential election, for whom would you vote? Yuliya Tymoshenko Serhiy Tihipko Against both I would not vote Difficult to answer/Don’t know 31% 17% 26% 13% 13% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 26 If the following candidates are in the second round of the presidential election, for whom would you vote? Yuliya Tymoshenko Mykhaylo Dobkin Against both I would not vote Difficult to answer/Don’t know 33% 12% 28% 14% 13% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 27 In your opinion, will Russia attempt to disrupt or discredit the upcoming presidential election in Ukraine? 11% Definitely yes 12% Rather yes 37% Rather no 13% Definitely no Don't know/Refused
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