Southern Members of Congress and the Vietnam War Mark David Carson Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected]
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2003 Beyond the solid South: southern members of Congress and the Vietnam War Mark David Carson Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Carson, Mark David, "Beyond the solid South: southern members of Congress and the Vietnam War" (2003). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 3712. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3712 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. BEYOND THE SOLID SOUTH: SOUTHERN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THE VIETNAM WAR A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College In partial fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History By Mark David Carson B.B.A., Loyola University, 1985 M.A., University of New Orleans, 1993 May, 2003 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Several people have made this dissertation possible. I cannot thank them enough. To Dr. Gaines M. Foster, whose scholarly patience and dedication has kept me on the right track; to Dr. Charles Shindo, whose good advice, constant encouragement, and enduring friendship I value greatly; and to Robert Mann, who so generously shared with me his research materials on Congress and Vietnam, and who made himself available for discussion whenever I asked, I owe a debt of gratitude. This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Barbara Carson, and my daughter, Elizabeth Carson, whose love and constant support have inspired me to continue working through this long and sometimes arduous process. They are my strength. Without them, I could not have done the work. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………….…..ii ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………iv INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………..1 CHAPTER 1. SETTING THE STAGE……………….…………………………….19 2. “THE GENERAL AREA OF CHINA”…….………………………53 3. DIEN BIEN PHU: DISSENT AND CONSENT…………………..97 4. “PREDATED DECLARATIONS OF WAR”……………….……131 5. HAWKS, DOVES, AND DIEM……………………………….…..163 6. JOHNSON, FULBRIGHT, RUSSELL, “THE HARVARDS” AND THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION…………….…...206 7. ESCALATION AND DISSENT: THE END OF A FRIENDSHIP……………………………………………….………239 8. “RESPECTABLE” PROTEST, A CALL TO HONOR, AND A CORRUPT BARGAIN………………………………….……….299 9. NIXON AND THE UNSOLID SOUTH………………….………..372 10. THE LIMITS OF DISSENT, DISHONORABLE PEACE, AND FINAL CONSENSUS……………………………………….………434 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………….……...469 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………....…478 VITA………………………………………………………………………..……489 iii ABSTRACT From the beginning of America’s involvement in Vietnam in 1943 to its disastrous end in 1975, southern members of Congress exerted a significant influence on and expressed divergent opinions about Cold War foreign policy. In part because of an enormous increase in military spending in the South fueled by prominent membership on military committees, congressional hawks were more inclined to support military aid for countries fighting communism and accept military over civilian advice in prosecuting the Cold War. Hawkish southerners embraced containment wholeheartedly, exhibited an intense patriotism, and concerned themselves with upholding personal and national honor. Therefore, with some prominent exceptions initially, hawks were more inclined to accept military solutions to contain communist aggression. When America became involved in Vietnam, southern congressional hawks advocated fighting a war without limits for a total victory. On the other hand, the southern doves were much smaller in number but still extremely influential. They did not abandon internationalism until very late, and preferred economic aid and multilateral solutions to Cold War problems. The leading doves, Senators William Fulbright of Arkansas, Albert Gore of Tennessee, and John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, after enabling the United States to deepen its commitment in Vietnam, mounted a spirited dissent that legitimized protest and eventually helped end the war. They rejected American interference in smaller and weaker countries and also upheld a version of Southern honor that demanded that America admit its mistake in Vietnam. Therefore, the South, though “solid” on Civil Rights and other domestic issues, did not speak with one voice on Vietnam. iv INTRODUCTION It had been a long three weeks. On July 25, 1969, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, chairman of the powerful Armed Services Committee, led a difficult and increasingly contentious floor fight to win congressional authorization for funds for an antiballistic missile system favored by President Richard Nixon. In previous years, the Senate had passed as a matter of course every administration’s requests for military hardware. Vietnam changed the landscape of debate on all things military. Stennis, who had since 1964 had been one of the war’s most hawkish supporters, urged his colleagues to pass the bill. While the Mississippi senator tried to get agreement on procedures that would bring the funding for the ABM to a vote, Arkansas Senator and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright interrupted. Fulbright had turned against the Vietnam War in 1965 and was considered one of the chief leaders of the congressional antiwar movement. He had clashed with Stennis several times over Vietnam policy, and the three-week debate had heightened the resentment between the two senators. Fulbright wanted to hear more information and debate on the ABM. He marveled that in the twenty-five years he had been in the Senate that this was the first time that there had ever been “serious debate” on a Pentagon request. The ABM, to the senator, served as a “symbol” of the dependence of the Senate and the country on the “great manufacturers…the great industrial enterprises,” and, particularly, “the military bureaucracy.” He praised some incoming senators for joining him in opposition to the ABM. “It is remarkable how interested they are in being senators,” he remarked, “and not stooges of the military.” 1 Stennis leapt to his feet. He angrily shouted, “Will the senator yield? Will the senator yield right there?” Stennis demanded and got an apology, but Fulbright continued. He provided several examples of military contractors and the money they provided for several states. “The military-industrial complex is a tremendous influence in this country,” Fulbright asked Stennis, “You won’t challenge that?” “I’ll challenge your whole remarks,” Stennis retorted. The Mississippi senator let Fulbright finish, then got to his feet once more and banged his hand down on his desk. “I fully made up my mind that no one who comes here and imputes bad motives and sinister influences by the military services would go unchallenged.” 1 The clash between to two powerful and proud senators in part illustrates the diversity of opinion on military matters among southerners in Congress. By 1969, after five years of American involvement in Vietnam, the lines had been fully drawn between the majority of legislators from the South, firm believers in the domino theory and champions of a unilateralist American anticommunist policy, and the smaller yet still influential southern doves, previously upholders of an internationalist and multilateral approach. They had soured on both internationalism and unilateralism, however, and wanted the United States to withdraw from the “immoral” war in Vietnam as quickly as possible. Both sides exerted significant influence on foreign policy decisions that led to America’s involvement in Vietnam. And key leaders of both hawks and doves came from a region that has always been associated with militarism. 1Congressional Record (hereafter cited as CR), 91st Congress, 1st Sess., 25 July, 1969, 20825-20829. 2 Stennis’s championing and protecting of the military was neither surprising nor new. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the region wholeheartedly supported the armed forces, some preferring the judgment of generals and admirals to that of civilian leaders on foreign policy. And there were several reasons why. One was, as Fulbright suspected, economic. Southern “hawks” represented states that benefited greatly from military spending. World War II began a relationship between the Defense Department and the South, of which President Franklin Roosevelt played matchmaker. Though in the 1930s the President had championed the cause of uplifting the impoverished southern economy, which he called “the nation’s number one economic problem,” it was the war that brought significant relief to the region. 2 In return for Roosevelt’s increased attention to southern economic concerns, Senators Tom Connally of Texas, Walter George of Georgia, and others supported FDR’s desire for an internationalist foreign policy against the likes of Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, and other northern and western isolationists. For the most part, the rest of the South in Congress fell in line with Roosevelt on foreign policy. In part for this support, and in part because of the cheap land and pleasant climate, the South received forty percent of the War Department budget for building military installations in the