Operation Ingwavuma

OPERATION INGWAVUMA Memoirs of a Political commissar UNDER normal circumstances, break with the conventional rule one questions since I was the military participants are expec requiring the writing of military only one in that meeting who ted to write their memoirs only memoirs only when the war is was thoroughly acquainted with when the war is over, to give over. Northern Natal, as I was actually them the advantage of looking bom in Zululand and had already at things more objectively, THE NATAL REGIONAL worked as a political operative in weighing both successes and fai COMMAND MEETS the area of Ingwavuma for a pe lures unemotionally, and talcing TO DISCUSS riod of close to two years under advantage of the total outcome 'OPERATION INGWAVUMA' the political structures of the of the whole war period to ap ANC. praise the contribution of single I was summoned to the first After about four hours, our battles. meeting to discuss the implem meeting was over. The task of I took up my pen to write entation of this plan in the un our Military Command was clear. about our experiences in the derground Operational Head We were expected to begin work planning and implementation of quarters of the Natal Regional ing immediately to prepare con 'Operation Ingwavuma' for the Military Command. Also present ditions for the creation of guer following reasons: at-the meeting was the sub-struc rilla zones in Northern Natal. 1)1 was asked to do so by the ture of this Command, called the The area of Ingwavuma, situated Editor of Dawn, who insisted Northern Natal Military Com on the most Northern tip of that since a special issue of our mand (NNMC) whose specific Natal and also bordering on Swa army's journal was being pre task it was to execute this, task. I ziland and Mozambique, was pared to commemorate the 25 was appointed the Political Com specially earmarked for this pur years of Umkhonto we Sizwe, missar and Deputy Commander pose. Right on that first meeting, telling the story of Ingwavuma of this sub-structure of the Re and basing our analysis on the would be a proper contribu gional Command, and apart from available intelligence data as well tion to illustrate, by this ex its Command, I was to work with as political information about ample, how it is possible under a Chief-of-Staff, Chief-of-Intelli- the area provided by me on the South African conditions to gence as well as a Chief-of-Logis- basis of my experience in work build up a people's army from tics. ing in that area, we reached a ge within the country. We there neral agreement in our assess As a result of the decision that ment that this area had the pote fore reasoned that if this story the Northern Natal Commman- was told, this article would ntial to accommodate (either in der's task would, for quite a long the terrain or among the people), not only serve as concrete do period (until the plan had gone cumentary inspiration to the trained and armed cadres which into a certain advanced stage) be were to constitue the nuclei for thousands of our combatants more of a servicing personnel to the internal recruiting, training whose task at this period is the rest of the members of our and arming of guerrilla units. precisely * to root our army Military Command who were to from among the local copulation. among the people, but would be stationed geographically else also, for the first time, provide where, the effective task of Com Our plan had to consider not the members of our Movement manding, 'Operational Ingwavu just the survival of those combat in general and of MK in parti ma' fell on my shoulders during units, but also the potential of cular, with a generalised stra all its events. transforming those areas over a tegic context of the circum In the room the whole map of period of time into active guar stances and conditions that led Natal was spread over the table, rilla zones, during the course of to the writing of 'The Diary of with all the eyes starring at it as which the enemy would be A Guerrilla' by Comrade Mu though the battles we were plan wiped out, or forced to retreat gabe (Robert Dumisa), the ning were already taking place or come# directly under our poli first document of its kind in right there on the map. tical administration, which our military history. I must admit that the driving would be an organ of people's 2) Although I am confined by se force and one of the most mov power. We also envisaged the de curity considerations from giv ing personalities in that meeting velopment of mass peasants' po ing many important details was our Regional Chiet-of-Staff, litical organisations and under about this Operation, yet cer the late Comrade Zweli Nyanda, ground units whose task would be tain aspects of the story, can who was killed together with augmented by our military or and should be told, more so Keith McFadden during a South ganisation. • $hat, as I have said one of the African Defence Force raid in Conscious as we were of the commanders of this area has Swaziland. I highlight the name strategic line of our organisation, written a much publicised of Zweli not because he happens we would not have allowed a si diary, and also went further to to be dead and has joined our tuation where the military struc make revealations ot our martyres. No. I am conscious of tures were to be the sole deter intentions during their public the queer tendency nowadays of minants of what went on in In trial in the Natal Division of calling everybody who dies a gwavuma and elsewhere in our the South African Supreme hero. Comrade Zweli was a living zone. The point, however, and Court. Comrade Mugabe's hero of our aimed struggle. I re this we minced no words about diary was confiscated by the member him very clearly in that it was that we were supposed to police during the arrest of his meeting, sitting opposite me and develop a war in Ingwavuma, and unit, but we also managed to standing up now and again to war means the physical military get our own copy. pace up and down the room. elimination of the enemy and the I find these two reasons com Then he would come back and imposition of our political will pelling enough to justify the quiz me with one hundred and over him. This war perspective • . was to be guarded against "revert repeating to "R", almost word ing back to the strategic period 1 Bh 4 for word, the response that is when our priority task inside the L •kM9L said to have been made by country was only to do political -3roz Tito to that soldier: mobilisation with armed propa ganda serving as a secondary and . "Comrade, are you suggesting supportive exercise. (hat we will' never be able to Although the political situa ^•EHV' ' ':iw fight guerrilla war in South tion in Ingwavuma was not so i" BNH1^CMfl^ l ^lt Africa because there are insuf promising, in the sense that we. I" BfeCLJ&fi ficient forests? If the area you had no political mass organisa saw has no widespread jungles, tion and other underground poli yp~ *H'' • J \ is " ^H then it is precisely the place tical structures involving the pea - 1^1 we need to prove that guerrilla sants as active political fighters >*^»'^^B ^^F MM ' W warfare does not depend on for freedo.m, and neither were jungles! ,» there organised units to serve as • ww reception bases, a few contacts, ^^^Bfl^^h*U The Chief-of-Staff however, however, served as the initial i Wp. thought that I was making a mis group to receive our comrades. K take by responding like this (al We also counted on the seething Wit |F*SR?fc.? though he did not say it in the discontent of the people of that meeting in the presence of "R"), area about the apartheid regime's • and he suddenly said to "R": plans to cede Ingwavuma and the Comrade Mugabe KwaNgwane bantustan to Swazi as well as the building of safe land. bases in the terrain in the event "Okay, Comrade "R", thank of battles with the SADF break you very much for the report. Indeed, when I made contact ing out and survival of a sizeable We shall discuss your report in with a few peasants I had known guerrilla unit among them be detail in a full meeting of the when I was working in that area, coming difficult. They were also Command, we shall then in- they insisted that they wanted expected to find training bases fromyouof the next step af weapons and they would will far from their rear bases, where ter those discussions." ingly join Umkhonto we Sizwe. mobile training camps were to If they were to be organised, be established to build an army As soon as the word reached they used to say, well and good from among the local popula the members of the Regional but let this be done simultaneou tion. After the period of two Command as well as some mem sly with their being armed for 'weeks., one member of the unit, bers of the PMC that "R" had War against the apartheid regime. "R" (who had been appointed some report from Ingwavuma, al For us in the Military Command, the commander) would have to most everyone was keen to de these were sufficient sparks un go to report their findings to our brief him in order to ascertain der the circumstances to kindle Military.

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