DOCSLIB.ORG

Mao Zedong's Art of War

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Mao Zedong's Art of War Liu Jikun HRIFCNG Publishing (o. ilDoll0'$ IRI OI IIIR MAO ZEDONG'S ART OF WAR Author: Liu Jikun Art Editor: Ki-Coo Seto Published by: Hai Feng Publishing Co. Rm. 1502, Wing On House, 7l Des Voeux Road, C., Hong Kong. General distributed by: Peace Book Co., Ltd. Rm. 1502, Wing On House, 71 Des Voeux Road, C., Hong Kong. Pnnted by: Sun Light Printing & Bookbinding Factory Unit B, l2lF., Yiko Industrial Building, l0 Ka Yip Street, Chai Wan, Hong Kong Published & Printed in Hong Kong First Edition October 1993 rsBN 962-238-084-0 HF-213-P All rights reserved. Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Contents Preface 1. Overawing the Foe with Bluff and Bluster - Defeating the Enemy Without Fighting a Battle , Go to the Mountains and Learn from the Bandits - Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun J. Establishing an Independent Regime by Armed Force - A Huge Vat Can Be Broken with a Small Rock 15 4. The Enemy Advances, We Retreat - Concealing the Army in the Mountains and Forests 20 5. Turning Every Man into a Soldier - Placing the Party and People on a War Footing 24 6. Casting a Net to Catch the Fish - Casting It Wide or Drawing It In at Any Moment 30 .7 Manoeuvre Against Manoeuvre - Guerrilla Warfare Plus Mobile Warfare Luring the Enemy in Deep - Avoiding the Enemy's Main Force and Striking at His Weak Spots 4:l War Mao Zedong's Art of Mao Zedong's Art of War 9. Fighting Not for TerritorY 20. Outflanking and Encircling Tactics in Order to Take 49 - Give - Injuring a Man's Ten Fingers Is Not as Effective as Chopping Off One 707 10. Long-Distance Oxodus to Preserve Strength 54 - A Strategic Shift 21. Fighting a Protracted War - Trading Space for Time ll2 11. Crossing the Sea by DecePtion Thirty-Six Stratagems 60 - The First of the 22. All Is Fair in War There Is No Use for Asinine Ethics 116 12. Lightning Speed Is Important in War of Three Steps in Two 65 - Covering the Distance 23. Taking Bold and Resolute Measures - Converging on the Enemy 13. Moving Deep into the Barren Land in Coordinated Actions 722 Hiding the True Intention {rom the Enemy 77 - 24. The Enemy Advances, We Advance 14. Pulling Back After Attaining the Objective - Penetrating Deep into the Enemy's Rear L27 Reason - Assigning a Convincing for the Use of Force 75 25. Clearing the Door Front - Drivinng Away the Enemy from the Bedside 132 15. Giving a Little Ground After SPotting the 26. Storming Fortifications - Attacking Enemy's Weak Point 81 - Going All Out to Reduce Enemy-Occupied Areas 136 16. Catching the Turtle in a Jar the First Battle 86 27. Pursuing the Hard-Pressed Enemy - It Is Important to Win - Competing Politically and Militarily 17. Fluidity of Territory for Territory 747 Move Away When You Can't Win 91 - 28. Pincer Movements 18. Making Raids from the East and West - Intercepting Enemy Reinforcements 146 Employing the Main Force on the Flanks 96 - 29. Conserving Strength 19. Come and Go Like a Shadow Carving Up and Destroying Behind Enemy Lines 102 the Exhausted Enemy l5 - Building Bases Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 41. Effecting a Breakthrough in the Middle 30. Leave the High Road Alone Places 155 Revealing Not the Main Target of Attack 208 - Seizing the Less Conspicuous - 42. Wait {or the Prey to Fall into the Trap 31. Killing a Chicken with an Ox Cleaver Never Try to Do Anything Out of Bravado 273 Concentrating the Forces to Destroy the EnemY 159 43. Cutting the Enemy into Two co Eating the Flesh Before JL. Advance and Retreat in Giant Strides - into Initiative 165 Cracking the Bones 278 - Turning Passivity 44. Reaching Out {or the Yard JJ. Act According to Circumstances Taking an Inch Carving the Opponent into Several Pieces 170 After - A Million Bold Warriors Crossed the Great River 223 34. The Tactics of "Wear and Tear" An "Empty-City" Stratagem 174 45. Driving Continuously Forward Smashing All Enemy Resistance 229 35. Driving Straight In Thrusting a Dagger into Both Inside and Outside the Enemy's Heart 180 46. Attacking {rom - Stealing Across the Sea in Junks 233 36. Cutting a Tangle of Hemp with a Sharp Knife Insignia Dealing Crushing Blows to the Enemy 185 47. Changing the - Showing Military Prowess on Foreign Soil 238 37. Attacking a City and the Tail Striking at Reinforcements 48. Cutting Off the Head and the to Blocking the Enemy at EverY SteP 190 - Beating Underling - Embarrass the Master 242 38. To Be Able to Extend and Contract at Will Attacking Later 193 About the Author 249 - Encircling First and 39. Directing the Attack at One Point Initiative 198 - Swiftly Gaining the 40. Making Long-Distance Raids Converging on the EnemY - from the Flanks 203 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Preface In the several thousand years of Chinese history, Mao Ze- dong was the most outstanding military strategist of all times. With "millet plus rifles, " he defeated the Kuom- intang' s "aircraft plus cannons. " Starting with a handful of people and rifles, he created the Liberation Army of two or three millon men. Following the motto: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, " he eventually be- came the supreme ruler of the Red regime. These were facts that no one will dispute, whether he is a Chinese or a foreigner, a Leftist, middle of the roader or Rightist. be- longing to the upper, middle or lower stratum. A mere scholar, Mao Zedong actually was able "to contrive strategic plans at his headquarters and win victories on the battlefield a thousand miles away. " Even though this fact is not widely known, no one can deny that he was an ex- traordinary military genius. Mao Zedortg certainly did not win victories on the battle- field by good luck; he had made painstaking studies of wars and military affairs and devised a military strategy of his own, which is comparable to the art of war of the fa- mous Sun Zi in ancient China, if not better. In this book, Mao' s military strategy is illustrated with stories of the battles he had fought. Even though the au- thor of this book is only an armchair strategist, he be- lieves readers will be benefited by knowing about Mao's art of war. As people say, "life is a battle{ield, " "the business world is a battlefield" and "the political arena is a battlefield, " readers will certainly find Mao Zedong' s mil- itary strategy applicable and highly useful in their person- al endeavours and careers. As everyone knows, "Dear Comrade Jiang Qing" was not Mao Zedong's beloved wife. His beloved wife was Yang Mao Zedotg's Art of War Mao Zedorg's Art o{ War Kaihui, a famous beauty of the period of the May Fourth ning many victories in wars is a shameful deed. He never Movement of 1919. Yang Kaihui's father, Yang Changji' claimed to be a master of the art of war nor a man of wise was Mao Zedotg's teacher. words. In 1913, when Mao Zedong was a young student at the Fighting a hundred battles and winning a hundred victo- First Normal School of Hunan, Yang Changji was the ries is not the best of the best. Subjugating an enemy teacher of ethics in that school. without fighting a battle is the best of the best. There- An avid student, the young Mao Zedong listened atten- fore, a man good at fighting battles is not a wise man, nor tively to Yang' s lectures and took careful notes' These a brave man. (Quoted from Sun Zi' s Art of War, notes, known as "Classroom Notes,' are now preserved "Preparing for War. " ) in Mao's birthplace in Shaoshan, Hunan province' To kill is to let live. Some of the notes are on the art of war: Winning victory in a protracted war is the result of perse- verance and, in the last analysis, the result of unremitting When two armies are at war, the cool-headed one will win efforts. and the arrogant one will be defeated. The spear kills and the shield protects, each having its Of course, }l4ao Zedong did not take down every word his use. This is called tool determining the man. teacher Yang had said in the classroom. He jotted down When pitting five thousand soldiers against an enemy of a only the main points. But when Yang talked about the art hundred thousand, one must drive them as if they were an of war, Mao Zedong wrote down almost every word be- exhausted army or a newly broken horse. One must fight cause to him every word his teacher said was highly valu- a desperate battle in order to survive. able. Soldiers are defenders of the country. They cannot per- Mao' s future father-in-law taught him many things, but a form their duties unless they are physically strong and, in couplet gave him the deepest impression: particular, they cannot perform outstanding services un- less they are well-educated. People in our country are Don't be disturbed even when Mount Taishan collapses in physically weak. As soldiers are recruited on a voluntary front of you; basis, thugs and ignorant persons are often enlisted' Don't be lose your wits even when a fierce tiger is at your When they are driven to battle' they disperse before en- heels. gaging the enemy.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Documentary Film (纪录片)
    The Mao Era in Objects Documentary Film (纪录片) Ying Qian, Columbia University Summary Films are objects whose production requires resources, labor and technology, and whose distribution requires infrastructure. Films also present other objects on the screen. Documentary images, in particular, are supposed to tell truths about the physical and historical world we live in. This biography discusses the substantial resources committed to filmmaking by the young PRC: in one example, the People’s Liberation Army re-enacted four major battles in the Chinese Civil War for the camera. Why was there a perceived need for re-enactment, and what it might tell us about the society where the film was produced? Introduction In October 1949, soldiers in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Fourth Field Army, who had just recently arrived and settled in their new station near Tianjin, were told that they would again be transferred back to the northeast, where their battalions had fought victorious battles against the Nationalist army a year before. Canons, tanks, and tens of thousands of soldiers were loaded onto trains. Soon the open plains near Jinzhou, where the dust of war had barely settled, were shaken again by cannons and gunfire. Between autumn 1949 and summer 1950, four major battles marking PLA’s victory over the Nationalists were re-enacted for the purpose of making PRC’s first color documentary Victory of the Chinese People (Zhongguo renmin de shengli 中国人民的胜利 ), a Sino-Soviet coproduction directed by the renowned Soviet filmmaker Leonid Varlamov 29 [see C9 source: Victory of the Chinese People, see also title screen of Victory of the Chinese People depicted to the left ].
    [Show full text]
  • CHP-121 Terms
    T E R M S R E F E R E N C E D I N E P I S O D E The Chinese Civil War (Part 3) Ep. 121 P I N Y I N / T E R M C H I N E S E E N G L I S H / M E A N I N G Anhui 安徽 Province in China Chang Jiang 长江 The Yangzi River Changchun 长春 Capital of Jilin province in Manchuria Chen Cheng 陈诚 NRA General Chen Cheng 陈诚 NRA General Chen Mingren 陈明仁 NRA General Chen Yi 陈毅 PLA General and future foreign minister Chen Yun 陈云 One of Mao’s earliest political allies Dabie Mountains 大别山 Mountain chain just northeast of Wuhan in Hubei province Du Yuming 杜聿明 Nationalist General Fenghua 奉化 City and county in Zhejiang, near Ningbo Fu Zuoyi 傅作义 Nationalist General Fujian 福建 Province in China Gao Gang 高岗 PLA leader who served closely with Lin Biao Geng Biao 耿彪 PLA leader Guangdong 广东 Province in China Guangxi 广西 Province in China Han Gaozu 汉高祖 Liu Bang, founder of the Han Dynasty Hu Zongnan 胡宗南 Nationalist General Huabei 华北 Northern China Huaihai 淮海 Civil War Campaign in 1948 Huang Wei 黄伟 Nationalist General Hubei 湖北 Province in China Jiangsu 江苏 Province in China another military region of the Communists covering parts of Shanxi, Inner Jin-Cha-Ji 晋察冀 Mongolia and Hebei Jinzhou 锦州 City in Liaoning province Ming Dynasty loyalist who fought on against the Qing from his Taiwan base. Koxinga 郑成功 Also known as Cheng Ch’eng-kung Li Fuchun 李富春 PLA General Li Zongren 李宗仁 Nationalist General Liaoning 辽宁 Province in Manchuria Liaoshen 辽沈 Civil War Campaign in 1948 Lin Biao 林彪 PLA General in Manchuria and northern China Liu Bocheng 刘伯承 PLA General (Deng Xiaoping partner in civil
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 International Religious Freedom Report
    CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2019 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary Reports on Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang are appended at the end of this report. The constitution, which cites the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, states that citizens have freedom of religious belief but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities” and does not define “normal.” Despite Chairman Xi Jinping’s decree that all members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) must be “unyielding Marxist atheists,” the government continued to exercise control over religion and restrict the activities and personal freedom of religious adherents that it perceived as threatening state or CCP interests, according to religious groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international media reports. The government recognizes five official religions – Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. Only religious groups belonging to the five state- sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” representing these religions are permitted to register with the government and officially permitted to hold worship services. There continued to be reports of deaths in custody and that the government tortured, physically abused, arrested, detained, sentenced to prison, subjected to forced indoctrination in CCP ideology, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices. There were several reports of individuals committing suicide in detention, or, according to sources, as a result of being threatened and surveilled. In December Pastor Wang Yi was tried in secret and sentenced to nine years in prison by a court in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, in connection to his peaceful advocacy for religious freedom.
    [Show full text]
  • New China and Its Qiaowu: the Political Economy of Overseas Chinese Policy in the People’S Republic of China, 1949–1959
    1 The London School of Economics and Political Science New China and its Qiaowu: The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1959 Jin Li Lim A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2016. 2 Declaration: I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 98,700 words. 3 Abstract: This thesis examines qiaowu [Overseas Chinese affairs] policies during the PRC’s first decade, and it argues that the CCP-controlled party-state’s approach to the governance of the huaqiao [Overseas Chinese] and their affairs was fundamentally a political economy. This was at base, a function of perceived huaqiao economic utility, especially for what their remittances offered to China’s foreign reserves, and hence the party-state’s qiaowu approach was a political practice to secure that economic utility.
    [Show full text]
  • Xu-Beng Campaign [Huai-Hai Campaign]
    Xu-Beng Campaign [Huai-Hai Campaign] by Ah Xiang [Excerpts from “Civil Wars: 1945-1950” ] Before the Liao-Shen Campaign rolled to the end, CCP Eastern China Field Army completed the campaign against the Jinan city with the help of Wu Hualong's defection. Liu Zhi's KMT army group, with 600,000 troops, failed to give the relief to Jinan the provincial city of Shandong Province, but instead concentrated onto the cities of Shangqiu, Xuzhou and coastal Lianyungang, along the railway lines of Jin-Pu & Long-Hai. To the right side of Liu Zhi would be KMT's Huang Baitao Army Group that was in charge of the area between Long-Hai Railway to the north and the Huai-he River to the south and between coastal Lianyungang to the east and Xuzhou to the west. Mao Tse-tung continued the communist strategy of attacking one outpost while impeding or eliminating the enemy relief. To link up the “liberated area” of Shandong Province and northern Jiangsu Province as well as to cut off the right arm of Liu Zhi's army in Xuzhou, Mao Tse-tung proposed to first attack Huang Baitao's army group. For sake of taking out Huang Baitao's army, Mao Tse-tung instructed that more than half of CCP Eastern China Field Army should be deployed against the relief armies of Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi. During the campaign, the original communist plan changed midway when Liu Zhi's KMT army in Xuzhou fled to the west and Huang Wei's KMT army group came north, culminating in an expanded Huai-Hai Campaign that would suck in Huang Wei & Du Yuming's army groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    Notes Introduction 1. Hobsbawm 1990, 66. 2. Diamond 1998, 322–33. 3. Fairbank 1992, 44–45. 4. Fei Xiaotong 1989, 1–2. 5. Diamond 1998, 323, original emphasis. 6. Crossley 1999; Di Cosmo 1998; Purdue 2005a; Lavely and Wong 1998, 717. 7. Richards 2003, 112–47; Lattimore 1937; Pan Chia-lin and Taeuber 1952. 8. My usage of the term “geo-body” follows Thongchai 1994. 9. B. Anderson 1991, 86. 10. Purdue 2001, 304. 11. Dreyer 2006, 279–80; Fei Xiaotong 1981, 23–25. 12. Jiang Ping 1994, 16. 13. Morris-Suzuki 1998, 4; Duara 2003; Handler 1988, 6–9. 14. Duara 1995; Duara 2003. 15. Turner 1962, 3. 16. Adelman and Aron 1999, 816. 17. M. Anderson 1996, 4, Anderson’s italics. 18. Fitzgerald 1996a: 136. 19. Ibid., 107. 20. Tsu Jing 2005. 21. R. Wong 2006, 95. 22. Chatterjee (1986) was the first to theorize colonial nationalism as a “derivative discourse” of Western Orientalism. 23. Gladney 1994, 92–95; Harrell 1995a; Schein 2000. 24. Fei Xiaotong 1989, 1. 25. Cohen 1991, 114–25; Schwarcz 1986; Tu Wei-ming 1994. 26. Harrison 2000, 240–43, 83–85; Harrison 2001. 27. Harrison 2000, 83–85; Cohen 1991, 126. 186 • Notes 28. Duara 2003, 9–40. 29. See, for example, Lattimore 1940 and 1962; Forbes 1986; Goldstein 1989; Benson 1990; Lipman 1998; Millward 1998; Purdue 2005a; Mitter 2000; Atwood 2002; Tighe 2005; Reardon-Anderson 2005; Giersch 2006; Crossley, Siu, and Sutton 2006; Gladney 1991, 1994, and 1996; Harrell 1995a and 2001; Brown 1996 and 2004; Cheung Siu-woo 1995 and 2003; Schein 2000; Kulp 2000; Bulag 2002 and 2006; Rossabi 2004.
    [Show full text]
  • Reform in Deep Water Zone: How Could China Reform Its State- Dominated Sectors at Commanding Heights
    Reform in Deep Water Zone: How Could China Reform Its State- Dominated Sectors at Commanding Heights Yingqi Tan July 2020 M-RCBG Associate Working Paper Series | No. 153 The views expressed in the M-RCBG Associate Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government or of Harvard University. The papers in this series have not undergone formal review and approval; they are presented to elicit feedback and to encourage debate on important public policy challenges. Copyright belongs to the author(s). Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Weil Hall | Harvard Kennedy School | www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg 1 REFORM IN DEEP WATER ZONE: HOW COULD CHINA REFORM ITS STATE-DOMINATED SECTORS AT COMMANDING HEIGHTS MAY 2020 Yingqi Tan MPP Class of 2020 | Harvard Kennedy School MBA Class of 2020 | Harvard Business School J.D. Candidate Class of 2023 | Harvard Law School RERORM IN DEEP WATER ZONE: HOW COULD CHINA REFORM ITS STATE-DOMINATED SECTORS AT COMMANDING HEIGHTS 2 Contents Table of Contents Contents .................................................................................................. 2 Acknowledgements ................................................................................ 7 Abbreviations ......................................................................................... 8 Introduction .........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Information to Users
    INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript Pas been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissenation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from anytype of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely. event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material bad to beremoved, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with smalloverlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back ofthe book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell &Howell Information Company 300North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. MI48106-1346 USA 313!761-47oo 800:521·0600 THE LIN BIAO INCIDENT: A STUDY OF EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY AUGUST 1995 By Qiu Jin Dissertation Committee: Stephen Uhalley, Jr., Chairperson Harry Lamley Sharon Minichiello John Stephan Roger Ames UMI Number: 9604163 OMI Microform 9604163 Copyright 1995, by OMI Company.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Conflicts Between KMT &
    Armed Conflicts Between KMT & CCP excerpts from http://www.republicanchina.org/terror.html by Ah Xiang (Posted and referenced at :forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php%3Ft%3D105421+li+xianzhou&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3&client=firefox http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?s=9bf9285e959fd6060111392480c8e516&showtopic=791&st=45&p= 4724195&#entry4724195) In the opinion of Zhang Yufa, Nationalist Government was very much aware of the communist sabotage but chose to refrain from taking action as a precautionary measure for maintaining the collaboration scheme with the Soviet Union & Chinese communists and securing the wartime support.Tolerant policies would include: 1) allowing the establishment of Shen-Gan-Ning Borderline Government [March 1939] and Jinn-Cha-Ji- Sui Borderline Government which were empowered with printing own currency and assignment of administrative officials; 2) conferring the post of "politics participants [councillor] of national government" onto seven senior communist leaders including Mao Tse-tung, Zhou Enlai, Chen Shaoyu [Wang Ming], Qin Bangxian [Bo-gu], Dong Biwu, Wu Yuezhang & Deng Yingchao, and the post of deputy director of "politics department of the military committee of the national government" onto Zhou Enlai; and 3) approving the communist publication & distribution of "New China Daily" newspaper in Chongqing and establishment of representative offices of the Eight Route Army in Chongqing, Xi'an & Chengdu etc. However, Mao Tse-tung had taken the path of expansion right after the Shanxi Province campaign by ordering Lin Biao's 115th Division to Shanxi-Chahar area, Heh Long's 120th Division to northwestern Shanxi Province, and Liu Bocheng's 129th Division to Shandong-Hebei provinces.The expansion into domains other than Yan Xishan's 2nd military district in Shanxi Province meant for the annexation of the military districts and subdistricts of the other Nationalist Government generals.
    [Show full text]
  • The Generalissimo
    the generalissimo ګ The Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek and the Struggle for Modern China Jay Taylor the belknap press of harvard university press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, En gland 2009 .is Chiang Kai- shek’s surname ګ The character Copyright © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Taylor, Jay, 1931– The generalissimo : Chiang Kai- shek and the struggle for modern China / Jay Taylor.—1st. ed. â p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978- 0- 674- 03338- 2 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Chiang, Kai- shek, 1887–1975. 2. Presidents—China— Biography. 3. Presidents—Taiwan—Biography. 4. China—History—Republic, 1912–1949. 5. Taiwan—History—1945– I. Title. II. Title: Chiang Kai- shek and the struggle for modern China. DS777.488.C5T39 2009 951.04′2092—dc22 [B]â 2008040492 To John Taylor, my son, editor, and best friend Contents List of Mapsâ ix Acknowledgmentsâ xi Note on Romanizationâ xiii Prologueâ 1 I Revolution 1. A Neo- Confucian Youthâ 7 2. The Northern Expedition and Civil Warâ 49 3. The Nanking Decadeâ 97 II War of Resistance 4. The Long War Beginsâ 141 5. Chiang and His American Alliesâ 194 6. The China Theaterâ 245 7. Yalta, Manchuria, and Postwar Strategyâ 296 III Civil War 8. Chimera of Victoryâ 339 9. The Great Failureâ 378 viii Contents IV The Island 10. Streams in the Desertâ 411 11. Managing the Protectorâ 454 12. Shifting Dynamicsâ 503 13. Nixon and the Last Yearsâ 547 Epilogueâ 589 Notesâ 597 Indexâ 699 Maps Republican China, 1928â 80–81 China, 1929â 87 Allied Retreat, First Burma Campaign, April–May 1942â 206 China, 1944â 293 Acknowledgments Extensive travel, interviews, and research in Taiwan and China over five years made this book possible.
    [Show full text]
  • A RE-EVALUATION of CHIANG KAISHEK's BLUESHIRTS Chinese Fascism in the 1930S
    A RE-EVALUATION OF CHIANG KAISHEK’S BLUESHIRTS Chinese Fascism in the 1930s A Dissertation Submitted to the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy DOOEUM CHUNG ProQuest Number: 11015717 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 11015717 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 2 Abstract Abstract This thesis considers the Chinese Blueshirts organisation from 1932 to 1938 in the context of Chiang Kaishek's attempts to unify and modernise China. It sets out the terms of comparison between the Blueshirts and Fascist organisations in Europe and Japan, indicating where there were similarities and differences of ideology and practice, as well as establishing links between them. It then analyses the reasons for the appeal of Fascist organisations and methods to Chiang Kaishek. Following an examination of global factors, the emergence of the Blueshirts from an internal point of view is considered. As well as assuming many of the characteristics of a Fascist organisation, especially according to the Japanese model and to some extent to the European model, the Blueshirts were in many ways typical of the power-cliques which were already an integral part of Chinese politics.
    [Show full text]
  • Scanned Using Book Scancenter 5033
    VII THE PERIOD OF THE MONGOLIAN POLITICAL COUNCIL APRIL 1934 - JANUARY 1936 Founding of the Council The approved Eight Articles on Mongolian Local Autonomy became the legal foundation for Mongolian self-rule that Mongolian leaders had desired for years. In ac­ cordance with these principles, both the Temporary Outline of the Organization of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council and its main personnel were all announced. The hearts of both traditional and more modem-minded Mongol leaders were gladdened, and they also perceived this as an unprecedented event in the history of the Republic of China. Still, the Eight Articles also occasioned a counterattack from the frontier provinces. Fu Zuoyi and his clique tried hard to destroy this great accomplish­ ment. Because of this. Prince De and other leaders ofthe autonomy movement had no choice but to concentrate their attention and energy on dealing with the pressure from without. But they were unable to make progress solving internal problems and satisfying the desires of the Mongol people because of Japanese westward expansion and changes in China ’s domestic political scene. After the Mongolian delegates returned to Beile-yin sume and submitted their report, both Prince Yon and Prince De took up their positions on April 3, 1934 and then telegraphed the Chinese government that they would go ahead with ceremonies to mark the establishment of the Mongolian Political Council and the inauguration of its mem­ bers. Princes Yon and De invited General He Yingqin, the Superintendent of Mongolian Local Autonomy, to come and “supervise” the ceremony. On April 23, 1934 the Mongolian Political Council was founded and its mem­ bers were sworn in.
    [Show full text]