Liu Jikun HRIFCNG Publishing (o. ilDoll0'$ IRI OI IIIR
MAO ZEDONG'S ART OF WAR
Author: Liu Jikun Art Editor: Ki-Coo Seto
Published by: Hai Feng Publishing Co. Rm. 1502, Wing On House, 7l Des Voeux Road, C., Hong Kong. General distributed by: Peace Book Co., Ltd. Rm. 1502, Wing On House, 71 Des Voeux Road, C., Hong Kong. Pnnted by: Sun Light Printing & Bookbinding Factory Unit B, l2lF., Yiko Industrial Building, l0 Ka Yip Street, Chai Wan, Hong Kong
Published & Printed in Hong Kong
First Edition October 1993 rsBN 962-238-084-0 HF-213-P
All rights reserved. Mao Zedong's Art o{ War
Contents
Preface
1. Overawing the Foe with Bluff and Bluster - Defeating the Enemy Without Fighting a Battle
, Go to the Mountains and Learn from the Bandits - Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun
J. Establishing an Independent Regime by Armed Force - A Huge Vat Can Be Broken with a Small Rock 15
4. The Enemy Advances, We Retreat - Concealing the Army in the Mountains and Forests 20
5. Turning Every Man into a Soldier - Placing the Party and People on a War Footing 24
6. Casting a Net to Catch the Fish - Casting It Wide or Drawing It In at Any Moment 30
.7 Manoeuvre Against Manoeuvre - Guerrilla Warfare Plus Mobile Warfare Luring the Enemy in Deep - Avoiding the Enemy's Main Force and Striking at His Weak Spots 4:l War Mao Zedong's Art of Mao Zedong's Art of War
9. Fighting Not for TerritorY 20. Outflanking and Encircling Tactics in Order to Take 49 - Give - Injuring a Man's Ten Fingers Is Not as Effective as Chopping Off One 707 10. Long-Distance Oxodus to Preserve Strength 54 - A Strategic Shift 21. Fighting a Protracted War - Trading Space for Time ll2 11. Crossing the Sea by DecePtion Thirty-Six Stratagems 60 - The First of the 22. All Is Fair in War There Is No Use for Asinine Ethics 116 12. Lightning Speed Is Important in War of Three Steps in Two 65 - Covering the Distance 23. Taking Bold and Resolute Measures - Converging on the Enemy 13. Moving Deep into the Barren Land in Coordinated Actions 722 Hiding the True Intention {rom the Enemy 77 - 24. The Enemy Advances, We Advance 14. Pulling Back After Attaining the Objective - Penetrating Deep into the Enemy's Rear L27 Reason - Assigning a Convincing for the Use of Force 75 25. Clearing the Door Front - Drivinng Away the Enemy from the Bedside 132 15. Giving a Little Ground After SPotting the 26. Storming Fortifications - Attacking Enemy's Weak Point 81 - Going All Out to Reduce Enemy-Occupied Areas 136 16. Catching the Turtle in a Jar the First Battle 86 27. Pursuing the Hard-Pressed Enemy - It Is Important to Win - Competing Politically and Militarily 17. Fluidity of Territory for Territory 747 Move Away When You Can't Win 91 - 28. Pincer Movements 18. Making Raids from the East and West - Intercepting Enemy Reinforcements 146 Employing the Main Force on the Flanks 96 - 29. Conserving Strength 19. Come and Go Like a Shadow Carving Up and Destroying Behind Enemy Lines 102 the Exhausted Enemy l5 - Building Bases Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War
41. Effecting a Breakthrough in the Middle 30. Leave the High Road Alone Places 155 Revealing Not the Main Target of Attack 208 - Seizing the Less Conspicuous - 42. Wait {or the Prey to Fall into the Trap 31. Killing a Chicken with an Ox Cleaver Never Try to Do Anything Out of Bravado 273 Concentrating the Forces to Destroy the EnemY 159 43. Cutting the Enemy into Two co Eating the Flesh Before JL. Advance and Retreat in Giant Strides - into Initiative 165 Cracking the Bones 278 - Turning Passivity 44. Reaching Out {or the Yard JJ. Act According to Circumstances Taking an Inch Carving the Opponent into Several Pieces 170 After - A Million Bold Warriors Crossed the Great River 223 34. The Tactics of "Wear and Tear" An "Empty-City" Stratagem 174 45. Driving Continuously Forward Smashing All Enemy Resistance 229 35. Driving Straight In Thrusting a Dagger into Both Inside and Outside the Enemy's Heart 180 46. Attacking {rom - Stealing Across the Sea in Junks 233 36. Cutting a Tangle of Hemp with a Sharp Knife Insignia Dealing Crushing Blows to the Enemy 185 47. Changing the - Showing Military Prowess on Foreign Soil 238 37. Attacking a City and the Tail Striking at Reinforcements 48. Cutting Off the Head and the to Blocking the Enemy at EverY SteP 190 - Beating Underling - Embarrass the Master 242 38. To Be Able to Extend and Contract at Will Attacking Later 193 About the Author 249 - Encircling First and
39. Directing the Attack at One Point Initiative 198 - Swiftly Gaining the
40. Making Long-Distance Raids Converging on the EnemY - from the Flanks 203 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War
Preface
In the several thousand years of Chinese history, Mao Ze- dong was the most outstanding military strategist of all times. With "millet plus rifles, " he defeated the Kuom- intang' s "aircraft plus cannons. " Starting with a handful of people and rifles, he created the Liberation Army of two or three millon men. Following the motto: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, " he eventually be- came the supreme ruler of the Red regime. These were facts that no one will dispute, whether he is a Chinese or a foreigner, a Leftist, middle of the roader or Rightist. be- longing to the upper, middle or lower stratum. A mere scholar, Mao Zedong actually was able "to contrive strategic plans at his headquarters and win victories on the battlefield a thousand miles away. " Even though this fact is not widely known, no one can deny that he was an ex- traordinary military genius. Mao Zedortg certainly did not win victories on the battle- field by good luck; he had made painstaking studies of wars and military affairs and devised a military strategy of his own, which is comparable to the art of war of the fa- mous Sun Zi in ancient China, if not better. In this book, Mao' s military strategy is illustrated with stories of the battles he had fought. Even though the au- thor of this book is only an armchair strategist, he be- lieves readers will be benefited by knowing about Mao's art of war. As people say, "life is a battle{ield, " "the business world is a battlefield" and "the political arena is a battlefield, " readers will certainly find Mao Zedong' s mil- itary strategy applicable and highly useful in their person- al endeavours and careers. As everyone knows, "Dear Comrade Jiang Qing" was not Mao Zedong's beloved wife. His beloved wife was Yang Mao Zedotg's Art of War Mao Zedorg's Art o{ War
Kaihui, a famous beauty of the period of the May Fourth ning many victories in wars is a shameful deed. He never Movement of 1919. Yang Kaihui's father, Yang Changji' claimed to be a master of the art of war nor a man of wise was Mao Zedotg's teacher. words. In 1913, when Mao Zedong was a young student at the Fighting a hundred battles and winning a hundred victo- First Normal School of Hunan, Yang Changji was the ries is not the best of the best. Subjugating an enemy teacher of ethics in that school. without fighting a battle is the best of the best. There- An avid student, the young Mao Zedong listened atten- fore, a man good at fighting battles is not a wise man, nor tively to Yang' s lectures and took careful notes' These a brave man. (Quoted from Sun Zi' s Art of War, notes, known as "Classroom Notes,' are now preserved "Preparing for War. " ) in Mao's birthplace in Shaoshan, Hunan province' To kill is to let live. Some of the notes are on the art of war: Winning victory in a protracted war is the result of perse- verance and, in the last analysis, the result of unremitting When two armies are at war, the cool-headed one will win efforts. and the arrogant one will be defeated. The spear kills and the shield protects, each having its Of course, }l4ao Zedong did not take down every word his use. This is called tool determining the man. teacher Yang had said in the classroom. He jotted down When pitting five thousand soldiers against an enemy of a only the main points. But when Yang talked about the art hundred thousand, one must drive them as if they were an of war, Mao Zedong wrote down almost every word be- exhausted army or a newly broken horse. One must fight cause to him every word his teacher said was highly valu- a desperate battle in order to survive. able. Soldiers are defenders of the country. They cannot per- Mao' s future father-in-law taught him many things, but a form their duties unless they are physically strong and, in couplet gave him the deepest impression: particular, they cannot perform outstanding services un- less they are well-educated. People in our country are Don't be disturbed even when Mount Taishan collapses in physically weak. As soldiers are recruited on a voluntary front of you; basis, thugs and ignorant persons are often enlisted' Don't be lose your wits even when a fierce tiger is at your When they are driven to battle' they disperse before en- heels. gaging the enemy. Over the years' our country has suf- In the scores of years of his life, Mao Zedong had braved fered a great deal from this. untold dangers and shown extraordinary courage. This When his hand was bitten by a poisonous snake, a brave was inseparable from Yang Changji' s teachings. On many man would cut it off at the wrist. This was not because he occasions "Mount Taishan collapsed in front of him" and did not value his hand, but because he could not save his "a fierce tiger was at his heels. " But each time he was able Iife without cutting off his hand. turn danger into safety. He managed not to save Sun Zi thinks that going to war is the last resort, long to only his also to defeat into wars with much slaughtering are not justified, and win- life, but turn victory. Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong' s Art of War Overawing the Foe with Bluff and Bluster The passages on military affairs in the "Classroom Notes' Defeating the Enemy Without may be considered the embryo of Mao Zedong' s art of - war. From his teacher Yang Changji, Mao learned the Fighting a Battle rudiments of military strategy. There would have been no Mao Zedong, the military genius. without his teacher' s Mao Zedong was the supreme commander of the Chinese initiation. Yang Changji' s lectures on military strategy, Communist Party and chairman of the Military Commis- though limited in content, were the source or origin of sion of the Communist Party' s Central Committee. But Mao Zedong's art of war. when he first joined the army, it was not the Communist Mao Zedong had written down some quotations ftom Sun army but the Kuomintang army that he joined, because Zi' s Art of War in his "Classroom Notes, " but he never the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the read the military classic, neither at that time, nor in the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Chi- next twenty years. It was not until 1936, the year before nese People's Liberation Army did not exist at that time. the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan' did On October 10, 1911, the whole of China was shaken by he earnestly study the book for the first time. By that the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising. which marked the time, he had already fought a great number of victorious beginning of the Revolution of tgtl that overthrew the or disastrous battles. Manchu or Qing dynasty and created the republic. Hunan province During a meeting with some senior intellectuals in the was the first to respond to the uprising, and the political situation there scenic Hangzhou on December 27' 1965, Mao said: was very tense. Despite the fact governor "Kuomintang army officers who were graduates from the that the Manchu Yang Wending had imposed a curfew on the whole city of Changsha, the provincial capi- War College didn't know how to fight on the battlefield' tal, members of the Revolutionary Party were still secret- On the contrary, those who'd studied only a few months ly active both inside and outside the city. at Huangpu Military Academy were competent comman- With the permission of the school principal, a member of ders on the battlefield. Few of our marshals and generals the Revolutionary Party came one d"y to speak at are college graduates. I myself had at {irst never read any Xiangxiang School in the provincial capital. military books. I' d read Zuo' s Commentaries on the where Mao Zedong was a student. The man made a stirring speech. Spring and Autumn Annals, History as a Mirror andTales Several students stood up from their seats afterwards and of the Three Kingdoms. There are descriptions of battles expressed support for his stand. They fiercely denounced in these books. But when I came to fight a battle, what- the Qing government and called on the students to take ever impression I had about them went completely out of action for the founding of a republic. Mao Zed.ong, too, my mind. We didn't carry a single book with us when we was stirred by the speech and decided to go to Hubei fought battles. Al1 we did was to analyse the situation of province and join the Revolutionary Army led by the the enemy and ourselves, the actual the struggle between Hubei military governor Li Yuanhong. Transportation " conditions. problems, however, prevented him from taking the trip. Mao Zedotg's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War
Later, an uprising was success{ully staged in Hunan, and had taken Changsha, they did not dare to proceed and a student army was organized in Changsha. But Mao did were taking a rest there and seizing food from the peas- not join it because he thought it was a disorderly band. He ants. The news threw the whole school into confusion. decided to join the regular Revolutionary Army, which After hearing the conditions of the defeated unit and later became the National Revolutionary Army, that is, knowing they were hungry, fatigued and badly shaken and the army o{ the Kuomintang. had no knowledge that the Guangxi army had not yet en- After joining the army, Mao Zedong became a soldier in tered Changsha, Mao judged they could be driven away. the Left Company of the First Battalion, 50th Regiment. He told more than two hundred of the bolder ones in the 25th Mixed Brigade of the Hunan New Army. . His salary students' voluntary army to arm themselves with the was seven silver dollars a month. wooden rifles they used in their daily drill and station After serving for half a year in the army without fighting a themselves on top o{ Miaogao Hill behind the school. He single battle, Mao became disappointed and left. then got in touch with the local police station and asked In October 1916, a students' extracurricular voluntary the police chief to send a number of policemen with real ri- army was organized in the First Normal School of Hunan, {les to lay in ambush in front of the students. At dusk, as where Mao Zedong had enrolled to continue his schooling. the Northern Warlord soldiers began to probe their way This most irregular army had high-sounding declared pur- northward along the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway at the poses, which were "to foster patriotism, promote a mili- foot of Miaogao Hill, Mao told the policemen to open fire tary spirit, study military strategy and conduct national e- and the students on the hill top to set off firecrackers. ducation. " The student volunteers in the whole school They then shouted together, 'Fu Liangzuo is gone. The formed a battalion, with two companies under it. As Mao Guangxi army is in the city. Hand over your arms and was one of the first to join, he was elected a company live!' The defeated army did not dare to resist. A repre- commander. sentative was sent over to negotiate and the entire unit Mao Zedong fought his first battle with this students' vol- was disarmed. The students in the whole school then untary army on November 20, l9l?, in which he success- came out and took the rifles and other weapons to the {ully defended his school and disarmed some soldiers of a school. . . . The disarmed soldiers were told to sleep in the defeated Northern Warlord army. open on the school's playground. The following day, the A vivid account of the battle has been given by Zhou city's commercial chamber distributed some money to the Shizhao, a close friend of Mao who studied at the same soldiers and sent all of them home. Mao Zed.ong' s daring school: exploit became the talk of the whole school, all saying "News arrived one day after lunch that some soldiers of a that he was 'a man of extraordinary valour.' " defeated unit of the Northern Warlord's Eighth Division Mao Zedong had another school friend named Zou Yun- were beating a precipitate retreat from the area around zhen, who had asked him at the time, "'What if the defeat- Zhuzhott and Xiangtan towards Changsha. They were al- ed soldiers had returned fire? Wasn' t it too dangerous?" ready at Monkey Rock, less than two kilometres from the The young Mao answered in a calm voice, "If the defeated First Normal School. As the soldiers were not sure who soldiers had intended to take the city, they would have Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War started an attack that night. Since they had chosen this Go to the Mountains and Learn path instead of entering Changsha's northern gate, they 2 from the Bandits must have been too tired and discouraged. That' s why Political they immediately surrendered when we shouted at them. " - Power Grows Out of In the first battle he had ever fought in his life, Mao Ze- the Barrel of a Gun dong had fully displayed his military genius. The battle ended close to what Sun Zi said that "Subjugating the ene- When the Kuomintang and the Communist Party fell out my without fighting a battle is the best of the best, " in the summer of 7927 after a short period of cooperation, which Mao had written down in his "Classroom Notes. " Chiang Kai-shek started a "party purge" in which a large In the battle to disarm the Northern Warlord's soldiers, number of Communists were killed. Mao was also inspired by the battle fought in A. D. 383 Mao Zedong naturally did not want to stretch his neck and between General Xie Xuan of the Eastern Jin dynasty and wait for the executioner's knife to come down. He secret- Fu Jian, ruler of the state of Qin. General Xie Xuan made ly slipped back to Hunan, where he made three different an awe-inspiring display of his forces before launching an arrangements for those Communists who were members of attack on the Qin city of Shouyang. When Fu Jian and his the workers' and peasants' armed units: brother mounted the city wall and saw the neat array of 1. All members of the Workers' Guard and the Peasant the Eastern Jin soldiers, they were overawed. Even the Self-Defence Army who had been detected by the Kuorn- bushes and trees on the nearby Bagong Hill appeared to intang were to "go to the mountains and learn from the them like enemy soldiers. In the end, the Fu brothers bandits. " were utterly routed. Mao learned from Xie Xuan to make 2. Members of the workers' and peasants' armed units a powerful display of forces and succeeded in his first try. who had not yet been discovered should continue to make In 1918, another tangled war broke out between the use of their lawful identity and wait for an opportunity to northern and southern warlords. Changsha was occupied start an uprising and display the Communist hammer-and- by Zhang Jingrao. Together with some others, Mao Ze- sickle flag. dong organized a guard on the basis of the students' vol- 3. Those workers' and peasants' armed units which were untary army to safeguard the school and served as its cap- weak and not properly organized should bury their tain. At first, "the city was in great disorder. He orga- weapons in the ground and disband or join the armed units nized, a students' peace-keeping guard together with stu- under He Long and Ye Ting or find their way into the dents from other schools and patrolled the city streets un- Kuomintang army or local militia and try to engineer re- til the northern army arrived. " Later, "when war broke volts and seize weapons. out in Hunan, the residents were aroused from their sleep In the view of the Kuomintang, "going to the mountains by gunfire several times a night. The students were highly and learning from the bandits" was "going to the moun- competent in safeguarding the schools. . . . The faculty tains and becoming bandits. " But Mao Zedong's idea was and students even played music as if there was not a war different. He had obviously learned this from classical raging around them. " novels llke Outlauts of the Marsh, which he had read vora- War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 10 Mao Zedong's Art of I1 ciously when he was a boy. The novel describes 108 Harvest Uprising, Mao Zedong for the first time put for- "Political heroes of the greenwood who banded together with heart ward the world-shaking slogan: power grows " "The and soul and fought for a common cause. out of the barrel of a gun. He said: purpose of the 'We can build a base for our military force in the moun- Autumn Harvest Uprising is to solve the land problem of tains, " said Mao Zedong. "Without a military force' we the peasants. No one can deny this. To start the upris- shall be powerless to deal with any change in the situation ing, it is not enough to rely solely on the strength of the in the future. " peasants. There should be military assistance with one or He also said, "I wanted to make friends with men of the two army regiments. Otherwise, it will certainly end in greenwood. I decided to go to the mountains and lakes' failure. The ultimate aim of the uprising is to seize politi- where I can make friends with men of the greenwood' " cal power. It will be self-deception if there is not an army "Going to the mountains and learning from the bandits" is to guard it or seize it. Our Party committed mistakes be- a very important part of Mao Zedong's military strategy' cause it overlooked military matters. \Ye should now de- If he did not have that courage and experience, he would voted 60 percent of our energies to military activities so never have been able to command an army of several mil- that we can put into effect that political power grows out lion men and fought his way to victory in the whole coun- of the barrel of a gun and is built with guns. " try. Mao Zedong reorganized the armed units that had taken By the time of the autumn harvest rrt 1927' the workers' part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising into the First Divi- and peasants' armed units were no longer poorly orga- sion of the First Corp of the W'orkers' and Peasants' Rev- nized bands of men; they had become a full-fledged army olutionary Army. The division was composed of three reg- of considerable strength. Seeing that the time had ar- lments. rived, Mao Zedong put forward a proposal to the Political The First Regiment included the Headquarters Guard Bureau of the Communist Party' s Central Committee in Regiment of the Second Front Army of the National Revo- which he stated: "People in Hunan are more extensively lutionary Army' s Fourth Group Army as its backbone, organized than in Guangdong' What they need are the Pingjiang Workers' and Peasants' Volunteers from weapons. At the present time of upheavals, there is a Hunan province and the Peasants' Self-Defence Army of more urgent need for weapons. A plan which I have draft- Chongyang and Tongcheng from Hubei province. ed and the Standing Committee has approved not long ago The Second Regiment was formed by the workers' armed calls for the formation of an army division, which can oc- units of Anyuan and the Communist-controlled police cupy five or six counties and establish a polltical base' corps of the Anyuan coal mine as its backbone as well as wherefrom an agrarian revolution can spread to the whole by the armed peasants from Pingxiang, Anfu, Lianhua province. " and Liling. Mao also pointed out that in the agrarian revolution' "We The Third Regiment was composed mainly of the should not carry the Kuomintang flag, but should hold Workers' and Peasants' Volunteers of Liuyang and some high the flag of the Communist Party.' of the Workers' and Peasants' Volunteers of Pingjiang In a discussion on the military problem in the Autumn and some soldiers from the Guard Regiment.
I Mao Zedong's Art War oI War o{ 13 t2 Mao Zedong's Art Tonggu, he was arrested by the local militia and almost five thousand men in the three regi- There were about lost his life. ments. They were led by the Front Committee with Mao Mao Zedong later recounted his hairbreadth escape from Zedong as its Party representative and Lu Deming its com- death to the American reporter Edgar Snow: "While I was mander. organizing the army and travelling between the Hanyang Mao Zedong and the others decided to attack Changsha a- miners and the peasant guards, I was captured by some three routes: long min-t' uan mllitiamen, working with the Kuomintang. The Second Regiment with Anyuan miners and the origi- The Kuomintang terror was then at its height and hundred nal coal mine police corps as its main force was to take the of suspected Reds were being shot. I was ordered to be first route. They were to attack Pingxiang and Liling and taken to the min-t' uan headq',s.arters, where I was to be with peasant uprisings in Liling and Zhuzhou to coordinate killed. Borrowing several tens of dollars from a comrade, cordon around Changsha' form a however, I attempted to bribe the escort to free me. The Regiment with the original Guard Regiment and The First ordinary soldiers were mercenaries, with no special inter- . Worke."' and Peasants' Volunteers as its Pingjiang' est in seeing me killed, and they agreed to release me, but force was to proceed from Xiushui and attack main the subaltern in charge refused to permit it. I therefore Pingjiang, start peasant uprisings and march on Changsha decided to attempt to escape, but had no opportunity to do taking Pingjiang. after so until I was within about two hundred yards of the min- Third Regiment with the Workers' and Peasants' The t' uan headquarters. At that point I broke loose and ran Volunteers of Liuyang and a small part of the Guard Regi- into the fields. I reached a high place. above a pond, with ment as its main force was to attack Liuyang from Tong- some tall grass surrounding it, and there I hid until sun- peasant uprisings everywhere in Liuyang and gu, start set. The soldiers pursued me, and forced some peasants launch a direct attack on Changsha' then to help them search for me. Many times they came very The forces advancing along the three routes were to coor- near, once or twice so close that I could almost have their operations. After successfully carrying out dinate touched them, but somehow I escaped discovery, al- missions along the routes, they would be assisted by their though half a dozen times I gave up hope, feeling certain I workers and peasants in Changsha who would stage an up- would be recaptured. At last, when it was dusk, they a- in the city to coordinate with their attack from the rising bandoned the search. At once I set off across the moun- outside. tains. travelling all night. " This strategic plan of Mao Zedong's appeared to be per- After making his escape, Mao Zedong was elated and de- in fact not "great' " Changsha was guarded fect, but *u. cided to put his military plan into execution. troops of the warlord Tang Shengzhi' The city' s by the On September 9, 1919, the Autumn Harvest Uprising was practically impregnable' To take a city like dlf".r." broke out on the Hunan-Jiangxi border. Railway workers was far from easY' Changsha took the lead in destroying the railways connecting Chang- Beforl Mao Zedong was able to put his plan into execu- sha with Yueyang and Zhuzhou, cutting off the enemy' s happened to himself' While travelling tion. something main arteries o{ transport, past Zhangjiafang on the border between Liuyang and Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War 74 15
At the same time, the First Regiment and the new Fourth Establishing an Independent Regiment departed from Xiushui and started to attack 3 Regime by Armed Force Pingjiang. When they reached Jinping' the Fourth Regi- A Huge Vat Can Be Broken First Reg- *.rr1 .rdd"nly revolted, turning its guns on the with a Small Rock iment and putting it at a disadvantageous position' led by Mao Zedong himself proceeded The Third Regiment Mao Zedons abandoned the military action aimed at taking the direction of Liuyang' On the way' it from Xiushui in the city of Changsha because he did not want "to throw an an enemy unit' When Mao fought a fierce battle with egg against a rock " and to lead the Workers ' and was being attacked from l"a.n"d that the First Regiment Peasants' Revolutionary Army to certain doom. But his he de- both the front and the rear and suffered setbacks' good intention was not understood by everybody. A divi- all cided to abandon the attack on Changsha and ordered sion commander named Yu Sadu was against him at the at Wen- the troops to rendezvous with the Third Regiment time, denouncing him for intending to run away and be- jiangshi in LiuYang. come a "bandit chieftain in the mountains. " Muo Z"dorrg and his troops arrived at Wenjiashi on Mao argued, "It is not because we do not want to take September 19. After what remained of the First and Sec- Changsha, but because we cannot take it now. The reason reorga- ond Regiments also arrived, the three groups were is that the Chinese revolution is, in essence, a peasant 'Workers' Rev- nized into a new unit of the and Peasants' revolution. The enemy' s control of the countryside is weak, which is good place olutionary ArmY' for us to find a to stay, strike roots, develop and expand our forces. " Mao Zedong had written a lyric poem about the Autumn He also pointed out, "Throughout history, 'mountain Harvest UPrising: bandits' have never been eliminated. If we are to become ' mountain bandits,' we shall be a different kind of Autumn Harvest UPrising 'mountain bandits.' These 'mountain bandits' are led by to the tune of Xi Jiang Yue the Communist Party and have their political stand, poli- - cies and methods; they are different from the 'mountain of worhers and peasants' A revolutionary army bandits' of the old days. " A hammer-and-sichle flag flYing' Mao also stressed the importance of making a strategic re- and Lu' They march through Kuang treat to the countryside in the border area of Hunan, Xiao and Xiang' Heading straight for the Jiangxi and Guangdong provinces. "We can take part in a A deep hatred. they hold against the- landlords' peasant uprising that may occur in any one of the three Who oPPress them on all sides' provinces in the future. " When the shy is ottercast at autumn hafi)est' On the morning of September 10, a meeting of the Work- A rettolt, like an angry thunder' brohe out' ers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army was held on the playground of a school in Wenjiashi. Mao Zedong's Art of War T7 16 Mao Zedong's Art of War
Kuomintang county headquarters and county government, In his address to the meeting, Mao Zedong further devel- broke into the prison and freed more than a hundred Com- oped his idea: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a munists who had been locked up there. gun.' Continuing the march for three more days, they arrived at "Brothers, the Great Revolution has failed and workers a village called Sanwan in Yongxin county. and peasants are being brutally slaughtered' The revolu- Sanwan was a very small village, but it occupies an impor- tion is at a low ebb. But victory and defeat are common tant place in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. occurrences to a military man. Failure is the mother of This was because an event known as the Sanwan Reorga- success. A high tide of the revolution will sooner or later nization took place there. In the reorganization, Mao Ze- arrive. We suffered in the past because we did not have dong adopted some of the most important measures for the guns. We must, therefore, have our own armed forces' organization o{ an army. These measures included setting So.rr" p"ople say that Chiang Kai-shek is very powerful up Communist Party organizations at all levels in the army and we are very weak. They doubt if we can achieve any a Party group in each squad, a Party branch in each success. In my opinion, we are weak only temporarily' - company and a Party committee in each regiment and We are like a piece of rock and Chiang Kai-shek is like a appointing Party representatives to all units above the big water vat. There will certainly be a day when the company. A Front Committee was established with Mao small rock that is us will break the big water vat that is Zedong as its secretary. Chiang Kai-shek. " The Party commands the guns ! This was realized through the end of his address, Mao again emphasized' "At At the Sanwan Reorganization. present, the enemy is big and we are small, the enemy is A Soldiers Committee was set up in each army unit to strong and we are weak. A city like Changsha is not a practise democratic administration and a system of politi- place for us to stay. We must change our strategy and go cal, military and economic democracy. New rules of disci- io th" countryside, where the enemy' s rule is weak and pline were laid down, which included the abolition of cor- we can conserve our strength and develop our forces' " poral punishments and the execution of deserters. prohibi- Mao Zedong was a gifted speaker. His address to the tion of beating or swearing at people and of press-ganging meeting was like a bugle call, which was immediately re- labourers, and fairness in business transactions. .po.rded by the men, who followed him and marched Mao Zedong also adopted a brilliant measure, which was southward. regarded at the time as "buying popular support. " He de- The march was uneventful during the {irst few days' But clared that anyone in the army could "leave or stay on a on the early morning of the fifth day, the men of the voluntary basis. " Those who wanted to leave were given Workers' and Peasants ' Revolutionary Army were certificates and travelling expenses. These people did not aroused from their sleep by an enemy surprise attack' Lu necessarily looked upon Mao Zed,ong as their saviour; Deming, the commander, was hit by a bullet and killed' they at least would not harbour hatred for him. Angered and saddened by the loss of their comrade-in- Shortly afterwards, Mao Zedong marched his army to the u.* Mao Zedong and his men attacked and took the Mountains in province, where he not county town of Lianhua, where they destroyed the Jinggang Jiangxi 18 Mao Zedot/ s Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 19 only "went up the mountains and learned from the ban- On the Jinggang Mountains, Mao made every effort to es- dits, " but also "formed an alliance with bandits. " tablish a Red regime so as "to carve out a territory by The Jinggang Mountains were then the hideout of two armed force, encircle the cities from the countryside and bandits named Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, each having eventually attack and occupy the cities and liberate the over six hundred underlings and sixty dilapidated rifles. whole of China. " He knew that in order to consolidate the Mao Zedong later told Edgar Snow: "Two former bandit Red regime he must build a powerful and well-disciplined leaders near Chingkanshan [Jinggang Mountains], named Red Army. Wang Zto and Yuan Wencai. joined the Red Army in the In the spring of 1928, Mao Zedong laid down the Three winter oI 7927. This increased the strength to about three Rules of Discipline for the Red Army: 'Wang regiments. and Yuan were each made regimental 1. Obey orders in your actions. commander, " Although the two bandit leaders had joined the Red 2. Don't take anything from the workers and peasants. Army, Mao Zedong did not regard them as comrades in 3. Turn in all things taken from local bullies. Party and was on guard against them. He the Communist In the summer of the same year, he supplemented the "These men, although former bandits, had said, two Three Rules of Discipline with Six Points of Attention: thrown in their force with the Nationalist Revolution, and were now ready to fight against the reaction. While I re- 1. Put back the doors you have taken down for bed- mained on Chingkanshan they were faithful Communists, boards. and carried out the orders of the Party. Later on' when 2. Put back the straw you have used for bedding. they were left alone at Chingkanshan, they returned to 3. Speak politely. their bandit habits. Subsequently they were killed by the 4. Pay fairly for what you buy. peasants, by then organized and Sovietized and able to de- 5. Return everything you borrow. fend themselves. " 6. Pay for anything you damage. Making use of bandits {or his own purpose is a brilliant part of Mao Zedong's art of war. After 1929. Mao Zedong changed "Don' t take anything In the spring of 1928, Zhu De had fought his way to the from the workers and peasants" into "Don't take a single Jinggang Mountains with what remained of the army in needle or piece of thread from the masses' and "Turn in the Nanchang Uprising and a peasant army that had taken all things taken from local bullies" into "Turn in all mon- part in a southern Hunan uprising. On the Jinggang ey raised" and then into "Turn in everything captured. " Mountains, ZhtDejoined force with the army of MaoZe- To the Six Points of Attention he added two more: dong. This was the world-famous "junction on the Jing- "Don't bathe within sight of women" and "Don't search gang Mountains. " The two armies joined together and the pockets of captives. " The Three Rules of Discipline formed the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and and Eight Points of Attention were later further improved Peasants' Red Army, with Zhu De as its commander-in- and even set to music and sung by every soldier in the Red chief and Mao Zedong as its political commissar. Army. Zedong's Art oI War 20 Mao Mao Zedong's Art of War 27
Mao Zedong paid particular attention to training an effi- Mao Zedong's original sixteen-character formula was de- of cient army and preparing it for war' The Three Rules signed solely for the Red Army base area in the Jinggang Discipline and Eight Points of Attention were part of the Mountains. It meant: When the enemy leaves the moun- training and PreParations. tains, we go in; when the enemy comes into the moun- tains, we leave; keep clear of the enemy's main force and attack his weak points; conceal the Red Army units and attack the enemy at unexpected places. "When I The Enemv Advances, We Retreat the Red regime is encircled by the White regime. it is necessary to make use of the dangerous mountain ter- + Conceaiing trre ArmY in the - rain, " said Mao. Mountains and Forests But why did Mao choose the Jinggang Mountains as his base area? In May 1929, Mao Zedong put forward his important six- The answer can be found in a Chinese Communist book of teen-character formula : history: "The reasons were: 1. The Jinggang Mountains form the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountains. They extend to Guangdong in the south and to Hubei in the The eneml advances, we retreat; north and form the border between Jiangxi and Hunan. The enemY cam4s, we harass; All revolutionary activities there would influence people in The enem5, tires, we attach; Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces. 2. There were rela- The enentY retreats, we Pursue' tively well-organized Party cells, people who were sympa- thetic of the revolution, and an armed force with rich ex- The sixteen-character formula constituted the basic princi- perience in the struggle. 3. There were villages in the ples of his tactics in guerrilla warfare and a golden key to Jinggang Mountains where rice and a variety of other food his extraordinarY exPloits. grain are produced. Close to the Jinggang Mountains were The formula, however, was not coined in one day; it was areas fairly rich in produce, from where the Red Army a summing-up of the lessons Mao had learned in long could collect food and money. 4. The Jinggang Mountains years of bloody wars. are located between Jiangxi' s Suichuan, Ninggang, The earliest version of the sixteen-character formula was: Yongxin and Lianhua counties and Hunan's Chaling coun- ty. With Ninggang as the centre, the mountains are 250 kilometres in circumference and forty kilometres in length He goes out, tae corne tn; and breadth. There were only five narrow and rugged He comes in, we go out: paths leading into the mountains where there were many Avoid the strong, attach the weah: sheer precipices and tall trees. The dangerous terrain KeeP our forces in hiding' made the mountains easy to defend and hard to attack and provided the Red Army with a favourable place to create Mao Zedotg's Art o{ War LJ Mao Zedong's Art of War
their ways .. with bushes. Narrow trails now wound an indePendent regime. through former gullies and marshes. Military maps are was also answered in a history book The same question extremely important for an army on the march or during a "The reason that the Red published by the Kuomintang: battle. But if an army was to follow the old military maps spread and grow was to be found in Landit" were able to there, it would soon lose its way. " of the locality where they were ,h" *"o*r^rhical condition From the above we can see that Mao Zedong had brought on the upper reaches of the River active. Southern Jiangxi about vast changes in the Jinggang Mountains and that mountains about 700-800 metres Gan is an area of high military maps had become useless and Kuomintang offi- years of erosion had created many above sea level. Long cers who followed the old maps became lost in the moun- ln the mountains' There were' how- long and deep gorges ta1ns. the mountains where there were .u"i, pi""". oflf"i land in The author had no intention of derogating Kuomintang ponds watered by sufficient fertile fields and beautiful generals. But Chiang Kai-shek himself had said at the forests made the place rainfall. Steep mountains and dense time, "Putting down the bandits is even more difficult to attack' Ordinary bandits ,o d"f"rrd and difficult than fighting a great war. This is because they are famil- "u., poor' out-of-the-way areas' usually built their dens in iar with the local terrain, coerce the people to follow located behind natural bar- But the bandit dens in Jiangxi' them, avoid the strong and attack the weak. The govern- self-sufficient' The well-known riers, were economically ment troops pursued them here and there and exhausted and Donggu were located on dan- bandit dens at Jinggang themselves without achieving any result. " time the bandits were defeated' gerous terrain. Et!,1 As the movement started by Mao Zedong in the Jinggang put up a stubborn defence at ihey withdrew to their dens' Mountains steadily gathered momentum, even Chiang to come out' " strategic spots and refused Kai-shek was alarmed. But was the movement always vic- the Mountains after Mao Ze- What happened to Jinggang torious without suffering any defeat? No. In July 1928 into his revolutionary base? The dotg h"i'turned them some fanatical "Leftists" in the higher hierarchy of the book only says that "the masses were Communist history Chinese Communist Party advocated that "the petty bour- down the local bullies' divide the fully mobilized to strike geoisie must be rendered propertyless before they can be and peasants' regime' " A lani and establish a workers' forced to take part in the revolution. " These people did however' gives a more vivid Kuomintang history book, not know how to fight on the battlefield but liked to is- "After having entrenched them- and objective account: sued orders. When Mao Zedong was in Yongxin away for several years' the Red ban- selves in southern Jiangxi from the Jinggang Mountains, some "Leftist" officials boundzrrics of the cultivat- dits had not only eliminated the took the Fourth Red Army to southern Hunan and at- (The o{ the former owners of the land ed land boundaries tacked the town of Chenzhou. The battle led to the total land was diviclcd) but also changed were destroyed when ' fiasco of the 29th Regiment and the loss of half of the Red for thc mountains and rivers the local terrain. Except Army. As a result of the "Leftist" policies, the majority s powor t 1 Mao Zedorg's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 24 At Huangyangjie, guns roar lihe thunders, of the county towns and flat lands in the Red ed: and most Report comes: The enenry ran alt)ay last night. areas were occupied by the Kuomintang army' was not flurried by the at- Mao Zedong himself' however' As everyone knows, Mao Zedong always stood for fight- When the 28th and 29th tacks of the Kuomintang army' ing a "people's war' and even advocated "turning the march to southern Hunan' he R"gi.n".rt, were about to whole population into soldiers. " This military idea of his Regiment to Yongxin to aoJk ,*o battalions of the 31st was formed as early as the period when he fought in the block the invading enemy from Jian' Jinggang Mountains. battle he used the tactic of Mao Zedong said that in that In "The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains, " he wrote: " "guerrilla warfare on all sides' "Since the struggle in the border area is exclusively mili- the people' " he said' "3h"1t"."d by the broad masses of tary, both the Party and the masses have to be placed on a 'guerrilla on all sides' "we adopted the method of warfare war footing. How to deal with the enemy, how to fight, of the enemy and succeeded in detaining eleven regiments has become the central problems in our daily life. An in- from the for twenty-five days at a spot fi{teen kilometres dependent regime must be an armed one. Wherever such county town of Yongxin' " an area is located, it will be immediately occupied by the enemy if armed forces are lacking or inadequate, or if wrong tactics are used in dealing with the enemy. ' The defensive battle at Huangyangjie described in the po- ern above was a "people's war. " EverY Man into a Soldier E Turning The battle at Huangyangjie was fought according to f, PartY and - Placlng of the Mao's tactics, but the troops were not commanded by PeoPle on a War Footing him, but by a Red Army battalion commander named Chen Yian. (to Xi In the lyric poem Jinggang Mountains the tune of In mid-August 1928 Mao Zedong took two battalions of Jiang Yue) Mao Zedong wrote: the Red Army 31st Regiment to the triangular area formed by Yongxin, Lianhua and Chaling counties. When news of the 29th Regiment being totally wiped out reached him, Mountarns Jinggang he immediately decided to lead the Third Battalion of the to the tune of Xi Jiang Yue - 31st Regiment to Guidong to meet the de{eated 28th Regi Below the mountains, flags and banners are in sight' ment and ordered the First Battalion to rush back and de- On the mountaintop, bugles and drums echo' fend the Jinggang Mountains. Surrounded by thousands of enemies The victorious enemy was now heading straight for the We stand firmlY to our ground' Jinggang Mountains. The Red Army battalion commander Chen Yian sped back with only two companies of the sol-l d.efence is as strong as a fortress' Our diers. They crossed a mountain peak and manned their po- And our wills unite us as one' Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War 27 the Red Army on the mountain took out a 82mm mortar sitions at Huangyangjie. A11 the inhabitants in the moun- tains, both men and women, young and old' were then and fired three shots. Upon hearing the sound of the mor- tar, the enemy thought there were thousands Red mobilized to defend the Red base with whatever weapons of Army men with cannons on the mountains. Scared out of their wits, they turned and fled. Mao Zedong not only wrote a poem describing the battle, but also reported the successful defence of the Jinggang Mountains to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. "'When our men were returning but had not yet reached their destination, ' he wrote, "enemy units from Hunan and seized the opportunity to attack the glance. " Jiangxi points ih" launched its fi With Jinggang Mountains on August 30. Using their of ".r".rry in- vantage, the defending troops, numbering less than one the Red ArmY firing from ith battalion, fought back, routed the enemy and saved the numerable bamboo lPikes in the " grass, it was extremely difficult for the enemy to move base. {-or*utd. Each enemy soldier had to keep a certain dis- What else did Mao Zedong do on the Jinggang Mountains? gun' In today's words, Mao Zedong was very good at "doing tance {rom the next one before he could fire his political and ideological work. " Although the enemy army attacking the Jinggang Moun- Sun s there are about Tao: tains was more than a division strong' the soldiers who In Zi' Art of War talks the by "The Tao enables the people to be of one heart with their could be positioned at the first line of fire were limited superiors. They can be die live and they be- the terrain to no more than a battalion' The two compa- told to or to come fearless of danger. " nies of the Red Army reinforced their positions on the ene- Mao' s political and ideological achieved the same mountain and collected many rocks to throw at the work purpose as the Tao in Sun Zi's Art of War. In the words my. the Kuomintang, "Mao Zedong made the Red Army Vlhen the enemy failed to make any advance in a single of and people the sacrifice file, they began to cover the attack with machine-guns' on Jinggang Mountains willingly prevent- their lives for him. " In Mao' s own ". . making But when firing at a low angle' the machine-guns words, . the men feel they are fighting for themselves and for the ed their own soldiers from moving {orward' and when fir- people and not for somebody else. " First of all, Mao Zedong told his men that "they are fight- ing for themselves, for the working class and the peas- antry. " If they were victorious, they could stand up and become their own masters and divide the land of the land- When an enemy soldier stepped on one o{ them' he was lords. Words like these could certainly spur every poor immediatelY Put out of action' man to actron. The attack lasted until {our orclock in the a{ternoon when Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zed,org's Art of War 29 28 "The officers Mountains He also practised. "democracy" in the army' Jinggang equal treat- to the tune of Nian Nu do not beat the men; officers and men receive Jiao and speak out; ment; soldiers are free to hold meetings Thousands of tall trees and the ac- trivial {ormalities have been done away with; Corer hundreds of miles, " counts are open for all to inspect' Piercing the shy aboae spectacular southern mountains. "The very He believed his method could work wonders: What do I see on nD) return to the old place? army yesterday soldiers who had no courage in the White More touters, pavilions and terraces. such is the ef{ect ur" r"r, brave in the Red Army today; Before the monument at Fiue Wells in which all of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace And at Huangyangjie they come captured soldiers are transmuted the moment Cars speed as if on wings. as much as the o,r"r. L China the army needs democracy The scenery is lihe a piclure. weapon people do. Democracy ln our army is an important A green sea, as the ancients described it. " ior ,.rd".*ining the feudal mercenary army ' Thirty-eight years haae passed in a flash. on captured Mao Zedong was particularly good at working The world has changed, "The most effective enemy soldlr". Very frankly he said: As though the shy has been oaerturned. {orces is to method in propaganda directed at the enemy I still remember the days of war, wounded medical release captured soldiers and give the Brauing dangers as if it happened yesterday. or compa- treatment. Whenever soldiers' platoon leaders' The sarne lofty aspirations are still here. are cap- ny or battalion commanders of the enemy forces A bright moon hangs in the shy, them; tu'ed, we immediately conduct propaganda among While wind and thunder rage. those wish- they are divided into those wishing to stay and As the rooster crows, ing to leave, and the latter are given travelling expenses All deails aanish lihe smoke and mist. the bottom out the and set free. This immediately knocks every- slander that 'the Communist bandits kill ".r"rrrr's Reascending the Jinggang Mountains one on sight.' " of{icial to the tune of Shui Diao Ge Tou Mao Zedong' s method' had caused a Kuomintang - "How ! " Mao .ru.n"d V^rrg Ct i,tteng to exclaim' vicious I have long wished to touch the clouds s remark be- was very pleased with hi*t"lf when Yang' And once again climb the Jinggang Mountains. cameknowntohim.MaoZedongalwayscherishedthe Coming to the old place from afar, Mountains' memory of the days he spent in the Jinggang I find old scenes replaced by new ones. of 1928' In addition to the poem he wrote in the autumn Orioles sing and swallows dance eaer5ruthere, Mountains he wrote two more lyric poems on the Jinggang And euerywhere are babbling streams. The roads ascend into in May 1965: the clouds. After passing H uangyang.jie. llao Zedong's Art of War 31 30 Mao Zedong' s Art o{ War No precipitous place is worth a glance. egy and pit the many against the few in tactics. He also laid down such basic tactics as "luring the enemy in Wind and thunder rage, deep, " "concentrating the force, " "striking at one part of Flags and banners are unfurled the enemy" and "destroying the enemy ont: lly one. " In the zt-,orld of manhind- Since the war fought by the Red Army took mainly the Thirty-eight years have Passed form of guerrilla warfare or mobile warf:rrt:, Mao pointed Like a snap of the fingers. out that the main force must act in conccrt witlr rcgional Heaaen to tie up the We can climb to the Ninth forces; the regular troops, with guerrillzr rrnits :rnd the moon, Red Guards (militia) ; and the armed masscs, with non- turtles, Dive into the Fir-te Seas to catch armed masses. Only then could the Red Army clcfcat the laughter' And return amid triumphant songs and enemy who was many times stronger than itscl[. Nothing is too hard in this world, This means that when fighting a battle, Mzro Zcrlong not If you are willing to scale the heights. only mobilized his troops, but also all thc ordinrLry pco ple, including even those who werc old and wcak and the wounded soldiers. Recounting the situation on the Jing- gang Mountains, a book of the history of the Chinese Casting a Net to Catch the Fish Communist Party says, "The hospitals in the rear were al- 6 Casting It Wide or Drawing so mobilized to action. Soldiers suffered wounds - who light It In at Any Moment requested to go back to the front to fight the enemy; those who were seriously wounded were confident of their re- In addition to the sixteen-character formula, Mao Zedong covery and rested in peace. Also mobilized were the Chil- also put forward such guerrilla tactics as: "Divide our dren's Corps and the Young Pioneers, who armed them- forces to arouse the masses; concentrate our forces to deal selves with spears with red tassels, stood guard and check with the enemy" and "To extend stable base areas, em- travel permits to prevent enemy spies from slipping in. " ploy the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a A rare military genius as he was, Mao Zedong aspired a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around' " greatness more than that of "a mountain bandit" on the "the Mao compared these tactics to casting a net' The net Jinggang Mountains. His ambition was liberation of could be cast wide or drawn in at any moment, casting it all China. " wide to win over the masses and drawing it in to deal with In January 1929, Mao decided to leave the Jinggang the enemy. Mountains. He moved the main force of the Red Army to Mao Zedong decided that the war fought by the Red Army southern Jiangxi and western Fujian and established a must mainly take the form of guerrilla warfare or mobile larger revolutionary base with Ruijin in Jiangxi province warfare with a guerrilla character. The Red Army must as its centre. Two years later, in 1931, the base area al- fight a protracted war in strategy and battles of quick de- ready covered more than three hundred counties with a population cision in tactics, overcome the many with the few in strat- of tens of millions. On November 7, the {irst t. Mao Zedorg's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War National Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers was shift and not to attack Nanchang and other big cities. On convened in Ruijin, attended by more than six hundred November 1. Mao Zedong ordered the Red Army "to lure deputies. The congress issued a declaration, adopted the the enemy deep into the Red area and wait for an opportu- "Outline Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic" and nity to wipe it out when it is exhausted. " 'fhe main force elected Mao Zedong chairman of the Central Workers' and of the Red Army left the Yuanshui River valley, crossed Peasants' Democratic Government. the river Ganjiang and marched eastward. It thcn with- How strong was Mao' s Red Army at the time? A drew to the central part of the base area witlr thc intcntion "Within Kuomintang history book says, the boundaries of of making use of the favourable conditions o[ thc basc area the Chinese Soviet Republic, there were 360'000 men in to destroy the enemy in mobile warfare when opportunity the regular Red Army and 650,000 men in the non-regular presented itself. probably result units. " These astounding figures were the November 5. The Kuomintang troops zrdv:rncr:d to the of Mao' s bluff and bluster. The main force of the Red Yuanshui River valley. Failing to find ttrc Ilcd Army, Army was actually only 40,000 strong. they pressed toward the eastern bank of thc rivcr (lan- plan "suppression the Chiang Kai-shek devised a for the of jiang. The main force of the Red Army had by now moved "After " bandits" in August 1930. giving thought to it, he to the area around Longgang. "I' the suppression of said, ve come to the conclusion that December 6. The Kuomintang army started to attack the succeed overnight. The only way the Red bandits cannot central part of the base area, searched for twenty days, succeed is to concentrate the troops, build fortresses to but still could not find the Red Army and engage it in a so that the ban- and roads and develop communications, decisive battle. have no place to hide and act stealthily and our dits will Since the Kuomintang troops were positioned along a 400- government troops will be able to move freely and take the kilometre front from Wanan and Taihe in Jiangxi province bandits by the throat. " in the west to Jianning in Fujian province in the east, Mao In November, a great army of 100'000 men was assem- Zedong proposed that the Red Army should "make a Lu Diping, governor of Jiangxi province, as bled. With breakthrough at the centre" and strike at enemy divisions the commander-in-chief, the government troops launched under Tan Daoyuan and Zhang Huizan. The enemy troops the first encirclement and suppression campaign against would then be cut into two widely separated groups, and the Red base area headed by Mao Zedong. The invading the Red Army could defeat them one by one. army advanced in eight columns from north to south and December 24. Mao Zed,ong ordered the Red Army to en- adopted a strategy of "driving straight in and converge the gage the division under Tan Daoyuan which had "penetrat- attack along different routes. " ed deep" into the Communist area. The Red Army held a Before the campaign started, the Front (lommittee of the rally to pledge resolution. A couplet written by Mao hung First Front Army of the Red Army ntt'l at l-uofang in at the rally reads: Jiangxi' s Xinyu county (today' s Xinytr city) to make preparations against the encir<'l('I))('Ilt ;rnd suppression campaign. The committee dct'irlt'tl to rnake a strategic The enerny adaances, rue retreat; the enem5t camps, ute ha- I l I t s o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War Dtr 34 Mao Zedong' Art rass; the enem)l tires, we attach; the enemry retreats' we tured alive. The more than 9,000 men who made up his division headquarters and two brigades were either killed, pursue. We can win sure aictory in guerrilla @arfare' l Aduance and retreat in giant strides; lure the enemy in ,l wounded or taken prisoner. Not a single man escaped. ( poem (Jeep: concentrate our forces; destroy the enenty one by one' Mao Zedong wrote a after this victorious battle: I We will wipe out the enemy in mobile warfare' Against the First "Encirclement" Campaign to the tune Yu Ao The couplet actually embodied all of Mao Zedong's strate- - of Jia gy and tactics in guerrilla and mobile warfare' The trees are ablaze against a frosty shy, "As At th" meeting, Mao declared, we've followed the The wrath of Heaven' s soldiers soars to the clouds. policy of luring in the enemy deep and of advancing and re- Blurred by fog are Longgang' s thousand peahs. treating in giant strides, the enemy has fallen into our All cry out together, trap. Changes have taken place in the conditions of the en- Our vanguard has captured Zhang huizan. emy, the terrain and the people. Conditions for victory are all here. Victory is just ahead. " An army of two hundred thousand has relurned lo was not an idiot' He refused to Tan Daoyuan, however, Jiangri, take Mao' s bait and ordered his men to defend their posi- Smohe bellows, obscuring half of the shy. tions resolutelY. Millions of worhers and peasants are aroused Unable to touch Tan Daoyuan, Mao was overcome with To fight bacb as one tnan. anxiety. But at this moment the enemy' s 18th Division Below Mount Buzhou is a riot of red flags. commanded by Zhang Huizan suddenly approached Long- gang. Mao was overjoyed and said to Zhu De' "Heaven is helping ,. t ' He immediately decide to attack Zhang Recalling in later days the battle at Longgang where Huizan. Zhang Huizan was defeated, Mao said, "The battle at By the afternoon of December 30, most of the units of the Longgang was perfectly executed. It was the first battle Red Army' s Third Army Group and the Fourth Front against the encirclement and suppression campaign, and Army had converged on Longgang from the northwest and the enemy was totally destroyed, without a single man es- northeast and had Zhatg tightly encircled' Defeating him caping the net. It rarely happened in the history of war. " became as easy as catching a turtle in a jar' Chiang Kai-shek started the encirclement and suppression Soon after four o'clock in the afternoon, the Red Army campaign with an army 100,000 strong. The Red Army of headquarters signalled for an all-out attack' RiIle shots' 40,000 men destroyed Zharg Huizan' s division of 9,000 "pit- bugle calls and battle cries resounded everywhcre' The men. This was a successful example of strategically "pitting Red Army's only mortar also went into at'titln zrnd fired a ting one against ten" and tactically ten against " few shots. one. "ex- The enemy division commander Zl'mtg lltrizan was cap- Mao Zedong also described this method of fighting as Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War How did the Red Army deal with Chiang Kai-shek's sec- terior-line operations within interior-line operations, en- ond encirclement and suppression campaign? As Mao Ze- circlement and suppression within 'encirclement and sup- dong told Edgar Snow: "By 1931 this First Cam- pression, ' blockade within blockade, the offensive within January paign had been completely defeated. . . . After a respite of the defensive, superiority within inferiority, strength only four months, Nanking launched its Second Cam- within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and ini- paign, under the supreme command of Ho Ying-ching tiative within passivity. " [He Yinqin], now Minister of War. His forccs exceeded 200,000 men, who moved into the Red arcas by seven routes. The situation for the Red Army was then thought to be very critical. The area of Soviet power was very Manoeuvre Against Manoeuvre nI small, resources were limited, equipment scanty, and en- - Guerrilla Warfare Plus emy material strength vastly exceeded that of the Red Mobile Warfare Army in every respect. To meet this offensive, however, the Red Army still clung to the same tactics that had thus Against the Second "Encirclement" Campaigz (to the far won success. Admitting the enemy columns well into tune of Yu Jia Ao) was another poem written by Mao Ze- Red territory, our main forces suddenly concentrated a- dong during the days when the Red Army was under the gainst the second route of the enemy, defeated several siege of Kuomintang troops. It reads in translation: regiments, and destroyed their offensive power. Immedi- ately afterwards we attacked in quick succession the third route, the sixth and the seventh, defeating each of them Against the Second "Encirclement" Campaign in turn. The fourth route retreated without giving battle, to the tune of Yu Jia Ao - and the fifth route was partly destroyed. Within fourteen Clouds roll skjrwards on White Cloud Mountain, days the Red Army had {ought six battles, and marched Belou the mountain are quichened battle cries- eight days, ending with a decisive victory. With the Rotten wood and whithered trees have joined. in the break-up or retreat of the other six routes, the first route fisht. army, commanded by Chiang Kuang-nai [Jiang Guangnai] As a forest of guns Press forward, and Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai [Cai Tingkai], withdrew without The Winged General descends from the shies. any serious fighting. " Mao also wrote in his "Problems of Strategy in China' s We haae marched serten hundred li in fifteen clays' Revolutionary War" : "The situation in the second cam- Crossing the misty River Gan and Fujian' s gre.en paign was as follows: 1. The 'suppression' forces num- mountatns, bering 200,000 were under the command of He Yinqin Rolling bach strong enemy armies lihe all my's weak points with true strength, and attack for the sive battle, the government troops must concentrate could play purpose of defence. " the available forces so that every single soldier effective way Chiang Kai-shek also raised three slogans, which were: a role in it. This was the most economic and "Not to withdraw when wounded; not to bcnd when cap- tured; faithfully carry out one' s mission.' He told his men to pay attention to the concentration and division of forces, which were two main tactical principles. He laid special emphasis on prudence, explaining thnt since an- cient times the use of force had always becn thc last resort and the side that was rallied by griel and indignation won. Quoting Lao Zi's words, he said. "Whcn two armies are at war, the one that is filled with grief and indignation to wins. " could keep half or two-thirds of their forces as reserves were need- From the strategy outlined by Chiang Kai-shek, we can be dispatched as reinforcements wherever they see that Mao Zedong was competing with a formidable ri- ed. val. 9) Flexible deployment of forces' Based on the comman- der's talent and understanding' his courage to take risks flexi- and his wise decisions, he was to deploy his troops 8 Luring the Enemy in Deep - Avoiding the Enemy's Main Force and Striking at His Weak Spots Beginning from July 1931, Chiang Kai-shek started his third encirclement and suppression campaign against Mao Zedong' s central base area. Amassing a great army of 300,000, including his own troops, Chiang served as the commander-in-chief himself, with He Yingqin as the front-line commander. They were assisted by British, German and Japanese advisors. Since Chiang Kai-shek had an army ten times more numer- ous than the Red Army this time, he decided on a strategy of "driving straight in" with the aim of pressing the Red Army back against the river Gan and crush it there. He Zedong' s War Mao Art of War 45 44 Mao Zedong's Art of portunity. By the time the government troops had discov- could then divide his forces to encircle and totally destroy ered that the main force of the Red Army was in the west, the central base area and the Red Army' the Red Army had already rested for a fortnight. It had The main force of the First Front Army of the Red Army become increasingly clear that the government troops were was at the time dispersed in the area around Jianning' far in a passive position everywhere and the initiative was in from the old base area. It had only about 30'000 men' the hands of the Red Army. Seeing that his troops had be- who had fought many bitter battles in the second cam- come utterly exhausted and the troops of the warlords of paign and had not rested and been replenished' Guangdong and Guangxi were moving towards Hengyang t" it face of a powerful enemy, Mao Zedong again decid- " in Hunan, Chiang Kai-shek decided at last to withdraw. ed to adopt the strategy of "luring the enemy in deep' " As the government troops were withdrawing, the Red avoiding his main force and striking at his weak spots' Army, following Mao Zedong's tactics of "The enemy re- The main force of the Red Army under Mao Zedong and treats, we pursue, " gave chase in early September and at- ZhtDe left Jianning, made a great detour of 5OO kilome- tacked the retreating enemy twice, killing, wounding and tres and assembled at Xingguo in southern Jiangxi' where capturing more than 4,000 men and on September put a it was then joined by the Red Seventh Army' They 15 whole enemy division out of action. planned to move northward through Wanan but did not In this campaign which lasted three months, more .r."""d. In August, the Red Army had to fall back to the than 30,000 enemy troops were annihilated and guns part of Xingguo. 14,000 western captured. The government troops were now advancing on the Red In an article which he wrote in later days, Mao compla- Army along several routes at great speed, placing it in a cently retold how the third encirclement and suppression semi-encirclement. The Red Army made a thrust east- campaign was thwarted: ward through a gap of twenty kilometres in the cordon' "If the attacking enemy is far more numerous and much From August 7 to August 11, it fought three successive stronger than we are, we can accomplish a change in the battles and won all the three, wiping out more than balance of forces only when the enemy has penetrated 10,000 of the government troops. Upon discovering that deeply into our base area and tasted all the bitterness it the Red Army had moved eastward, Chiang Kai-shek im- holds for him. As the chief of staff of one of Chiang Kai- mediately ordered all the government troops that were shek' s brigades remarked during the third 'encirclement moving westward and southward to turn eastward' ap- and suppression' campaign, 'Our stout men have worn proach the Red Army along two routes and encircle it' themselves thin and our thin men have worn themselves to Adopting the tactic of "making a feint to the east and at- death.' Or, in the words of Chen Mingshu, commander- tacking in the west, " Mao ordered the Red 12th Army to in-chief of the western route of the Kuomintang' s 'encir- masquerade itself as the main force and march towards the clement and suppression' army, 'Everywhere the Nation- northeast, while the Red Army' s main {orce moved al Army gropes in the dark, while the Red Army walks in through ten kilometres of great mountains between two broad daylight.' By then the enemy army. although still units of the government troops ancl rtrttrrned to western strong, is much weakened. its soldiers are tired, its Xingguo, where it recuperated and waitcd for the next op- o{ War 46 Mao Zedong's Art Mao Zed,ong's Art of War 47 morale is sagging and many of its weak spots are revealed. Anhui base area had about 45 ,000 men organized in two But the Red Army, though weak, has conserved its corps, six divisions, four independent divisions and one strength and stored up its energy, and is waiting at it ease independent regiment. for the fatigued enemy. At such a time it is generally pos- After storming into the Red area, the headquarters of the sible to attain a certain parity between the two sides, or to Communist-suppression army issued an order: "1. All change the enemy's absolute superiority to relative supe- able-bodied men in the bandit area are to be executed. 2. riority and our absolute inferiority to relative inferiority. All houses in the bandit area are to be burned down. 3. and occasionally even to become superior to the enemy. Food grain in the bandit area is to be distributed to the 'encirclement When fighting against the third and sup- Communist-Eradicating Volunteers. Food grain that can- pression' campaign in Jiangxi, the Red Army executed a not be taken away should all be burned. Decisive and retreat to the extreme limit (to concentrate in the rear sec- drastic measures should be taken to carry out this order. " tion of the base area) ; if it had not done so, it could not Chiang Kai-shek' s National Army was successful this have defeated the enemy because the enemy' s 'encir- time. A history book of the Chinese Communist party clement and suppression' forces were then over ten times says: "Zhang Guotao, secretary of the Hubei-Henan-An_ 'Avoid the size of the Red Army. When Sun Zi said, the hui sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese enemy when he is full of vigour, strike when he is fatigued Communist Party and chairman of its military commis- and withdraws, ' he was referring to tiring and demoraliz- sion, proposed at an emergency meeting held on October ing the enemy so as to reduce his superiority, " 10 that the main force of the Red Army should leave the Chiang Kai-shek of course would not give up. Knitting his Soviet area, fight on the exterior line and wait for an op_ brows, he hit upon a new idea. Leaving Mao Zedong portunity to come back. After the meeting, the main force alone for the time being, he decided to attack Mao's com- of the Four Front Army of the Red Army, comprising rades in other provinces first. more than 20,000 men, crossed the Beiping-Hankou Rail_ Between July 1931 and March 1933, Chiang Kai-shek way and shifted westward, abandoning in fact the Hubei- adopted a two-step strategy: attacking the Hubei-Henan- Henan-Anhui base area.' Anhui and Western Hubei-Hunan base areas of the Red While converging on the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area, Army first and, after succeeding there, then turning all Chiang Kai-shek dispatched an army of over 100,000 men the forces against Mao' s central base area. Assuming the and started an attack against the Western Hubei-Hunan post of commander-in-chief of the bandit-suppression base area. The Communist history book admits, ,.In early army against Hubei, Henan and Anhui in May 1932' September, most of the base area was occupied by the en_ Chiang started the fourth encirclement and suppression emy. The rear organizations and the masses of the people campaign. suffered heavy losses. More than Z,OOO of the ill or The attack against the Hubei-Henan Anhui base area be- wounded alone fell into enemy hands. " gan on July 14, 1932. On Chiang Kai-shck's side was an In May 1932, while making preparations for the encir_ army of 300,000 men, including 26 tlivisions and five clement and suppression against the Hubei-Hunan-Anhui brigades. The Fourth Front Army o[ thc Hubei-Henan- and Western Hubei-Hunan base areas, Chiang Kai-shek Mao Zedong's Art Mao Zedong's Art of War of War 49 served as a staff had set up a bandit-suppression general headquarters officer, I've never suffered defeat as I have now, ' admitted Chiang Kai-shek. headed by He Yingqin against the Jiangxi-Guangdong-Fu- jian border area. The headquarters was in command of the National Army in Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian and Hunan provinces and entrusted with the task of containing the Red Army in the central base area and making prepara- 9 Fighting Not for Territory tions for a large-scale attack against the central base area' Give in Order to Take By the end of that year, He Yingqin had assembled more - 500,000 men, who were than thirty divisions, comprising In the four campaigns guided by Mao Zedong against en- area in three columns: left' to march on the central base circlement and suppression, the Red Army achieved bril- the central column, as the spearhead central and right. In liant victories. According to statistics compiled by the encirclement and suppression cam- of attack in this fourth Military Commission of the Communist Party, the regular paign against the central base area, were twelve divisions Red Army, in the three years between 1931 and 1933, Chiang Kai-shek' s own troops com- and 160,000 men of routed 780,000 enemy troops, annihilated 316,000, took by Chen Cheng. manded 196,000 prisoners and captured 165,200 pieces of weapons force of the Red Army had by now grown to The main and 19 radio sets. The Fujian-Zhejiang-liangxi Commu- men organized in three group armies and about 70,000 nist area had expanded and become linked with the central four corps. Following Mao Zedong' s strategy, the Red base area in southern Jiangxi, increasing its territory by Army again employed the methods of making a feint to the 100,000 square kilometres. The central base area had a east and attacking in the west, laying an ambush with a population of three million. After the fourth campaign, force and concentrating a superior force to fight bat- large the Central Red Army started a recruiting movement, in- annihilation. tles of creasing its strength to 300,000 men. As the main force of the National Army was in the east' Chiang Kai-shek, however. was not a rival easy to deal two divisions in its western column were exposed to the with. He instructed the National Army, saying that the Red Army. Throwing in a numerically superior force' the basic way of eradicating the Communists was "30 percent Red Army ambushed the enemy in the western column and military force and 70 percent politics. " Quoting the an- annihilated the two divisions after a battle lasting one and cients, he said, "Even in a village of ten households, a half days. In an attempt to retaliate, the National Army there ought to be loyal and faithful people. " He instructed diverted two of its divisions in the eastern column to rein- the officers of the National Army "to distinguish between force the central column. The Red Army again concen- good people who are loyal and faithful and bad people who trated a superior force, encircled and annihilated a division are cunning and deceitful and then pick the good people of and a battalion of the enemy south of the Yihuang area' In a locality to weed out the bad people. . . people the two victorious battles, the Red Army captured more . Good are the source of good soldiers; good soldiers are models than 10,000 guns and virtually smashed the encirclement of good people. " and suppression campaign in March. "Since the days I Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 51 the Chinese Communist Party won one victory Chiang Kai-shek made all-round preparations for the fifth after an- and suppression campaign against the Red other when Mao Zedong was in command and suffered ut- ter defeats when "..i..1"m".rtArmy. Militarily he adopted a new strategy of fighting a he was excluded from the leadership. The ultra-Leftists in the Party, like Wang Ming and Bo Gu, were good at making high-sounding speeches and act- ed in contradiction to Mao's ideas, condemning his ways as "guerrilla-ism. " They emphasized regular warfare, op- posed Mao' s strategy and denied the fact that the Red Army was weak and the National Army strong. They op- posed Mao' s principle by purchasing a large number of new aircraft' cannons of fighting a protracted war in strategy and battles of quick decision in campaigns and trucks. and ad- vocated fighting a war quick The strategy of building blockhouses was immediately put of decision in strategy and protracted battles in campaigns. As into execution. By January lg34' 2'900 of them had been for the way of fight- ing the war, they stood for fighting positional warfare and regular warfare that relied solely on the main force of the army as against guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare with guerrilla characteristics. In tactics, they stood for "engag- ing the enemy outside the gates" as against "luring against the Red Army base area in October 1933' the en- emy in deep"; dividing the forces The government troops converged on the heart area of the for defence as against the concentration of forces; "short Comir,rni.t base from all directions, advancing gradually making swift thrusts" as against mobility and making detours; putting the ene- my to rout as against battles of annihilation. The fallacious ideas of the ultra-Leftists actually came from a German. According to a history book published by the Chinese Communist Party, "In October 1933 the Com- munist International sent a military advisor named Li De (originally Otto Braun) from Shanghai to Ruijin. Totally ignorant of the actual situation in China, he slavishly ap- base area had onlY 100'000 men' plied the experience the Atthistime,however,MaoZedongwasreplacedbysome o{ Soviet Red Army in regular warfare and caused enormous losses to the ultra-Leftists as leaders of the Communist Party' s Central Chinese revolu- tion. Bo Gu, who was then one Committee and had practically no voice in the decision- of those in charge of the provisional Central Committee the making. of Chinese Communist be Party placed complete trust in The hi-storical rights and wrongs o{ Mao Zedotg can Li De. In fact, Li De and Bo Gu the judged di{ferently. But his military ideas' his strategy and were supreme military commanders of the Red Army in this " ,u.,"i.", are perfect and cannot be refuted' The army o{ war. Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War E9 "The Red Army was rendered helpless before the {ierce munist area to contract continually. Its ultimate objective enemy campaign, " sighed Mao Zedong. was to surround the Communist army and destroy it in a Although Mao Zedong had forfeited his command' he had strong pincer movement. The military encirclement and e- his own ideas of how the fifth encirclement and suppres- conomic blockade had been very effective. The bandit sion campaign could be repulsed. When he was in army and bogus government were eventually forced to Huichang county, southern Jiangxi' in June' he said to start a long-distance exodus. Over 70, 000 of the bandits some Red Army officers, "The main force should be with- broke out of the cordon and fled westward to avoid total drawn now for consolidation. Small detachments should annihilation. The shift was called the Long March, which local be used to fight a guerrilla war in coordination with lasted a whole year and covered IZ, SOO kilometres. tsy the armed units and contain the enemy. In the consolidation' time they reached northern Shaanxi, there were only you should sum up your experience and think over careful- 2,O00 or 3,000 of them left. " ly why the enemy could not be stopped, why you could The fiasco of the Red Army and the loss of the whole cen- not fight victoriously and why the enemy could not be de- tral base area, however, did not dishearten Mao Zedotg. stroyed. ' Instead, he coolly summed up the lessons to be learned He also said, "To preserve the main force of the Red from the defeat. He later wrote, "Those who advocate Army and destroy the enemy, we should again adopt the 'engaging the enemy outside the gates' oppose strategic strategy of fighting guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare retreat, arguing that to retreat means to lose territory, to with guerrilla characteristics. Make a careful reconnais- bring harm on the people ('to let our pots and pans be sance of the enemy and the terrain and prepare the battle- smashed, ' as they call it ), and to give rise to un- field at a spot between Huichang and Yunmen' Concen- favourable repercussions outside. During our fifth trate a superior force on the enemy' s flank and create counter-campaign, they argued that every time we re- favourable conditions to wipe out an enemy battalion or treated a step the enemy would push his blockhouses for- regiment first before winning more victories' You should ward a step. so that our base areas would continuously hulr. ."rr"rul plans of operations. For example' if the ene- shrink and we would have no way of recovering lost his my advanced in a single column, we should not hit ground. Even though luring the enemy deep into our terri- in sev- head or body, but his tail. If the enemy approaches tory might have been useful in the past, it would be use- eral columns, we should hit the column on his flank' In less against the enemy' s fifth 'encirclement and suppres- short, always concentrate an absolutely superior force and sion' campaign in which he adopted the policy of block- strike at the enemy' s weak sPots. " house warfare. The only way to deal with this campaign, But Mao Zedong's ideas were totally ignored' they said, was to divide up our forces for resistance and pouring in and News of the National Army's victory kept make short swift thrusts at the enemy. It is easy to give an answer to such views, and our history has already done so. As for loss of territory, it often happens that only by loss can loss be avoided; this is the principle of 'Give in order to take.' If what we lose is territory and what we o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War 54 Mao Zedong's Art gain is victory over the enemy, plus recovery and also ex- habitants into the depth of sufferings, but also have be- purr.io.t of our territory, then it is a paying proposition' come a great hidden danger for the state and nation. Re- 'lose' cently, bandit-suppressing have In a business transaction, if a buyer does not some the officers and men 'lose' fought courageously and selflessly and recovered money, he cannot obtain goods; if a seller does not one by " one the places occupied by the bandits for years. They some goods, he cannot obtain money' have totally destroyed the bandits' dens located behind Muo wrote, "The losses incurred in a revolutionary "l"o dangerous natural barriers. " movement involve destruction' and what is gained is con- In fact, the "Communist bandits in have not been struction of a progressive character' Sleep and rest involve Jiangxi' totally eradicated. Senior cadres of the Chinese Commu- loss of time, but energy is gained for tomorrow's work' nist Party, such as Chen Yi, Xiang Ying, Deng Zihui and If any fool does not understand this and refuses to sleep' Zhang Dingcheng, were still in southern Jiangxi leading he will have no energy the next day, and that is a losing part of the Red Army to fight as guerrillas. They were proposition. We lost out in the fifth counter-campaign for still "a great hidden danger" for the Kuomintang. pr".l""ly such reasons. Reluctance to give up part of our The 12,SOO-kilometre exodus of the Red Army, which territory resulted in the loss of it all. " Mao Zedong euphorically called "the Long March" and C)f course, the battlefield is not the only place where these Chiang Kai-shek condemned as "blind stampede, " was in bright ideas of Mao Zedong's can be applied' fact a great strategic withdrawal and shift. In early October 1934, the National Army had pushed its way into the heartland of the central base area. The three important towns of Xingguo, Ningdu and Shicheng fell 1n Long-DistanceExodus one after another. rt' A Strategic Shift to Preserve Strength On the night of October 10, the Central Committee of the - Chinese Communist Party and its Military Commission Although the main force of the Central Red Army was not were forced to start a great strategic shift with 80,000 totally ..rr""h"d by Chiang Kai-shek' it had to pull out of men of the main force of the Red Army, who departed its base area and start a long-distance exodus in October separately from Ruijin and Yudu. It was an unprece- "enemy 1934. dented, large-scale execution of the policy of ad- The Kuomintang believed that "the Communist bandits in vances we retreat. " To put it less euphorically, it was " 1934' "running " Jiangxi had been totally eradicated' On December 80;000 men for their lives. As the saying goes, the flfth plenary session of the Kuomintang' s Fourth Cen- "as long as the green hills are still there, one need not " tral Executive Committee issued a declaration' which stat- worry about firewood, meaning that if these men could in preserve ed: " The Red bandits have entrenched themselves their lives they would one day make a comeback. barriers' However, Mao Zedong had no voice in the decision-mak- Jiangxi and Fujian for years' Relying on natural they gathered a group of desperados and carried out wan- ing. When directing the Red Army to break out of the en- torrdlstructions. They not only have plunged the local in- circlement and start the great shift, the leaders of the pro- War Mao Zedong's Art of War 5/ 56 tr'{ao Zed.ong's Art o{ visional Party centre were in a great panic and did not Army began to proceed toward the Xiangjiang river val- know what were the right things to do. The soldiers were ley. Chiang Kai-shek had by now moved several hundred told to carry many heavy printing machines and -machine thousand troops to the area to pursue and block the path tools for making weapons and ammunition' With so many of the Red Army in three columns in an attempt to destroy men carrying so many things, it was extremely cumber- the Red Army on the bank of the Xiangjiang. some for the Red Army to move about on its long-distance Hunan is Mao Zedong's home province. He was very fa- flight. miliar with the area along the Xiangjiang. This is shown According to the plan made by the leaders of the Commu- in his poem Changsha: nist Party, the 80,000 men were to head for the western they were to join force with the Sec- part of Hunan, where Changsha army groups and then march westward ond and Sixth to the tune of Qin Yuan Chun along the borders of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan and Guangxi, a route which the Sixth Army Group had trav- I stand alone in the autumn cold, elled in the past. On the water's edge of Orange Island, When the National Army discovered the intentions of the Watching the Riuer Xiang flowing northrpard. Red Army, it immediately formed four blockade lines in I see a thousand mountains tinted red southern Jiangxi, on the Hunan-Guangdong border' in And tiers of trees dyed in colours. southeastern Hunan and on the Hunan-Guangxi border All along the riaer of clear blue waters, and sent out massive forces to pursue and block the path A hundred boats are battling against the current. of the Red Army. Eagles sweep across the vast shy, The different units of the so-called National Army' how- Fish swim in the shallou.ts, ever, were not of one mind in pursuing and blockading the Thousands of creatures vie for freedom under the Red Army because each had its own calculations' On the frosty shy. eve of its exodus from Jiangxi, the Red Army had' in ear- Puzzled by lhis immensity, Iy October, reached a five-point agreement with the I ash: "On this aast erpanse of land, troops under Chen Jitang in Guangdong' which included Who is the master of fate?" on-the-spot cease-fire, exchange of information' removal I raas here with a throng of of blockade, opening to trade and, when necessary' pas- friends, Vir.,id are mU rnemories of those crowded years. sage through each other's territory. Therefore' when the Schoolmates we were, still young, Red Army broke out of the first line o{ blockade and en- In the period of our lives, tered Guangdong province, Chen Jitang turned a blind eye flowering to it. His troops fired into the air and permitted the Filled with students' enthusiasm. smooth passage of the Red Army through the second line Casting all restraints aside, commented on of blockade. We affairs of the state After breaking through the third line of blockade' the Red In passionate words. Mao Zedotg's Art o{ War ldao Zedong's Art o{ War 59 To us, the mightjt'Luere no more than dung' But Bo Gu and Li De still refused to change their plan. A Do you remember, meeting of the Party' s Political Bureau was held on De- province. As we su,,immed to mid-stream, cember 18 at Liping in Guizhou After heated de- The waves slowed down the speeding boats? bates. the majority of the members agreed to Mao Zedong's suggestion, and the Resolution on Establishing a Sichuan-Guizhou Base Area was adopted at the meeting. area without ldao Ze- Fighting a battle in the Xiangjiang After the Liping meeting, Mao Zedong was able once the other leaders do.rg m"urrt certain de{eat to Bo Gu and again to display his talents. The Red Army marched to- their of th" Communist Party, who were now at the end of wards the centre of Guizhou province and then turned the tether, but still refused to consult Mao' Ordering northward. In early 1935, it crossed the Wujiang River, landed them- troops to {ight the enemy head-on, they which was a natural barrier, and on January 7, occupied everywhere' selves in a passive position and were beaten the important town of. Zwyi in northern Guizhou. south of A fierce battle lasting a whole week was fought If one wishes to know and understand Mao Zedong, one must remember Ztnyi, which is as important as the Jing- gang Mountains. Ztnyi marked a turning-point in Mao Zedong' s career. In the words of the Chinese Communists, "At the Zwyi more than half of its men. Within three short months' the meeting, Mao Zedong' s leading position in the whole Par- ty and army was established. " An enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Zrny| January 75-77, attended by Mao Zedong. Zhang ernment troops built four lines of blockhouses and concen- Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, trated a heavy force in that area, intending to wipe out the Liu Bocheng, Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun and Deng Central Red Army then and there' Bo Gu and Li De were Xiaoping. blind to the enemy' s manoeuvre and stubbornly ordered The meeting appointed Zhang Wentian to draft the Reso- the Red Army to proceed as planned' This placed the Red lution Summing Up the Fight Against the Enemy's Fi{th Army in a tight spot. If the Red Army did not change its Encirclement and Suppression Campaign, which was later plan, it would meet with certain doom' adopted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Commu- At this critical moment it was Mao Zedong who came for- nist Party. ward with a bright idea. He suggested that the Red Army The resolution, which was in fact a paean to Mao "Under abandon its original plan o{ joining force with the Second Zedong' s military strategy, says, the condition and Sixth army groups and turn immediately westward to that the enemy is large and we small, the enemy strong establish a new base area in Guizhou province where the and we weak, our strategy should have been one of deci- (o{fensive National Army was relatively weak' sive de{ence defence), concentrating a superior Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 61 and then look for an force, picking the enemy' s weak spots and destroying county towns of Tucheng and Chishui to opportunity to cross the Yangtze River in the section be- with certainty a Part or a so as tween Luzhou and Yibin in Sichuan province. destroy the enemY forces rfare and Displaying his own military genius, Chiang Kai-shek im- crush the enemy' s enc ion cam- mediately deployed a heavy force along the Sichuan- Guizhou border to seal off the Yangtze River. On January 28, the Red Army started to attack Tucheng. As enemy reinforcements continually poured into the bat- tle, it soon became disadvantageous for the Red Army to blockhouse warfare. The so-called tactic of making and continue the attack. After pulling out of the battle at .short swift thrusts' was adopted to support the strategy Mao's order, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River at pure defence. The enemy was thus able to attain it ob- of the Yuanhou-Tucheng area the following day, marched j".iirr" with his strategy of fighting a protracted war and a westward and assembled at Zhaxi on the Sichuan-Yunnan war of blockhouses. " border. At Zhaxi, the Central Red Army was reorganized by Mao Zedong into sixteen regiments under the First, Third. Fifth and Sixth army groups. The National Army in Sichuan and Yunnan soon con- Crossing the Sea bY DecePtion verged onZhaxi from the south, north and west. 1l The First of the Thirty-Six Stratagems At this moment, the Red Army decided to postpone its - march northward across the Yangtze River and suddenly As the saying goes, "A man' s spirits heighten when a turned east to throw off the National Army. Between huppy event occurs. " This has been true since ancient February 18 and 21, it crossed the Chishui River once a- times. Mao Zedong' s spirits rose after he had gained the gain and re-entered Guizhou, launched a surprise attack supreme powers in the Communist Party' To demonstrate on Loushan Pass and reoccupied Zunyi. In the battle to his superb art of war, he commanded the Red Army in retake Zuny| the Red Army destroyed two enemy divi- prisoners. fighting a victorious battle. sions plus eight regiments and took 30,000 It greatest battle fought by the Red Army 1i"o pr"rr".rt the Central Red Army from marching north- was the victorious vrard to join with the Fourth Front Army or moving east- on its Long March. Not discouraged by the defeat at Ztnyi, Chiang Kai shek ordered the government troops to double back to the Zun- yi and Yaxi area in several columns. Seeing that the government troops were pouring into Zun- yi from all directions, Mao Zedong immediately led the area in an attempt to destroy the Red Army there' Red Army out of the net, marched westward, crossed the On January 19, Mao Zedong led the Central Red Army Chishui River for the third time on March 16 and 17 ar'd northward from the Zurryi atea, intending to seize the s Art of War liI.ao Zedong's Art of War 62 Mao Zedong' southern Sichuan. A history book of the Kuomintang recorded the events in re-entered "With Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Red Army was intend- those two years as follows: the bandit dens in ing to cross the Yatgtze and march north and tried again southern Jiangxi destroyed, the remnants of the bandits to block its path with powerful forces' broke out of the encirclement and fled toward the west, At this juncture, Mao again ordered the Red Army to turn intending to harass Sichuan and Guizhou. The bandit-sup- eastward and return to Guizhou. After crossing the pressing forces gave chase and tried to blockade their Chishui River for the fourth time, the Red Army moved path. Considering that the government troops in Sichuan southward, made a feint attack on Guiyang and sent its were not under a unified command and might not be able forces to eastern Guizhou to lure the government troops to play an effective role in wiping out the bandits, Presi- out of Yunnan to reinforce Guizhou. dent Chiang brought himself to Sichuan in March, the When all the government troops were moving towards 24th year of the Republic (1935). to supervise personally Guiyang, the Red Army unexpectedly marched southward the suppression of the bandits. He flew from Chongqing at the speed of sixty kilometres a day toward Yunnan' to Guiyang, from Guiyang to Kunming, and then from now devoid of government troops. After making a feint Kunming to Chengdu. In August, he supervised the es- near Kunming, the capital city o{ Yunnan, it moved at tablishment of an officers' training corps on Mount Emei. lightning speed toward the northwest and crossed the Riv- He once flew with Long Yun, the governor of Yunnan ei of Golden Sand known for it deep gorges and turbulent province, in the same plane over Huili and Xichang to flow in early March. watch the movements of the bandits on the ground. On After the Red Army had taken Loushan Pass' ldao Ze- the plane, he pointed his finger at the mountains and dong wrote a stirring Poem: rivers below and explained his military strategy to Long, who was deeply moved by President Chiang' s explana- the government troops in hot pursuit all the Loushan Pass tion. With to Hunan, Guizhou. Yunnan, Sichuan to the tune of Yi Qin E way from Jiangxi - and Xikang provinces, the Red bandits had no time to re- The west wind is fierce, gain their breath and still less time to entrench themselves Geese cry under a frosty morning moon' and coerce the local inhabitants into their ranks. The Wu- LJnder a frostY morning moon' jiang River, the River of Golden Sand and the Dadu Riv- Horses' hoottes clatter, er, where to National Army marched, were known for The sound of bugles is muffled. their dangerous and difficult terrain. After arriving in Do not say the mountain pass is iron.-clad' Sichuan in March, the president made several trips to We are now crossing it in firm steps' Guizhou and Yunnan, spent more than two months to su- As we cross it in firm stePs, pervise the tracking of the remanent bandits under Zhu De The green mountains are lihe the sea, and Mao Zedong and did not come to Chengdu until late joined The dying sun is blood red. May. In mid-June, the remanent bandits with those under Xu Xiangqian in the Songpan and Maogong area in Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 64 Mao Zedong's .' at Windlass Ferry and found all the boats for ferrying northwestern Sichuan. river were gone. With the assistance of the lo- The River of Golden Sand was the upper section of the across the cal people, they eventually managed to find seven small Yangtze River. \t zigzags its course through deep gorges places and began to cross the river in th" border between Sichuan and Yunnan' Its turbu- boats from nearby "lo.rg lent Jlow, surging waves and the sheer cliffs on either side these boats. crossing the river, Mao Zedong stayed in a cave of the river make it the most dangerous river to cross' After the ferry and spent days and nights directing the men If the Red Army could not speedily cross the river' it was near to cross the river as speedily as possible. in danger of being pressed in the deep gorge and destroyed of the Red Army many men and too few boats, it took by the government trooPs. As there were too to ferry across the In the teantime, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly dispatched the entire army seven days and nights to the other side of the troops to reinforce Yunnan and flew to Kunming in person River of Gold Sand. After crossing the boats. to supervise the war, while sending planes to reconnoitre river, the Red Army burned all "Crossing of the thirty- the movements of the Red Army along the River of Gold- the sea by deception" is the first ancient books on the art of en Sand. six stratagems mentioned in After marching through Wuding and Yuanmou' the First war. Mao Zedong cleverly applied this stratagem in the Army Group of the Red Army soon reached the ferry Red Army's crossing of the River of Golden Sand. point at Longjiedu, a main passage between Sichuan and Yunnan. The ferry point was not an ideal place to cross the river because the river is wide at this point and enemy aircraft could attack the Red Army from the air' But Mao Lightning Speed Is Important in War Zedortg told the Red Army to make a show of erecting a 12 Covering the Distance of that bridge. This led the government troops into believing - Three Steps in Two the Red Army was going to cross the river at this place' Large forces immediately began to pour into the Yuanmou After crossing the River of Golden Sand, the Red Army area in an attempt to wlpe out the Red Army there' continued to march northward through the Great Cool While the government troops were concentrating at Kun- Mountains inhabited by the Yi people. and then headed ming and the Yuanmou area, the Central Military Com- toward the Dadu River. *i..io., Column and the Third and Fifth army groups of It was at the Dadu River that Shi Dakai, the famous in- the Red Army moved swiftly toward Luquan on the bank surgent general of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and of the River of Golden Sand in two columns' The Military his army of 100,000 men were defeated nearly a century Commission Column and the Cadres Regiment was to take ago by the Qing soldiers commanded by Zertg Guofan. Windlass Ferry and the Third Army Group' Hongmen perished at Anshunchang, a ferry point Ferry, while the Fifth Army Group acted as the rear Shi Dakai's army on the southern bank of the Dadu River where lofty peaks guard. stand on either side of the river. An army has no room to At dusk on May 1' the vanguard of the Red Army arrived Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 67 Sichuan troops the northern bank opened fire on manoeuvre in a gorge like this and is very easy to fall into The on small and splashed into the water all an enemy ambush- the boat, bullets to move forward, brav- Chiang Kai-shek ordered the government troops under around it. But the boat continued and enemy bullets. Xue Y1e and Zhou Hunyuan to continue their pursuit and ing waves reached bank. the seven- at the same time instructed the Sichuan warlords to pre- As soon as the boat the opposite Red soldiers jumped shore, opened fire on vent the Red Army from crossing the Dadu River by build- teen Army to the enemy and soon took over the blockhouse guarding the ferry. The small boat quickly returned to the southern bank and ferried more Red Army soldiers over. Under the Red Army' s fierce attack, the enemy troops on the north- ern bank soon lost heart and fled. the northern bank, Dakai alive. After taking control of the ferry on the Red Army seized two more boats from downstream. But it was impossible to ferry all the Red Army men to the opposite bank in the three small boats. Mao Zedong im- mediately decided that the First Division of the Red Army was to continue to be ferried across the river and then head northward along the western bank of the river while the main force of the Red Army was also to head north- ward along the eastern bank of the river, and the two groups were to rendezvous at the Luding Bridge up- stream, groups Army. The distance was 120 kilometres. The two must After taking control of the Anshunchang ferry point' the reach the bridge on foot in one day' s time because two brigades government troops were on their way to rein- vanguard of the Red Army immediately made preparations of force the defenders of the bridge. The paths along the riv- to cross the river. But all the boats had been taken to the zigzagged steep mountains and down deep valleys northern bank by the enemy' The only boat available was er up enemy interceptions along the But a small one used by messengers' After finding this boat and there were way. the Red Army must get there before the government rein- and the boatman, the Red Army decided to force a cross- forcements. Otherwise, the Red Army would never be en brave men led bY their able to cross the river. river-forcing squad and Time was victory. The Red Army marched at the highest small boat under cover of speed and tried to cover the distance of three steps in two. the powerful gunfire of their comrades on the southern After marching at top speed for a whole day and night, vanguard the group reached the Luding Bridge bank. the of left Mao Zedong' s Art of War Mao Zcdong's Art of War structure at the other end of the bridge. The government at dawn the following day and immcdiately seized the soldiers had set fire to it to stop the advance of the Red western end of the bridge. Army men. Undaunted, the Red Army shock brigade con- The Luding Bridge on the Dadu River w;rli a strategic pas_ tinued to move forward even when their eyebrows and hair sage between Sichuan province and thc Xikang_Tibet were burned. Overawed by the Red Army men' s bravery, area. The bridge was built with thirteen iron chains sus_ the defenders abandoned their defence works and fled. Af- pended over the river. Two iron chains on cach side of the ter taking the eastern end of the bridge, the Red Army bridge served as guard rails while nine iron chains with rushed to the town of Luding and engaged the garrison in wooden planks laid on them formed the bridge itself. The street fighting. turbulent river roared deafeningly undernearh the bridge After the western group of the Red Army had taken the as waters cascading down through the gorgcs upstream, Luding Bridge and crossed the river, the eastern group al- throwing up innumerable waves and forming many so arrived at the spot. The main force of the Red Army whirlpools as they hit the rugged rocks at rlrc botom of then crossed the river in a continuous stream. Where Shi the river. Dakai had failed nearly a hundred years ago the Red Army Stationed in the town of Luding were two cnemy regi_ succeeded. ments, who had built defence works at their end of the "Lightning speed is important in war. " Mao Zedong had bridge and removed all the planks wooden on the bridge, dexterously followed this principle of the classical art of believing that their defence works and the natural barrier war. formed by the turbulent river prevent would any Red After crossing the Dadu River and breaking through ene- Army men from making a crossrng. my interceptions, the Central Red Army marched to Tian- The vanguard of the Red Army picked twenty brave sol_ quan, Lushan and Baoxing and entered the Sichuan- diers to form a shock brigade. In the afternoon on that Xikang border area, where it climbed the Great Snow day, at the sound of bugles, the twenty men, each armed Mountains, or Jiajin Mountains, the first great mountains with a cavalry sword, a pistol and with handgrenades in on its Long March. It then occupied Dawei and Maogong his belt, began to crawl along the bare iron chains, brav_ and joined force with part of the Fourth Front Army of ing powerful enemy gunfire and under cover of fire from the Red Army that had pulled out of the Sichuan-Shaanxi their own side. A company of soldiers followed immedi_ base area. While crossing the Great Snow Mountains. ately behind them and placed wooden planks on the iron Mao Zedong wrote three short poems: chains as they advanced. The sounds of bugles, gunfire and men shouting mixed to_ gether. The shock brigade crawled steadily forward, ig_ Three Short Poems noring the roaring waters below and bullets whistling - to the tune of Shi Liu Zi Ling overhead. They had only one mind: to reach the other enJ Mountains! of the bridge. I whip my fast horse instead of dismounting. As they were fast approaching their objective. flames and Turning bach mry head, I arn startled, black smoke suddenly began to bellow from the wooden Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 71 The shy is only three foot three atuay. total strength of the Fourth Front Army soon grew to more than 80,000 men. The situation was highly Mountains! favourable. But Zhang Guotao thought his Sichuan- Lihe surging aaaaes in a crushing sea, Shaanxi base area held no promise. Without consulting Lihe ten thousand horses Mao Zed.ong and the others, he abandoned it and moved Galloping in the heat of battle. the Red Army units to the western side of the Jialing Mountains! River. Piercing the sky, their barbs are not blunted. Mao Zedong accused Zhang Guotao of having committed The shy would fall "flightism" and "splittism. " Later, Zhang made many Without them supporting it. more disruptive moves which had caused heavy losses to the Red Army. Mao settled score with him in April 1937. Zhang left the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area in the Mao Zedong' s instructions for the Red Army were: "Af- spring of 1938 and began to engage in anti-Communist ac- ter the First and Fourth front armies have joined force, tivities. He later took refuge in Hong Kong and Canada. the general policy is to occupy the three provinces of Sichuan. Shaanxi and Gansu and establish a Soviet. The main force o{ the Fourth Front Army should expand its in- fluence in the area between the Minjiang and Jialing rivers 'Weiyuan Moving Deep into the Barren Land and consolidate in the Maoxian, Beichuan and 1 I ^v Hiding the True Intention area, using it as a pivot for advancing northward. Places - like the Maogong area, the banks of the Dadu River and from the Enemy Mount Emei are not areas for development. " However, his plan could not be carried out because Zhang On August 17, 1935, Mao Zedong started to lead the Red Guotao, a leader of the Fourth Front Army o{ the Red Army across the Great Grassland. His destination was Army, refused to follow his instructions. northern Shaanxi. The Fourth Front Army started a battle at the end of Mao Zedong' s instructions for the vanguard of the Red March 1935 for the forced crossing of the Jialing River for Army was: "Marching north to fight the Japanese in- the purpose of finding a new area of development on the vaders is a correct line decided by the Party centre after Sichuan-Gansu border and coordinating with the opera- studying the present situation. At present, Hu Zongnan tions of the Central Red Army on its Long March at the has concentrated four divisions at Zhangla, Longhuguan borders of Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan. After a fierce and Baozuo in the Songpan area; the Sichuan army in the battle, the Red Army successfully crossed the river, dis- east and west has occupied the eastern bank of the Min- rupted the government army' s plan of suppression in jiang River and the town of Zagunao on the western bank; Sichuan and Shaanxi and took control of an area west of the army under Liu Wenhui pursuing us has reached Mao- J the Jialing River. 150 kilometres in length and width. The gong and is moving toward Fubian; and the armies of Xue J I ) 72 Nlao Zedotg's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Yue and Zhou Hunyuan are assembled in Yachuan. If we gle-deep mud. There were no people' s houses to take turn back and head for the south, we would be fleeing shelter in at night; the Red Army had to sleep in the away from them and ruin the revolution. " open, wet wilderness. They had to carry their own dry ra- The enemy was on three sides of the Red Army. In front tions because there was no food grain to be obtained in the of it lay the Great Grassland. If they did not cross the locality. grassland, they would "ruin the revolution, " or in other An American scholar described the Red Army's crossing words, "everybody would lose his life. " of the Great Grassland as follows: The crossing of the Mao Zedong also said, "We can only move forward. The Great Grassland in Gansu was the most frightening expe- enemy will believe that we are going east out of Sichuan rience on the Long March. Mao Zedong lost several thou- and do not dare to risk crossing the grassland and move sand of his soldiers, who were engulfed in mud holes, north to Shaanxi and Gansu. But the enemy will never be died of hunger or were killed by aborigines in the locality. able to fathom out our true intention. We will take the But this had not affected Mao' s strategy and tactics. A road the enemy thinks we do not dare to take'' woman tribal chieftain was deeply hostile to the Han peo- According to what is recorded in a Kuomintang history ple. She threatened that any man who helped the Red book, "In August and September, the 24th year of the Army would be scalded to death with boiling water. The Republic (1935), President Chiang ordered the Central Red Army was forced for the first time to kill and rob in Army and the armies from central Sichuan to intensify order to obtain food. Mao later said, "This is the only their encirclement and suppression. The Songpan plateau debt we owe, which we will definitely pay back in the fu- had become a world of ice and snow a{ter September. The ture. Pay back the provisions we were forced to seize from weather was bitterly cold. More than 70 or 80 percent of the Miao people and the Tibetans. the local inhabitants were nomadic Tibetans not engaged The vanguard regiment took a fortnight from August 11 in agriculture. As only a small quantity of maize was pro- to August 26 to find a path through the boundless grass- duced there, there was an acute shortage of grain. To ob- land. The whole army then followed. tain food, the Red bandits plundered cattle and sheep In mid-September, Mao Zedong led the Shaanxi-Gansu from the Tibetans and lamaist temples. The Tibetans and detachment of the Red Army to Lazikou at the foot of the lamas came together spontaneously and desperately resist- Minshan Mountains after crossing the White Dragon Riv- ed the bandits. Forced by hunger and cold, the Red ban- er and following an old and dilapidated plank path built on dits decided to flee. The remnants of the bandits' 5,000 cliff face. or 6,000 in number, moved to eastern Gansu along the Lazikou was an important pass in the Minshan Mountains Qinghai and Gansu border. Government troops intercept- and a gateway to Gansu from Sichuan. The pass was a ed them along the route, defeating and dispersing many of gully about thirty metres wide between the sheer cliffs of them. " two mountains. The deep and turbulent Shisha River The Great Grassland was a large expanse of uninhabited flows at the bottom of the gully and was spanned by a marsh. The ground was overgrown with luxuriant green wooden bridge, which provided the only passage to grass, but when a man stepped on it he would sink in an- Lazikou. Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 74 Mao Zedong' s Art of War Lu Dachang, the warlord of Gansu, stationed a strong the others up. force at Lazrkot and built many defence works, which After some rest, the Sixth Company organized a dare-to- formed a network of fire in the vicinity of the bridge' die squad of fifteen men, who were to approach the bridge With the main force of Hu Zotgnan' s troops on its left in two groups. The first group was to climb the bridge piers and Yang Shisi's 20,000 cavalrymen on its right' the Red and work themselves forward to the enemy at the Army had no choice other than moving north through other end of the bridge. The second group was to coordi- Lazikou despite the fact that Lu Dachang had stationed a nate with the first group and approach the bridge from the strong force and relied on the natural barrier to block the other end. passage of the Red ArmY. When fighting started again, the first group of soldiers After studying the situation with his comrades, Mao Ze- groped their way to the foot of the bridge in the darkness dong decided to take Lazikou by force' of the night and climbed the piers, moving stealthily to At nightfall, thirty Red Armv soldiers from the Sixth the enemy at the other end. One of the soldiers, however, Company started a fierce frontal attack under dense cover- lost his hold when he was climbing a pier and fell into the ing fire. The government troops stayed put in their de- water. The enemy was alarmed and began to open fire on fence works and did not return fire at first. When the Red those below the bridge. Unable to move forward, the Red Army' s covering fire stopped and the soldiers began to Army men immediately took cover behind rocks. As the rush toward the bridge head, the government troops enemy was firing at the Red Army men under the bridge, threw a large number of handgrenades at them' As the the other group moved swiftly forward to the bridge, terrain was disadvantageous to them, the Red Army men threw a row of handgrenades at the enemy and rushed into tried several times but failed to attain their objective' their defence works. A hand-to-hand fighting followed. To overwhelm the enemy gunfire, the Red Army intensi- The First and Second companies were also successful in fied their covering fire with heavy and light machine- their outflanking operations. guns. But the enemy threw out more handgrenades, pre- After the Red Army had taken Lazikou, the remains of venting the Red Army men from making any advance' the enemy withdrew to Minzhou. Mao Zedong was highly Mao Zedong was very concerned about the progress of the pleased with another victorious battle. battle. Several times he sent men to the forefront to take a look. He then ordered the shock team to pull back and take a rest before starting another attack. To coordinate with the operations of the Sixth Company' Pulling Back After Attaining the Objective decided to lead the commander of the vanguard regiment 14 Assigning a Convincing Reason for the First and Second companies and outflank the enemy - the Use of Force from his rear. The steep cliff face on the right of the pass was very difficult to climb. After many tries' a man who was as nimble as a monkey succeeded in working himself After fighting its way through Lazikou. the Central Red up to the top. He then lowered down a rope and hoisted Army led by Mao Zedong marched to southern Gansu, Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 76 Mao Zedong's Art of War broke through the enemy defence lines along the Weihe The faces of the three armies brighten after crossing River and between the Xian-Lanzhou and Pinggu high- tt, ways, climbed over Mount Liupan and arrived at northern Shaanxi, where it Wuqizhen in Baoan county, In fact, Mao Zedong's face was already glowing when he Shaanxi under joined force with the Red Army of northern climbed over Mount Liupan. Liu Zhidan. It took the Red Army a whole year, from October 1934 to October 1935, to complete the great strategic shift' Mount Liupan The 12,500-kilometre long-distance running, which Mao to the tune of Qing Ping Yue a Kuomintang Zedortg called Long March, is described in The shy is high; the clouds, pale. "The Red bandits call their pell- history book as follows: We watch the wild geese until they vanish southward. Long March. In the four months after mell running the If we fail to reach the Great Wall we are not brave on the move' the Zunyi meeting, their army was always men, fierce battles. After experiencing innu- frequently fighting After we have marched twenty thousand li, merable difficulties' crossing China' s longest and deepest river, tallest and most dangerous mountains and an exten- On the lofty peah of Mount Liupan, sive grassland and after suffering from freezing cold and Red flags flutter in the zaest wind. broiling hot weather' wind and frost, rain and storm' it With a long rope in hand today, eventually reach northern Shaanxi. " When can u)e tie up the grey dragon? Mao Zedong described the Long March in one of his po- ems. Mao was very proud about the Long March whenever it was mentioned. He wrote, "The Long March is the first The Long March of its kind in the annals of history. . . . Since Pan Gu divid- - a lti shi ed the heavens from the earth and Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors reigned, has history ever The Red Arnry is undaunted by the trials of the Long witnessed a long march such as ours? For twelve months March, we were under daily reconnaissance and bombing from Mahing light the thousand riaers and mountains' the skies by scores of planes, while land The Fiuer Ridges undulate lihe gentle ripples; on we were encircled and pursued, obstructed The majestic Wumeng rolls by like balls of clay' and intercepted by a huge force of several hun- dred thousand men, and Warm are the cliffs lapped by the'@aters of the Golden we encountered untold difficulties Sand: and dangers on the way; yet by using our two legs we Cold are the iron chains on the bridge spanning the swept across a distance of more than twenty thousand li Datu. through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. Let The boundless snow on the Minshan is a joy to see, us ask, has history ever known a long march to equal Mao Zedong's Art of War iNlao Zedong's Art o{ War 79 ours? No, never.' the Shanxi-Suiyuan army to stop the Red Army' s east- In addition to writing poems and uttering proud words' ward march. Mao Zedong also said coolheadedly, "In one respect the On March 10, the headquarters of the Red Army on the "Notice Red Army has failed (i. e. , failed to maintain its original eastern expedition issued the of the Chinese Peo- ple' positions ), but in another respect it has won a victory s Anti-Japanese Vanguard Army, " in which it con- "reactionary" (i. e., in executing the plan of the Long March) ' " demned Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan's "stop As early as 1931, the year when the Japanese invaders oc- actions and reiterated the Red Army's desire to all " "march cupied China' s three northeastern provinces' Mao Zed'ong civil wars, eastward to resist the Japanese" and "save had advocated resistance against Japanese aggression' But the nation from subjugation. " in the five years that {ollowed' he never fought against On March 23, Chiang Kai-shek moved more than ten divi- sions, totalling 300,000 men such any Japanese army. The reasons were that he was in the from strategically im- portant places far-away Jiangxi province at the time and later was run- as Luoyang, Xuzhou and Pukou into Shanxi ning for his life on the Long March. to intercept the Red Army' s eastern expedition against In early 1936, the Central Workers' and Peasants' Demo- Japan and ordered the Northeast Army, Northwest Army cratic Government and the Revolutionary Military Com- and other units of the government troops in Shaanxi and mission of the Chinese Anti-Japanese Red Army headed by Gansu to harass the Red Army' s rear base. Chiang de- "Today, Mao Zed,ong organized the Chinese People' s Anti- clared. we may declare that Japan is not qualified to be our enemy; our enemies are Japanese Vanguard Army of. 72,000 men, with Peng De- still the Red bandits. hui as its commander-in-chief' Mao Zedon'g, its general Once we have eliminated the Red bandits who are the in- political commissar, and Ye Jianying its general chief of ternal roots of disaster, there is no problem in dealing staff. The "Order for the Red Army to Advance Eastward with Japan. I hope everybody will realize that our objec- tives to Resist the Japanese and Punish the Traitor Yan were opposing the Japanese invaders externally and " Xishan" was issued on January 15' 1936, and the "Procla- opposing the Red bandits internally. What he meant was policy "internal mation of the Eastern Expedition, " on February 17. The to implement the of pacification before re- proclamation declared that the purpose of the Red Army' s sisting foreign aggression. " Red crossing of the Yellow River and marching eastward was The Army on the eastern expedition routed seven di- to resist aggression. visions of Yan Xishan's army in the Fenhe River valley, JaPanese putting On the night of February 20, the Red Army crossed the 13,000 enemies out of action, taking more than Yellow River in two columns in a fifty-kilometre section 4,000 prisoners below the rank of regimental commander and enlarged of the river between Hekou in the south and Goukou in the its own strength by recruiting over 7,000 north. After breaking through Yan Xishan's defence line new soldiers. It conducted propaganda in more than twen- of blockhouses alone the river, the Red Army entered ty counties on resisting Japan and the ideals of commu- nlsm. Shanxi province. Yan Xishan telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek for aid on the Attacking Yan Xishan was in itself an act of civil war. But Zedong one hand, and on the other concentrated seven divisions of Mao did it on the ground of fighting against the Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 81 for the use of force' After Huining in Gansu province, where it joined force with the Japanese - a convincing reason having gained the upper hand and seeing that Chiang Kai- Second and Fourth front armies of the Red Army and ef- joining shek's reinforcements of 300,000 men would soon arrive' fected the largest historic of the two main forces of the Mao declared that as a large-scale civil war was imminent' Red Army. As a result, the Red Army again grew in the Chinese People' s Anti-Japanese Vanguard Army did strength. Shortly afterward, the Red Army commanded not want to be involved in it, causing losses to China' s by Mao Zed.ong destroyed three brigades of the govern- strength of national defence and pleasing the Japanese im- ment army under Hu Zongnan and won the last great vic- perialists, and decided to withdraw to the western side of tory in the ten years of civil war. the Yellow River. In May 1936, Mao Zedong and Zhu De jointly sent an open telegram, announcing the withdrawal of their army' The "Telegram Calling for Cease-Fire, Peace Negotia- LUI q Giving a Little Ground tions and United Resistance Against Japan" announced Attacking After Spotting the side - that the withdrawal of the Red Army to the western Enemy's Weak Point of the Yellow River was "an action for showing its sinceri- ty to the people of the whole country' We are willing' In 1936, the second year Mao Zedong was in northern within a month's time, to stop fighting and negotiate for Shaanxi, he wrote the Problems o-f Strategy in China' s peace with all the armed units attacking the Anti-Japanese ' Revolutionary War, a book comparable the ancient Red Army so as to attain the objective of cease-fire with Sun Zi' s Art of War. The following are some main points and resistance against Japan.' As a warning to the of the book. Kuomintang, the telegram stated, "At a critical juncture More than any other topics he dwelled on in when the nation is in danger of being subjugated and de- this book of military strategy, Mao wrote a great "strategic stroyed by genocide, it is time to turn a new leaf and stop deal about retreat, " which is, in fact, the civil war in the whole country and, first of all' in the most important part of his military strategy. Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia. If you obstinately refuse to Citing an example from the classical novel change and want to be willing traitors, your rule will in- Outlaras of the Marsh, Mao "We evitably collapse and you will be rejected and overthrown wrote, all know that when two boxers people of the whole country. " fight, the clever boxer usually gives a little ground at by the first, After the Red Army had withdrawn, the government while the foolish one rushes in furiously and used up all resources troops started. to attack northern Shaanxi' In order to his at the very start, and in the end he is of- ten beaten smash the encirclement and meet the Second and Fourth by the man who has given ground. In the novel armies on their northward march, the Red Army in Outlaws of the Marsh, the drill master Hong, challenging front .Come northern Shaanxi launched a western expedition' moved Lin Chong to a fight on Chai Jin's estate, shouts into Gansu and expanded its territory at the borders of on! Come on! Come on!' In the end it is the retreating Shaanxi, Gansu and. Ningxia. In October' it occupied Lin Chong who spots Hong's weak point and floors him Art of War NIao Zedong's Art of War 82 Mao Zedong's mounted the arm-rest of the chariot to look afar. He said, with one blow. " "During 'Now we can pursue ! ' So began the pursuit of the He then went on the give another example' the Qi troops. After the victory the Duke asked Cao why he had Spring and Autumn Era, when the states of Lu and Qi -r, given such advice. Cao replied. 'A battle depends upon *"r" war, Duke Zhuang of l-u wanted to attack before courage. At the first drum courage is aroused, at the sec- the Qi troops had tired themselves out' but Cao Kui pre- 'the ond it flags, and with the third it runs out. When the ene- vented him. When instead he adopted the tactic of is my's courage ran out, ours was high and so we won. It is enemy tires, we attack, ' he defeated the Qi army' This difficult to fathom the moves of a great state, and I feared a classic example from China's military history of a weak an ambush. But when I examined the enemy' s wheel- force defeating a strong force' " tracks and found them crisscrossing and looked afar and He even quoted the entire text of "Cao Kui on War" from "In saw his banners drooping, I advised pursuit.'" Zuo' s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals" Analysing the battle, Mao wrote, "That was a case a the spring the Qi troops invaded us' of weak state resisting a strong state. The story speaks to fight. Cao Kui requested an audi of the political preparations said. 'This is the business of the before a battle - winning the confidence of the people; it speaks of a battlefield why meddle with it?' Cao replied, 'Meat-eaters are fools' favourable for switching over to the counter-offensive they cannot plan ahead" So he saw the Duke' And he - Changshao; it indicates the favourable u"t"a, 'What will you rely on when you fightl The Duke time for starting the counter-offensive when the enemy' s courage is run- answered, 'I never dare to keep all my food and clothing ning out and one's own is high; and it points to the mo- for my own enjoyment, but always share them with oth- ment for starting the pursuit when the enemy's tracks ers.' Cao said, 'Such paltry charity cannot reach all' The - are crisscrossed and his banners are drooping. Though the battle was not a big one, it illustrates the principles of the strategic defensive. " He then listed a number of famous battles in China's mili- tary history, such as the battles of Chenggao, Kunyang, Guandu, Chibi and Yiling, in which "the contending sides were unequal, and the weaker side, yielding some ground Cao said, 'That shows your devotion to your people' You at first, gained mastery by striking only after the enemy can give battle. When you do so' I beg to follow you" had struck and so defeated the stronger side. Thebuke and he rode in the same chariot' The battle was The Battle of Chenggao was fought 203 B. between joined at Changshao. When the Duke was about to sound in C. 'Not the states of Chu and Han at Chenggao, an ancient town ah" d.rr* for the attack, Cao said, yet.' When the 'Now of great military importance in the northwest of today' s men of Qi had drummed thrice, Cao said' we can Chenggao county, Henan province. was a be- drum.' The army of Qi was routed' The Duke wanted to It battle tween Liu Bang, king and pursue. Again Cao said, 'Not yet'' He got down from of Han, Xiang Yu, king of Chu. At first Xiang Yu captured Yunyang and the chariot to examine the enemy' s whecl-tracks' then Chenggao Mao Zedong's Art of Wal Mao Zedong's Art of War 85 and Liu Bang' s troops werc almost routed' Liu Bang him. waited until the opportune moment when Xiang Yu' s The Battle of Yiling, in which Lu Xun, a general of the troops were in midstream crossing the Fanshui River' and state of Wu, defeated the army of Liu Bei, ruler of the then crushed them and recaptured Chenggao' state of Shu, occurred in A. D. 222 at Yiling, east of The Battle of Kunyang was fought in A' D' 23' between today' s Yichang county, Hubei province. At the begin- Liu Xiu, founder of the Eastern Han dynasty' and Wang ning of the war between Wu and Shu, Liu Bei's army Mang, Emperor of the Xin dynasty' There was a huge nu- scored successive victories and reached as far as Yiling, merical disparity between the two sides, Liu Xiu pitted his which was almost three hundred kilometres inside Wu' s army of 8,000 to 9,000 men against Wang Mang' s territory. Lu Xun, who was defending Yiling, avoided 400,000. Taking advantage of the negligence of Wang battle for seven or eight months until I-iu's army was ex- Mang's generals, Wang Shun and Wang Yu' who under- hausted and demoralized.. One day, when there was a picked favourable estirnated the enemy, Liu Xiu with only 3 ' 000 wind, Lu Xun' s men suddenly attacked and troops put Wang Mang' s main forces to rout' He followed crushed Liu's army by setting fire to their tents. up this victory by crushing the rest of the enemy troops' Mao Zedong emphatically pointed out, "The object of The Battle of Guandu between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao strategic retreat is to conserve military strength and pre- pare for the counter-offensive. Retreat is necessary be- cause not to retreat a step before the onset of a strong ene- my inevitably means to jeopardi ze the preservation of one's own forces. " the lack of vigilance on the part of Yuan Shao men who He ridiculed the policies of the Leftists. such as "pit one belittled the enemy, Cao Cao launched a surprise attack against ten, pit ten against a hundred, fight bravely and with lightly equipped soldiers and set fire to Yuan' s sup- determinedly, and exploit victories by hot pursuit" ; "At- "Seize plies. When Yuan' s army was thrown into a great confu- tack on all fronts"; key cities"; and "strike with .rio.r. Cao attacked with his entire army and destroyed two fists. " Yuan' s main force. As we see it today, "strike with two fists" sounds really The Battle of Chibi between Sun Quan of the state of Wu ridiculous. Even an eight-year-old boy knows that strik- and Cao Cao of the state of Wei was fought in A' D' 208 at ing with one fist hurts more than two fists together. But "a Chibi on the southern bank of the Yangtze River' to the this was great principle" advocated by the ultra-Left- northeast of Jiayu county, Hubei province' Cao Cao at- ists who directed the operations of the entire Communist tacked Sun Quan with an army o{ 500,000 men' which he army, and led to the death of tens of thousands of Red proclaimed to be 800,000 strong. The latter' in alliance Army men on the battlefield. Any one of the Communist SO OOO Party members, including with Cao' s antagonist Liu Bei, mustered a lorce of ' those who were not fighting on men. Knowing that Cao' s army was plagued by epidemics the battlefield, who was against "strike with two fists, ' "opportunist. and was unaccustomed to action afloat, thc allicd forces of was condemned as an " Mao Zedong himself SunQuanandLiuBeisetfiretoCao'sfltrt:landdefeated was a target of their criticism. Deng Xiaoping and Tan Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong' s Art of War enemy' s offensive we usually do not know which of his who supported Mao' s slratcgic principles of Zhenlin, advancing columns is the strongest and which the second "Luring the enemy in dcep" and "'l';rking {rom the fat to strongest, which is the weakest and which the second pad lean, ' were also censured' the weakest, and so a process of reconnaissance is required. This often takes a considerable time. That is another rea- son why strategic retreat is necessary. " When writing Problems of Strategy in China' s Reaolution- I / Catchine the Turtle in a Jar ary War, Mao Zedong read Sun Zi' s Art of War for the IO It Is"Important to Win the First Battle first time in his life and learned to apply it. He wrote, - 'Tinally, the object of retreat is to induce the enemy to that the When doing propaganda' Mao Zedong often said make mistakes or to detect his mistakes. One must realize on Red Army *u, "gi"ut' " but when it came to fighting that an enemy commander, however wise, cannot avoid the battlefield, i" t"p"ut"dly emphasized that the Red making some mistakes over a relatively long period of Army was "weak and small' " To defeat a strong enemy time, and hence it is always possible for us to exploit the had made ex- he leaves The enemy is liable to make mis- with a weak force is certainly not easy' Mao openings us. and just sometimes miscalculate and haustive studies of how this could be accomplished' takes, as we ourselves give him openings exploit. addition, we can induce set forth some brilliant views: to In it in- "One advantage of operating on interior lines is that the enemy to make mistake by our own actions, for terrain stance, by ' counterfeiting an appearance,' as Sun Zi makes it possiLle for the retreating army to choose- to fight on called it, that is, by making a feint to the east but attack- favourable to itself and for the attacking army army ing in the west. If we are to do this, the terminal point for its terms. In order to defeat a Strong army, a weak the retreat cannot be rigidly limited to a definite area. must carefully choose favourable terrain as a battle- when we have retreated to the predetermined ground' But this condition along is not enough and must Sometimes area and not yet found openings to exploit, we have to re- be accomPanied bY others' " six: treat farther and wait for the enemy to give us an open- What are the other conditions? Mao said there were irg. " 1. The population actively supports the Red Army' These theories of Mao Zedong' s can indeed be regarded as 2. The terrain is favourable for operations' "supreme instructions' even to those who "operate" on 3.AllthemainforcesoftheRedArmyareconcentrated. the business front today. 4. The enemy' s weak spots have been discovered' Mao Zedong emphatically pointed out, "The first battle in 5. The has been reduced to a tired and demoralized "rr".ny the counter-offensive is of the greatest importance, " be- state. cause "victory or defeat in the first battle has a tremen- The enemy has been induced to make mistakes' 6. dous effect upon the entire situation, all the way to the fi- also said, "Another essential condition for a weak He nal engagement. " a strong one is to pick out the enemy' s army fighting What he actually intended was to be a person described in weaker units* for attack' But at the beginning of the Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War a saying, who "remains inactive unless he can startle the started by the enemy with an army 300,000 strong, bear- world with a brilliant feat. " Not without pride, he later ing down menacingly on the Red Army. The enemy fol- said that the Red Army emerged on the battlefield of the lowed a strategy of "driving straight in, ' intending to civil war as a small and weak force and shook the world by drive the Red Army back against the river Gan and annihi- repeatedly defeating a powerful enemy. late it there. The Red Army had not rested after the bitter In the Problems of Strategy in China' s Reuolutionary fighting in the previous campaign and had marched five War, Mao summed up the lessons to be learned from the hundred kilometres to southern Jiangxi. Mao Zedong de- success and failure of the operations of the Red Army cided to avoid the enemy' s main force and strike at his against the {ive enemy "encirclement and suppression" weak spots. The first battle was fought against the divi- campalgns. sion commanded by the bull-headed Shangguan Yunxiang. In the {irst "encirclement and suppression" campaign' the The enemy division was utterly routed and the Red Army "suppression" army did not exceed 100,000 men' The two captured several thousand rifles. divisions under Zhang Huizan and Tan Daoyuan each had In the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, about 14,000 men arrd Zhatg's division was divided be- the enemy advanced on the Red Army in three columns. tween two places. After making a correct study of the sit- The eastern column was the enemy's main force. But two uation, Mao concluded that the Red Army could achieve divisions of the enemy' s western column were exposed to absolute superiority by striking at one enemy division at a the Red Army at the spot where the Red Army was con- time. In addition, the Red Army decided to make a break- centrated. Mao therefore decided to engaged the western through at the centre and cut the enemy' s eastern and column first and in the first battle destroyed the two ene- western columns into two widely separated groups' The my divisions. "encirclement Red Army, therefore, fought its first battle against Zhang In the fifth and suppression" campaign, the Huizan' s main force and successfully hit two of his Red Army was foiled in the first battle and then suffered brigades and his division headquarters, capturing 9'000 one defeat after another. men, including the division commander himself' without With deep regret, Mao wrote, "In his fifth campaign the letting a single man escape. enemy advanced by means of his new strategy of building In the second "encirclement and suppression" campaign' blockhouses and first occupied Lichuan. But, in attempt- the enemy forces numbered 200,000 men' The enemy' s ing to recover Lichuan and engage the enemy outside the Fifth Army commanded by Wang Jinyu had newly arrived base area, we made an attack north of Lichuan at Xiaoshi, from the north and was fear{ul of the Red Army' Mao de- which was an enemy strong point and was situated, more- 30 000 men' area southeast again cided that the Red Army, totalling now only ' over, in the White of Xiaoshi, and should fight its first battle against Wang' s army' After we failed. Then in seeking battle we milled around be- winning victory in the first battle, the Red Army then en- tween the enemy' s main force and his blockhouses and gaged, each at a time, several more enemy units and de- were reduce to complete passivity. All through our fifth {eated all of them. counter-campaign against encirclement and suppres- The third "encirclement and suppression" campaign was sion,' which lasted a whole year, we showed not the Mrao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 91 slightest initiative or drive. In the end we had to withdraw ture changes are difficult to foresee and the farther ahead from our Jiangxi area.' one looks the more blurred things seem, a general calcula- He, therefore, drew the following conclusion: tion is possible and an appraisal of distant prospects is First, the first battle must be won. The Red Army should necessary. . . . In short, in the stage of retreat we must strike only when positively certain that the enemy' s situa- see ahead to the stage of the counter-offensive, in the tion, the terrain and popular support were all in the Red stage of the counter-offensive we must see ahead to that of Army' s favour and not in the enemy' s' Otherwise the the offensive, and in the stage of the offensive we must Red Army should rather fall back and carefully bide its again see ahead to a stage of retreat. Not to do so but to time. There would always be opportunities; the Red confine ourselves to considerations of the moment is to Army should not rashly accept battle. Losing the initia- court defeat. " tive at the very first move was really the worst and most These principles laid down by Mao Zedong are indeed stupid way to fight. "golden rules. " They are not only a guide to generals Second., "the plan for the first battle must be the prelude fighting on the battlefield. but also a philosophy of life, to, and an organic part of, the plan for the whole cam- embodying the art of struggle in our daily life. paign. Without a good plan for the whole campaign it is absolutely impossible to fight a really good first battle' That is to say, even though victory is won in the first bat- tle, if the battle harms rather than helps the campaign as Fluidity of Territory can only be reckoned a defeat' l7 a whole, such a victory L ' Move Away When You Can't Win Hence, before fighting the first battle one must have a - general idea of how the second, third, fourth and even the Zedong a man had "a whole bag tricks. " iinal battle will be fought. and consider what changes will Mao was who of He stood for mobile warfare. ensue in the enemy' s situation as a whole if we win' or From the way the Red fought, he reached the con- lose, each of the succeeding battles. Although the result Army Red may not and, in fact, definitely will not turn out ex- clusion that the Army must fight without fixed battle - - "Fluidity battle lines, " he "leads to fluid- actly as we expect, we must think everything out carefully lines. of wrote, and realistically in the light of the general situation on ity in the size of our base areas. Our base areas are con- both sides. Without a grasp of the situation as a whole' it stantly expanding and contracting, and often as one base is impossible to make any really good move on the chess- area falls another rises. This fluidity o{ territory is entire- " board. " ly a result of the fluidity of the war. Third, "one must also consider what will happen in the When fighting a war, many people think it is important "to next strategic stage of the war. Whoever directs strategy fight for every inch of the territory" and meet the ene- will not be doing his duty if he occupies himself only with my head on. But Mao Zedong thought otherwise. the counter-o{fensive and neglects the measures to be tak- He said, recognize fluidity is to our advantage. "We must en a{ter it succeeds' or in case it fails. . . . Even though fu- base our planning on it and must not have illusions about a Mao Zedong's Art of War 93 92 Mao Zedotg's Art o{ War pendently operated guerrilla war under unified strategic war of advance without any retreats, take alarm at any guidance, basically a guerrilla war but not excluding mo- temporary fluidity of our territory or of the rear areas of bile warfare under favourable conditions. ourarmy...." "move men of the Red Army to lead a When Mao Zedong emphasized away when you He told the officers and " fluid way of life. "It is only by exerting ourselves in can't win, he was following the saying: A true man can and "Move away when you can' t today' s fluid way of life that tomorrow we can secure rel- both expand contract. is to contract, and "fight when you can win, " to ex- ative stability. and eventually full stability. " win" pand. What is mobile warfare? In the most popular way Mao Ze- Pingxingguan fought by the Communist dong described it, it is "Fight when you can win' move The Battle of army at the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War was a away when you can't win. " example of mobile warfare, following the princi- Mao wrote, "There is no military expert anywhere in the brilliant ple "fight you " world who approves only of fighting and never of moving' of when can win. time renamed the Eighth though f we do. We general- The Red Army was by this ly spend fighting and would Route Army and the New Fourth Army of the National Arrny after the Communist Party and the be doing of one sizable battle Revolutionary Kuomintang had reached an agreement to stop the civil a month. A11 our 'moving' is for the purpose of 'fight- together against aggression. In ing, ' and all our strategy and tactics are built on 'fight- war and fight Japanese Division o{ the Eighth Route irrg.' " August 1937, the 115th and marched to northern He said that under four situations it was best for the Red Army crossed the Yellow River Army to move away. First, it was inadvisable to fight Shanxi province from its base area in Sanyuan, Shaanxi province. division was assigned to defend a ten-kilo- when the force confronting the Red Army was too large; The mountain pass of second, it was sometimes inadvisable to fight when the metre section of the right flank of the against approaching army. The enemy force, though not too large, was very close to oth- Pingxinguan the Japanese had been trans- er enemy forces; third; it was generally inadvisable to original garrison under Wang Qingguo Great the northwest of the fight an enemy force that was not isolated and was strong- ferred to defend the Wall to ly entrenched; fourth, it was inadvisable to continue an pass. province north China, the engagement in which there is no prospect of victory' After occupying Chahar in proceeded to take Shanxi province. It ad- In the eye of your enemy' "moving away" means taking to Japanese army your heels. But you must not mind what your enemy or vanced in two columns: One took the city of Datong and the comprising others say when you move away. "It's never too late to began to attack Yanmenguan, and other, the take your revenge. " Only by taking to your heels can you more than 4,000 soldiers of the 21st Brigade of iaka- "Flower the Army, " ap- laugh the last laugh. gaki Division, known as the of proached from Lingqiu. When the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression Pingxingguan began to in concert with Wang broke out in July 1937, Mao Zedong {ormulated a military The 115th Division operate Division was strategy for fighting the Japanese: It was to be an inde- Qingguo' s unit on September 26. The 115th Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 95 to take Xiaguangou, Caijiayu and Dongkou and reach ly, position warfare and the strategy of pure defence are Shangpuxi, where it was to rendezvous with Wang' s dangerous; they were the main reasons of the defeats we army which was to attack the Japanese army from the suffered in the past. The main reasons for the victory west. were: 1. Secrecy of movements. All our military move- The battle started in the early morning of September 26. ments were undetected by the Japanese army. 2. Ltght- The Chinese army pressed on northward and, by noon, ning speed. It was already too late by the time the had taken Caijiayu, Dongkou and Nanguangou' chasing Japanese discovered our intention. On one occasion, the the Japanese army to Shangpuxi and inflecting casualties Japanese army and our army raced to control a hill top. on the Japanese army amounting to a whole regiment. The Japanese were already half way up the hill, but we The Japanese headquarters immediately sent a reinforce- reached the top before them. 3. Familiarity with the ter- ment of two regiments. When the reinforcement reached a rain. We could turn positional warfare into mountain war- deep gully at Xiaochai village, it was ambushed by the fare at any time. Mountain warfare is the best way of Chinese army and totally wiped out. dealing with an enemy with superior weapons. " The gully to the west of Xiaochai village providing the Mao Zedong had listed many questions to be taken into only passage from Caijiayu to Pingxingguan was flanked consideration in mobile warfare, such as reconnaissance, by sheer cliffs on both sides. "Lay down your arms!" the forming judgments, making decisions, disposition of Chinese soldiers shouted at the Japanese soldiers. Not troops, directing a battle, concealing, concentrating and knowing the language, the Japanese soldiers fought on spreading out the forces, attacking, surprise attack, raid- desperately until they were almost all killed by bullets and ing enemy positions, defending one's own positions, con- handgrenades. The Sakagaki Division suffered a gory de- tact battle, withdrawal, night fighting, fighting under feat. special circumstances, avoiding the strong and hitting the On September 27, the Chinese army advanced to the vicin- weak, encircling an enemy city and attacking his rein- ity of Lingqiu and defeated the Japanese twice more, forcements, feint attack, air defence, manoeuvre between killing 3,000 and capturing over 100 trucks, tanks and several enemies, fighting without a rear and the necessity cannons and innumerable military supplies. Unable to of preserving one's strength. maintain its foothold in the area, the Japanese army hur- Mao must have given deep thought to all these problems, riedly pulled back. but unfortunately he did not dwell in length on them. The After the Chinese army as a whole had suffered one defeat same questions, such as "the necessity of preserving one's after another in the war against Japan, its victory at strength, " certainly also deserve our consideration in our Pingxingguan formed the only glorious page in the history dealings with others and in our struggle to live and excel. of the war in northern Shanxi. A Chinese army of{icer who had taken part in the battle said, "The campaign proved that flexible tactics' offen- sive defence and mobile warfare are absolutely effective; they are the basic tactics for winning the war. Converse- Mao Zedong's Art of War 97 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War and that it was essential to adopt encircling and outflank- the East and West 1 Ct Making Raids from ing tactics in order to attack the enemy independently and lo Main Force - Employing the with initiative. on the Flanks He said that the use of some of the forces against the ene- my' s rear was particularly effective, because they could In an interview with the British journalist James Bertram disrupt the enemy' s supply lines and bases. in Yanan on October 25, 1,937, Mao Zedong spoke in He also said that even the frontal forces should rely main- Iength on the strategy and tactics to be applied in the War ly on "counter assault' and not on purely defensive tac- of Resistance Against Japan. tics. "After Mao told Bertram about the field operations of the Eighth According to a Kuomintang history book, receiv- ing orders to fight the Japanese, the entire Eighth Route Army marched to Hebei, Chahar and Shanxi provinces, where they fought as guerrillas. Their missions were: l. to disrupt the Japanese army' s communication lines so as to reduce its effective strength; 2. to make raids upon the flanks and pin down the Japanese army; 3. to attack the weakly defended places and destroy the Japanese army. " After Yanmenguan was taken by the Japanese army on October 1937, Yan Xishan, the governor of Shanxi, and Ningwu ) , the assault on the rear of the Japanese 2, put forces south of Yanmenguan, the recapture twice over decided to up a frontal defence at the strategic Xinkou in order to stop the enemy's southward advance, protect the provincial capital Taiyuan and bring about a change in the war situation in Shanxi. Chiang Kai-shek immediately rushed the 14th Group Army commanded by Wei Lihuang to reinforce Yan Xishan. Fighting in the Battle of Xinkou on the Chinese side were the Central Army, Shanxi-Suiyuan army, Sichuan army roughshod over Shanxi, they will certainly encounter and the Eighth Route Army; on the Japanese side were greater difficulties than ever. " the Fifth Division, part of the Guandong army and some [u."d on these observations of the situation' Mao said that the Eighth Route Army' s tactics was "operating special forces. On October 6, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai chiefly on the enemy' s flanks and rear' " tactics which had asking him to inform the commanders of the National not been adopted by other Chinese troops' Army that after occupying Shijiazhuang, the Japanese He explained that he was not against employing part of would definitely attack westward and that the National the forces in frontal operations' But he emphasized that Army should concentrate a strong force to defend the main force must be used against the enemy' s flanks Mro Zcdong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War ur ('()unter attack with several dozen tanks, which appeared to win victory in the fighting north Niangziguan in order for tlre first time in this battle. The Chinese army waited Taiyuan. of of for lhc Japanese infantrymen to come closer. They then g"f"i at the conference to discuss the concept 7fr., was rrrshcd out and engaged them in hand-to-hand fighting' in the Battle of Xinkou' Seeing the Japanese op"ruaio.t" Yan lorcing them to withdraw in defeat. advancing southward in tflee columns' ui*, *"" On October 16, the Japanese army came with a reinforce- commanders decided to deploy their i;h^" and the other a breakthrough in and right' and place rnent of more than 3,000 men and made forces in three regions' left' central frontal defence' the Chinese positions. The Chinese army also brought in main force in the central region for their to reinforcements and had the Japanese surrounded. In the that the forces in the central region was It was decided than 2 000 were on the right flank frantic battle that ensued, more ' Japanese be commanded by Wei Lihuang; those De and Peng killed. In the several days of bloody battle, the Chinese (including some Kuomintang forces) ' by Zht Aiyuan' army captured 500-600 rifles, over 40 light and heavy ma- and those on the left flank' by Yang Dehuai; ln chine-guns and, 20 artillery pieces. A Japanese heavy to..". defending Shilingguan and the reserves ih" After bomber was brought down on October 17. were under the command o{ Fu Zuoyi' iuir,ru., Zhou When the Japanese army was preparing for its southward the actual situation of the war in the area' would result in advance to Xinkou, the headquarters of the Eighth Route "*UrJ*Enlai reminded them that frontal de{ence victory' He Army assigned to its 11sth and 120th divisions the task of il;;, losses and offer little :hance o{ winning region to pin disrupting communication lines and strongholds in the en- suggested using a small force in the central employing emy's rear from the east and west. the enemy, strengthening the flanks and down to The main force of the 115th Division was active in north- in an attack on Daixian in the northeast the main force eastern Shanxi. It disrupted the communication line from result in preventing the enemy from achieve the best Zhangjiakou to Guangling and Xinkou and its Independent marching south- Regiment and Cavalry Battalion raided southern Chahar at Xinkou on the night of October 1.1.' itr" Uu,,.-t" started and western Hebei. The main force of the 120th Division previous victories' the Japanese tried Following up their was active in northwestern Shanxi. It attacked the com- troops at one swoop but were met ,o o,r"r.Jrn"1h" Chi""se munication line from Xinkou to Yanmenguan, Ningwu resistance' with head-on and Datong. Its Yanbei Detachment made raids north of fighting became fierce' The well-pre- O.r O.,ob", 13, the Wall. *o" u big victory' Beginning from the Great pared Chinese army While fierce fighting was going on at the main {ront in columns of the Chinese army bctober 14, the different Xinkou, the 115th and 120th divisions of the Eighth attack' assisted by several dozen air- ,tu.t"d a general Route Army coordinated with fighting at the main front all the Japanese artillery positions' craft, which destroyed by making raids on the enemy' s flanks and rear. They re- p"hed back' On the morning of Octo- The Japane"" *"t" peatedly cut off the main communication lines in the ene- took place at Southern Huaihualing ber 14, a fierce battle army were killed' my' s rear, destroyed a large number of Japanese and more than 1,000 Japanese troops army started trucks, raided the enemy' s reinforcements and recovered on the morning of octoier 15, the Japanese of War Mao Zt,dong's Art o{ War 101 100 Mao Zedong's Art I ltnu cun you cede territory to the enemry several county towns, seriously threatening the enemy' s 'l'o greed? rear and preventing the enemy's supplies of food and am- sutisJy his munition from reaching the front. It is like handing over the whip to the enemlt On October 17, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zht And reducing ourselaes to slar.tes. De and Peng Dehuai in which he said, 'Your Lin division llrrnember hou heroic our ancestor was and, Zhang brigade have repeatedly performed remarkable And how he forged his own destiny. feats in the war, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy' ltighting courageously at Zhulu, They should be highlY commended. " I Ie succeeded in pacifying the whole country. The Battle of Xinkou was an earth-shaking event' a bril- Why are his descendants so laching in prowess liant example of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation' And allow a great country to be humiliated by an enen4t Although the battle was not directed by Mao Zedong him- I and my friends are not men of talents, sel{, Zhou Enlai' who attended the operational confer- But we are determined to pich up our swords which included ence, adopted Mao' s military strategy, And march ten thousand miles to se?'ue the country. east and west the Eighth Route Army' s attacks on the After several years of bitter struggle the flanks' and the use of the main force on And after erperiencing all dangers and hardships, months be{ore the outbreak of On April 5, 1937, three We have not yet destroyed the enemg. War, Mao Zedong wrote the impas- the Anti-Japanese Where are'we to build our homes? "Elegy the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor' " sioned on Atl political parties and people of all circles, was actually a declaration expressing his determina- which Both the military and the ciailians, tion to resist Japanese aggression. The full text reads in Both the rich and the Poor, translation as follows: Let us firmly unite to form a national front. For to save the country this is the best way. Our glorious ancestor created China, our homeland: Four hundred million people will resolutely fight bach. prosper His descendants regenerate and (Jnited in a democratic republic with reformed politics, majestic riaers' Among lofty mountains and Millions upon millions will fight with one mind shine over the remotest waste' His wisdom and hnowledge To win certain viclory in war, great creation stands heroically in the east' And his Recoaer lost territories and safeguard soaereignty. But how the world has changed! We shall never forget this determination of ours, After several thousand years and repeated setbachs' And we shall train and strengthen our forces We are now bullied by a powerful neighbour' And ask our ancestor to wilness Ryuhyu and Taiwan were lost That our determination is firmly carried out And the three Hans reduced to ruins' In this land ours. In Liao and Hai, Yan and Ji Why are there so manY traitors? 102 Mao Zedong's Art of War Miro Zcdong s Art of W'ar I03 Come and Go Like a Shadow ('()me a protracted and ruthless one. "For all these rea- t O " "China's 't' ' Building Bases Behind Enemy Lines sons. he said, guerrilla warfare against Japan - Irzrs broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gzrtes of strategy, and it demands examination from the After arriving in northern Shaanxi, Mao Zedong put for- view point of strategy. " ward in clear terms the strategy to be adopted in the War He laid down six strategic principles for fighting a guerril- of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. la war, which he called "the whole of the strategic pro- In his instructions f.or Zho't Enlai on September 25, 7937, gramme for a guerrilla war against Japan" : he wrote, ".Work in the entire northern China should be 1. The use of initiative, flexibility and planning in con- orientated towards fighting a guerrilla war; all work, / ducting offensives within the defensive, battles of such as mass work and the united front, should be centred quick decision within a protracted war, and exterior- on fighting a guerrilla war. . . . The whole Party should be line operations within interior-line operations. informed that from now on there is no work other than 2. Coordination with regular warfare. fighting a guerrilla war.' 3. Establishment of base areas. On in the report (The Situation and Tashs November 72, 4. The strategic defensive and the strategic offensive. After the Shanghai and in the Anti-Japanese War Fall of 5. The development o{ guerrilla warfare into mobile war- Taiyuan) delivered to a meeting of Party activists in fare. pointed "In Yanan, Mao Zedong out, northern China, 6. Correct relationship of command. played regular warfare in which the Kuomintang the chief He also stressed the importance of establishing anti- role has ended, and guerrilla warfare in which the Com- Japanese base areas. "What, then, are these base areas?" prima- munist Party is playing the chief role has become he wrote. "They are the strategic bases on which the " ry. guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and Mao had reached the correct conclusion that the Chinese achieving the object of preserving and expanding them- side could fight large-scale campaigns like the battles of selves and destroying and driving out the enemy. Without Xinkou and Pingxingguan only occasionally at the initial such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in stage of the war and could not afford to fight them regu carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the larly. He therefore emphasized guerrilla warfare. aim of the war. " In May 1938, in his second book on military strategy, How these principles were applied in the war? A book Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, he published in October 7944 by Chongqing' s Xinhua Book- gave strategic importance to guerrilla war. His reasons store under the title China' s Anti-Japanese Democratic were: China was a large and weak country being attacked Bases Behind Enemry Lines ofJers some highly valuable by a small and strong country. As this had happened in an first-hand materials. "The Establishment of the Shanxi- era of progress and the enemy could not expect to conquer Chahar-Hebei Base Area, " one of the articles in the book. the large and weak country in a brief war, vast areas of gives the following account: China were occupied by the enemy and the war had be- "When the Eighth Route Army departed for the front af- rl I Art of War Mao Zed,ong's Art of War 105 104 Mao Zedong's year' ter the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War' the strategy one s time, from the fall of Taiyuan in November 1937 to October 1938, the Eighth Route Army in northern China engaged the enemy more than 1,500 times, inflict- ing 30,000 casualties on the Japanese army, capturing over 10,000 guns and destroying more than 1,000 motor vehicles. fell to the enemy. It then received a directive from the In addition to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area, there several Military Commission ordering it to proceed to Weixian to were other important anti-Japanese base areas. Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan intercept the enemy. While the army was still on its way' The anti-Japanese base area: In Weixian also fell to the enemy' The headquarters of the November 1937, the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army (division commander, Liu Bocheng, and po- litical commissar, Deng Xiaoping) marched to the south- eastern part of Shanxi province to intercept the enemy on the southern side of the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway and destroy the puppet organizations set up by the enemy in the area. After Taiyuan was 11sth Division then took a roundabout route to intercept occupied by the enemy and the Kuomintang the enemy in his rear and {ought the first victorious battle withdrew further to the south, the 129th Division made at Pingxingguan on September 25' When the situation at the Taihang Mountains its base and re- Ni".rgrigrun Taiyuan and Xinkou became critical' the ceived support from the local Communist Party organiza- *"irloi"" of the 11sth Division immediately set out from tions in southeastern Shanxi and from the anti-Japanese the Wutai Mountains in the middle of the night to give forces in Shanxi organized mainly by refugee students from Beiping aid. On October 23, Nie Rongzhen' deputy division com- and Tianjin. In December. it smashed a six- pronged attack by mander and political commissar of the division' was or- the enemy and established the Taihang- Taiyue Mountains anti-Japanese dered to defend the Wutai Mountains area and set up the base area. After suffer- ing first guerrilla base behind enemy lines' The forces under repeated setbacks and feeling threatened by the guer- rillas, the his command included only an independent regiment' a Japanese army amassed a force of 30,000 men and launched a converging , calvary battalion and two not fully complemented compa- attack on southeastern Shanxi in nine columns, beginning nies, iotalling about 2,000 men' On November 7 ' the from April 4, 1938. This at- tack was again smashed headquarters of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Zone by the 129th Division and the vic- of Chu De tory laid the foundation {or the establishment of the headed by Nie Rongzhen was set up at the order 'With and Peng Dehuai, commander-in-chief and deputy com- Shanxi-Hebei-Henan base area. the fall of mander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army' " Shijiazhuang and Anyang into enemy hands, the great plain of Hebei, Many large and small victories were won in the guerrilla Shandong and Henan was a scene of utter confusion. The 129th Division began areas behind enemy lines during the early stage of the An- to fan out westward several detachments ti-Japanese War. According to incomplete statistics' in in in the direction of the Beiping- of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 106 Mao Zedong's Art t07 areas, guerrillas Hankou Railway and engaged the enemy in fierce battles' came and went like shadows, dealing blows and inflicting It recovered altogether more than sixty counties in nine- casualties on the Japanese army be- hind enemy lines. teen months after its eastward march in 1937 and eventu- ally established the Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area' The Shandong anti-Japanese base area: After the Shan- dong warlord Han Fuqu had fled without firing a shot be- the Commu- fore the invading enemy at the end of 1937' )tan' fi Outflanking and Encircling Tactics nist Party members in Taian county organized a number o{ Injuring a Man's Ten Fingers Is Not Tianjin and some peas- - refugee students from Beiping and as Effective as Chopping Off One ants into a Shandong column and staged an anti-Japanese uprising with three worn-out rifles' By the autumn of Mao Zed,ong often held unusual views of problems, views f-gSS, th" column had grown into an army of nine detach- different from those of an average man. In his analysis of ments and 30,000 men. It recovered more than a dozen the War of Resistance Against Japan, he presented some county towns and set up a guerrilla base in Jiaodong' surprising views on the question of "encirclement. " Huangxian, Penglai and Yexian. In August that year' the He said, "Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there column even succeeded in breaking into Jinan' the capital is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the ene- city of Shandong province, and fought its way more than my, because he is on the strategic offensive and is operat- once into the coastal city of Yantai, and occupied Weihai- ' irg on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defen- wel. sive and are operating on interior lines. This is the first The Central China anti-Japanese base area: In the spring form of encirclement. " of 1938, the New Fourth Army began to march into areas He then pointed out, "We on our part encircle each of the behind enemy lines on either side the Yatgtze River to enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, be- wage a guerrilla war and build bases' The units on the cause we apply the policy of the offensive and of exterior- .orth".r, side of the river moved into the area around Nan- line operations in campaigns and battles by using numeri- lifig, Zheniiang, Danyang and Wuhu and built the South- cally preponderant forces against these ;iu.tg", base area. In the three months from June to enemy columns ad- vancing us from "..,August, they fought more than thirty battles and dealt on exterior lines. This is the first form of our encirclement h"""y blows to the enemy, forcing him to increase his of the enemy. "Next, if we consider the guerrilla base forces from three regiments to three divisions in that area. areas in the ene- my's rear, each area taken singly is The units of the New Fourth Army on the northern side of surrounded by the en- the river moved to the area around Lake Chaohu and emy on all sides, like the northwestern Shanxi area. This is and Dingyuan counties and set up the North-of- the second form of enemy encirclement. Wuwei "However, the-River base area with Outang as its centre' if one considers all the guerrilla base areas to- gether and in their From these bases inside and outside the Great Wall' north relation to the battle fronts of the regu- and south of the Yangtze River and along the coastal lar forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedotg's Art of War 108 Mao 109 many enemy forces. . - . This is the second form of our en- divisions, the garrison adopted a strategy of active defence circ against the powerful enemy. By Y into consideration and aPPIY- In mid-March, a unit of the Japanese army started to at- ing Mao Zedong was able to reach tack the Shenfu section of the Yellow River in an attempr the mY encircled us' we also encir- to cross the river at that spot. The Sixth Garrison Regi- cled the enemy. ment of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region met the He said, "Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the attack calmly. It waited until the Japanese army had be- gun to cross the river, and met the enemy with intensive fire from close formations. A mobile unit, which had crossed to the eastern bank of the river, then began to at- tack the enemy in his flanks and rear. The enemy was forced to abandon his attempt to cross the Yellow River and withdraw to Xingxian. In April, another attempt by the Japanese army to cross the Yellow River at Lishi was thwarted. In early May, about a brigade of the Japanese forces advanced to Jundu and began to threaten the river defence of the Eighth Route Army at Songjiachuan. The main force of the Eighth Regiment of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia garrison crossed to the eastern bank of the Yellow River and am- bushed and launched surprise attacks on the enemy in the area northwest of Lishi. After suffering heavy blows at the hand of the Eighth Regiment, the Japanese army was "Injuring a the enemy and battles of annihilation' all of forced to give up its attempt to advance westward. " man' s ten fingers is not as ef{ective as chopping off one' After his Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against said he. Japan, Mao Zedong's third book on military strategy was After having taken all the important cities and towns in On Protracted War, which was published in May 1938. northern $hanxi and occupied the southern section of the The book On Protracted War was a summing up of the Datong-Puzhou Railway, the Japanese army deployed its first ten months of China' s War of Resistance Against forces and posed to cross the Yellow River in several Japanese Aggression. columns and attack the Communist-controlled Shaanxi- The war situation at the time was as follows: The Japanese army with its superior weaponry had made a long drive into Chinese territory. After having occupied all principal cities and main lines of communications in north- ern China, it was pushing the front to central and south- Art of War 110 Mao Zedong's Mao Zedong's Art of War 111 ern China and making preparations to seize Wuhan and Since the enemy was strong and we weak, China could not Guangzhou. On the Chinese side, the National Army on hope to defeat the enemy' s armed aggression and drive the the main front had suffered repeated defeats' Although it enemy out of China in one stroke; since the enemy, s had won victories in one or two campaigns' it followed a strength had not been reduced and our strength has not in_ strategy of pure defence and was in a strategically passive creased within a short period of time, we could not hope po.itio.r. In the meantime, the Eighth Route Army and to turn immediately from strategic retreat to offensive. New Fourth Army had penetrated deep into the enemy' s For these reasons, the War of Resistance Against Japan rear, where they had started a guerrilla war and built must pass through the three stages of strategic retreat, bases. They had not only won victories in several cam- strategic stalemate and strategic offensive. paigns, but also gained strategic footholds for waging a Since the enemy was strong, he was attacking China with protracted war. a superior force and had occupied parts of China; since In his On ProtractedWar, Mao Zedong refuted those who China was weak, it was on the defensive. But strength believed that the subjugation of China by the enemy was and weakness, superiority and inferiority, were relative inevitable as well as those who upheld the theory that and not absolute. They could be changed. China could win quick victory in the war' "In the eyes of Moreover, owing to the enemy's shortage of troops and the subjugationists, " he wrote, "the enemy are superhu- China's firm resistance, he could not keep on advancing men and we Chinese are worthless, while in the eyes of and could not hope to occupy the whole of China. After the theorists of quick victory we Chinese are superhumen attaining certain strategic objectives. he would inevitably and the enemy are worthless. Both are wrong' We take a turn to safeguard the occupied areas. As an extensive peo_ different view; the War of Resistance Against Japan is a ple's anti-Japanese guerrilla war was being waged behind protracted war, and the final victory will be China' s' enemy lines, the enemy could only occupy the large cities, These are our conclusions. " parts o{ the plains and some trunk lines of communica_ Since the war was to be a protracted one' Mao pointed tions. A stalemate between the enemy and ourselves out, it would pass through three stages: would then occur. This would be a period when the enemy The first stage was to cover the period of the enemy' s could not advance any further and had to engage the guer_ strategic offensive and our strategic defensive' rillas in fierce battles. The second stage would be the period of the enemy' s The stage of stalemate would be the most arduous period strategic consolidation and our preparation for the and would last longer than the other stages, and China,s counter-offensive. strength would grow mainly in this period. The third stage would be the period of our strategic The guerrilla war would eventually developed into regular counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat' warfare. On this basis, added by international forces and Mao also stated that {rom the way the war was fought' it the anti-war movement in Japan, the Chinese army would would be "a war o{ jig-saw pattern" on a large scale' This turn to offensive, engage the enemy in strategically deci_ explained why the war would become a protracted and sive battles, destroy the enemy and recover lost territo_ complicated one and how final victory was to bc won' r1es. s Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 1L2 Mao Zedong' 113 Fighting a Protracted War conduct mobile and guerrilla warfare against the enemy. "r l As a result, we could concentrate a superior force and 2 t- Trading SPace for Time - fight offensive campaigns and battles of quick decision on exterior lines with initiative. We would then be on the of- that the War of Resistance When Mao Zedotg said fensive and the enemy on the defensive; we on the cxterior was going to be "a war of jig-saw pattern' " Against Japan lines and the enemy on the interior lines; we would be he explained that its com- u *". of infinite complexity' fighting battles of quick decision and the encmy trying to gain time and waiting for reinforcements. Conscquently, in specific battles, the enemy' s position would change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forces would change from weak to strong, from in- The enemy might reach tween the enemy and ourselves' ferior to superior, and we would be able to win victories in control the big cities' vast areas in China but could only campaigns and battles. Through the accumulation of these the plains. some trunk communication lines and some of victories, the general balance of forces would gradually and tacti- Militarily, he pointed out, the guiding strategic change; we would increasingly grow in strength, and the de- cal principle was "the preservation of oneself and the enemy steadily weaken until he was totally destroyed. struction of the enemy' " In quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exte- First,theChineseforcesshould'withinitiativeandina rior lines, the crucial point is the offensive; exterior lines flexibleandplannedway,conducttacticaloffensiveswith_ refers to the scale of the offensive, and quick-decision, to quick in the strategic defensive, campaigns and battles of its duration. It is the best principle for waging a protract- decision within the strategically protracted war' and cam- ed war and the principle for mobile warfare. But this prin- paignsandbattlesonexteriorlineswithinstrategicallyin_ ciple cannot be put into effect without initiative, flexibili- terior lines. This principle should be {ollowed for a long ty and planning. time and should not be changed be{ore the stage of strate- Initiative here means an army' s freedom of action. Free- gic counter-offensive began' dom of action is the very life of an army and, once it is Because the enemy was strong and China weak' the enemy lost, the army is close to defeat or destruction. Initiative had adopted a policy of fighting a war and passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority of quick decision and o r lines' China' in the capacity to wage war. The enemy's superiority at on the other hand, had strategic defen- present was relative and limited. China could gain initia- sive, fighting a protracted war and operating on interior tive through correct subjective direction. This meant that "know lines. Because the enemy was small and China large' the commanders should the enemy and know them- coun- " enemy was employing his small forces against a vast selves, commit fewer mistakes, mislead the enemy and try. He could only occupy parts of China's territory' and make use the subjective mistakes committed by the ene- unoc- even in the occupied territory there were still nrany my. (]hina cupied areas, which provided large spaces for to Flexibility means the flexible employment of armed forces t74 Mao Zedong's Art oI War Mao Zedong' s Art of War 115 "Accumulating and the flexible application and change of strategy and tac- two sentences: small victories into a big tics. Only then could more victories be won in quick-deci- victory and trading space for time. " With Zhou Enlai' s sion o{fensive warfare on exterior lines' approval, the Military Commission issued a circular or- Planning is the concrete expression of flexibility in war' der, making the two sentences the strategic guiding prin- All the operations of an army should be carefully planned' ciple for the War of Resistance Against Japan. Without planning, the operations would become "blind ac- In On Protracted War, Mao Zedong emphasized that "the tions" and would certainly end in defeat' But plans in war army and the people are the foundation of victory" and "the can only be drawn with relative certainty and stability' richest source of power to wage war lies in the mass- They must change with the movement of the war and with es of the people. " the changes in the situation of the enemy' He repeatedly stressed that sometimes it was necessary "to " Secondly, the War of Resistance Against Japan was to be trade space for time, that is, to make a courageous fought in the forms of mobile warfare and guerrilla war- retreat and abandon territory in order to avoid a decisive fare-. As Mao Zedong said, "Guerrilla warfare is basic' battle under unfavourable conditions. He had written a but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable b?illiant passage on the subject; people of the business conditions. " The war was going to be a protracted one and world today may still find inspiration in it. "Is China could not hope to win quick victory' It was there- it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and fore necessary to build bases for waging a guerrilla war then abandon territory? Will not our heroic fighters have shed and develop guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare' that is' their blood in vain? That is not at all the way ques- to turn guerilla warfare into mobile warfare' In order to tions should be posed. To eat and then to empty your fight an extensive guerrilla war in the enemy' s rear' it bowels is this not to eat in vain? To sleep and then to get - was necessary, on the one hand, to arm the masses of the up is this not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed people and build local armed forces, and, on the other' to in such a way? I would suppose not. To keep on di.p".." the regular forces so that they could fight as eating, to keep on sleeping, to keep on {ighting heroically all the way to the guerrillas and organize themselves into guerrilla corps' Yalu River without a stop - these are These regular forces could also engage the enemy in mo- subjectivist and formalist illusions, not realities of life. bile warfare when they were assembled together' As everybody knows. although in fighting and shedding As soon as On Protracted War was published' Zhou Enlai our blood in order to gain time and prepare the counter-of- fensive recommended it to the Kuomintang general Bai Chongxi' we have had to abandon some territory, in fact we After reading it, the latter expressed full approval' saying have gained time, we have achieved the objective of anni- that the book embodied the highest strategic principle for hilating and depleting enemy forces, we have acquired ex- perience overcoming the enemy and winning victory' Lalcr' when in fighting, we have aroused hitherto inactive Bai told Chiang Kai-shek about the book' Chiang also people and improved our international standing. Has our highly approved of it. Cheng Siyuan, Li Zorrgrcn's secre blood been shed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been tary, later recalled, "With Chiang Kai-shck' s strpport' given up in order to preserve our military forces and in- deed preserve Bai Chongxi summed up the spirit of On I'ntt rut'tr led to "security-tightening and Hangzhou and occupied the economically more devel- the movement" started in north at the estuary of the Pearl River' along the China. op"d "r"u" burrk" of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River and the The Japanese designated north China into three kinds of "security "semi-se railway trunk lines of north and central China' areas: area" (enemy-occupied area), curity (guerrilla "non-security By the end of 1938' Japan had thrown in altogether twen- area" area) and area" (lib- ty-three divisions and sixteen brigades' totalling a million erated area). "security " men, or two-thirds of the entire Japanese army' on the In the areas, the Japanese carried out a large- "to china front. As a result of the all-out resistance by both scale campaign clear the countryside, " strengthened the Kuomintang and the Communist Party' the Japanese the organization of households, forcibly combining several villages army suffered more than 447,000 casualties' into one large village, adopted a measure of pun- FromtheoutbreakoftheWarofResistancetothefallof ishing those who were related to a culprit, and organized the Security Wuhan, the Japanese army' s attacks were directed mainly Army, Security Detachments, Police Detach- at the Kuomintang, which resisted the Japanese at the ments and other armed forces in an attempt to straggle all front on the battlefield. In the eight years of the War of anti-Japanese activities. They also adopted a policy of mollification Resistance Against Japan, the Kuomintang army engaged and carried out deceptive propaganda which "paradise the enemy in twenty-two campaigns and 1"1'17 large bat- described the enemy-occupied areas as on earth tles, most of which took place during the early period of ruled in the king's way. " "semi-security " the war. In the areas, the Japanese implemented a policy Because the Kuomintang army was resisting the enemy at of mollification on the one hand and a policy of ter- the front and had drawn the overwhelming majority of the ror on the other. Blockade trenches and walls and block- Eighth houses were built everywhere. Japanese forces to itself, it became easier for the Villages were levelled to Route Army and New Fourth Army to penetrate deep be- create no man' s land. Mobile forces were dispatched fre- hind enemy line, fight a guerrilla war and open a battle quently to make searches, kill anyone on sight, burn front in the enemY's rear. down houses and seize property. "mopping-up" "Without the main force fighting heroically at the front of The Japanese army launched campaigns in "non-security the battlefield, it is impossible to wage guerrilla warfare the areas, " and burned, killed and plun- "caging successfully in the enemy's rear, " said Mao Zedong' dered in a more cruel way. Adopting a so-called policy, " On December 6, 1938, the Japanese Ministry of Army laid it carved up the liberated area bound by railways, down "Policies for Handling Affairs in China' " which highways. blockhouses and blockade trenches and walls. pointed out that after the occupation of Wuhan and into small separated pieces and employed an absolutely su- -Grru.rgrho,r, "mop " the fundamental policy should be the perior force to up district by district with suitably peace and security" and that "the elimina- organized units. which adopted flexible tactics of pursuit restoration o{ " tion of the remaining anti-Japanese forces should contin- and suppression. These tactics included the so-called "ox-cleaver " "water-draining ue. but should be carried out mainly by maniptrlation and tactics, tactics" and "break- 'l'his political means based on the force of arms' " policy ing-in tactics. " lz0 Mao Zedotg's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War t2t When the War of Resistance entered the stage of stale- town walls, destroyed highways and dug an innumerable mate, the Japanese army' s attack began to be directed ditches on the plain. against the base areas of the Chinese Communist Party' At the end of September 1939, assisted by Shanxi-Cha the B"tw"e., November 1938 and the end of 1940' har-Hebei units, the main force of the 120th Division. Japanese army in north China launched a total o{ 109 which was returning to its base in the west from central Commu- large-scale "mopping-up" campaigns against the Hebei, made use of the favourable mountain terrain and 1 ,000 troops in nist areas, employing a force no less than successfully ambushed and wiped out a Japanese and pup- each campaign. The forces employed in these campaigns pet force of more than 1,100 men which had come out of totalled more than 500,000. the town of Lingshou on a "mopping-up" campaign, at In the face of the Japanese army' s rabid attacks' Mao Ze- Chenzhuang village in Lingshou county. His strategic plan dong remained, calm and undisturbed. In the last quarter of 1939, the Japanese amassed a force in central was to "consolidate in north China and develop of more than 20,000 men and launched a winter "mop- Route Army's 115th Divi- China. " He ordered the Eighth ping-up" campaign in the mountains of western Hebei and to pene- sion to march into Shandong, the 120th Division northern Shanxi. In early November, the Shanxi-Chahar- Division to enter trate into central Hebei' and the 129th Hebei army, coordinated by some units of the 120th Divi- borders of Hebei' southern Hebei and the plain on the sion, fought two battles of encirclement and annihilation a more extensive guerrilla Shandong and Henan, to {ight at Yansuya and Huangtuling in Laiyuan county and wiped the people' s war. He believed that only by intensifying out over 1,500 enemies. Lieutenant-General Apu Kisiwu, army from attaining its aims war can prevent the Japanese commander of the Japanese Second Independent Mixed by rabid attacks. Brigade, was killed in one of the battles. He was the high- at Mao' s order, He Long and Guan Late in January 1939' est ranking Japanese army officer killed by the Eighth force of the 120th Division from Xiangying led the main Route Army in the War of Resistance. In mid November, central Hebei, where it joined northwestern Shanxi to the Japanese army penetrated deep into the Shanxi-Cha- headquarters organizations of the Eighth force with the har-Hebei base area in a converging attack along several Hebei district and formed a mil- Route Army in the central routes. In forty-three days, the Eighth Route Army political committee headed by He Long and the itary and fought 108 large and small battles and smashed the command. After having smashed the central Hebei Japanese "mopping-up" campaign after killing and wound- fourth and fifth "mopping-up" Japanese army' s third' ing over 3,600 of the enemies. campaigns, the central Hebei command assembled a force of seven-plus regiments at the end of April and wiped out a Japanese unit of over 700 men at Qihui village in Hejian county, scoring an important victory in the Central Plain area, In order to check the mobility of the Japanese mechanized units, the army and people in central Hebei pulled down 122 Mao Zedorg's Art o{ War Mao Zedotg's Art o{ War 723 .r? Taking Bold and Resolute Measures governor. Even when he became President of the National Government first in Guangdong and then in he 2" Converging on the EnemY in Wuhan, was concurrently the commander of the Second Army. " - Actions Coordinated "There have also been parties in China, notably the Pro- gressive Party, which did not want to have an army; yet reviled During his life, MLao Zedong had vehemently even this party recognized that it could not govern- Rut €Jet against the Kuomintang on countless occasions' ment positions without some warlord backing. Among its not in heart' on- sometimes he reviled it only in words and successive patrons have been Yuan Shikai. Duan Qirui and ly in public and not in private' He stood for Communist- Chiang Kai-shek. " and had carefully studied the war Kuomintang cooperation "A few small political parties with a short history, e.g. , history o{ the Kuomintang. the Youth Party, have no army, and so have not been able On November 1938, he published his Problems of War to get anywhere. " in and Strategy, his fourth book of military strategy' Mao Zedong openly declared, "Those who have guns have the which a chapter is devoted to the war history o{ power, and those who have more guns have more power. " Kuomintang. He said expressly, "Having guns we can create Party or- "After Speaking about Chiang Kai-shek, he said' Sun ganizations, as witness the powerful Party organizations Yat-sen came Chiang Kai-shek, who brought the which the Eighth Route Army has created in northern Kuomintang's military power to its zenith' He values the China. " army as his very life and has had the experience o{ three But he emphasized, "Our principle is that the Party com- wars, namely, the Northern Expedition' the Civil War mands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to and the War of Resistance Against Japan' ' ' ' He has cre- command the Party. " ated a huge 'Central Army' for counter-revolutionary Mao Zedong had harshly condemned Marshal Peng Dehuai purposes. He has held firmly to the vital point that who- on several occasions. One of Peng' s crimes was trying "to ever has an army has power and that war decides every- command the Party with the gun." An article circulated thing. In this respect we ought to learn from him' In this during the Cultural Revolution told a great deal about respect both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are our Peng: teachers. " "From August 20 to December 5, 1940, Peng Dehuai, He also said, "Since the Revolution of 1911' all the war- acting behind Chairman Mao' s back together with Deng lords have clung to their armies for dear life' setting great Xiaoping and others, launched the Hundred-Regiment store by the principle, 'Whoever has an army has pow- Campaign. which was politically capitulationist and mili- er.'" tarily adventurist in nature. Peng Dehuai's political pur- He then gave the following examples: pose for starting the campaign was to defend Chongqing ,.Tan Yankai, a clever bureaucrat whO ha Campaign because Peng had disrupted his strategic plan. our forces, totalling 400,000 men (or B0 percent of our According to Mao Zedong, the Hundred-Regiment Cam- army) , to start an all-out attack along a 2,S0O-kilometre paign performed a great service for Chiang Kai-shek. front behind enemy lines. He engaged the Japanese and The Hundred-Regiment Campaign was fought in the fol- puppet forces in so-called 'large-scale active campaigns' lowing manner: of a mobile and regular war and acted in the most reckless In the summer of 1940, the Eighth Route Army in north manner. Because the fighters of the Eighth Route Army China started a large-scale offensive against the Japanese. and the broad masses of the people in north China had As the campaign went on, the troops taking part in it in- fought heroically, some victories were won in these bat- creased to 105 regiments and over 200,000 men. It was tles and more than 20,600 of the enemies were wiped out' therefore called the Hundred-Regiment Campaign. But owing to basic mistakes in strategy and command' our The first stage of the campaign lasted from August 20 to army suffered over 22,OOO casualties. The campaign was September 10. The objective was the destruction of the fought in total violation of Chairman Mao idea of the peo- enemy's main lines of communications and the destruction ple's war; it was a product of Peng Dehuai's military ad- of the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway in particular. venturism and theory of quick victory. His employment of On the night of August 20, the various units of the Eighth large forces to fight battles of attrition played into the Route Army began to sally forth on different targets. The hands of the Japanese, who sought to engage our main Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Command mobilized a {orce force in decisive battles' and prematurely revealed our forty-six regiments the command Nie army' s actual strength. Chiang Kai-shek expressed of which, under of Rongzhen, destroyed the section of the Zhengding- hearty approbation of Peng' s campaign' While the cam- Taiyuan Railway east of Yangquan and west of paign was under way, Chiang Kai-shek sent a 'special Shijiazhuang, seized Niangziguan and other important en- telegram of approbation' to Peng, encouraging him to emy and puppet strongholds, and dynamited the 'continue with the effort' and 'start another one'' Peng Jingjing coal mine run by the Japanese. Dehuai launched the campaign without asking permission The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Command from Chairman Mao, who learned about it from the news- and the 129th Division threw in forty-seven regiments. paper. Chairman Mao waged a resolute struggle against Under the command of He Long and Guan Xiangying, Peng Dehuai' s grave mistake. While the Hundred-Regi- these forces occupied Yangfang, Kangjialing and other en- ment Campaign was going on, Chairman Mao called Wang emy strongholds, destroyed the Tatong-Yinqu section of Zhen to Yanan and said to him, 'Peng Dehuai started this the Datong-Puzhou Railway and the entire Fen-Li High- important campaign without consulting me' Our strength to prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to is now fully revealed' The consequences will be very way the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway. bad.' Peng was later criticized by Chairman Mao on sev- In the second stage, from September 22 to early October, eral occasions for his grave mistake of launching the Hun- attacks were continued on the enemy on either side of lines dred-Regiment Campaign without Mao' s permission' " of communications and on the enemy and puppet This remarkable piece of writing revealed a top secret' strongholds deep in the base areas. Attempts were made Mao Zedong criticized Peng for the Hundrcd-Regiment Mao Zedong's Art of War t27 1,26 Mao Zedong's Art of War to seize the towns of Yushe, Liaoxian, Laiyuan and ).A,r The Enemy Advances, We Advance Lingqiu. But as a result of exhaustion through continuous - - Penetrating Deep into fighting on the part of our troops and owing to poor tech- the Enemy's Rear nical equipment, none of the town were taken except which was taken and then lost. Altogether, 1,824 Yushe Mao Zedong often talked about the militia and the devel- large and small battles had been fought in the Hundred- opment of the militia in his military strategy. What was Regiment Campaign by the end of December. About the role the Communist-led militia played in the War of 30,000 Japanese and puppet troops were killed or wound- Resistance Against Japan? ed and 281 Japanese soldiers and over 1,400 puppet sol- During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the militia diers were taken prisoner. More than 1, 800 puppet troops in the Communist areas had grown to a formidable force of came over to our side. Over 470 kilometres of railways, 2,500,000 men. 1,500 kilometres of highways' 213 railway stations and The duty of the militia in ordinary times was to stand bridges and 260 tunnels, and 293 enemy strongholds were guard and engage in reconnaissance. Disguised militia destroyed. Among the booties were 53 cannons, more guards were often stationed at enemy watchtowers and than 5,800 various types of guns and a quantity of other .When militia spies worked inside enemy strongholds. military material. fighting broke out, the militia often fought at the outposts In the War of Resistance Against Japan, Mao Zedong and coordinated with the manoeuvre of the regular forces, urged the Kuomintang army to fight on the main front ' so that the regular forces could give full play to their while the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army were might. to fight as guerrillas on the flanks. He wished the 'War the of Resistance, the militia fought so- Kuomintang would be weakened in the war instead of In units a called "sparrow against the invaders. growing stronger. Now that the Hundred-Regiment Cam- warfare" Japanese "mopping-up" paign had revealed the actual strength of the Communist When the enemy conducted a campaign, they usually employed a force of several hundred or sever- armies, the Japanese army' s attacks began to be directed poorly mainly against the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth al thousand men. It was difficult for the equipped Army. The Communist armies could no longer fight only militia to defeat them in a head-on clash. The militia on the flanks but had to take on the enemy on the main therefore divided themselves into small guerrilla groups of front with resulting heavy casualties. This was the reason three or five men and harassed the enemy. Because they why Mao Zedong condemned the Hundred-Regiment Cam- were highly mobile and could group together and disperse paign. A cool-headed analysis, however, will show that at will and strike at the enemy at unlikely places, they the Hundred-Regiment Campaign' was acttrally [ "blooming-flowers force, they could strike at its head, body or tail, so that mine" ; a small mine inside a big one, "mother-and-son " "flying " the enemy would be exhausted in trying to protect each mine. There were also mine, "string-ignited " "time "jumping section. The enemy was also prevented from reaching mine, mine" and mine.' The militia mines place their rendezvous on time by the militia' s harassment' buried at every where the enemy were likely appear, When the enemy withdrew, the militia from several vil- to giving them a hard time trying to avoid the mines. lages would attack them at every possible place. The militia paid a great In the "mopping-up" campaigns, the Japanese invaders deal of attention to camouflage the spots adopted a policy of "burn all' kill all and loot all. " To where mines were buried. The ground surface was often covered deal with the enemy's cruelty, the militia helped the peo- with the imprints of chicken feet or donkey ple clear all food grain and other useful things from their hooves to mislead the enemy. Sometimes the militia even put provocative posters houses and fields and led them to places of safety before up in a mine field to infuriate the enemy the enemy arrived. The enemy carried out a "mopping-up and lead them to the mines. campaign" against the Taiyue mountain area in 1942. The land mine warfare threw the enemy into a great con- put When they arrived at Qinyuan county (designated by the fusion, them in constant fear and hindered their free movement, enemy as "an experimental district for the suppression of The policy "nibbling" Communists in mountainous areas), they could find noth- Japanese also adopted a of at the an- ing except the empty houses and fields in an area several ti Japanese base areas. They blockaded and carved up the base dozen kilometres in circumference. As they could not even areas with communications networks, blockhouses "suppression" "mop- find drinking water, they had to admit defeat and with- and ditches and then launched and ping-up" draw. campaigns against each of them. To counter the Gunpowder, one of China' s four great ancient inventions, Japanese, one of the militia's important missions was to was put to creative use during the War of Resistance disrupt the enemy' s communication lines, destroy their blockhouses and level the Against Japan. The militiamen put gunpowder into house- ditches. hold pots, bowls, jars and vats and turned them into im- The militia also waged communication warfare against the provised wooden, stone and porcelain mines and used enemy. While disrupting the enemy' s communication Iines, they made them against the Japanese. As these indigenous mines every effort to safeguard their own lines could be easily assembled with readily availablc material, of communications. The even a woman or a child could make them. '['hcy were militia' s most unusual achievement, however, was the suitable for carrying out an extensive peoplc' s war be- tunnel warfare they had initiated against the enemy. The vast plains cause they could be used in any terrain and lrirlrlt'n in cvery in north China offered good communica- imaginable place. tions. But the absence of natural barriers made it difficult According to the places where they wcrt' lrirl,lt'rr, people to wage guerrilla warfare. At first, the militiamen dug pits called a mine hanging above a door{r:rnrt' "llr. ovt'rhead into the ground and used them as hiding places during an emergency. mine" ; a mine suspended in a well, "tlr:rgorrllv l,trt:hing- Later, they were inspired to dig under ground water mine"; a mine that could ignitc st'vlr;rl ollr,'t'lrtines, tunnels. These tunnels were then extended to 130 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedorg's Art of War 131 form an underground network, Iinking up villages, dis- forms of guerrilla warfare. tricts and counties several hundred kilometres away. The "The enemy advances, we retreat" was the most impor- militiamen could move about freely through these tunnels tant principle in Mao Zedong's well-known "sixteen-char- without emerging to ground surface. The exits of the tun- acter formula. " But in the War of Resistance Against nels were cleverly hidden in a brick platform bed, a brick Japan, he had proposed a totally contradictory principle, stove, a well or even in a trough at a horse stable, or on which was "the enemy advance, we advance. " the roof of a house. The militia could appear and disap- This principle was put forward to deal with the enemy's pear like shadows and attack the enemy from unexpected policy of "clearing the countryside of anti-Japanese activi- places. As the enemy had no definite target to fire at and ties. " It meant that as the enemy advanced, the anti- could not see their opponents, they were exasperated. Japanese forces should advance to the enemy's rear. The The highly developed tunnel warfare enabled the Chinese Eighth Route Army organized armed working teams, forces to establish their bases on the plains where the ene- which were to slip through the enemy blockade and move my had built innumerable blockhouses and anti-guerrilla deep into the occupied areas. ditches. An armed working team was not only an armed force; it When the War of Resistance entered the third year in the was the army, the government and the people in one. It autumn of 1939, news of Chinese victories began to pour was an organization that combined military struggle with in. Mao Zedong cool-headedly analysed the overall war political struggle. In the enemy occupied areas, the armed situation. At an interview with three correspondents from working teams appeared and disappeared mysteriously, the Central News Agency, the Sao Dang Bao and the Xin carrying out open and secret, political and military activi- "As Min Bao on September 16, 1939, he said, for the ties to disrupt the enemy and puppet ruling organs and specific task in the new stage, it is to prepare for the thwart their plans of pressganging young men into mili- counter-offensive, and this concept covers everything. tary service, robbing the peasants of their harvests, That is to say, during the stage of stalemate China must launching "development" projects and enslaving the peo- build up all the strength required for the future counter- ple. offensive. To prepare for the counter-offensive does not The armed working teams moved about in the "heart" of mean launching it immediately, since it cannot be done un- the enemy; they were visible to the people everywhere, " meant here was less the conditions are ripe. What Mao but were invisible to the enemy. strategic counter-offensive and not tactical counter-offen- slve. He emphasized, "To itemize the tasks of the nt'w slage, in the enemy' s rear we must keep up guerrill;r warfare, smash his 'mopping-up' campaigns and "Our were recaptured. The central Anlrtri ;lIrti'.lapanese area sioned speech, he said, army has already expanded to 910,000 expanded to Jiangpu in the east and w('stcrn Anhui in the men. and the number of our rural militia, who west, and the Hubei-Henan-Hunan-Jiangxi border area are not withdrawn from normal productive work, has grown grew to 300,000 square kilometres with a p Soviet Union, stating that the Communist armies had the among his subordinates and required them to study and right to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet apply it creatively. forces encircled by the Communist armies. In a secret telegram to his commanders of the War Zones on September "The On September 2, the Japanese foreign minister, Mamoru 20, Chiang Kai-shek stated, purpose entering Shigemitsu. and chief o{ general staff of the Japanese of into negotiations with the traitorous party was forces, Michiro lJmezu' representing the emperor, the to fathom its demands and intentions and to stall for time and relax international government and the imperial general headquarters, signed attention, so that the National Army surrender terms abroad the U. S. battleship Missouri' could take this opportunity speedily to seize the ma- jor cities in the enemy-occupied areas. After the National The surrender of the Japanese army of 7 '280,000 men to Army has taken control strategic points China marked the victorious conclusion of China' s War of of all the and eommunication lines and accepted the surrender the Resistance Against JaPan. of Japanese invaders, it can then conduct specific negotia- tions with the traitorous party from a favourable and su- perior military position. If the traitorous party refuses to bend under the principle of unified military command and Pincer lVlovements ar', R government administration, it will be denounced as ban- - Intercepting Enemy Reinforcements dits and totally suppressed. Two days before Mao Zed.ong flew to Chongqing, he has proved that the Kuomintang and the Commu- drafted "On Peace Negotiations with the Kuomintang History - nist Party could not cooperate with each other, and clash- Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party es between the two parties were inevitable' of China, " in which he wrote, "Moreover, our Party is After victory over Japan, the clash between the powerful, and if anyone attacks us and if the conditions Kuomintang and the Communist Party started once again' are favourable {or battle, we will certainly act in self-de- Both sides paid lip service to cooperation. Mao Zedong fence to wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and even flew to Chongqing on August 28, 7945' to carry on completely. " After his return from the Chongqing negoti- peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek' The negotia- ations, Mao Zedong made a report to a meeting of cadres tions even produced the ostentatious "October 10th A- in Yanan on October 17. Revealing some facts about the greement, " in which it was declared that "civil war will be civil war, he said, "Peace, though written into the agree- resolutely avoided, " "peace and democracy will be the ba- ment, has not in fact been realized. In places like the sis for unity" and "an independent, free, prosperous and Shangdang area in Shanxi province there is fighting on a strong New China will be built. " But in actuality' both fairly large scale. The Shangdang area, rimmed by the sides were making active preparations for war' Taihang, Taiyue and Chongtiao mountains, is like a tub. On the day after Mao Zedong' s arrival in Chongqing for This tub contains fish and meat, and Yan Xishan set thir- the peace negotiations, Chiang Kai-shek secretly circulat- teen divisions to grab it. Our policy also was set long ago to give tit for tat, to ed a reprint of his early Handbooh on Bandit Suppression - fight for every inch of land.. . . Mao Zedong's Art of 148 Mao Zedorg's Art of War War 149 We wiped out all thirteen divisions. Their attacking forces gion to intercept the Kuomintang forces marching north_ had 38,000 men, and we employed 31,000 men. Of their ward along the Datong-Puzhou Railway while concen_ 38,000 men, 35,000 were destroyed, 2,000 fled and trating the main force to stop the advance of the 1,000 scattered. Such fighting will continue. " Kuomintang troops along the Beiping-Hankou Railway. It was clear from the above passages that the civil war be- In a telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Mao ex_ tween the Kuomintang and the Communist Party could plained, "It will take at least one more month lor the main not be avoided. Nobody could prevent it from breaking forces from Shandong and central China to shift to the out. Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning area; two to three morc months are The following is an account of a campaign fought against needed for these forces to be deployed for batrle, to famil_ the Kuomintang by Deng Xiaoping under Mao Zedong' s iarize themselves with the local terrain and 1o complete the directions. initial preparations after their arrival at their stations. The Beiping-Hankou campaign, also known as the Han- Stopping and delaying the northward advance of the die- dan campaign, was fought between October 27 and hard forces, therefore, is our overwhelming strategic task present. " " November 2, 1945, by Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng at He emphasized, The forthcoming new and directed from afar by Mao Zedong. Beiping-Hankou campaign is an offensive against the Chiang Kai-shek had given secret orders to suppress the Kuomintang's main force and a move for the realization of peace. Communists and was at the same time hurriedly sending Victory or defeat in this campaign will have an ex_ tremely his troops to take over Beiping, Tianjin and the northeast important bearing on the situation as a whole. . . . main which had been occupied by the Japanese. A force of over 60,000 men from the Taihang and Among the Kuomintang troops that were pushing north- Hebei-Shandong-Henan areas is to be placed under the ward along several routes were the 30th Corps' 40th unified and personal command of Liu and Deng to deal Corps and the New Eighth Corps, totalling 45'000 men, with the die-hard army advancing northward along the under Sun Lianzhong, commander-in-chief of the 11th Beiping-Hankou Railway and to ensure that a part or a War Zone. These forces, directed by deputy commanders- greater part of it is eliminated. " in-chief Ma Fawu (concurrently commander of the 40th With Mao Zedong' s directives from afar, Liu Bocheng Corps) and Gao Shuxun (concurrently commander of the and Deng Xiaoping acted without hesitation. They assem_ New Eighth Corps), proceeded northward along the Bei- bled a main force of 60,000 men, including the First, Sec_ jing-Hankou Railway and were followed by the 32nd ond and Third columns and the troops from the Taihang, Corps, the puppet troops under Sun Dianying and the fol- Southern Hebei and Hebei-Shandong-Henan military re- low-up units of four more corps. Some of these troops had gions, and 100,000 militiamen and civilians and prepared entered Xinxiang, and others were about to enter. to battle continuously in the next two months and destroy In order to safeguard the gateway to north China and en- the enemy advancing northward along the Beiping Hankou sure the strategic operations of the Communist armies in Railway. the northeast, Mao Zedong decided to employ part of the In order to concentrate their forces in a pincer movement troops of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Re- against the enemy from both the eastern and western sides 150 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 151 of the railway, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping designat- Conserving Strength a,O ed the First Column and the troops of the Hebei-Shan- ' - Carving Up and Destroying dong-Henan Military Region as the eastern column, and the Exhausted Enemy the Second and Third columns and the troops of the Tai- Hebei military regions as the west- hang and the Southern On October 22, the enemy' s first echelon of three corps detach- ern column. They also organized an independent crossed the Zhanghe and advanced northward along three ment with part of the troops of the Taihang Military Re- routes. Part of the enemy occupied Cixian county, and an- gion, which was to operate jointly with the local forces other part attacked Dongfang village in the south, while and militia of the Taihang and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan the main force moved northward along the eastern side of areas and block the enemy in the area between the north- the railway. To prevent the Kuomintang forces from en- ern bank of the Yellow River and Anyang so as to gain tering Handan so that they could be destroyed later in field time for the main force to converge on the Beiping-Hankou battles, the first column of the Communist army, leaving Railway from the Shangdang and the Hebei-Shandong- a regiment to intercept the enemy north of Linzhang, Henan areas and to force the enemy to leave a large force moved its main force to the south of Handan and north of to guard the area along the railway south of Anyang, and Xiangyang and put up a strong defence to pin down the en- to reduce the enemy forces marching northward. After the emy. the Zhanghe River, the independent On the morning of October 23, before the Communist enemy had crossed ' detachment was to seize the ferry point and prevent the army had completed its defence works, the vanguard of the Kuomintang positions enemy reinforcements from crossing the river. The re- army began to attack the of the First Brigade of the First Column. The First Brigade put maining local forces and militia were to continue to block up a stubborn defence and repulsed several enemy as- the enemy south of Anyang. saults. The entire campaign was fought in four stages: blocking, On October 24, the enemy 30th Corps. 40th Corps and encircling, general attack, and pursuing and destroying. New Eighth Corps pushed vigorously northward after Together with Zhu De, Mao Zedong studied military maps crossing the Zhanghe River. Under cover of concentrated while Liu in Yanan and issue directives to the front fire, the 106th Division of the 40th Corps launched repeat- Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping followed every one of the di- ed attacks on the First Brigade of the Communist Army. rectives to the letter. The Communist defenders resolutely fought back and beat As expected, the first column of three Kuomintang army back the enemy by firing at close range and launching corps, eager to win more victories, proceeded northward counter-assaults. A fierce battle lasted a whole day. At from Xinxiang and was continually harassed by the Com- dusk, the Kuomintang troops concentrated their attacks munist independent detachment and the local forces and at several points and succeeded in breaking into the Com- militia. munist positions. The Kuomintang army, however, did not know that by this time the other Communist forces t52 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War 153 had arrived on the scene and had encircled the Kuomintang actlvrtles. army on three sides. The First Column of the Communist Since the surrounded enemy still maintained their posi- army had succeeded in pinning down the enemy at the pre- tions and suffered little loss, the Communist army decided arranged battlefield and gaining time for the Communist not to start the decisive battle before the Communist fol- main force to concentrate. low-up units arrived. It only sent out small details to close After arriving on the field of battle, the main force of the in on the enemy and carve up and penetrate into the enemy Communist army immediately began to attack. But as the positions so as to tire out the enemy. At the same time, it assaults were hastily started, no remarkable results were tried by every means to urge the New Eighth Corps to achieved that night. change sides. On the night of October 25, af.ter all the units of the Com- In a telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Mao Ze- munist Second Column had arrived, the Communist army dong stated, "The deployment is appropriate. Conserve launched a new attack. The Kuomintang army took cover your strength and wait for the arrival of the follow-up in the densely located villages on the plain, placed barri- units. By that time, the enemy will be both hungary and cades of felled trees around the villages and organized tired, and his weak points will be exposed to us. We crossfire from bunkers. The Communist army again failed should concentrate our main force, find the enemy's weak to achieved much result. The Kuomintang army had by spot and wipe out one or two enemy divisions. The now found that it had been surrounded by the Communist enemy' s arrogance will certainly be deflated. . . . There army on four sides and could neither advance nor with- are fourteen enemy divisions altogether eight enemy di- draw. When it learned that its New Eighth Corps had con- visions in Shijiazhuang and Xinxiang and six divisions in tacted the Communist army with the intention of changing front of you. When you destroy one or two of the enemy sides, it began to waver and fail in its morale. divisions in front of you, there may be enemy reinforce- On October 26, Hu Zongnan's 16th Corps and Sun ments coming {rom both the north and the south. You Lianzhong's 32nd Corps came respectively from must be prepared to destroy four or {ive enemy divisions in Shijiazhuang in the north and Anyang in the south to rein- several continuous battles before a change will take place force the Kuomintang troops. in the situation. " In order to concentrate the main force and annihilate the By October 28, all the Communist follow-up troops had surrounded enemy, the Communist side moved part of the arrived and all preparations had been made. The general troops of the Taihang Military Region and part of the offensive against the surrounded enemy started in the troops of the Shanxi Chahar-Hebei Military Region to in- evenlng. tercept the enemy reinforcements and at the same time The Communist army had divided its forces into two strengthened the positions along the Zhanghe River. groups. The northern group was the assaulting troops of To stop the enemy reinforcements from moving north the general offensive, directing its blows at the enemy' s from Anyang, the Communist side mobilized the guerrilla 40th Corps. It also converged on the enemy from both the and militia units from the Taihang and Hebei-Shandong- northwest and the southeast, aiming mainly at carving up Henan military regions to divert the enemy with guerrilla and destroying the enemy' s 106th Division, which had al- 154 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 155 ready suffered some losses and whose positions were over- the enemy under Ma Fawu, who resisted stubbornly from extended on the northern side. village to village. The southern group pinned down the enemy's 30th Corps On November 1, when the Communist army broke into and made feint attacks on the New Eighth Corps. It also the headquarters of Ma Fawu, the Kuomintang forces lost intensified its effort to win over the New Eighth Corps by their commander and began to disperse in all directions. sending its chief of staff Li Da to meet Gao Shuxun, com- mander o{ the New Eighth Corps. By October 30, the Communist army had taken more than twenty towns and villages, destroyed a greater part of the Leave the High Road Alone Division of the 40th Corps and inflicted heavy losses 106th 30 Seizing the Less Conspicuous Places on the 30th Corps. The enemy' s reinforcements from the north and the south were blocked respectively on the southern side of the When we study the history of the Kuomintang-Communist Zhanghe River and in the vicinity of Gaoyi. In order to de- strife, we must read the history books put out by both parties, stroy the surrounded enemy first and then the enemy rein- make comparisons and carry out analysis before forcements, Mao Zedong sent an urgent telegram to Zhao we can acquire a truly objective understanding of this his- Erlu: "Lead six regiments of the main {orce to the south tory. and assist the Taihang forces to wipe out the 16th Corps A certain history book says that in 1946 "the seizure of which is moving southward from Shijiazhuang. " the northeast was one of the important and immediate ob- jectives In the face of threats and promises, Gao Shuxun staged a of the Kuomintang government in provoking a civ- mutiny at Matouzhen and led the New Eighth Corps and il war. " the Hebei local {orces, a total of over 10,000 men, to the The northeast is part of the territory belonging to the mil- Communist side. lions of the Chinese people as a whole; it is not to be On the morning of October 31, the enemy main force be- seized and possessed by a single party or group. gan to try to break out of the encirclement in the south. In fact, it was not the Kuomintang but the Communist As the Communist army had foreseen this possibility, it Party which "seized" the northeast first. The northeast intentionally left an opening. After the Kuomintang was an industrial base. Mao Zedong knew that the north- troops had deserted their positions, the Communist army east was a thousand times better than the Jinggang Moun- pounced on them from both the eastern and the western tains and the Yanan region as a base area. The seizure of sides. Another part of the Communist army pushed ,p- the northeast meant the liberation of half of China. wards from the northern bank of the Zhanghe River. A As soon as Japan had surrendered, the Communists began large number of the militia also intercepted the enemy to dispatch large numbers of troops and cadres to the along the communication lines. In the afternoon, the northeast. Communist army concentrated a superior force and On December 28, 1945, half a year before the Iaunched fierce attacks on the remaining 20,000 men of Kuomintang tried to "seize" the northeast, Mao Zedong 156 Mao Zedong' s Art o{ War Mao Zedorg's Art of War 1,57 wrote "Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast, " in Kuomintang attacks. " which he outlined his plan to turn the northeast into stable By "smashing the Kuomintang attacks, " Mao actually base areas. meant "making preparations to attack the Kuomintang. " He wrote, "It should now be made clear that these base He would not say so because it was not good propaganda areas are not to be built in the big cities or long the main and he wanted all the Chinese people believe it was the communication lines that are or will be occupied by the Kuomintang, and not the Communist Party, which fired Kuomintang; under present conditions this is not practica- the first shot in the civil war. ble. Nor are they to be built in regions close to big cities Would anyone believe that the civil war in China could or main communication lines held by the Kuomintang. have been avoided and the Kuomintang and the Commu- The reason is that the Kuomintang, having seized the big nist Party would have existed in peace i{ the Kuomintang cities and the main communication lines, will not let us had not attacked? If you believe it, Mao Zed.ong certainly build stable base areas in regions very close to them. Our did not. According to his theory, the solution of national Party should do adequate work and set up our first line of contradictions would give rise to class contradictions. military defence in these regions, which must never be While the Kuomintang wanted to maintain its rule, the lightly abandoned. But they will be guerrilla zones for Communists wanted to overthrow it and liberate the whole both parties and not our stable base areas. " country. The two political parties were as incompatible as The regions in which to build stable bases, said Mao, water and fire. A decisive battle between the two parties were the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote could not be avoided. from the centres of Kuomintang occupation. He laid down Mao Zedong calculated, "This time over 100,000 of our his strategy for seizing the northeast in eight Chinese troops have entered the northeast and Rehe; the army characters, meaning "Leave the high road alone and occu- there has recently expanded by more than 200,000, and py the land on both sides. " This meant that the Commu- the trend is to keep on expanding. Adding Party and gov- nists were to seize the less conspicuous and out-of-the- ernment workers, we estimate that the total will exceed way places while allowing the Kuomintang to take over 400, 000 within a year. " the cities and main communication liens for the time be- The Kuomintang certainly would not hand over the north- irg. east to the Communist army. Mao's order to the Communist army entering the north- On December 22, 1945, the U. S. Seventh Fleet began to east was: "Promptly delimit military areas and sub-areas transport the government troops under Du Yuming to the in western, eastern and northern Manchuria and divide northeast. The U. S. navy again transported three more our force into field armies and regional troops. Distribute corps of government army to the northeast in March the a considerable part of the regular troops among the mili following year and two more corps between April and tary sub-areas to arouse the masses, wipe out bandits, set May. up organs of political power, organize guerrillzrs, people' s Chiang Kai-shek' s directive to Du Yuming was, "You militia and self-defence forces so as to makc our areas se- must fight your way to the other side of the Great cure. coordinate with the field armies attrl smash the Wall. . . . Two corps can fight their way out of the pass of 158 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 159 Shanhaiguan first . . . to destroy the Communist army. " nists. Employing 80 percent of his regular forces, he On April 18, when the Communist army marched into the started an all-out attack on the Communist areas. His city of Changchun after the Soviet army had withdrawn, forces were deployed as follows: the Kuomintang wanted to take it from the Communists. East China area: 58 brigades (about 460,000 men). A bloody battle broke out between the two armies, result- Central Plains area: 25 brigades (210,000 men). ing in heavy casualties on both sides. The Kuomintang Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan area: 28 brigades (about army lost over 10,000 men while the Communist army 250,000 men) . over 8,000. When large Kuomintang reinforcements be- Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area: 20 brigades (97,000 men). gan to pour in. the Communist army sensed that it was Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia area: 19 brigades ( 155,000 not to its advantage to put up a stubborn defence. It with- men). drew from the city on May 19. Guangdong guerrilla areas and Hainan Island area: I The situation of the struggle between the Kuomintang and brigades (75, 000 men). the Communist Party at that time was "fighting skirmish- These 193 brigades (which were divisions before the reor- es inside of the Great Wall and large-scale battles outside ganization) , totalling 1 ,600,000 men, were more than B0 of the Great Wall. " percent of the Kuomintang regular army of 248 brigades In a directive to the Communist army on July 20, 1946' (divisions) of 2,000,000 men. Mao Zedong stated, "For defeating Chiang Kai-shek the At Mao Zedong's order, the Communist army voluntarily general method of fighting is mobile warfare. Therefore, abandoned some cities to avoid the blows of the superior the temporary abandonment of certain places or cities is enemy forces. It shifted its forces and resorted to destroy- not only unavoidable but also necessary. Certain places or ing the enemy in mobile warfare. cities are temporarily abandoned in order to win final vic- tory, which would otherwise be impossible. " Why did Mao Zedong, who had always advocated guerrilla Kilting a Chicken with an Ox Cleaver warfare, stopped talking about it and ordered the Commu- v11 L nist army to engage the enemy in mobile warfare? The - Concentrating the Forces to reason was that the Communist army had by now become Destroy the Enemy fully fledged. It had grown into a formidable force of 7,200,000 men, and the population in the Communist- We have mentioned the Beijing-Hankou campaign fought controlled areas exceeded 100 million. Unlike the days on by Deng Xiaoping under Mao Zedong' s direction. The fol- the Jinggang Mountains when the Communist forces lowing is an account of the Dingtao campaign which was fought with home-made guns and cannons, the Commu- also fought by Deng Xiaoping under Mao's direction. nist army had become more like a regular army equipped In August 1946, in order to divert the enemy' s attention with some advanced weapons. It could operate in large from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army formations instead of small groups. which was trying to break out of the encirclement in the Chiang Kai-shek was determined to wipe out the Commu- Central Plains and in order to coordinate the operations of 160 Mao Zedong's Art of War trlao Zedong' s Art of War 161 the Communist army in central Jiangsu, the Communist Shandong-Henan Field Army in a telegram to assemble on forces suddenly sallied out along the I-onghai Railway. the northern side of the railway to rest and reorganize. After occupying more than a dozen important towns, The field army was to lure the enemy in deep and look for breaking into the city of Kaifeng and annihilating more an opportunity to destroy it. He told its commanders not than 16,000 Kuomintang troops, it seized control of three to fight a battle when they were not sure of winning. Ev- hundred kilometres of the Longhai Railway between ery time they fought, they must be sure of winning victo- Kaifeng and Xuzhou. ry. They must concentrate a superior force, three or four This thrust into the middle section of the Kuomintang times and even five or six times the enemy strength, to forces disrupted the Kuomintang' s plan of operations on destroy one part of the enemy forces first and then another the southern front. To counter the Communist offensive, part, so as to destroy the enemy forces one by one. Chiang Kai-shek amassed 14 reorganized divisions, com- Following Mao' s instructions, Liu Bocheng and Deng prising 32 brigades and about 300,000 men, and pounced Xiaoping, commanders of the field army, told their troops murderously upon the Communist Shanxi-Hebei-Shan- to take advantage of the intervals between battles to rest dong-Henan area on August 28. and prepare for more fighting. After carefully analysing The situation was very tense. The Kuomintang forces the situation, they found the enemy' s eastern column was closed in on the Communist army like the two jaws of a composed of troops under Chiang Kai-shek' s direct con- big pincer. The eastern column, comprising more than trol, who were better equipped and higher in combat ef- five brigades from the Xuzhou Pacification Headquarters, fectiveness, but among the five reorganized divisions in advanced along the Dangshan and Yucheng line to the the western column, only the Third Reorganized Division Shanxian, Chengwu, Fengxian and Yutai area, while the was Chiang Kai-shek' s own troops and the others were western column, comprising ten brigades from the miscellaneous troops not under Chiang's direct control. If Zhengzhou Pacification Headquarters, proceeded along the they could lure the Third Reorganized Division to a pre- Fengqiu, Kaifeng and Shangqiu line to attack the Dong- pared battle{ield, encircle and destroy it with a superior ming, Dingtao and Caoxian area. Their operations were force, the miscellaneous troops would not enthusiastically supported by a large number of more Kuomintang forces come to its rescue because there were deep-rooted contra- from Anyang and other areas in northern Henan. dictions among the enemies themselves. A strong enemy The objective of the Kuomintang army was clear. It in- would thus become a weak enemy, who could be easily de- tended to employ a force numerically twice superior to the feated. Once the Third Reorganized Division was wiped Communist army to catch and destroy the latter in a nar- out, the enemy in the western column would be shaken row strip of land north of the Longhai Railway and south and the enemy' s plan would be thwarted. Liu Bocheng of the former riverbed of the Yellow River when it had be- and Deng Xiaoping therefore decided to strike at the ene- come exhausted after continuous fighting along ttre I-ong- my's Third Reorganized Division first. hai Railway. The task of luring the Third Reorganized Division into the As the huge enemy forces approached thc (bnrmunist-con- "bag" was assigned to the Sixth Column of the Communist trolled areas, Mao Zedong instructed t lrc Shanxi Hebei- army, t62 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 163 At this moment, another telegram arrived from Mao Ze- was totally destroyed on the morning of September 6. dong, instructing the Communist army to aim at annihi- When Zhao Xitian, commander of the Third Reorganized lating the enemy's effective strength and not at holding or Division saw that his division headquarters was exposed to seizing a place. The Communist army must concentrate a the Communist army' s direct attack, he hurriedly re-de- superior force, three or four times the enemy strength, to ployed his forces and tried to flee towards the south where wipe out totally and completely a whole enemy brigade or they could join force with the 47th Reorganized Division. division. But as soon as his men departed from their dugouts, the On September 5. the entire Third Reorganized Division Communist columns began to give chase. Battle cries was lured onto the battlefield planned by the Communist echoed everywhere on a large expanse of the plain. By the army. The enemy's 47th Reorganized Division which had afternoon, the 20th Brigade, 30th Brigade and the division advanced side by side with the Third Reorganized Division headquarters of the Third Reorganized Division had been was stopped at a place twenty kilometres from the battle- destroyed while they were on the move; Zhao Xitian, the {ield. The Communist army then closed in on the enemy in division commander, was taken prisoner. On September two large groups, the Second and Sixth columns in the 7, while the 41st and 47th divisions were withdrawing to- right group and the Third and Seventh columns in the left wards Kaocheng, they were ambushed by the Communist group. The enemy' s Third Reorganized Division was army, and two of their brigades were wiped out. The 55th placed in a tight cordon. and 68th divisions also lost a regiment when they were In the afternoon on that day, Liu Bocheng brought him- withdrawing towards Kaifeng. self to the headquarters of the Sixth Column and gave in- Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping immediately informed structions to the column commanders for the coming bat- Mao Zedong by telegram of the victory in this campaign in tle. He required the Sixth Column to start the general at- which more than 17,000 enemy troops were destroyed. tack on that night. He said that the Sixth Column should After victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, use the method of "killing a chicken with an ox cleaver, " Mao Zedong renamed the Eighth Route Army and New meaning employing a means more than adequate for the Fourth Army the People' s Liberation Army to win the end, by throwing in all the troops of the Sixth Column to support of the people. destroy the 59th Regiment of the enemy' s 29th Brigade He divided the Communist areas (or liberated areas) into first. The 59th Regiment was the main force of the Third six war zones. Reorganized Division; it was fully complemented and best 1. The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan liberated area, equipped. The destruction of the enemy' s strongest unit where the Communist army was under the command of would terrify the entire enemy division and shake its Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping. morale. It would achieve the effect of "pulling a single 2. The East China liberated area, where the Communist hair to throw the entire body out of balancc. " 'l'he Com- army was under the command of Chen Yi, Su Yu and Tan munist army could then wipe out the entirc isolzrted Third Zhenlin. Reorganized Division. 3. The Northeast liberated area, where the Communist After a whole night of fierce fighting, lht' 51)th Regiment army was under the command of Lin Biao and Luo Mao Zedotg's of War 165 164 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Art Ronghuan. weak spots in the enemy' s positions, attack it fiercely and 4. Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei liberated area, where the Com- be sure to win. This accomplished, swiftly exploit the vic- munist army was under the command of Nie Rongzhen. tory and destroy the enemy forces one by one. " 5. The Shanxi-Suiyuan liberated area, where the Commu- These brilliant tactics of Mao Zedong's certainly deserve nist army was under the command of He Long. applause. Without them, the Communist army could not 6. The Central Plains liberated area, where the Commu- have swept across the whole of China to victory. nist army was under the command of Li Xiannian and Zheng Weisan. On September 16, 1946, Mao Zed.ong wrote a brilliant ar- Advance and Retreat in Giant Strides "Concentrate to the Ene- ?) ticle: a Superior Force Destroy >' a Turning Passivity into Initiative my One by One, " in which he explained the tactic de- - scribed by Liu Bocheng as "killing a chicken with an ox cleaver. " Following Mao Zedong' s tactics, the Communist army "With regard to the disposition for a campaign, when the won a series of victories. enemy employs many brigades (or regiments ) and ad- In July 1946, the Communist army of the Central Plains vances against our army from several directions, our army area broke out of the enemy encirclement and shifted to must concentrate an absolutely superior force six, five, the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi area after it had successfully - tied up a strong enemy force. The enemy attacking north- four or at least three times the enemy strength - to pick an opportune moment to encircle and wipe out one enemy ern Jiangsu was met head-on by the Communist army of brigade (or regiment) first. It should be one of the the East China area. Between July 13 and August 27, the enemy' s weaker brigades (or regiments) , or one that has Communist army fought seven successive battles and won less support, or one stationed where the terrain and the seven victories. Although several deserted towns had been people are most favourable to us and unfavourable to the abandoned, it wiped out seven enemy brigades and five enemy, " wrote Mao. communications police corps, a total of 56 ,300 men. "In the disposition for a battle, when we have concentrat- The seven victories in seven battles showed that ll4.ao Ze- ed an absolutely superior force and encircled one of the en- dong' s tactics really worked. As a Communist military "The emy detachments (a brigade or regiment) , our attacking commander commented, key to winning seven victo- formations (or units) should not attempt to wipe out all ries in seven battles lies in firmly adhering to Mao the encircled enemy simultaneously at one swoop and thus Zedong' s strategic principles: Advance and retreat in gi- divide themselves and strike everywhere without enough ant strides and turn passivity into initiative for the pur- strength anywhere, losing time and making it hard to get pose of destroying the enemy's effective strength in large results. Instead, we should concentrate an alrsolutely su- numbers. " perior force, that is to say, a force six, [ivc, four or at Under Mao Zedong's strategic guidance, the Communist least three times that of the enemy, conccntrir tt'the whole forces in the various war zones coordinated their opera- or the bulk of our artillery, select onc (not two) of the tions and actively looked for opportunities to destroy the 166 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedotg' s Art o{ War t67 enemy. engage it in a decisive battle. After four months of fighting from July to October 1946, By the end o{ January 1947, the East China Field Army the Communist army forfeited control of 105 cities and had successively fought several battles in central Jiangsu, towns, but succeeded in wiping out 298'500 Kuomintang northern Anhui and southern Shandong and score a victo- troops. After taking over the cities and towns, the Kuom- ry of annihilating almost 200,000 enemy troops. Follow- intang army had to divert forces to defend them and thus ing the strategic principle of destroying the enemy on inte- weaken its offensive. rior lines, it voluntarily abandoned some towns and dis- From then on, the Communist army grew steadily tricts, moved the battlefield to Shandong province and stronger in the fighting. In one battle fought in northern concentrated its main force in the Linyi area. Jiangsu in December 1946, the Communist army of the Chiang Kai-shek concluded that the Communist army "had East China area succeeded in destroying three Kuomintang suffered heavy losses and was not strong enough to con- brigades, a total oI 24,000 men. Fighting its way to tinue the fighting. " When he learned that the main force southern Shandong, the same army wiped out five more of the Communist army had concentrated in the Linyi Kuomintang brigades, a total of 50'000 men, in January area, he believed the Communist army would put up a 7947. Infuriated by the setbacks, the Kuomintang stubborn defence at Linyi, which was the central city in amassed a huge force of fifty-three brigades, totalling the Communist area in Shandong. After drawing up a plan more than 310,000 men, and started a offensive against for the southern Shandong campaign, Chiang Kai-shek re- the East China liberated area from both the north and the placed Xue Yue with Chen Cheng, his chief of general south. Adopting the tactics of advancing and retreating in staff, as commander-in-chief of the campaign, and at- giant strides, the Communist army concentrated its forces tacked the East China Field Army under the command of to strike at only one column of the enemy at a time and Chen Yi, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, with a massive force of scored a staggering victory in February in the Laiwu area over 300,000 men. of central Shandong. Seven whole enemy brigades, to- Chen Cheng deployed a frontal force of eight reorganized talling over 60,000 men, were wiped out. Among them, divisions, comprising over twenty brigades, under the 49,000 men, including Li Xianzhou, deputy commander- command of Ou Zhen, thirty kilometres north of in-chief of the Kuomintang Second Pacification Zone, Xinanzhen on the eastern section of the Longhai Railway. were taken prisoner. This frontal force was to approach Linyi from the south in The situation at the time of the Laiwu campaign was as three columns, left, central and right, followed by a re- follows: Chiang Kai-shek had amassed sixty-two reorga- serve force of four more reorganized divisions. Its flank nized brigades (divisions), totalling about 500'000 men. was protected by the 42nd Group Army under Hao Pengju or one third of the regular forces he used against the Com- at Baitafu and Tuofeng. A secondary attacking force of munist areas, in this campaign. His intention was to seize three corps under the command of Li Xianzhou, deputy the Communist areas in Jiangsu and Anhui and destroy the commander-in-chief of the Second Pacification Zone. ad- Communist main force in that area, or force it to with- vanced on Laiwu and Xintai from the north along the route draw to Shandong, and then look for an opportunity to of Zichuang, Boshan and Mingshui. Approaching the tar- Zedong' s of War 168 Mao Art Mao Zedong's Art of War 169 get from both the north and the south, the Kuomintang if we should strike out. . . . Lure in the enemy deep. We aimed at encircling and destroying the main force of the shall not attack when the enemy stays put. Nor shall we Communist army. attack before the enemy has reached a locality favourable declared even his It was said that Chen Cheng had that to us and unfavourable to the enemy. In this way we can useless as bean dregs' the 300,000-plus men were as take the initiative wholly into our own hands. . . . The en- death after swallowing Communist army would bloat to emy' s present policy is to induce us to sally out early. A{- had included a crack unit in each of the three them. He ter fighting and exhausting us, he can then advance 11th Reorganized Division in the southern columns: the steadily and occupy Linyi. You should never allow your- left column, the 74th Reorganized Division in the central selves to be fooled. The best policy is to wait until the en- column, and the 25th Reorganized Division in the right emy has advanced to the area between Yancheng and Linyi column. (closer to Linyi) before fighting the first battle. " Mao Zedong sent many telegrams to the East China Com- Faithfully following Mao's directives, the Third Column munist army, in which he directed, "You should aim at of the Communist army stubbornly blocked the advance of destroying six or eight of Ou Zhen' s brigades. . . . If you the enemy along the central route at the area around think beating Ou Zhen requires the concentration of more Chongfang, Yancheng and Taolin. The purpose was to al- forces, consider if either the Fourth Division or the Ninth low the enemy forces on the two flanks to move {orward Division can be kept there and return to central Shandong so that the Communist army could after the battle against Ou Zhen. . . . From tomorrow, the destroy one of them be- fore entire army, except the unit that is attacking Zaozhtang, defeating one by one the enemy moving along the oth- are to rest and consolidate for two weeks, so as to concen- er routes. When the enemy along the central route was trate all the forces to destroy Ou Zhen. " checked by the Communist army, the enemy forces along While the Communist army was making preparations to the other routes, however, also stopped moving forward. attack Or Zhen, the Kuomintang army in the south start- In order to create favourable conditions for battle and de- ed the offensive against the Communist army on January stroy the enemy, the Communist army decided to allow 31. It adopted a tactic of "concentrating the forces, strik- the enemy forces to advance to the Yancheng and Linyi ing sure blows, advancing side by side' and avoiding area before destroying them. The Communist Ninth and sticking out. " It advanced at an average speed of less than 1Oth columns were speedily transferred southward to take ten kilometres a day and entrenched at a newly occupied part in the fighting. place before making further simultaneous advance. At this moment, however, the Kuomintang army in the To deal with this situation, Mao Zedong directed Chen Yi north had reached the Laiwu area and was threatening the and the others in a telegram, "It appears that the best Communist rear. Seeing the enemy forces on the southern principle for our army to follow is to lure the enemy in front were concentrated, moved very carefully and could deep. Not only should we refrain from zrttacking the not be carved up, the Communist army decided to change Longhai Railway. Even when the enemy reaches the its plan of operations for the defence of Linyi and hoped Yancheng and Matou area, we still should think carefully that a change might take place in the overall situation. Mao Zedong's Art of War 1.70 Miro Zcdong' s Art o{ War 171 aa Act According to Circumstances On the night of February 6, the Second Column of the Communist army, at Chen Yi and Su Yu' s order, sudden- JJ Carving the Opponent into - ly made a thrust towards the southeast. In one battle Several Pieces fought on February 7 in the Baitashan and Tuofeng area, it destroyed the main force of the Kuomintang' s 42th On February 5, 7947, in a telegram to Mao Zedong' Chen Group Army under Hao Pengju, which formed the wing of Yi, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin proposed three alternative the enemy along the right route. Hao Penju himself was plans of operations. taken prisoner. When Hao Pengju's troops were under at- According the first plan, the Communist army was to at- tack, the Ou Zhen group did not dare to move northward tack the enemy under Hao Pengju with one column of its to reinforce. The enemy along the left route even retreat- forces so as to lure the enemy along the right route to ed. On February 8, the enemy on the northern front occu- come to its aid in the north or to draw to enemy along the pied Xintai. middle and left routes northward, which might present According the way the campaign developed, Mao Zedong opportunities for destroying the enemy. issued the following directive in a telegram on February 9: The second plan was: If the first plan failed to achieve any "It is very good that Hao Pengju' s forces were disposed result, only one column would be positioned south of of. But in view of the strategic plan as whole, the fighting Linyi to keep watch on the enemy, and the main force was has started too early if your intention is to defeat the ene- to be assembled in the area north of Linyi to rest and wait my on the southern front. The various enemy units may for further oPPortunities. advance more carefully. After beating Hao Pengju, you The third plan suggested that if the enemy forces still did should take no further action (be extremely patient) and not move to the north or were difficult to destroy when it allow the various enemy units to advance towards the did, only one column would stay behind in the Linyi area north before destroying them one by one. If your intention and harass the enemy, the rest of the main force was to is to deal with the enemy on the northern front first, the rush speedily northward to destroy the enemy on the destruction of Hao Pengju' s troops will not impede your northern front, attack the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway and plan. What you need is to choose between the two plans. " threaten the city of Jinan. This would draw the enemy on On February 10, the East China Field Army finally decid- the southern front to move into the mountainous area ed to concentrate a force of fifty-three regiments, destroy north of Linyi or reinforce the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway' the enemy' s 73rd Corps and a division of the 12th Corps The Communist army would then start an all-out offen- first and then shift its forces to defeat the 46th Division sive and destroy the enemy one by one. that had occupied Xintai. It would then push northward Mao Zedong was highly pleased with the telegram' In his towards the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway and totally destroy answering telegram, he stated, "Full approval for the the enemy forces on the northern front. This decision was third plan in the telegram of 15:00 hours, February 5' It approved by Mao Zedong. will give us full initiative and put Chiang Kai shek in a to- Leaving the Third Column and the Second Column behind tally passive Position. " to block and mislead the enemy, the main force of the t72 Mirr Zcdong' s Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 773 East China Field Army abandoncd l-inyi zrnd marched day Wang Yaowu's order, he commanded that Li Xianzhou's and night to the north to attack the gr Preserae the men and lose the territory; attempt to open up a road of escape for I-i Xianzhou' Both men and territory be preserued. Upon receiving Wang Yaowu's order, [-i Xianzhou began will Presente the territory and lose the men; to lead the 73rd and 46th corps away from Laiwu on the Both men and be morning of February 23. When these forces' marching in territory will lost. three columns, reached a valley, measuring ten kilometres north-south and three kilometres east-west' they were He said this when he was directing the Battle of Yanan in ambushed by the Communist forces' 1947. The Communist forces swept down on them from all sides In early March that year, Chiang Kai-shek had amassed and cut them into small sections. In a ferocious battle thirty-four brigades, a military force 230,000 strong, to lasting more than six hours, Li Xianzhou was captured attack the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Communist area. The and his two corps and a division were totally annihi- alive foremost target of the attack was Mao Zedong's den - lated. Yanan. 000 In this campaign, the Communist army put over 60 ' Yanan was invaded by fifteen brigades under the command cities enemy troops out of action and recovered thirteen of Hu Zongnat. As the Communist army defending Yanan forces did not and towns. For forty days the Kuomintang was only one-tenth of the Kuomintang forces, Mao decid- under Com- dare to fight again. Shandong was completely ed to pull out of Yanan and lure the enemy forces in deep munist control. into the Communist area so as to destroy them one by suc- Under Mao Zedong's direction, the Communist army one. troops in the four ceeded in wiping out 415,000 enemy Many people did not understand at the time why Mao had and February 1947' It a- months between November 1946 decided to abandon Yanan, and were unwilling to leave. recovered the bandoned eighty-seven cities and towns and Patiently, Mao explained to them: "We have lived in in eight same number of cities and towns. Altogether' Yanan for ten years. We have dug cave dwellings, sown army occupied 105 months of fighting, the Kuomintang millet and directed the revolution in the whole country areas' but suffered cities and towns in the Communist from here. All China and the world know there is Yanan. averaging 7,000 casualties for every 710,000 casualties, We must defend it, but we are not going to defend it to city or town. the death. " He explained to them again and again that the outcome of a battle is not decided by gaining or losing a city or land; the most important thing is to destroy the en- "Wear emy' s ^. a The Tactics of and Tear" effective strength. J+ An "Empty-City" Stratagem "The enemy has 230,000 men, " continued Mao. "We - have just over 20,000 men. It is difficult for the 20,000 men to destroy 230,000 men. To win victory over the ene- Mao Zedong had a famous saying, which should be re- my, we must adopt a correct method of fighting. pre- membered: At sent, it depends on you 'to torture the enemy mentally, ' Mao Zedong's L76 Mao Zedong's Art of War Art of War t77 lead the enemy along, wear out the enemy and make the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. enemy circle around you in vain. This method is called the After having occupied Yanan, Hu Zongnan's army eager- tactic of 'wear and tear.' In northern Shaanxi, the moun- ly searched for the main force of the Communist army in tains are high and the roads, narrow. You are to lead the the northwest, intending to engage it in a decisive battle. enemy to climb the mountains. When he has climbed The Northwest Field Army adopted an unfathomable mo- enough mountains and become exhausted and hungary, we bile tactic. A small force, masquerading as the Commu- will find an opportunity to destroy him. " nist main force, engaged the enemy and retreated steadi- On March 16, after paying a heavy price, Hu Zongnan's ly, leading the enemy main force towards Anzhai to the men had reached the reclaimed area of Jinpenwan and northwest of Yanan, while the Communist main force as- Nanniwan in the vicinity of Yanan- Mao Zedong stayed at sembled and hid in ambush in the area south of his post and did not leave his office in Yanan until March Qinghuabian to the northeast of Yanan. When the head- 18 when enemy troops had reached Sanshilipu on the out- quarters unit of the enemy' s 31st Brigade and a regiment skirts of Yanan and gunfire could be clearly heard' of over 2,900 men, covering the flank of Hu Zongnan's "The Kuomintang' s attack on Yanan and the Shaanxi- invading army, fell into the trap on March 25, they were Gansu-Ningxia Border Region' " Mao pointed out, "is a totally annihilated after more than an hour's fighting. "The vain attempt to settle the Northwest question first, cut off On April 77, MaoZedong drafted Concept of Opera- our Party' s right arm, drive our Party's Central Commit- tions for the Northwest War Theatre, " in which he point- tee and the General Headquarters of the People's Libera- ed out: "The enemy is now quite tired, but not yet tired tion Army from the Northwest' then move its troops to out. He is in considerable difficulties with his food sup- attack northern China and so achieve the objective of de- ply, but not yet in extreme difficulties. . . . lJnless we re- feating our forces one by one. " duce the enemy to extreme fatigue and complete starva- On March 72, at the head of the main attacking force of tion, we cannot win final victory. This may be called the 'wear 140,000 men, Ht Zongnan approached Yanan along the tactics of and tear, ' that is, of wearing the enemy Luochuan and Yichuan line in two columns. He was as- down to complete exhaustion and then wiping him out. " sisted by Qinghai' s Ma Bufang and Ningxia' s Ma Having discovered the whereabouts of the Communist Hongkui with twelve divisions and by two divisions of the army in the Battle of Qinghuabian, Hu Zongnan's army 22nd Corps from Yulin, which invaded Yanan from the immediately headed for the northeast of Yanan and gave west and the north. The Kuomintang also used more than chase. This great army of tens of thousands of men turned a hundred aircraft to drop bombs on Yanan and its vicini- in circles in the Yanchuan, Qingjian and Wayaobao area ties on an extensive scale. but could not find its prey. In mid-April, Hu Zongnan On March 16, the Communist Northwest Field Army was moved eight of his brigades westward from Panlong and formed at Mao Zedong's order with Peng Dehuai as its Qinghuabian and the 135th Brigade southward from commander and concurrently its political commissar and Wayaobao in an attempt to wipe out the main force of the Xi Zhongxun, its deputy political commissar, to give uni- Northwest Communist army in the area northwest of Pan- fied command to all the Communist forces fighting in the long and Qinghuabian. The Communist army used part of t78 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Ndao Zedong' s Art o{ War t79 its forces to draw the enemy' s main force westward and from Yanan, and Mao Zedotg was able to return. positioned the greater part of its forces in an ambush In 1936, Mao Zed.ons wrote Snoza, which is considered south of 'Wayaobao. On April 14, when 4,700 men of the most brilliant of his poems: Hu' s 135th Brigade entered the Yangmahe area in their southward march, they were completely wiped out by the Snow eight hours of fierce fighting' Communist army after - to the tune of Qin Yuan Chun Towards the end of April, Chiang Kai-shek, believing Northern country scenery: that the Communist Party Central Committee and the A thousand miles sealed in ice, main force of the Northwest Communist army intended to Ten thousand miles of drifting snou,t. cross the Yellow River and move to eastward, ordered Hu On both sides of the Great Wall, Zongtan's forces to speed northward along the Xianyang- A aast erpanse of zuhite. Yulin Highway and the 22nd Corps to move southward Up and dozun the Great Rir.rcr, from Yulin so that they could catch the Communist army The roaing reaaes are suddenly stilled. in a pincer movement in the area of Bixian and Wubao or The mountains are lihe dancing sikter snakes, force it to move eastward across the Yellow River' The And the plains, scampering war-coloured elephants, Communist army again lured the enemy main force north- Trying to match heaven in height. ward with a part of its forces' while sending four brigades Wait for a fine day, southward to raid the enemy's important supply base at The land will be clothed in white, adorned in red. Panlongzhen. The four brigades launched an attack Becorning erceeding enchanting. against Panlongzhen on May 2 and put all the 6,700 ene- The riaers and mountains are so full of charm, my troops out of action in the battle which lasted for two Mahing countless heroes bend their bachs. days and three nights. Regretfully, the Qin emperor and Han Wudi zaere I/lay 2'4 An enemy brigade headquarters unit and a - Slightly laching in literary talent; regiment, comprising 6,700 men, were totally destroyed' Tang Taizong and Song Taizu May 30-June 30 4,400 of Ma Hongkui's men were - Did not haae enough grace and charm; wiped out. And Cenghis Khan, August 6-11 More than 5,200 enemy troops guarding - The proud hero of his time, fauoured by heaaen, the outer perimeters of Yulin were annihilated' Knew only to bend his bow to shoot at great aultures. August 20 Over 6,000 enemy troops were wiped out in - All are gone now. the Shajiadian area, northeast of Mizhi. To find truly great men, Zongnan' s attack against the key areas of the Shaanxi- Hu We must look to the present. Gansu-Ningxia Border Region was completely defeated in the seven battles. A{ter having su{fered more than 100,000 casualties in just After recovering Yanan, Mao Zedong was indeed more over a year's time, Hu Zongnan was forced to withdraw like a great ruler ! 180 Mao Zedong's Art of War i&lao Zedong's Art of War 181 ?( Driving Straight In mintang' s counter-revolutionary strategy, which is, on Thrusting a Dagger into the contrary, to continue to carry the war into the Liber- "r' - ated Areas, further damage and drain our manpower the Enemy's Heart and material resources and make it impossible for us to hold out very long. " place in the war between the A fundamental change took The spearhead of Mao Zedong' s strategic counter-offen- Party in July-September Kuomintang and the Communist sive was directed, out of many people' s expectation, at the strategic offen- 1947. The Communist army went onto the Dabie Mountains area. the Kuomintang sive from the strategic defensive while The Dabie Mountains sprawl across the borders of Hubei, the strategic de- changed from the strategic offensive to Henan and Anhui provinces between Nanjing and the the Communist fensive. This change was marked by strategic city of Wuhan in the middle reaches of the and bringing the war army' s crossing of the Yellow River Yangtze River. To the Kuomintang army, the Dabie of the river' to the Kuomintang-controlled areas south Mountains were strategically the most sensitive area, Ze- This change was certainly not brought about by Mao where the defence was the weakest. As the mountains general dong's good luck, but by the development of the used to be a base area of the Communists, the Communist situation of the war. army could easily establish a foothold there. If the Com- After a whole year of fighting, a tremendous change oc- munist army had penetrated into the Dabie Mountains, it parties' curred in the balance of forces between the two could imperil Nanjing in the east, threaten Wuhan in the The Kuomintang' s total military strength of 4'300,000 west, block traffic on the Yangtze and bear down on the men at the beginning of the civil war was reduced to Central Plains. Chiang Kai-shek would certainly not allow 3,700,000. Its regular army of 2,000,000 men dwindled anyone else to sleep at his bedside. He would certainly the to 1 , 500,000. There were far less troops available for transfer his troops attacking Shandong and northern Kuomintang on the battlefield. In the mean time' the Shaanxi back to reinforce this area and fight against the to Communist army grew from 1 ' 200,000 men Communist army for this strategically important area. If 1,950,000, with more than 1,000,000 men in its regular he did that, he would be doing exactly what Mao Zedong forces. As most of the Communist areas were in the coun- expected him to do, and Mao Zed.ong would attain his tryside, the Communist army did not have to divert its strategic end. forces to garrison the cities in the rear and guard the sup- Mao Zedong's strategic plan of marching into the Dabie ply lines. It could put more troops on the battlefield' Mountains and seizing the Central Plains was to be care- Mao Zedong' s strategy for the second year of the civil war fully executed by the coordinated operations of three was: "Our army' s basic task is to launch a country-wide armies and two containing movements on the flanks. counter-offensive, that is to use our main forces to fight The three armies included the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong- our way to exterior lines, carry the war into the Henan Field Army under the command of Liu Bocheng and Kuomintang areas, wipe out large numbers of the enemy Deng Xiaoping, which was to march straight into the on the exterior lines and completely wreck the Kuo- Dabie Mountains in the middle; the East China Field Mao Zedong's Art of War t82 Mao Zedong's Art of War 183 paying price, Army under the command of Chen Yi and Su Yu was to be 1. After a the army could not establish a the left army, which was to advance into the Jiangsu- foothold and was forced to turn back; paying Shandong-Henan-Anhui region; the Taiyue Army under 2. After a price, it could not establish a firm foothold the command of Chen Geng and others was to be the right and was forced to fight as guerrillas in the sur- army, which was to thrust into western Henan' On the rounding areas; flanks, the Communist army in northern Shaanxi was to 3. After paying a price, it succeeded in establishing a firm strike out at Yulin to draw the main force of Hu foothold. Zongnarl s army to the north, and the Communist forces He warned the Communist army to be mentally prepared for the in Shandong were to launch attack in the Jiaodong area to worst and work hard for the best. draw Gu Zhttong's army to the sea coast, to facilitate the After crossing the Yellow River, the Communist army de- stroyed operations of the three armies. nine and a half enemy brigades in southwestern Shandong push On the night of June 30, 1947' the country-wide offensive in mid-July, continued to southward and began when the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shan- occupied most of the county towns in southeastern Henan, dong-Henan Field Army, totalling 120,000 men, crossed eastern Hubei and eastern Anhui in early August, and the Yellow River by force along a 1SO-kilometre section in reached the Dabie Mountains on August 27. Then, after fighting more western Shandong and marched into the Dabie Mountains' than three months of bloody battles, it es- political Not to be outdone' Chiang Kai-shek declared the Nation- tablished Communist power in thirty-three coun- wide General Mobilization for the Suppression of Turmoil ties and the Dabie Mountains base area. It thus succeeded thrusting and at the same time amassed large forces in an attempt to in a dagger into the Kuomintang' s heart area (the destroy the army of Liu and Deng between the Longhai area between Wuhan and Nanjing). Railway and the Yellow River or drive it back to the On August 23, another part of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shan- northern side of the Yellow River' dong-Henan Communist army forced the Yellow River in southern Shanxi and started push In a directive to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Mao Ze' to towards western dong wrote: "Your march into the Dabie Mountains Henan. In the areas north of the Longhai Railway, south should not be made by pushing steadily forward and occu- of the Yellow River, in western Henan, it fought a series pying one city or area after another as in the Northern Ex- of battles in which the enemy forces were destroyed. By pedition; it must be a hopping of{ensive' You should be occupying a vast area in western Henan and on the Henan- Shaanxi border, determined not to have a rear, drive straight in and reach it isolated the enemy' s important city of Luoyang in the Dabie Mountains in half a month. You are to occuPy western Henan and threatened Hanguan. the end several dozen counties at the centre of the Dabie Moun- At of August, the main force of the East China tains, eliminate the local militia, mobilize the masses' es- Field Army sallied out westward to the Tianjin-Pukou Railway tablish bases, induce the enemy to attack, and engage the and the Grand Canal in an attack against the ene- my in southwestern Shandong. enemy in mobile warfare. " It wiped out the enemy's Reorganized Mao Zedong foresaw three kinds of future for the Commu- 57th Division in Heze' s Shatuji in western nist army that was marching into the Dabie Mountains: Shandong on September 8, crossed the Longhai Railway, Mao Zedong's Art of War 184 Mao Zedong's Art of War 185 marched southward and occupied more than twenty county and regarded Mao Zedong as a great saviour. towns on the borders of Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu at the end of September. The enemy at the strategic city of 16 Cutting a Tangle of Hemp v v with a Sharp Knife Dealing Crushing Blows to the Enemy brought about a change in the overall situation of the war' - Moving a great army of over a hundred thousand men far In October 1947, Mao Zedong issued his "Manifesto of away from its base and deep into the enemy' s rear in hops the Chinese People's Liberation Army. " in which he arro- was an unprecedented form of of{ensive. It was a clever gantly and aggressively declared that the Communist move in Mao Zedong' s art of war. armies had "now launched a large-scale counter-offen- The Communist army thus succeeded in {ighting its way to sive. . . . Our armies on the southern front are advancing the exterior lines, opening a new battlefield more than to the Yangtze River valley, our armies on the northern five hundred kilometres in length and breadth, south of front are advancing on the Chinese-Changchun Railway the Yellow River, north of the Yangtze, from the Han- and the Beiping-Liaoning Railway. Wherever our troops shui River in the west to the sea in the east' In the few go, the enemy flees pell-mell before us and the people give months of fighting, the Communist army advancing along 'thunderous cheers. " He ordered, "All officers and fight- three routes had destroyed 190,000 enemy troops' cap- ers of our army must improve their military march tured over a hundred county towns and established the art, forward courageously towards sure victory in the war and Central Plains base area. resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely In the "strategy for the Second Year of the'War of Libera- wipe out all enemies. " tion, " a directive for the Communist army, Mao Zedotg Shortly afterwards, publicized pointed out: "The keys to victory in fighting in the Mao Zedong the Commu- nist army's ten major principles pro- Kuomintang areas are, first, to be good at seizing the op- of operation, which portunities for fighting' to be brave and determined and duced wide repercussions in the whole country and the whole world. These principles win as many battles as possible; and, second, to carry out of operation, which marked the zenith resolutely the policy o{ winning the masses and enable the of Mao Zedong's art of war, are: dispersed, enemy broad masses to benefit so that they side with our army' 1. Attack isolated forces first; attack " concentrated, strong enemy forces later. If these two points are carried out, we shall win victory' In those days, the Communists were called "Communist 2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas bandits" by the Kuomintang. But as Mao Zedong's Com- first; take big cities later. munist army was determined to "enable the broad masses 3. Make wiping out the enemy' s effective strength our to benefit, " which included dividing the land and giving it main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or to the poor, millions of the poor "sided with the bandits" place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place s o{ War 186 Mao Zedong' Art Mao Zedong's Art of War 187 is the outcome of wiping out the enemy' s effective points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for take them. good only after it has changed hands a number of times' 9. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of 1. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six sources of manpower and materiel are at the front. times the enemy' s strength), encircle the enemy forces 10. Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, let any escape from the net. In special circumstances' use training and consolidation should in general not be very the mlthod of dealing crushing blows to the enemy' that long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack no breathing space. and also to attack one or both of his flanks' with the aim Beginning {rom September 1948, at Mao Zedong's order, of wiping out one part and routing another so that our the Communist army launched an autumn offensive of un- army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy precedented scale on the Northeast, East China, Central forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we 10se Plains, North China and Northwest fronts. more than we gain or only break even' In this way' al- One of the important campaigns in this autumn o{fensive though we are inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers) ' was the seizure of Jinan. *" absolutely superior in every part and every specific Jinan, the junction of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and ^i" campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway, is a city of strategic importance whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy' in north China. The dangerous local terrain makes the city 5. Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not easy to defend and difficult to attack. sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for The city was defended by 110,000 Kuomintang troops un- each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the giv- der the command of the famous Kuomintang general Wang en set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves' Yaowu. The defenders had built a permanent system of 6. Give full play to our style of fighting - courage in bat- defence around the city covering six hundred square kilo- tle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue' and continuous metres, with the inner city as the nucleus, the outer city fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short and business area as the basic defence area, and the towns time without rest). and villages from twenty to thirty kilometres around the 7. Strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare' city as the perimeter of defence. At the same time, pay attention to tactics of positional at- Before the Jinan campaign, the main force of the tack and capture enemy fortified points and cities' Kuomintang army in East China was grouped in three 8. With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all ene- armies: The Second Army commanded by Qiu Qingquan my fortified points and cities which are weakly defended' was assembled in the area around Shangqiu. The Seventh Seize at opportune moments all enemy fortified points and Army commanded by Huang Botao was deployed in the cities defended with moderate strength, provided circum- Xinanzhen area. The 13th Army commanded by Li Ni was stances permit. As for strongly defended enemy {ortified in the Suxian and Guzhen area. 188 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zed.org' s Art o{ War 189 Mao Zedong decided that in the third year of the civil war along a fifty-kilometre front on each of the four sides of between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the the city. Communist armies were to continue to fight in the north Fighting on the eastern outskirts was the fiercest. On the of the Yangtze River and strive to wipe out no less than a morning of September 17, under cover of concentrated hundred enemy regular brigades. howitzer and mortar fire, the Communist infantry began The East China Field Army was required to wipe out to attack Maoling and Yanchi hills that screen the city of about forty enemy brigades and to attack and capture Ji- Jinan on the eastern side, and captured the two hills after nan between August and SePtember. a hot battle lasting a whole night against the enemy' s Mao Zedong proposed that in the Jinan campaign the Com- 15th Brigade. munist army should adopt the tactic of "capturing Jinan The fierce {ight on the eastern outskirts of the city led the and attacking the enemy' s reinforcements. " "The purpose Kuomintang commander Wang Yaowu to believe that the of this campaign, " he said, "is to capture Jinan and wipe main assaulting force of the Communist army was on the out part of the enemy' s reinforcements. In the disposition eastern side. He hurriedly transferred his troops to the of the forces, part of the troops should be used to attack eastern outskirts. But all these troops were repulsed by Jinan and the greater part should be concentrated to strike the Communist army. at the enemy' s reinforcements. " By midnight on September 19, all the positions on the Towards the end of August 1948, the East China Field perimeter of the city had been taken by the Communist Army held a high-level meeting to discuss plans for the Ji- forces. The Communist assaulting {orces then encircled nan campaign. It was decided that a group of seven the city on the western, southern and northern sides. oc- columns, including the entire Shandong Army and part of cupied the airfield and cut off the enemy' s air supplies. the forces on the exterior line, under the command of Tan 'W'u Huawen, commander-in-chief of the enemy's western Zherrltn and Xu Shiyou, was to assault the city, and an- defence zone and commander of the Reorganized 96th other group of eight columns was to strike at the enemy's Corps turned his coat and went over to the Communist reinforcements, with its main force positioned in the side with his three brigades of about 20,000 men. Juye, Jiaxiang, Jining and Yanzhou area on either side of Seeing the situation was deteriorating, Wang Yaowu the Grand Canal to block and destroy the enemy' s rein- wanted to abandon the city and break out of the encir- forcements. The city-assaulting forces were divided into clement. But he was ordered to put up a stubborn defence the eastern and western groups. The main assault forces and wait for reinforcements. were positioned on the western side of the city to occupy the airfield and cut off the enemy' s air supplies. The two groups were then to coordinate their operations in the as- sault of the city. The Jinan campaign started at midnight on September 16. The eastern and western groups of the Communist army opened fire on the defenders on the perimeter of the city 190 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War 191 Attacking a City and umn attacked the business district from the south towards 37 Striking at Reinforcements the northeastern direction and severed the defenders from inside the city. Blocking the Enemy at EverY SteP those - The Third Column moved speedily forward along the Jinger and Jingsan roads, two thoroughfares running east- the campatgn, Mao Ze- Based on the development of Jinan west of the business district and leading to the headquar- "Preparations dong directed his generals in a telegram: ters of the Second Pacification Zone. Although Wang army has must be made before hand so that when our Yaowu himself had moved into the city, the headquarters Wang Yaowu and fought its way into the city and when was still defended by his best troops. The network of de- the encirclement his die-hard followers try to break out of fence consisted of several tall concrete and steel buildings be de- and flee along different routes, they must totally and an innumerable number of open and hidden bunkers the stroyed and none of them are to be allowed to escape on the surrounding streets and inside and outside the net. You should deploy ring upon ring of blocking forces headquarters courtyard. There were altogether more than along the main and secondary escape routes both far and a hundred machine-gun nests and more than a thousand near. " In addition to the regular forces, he also directed gun embrasures. the regional forces and militia to position themselves along On the evening of September 27, under cover of gunfire, " all the escape routes "to block the enemy at every step' the shock brigades of the Communist army broke into the Wang Yaowu also adjusted his disposition of defence' headquarters courtyard through a heavily defended high Pulling back the main force into the city, he left a strong wall. Bitter fighting continued until the afternoon of force to defend the business district, where the headquar- September 22 when the Communist soldiers climbed to the ters of his Second Pacification Zone was located. top of this group of tall buildings and rounded up all the At 6 p. m. on the evening of Septembet 20, the various remaining defenders of the business district. columns of the western group of the Communist city-as- Without a single pause, the Communist army started a saulting forces started a sudden attack on the business dis- fierce attack on the outer city at 6: 30 p. m. on the same trict and, after more than forty hours of exchange of in- day. Under powerful artillery fire and successive demoli- tensive gunfire and continuous demolition, the Communist tions. the Communist forces soon made several breaches army succeeded in breaking into the enemy' s defence posi- in the city wall, poured into the city and engaged the ene- tions at several points and began to move forward in my in street fighting. By September 23, a greater part of depth. the outer city had been occupied by the Communist army, The 10th Column attacked the business district from the which began to close in on the inner city. north and seized the city's railway station which was de- In order to rescue Jinan, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly or- fended by the enemy' s armoured vehicles. It then wedged dered the Kuomintang forces in Xuzhou to reinforce the itself all the way to the foot of the outer city wall and city from the south and sent aircraft to bomb the Commu- blocked the route of retreat of the defenders in the city. nist forces which were already inside the city. The 13th Column and the Central South Shandong Col- The Communist forces began to assault the inner city in 792 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art o[ War 193 waves on September 23. At 6 p. m. in the evening, the diers broke into the building, Luo Xinli. chief of staff of Communist artillery began to bombard the defensive the Second Pacification Zone, emerged from the cellar and works and the inner city wall, which was fourteen metres surrendered himself. Wang Yaowu tried to flee and was high and ten metres thick. The various assaulting units later captured on the road. crossed the city moat and rushed together to the city wall. In the Jinan campaign, the Communist army succeeded in The Kuomintang defenders under'Wang Yaowu put up a destroying an enemy Pacification Zone headquarters, a stubborn resistance. When part of the Ninth Column from Peace Preservation headquarters, 2 division headquarters, the eastern group of the Communist assaulting forces 11 whole brigades, 2 defence corps and 5 regiments, broke into the city from the southern side of the city' s killing and wounding over 84,000 enemies. Among those eastern gate, more than a company of Communist soldiers taken prisoner were 25 Kuomintang officers above the mounted the city wall and engaged the enemy in hand-to- rank of brigadier. More than 20,000 of the Kuomintang hand fighting. troops went over to the Communist side. Two battalions of the 13th Column succeeded in breaching The Jinan campaign showed that the Communist army had the city wall from the southwestern corner. After beating mastered artillery and engineering skills and was capable back the enemy' s counter-attacks, two companies of sol- of attacking cities heavily defended by Kuomintang forces diers rushed into the city and engaged the enemy in street and storming strong fortificatrons. {ighting. The Communist army took only eight days and nights to On the night of September 24, the Communist forces capture Jinan instead of twenty days as planned. After the started another fierce attack. The 73rd Regiment of the fall of Jinan, the Communists gained control of the entire Ninth Column successfully broke into the city and occu- Shandong province. pied the city' s southeastern corner opposite the Black Tiger Spring. The 109th Regiment from the 13th Column of the western group of the assaulting forces made a breach in the city To Be Able to Extend and Contract at Will wall and fought a bloody battle with the enemy to gain lR v v Encircling First and Attacking Later control of the southwestern corner of the city near Baotu - Spring. The main force of the 13th Column and the entire Third The Taiyuan campaign was another campaign against a Column poured into the city one after the other and pene- strongly fortified enemy city in the autumn offensive. trated the enemy defence eastward and westward in house- Taiyuan, capital city of Shanxi province, is located in the to-house fighting. northern part of the Central Shanxi Plain, on the eastern The two columns of the Communist forces soon closed in bank of the River Fen. The terrain to the north and south like the two jaws of a big pincer on the Shandong provin- of the city is slightly undulating. Five kilometres to the cial government building, where Wang Yaowu had dug in east of Taiyuan is Hanshan Hill, which is five hundred and waited for reinforcements. When the Communist sol- metres higher than the city itself and commands a 194 Mao Zedong' s Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War 195 panoramic view of the entire city. Known for its rugged While the Communist army was making preparations, the and treacherous terrain, the hill is a natural defence for defenders of Taiyuan amassed nine infantry divisions and Taiyuan. Six kilometres to the west of Taiyuan are the sallied out from southern side of the city on October 2. Xu Thousand Rocky Hills. There were two airfields in Xiangqian decided to start the Taiyuan campaign be{ore Taiyuan, one at Wusu to the south of the city and the oth- the scheduled time and destroy the enemy troops in the er at Xincheng to the north of the city, which channelled south of the city. When this decision was approved by supplies and reinforcements into Taiyuan. Mao, the 60th and 61st corps of the Communist army At the time of the campaign, Taiyuan was defended by speedily had Yan Xishan' s 44th and 45th divisions sur- Yan Xishan' s troops, which included sixteen divisions of rounded. After two days of fighting on October 5 and 6, regular troops, three divisions of special forces and a the two enemy divisions were wiped out. Peace Preservation Corps, totalling 100,000 men and 600 When Mao Zedong was informed of the victory, he sent a artillery pieces. Making use of and relying on Taiyuan's telegram to Xu Xiangqian. saying, "Pleased to hear the favourable terrain for defence, Yan Xishan built strong destruction of two enemy divisions. . . . You now have a fortifications and planned to fight a decisive battle against good opportunity to destroy the enemy forces in the south the Communist army on the perimeter of the city. He de- and east of the city. When you succeed, the enemy will be ployed his headquarters troops inside the city and the rest shaken. Hope you will take advantage of your victory to of the troops at the fortified points around the city to form wipe out the enemies on the perimeter one by one and oc- a system of defence radiating from the centre to the four cupy every airfield. " directions. Taiyuan was virtually turned into "a city pro- After eleven days and nights of fighting that followed, the tected by walls of iron and bronze. " Communist forces made a breach in the enemy's southern In July 1948, the First Army and some other units of the line of defence and pushed six kilometres forward into the Communist North China Field Army, which had just won enemy positions and occupied the southern airfield. The victory in the Central Shanxi campaign, began to close in northern airfield came within Communist gunfire. A on Taiyuan. breach was also made in the enemy' s defence system on In a telegram to Xu Xiangqian on July 16' Mao Zedong the eastern side of the city. stated, "Taiyuan has become isolated. It becomes possi- To enlarge the victory, the Communist forces decided to ble for our army to capture Taiyuan ahead of time.. . . take Dongshan Hill when the enemy' s defence on the east- Your entire army is to be positioned near Taiyuan for rest ern side of the city was weak, and turn it into a base for and consolidation and make preparations for the seizure of controlling and seizing the city. Taiyuan during this period of rest and consolidation. " At this time, the war situation in the whole country was Following Mao Zedong's directive, Xu Xiangqian intensi- developing more and more in favour of the Communist fied preparations for battle and laid down the tactics of army. Mao Zedong had decided to launch a campaign to "pinning down, disintegrating, attacking and gradually take Beiping and Tianjin. To prevent the enemy troops in weakening the enemy before capturing Taiyuan at one Beiping, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou and Tangshan from fleeing swoop. " and facilitate their annihilation on the spot, Mao Zedong 196 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong' s Art of War t97 sent a telegram to Xu Xiangqian: "It is estimated that a together, his troops were equipped with about nine hun- premature attack on Taiyuan will make Fu Zuoyi feel iso- dred artillery pieces. After readjustments in the deploy- lated and force him to abandon Beijing, Tianjin. ment of forces, Taiyuan was divided into five defence Zhangjiakou and Tangshan and retreat to the south or in zones - north, west, south, east and southeast. several groups to the southwest, and therefore increase At the end of March 1949, the Communist army that had the difficulty of destroying them later. Please consider surrounded Taiyuan was joined by some of the forces that stopping the attack and starting a political offensive after had taken part in the Beijing-Tianjin campaign, increasing you have taken several key fortified points on the perime- the total attacking forces to about 300,000 men. ter and occupied the airfield for good in the next week or The second stage of the Taiyuan campaign began on April two. Our troops are to strengthen their positions, rest 20. and consolidate on the spot, and attack Taiyuan again at In the northeastern part of the city, the Communist 20th the beginning of January next year when our army in the Army broke into Zhangzitou, pushed speedily westward northeast moves to this side of the Great Wall and begins and occupied the northern airfield south of Xincheng. An- to attack Beijing and Tianjin. other Communist force advanced southward from Lancun Following Mao' s order, Xu Xiangqian postponed the at- along the western bank of the River Fen and headed tack on the city of Taiyuan, but continued to seize key straight for the steel bridge on the river west of the north- strategic points and gained control of the two airfields to ern airfield. Operating in coordination, the two Commu- cut off completely the enemy' s airlift supplies. Between nist forces succeeded in cutting the route of retreat of the November 29 and December 1, the Communist forces enemy troops north of the northern airfield. seized some fortified points around the makeshift airfield In the western part of the city, the Communist 19th Army so that they could seal it off with their gunfire. This and the troops from the Central Shanxi Military Region marked the end of the first stage of the Taiyuan cam- destroyed one after another all the fortified points west of paign, in which over 34,000 enemy troops were put out of the River Fen and advanced swiftly to the Wanbailin area, actron. where they joined force with a Communist division moving In March 1949, Yan Xishan' s army was reinforced by the southward, cut off the route of retreat of Yan Xishan' s 83rd Division, which had been successfully airlifted to troops west o{ the river and had them surrounded. Anoth- Taiyuan. To boast the morale and make up the number of er column of the Communist forces broke the line of ene- his forces, he incorporated the useless Peace Preservation my defence at Yangjiabao on the eastern bank of the river, Corps and People's Defence Army into the regular army occupied East and West Kouzhuang and cut off the link and formed three new divisions, known as the "Iron and between Shuangtasi and the city of Taiyuan. Blood, " "Unflinching Loyalty" and "Dauntless Courage" In the eastern part of the city, the main force of the Com- divisions, by reorganizing what remained o{ the 44th Divi- munist l8th Army and that of the Seventh Army of the sion and drafting new recruits. He also organized the new Northwest Field Army seized Jianziwan and the store- 10th and 15th armies, while preserving his six armies of house area and then occupied Heitugang and Dadongguan. sixteen divisions and three divisions of special forces. A1- By Aprll 22, all the strongholds of Yan Xishan' s army 198 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War 199 around the city had been destroyed, and thirteen enemy had devised many methods for training the new recruits. divisions, wiped out. In the spring of 1948, he put forward the slogan: "Offi- After losing all his forces outside the city, Yan Xishan im- cers teach soldiers, soldiers teach officers. and the sol- mediately re-deployed his forces to defend the city itself. diers teach each other. " The Communist army also re-deployed its forces and be- He said to the Communist army officers, "The soldiers gan to build assaulting positions. On the evening of April have a wealth of actual experience in battle. An officer 24, the Communist forces launched the general offensive should learn from the soldiers and turn the soldiers' expe- under cover of powerful artillery fire and advanced on the rience into his own; he will then become more compe- city along twelve routes from all the four directions. It tent. " By the autumn of 1948, the Communist army had took only an hour for all the Communist forces along the grown to 2,800,000 men, who could fight not only in mo- twelve routes to reach the city proper. The fighting ended bile warfare, but also in positional warfare. The Commu- at 10 o'clock in the evening after all the defending troops nists now controlled 25 percent of China' s land area with had been put out of action. Taiyuan had been surrounded a population of 150 million on it. Although the for more than half a year before it was finally taken over Kuomintang still had 3,650,000 troops, only 1,700,000 by the Communist army. This strategy of surrounding could be used on the first line of battle. It had to switch first and attacking later has rarely been practised any- from "all-round defence" to "defence of key points. " where in the world. The Kuomintang then had five strategic groups of forces, Mao Zedong was not in Yanan at this time. He and Zhou which were tied down on five battle fronts: Enlai and the other leaders of the Chinese Communist Par- On the Northeast front was Wei Lihuang' s group of ty were moving to Xibaipo village, Pingshan county, in 550,000 troops, deployed in three isolated areas in western Hebei province, from where Mao began to direct Changchun, Shenyang and Jinzhou. the fighting of the Communist forces in the whole country On the North China front was Fu Zuoyi' s group of 600,000 troops, defending places from May 1948. such key as Zhangjiak- ou. Beiping, Tianjin. Tangshan and Shanhaiguan. On the East China front was Liu Zhi' s group of over 600,000 troops, concentrated in the area around Xuzhou. On the Central Plains front was Bai Chongxi' s group of Directing the Attack at One Point ?q about 750,000 troops, positioned along the southern sec- ''' ' - Swiftly Gaining the Initiative tion of the Beiping-Hankou Railway and around Hankou. On the Northwest front was Hu Zongnan' s group of about Mao Zedong knew that i{ he wanted to win nationwide vic- 300,000 troops in the Guanzhong area around Xian. tory. he must further expand his army. Although the Mao Zedong now cherished soaring aspirations and was Communist army had won many victories, it had suffered highly confident of victory. He declared, "We are pre- heavy casualties. In order to replace the losses, it was pared to bring about the fundamental overthrow of the necessary to enrol and train new recruits. Mao Zedong Kuomintang in about five years, counting from July 1946. o{ War Mao Zedong's Art Mao Zedong's Art of War 207 This is possible. Our objective can be attained provided the Kuomintang planned to pull out oI the Northeast, we destroy about 100 brigades of Kuomintang regular safeguard Central China and strengthen South China, but troops every year, or some 500 brigades over the five was hesitant in making the final decision. years. " Mao Zedong maintained that if the Kuomintang succeeded When he was young, Mao Zedong was a student poor in in moving all its forces to the south of the Great Wall and arithmetics. But this time he was very smart when he to Central and South China, it would make it far more dif- came to work out when and how the Kuomintang army ficult for the Communist army to destroy them in later could be totally destroyed: "In the past two years our days. Before the Kuomintang had made the final decision, army has annihilated a total of 191 brigades of enemy reg- the Communist army must decide promptly and seize the ulars, an average of 95 brigades a year, or nearly 8 opportunity to engage the enemy in strategically decisive brigades a month. In the next three years it is required battles and destroy the enemy's powerful armies. that our army should wipe out 300 or more brigades of en- As a result, Mao Zedong decided to engage the emy regulars. Between July this year [1948] and June Kuomintang forces in three large-scale campaigns. He di- next year we expect to destroy some 115 brigades of ene- rected the operations of the Communist army from afar my regulars. " with telegrams. The task of destroying 115 Kuomintang brigades was to The {irst decisive campaign was the Liaoxi-Shenyang cam- be shared by his field armies and armies as follows: paign fought in the Northeast. The East China Field Army - about 40 brigades. The Kuomintang had altogether 550,000 troops, includ- The Central Plains Field Army - about 14 brigades. ing 480,000 regulars, in the Northeast, while the Com- The Northwest Field Army about 12 brigades. munist main and regional forces totalled more than The army of Xu Xiangqian and Zhou Shidi in North China 700,000. In a telegram to the two Communist generals, was to destroy about 14 of Yan Xishan's brigades. Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan, Mao Zedong stated: "If in The Northeast Field Army and the two armies of Luo the two months of September and October, or a little Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu were jointly responsible for longer, you can wipe out the enemy along the line from the destruction of about 35 brigades under Wei Lihuang Jinzhou to Tangshan and take Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan and and Fu Ztoyi. Tangshan, you will have achieved the task of wiping out After comparing the relative strength of the two sides, some 18 enemy brigades. In order to wipe them out, you Mao Zedong decided that the time had come for the Com- must now prepare to employ your main force on this line, munist army to fight strategically decisive battles against leaving the enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang the Kuomintang forces. In order to wipe out large num- alone. When you are attacking Jinzhou, be prepared also bers of enemy forces and gain nationwide political power, to wipe out the enemy forces that may come to its rescue the Communist army must attack the enemy' s heavily de- from Changchun and Shenyang. " fended big cities and battle against the enemy's powerful Why did Mao Zedong choose to attack Jinzhou first in- and mechanized troops. stead of the picturesque Changchun or the industrial At a military conference held in Nanjing in August 1948. Shenyang? Mao Zedorg's Art o{ War 202 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War This was because where the Communist army directed its none of the other objectives is attained and Jinzhou alone attack first was a question that would affect the war situa- is captured, you will have won the initiative, which in it- tion as a whole. self will be a great victory. " The city of Changchun had for a long time under the siege of the Communist army and was not a very strongly de- fended city on the Northeast front. It would not have been a difficult task if the Communist army had intended to Making Long-Distance Raids its rear. The 10 seize the city and eliminate the threat on - Converging on the Enemy Kuomintang wanted to use Changchun to contain the from the Flanks Communist army, cover Shenyang and improve the situa- tion of the defenders at Jinzhou, and was making prepara- It has been mentioned above that Mao Zed,ong's adver- tions to retreat to the other side of the Great Wall. If the sary, Chiang Kai-shek, was also a strategist of great tal- Communist army had attacked Changchun, it would have ent and bold vision. For a time, Chiang had considered a- played into the hands of the Kuomintang. The fall o{ bandoning Shenyang, pulling his main force back to Changchun would frighten the enemy forces in Shenyang Jinzhou and using it later in North and Central China. Af- and Jinzhou into fleeing away, which would affect the ter weighing the advantages and disadvantages, however, campaign and the war situation in the whole country. Chiang decided to defend the Northeast resolutely so that The situation in Jinzhou was different. Although there he could consolidate North China. He adopted the policy were more enemy forces in Jinzhou than Changchun, they of "concentrating the forces, defending the key places, were scattered at several points along the railway between safeguarding Shenyang, Jinzhou and Changchun and, Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan and each unit was isolated from when opportunity appeared, opening the others. The Communist army was more sure of victo- up the Beiping- Liaoning Railway. " ry. When fighting broke out in Jinzhou on the Beiping- The Kuomintang forces Liaoning Railway, the Kuomintang forces in Changchun were deployed as follows: Changchun was defended by Zheng Dongguo, and Shenyang might come to its rescue and offer an oppor- deputy com- mander-in-chief tunity for the Communist army to destroy them. It could of the Northeast Bandit-Suppression also separate the two Kuomintang strategic groups of Headquarters and commander of the First Army with six divisions forces in North China and in the Northeast. To the enemy in two corps, totalling 100,000 men, to contain the main force of the Communist army in the forces, Jinzhou was a gateway through which they could Northeast. move to North China. If Jinzhou fell, the door was closed The line between Yixian and Shanhaiguan was defended on the Kuomintang forces in the Northeast, and the Com- by Fan Hanjie, deputy commander-in-chief of the North- munist forces could close in on them from the two flanks. east Bandit-Suppression Headquarters and head of the In another telegram, Mao Zedong pointed out, "You must Jinzhou command, with fourteen divisions in four corps, centre your attention of the operations in Jinzhou and totalling 150,000 men, to ensure land and sea routes of strive to capture this city as quickly as possible. Even if communications between the Northeast and North China. Mao Zedong' s Art o{ War Mao Zedorg's Art of War with Jinzhou and Jinxi as the main areas of de{ence. completely destroyed the defending Kuomintang forces. Shenyang and its surrounding areas, the centre of defence Fan Hanjie, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast in the Northeast, was defended by Wei Lihuang, com- Bandit-Suppression Headquarters, and Lu Junchuan, mander-in-chie{ of the Northeast Bandit-Suppression commander of the Sixth Army, and more than 100,000 Headquarters, with twenty-four divisions in eight corps, enemy troops under their command were taken prisoner. totalling 300,000 men, not only to safeguard Shenyang, Intending to recapture Jinzhou and reopen the line of com- but also to give aid to Changchun and Jinzhou whenever munications between the Northeast and North China. Chi- necessary. ang Kai-shek ordered Liao Yaoxiang' s army to continue The Communist forces' following Mao Zedong' s direc- its advance towards Jinzhou. tives, deployed one column (corps) and seven independent After taking Jinzhou, the Communist army immediately divisions to continue the siege of Changchun and employed swung back to the northeast and closed in on Liao' s army six columns, one artillery column and a tank battalion to from the north and south of Heishan and Dahushan and, attack Jinzhou. Two more columns were positioned in the on October 26, had Liao' s army encircled in the Heishan, Tashan-Gaoqiao sector, southwest of Jinzhou; and three Dahushan and Xinmin area and. after a bitter fighting more columns in the Heishan-Dahushan-Zhangwu sector, lasting two days and one night, completely wiped it out, to intercept any Kuomintang reinforcements from Jinxi capturing army commander Liao Yaoxiang and corps com- and Huludao and from Shenyang to relieve Jinzhou. manders Li Tao, Bai Fengwu and Zheng Tingji and more Fighting in the Jinzhou area started on September 12. Just than 100,000 men. as the Communist army was mopping up the enemy on the Following this victory, the Communist army attacked and perimeter of Jinzhou after taking Yixian, Chiang Kai-shek took Shenyang and Yingkou on November 2 ard wiped out himself flew to the Northeast to direct the operations of 149,000 more enemy troops. The whole of the Northeast the Kuomintang army. He hurriedly transferred five divi- thus came under Communist control. A total of more than sions of the North China Bandit-Suppression Headquarters 470,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out in the cam- from Beining and two divisions from Shandong to rein- pa1gn. force the four divisions of Kuomintang forces in Jinzhou' After the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, the Communist Together the eleven divisions started a fierce attack on the forces grew to more than 3,000,000 men while the Kuom- Communist positions at Tashan on October 1, but never intang forces were reduced to 2,900,000 men. succeeded in breaking the Communist line of defence. In the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, Mao Zedong applied This was followed by Liao Yaoxiang' s Ninth Army of the principles of battles of annihilation for the first time eleven divisions and three cavalry brigades' which was on the strategic scale, which marked a further develop- rushed to Jinzhou from Shenyang, but was blocked by the ment of his art of war. Communist army in the area northeast of Heishan and The Liaoning-Shenyang campaign was fought on a large Dahushan. battlefield under extremely complicated conditions, in- The Communist army started the assault on Jinzhou on volving vast numbers of forces. Proceeding from the actu- October 14 and, after thirty-one hours of fierce fighting, al conditions on the battlefield, Mao instructed the Com- Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedotg's Art o{ War 207 munist army in the Northeast to take the actual conditions Mao Zedong had by now become truly and really the into consideration and adopt different forms of fighting, supreme commander of the mighty and powerful Commu- including long-distance raids, storming strong fortifica- nist army. He reorganized all the troops of the big strate- tions, mobile warfare, positional warfare and mobile de- gic areas into field, regional and guerrilla forces. The field fence. By adopting various forms of fighting in a cam- forces were organized into field armies. A field army was (originally paign, the Communist army had accumulated experience composed of armies, an army of corps called for organizing the large-scale battles of annihilation it was columns ) , a corps of divisions, and a division of regi- to fight in later days. ments. In accordance with their locations, the field armies In the second half of the 1940s, Mao Zedong began to take were designated the Northwest Field Army, Central a special interest in figures. He listed the following fig- Plains Field Army, East China Field Army, Northeast Field and ures on October 10, 1948: Army North China Field Army. The number of "In the last two years of fighting, from July 1946 to June armies, corps and divisions in each field army differed ac- 1948, the People' s Liberation Army has wiped out cording to the actual conditions in each big strategic area. 2,640,000 enemy troops. including 1'630,000 captured. Later the Northwest Field Army was renamed the First The main war booty of the two years amounts to nearly Field Army, comprising two armies; the Central Plains 900,000 rifles. over 64,000 heavy and light machine- Field Army was renamed the Second Field Army, com- prising three armies; and the East China Field was guns, 8,000 pieces of light artillery, 5 ,000 pieces of in- Army fantry artillery and 1,100 heavy mountain and field guns. renamed the Third Field Army, comprising four armies; In these two years the People' s Liberation Army has and the Northeast Field Army was renamed the Fourth Field Army, comprising four armies. The three armies grown from 1 ,200,000 men to 2,800,000. Our regular troops have increased from 118 brigades to 176' that is' making up the North China Field Army were placed under command from 610,000 men to 1,490,000. The liberated areas now the direct of the General Headquarters of the cover 2,350,000 square kilometres, or 24.5 percent of Communist army. China' s total area of 9,597,000 square kilometres; their In April 1949, the hierarchy of the Communist army was as follows: population is 168 million. or 35. 3 percent of China' s total The Commission of 475 million; and they have 586 large, medium and Military of the Central Committee of the small cities, from county towns up, or 29 percent of Chi- Communist Party: na's total of 2,009 such cities. " Chairman: Mao Zedong. Highly elated, Mao Zedong concluded that the duration of Vice-Chairman and Commander-in-Chief : Zhu De. the civil war might be shortened. He said on November Vice-Chairman and Director of the Political Department: 14, 1948: The original estimate was that the Kuomintang Liu Shaoqi. government could be completely overthrown in about {ive Vice-Chairman and Chief of General Staff : Zhou Enlai. Vice-Chairman and years, beginning from July 1946. ,A.s we now see it, only Deputy Commander-in-Chief: Peng another year or so may be needed to overthrow it com- Dehuai. pletely. Deputy Chiefs of General Staff: Nie Rongzhen and Ye Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War concept campaign was outlined Jianying. The o{ operations for this First Field Army: in a telegram to the front drafted by Mao on October 11. Commander and Political Commissar: Peng Dehuai. Mao Zedong required the East China Field Army, in the Second Field Army: first stage, to concentrate forces so as to wipe out the Commander: Liu Bocheng. Kuomintang' s Seventh Army and effect a breakthrough in Political Commissar: Deng Xiaoping. the middle; in the second stage, to destroy the enemy in Third Field Army: the Haizhou-Lianyungang area; and in the third stage, to Huaian The Commander and Political Commissar: Chen Yi. engage the enemy in the Huaiyin and area. Fourth Field Army: Central Plains Field Army was required to attack the section Railway Commander: Lin Biao. Zhengzhou-Xuzhou of the Longhai with Political Commissar: Luo Ronghuan. its main {orce to coordinate the operations of the East Chi- na Field Army and prevent the Kuomintang's 16th Army from being transferred to the east. In order to wipe out the enemy's Seventh Army completely, mislead the ene- my and prevent him from finding out the main target of a Breakthrough in the Middte A 1 Effecting the Communist army's offensive, Mao Zedong studied the -r Not the Main - Revealing enemy's dispositions and told the East China Field Army Target of Attack to employ half of its troops to contain and intercept the bnemy forces and approach Xuzhou from the north, south After the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, the Communist and west, so that more time could be gained for the com- army began to look for an opportunity to engage its oppo- plete destruction of the Seventh Army. nent in another decisive battle. Xuzhou, a vital communication pivot between North and Liu Zhi, commander-in-chief of Kuomintang' s Bandit- Central China, that protects Nanjing and Shanghai in the Suppression Headquarters in Xuzhou, had contracted his south and is linked with Hebei and Shandong in the north, front. At the end of October 1948, he had deploved his has always been a place contested by strategists in Chinese four armies, four Pacification Zones, totalling twenty-five history. When Chiang Kai-shek found that the Commu- army corps and about 600,000 troops' along the Longhai nist forces were active between the Tianjin-Pukou, Long- Railway and the Tianjin-Pukou Railway with Xuzhou as hai and Beiping-Hankou railways, he decided to concen- the centre, to prevent the Communist army from march- trate all his {orces in Xuzhou and engage the Communist ing south and protect the capital Nanjing' The troops army in a decisive campaign. were positioned in heavy concentrations so that reinforce- The campaign developed rapidly. Since the Kuomintang' s ments could be rushed swiftly to any spot that had been main force was now concentrated in Xuzhou, Mao Zedong threatened. had sent a telegram to the front, stating that the Commu- On September 25, 1948' Mao Zedong's Central Military nist army must strive to wipe out twenty-one or twenty- Commission decided to launch the Huai-Hai campaign' two enemy divisions under Huang Botao and Li Mi in the Mao Zedong' s Art o{ War 277 210 Mao Zedong' s Art of War first battle. I{ this task could be successfully accom- tre-wide area north of the Longhai Railway. Three plished. the whole situation would be changed and it columns of the Northern Jiangsu Army sallied out from the southeast the several would become possible for the East China Field Army and of Xuzhou to northwest. After the Central Plains Field Army to advance to the area be- days and nights of fighting, the enemy forces were cut in- several isolated tween Xuzhou and Bengpu. If the enemy did not move his to groups. When Huang Botao's army in troops from Xuzhou and its surrounding area to the south the east was encircled by Communist forces, Huang Botao of Bengpu, the Communist army could fight the second was alarmed and began to withdraw towards the west, in- route battle and destroy Huang Wei and Qiu Qingquan's armies tending to move closer to Xuzhou, but the of his re- and totally isolate the enemy forces in Xuzhou. As the sit- treat was cut off by the Communist Shandong Army. Huang and his entire army several tens thousands uation changed continually, Mao Zedong changed the dis- of of of positions of his forces. Four columns of the Central Plains men were encircled by Communist forces in the area the east Field Army were placed under the direct command of Chen Manzhuang to of Xuzhou. Following Mao Zedong' instructions "Making every Yi and Deng Xiaoping to strike out from Suxian and cut s of keep the him the road between Suxian and Bengpu. Two columns from effort to enemy on the move and engaging in mobile paying learning the East China Field Army were to advance northward on warfare; closest attention to the enemy positions forti{ications, " Huangkou and Xuzhou from the Xiaoxian area and join tactics of storming and "Attacking force with units of the Central Plains Field Army in and adopting the tactic of the weak enemy first and the strong enemy striking at the enemy's head- Suxian. If the Kuomintang troops in Xuzhou began to re- later; quarters " treat to the south, the Communist army would employ six to throw the enemy into confusion, the Commu- forces gave play superior skill in night columns of forces to destroy them. The East China Field nist full to their Army was to launch an all-out attack against Li Mi' s fighting, approached the enemy by digging ditches at army, with three columns approaching the prey from night and thrust into the areas between the villages. They intensified reconnaissance, made preparations and north to south and one column from south to north, so as full to gain control of the section of railway between Xuzhou concentrated their troops and weapons to seize the places one by one and destroy the enemy forces one by one. and the Grand Canal. The main force of the Communist army east of the Grand Canal was to fight and destroy The Kuomintang' s 100th Corps and 44th Corps on the and southern sides the cordon Huang Botao' s army. In this way, the Kuomintang forces western of Communist were relatively capacity. com- would be carved up and the Communist {orces could then weaker in fighting They were pletely after four days fighting. concentrate superior forces, wipe them out one by one and wiped out of the evening the Communist forces occupy Xuzhou. On of October 19, general The two Communist field armies followed Mao' s direc- started a attack on Nianzhuang where the head- quarters Huang Botao's army was located, and occu- tions and closed in on Xuzhou at lightning speed from east of pied on the early morning October The enemy and west, north and south. Thirteen columns of the East it of 20. army headquarters and the headquarters the China Field Army swept southward from Shandong and of 25th Corps were destroyed and over enemy troops taken pris- overtook the enemy positions in a three-hundred-kilome- 10,000 2\2 Mao Zedong s Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 273 oner. Huang Botao fled to a house in a big courtyard and Even though the Kuomintang forces had suffered defeat in continued to resist. In the evening on October 20, after the first stage of the campaign, the defenders of Xuzhou seventeen days of mobile and positional warfare, the seven were still high in their morale. To prevent a disaster like corps under the command of Huang Botao and one corps Huang Botao's from being repeated, the three armies un- from the Ninth Pacification Zone, also under his com- der Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi and Sun Yuanliang were imme- mand, totalling ten divisions and about 100,000 men, diately assembled at Xuzhou to strengthen the city' s de- were put out of action. fence. In an attempt to save Huang Botao, Chiang Kai-shek or- Having suffered a heavy blow from the Communist forces, dered Liu Zhi, commander-in-chief of the Bandit Suppres- Li Yannian' s army in the south did not dare to venture sion Headquarters in Xuzhou, and Du Yuming, deputy north. But the army under Huang Wei was caught in a commander-in-chief, to come speedily to Huang's rescue trap set by the Communist Central Plains Field Army. with all their forces. A total of five corps that made up Qiu Qingquan' s army, Liu Zhl' s main force, and Li Mi' s army, under cover of twenty aircraft, over a hundred tanks and over a hundred heavy artillery pieces, began to /D. Wait for the Prey to Fall into the Trap move eastward along either side of the Longhai Railway' a- Never Try to Do Anything was reinforced by Sun Yuanliang' s - The defence of Xuzhou Out of Bravado army, and by Huang Wei's army which had been swiftly transferred to the Xuzhou-Suxian line along the Beiping- Mao Zedong had a clear idea of what was going on on the Hankou Railway. he was far away. He decided to ex- Following Mao Zedong' s instructions, the Communist battlefield even though ploit the recent and wipe out Huang Wei's army. army fought a positional battle of defence in the east and victory Field was to play the main role south of Xuzhou to defend what it had already gained' The Central Plains Army part the East China Field The Communist forces positioned three columns to the in this battle, assisted by of Huang' s east of Xuzhou to check the advance of the Kuomintang Army. The tactic to be adopted was to block and then encircle reinforcements while despatching five columns to attack army from both the north and the south Xuzhou and threaten the enemy' s flank' Even after and destroy it in the middle. Huang Botao was killed and his army totally wiped out' Mao pointed out in particular that when Huang Wei' s Qiu's and Li's armies were still blocked by the Commu- army was being encircled, the entire Kuomintang army nist forces at a spot twenty-five kilometres from the defending Xuzhou might flee to the south in a stampede. Nianzhuang area, suffered over 10,000 casualties and lost He reiterated his determination to wipe out the more than thirty tanks. Kuomintang's main force on the northern side of the The two Communist field armies fought in close coordina- Yangtze River and told Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng "to tion and brought the first stage of the Huai-Hai campaign Xiaoping to make the necessary arrangements, so as to a victorious conclusion. carve up the enemies, destroy them one by one and never Art o{'War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 2r5 2t4 Mao Zedong's Central Plain Field Army and rescue Huang Wei's army from the Communist siege. The Kuomintang forces could thus preserve their strength and retreat together to the south. On the night of December 1, Du Yuming abandoned Xuzhou and began to flee towards the southwest at the enly thought that the Communist army was going to at- head of a great army of 270 men with Sun the *rrri", of Li Yannian and Liu Ruming first' He '000 tact Yuanliang's army, an inferior force, and Li Mi' s army ordered these two armies to retreat southward to Bengpu' fighting as the vanguard, and Qiu Qingquan's army, a su- the Huaihe River and prevent the Communist army defend perior force. protecting the rear. The East China Field Army immediately ordered its mo- bile units in the south to pursue and attack' The Commu- nist army pursued and attacked the fleeing Kuomintang army along a line parallel with the movement of the ene- "In order to defend the Yangtze River' it is necessary to my. It blocked the path of the Kuomintang army with the d,efence of the Huaihe River' " he empha- strengthen multiple barriers and waylaid and rounded it up every- sized. where. After three days o{ pursuit and attack' all Du and attacked by the central Plains Field Army, Encircled Yuming' s three armies commanded respectively by Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi and Sun Yuanliang were encircled in the Chenguanzhuang area, sixty-five kilometres southwest of Xuzhou on the morning of December 4. Sun Yuanliang's army tried to break out but was totally destroyed by the Communist army. Sun alone escaped with his life. The enemy troops now encircled by the Central Plains Field Army and East China Field Army were the best of the Kuomintang troops. In order to accelerate the progress of the campaign, Mao Zedong analysed the situation and decided to "concentrate a superior force to destroy Huang Wei's army, pin down Du Yuming in an encirclement and stop the advance of Li Yannian.' From the night of December 6 to December 15, the Cen- tral Plains Field Army adopted a tactic of "tightening the encirclement, starving and tiring out the enemy.' It at- tacked the enemy from village to village and never allowed 276 Mao Zedorg' s Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 2t7 the enemy a breathing sPell. Before the Kuomintang forces put the plan of retreating to After more than twenty days of fierce fighting, Huang the south into execution, the Communist army on the Wei's army was completely wiped out on December 15 in Huai-Hai front and North China front adopted the method southwestern Suxian. Huang Wei. the army commander' of "encircling without attacking or cutting off without en- and Wu Shaozhou, the deputy army commander, were circling" and postponed the general attack. The purpose taken prisoner. was to relax the war situation and mislead Chiang Kai- The second stage of the Huai-Hai campaign thus ended in shek into believing that he did not have to ship his troops victory for the Communist army. in the Beiping-Tianjin area to the south for the time being The Communist army was powerful enough to have swift- and could continue to fight on the Huai-Hai front. The ly wiped out Du Yuming's forces then and there' But it Communist forces could gain time to make full prepara- did not do so. On December 22, MaoZedong directed that tions to wipe out large numbers of enemy forces on the as long as Du's {orces did not try to break out of the en- Huai-Hai front and Beiping-Tianjin front. To spare the circlement in strength, the Communist army should take a remainder of Du Yuming's armies was to put out a bait, rest and start to attack on January 5, 1949' His decision so that when the time came for the Communist army to at- was based on an analysis of the situation of civil war in the tack Du Yuming' s forces, Li Yannian's army might come whole country. to their rescue from the south and the Communist army Chiang Kai-shek was lamenting over the loss of could wipe out part of Li's army, too. While 'Wei' Huang Botao' s and Huang s armies, the Beiping- Encircled and harassed by the Communist army and with Tianjin campaign had started on the North China front' iheir supplies cut off, Du Yuming' s troops suffered both Fu Zuoyi, with over 600,000 Kuomintang troops under hunger and cold. As they had nothing to eat, they fed on his command, was alarmed by the defeat of the tree barks. killed their horses and there were even in- Kuomintang army in the Northeast and the communication stances of them eating human flesh. line between Dagu and Tianjin being severed by Commu- In early January 1949, after the Northeast Field Army and nist forces. He hastily pulled back his forces and planned the North China Field Army had encircled and cut off Fu to flee to the south by the sea route or retreat westward to Zooyl's forces, Mao Zedong ordered the Communist army Suiyuan province. On December 20, Chiang Kai-shek had on the Huai-Hai front to start the general attack. ordered Tang Enbo, the Shanghai-Nanjing-Hangzhou After a fierce battle that lasted from the evening of Jan- Garrison Commander, to complete speedily the Yangtze uary 6 to the evening of January 10, the Communist army River defence, and LfuZhito send non-essential personnel succeeded in destroying Liuji, the enemy ' s last and heavy equipment to the south. Chiang' s intention was stronghold. Du Yuming was taken prisoner and Qiu to move his main force to positions in the south and set up Qingquan was killed. Only Li Mi managed to escape in defences along the Yangtze River. As for the Kuomintang disguiee. troops in North China, "when it becomes absolutely nec- In the sixty-five days of the Huai-Hai campaign. the essary to withdraw to the south, " Chiang Kai-shek would Kuomintang lost 56 divisions rn 22 corps, a total of send ships for them. 555,000 troops. 278 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedotg's Art of War 2t9 When Mao Zedong celebrated the victory with wine at he made his final decision to bolt. Xibaipo, he certainly did not sigh over the shortness of Fu Zuoyi could have abandoned the cities and beat a quick human life as many poets of the past had done. retreat any time he wanted. The success of the campaign therefore depended on whether the Communists could make Fu stay where he was. For this reason, Mao Zedong decided to mislead the ene- Cutting the EnemY into Two 'l:'A? my by lifting the siege of Guisui, postponing the attack on - Eating the Flesh Before Datong and entering into negotiations with Fu Zuoyi. At Cracking the Bones the same time, he ordered the main force of the Northeast Field Army to march secretly and speedily to North Chi- After the Liaoxi-shenyang campaign that ended in early na. Together with the Communist forces already in North November, 1948, Fu Zuoyi' commander-in-chief of the China, the Northeast Field Army was to encircle but not North China Bandit-Suppression Headquarters, was like a to attack the enemy on the western front and to cut off but bird that would start at the mere twang of a bow-string. not to encircle the enemy on the eastern front, so that the Because he had miscalculated that it would take three enemy would eventually be tightly encircled before he months for the Communist forces in the Northeast to knew it. march to North China, he decided to linger in Beiping and Based on Mao Zedotg' s concept of operations, between Tianjin, keep the route to the sea clear, expand his November 29 ard December 21, 1948, the Northeast and forces, and wait and see in which direction the situation North China field armies cut up and encircled the enemy would change before making the final decision. forces in Beiping, Tianjin, Tanggu, Xinbaoan and Based on his temporary decision, Fu Zuoyi contracted his Zhangjiakou, five isolated places, and blocked their west- front and deployed his forces of twelve corps in four ward road of retreat. armies, a total of 550,000 troops, in Beiping and Tianjin The Communist army seized Xinbaoan on December 22 and along a five-hundred-kilometre railway line from and, Zhangliakou on November 24, destroying Fu Zuoyi' s Tangshan in the east to Zhangjiakou in the west. crack 35th Corps and 11th Army. The war situation in the whole country showed that if the On January 14, 1949, the Communist forces started a Communist forces could detain Fu Zuoyi's army in North general o{fensive against Tianjin and occupied the city on China and then wipe it out there, it would be advanta- the 15th. Chen Changgeng, the garrison commander, was geous to the Communist side. captured alive. Mao Zedong, therefore, decided to transfer the Northeast The city of Tianjin faces the sea on the east, and the ur- Field Army to North China ahead of the scheduled time. ban area is cut up by five rivers into many sections. It is a Together with the Second Army and Third Army of the city easy to defend and difficult to attack. As early as in North China Military Region and the regional forces, a to- 1947, Chen Changgeng had begun to dra{t personnel and tal of one million troops' it could launch the Beiping-Tian- requisition supplies to strengthen the city' s defences. jin campaign and destroy Fu Zuoyi in North China before Pillboxes were built on every street leading up to the cen- Mao Zedong's Art of War 221 220 Mao Zedong's Art of War tral area, forming a solid de{ence system. A moat, three China field armies, totalling 900,000 troops, had the metres deep, five metres wide and sixty kilometres long, 200,000 Kuomintang troops tightly encircled in Beijing. was dug around the city, and all buildings 2' 5 kilometres For the siege of Beijing, the Communist army had concen- in front of the moat and the first line of defence were trated all its artillery forces, which aimed their big guns, pulled down and replaced by blockhouses. Chen including the powerful 155mm cannons, at the city wall. pressure, Changgeng intended to defend Tianjin by turning the city In addition to exerting military the Communist into a fortress. Relying on the network of pillboxes and army started a political offensive against the Kuomintang blockhouses, the barriers formed by the rivers, and ten forces defending Beiping and conducted peace negotiations divisions of regular force, four special corps and regional with Fu Ztoyl' s representatives, trying by every means to troops, totalling 130,000 men, Chen believed he could re- induce the Kuomintang general to go down on his knees in pulse any Communist attack. surrender. "in army employed an overwhelmingly supe- Fu Zuoyi actually had long been touch with the ban- The Communist " rior force of twenty-two divisions in five columns and a dits. Since the day when the Communist army began to large number of artillery units' tanks and engineering encircle Beiping in mid-December 1948, Fu' s represen- corps on the Tianjin front. tatives had been secretly in touch with Communist repre- Tianjin is an elongated city, narrow in the east-west direc- sentatives. The secret negotiations for peace had been go- tion. Chen Changgeng placed strong forces in the north ing on for more than a month with little results, because and powerful fortifications in the south. But the middle Fu had been halfhearted. section was weakly defended. After the Communist army had wiped out all the If the Communist army launched a powerful attack from Kuomintang forces along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway, both the eastern and western sides, it could cut the de- Mao Zedong declared the eight terms for peace on January fenders into two separate groups' disrupt the entire defen- 14. On January 15, Tianjin was taken by the Communist sive system and push freely northward and southward. army. On January 16, the headquarters of the Communist The commanders of the Communist army therefore decid- army on the Beiping-Tianjin front sent a message to Fu ed to attack the city from the eastern and western sides, Ztoyi on the conditions for the peaceful liberation of Beip- cut off the enemy in the middle section, push southward ing. It was pointed out in the message that the only way first and then northward, before encircling, carving up out for the Kuomintang forces was to lay down their arms "our and destroying the enemy. It was a method of "eating the and accept peaceful reorganization and that otherwise the bones. " army will attack the city with highly skilful tactics. Do flesh before cracking " The Communist army started the general attack against not say that you have not been warned. Sensing that his the Kuomintang troops in Tianjin at 10 a. m. on January defeat was inevitable, Fu had no choice but to accept the 14, 7949, and took the city after twenty-nine hours of bit- peaceful reorganization of his troops. troops ter fighting. A11 the 130,000 Kuomintang troops, includ- On the morning of January 22, Fu Zuoyi' s ing Chen Changgeng, were put out of action. marched out of the city through the city gates and assem- After the battle of Tianjin, the Northeast and North bled at rearranged places. At noon on that day, the 222 Mao Zedorg's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 0r2 Beiping radio station announced the turncoat general Fu Reaching Out for a Yard to move all his troops out of the city and L4 Zuoyl's decision I r After Taking an lnch wait for reorganization. By Jantary 27, most of Fu' s A MiIIion Bold Warriors troops were out of the city. A division of the Communist - army then marched into the city on January 31 to make Crossed the Great River preparations for taking over the city. 'When On February 3, the Communist army made a show of its Mao Zedong was sure of victory, he began to reach strength by holding a march-in ceremony and entered out for a yard after he had taken an inch. On April 21, Beiping in style. 1949, he issued the "Order to the Army for the Country- The Beiping-Tianjin campaign lasted altogether fifty-six wide Advance. " in which he said that the People' s Libera- days from December 5, 1948 to January 30, 1949. More tion Army was to "annihilate resolutely, thoroughly, than 530,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out or reor- wholly and completely all the Kuomintang reactionaries ganized during this campaign, and the entire North China . . . and arrest all the incorrigible war criminals. No mat- came under Communist control. ter where they may flee, they must be brought to justice After the three campaigns, Mao Zedong became more ar- and punished according to law. " rogant than ever. He began to call Chiang Kai-shek a war Before issuing the order for the country-wide advance, criminal, and in the New Year message he wrote for the Mao had organized a great army of a million troops, which Xinhua News Agency, he boasted, "The People's Libera- included all the twenty-four corps of the Second and Third tion Army was already able to conduct not only mobile field armies and part of the Fourth Field Army. This warfare but positional warfare as well. . . . It has been great army under the unified command of a general front able not only to capture the Kuomintang' s heavily forti- committee headed by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng fied cities but also to surround and destroy strong forma- Xiaoping, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin was to cross the tions of Kuomintang crack troops, a hundred thousand or Yangtze River in its lower reaches, seize Nanjing, Shang- several hundred thousand at a time. " hai and Hangzhou, and destroy the enemy main force in He declared, "In 1949. the Chinese People' s Liberation the triangular area between Nanjing, Zheniiang and Army will advance south of the Yangtze River and will I Wuhu. 1 win even greater victories than in 1948. " I Acting upon Mao Zedong' s instructions, Liu Bocheng, Whoever has guns has power. Whoever has more guns can Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping and the others divided the great speak in a louder voice. Less than a fortnight later, on army into three groups. The eastern group formed by January 14, Mao Zedong for the first time issued a state- eight corps of the Eighth and Tenth armies of the Third ment in his own name. This was the "Statement on the Field Army, totalling 350,000 troops, was to cross the Present Situation by Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Cen- river between Zhanghuanggang and Sanjiangying. The tral Committee of the Communist Party of China, " in middle group formed by seven corps of the Seventh and which he did his utmost to ridicule and satirize the Ninth armies of the Third Field Army. totalling 300,000 Kuomintang government. troops, was to cross the river between Yuxikou and .|dao Zedorg's Art of War 9rq 224 Mao Zedong's Art of War Kuomintang Zongyang. After crossing the river, the two groups were and Bai Chongxi were reinforced by the Defence Fleet and the to push speedily eastward and westward, encircle and at- navy's Second Fleet and the River tack the enemy main force in the Wuhu, Nanjing and Kuomintang air force. In total, the river was defended by naval ves- Zhenjiang area in a pincer movement. The ring of encir- 700,000 Kuomintang troops in forty corps, 133 forces formed clement was to be closed at the Changxing-Yixing area. sels and over three hundred aircraft. These joint and defence to prevent the Commu- The western group formed by nine corps of the Third, a army, naval air Fourth and Fifth armies of the Second Field Army' to nist army from crossing the river and marching south- talling 350,000 troops. was to cross the river between ward. group the Commu- Zongyang and Wangjiang. Part of this group was to head On the night of April 20, the central of direct for the highway between Zheiiang and Jiangxi and nist army began to fight its way across the Yangtze River cut off the link between the eastern and western groups of in the section between Yuxikou and Zongyang. The the enemy troops, while its main force was to advance Kuomintang's line of river defence was cut in the middle swiftly eastward to attack and occupy Wuhu and Nanjing. on the morning of April 21. The Communist army occu- The advance troops of the Fourth Field Army and the pied Tongling, Nanling and Wuhu, smashed the troops from the Central Plains Military Region were Kuomintang forces in front of it and advanced rapidly to placed under the command of the western group and posi- wards Xuancheng. tioned at Wuhan to contain the Bai Chongxi group of the The eastern and western groups of the Communist army Kuomintang army and coordinate their operations with the crossed the river in force simultaneously on the night of movement of the main force' April 21. By April 23, the eastern group had occupied On the Kuomintang side, the section of the Yangtze River Zhenlrang and Changzhou, and the western group had tak- between Hukou and Shanghai was defended by twenty- en Qingyang, Gaotan and Zhide. Li Zongren acting pres- five corps, totalling 450,000 troops, under Tang Enbo, ident of the Nanjing government fled from Nanjing to commander-in-chief of the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Guangzhou on Aprll 22. Garrison Headquarters. eighteen of these corps were posi- On April 23, the Communist army attacked and occupied tioned to guard the river, and the other seven were de- Nanjing, capital of the Kuomintang government. ployed in strategic depth along the highway between Zhe- Overjoyed, Mao Zedong wrote a poem to celebrate it: jiang and Jiangxi and in eastern Zhejrang. The middle reaches of the Yangtze was defended by fifteen corps, to- The People's Liberation Army talling 250,000 troops, of the Kuomintang army under Bai Captures Nanjing Chongxi, commander-in-chief of the Central China Ban- a lii shi dit-Suppression Headquarters. Thirteen of these corps storm stueeps over Mount Zhongshan' were positioned to defend the section of the river between A rnighty a million strong, Yichang and Hukou and garrison Wuhan. The other two As a army, Riaer. corps were deployed in strategic depth in Changsha and Crosses the Great and a coiled dragon, Nanchang. The two groups of defenders under Tang Enbo Like a crouching tiger ,ra Mao Zed.ong's Art of War Mao Zedorg' s Art of War The city is a better place than eaer. 200, 000 troops in eight corps had retreated to Shanghai, In this heroic truimPh, Mao Zedong ordered the Third Field Army to fight a bat- Heaven and earih are orterturned. tle "to liberate the greater Shanghai" and the Second Field With forces to spare, Army to assemble at the Zhejiang-liangxi Highway for We must pursue the fleeing foe rest and consolidation. at- And not idle fame The Ninth and Tenth armies of the Third Field Army Lihe the Conquering King. tacked Shanghai on May 12 and occupied the city on May troops fled ward- If Heaven has feelings, 27. Tang Enbo and 50,000 of his in It, too, will grow old. ships. But the other 150,000 of his troops were taken prisoner. Island was occupied by The true way in man' s uLorld is: On June 2, Chongming the Communist army. Seas become mulbery fields. While the battle of Shanghai was raging, the Seventh Army of the Third Field Army attacked and occupied east- Under the powerful onslaught of the Communist army. ern and western Zheliang. Part of the Second Field Army, the line of Kuomintang' s river defence collapsed com- assisted by local guerrilla units, occupied western Zhe- pletely. The defending forces east of Changzhou began to jiang, northern Fujian, northeastern Jiangxi, central retreat towards Shanghai in an attempt to put up new de- Jiangxi and the cities of Jiujiang and Nanchang. When two fences for the Wusong-Shanghai area. Having detected corps from the advance troops of the Fourth Field Army the enemy's movement, the eastern and middle groups of crossed the Yangtze River at Huanggang in eastern Hubei the Communist army marched day and night, joined force on May 15, the Bai Chongxi group of the Kuomintang near Wuxing on the night of Aprll 27, and completely army retreated further south. wiped out the five Kuomintang corps in flight in the The victorious Communist army was now like a ferocious Langxi-Guangde area on April 29. On May 3, Hangzhou tiger pouncing on anything that was in its way. It occu- was captured by part of the Communist Seventh Army. pied Hankou on May 16 and Wuchang and Hanyang the The two groups of Communist army then pushed straight following day. to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Highway and Anhui-Zhejiang The campaign for the crossing of the Yangtze River began Highway, outflanked Tang Enbo' s forces and advanced on April 20 and ended on June 2. In the forty-three days, towards Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces. On May more than 430,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out. 7, the Communist forces were in control of the two-hun- A minor episode took place while the Communist army dred-kilometre section of the Zheliang-Jiangxi Highway was fighting its way across the Yangtze River, H. M. S. between Yiwu and Dongxiang, smashing all attempts of Amethyst and three other British warships intruded into the Kuomintang forces to organize new defences and cut- the Communist line of defence on the river. Despite the ting off the link between the Tang Enbo group and the Bai warning shots fired by the Communist army, the British Chongxi group of the Kuomintang forces. warships continued to steam upstream. A fierce exchange After the remaining twenty-four divisions of Tang Enbo' s of gunfire followed and H. M. S. Amethyst was damaged. I {. 228 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War In the name of the spokesman of general headquarters of /t\ Driving Continuously Forward the Communist army, Mao Zedong issued a statement, in r Y Smashing All Enemy Resistance which he severely condemned the British. "'We denounce - the preposterous statement of the warmonger Churchill, " After crossing the Yangtze River, the Communist army he said. " In the British House of Commons on April 26, drove continuously forward towards the Southeast, Cen- Churchill demanded that the British government should tral South, Northwest and Southwest, conquering the send two aircraft carriers to the Far East for 'effective whole country like the autumn wind sweeping up fallen power of retaliation.' What are you 'retaliating' for, Mr. Churchill? British warships together with Kuom- Ieaves. Even before the Communist army attacked and occupied intang warships intruded into the defence area of the Shanghai, Mao Zedong had issued the following instruc- Chinese People' s Liberation Army and fired on the tions: People' s Liberation Army, causing no less than 252 casu- 1. The First Field Army was to advance to the Northwest alties among our loyal and gallant fighters. Since the to destroy Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui's troops and part British have trespassed on Chinese territory and commit- of the Zongnan group of the Kuomintang army, liber- ted so great a crime, the People' s Liberation Army has Ht ate and control Shaanxi, Gansu, and good reason to demand that the British government admit Ningxia, Qinghai Xinjiang provinces; part of this army was to make prepa- its wrongdoing, apologize and make compensation. " rations to march into Sichuan. li4ao Zedong's statement was indeed the most incisive de- The Second Field Army was to assemble its main force nouncement of the British in the one hundred years after 2: the Opium War of 1840. Any Chinese who has been bul- in southern Anhui, eastern Jiangxi and western Zheliang part lied by the British should applaud for it. to be ready to advance to the Southwest. Assisted by the First Field was wipe out the main force All his life, Mao Zedong was never afraid of "foreign dev- of Army. it to ils. " Even the anti-Communists admit that since he took of the Hu Zongnan group of the Kuomintang army that control of the whole of China, "foreign devils" could no had retreated from the Qinling Mountains to Sichuan as longer harm the Chinese people. No one has ever de well as the regional warlords' forces in the Southwest, nounced him as "a scum of the Chinese nation. " He was liberate and control Sichuan, Guizhou, Xikang and Yun- nan provlnces. indeed the No. 1 " hero of the Chinese nation, " from whom many Chinese today should learn. 3. The Third Field Army was to march into Zhejiang and Fujian and then take control of Shandong, Jiangsu, An- hui. Zhejiang and Fujian provrnces. 4. The Fourth Field Army was to advance to the Central South, destroy the troops of the Bai Chongxi group and those under Yu Hanmou, liberate and control Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong and Guangxi. Mao Zedong's instructions for the Communist army com- Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 237 launched an attack a- manders were: "In the operations to wipe out the enemy' circlement, the Eighteenth Army forces. The our army must use the method of making a long distance gainst the Hu Zongnan group of Kuomintang outflanking movement, laying a wide ring of encirclement Nineteen Army, active in southern Shaanxi and western to attract the enemy's and carrying out large-scale annihilation. Only by cutting Hubei, also made feint movements made its move. off their escape route can we thoroughly wipe out these attention before the Second Field Army the Second Field enemies. " When the headquarters organizations of Nanjing His instructions for the operations in the Southwest were Army arrived at Zhengzhou by train from the falsely de- even more specific: "It is imperative to advance from the area, Liu Bocheng, its commander-in-chief, west. south and cut off the enemy's route of retreat' Long-dis- clared that the army was advancing towards the campaign tance outflanking movements should be carried out against The Heng-Bao campaign and Guangdong also for the pur- all the enemies in the Southwest. Penetrate into the ene- launched by the Fourth Field Army were my' s rear and have him completely encircled before at- pose of covering up the movements and amassing of the movements which aimed at tacking. " Second Field Army. A1l these for the His detailed instructions were: "simultaneous with the misleading the enemy created favourable conditions Fourth Field Army' s advance into Guangxi, the main surprising outflanking movement of the main force o{ the to force of the Second Field Army should make a long-dis- Second Field Army from the Sichuan-Guizhou border tance outflanking movement and lay a wide ring o{ encir- the enemy' s rear. advance into clement by pushing straight into Guizhou from the Hunan- To assist the Second Field Army in its its own main force in- Guizhou border and occupy eastern and southern Sichuan Sichuan and coordinate the march of its to cut off the route of retreat into Yunnan of the Hu Zong- to Guangxi, the Fourth Field Army transferred nine of Hunan and western nan group and other enemies in Sichuan and Sikang' The divisions westward from northwestern Eighteenth Army and other units in the Baoji and Tianshui Hubei and placed them under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng area along the western section of the Longhai Railway is and Deng Xiaoping at the end of October' Liu to retain the Hu Zongnan group in the Qinling Mountains therefore decided to move the main force of the Third from area first and then march speedily into Sichuan and occupy Army and the troops from the Fourth Field Army northern Sichuan and the Chengdu area when the main the Hunan-Hubei border to Sichuan in an outflanking force of the Second Field Army has entered Sichuan and movement, destroying the Song Xilian group of the cut off the enemy' s retreat. The two armies can then co- Kuomintang army in the Pengshui and Qianjiang area first the ordinate their operations and destroy all the enemy troops before marching westward to Jiangjin to coordinate and the in Sichuan province. " movements of the Fifth Army. The Fifth Army The ones charged with the task of liberating Southwest Tenth Corps were to make a great detour to Guizhou, and to China were the now famous Deng Xiaoping and Marshals seize Guiyang and Zunyi and attack Yibin Luzhou, accom- Liu Bocheng and He Long. cut off the enemy' s retreat into Yunnan. After In order to mislead and catch the enemy by surprise in a plishing the tasks above, these forces were to fight side by Zong- long-distance outflanking movement and a wide ring of en- side with the Eighteenth Army and wipe out the Hrt I L, Mao Zedong's Art of War LJL Mao Zedong's Art of War town of Nanchuan on nan group in the Chengdu area' Nanchuan area, occupied the county and The Communist army started its advance into Sichuan on November 24, wiped out most the enemy's 12th 15th armies in the mountainous area north of Nanchuan and be- October 1. On October 10, the Fifth and Tenth armies entered gan to attack and capture the strongholds on the perimeter Guizhou province and headed straight for Guiyang and of Chongqing. Ztnyi. On November 30, the Communist attacked and occupied At the same time, the line of defence of the Song Xilian Chongqing. the largest city in Southwest China. group of the Kuomintang forces were broken by the main Chengdu, capital city of Sichuan province, fell into Com- force of the Second Army and the nine divisions from the munist hand on December 27. Fourth Field Army. On December 9, the Kuomintang generals Lu Han in Yun- The Communist army began to advance on the enemy in nan and Liu Wenhui, Deng Xihou and Pan Wenhua in several columns on a five-hundred-kilometre front from Sichuan and Xikang surrendered to their enemy respec- Badong in the north to Tianzhu in the south. tively in Kunming and Yaan and handed over Yunnan and These movements of the Communist forces caught the Xikang provinces to the Communtst army. Kuomintang army by surprise and totally disrupted its de- In the march to the Southwest, the Communist army had fensive dispositions. wiped out a total of 930,000 Kuomintang troops and To prevent the Song Xilian group from making a planned gained control of the entire Southwest China except Ti- retreat and organizing resistance, the various units of the bet. Communist army pushed swiftly forward according to plan. The Communist army took Guiyang on November 15, oc- cupied Pengshui and reached the eastern bank of the river Attacking from Both Inside and Outside Wujiang on November 16 and destroyed the enemy' s 14th 46 Stealing Across the Sea in Junks Army fleeing westward on November 19' - On November 21, after leaving some personnel to take A{ter the Guangdong and Guangxi campaign fought in De- over the city of Guiyang, the front committee of the Sec- cember 1949, the entire Central South China came under ond Field Army under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping in- the control of the Communists. structed the main force of the Fifth Army to execute a In a speech made on August 25, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek swift outflanking movement to southern Sichuan and cut had said: "Victory and defeat in a war are decided by the off the enemy' s retreat. The main force of the Third army fighting on the battlefield, but there are tactics gov- Army and the nine divisions from the Fourth Field Army erning the fighting, military strategy governing tactics. were to force the Wujiang River and encircle the enemy and political strategy governing military strategy. Since 12th and 15th armies in southern Sichuan and the area east inferior others, we must make every of it. After crossing the Wujiang by force' the Communist we are materially to the enemy spirit. troops began to converge on the enemy forces in the effort to find ways of overcoming in 234 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art o{ War This is certainly possible. If we cannot defeat the enemy Mao Zedong' s instructions to the Communist troops was: in fighting, we should win by tactics. If we cannot win by "Make use of a large number of junks and available equip- tactics, we should win by military strategy. If we still ment; give full play to the might of the people's war and cannot defeat the enemy by military strategy, we must defeat the well-equipped enemy with inferior equipment.' win by political strategy. Tactics, military strategy and The Communist army then began to train its troops for political strategy, however, are to be applied by generals, fighting across the sea. In just over two months' time, particularly the supreme commander, who must be able to the soldiers from the Northeast had mastered the skills of cope skilfully with the changes in the situation. " dealing with tide and wind and fighting on the sea. Mao Zedong was a supreme commander who was "able to Before landing en masse, the Communist army sent a rein- cope skilfully with the changes in the situation. " He was forced regiment to Weizhou Island, a small island off the head and shoulders above the others in fighting a battle as coast of Guangxi, and seized four hundred enemy junks. well as in tactics, military strategy and political strategy. Upon discovering the Communist army' s intention to in- After the Communist army had occupied the Central vade Hainan Island, General Xue Yue strengthened the is- South, Mao Zedong's order was "Making preparations to land' s coastal defence and sent some of his forces to encir- liberate Hainan Island. " He emphasized that the liberation cle and attack the Communist guerrilla bases on the of Hainan Island must take place between spring and sum- island's Wuzhi Mountains. In order to rein{orce the Com- mer. munist guerrillas on Hainan Island, test the training of Hainan Island is a strategically highly important gateway the troops and carry out reconnaissance, the Communist to South China. The island was defended by the Kuom- cbmmanders decided to ferry a reinforced battalion to the intang general Xue Yue with 100,000 troops' fifty war- island by stealth. ships and thirty aircraft, which formed a three dimension- On the night of March 5, fourteen junks carrying eight al system of defence. hundred Communist soldiers set sail and headed straight The invasion of Hainan Island was the first sea-crossing for Hainan Island. At two o'clock in the afternoon of the battle ever fought by the Communist army. The shortest following day, they successfully landed at Baimajing on distance from Leizhou Peninsula to Hainan Island is only the western side of Hainan Island, undetected by the ene- twenty kilometres. But as the boats carrying the troops my. had to steer clear of the reefs and avoid the enemy's gun- On the night of March 26, the Communist army organized fire, they had to navigate for sixty kilometres at the least. another stealthy crossing of a regiment of soldiers. The The Communist army had no experience in sea-crossing, junks sailed smoothly at first. But there was a sudden no mechanized landing vessels and no naval and air sup- change in the weather and a thick fog rose from the sea. port. To smash the enemy' s land, sea and air defences Having lost signal contact, most of the junks drifted to a was certainly not an easy task. Moreover, as most of the section of the island where there were powerful enemy de- soldiers in the Communist attacking units had come from fences. The situation was critical. Instead of retreating, Northeast China, they did not know how to swim. It the regiment of Communist soldiers fired back at the ene- would be disastrous if their boats capsized. my warships, aircraft and troops on the island and landed 237 236 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong s Art of War on the island by force. Ten battalions of Kuomintang As the large Communist force started to push inland, they troops tried but failed to stop them. After killing, wound- were joined by the Communist units who had sneaked onto ing and capturing more than eight hundred enemy troops, the island and the Qiongya Column of Communist guerril- the regiment marched to the Communist guerrilla bases in las. Among them was probably the famous Red Detach- the Wuzhi Mountains. ment of Women. Since even junks could make the crossing' there must be The Communist landing force had the town of Lingao sur- loopholes in the enemy defence, the Communist comman- rounded the following night but did not met any resistance ders suddenly realized. They concluded that the time had from the enemy. Nor were there any signs of the enemy' s come to take the island. mechanized forces. Where was the enemy' s main force? The Communist commanders di{fered in their opinion as to After analysing the enemy' s dispositions and movements, how the landing was to be made. Some stood for sending the landing force concluded that Xue Yue must have con- all the junks out at once and land on the island en masse; centrated his main force on the eastern side of the island others suggested that stealthy landing in small groups and intended to destroy the Communist beachhead on that might be a better way. side of the island first and then defeat the other Commu- In fact, Mao Zedong had already clearly pointed out in his nist forces one by one. The landing force immediately de- order for the liberation of Hainan Island: A whole army cided to hand over the task of encircling and attacking Lin- corps should be ferried across all at once. The troops were gao to the guerrillas and the units that had sneaked to carry at least three days of ration, Iand by force and es- across, and move eastward to Chengmai. tablish a firm beachhead. They could then fight indepen- When the Communist army had reached the north of dently and push inland without relying on logistic sup- Chengmai, it learned that a enemy division had moved to port. Meiting. The Communist army then rushed speedily to On April 16, more than a thousand junks with Communist Meiting, braving continuous enemy bombing. soldiers on board set sail and headed straight for Hainan Xue Yue was a general known for his courage and wis- Island. Before they had covered twenty kilometres, they dom. He speedily moved four divisions of his forces and were discovered and attacked with dense gunfire from placed the Communist forces that had landed on the east- Kuomintang aircraft and warships. The landing fleet fired ern side of the island in a counter-encirclement' Attacked back and continued to push swiftly forward. Hainan Is- by the enemy from both the front and the back, the Com- land came in sight at two o'clock in the early morning. munist forces on the eastern side of the island were in a When the junks were {ifty or sixty metres from shore, the critical situation. Communist soldiers from the Northeast who had by now The Communist forces on the western side of the island learned to swim began to jump into the sea and swim to- then executed a pincer movement and placed the enemy wards the shore. The three-dimensional system of defence forces in a counter-counter-encirclement. painstakingly built by Xue Yue collapsed within an hour. The fighting then developed in a jigsaw pattern. There The Communist soldiers completed their landing in four was fighting on both the interior and exterior lines. The hours. two sides were often engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. Mao Zedong's Art of War 238 Mao Zedong's Art o{ War 239 As the two sides were equal in strength, the battle raged conditions both on land and in the air. " relentlessly until the early morning of April 23 when Xue On October 18, 1950, Mao Zedong issued an order in the Yue forces were overwhelmed and the Communist forces name of chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary "the on both sides of the island joined force. Military Committee to the effect that Northeast Frontier Seeing the situation had become hopeless, Xue Yue or- Army is to be reorganized as the Chinese People's dered a general retreat. He himself departed from the is- Volunteers and march swiftly into Korea. . . . The Chinese People's Volunteers land in an airplane. are to be formed by the 13th Army and its 38th, 39th, 40th. 42nd corps, the Frontier Artillery Headquarters and its First, Second and Eighth artillery divisions. The above units are to complete their preparations at once and wait for orders to set Changing the Insignia off. . . . The Northeast Administrative Region will be the 47 Showing Military Prowess - general rear base for the Chinese People's Volunteers. " on Foreign SoiI After the Second World War, the United States. with its enormous industrial might and plenty of money, began to Mao Zedong was not afraid of foreigners. He was not dominate the world as a superpower. But Mao Zedong' s afraid of the British, nor the Americans. He looked upon "People's Republic, " despite its vast territory, rich natu- the United States as a "paper tiger. " ral resources and huge population, was a poor country When the Korean War broke out in 1950 and the U. S. with a war-torn, backward economy. The U. S. forces and South Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and be- were equipped with powerful warships and guns and innu- gan to threaten China' s Northeast, Mao Zedong decided merable bombs. But Mao Zedong' s Volunteers were to teach the Americans a lesson. He sent Marshal Peng armed mainly with rifles and a limited number of machine- Dehuai and the Chinese People's Volunteers into Korea to guns and cannons. They had only hand grenades and no contest against the U. S. army. aircraft to drop bombs and, needless to say, atomic His instructions for Peng Dehuai was: "After entering bombs. As the disparity in strength between the two sides Korea, our army should open up a base area in the large was so great, it was really audacious in the extreme for mountainous area north o{ the Wunsan and Pyongyang Mao Zedong to engage the United States in a war. Com- line and build two or three lines of defence north of this paring him with those who fawned on and cringed before line and south of the Tokchon-Yongwon Highway. Fight the Americans, Mao Zedong indeed projected the lofty im- only defensive battles at the initial stage and wipe out age of a national hero. small groups of the enemy. If the enemy attacks, carve The enemy advanced faster than Mao Zedong had expect- him up and destroy him in front of our positions. Our ed. Shortly after the People's Volunteers had crossed the army will coordinate with the Korean People' s Army in Yalii River on October 19, the South Korean army on the launching counter-attacks when our army is fully equipped American side occupied the North Korean capital of and trained and begins to enjoy overwhelmingly superior Pyongyang and quickly overtook the predetermined line of q l I l 240 Mao Zedong's Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 247 defence of the Volunteers. These instructions were followed to the letter by Peng De- In a telegram to the Volunteers on October 21, Mao told huai. them to abandon the original plan and adopt the tactic of In a telegram to the Volunteers on October 22, Mao wiping out the enemy on the move. "The question at pre- wrote, "Avoid the Chongju-Pakchon-Koonwoori line and sent is to create opportunities for battle and complete the the area twenty kilometres north of it when moving for- deployment in the next few days, so that our army can en- ward, to prevent the enemy from discovering us prema- gage the enemy in battles; it is no longer a question of turely, stopping moving forward or even drawing spending a period of time to deploy the forces for defence back. .. . In this battle, the best place for encircling and before talking about attacking the enemy, " he said. wiping out the enemy is at Pakchon, Koonwoori and the Mao Zedong had never been to the Korean peninsula, but area to their north. " he seemed to know the local terrain like the back of his This again was faithfully carried out by Peng Dehuai. hand. In his instructions for the deployment of the Volun- On October 23, in a telegram to Peng Dehuai, Mao Ze- teers, he stated: "If our army is not ready to fight the dong pointed out that the outcome of the Korean'War was first battle against South Korea' s Capital Division and to be determined by the following conditions: Third Division on the eastern front, a division from the 1. Can our army take the enemy by surprise and wipe out 42nd Corps positioned in the Changjin area to block the two, three or even four South Korean divisions in the bat- enemy' s advance will be enough. It will be appropriate to tle now being prepared? If we can win a great victory in position the main force of the 42nd Corps in the area south this battle, the enemy will have to re-deploy his forces, of Minsan (whereto South Korea's Sixth Division is mov- and under the present conditions of military strength, the ing) so as to cut off the railway connection between'Wun- enemy will be in a passive position. Otherwise, the situa- san and Pyongyang, contain the enemies in the two places tion will be favourable to the enemy. and prevent them from reinforcing the enemies in the 2. To what extent can enemy aircraft kill and wound our north, so that we can concentrate the main force of three men and hamper our movements? How skilled is our army corps to wipe out South Korea' s Sixth' Seventh and in marching and fighting at night? Can our army battle to Eighth divisions. Pay attention to gaining control of the our advantage when it is harassed by a large number of en- heights such as the Miaosang and Sobaik mountains to cut emy aircraft? off the link between the enemies in the east and west' " 3. Will the United States send more troops to Korea He emphatically pointed out' "There is an extremely good (such as five or ten more divisions) ? Or before the United opportunity at present to destroy three or more divisions States increases its troops, can our army annihilate sever- of the South Korean army, fight the first victorious battle al American and South Korean divisions in mobile warfare outside the country and bring about a change in the situa- and by attacking isolated strongholds? 'War. tion of the Korean " Mao Zedong also directed that every effort must be made He warned, "The enemy is advancing rapidly. It is ex- to win victory in the first campaign and to maintain a high tremely important to seize an opportunity {or battle' It morale and fight vigorously even under enemy bombing, will be too late if there is any delay. " and that every effort must be made to wipe out several 242 Mao Zedong' s Art of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 243 groups of the enemy before more enemy troops were ern side of the highway in preparation for ambushing the brought over from the United States or other places, so enemy' s follow-up troops. The 120th Division of the Vol- that the enemy would suffer more losses than he could re- unteers north of Woonsan had taken Oukniubang and plenish. In brief, the Volunteers were "to proceed from a other heights on the eastern side of the highway. steady and reliable basis and strive to win every possible At about seven o'clock in the morning, as the vanguard victory. " units of the First Division of the South Korean army were By renaming the Northeast Frontier Army as the People' s driving north heralded by tanks along the Woonsan-Wib- Volunteers, Mao Zedong changed only the name but not jeng Highway, they were hit head-on by the Volunteers. the essence. The Communist army was still the Commu- At about ten o'clock, as another group of South Korean nist army. The new name sounded much better in both army was marching north, it was cut into three sections domestic and foreign propaganda. It was intended to make by the Volunteers and totally wiped out in the fierce fight- people believe that the Volunteers had gone to war to aid ing that followed. On that night, the Volunteers attacked North Korea in resisting invaders and to protect the the enemy in Wonjeng and occupied it the following morn- people' s homes and defend their country' If the ing. Thus began the war of "Resisting U. S. Aggression Chinese " name of Liberation Army were used, it might mean that and Aiding Korea. And October 25 becomes the memori- "ResistinC the army had gone to liberate North Korea, which meant al day of U.S. Aggression and Aiding Korea' by aggression. From the new name we can see that Mao Ze- the Volunteers in the Chinese Communist history. At nine dong must have devised the new name after much delibera- o'clock on the evening of October 25, seeing that the enemy forces t1on. were darting everywhere in small units of tanks and trucks, Peng Dehuai found it difficult to de- stroy two or three enemy divisions in one battle. But in order not to miss the opportunity to wipe out the enemy forces which had rushed blindly forward, he Cutting Off the Head and the TaiI decided that ACt from that evening "each corps and division of the Volun- +o to Beating the Underling teers is to fight independently to destroy one or two enemy Embarrass the Master regiments at a time and strive to destroy altogether one or two enemy divisions in several battles, so as to stop the On October 25. 1950, the "United Nations forces" and enemy' s headlong rush and set people' s minds at rest. " the South Korean army driving north in divisions or regi- Peng' s decision for destroying the enemy in several bat- ments on the western front had reached the positions of tles was approved by Mao Zedong, who directed in a tele- the 40th Corps of the Chinese People' s Volunteers; their gram: "W'ipe out several enemy regiments first and en- vanguard units had even reached south of Mount Chosan Iarge the victory gradually to destroy more enemies so that In the early our army can gain a firm foothold by the Yalu River on the Sino-Korean border' - this is a correct morning on that day, the Volunteers which had moved to method. " He also clearly pointed out that the target of the the east of Bookjin had occupied the heights on the north- Volunteers' first campaign was the destruction of South tr4ao Zed,org's Art of War 245 Zedong' s Art of War 244 Mao launched an all-out attack on the enemy forces and wiped out all of them. The was the famous Battle of Woonsan. The Battle of Woonsan was the first battle in which the poorly equipped Volunteers succeeded in destroying the bulk of the Eighth Regiment of the U. S. First Cavalry Di- " the master. vision and part of the 12th Regiment of the First Division of the South Korean army equipped with modern weapons, killing, wounding and capturing 2,046 enemy troops (including 1, 840 Americans), destroying and cap- turing 28 enemy tanks, 176 trucks, 190 cannons of vari- ous types and other booty. enemy's link between the south and the north When the Simultaneous with the victory of Woonsan, the Volun- off the Volunteers could concentrated their was cut , teers on the western front also scored a series of victories. destroy the enemies one by one in the area forces and The 40th Corps succeeded in wiping out part of South Ko- north of the Chongchon River' rea' s Eighth Division and an artillery unit of the U. S. g a. m. on November 1, the units of Volunteers on the At First Cavalry Division. The 66th Corps advanced to the also started to attack' western front outskirts o{ Koosung, where it blocked and pinned down following the progress of the campaign' Mao Ze- Closely the 24th Division of the U. S. Army. The 50th Corps of Peng Dehuai and the others: Pay attention dong instructed the Volunteers crossed the Yalti River from Andong to the 38th Corps to gain control of the Anju-Koon- ,o ,r"" Sineuiju to check the advance of the British 27th Brigade focusing in particular on Koon- woori-Chochang area' which had reached Namsitong. and make sure that the link between the enemies woori, On November 1, while the war was raging on the eastern north and south of the Chongchon River were cut off' De- front, the enemy threw the First Division of the U. S. reinforcements from the U' S Second Division stroy the Marine into battle at Hansin. Under cover of more than north from Pyongyang and what remains of South -orrirrg fifty aircraft and forty tanks, the U. S. marines launched Seventh and Eighth divisions and make Kor"ui s Sixth, repeated fierce attacks on the Volunteers' positions, but possible effort to advance southward to the vicinity every was repulsed by the Volunteers in a counter-attack at mid- He said, "A victory in strategy can be of Pyongyang. night. Fierce fighting also went on elsewhere. move is successful' The key to the achieved if this ' ' ' In the blockading battle on the eastern {ront, the Volun- lies in the seizure of Koonwoori' Kachon' whole situation teers engaged the U. S. and South Korean forces continu- with lightning speed bv the 38th Corps Anju and Sinanju ally for thirteen days and nights, repulsed the ferocious the link between the enemies in the north and u.ri .ra off onslaughts of three enemy divisions and wiped out more A11 other moves are secondary' " south; than 2,700 enemy troops. They thwarted the enemy' s at- encircled enemy tried repeatedly to break out of the The tempt to outflank the Volunteers at Kangkyui and suc- the aid of aircraft and tanks without success' cordon with cessfully coordinated the operations of the Volunteers on On the night of November 3, the Communist army s of War Mao Zedong's Art of War 247 246 Mao Zedong' Art er, the Americans concentrated their forces the western front. and launched counter-attacks. We and Comrade Kim In the first campaign, the Volunteers and the North Kore- Il Sung then with_ drew to the 38th Parallel and held and positions an People' s Army succeeded in wiping out over 15'000 built our there. After its outbreak, the Korean War continued enemy troops, smashing the U. S' army' s plan to occupy for almost three years. American planes the entire Korean Peninsula before Thanksgiving and driv- were like hornets while we did not have a single plane ing the enemy from the Yalii River to the south of the at the front line. The two sides agreed to negotiate for peace. Cionchon River. As a result of the victory in the first Where was the negotiation to be held? They suggested that campaign, the situation of the war on the Korean Peninsu- it be held on board a Danish ship. We suggested Kaesong on side la was initially stabilized. our of Korea. They said it was all right. Since Kaesong Mao Zedong always stressed that victory must be won in was on our side, they came to the meeting every day the first battle. In the Korean War, the Volunteers under carrying a white flag and went back after the meeting also carrying a MLao Zedong' s control from afar also succeeded in winning white flag, I-ater, they found it was embarrassing victory in the first battle. Following Mao Zedong' s in- to fly a white flag every day and suggested moving place structions, the volunteers were also victorious in the later the of meeting to Panmunjom located between the lines of battle campalgns. of the two sides. We said it was all right. The signing of the cease-fire agreement at Panmunjom on Although the negotiation went on for about a year, the United States Julv 2i, 1953, by Peng Dehuai, commander-in-chief of was unwilling to sign. But the Americans, the Volunteers, and General Mark W' Clark' comman- ferocious as they were and having so much steel, had der-in-chief of the U. N. forces in Korea, marked the end no other choice. " of the Korean War. The United States lost of 390'000 As early as August 1946, in his talk with the American soldiers in the Korean War and defiled the pages of U' S' correspondent Anna Louise Strong, Mao history with a great humiliation. Zedong com_ pared the United States to a paper tiger. But From then on, although the U. S' army continued to act when it came to actual fight against the United States, Mao Zedong like an overlord elsewhere, it no longer claimoured about did not dare to slight the United States; he dealt seriously invading China' s mainland. with it as he would a powerful enemy. Mao Zedong was highly complacent when he talked about At the Wuchang meeting of the political Bureau the Korean War in a speech at a conference of represen- of the Central Committee of the Chinese party tatives of the Communist Parties held in Moscow on Communist held on December 1, 1958, Mao Zedong said that November 18, 1957: "At the beginning of the Korean American imperialism had a dual characteristic: it was a live tiger, War, a division of the U. S. army was equipped with eight an iron tiger and a real tiger on the one hand, but hundred cannons while three divisions of the Chinese Vol- it would eventually be transformed into a paper tiger, a dead unteers had only about fifty. But when the fighting start- tiger and a beancurd tiger. ed, the Americans were driven like a flock of ducks from The following passage by Mao Zedong the Yalti River to the south of the 38th Parallel' a dis- may enlighten us in our struggle on the battlefield of life: "Intrinsically, tance of several hundred kilometres, in a few weeks' Lat- from Art of War Mao Zedong's Mao Zedong's Art of War 249 About the Author Hu Changming Mao Zedong Memorial Museum, Shaoshan. Hunan this we base our tactical real tigers and can eat people' On The publication of Liu Jikun' s Stories Behind Mao "despising the enemy thinking. " This was his idea of Zedong' s Poems and Mao Zedong: Complete Poems in o{ him tactically' " strategically and taking full account Hong Kong has evoked strong repercussions. The two books have been published in their Taiwan edition by the Ocean Breeze Publishers in Taibei and were reported or reviewed on the mainland by the Liberation Daily, Wenhui Weehly Reading, Shenyang Daily, Sichuan Daily, Infor- mation on Party History, Shanghai' s Xinmin Eaening News, Hunan' s Weehly Digest, Sichuan' s Digest of the Weeh, Shanghai' s Digest from Newspapers and Periodi- cals, the Hunan People' s Broadcasting Station and other media. Born in an overseas Chinese family in Indonesia, Liu Jikun returned to China to continue his schooling in 1960 and then studied at Sichuan lJniversity' s Department of Chi- nese Literature. He was subjected to unjust treatment during the Cultural Revolution. In the mid-1920s, he moved to Hong Kong, where he is now engaged in jour- nalistic and cultural work. Liu Jikun is a prolific writer of remarkable talent. His Snow Falls on the Land of China records his unusual expe- rience during the Cultural Revolution when he was con- fined in a "cowshed, " locked up in prison and sent to do physical labour in a "May Seventh" Cadres' School. Writ- ten in a lively and fascinating style, the book is an out- standing piece of realistic literature based on facts. The Great Johes in the Cultural Revolution compiled by Liu Jikun is a collection of 160 jokes heard and experienced by the author during the Cultural Revolution. Illustrated with more than thirty pictures by Fang Cheng, a famous Mao Zedong's Art o{ War Mao Zedong's Art of War 251 cartoonist in Beijing, the book reflects diverse aspects of when writing about the life, exploits and artistic achieve- human nature during a specific period of history' Grief is ments of Mao Zedong for readers both in China and expressed in the humour of the jokes, and sorrow hides abroad. He devotes most of his energy to the study of b"i,i.ra what is laughable. In response to the proposal Mao Zedong and has reaped rich fruits, for which he has made by the great master o{ Chinese literature' Ba Jin' won {avourable comments both in China and in other parts for the construction o{ a museum of the Cultural Revolu- of the world. Liu Jikun's example is an indirect reflection tion, the author has supervised the publication of the of the power{ul coagulability of the Chinese nation. Fu- "Museum of the Cultural Revolution" literary series' to ture historians will certainly write more penetratingly warn people not to forget the historic tragedy of the so- about it. called Cultural Revolution. (From Xiangtan Daily September 8. 1991) Collected in Mao Zedong: Complete Poems are more than sixty poems and thirty couplets written by Mao Zedong' It took Liu Jikun ten years to collate and sieve through the materials he had collected. All the poems and couplets are authentic works of Mao Zedotg, and there is hardly any- thing that has been missed. The compiler's comments on MaoI . poems are both interesting and humorous' Taking a realistic and seeking-truth-from-facts approach' he never tries to give strained interpretations or make far- fetched comparisons. For seven months running a{ter its publication, the book stood at the top or among the first i"* i., the best-seller list of Hong Kong's Sanlian Book- store. In the Stories Behind' Mao Zedong' s Poems' the author discusses Mao's poems agarnst the historical background of modern and contemporary China, revealing not only the social significance and artistic value of the poems' but also Mao' s line of thoughts and the objectives of his life as well as his breadth of vision, romantic sentiments and un- usual aesthetic pursuit as a statesman and a poet' Of all these, the author gives a truthful and refreshing account' Liu Jikun is an honest, warmhearted and patriotic intellec- tual. Despite all the frustrations he has experienced in his life, he is able to examine the past and think of the future coolheadedly. He strives to be objective and impartial Mao Zedong in Ruijin, Jiangxi province, 1931. $. #**1 tr *r rl-Sl r*,ffi frL $ ]rf, il#..M,{,{ ,g e{ } +'+ *!*i: * rg F1 is.,A * M'E. t "{ "*i: {ii",ns..*"-E 4$ (f s &.& E 6 -f i., ir*fitt.sj'Sil_ ;; rt, .v * .r,u; t 1.; & i i: ;, j- *a ,t, fl ,-1 $ tI r (jA r. u'1",,-,,11't J r.+.r * f,: :, t: r:G:i ff +..]:,L r i,,. i 1,i.. l: s .i" 3l F--- #]^ffi.',*.+**aE *.:t'fl ffi,q.1.,*{€{..s€.8 t'F" 4 '* a":4 *$ f .,i.4 h r. :r .,, * * r 4,^.4 * t ,r-.' j. f s lr. .a. e{i 4J-,S-B I..ri rir(,,j r,i t drt s.{ Y 1ry t,r s"s e s ,,"- 8.4:1 4'f n {.ii ''s 1f ;1, f "^l -' tt f, :}' '{- + lr" i : t + ! a 5 ! a,. S .jrl + t i? \: t2':.' : ; i: w r, .: 3 && 4 ft s-&drr!-*."-+,: tf ')$ 1 +'r f.r€L{ 4 p u+ tJ 6 '{-.41 x-x< +{F,$"8"*&"{: :r -Lq &/-rLraS t'-: fi'.+lf1 r!6fl. e.4' ,rI "r *- f 's {'d + E t'- }" ; "& # A'e dr t'i qlfi +r re r'E € i[-{s rF &" E a.'- eq *. ? .i i * e + n *o 4 * ? + il it *ii +*q t:'-r i: r :i ',1 r ":- 'H +*-S,t;i& .S 6 ry ffiA+ e *a 4' .: 'j -{: *! ar t4 6t-'*t iE /. }^ Fl {-{- }" L-tt *qSz+sldf"++e.*rqg This photograph, taken in Yanan in 1937 , shows some of the \ 1.: #:L.*..{A6.f q* *4-9. men who had taken part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising and i{.,s0A*n-r*{:++* 1. were eventually ted hy Mao Zedong (seventh from left, front row) to the Jinggang Mountains in October 1927. A proclamation issued by the Red Army on its march to southern Jiangxi in 1929. rtr} i. Mao Zedong (thirtl from left) and some of the men who had taken part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising. I tiir. tl'r i:t: 'r, ,,, : ,l.i 1 .. Zedong Leagues from Mao at the Congress of Poor-Peasant Mao Zedong and Zhtt De, commander-in-chief of the Red 1933. eight counties in western Jiangxi and southern Fujian, Army, in Baoan country, northern Shaanxi, 1936. From right: MaoZedong,Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and QinBangxian (Bo Gu) after they had reached northern Shaanxi at the end Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi , Zhou Enlai antl ZhttDe after they of the Long March. had led the Red Army to norrhern Shaanxi. Mao Zetlong and Zhou Enlai in Yanan. ; .rt 'l ' i-, i ,.,1. , .iiliir, , r,ll .i' r , .1. ir.i'rl :,:: Mao Zedong in northern Shaanxi, 1937. Mao Zedong at work in Yanan, 1946. Mao Zedong on a tlrill grotrnd in Yanan, 1944. Mao Zedong in Yanan, 1946. # ,,:i :i Mao Zedong on campaign, 1947. I I ( a lVlrrrruscripts of tlne Problems of Var arud Strategy by Mao Mao Zedong speaking at the Anti-Japanese Military and Po- Z,.rlong. Iitical University in Yanan during the War of Resistance Against Japan. is.['ao Zed.ong and Zhu De discussing military operationa during the War of Resistance !.gainst Japan in 1944. Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek exchanging toasts during thr: Chongqing peace negotiations in August 1945. Each had a rlagger hidden behind his bland smile. Mao Zedong on the move during the northern Shaanxi cam- paign when the Kuomintang army under Hu Zongnan attacked Yanan in 1947 . Mao Zedong studying a military map in northern Shaanxi, -t947. A sketch map prepared by the staff office of the General Headquarters of the Eight Route Army, showing the disposi- tion of troops during the Huntlred-Regiment Campaign. Mao Zedong at the airfield in Yanan on his way to Chongqing for peace negotiations with the Kuomintang'"" ,t"g".'t)Al 1945. t i+#-tN $e$ri Draft of Mao Zedong's telegram, which sets forth the concept of operations for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in Xibaipo, seat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party after May 1948. !,. $& ,it $ it't I t.r Draft of Mao Zetlong's telegram for the Huai-Hai Campaign. Mao Zedong reviewing units of the People's Liberation Army at Xiyuan airfield in Beiping on March 25,1949. A Xinhua News Agency release drafted by Mao Zedong on the crossing of the Yangtze River by the Communist Army. 1949. Mao Zedong in Beiping reading a newspaper which reported the liberation of Nanjing. The Communist army marched into Shanghai on May 27, lsBN 962-238-084-0 HF-213-P Published & Printed in Hong Kong (JtanfU'liuii ('.tinipitifsii Octolwr 1918 Liuoxi-Slu'iiYun 90,000 riionucs ('.aiupaifiii iviiH'd out. liplnecn .fulv !946 and Way 19:)0. ifu' IdhtTiilion "Soveiuhcr 1948 IniM di'slroyvd a toliil of 8.070.tt00 Kuomintung :i70.00() t'lioniifs intofts. The \anjinii fiorornnwiil icon orrrtlirown. wiiuul out. lAuoxi C.onipaign Marrfi 1948 ZHANGJIAKOU l.ytLOOO cnpinios icipod out. i iMpiii^- rianjin In pifihl ypars hpfiinnin^ from July 1937, tlip .liiuin ('.am- Hightli RoulpArmy.!\eu- Fourth Army and .lanuary 1949 puipn other anli-Japanpspfoncs tcipod out .'>20.000 cnetnu's Spptpinbpr Ortoher I93.'t. The lipt(.\rm} rpuched northern Sluianxi at I'aiyuan the eiul of the Lona March. ('.ampaifin .{prd 1949 120.000 enemie.s tcipeil out. Cro.ssinf! the Yaiifitzp January 1949 5.30,000 enemies Ihaii-llai wiped out. Campaifni Ilan-Xun Hirer June 1949 Crossing C.nmpaign 400,000 enemies M■ ay 1949 :}7,000 wiped imt. enemies wiped out. NANJING JIANGY[N\ /^SHANGHAI U u.song- Shanphai' \ulumn 1927. Mao Zedonf! led the peasant Campaifiu \f>ril-June militia in llunan, lluhei and Jiangxi in slaf^itifi 1949 the Autumn Harvest IJprisinfi. JIUJIANG August I. 1927. Zhu He. Zhou ICnlai and others started the Nanchang Uprising. 'i .April 1928. .Mao Zedong ami Zhu He joined force in the Jinggang Mountains and JINGGANG estahlishetl the C.entntl liase A rea. ■I CRouCeAFcttfe [ The Hed f 1 rmy iiMi GUILIN "RetJil^rmyB »■■■■ Lond March s4a rted the Long MMMMmZ •■■IK March IIME GUANGZHOU on the night of Ocloher 16.1934. Liberated areas at outbreak of civil war in July 1946 HONGKONG Areas wbere important campaigns were / \ fought in the three-year War of Libera- ^ A Route of the Red Army's Long March A Areas not controlled by the Communists HAINAN IS. Battles and Campaigns Fought by the Communist-Led Liberation Army > NINQXIA ^ SUIYUAM ,'^y/J I /HEBEI \ OUTER MONGOLIA rrwntci ' / f SUIYUAk-l t CHAHARj HEBEI-REHE- . -y / I ^•^"-"7. A' UAONINS^.'- A"~\ / V \ SHANDONG/ Sfc*wi^2ewV'a^i9zs, \l I J J/ JJ WV mko} r\Xj^ I ^Phj SHAANM ^ p JIANGSU a .--•'£y^ J9«^- henan \ '-, ANHUl Cstraijim*^ V^c— fc/^-.'. m. 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B*ir Aim -J ^ I / . \ ■^-Aa ''tA'^ South China Sea CotrhlUCivmlU ArmAr««n bni< S««iiSoaih / i jI C". ^ PiJOq f TAIWAN 1 511 QwnilU Bw Arm GUANGM--, /,,GUANGDONG •Y'/ .(J^ANESE OCduPIBD) @1 tiamlia Arm Arm Wkmlkf Nfw Fooitk Ar«j CmrrMnUiI ^ ' •/'LLr/'4'■,'. ^ ■■ _ ■ ——————— / ;( ^//T^i^yr. g I South ChloaSea IflUn tKnrtMflefUev^n!oflWNfwFoarlLArsr ( ' od j Ami Baler Kbeaauat Rolf BurAim ( ®i%ifMBtoeci«M hu9ife»li. ^ *^sTa' Ha^itan Ami Omfad by ik JtptBiM Ara; J«iy 14J7 V ' ft^yiin Iff / Dongsbalt. J^vvv CBTfTifti Am Rural Revolutionary Base Areas (1928-July 1935) ^ Bardm Bur A/ru | ^ Ami Oerafad by tbr Jiptaoe Aray, Oet. 193 CoelrelM Am» ^ Ql^NGY/y South China Sea Facay Omped Arm The Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army Marching to the Enemy's Rear (July 1937-October 1938) Anti-Japanese Base Areas Behind Enemy lines (August 1945)