57

GEORGIAN DRIFT The crisis of Georgia’s way westwards

Maciej Falkowski NUMBER 57 WARSAW February 2016

GEORGIAN DRIFT The crisis of Georgia’s way westwards

Maciej Falkowski © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

Content editors Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota

Editor Anna Łabuszewska

Co-operation Halina Kowalczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska

Translation OSW

Co-operation Timothy Harrell

Graphic design PARA-BUCH

DTP GroupMedia

Photograph on cover Shutterstock

Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-77-9 Contents

Summary /5

I. Georgia between Russia and the West: the historical context /8

II. The successes of Georgia’s westward course /13

1. Saakashvili’s reforms /13 2. The Georgian Dream continues the pro-Western course /16 3. Western involvement /18 4. The impact of Georgia’s reforms on the post-Soviet area /20

III. The crisis /22

1. Chronic problems with democracy /22 2. Symptoms of the pro-Western course slipping into crisis /25 3. Causes of the crisis /36

IV. Prospects for the future /48 3. 2. 1. Summary and in some areas the situation has begun to revert to the the to revert to begun has situation the some in areas and setin, policy. has have stagnation Reforms lost momentum, foreign but affected situation, have also internal the concern They mainly crisis. political and social multidimensional ing, of adeepen symptoms as mayinterpreted be processes which experiencing been has Georgia years for several Nevertheless, Alliance. North-Atlantic the and Tbilisi between co-operation closer enabling Georgia, in opened also was centre 2014), (September Newport aNATO in mit training NATO of the sum aftermath 2016. the in In forsas Georgians vi would abolish EU the that announced 2015cember Brussels DCFTA). De In Comprehensive Area, Trade and Deep Free the Union (including European the with Agreement Association the June 2014, West in the by signing, with integration closer tion either. ahuge Moreover, made country leap towards the Rose Revolu of legacy the the with not did break sion, Georgia dimen internal the in (2012–2013) and, not did materialise, Dream Georgian the coalition his and Ivanishvili Bidzina power to oligarch of the rise following the priorities policy of Georgia’s change about alikely concerns foreign The initial immense. was Georgia project in European the thering involvement fur Union),in pean financial and whose political Euro the United States and of West for the attention the (both (2004–2013), rule a centre was Saakashvili’s Georgia Mikheil During irreversible. seemed recently until which reforms, – effective pro-Western – and of radical path the entering and decided go to out Russia opposing Georgia openly on alimb, Rose Revolution the 2003, in After Georgians. the Western as pro- firmly so been post-Soviet No has other society structures. the Euro-Atlantic with integrate and influence shedto Russian is aim its that declared clearly and consistently itstates, has post-Soviet Baltic the exceptional country. an is Like Georgia ------

5 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 6 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 5. 4. gia has now started drifting and slipping into malaise. This This slipping into malaise. and drifting now started has gia Geor navigating westwards, firmly been had that A country negativeuted there. tendencies the to contrib has policy its Georgia, in broad support win to Russia pro-Western it not is While possible for sentiments. undermine to effort an in Georgia with relations the power soft in using front), been mostimportant has and the as Ukraine (with area post-Soviet the at reintegrating aimed aggressivepolicy an ing pursu been indeed Moscow has lesser importance. and ondary Russia’s a factor,waning. of been a sec have albeit also actions been has Partnership theEastern of significance the and tures struc Euro-Atlantic the in of membership prospects denied have been Georgia like countries that fact by evidenced the as West’s the and diminishing, been involvement has area the in defensive been has policy post-Soviet This entire area. the and country particular West’s the this towards especially policy and Georgia, around environment geopolitical worsening the of However, living. to related Georgia’s also standards is crisis stagnating the and economic include difficulties crisis the lying under played of have factors style governance also arole. Other opaque and group’s disparity ruling the internal country; the for vision aclear lacks Dream Georgian the that fact the cerns con found itself has Georgia which in crisis The of cause the ambiguous. been have also regard this government in the from coming nence. The signals promi have gaining been Russia, towards for aturn calling and date to pursuing been has Georgia that line policy eign for forces, the West, contesting pro-Russian openly the while with disenchantment and Euro-scepticism breeding been has malaise social and political This have stagnating. been living people’s of because mainly apathetic, and standards frustrated become increasingly has society while crisis, aserious in itself found has system political nepotism).tion and The Georgian corrup levels, crime rising (including status pre-revolution ------and further problems in its immediate neighbourhood. neighbourhood. immediate problems its in further and EU’s of the policy afailure mean it Finally, mense. would also im was 2003 involvementafter Georgia in financial and cal West EU), of the the (including whose afailure politi mean would also that stagnant, become or reversed permanently or Moldova. Should Tbilisi’s pro-Western Ukraine like course of countries aspirations pro-European the would harm a turn beyond. Such and itself grave consequences forcountry the would entail Georgia project in European A collapse of the area. Caucasus South the in interest own its Moscow pursue to for easier been it present situation has the in Russia, wards to aturn mean foreign policy. may not necessarily that While pro-Western the in vector of Tbilisi’s acrisis triggering and instability political and social increasing dimension, internal the in far so achieved has country what the reversing risks - - -

7 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 8 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 in the second half of the 18 of the second half the in consumption), Beginning not is true. for external mainly parently (ap Georgia in promoted been public in discourse has which ries, for centu anti-Russian been However, has Georgia notion that the progressiveness. with West, associated is the to which contrast in epitome integrity,an of and backwardness, territorial and eignty sover its to country’s on the way obstacle athreat Europe, to main the as imperialism its with seesRussia narrative Georgian dominant The times. Soviet and Tsarist the to back dating associations torical (Orthodoxy),sia do not deny, they which positive his many the and Rus to proximity religious and cultural own despiteEurope, their of antithesis an as seeRussia Georgians opposition –the Russia to in built been has and anti-Russian organically been has sentiment heritage. Georgia’s pro-European acommon, Christian it shared which belonged with Europe in Georgia terms, civilizational and cultural Russia),into Soviet in deeply the held conviction that, and incorporated was Georgia of which aresult as aggression Bolshevik 1918–1921 the years (until the in Republic existed which Georgian independentDemocratic of the tradition the but also interests, of national not acalculation only was course Underlyinghood. this state conceptions and principle of political its afundamental and of cornerstone independentGeorgia’s the been ning foreign policy begin very pro-Westernthe from This independence. has course regain USSR and country’s the to quit the aspiration with linked were closely and era Soviet of end the the towards discourse litical po NATO.Georgian in and Pro-Westernsurfaced concepts first Union European join to the objective was strategic its that declared It had circumstances. external and internal and governments ing a pro-Westernpursuing chang foreign policy, of the irrespective been has country 1991, the in independence regained Since Georgia I. the 19 the throughout then and orbit influence, the of Russian within came the h the Geor th century, the dominant sentiment in Georgia was favourable was Georgia in sentiment dominant century, the gi is a between R a between tor cal context ical th century, when Georgian territory first first territory century, when Georgian u ssi a and the W the a and e s t: ------1 Azerbaijan, and nia by Arme claimed also of territories anumber included territory language.Its official the as Georgian with nomenklatura, party republic governed aseparate by alocal was Georgia dimension, thepolitical In system. theSoviet people its from and benefited world. Georgia society’s Soviet and external isolation the from alternative not of absence aconsequence of merely apolitical the the USSR). was with identification This strong their from stems Stalin havetowards apositive attitude mostGeorgians that fact (nb., sentiments the were no anti-Russian there of which sult a re Union, Soviet as the with a role), identify to came then and played (a repression state also Soviet which process in the with terms to came gradually followed, that Georgians years the In hopes for the to end put independence. ment an of Georgia Soviet establish the and (1921), elites Russia of political emigration the Republic by Bolshevik Georgian The conquest Democratic of the athreat. posed Bolsheviks the Whites and the tive, both which to alterna European emergence of the the to linked They were also revolution. Bolshevik of the wake the in and Tsars of the fall the after theperiod in surfaced first tendencies Anti-Russian way). asimilar in viewed Russia Armenians (theism Christian despot and of “Asian” antithesis the backwardness and gress, pro accessible only for of the Europe, civilizational centre stitute world. asub as seen Thus, Islamic was Russia the to alternative only the and empire aEuropean as time perceived at that Russia The Georgians themselves. liberate to Georgians helped the had Russia from which influence, Turkish Persian was and centuries, for experienced had Georgians the which alternative, the juncture historical empire. At Romanov that of the life cultural nomic and eco political, the in participated elites Georgian Caucasus) and the Russian capital theof was time, that at Tiflis called (Tbilisi, province aloyal was Georgia Russians: the and Russia towards

Kartli. The fact that there are large Armenian and Azeri minorities in Geor in minorities Azeri and Armenian large are there that The fact Kartli. Kvemo- Azeri-populated or the Javakheti Armenian-populated the Including 1 as well as Abkhazia, whose elites aspired whose aspired elites Abkhazia, as well as ------

9 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 10 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 is characteristic, though, that the aversion to Russia, which was aversion was which the Russia, to that though, characteristic, is It 19 at people least bywhich 1989 soldiers, Soviet in were killed. on 9April Tbilisi in demonstration independence of an crushing brutal the become since symbolic: event has by an which fuelled also was sentiments of The separatists). anti-Russian rise the ing (to Moscow contributed which Ossetia by actively support South and loss of the Abkhazia as well as Westernof alternative, the emergence the USSR and of the anti-Russian), breakup was the movement independence (whosegence Georgian of orientation the emer the process of perestroika, the region: developments the in new the with came Russia towards of attitudes change A radical (1978). SSR Georgian the in language official the as Russian imposing at attempts negative of overshadowed1930s the impact and the repression 1920s memories and of of the the the helped erode to republics. This other many in than were higher which of living, standards their and 1960s, noticeable the in particularly became economic appreciated stability, the which also The Georgians population. of advancement the majority for the civilizational brought era Soviet the aristocracy, the and intelligentsia of the repression meant for members many Bolsheviks by the Georgia of capture non-Russians,the to too. While tion opportunities offered promo that policy resources ahuman and army Soviet the in service Union Soviet concerned universal the with gration contributed Georgia’s to inte that factors successful important to the status of a Soviet Union member in its own right. of own its Uniona in Soviet member status to the 3 2

cerning territorial divisions were favourable to the Georgian SSR). Georgian the to favourable were divisions territorial cerning con decisions Soviet that demonstrates Azerbaijan) in of villages a handful for (except minorities Georgian no have Azerbaijan and Armenia while gia Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Republic. Soviet Autonomous Abkhazian the as SSR Georgian the into incorporated SSR). it was However, 1931 in ian Abkhaz (the republic Soviet aseparate was Abkhazia 1921–1931 years the In ficial language alongside the local languages. the local alongside language ficial of an was Russian republics other the In SSR. Armenian the and SSR gian Geor the in languages official only the were respectively) script, Armenian and Georgian the in (written languages local period, Soviet the Throughout 3

2 Other Other ------sia. When the Georgian Dream won the parliamentary elections elections parliamentary won the Dream Georgian When the sia. Rus challenged openly and structures Euro-Atlantic the in ship it member would seek that declared reforms, internal of radical pro-Western uncompromisingly an aprogram it policy: launched pursuing started Georgia Saakashvili, ofment Mikheil (UNM) Move 2001). United in National of the rule Under Georgian the in arrived advisers United States (US military the with co-operation 4 (1997) GUAM organisation anti-Russian the of members one founding of the 2002).also in was Georgia started pipeline oil Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan of the construction the and 1999, in built was pipeline (the oil Baku–Supsa Russia bypassing while territory Georgian via resources energy Caspian transport to pipelines viewto building a with took steps first Georgia that ofCommonwealth Independent States). term his during It was of the amember Georgia make to he had account (for instance Russia’s take to into strove interests West, he also the although with to developleader contacts Georgian first 1985–1990, the was the years in of foreign affairs minister Soviet the as served had (1992–2003), Shevardnadze who Eduard anti-Russian. certainly gia’s However, countries. by independence other was policy his Geor of recognition to obtain efforts making while tionalism), na Georgian promoting (keeping power, separatism, countering situation (1991–1992)dia internal on the focused he was because president Gamsakhur Georgian Zviad first of the case the in pro-Western discuss to leanings It would difficult be marginal. have scene, been always they political Georgian ongroups the political and politicians have pro-Russian been always there choices. While political and civilizational societal their in sistent have con been very twenty-five last Georgians the Over years, culture. and language people or Russian Russian the to into acommon aversion not did transform Georgia, in widespread

withdrew in 2005 (in 1999–2005 the organisation was called GUUAM). called was organisation the 1999–2005 (in 2005 in withdrew but it organisation, the joined Uzbekistan 1999 In GUAM. acronym the hence Moldova, and Azerbaijan Ukraine, Georgia, included members founding 1997. Its in established was Development Economic and for Democracy The Organisation 4 and started military military started and ------11 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 12 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 favour of joining the EU and NATO and EU favour the of joining in are (most Georgians consensus on it social because based is gia Geor in The pro-Western backing enjoys course popular massive 2014). Union (June European the with Agreement Association the signed later, Georgia a year that president elected Dream Georgian the Giorgider Margvelashvili, it 2012 pro-Westernin continued un along the it was and course, 5 tions with Russia could bring some positive change in this regard. regard. this some in positive bring could Russia change with tions rela improving hopes that the and recent years in of living ards stand stagnating West the to the related with disenchantment growing the to due is mainly This nostalgia. aSoviet and Russia towards attitudes friendly cherish to public morewider is likely the elites, among the attitude adominant clearly is this while that

ter%20poll_2015_Public%20presentation_ENG_version%20FINAL_0.pdf EU; https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Win the with of integration favour in were 58% NATO and with of integration favour in were of respondents 69% that 2015 showed November in institution same the by conducted A poll files/2015/NDI-Poll-April2015.pdf NATO; http://www.civil.ge/files/ of joining favour in were 65% and EU the of joining favour in were of Georgians 68% (NDI) Institute Democratic nal Natio US 2015 the by April in conducted polls opinion public to According 5 ). However, it noted be should - - - - - ­-

tionaries were replaced by new hires, and salaries were increased were increased salaries and were replaced by new hires, tionaries func of thousands disbanded, policewas force lice (the traffic implementedthepo were in reforms pillar, first of the part As of whom many lived for Westernand had in states longer periods. mission, of their whoof justness deeply reformers the in believed motivated, tight-knitleadership, ideologically by astrongly team image. These Saakashvili’s were put under national into practice, improve to Georgia’s measures and inter economic liberalisation, army), the (including institutions of state reconstruction lars: pil on three programme political his decided base to Saakashvili economic Thus, situation. disastrous the and state of the function state), dys the but authoritarian not rather an was vardnadze She under (Georgia of problem not democracy lack was The main time. at leadership that Georgian the facing of challenges nature of because the modernisation, as much about democratisation were not 2003–2012 so years implementedThe the reforms in the and West. Georgia between co-operation effective reforms) and of patron Saakashvili’s the became that country the United States, West the the from (especially backing expert and states), Baltic by huge financial the in buttressed pened political, post-Soviet (except entire area for the in what hap experiment and mostcourageous,momentous reform the effective dertook un Georgia time radically. Atpower, that changed situation the to came team levels. When Saakashvili’s crime enormous and Ossetia) andSouth Abkhazia (in conflicts unresolved separatist with struggling or control territory,was its and functions basic its fulfil to whose unable by corruption, ridden government was state failed a was Georgia fiction. political be to seemed rations Rose Revolution the Georgia’sUntil 2003, in pro-Western decla 1. II. Saakashvili’s reforms T cour he s he s ucce e ss e s of Geor gi a’ s we s tward ------13 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 14 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 States United the from support several-fold), substantial (with army the 9 8 7 6 were closer to the American model than to European solutions. European to than model American the to were closer economic which reforms, liberal were the important Equally Azerbaijan. from gas buying supplies it as started gas dependence its end on to Russian managed Georgia Finally, Samtskhe-Javakheti). (Ajaria, Shevardnadze controlled under were loosely only which control regions of those regained also grids). government The energy central and ways, public buildings rail roads, commenced (including infrastructure crumbling the Renovation of allowances. disability and pensions out salaries, pay regularly to started improvedvices state considerably the and of public ser quality the administration, the to restored was ality country imprisoned or either forced to leaders were leavethe mafia ential (the mostinflu crime foughtlentingly organised and corruption eral labour code, labour eral adoptiondo business), of assets, alib of state privatisation mass to required of permits licences number and the lation (slashing collection),tax more effective deregu and lower taxes stantially (sub system tax the ones repairing included The mostimportant

the very fact of belonging to such a fraternities was criminalised. was afraternities such to of belonging fact very the which under code, criminal the into rules anti-mafia of unique adoption the to thanks possible were circles criminal to links with people and of criminals imprisonments Massive Russia. and Italy) Spain, (France, Europe to Mostly an advocate of an ultra-liberal economic model. economic ultra-liberal of an advocate an Bendukidze, Kakha minister economy the by developed were The reforms code was amended in 2013. in amended was code the criticism, international Facing employee. the and employer the tween be agreed freely be could contracts) of labour terms and type the cluding (in questions remaining the ayear). days All (24 leave rights and hours) (41 time working age (16 years), weekly minimum workers’ regulated It only world. the in liberal most of one the was 2006 in adopted code The labour USA/NATO. the and army Georgian the between co-operation closer build to efforts and modernisation of the element important an was sion) of NATO’s- part mis (as Afghanistan in US) and the with co-operation tary of mili part (as Iraq in operations in soldiers of Georgian The participation 6 ) and in other enforcement bodies. The enforcement bodies. government unre other in ) and 7 ), the civil service was staffed with people,new with function staffed was service ), civil the 9 and measures to attract foreign investments foreign investments to attract measures and ------8

10 10% GDP in 2005. around in of economicgrowth recording investments, of foreign influx the and liberalisation economy internal of the aresult boomed as eyes people. of the the The in authority its regained and again ing function positive. Thestarted state certainly was line bottom its democracy”, problems“Chronic with p. for 22, more information) on chapter seethe methods; authoritarian (including elements of by negative anumber marred was rule Saakashvili’s While cities). other and Mtskheta Tbilisi, Batumi, in projects –investment extravagant –often or the renovation of buildings the Western media, promotionin the ofimage (including Georgia country’s the contributed boosting to also government projects world over However, the media. were all ofstatements anumber and leader whose actions charismatic of president, a its figure the to owed new its recognisability Georgia country. part, In the to tourists West investors and bring the from and support attract to objective was –the strategy element of Saakashvili’s’ important an also was image of Georgia apositive international Creating of model liberalisation”. “Georgian the as known be to came they were courageous so 2003 that mented after economicpropelled development. The imple economic reforms of most states), for nationals abolition of visas which Georgia, in foreign buy to operators for land investors,(facilitations allowing nomic reformer, and in 2010 the country ranked 11 ranked nomic country 2010 reformer, in the and world’s of the title eco prestigious leading the Georgia awarded World the 2008 and 2006 Bank In organisations. international of proved considerably, rankings the in by evidenced surge its as in Wall Heritage in by FoundationJournal the the Street and ranking economic position freedom the from positon to 113 advanced in 34 (up 2005). in also report Business” positioning from 112 Georgia

geostat.ge www. of figures 110%; around reached growth economic accumulated 2007) (2003- period same the In 2007. in 12.4% and 9.35 2006, in 2005, in 9.6% 2004, in 5.9% 2003, in 11.1% by followed 5.5%, by GDP Georgia’s increased 2002 In 10 Georgia’s international image Georgia’s im international th in the “Do the in - - - - - 15 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 16 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 with the signature of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA. the and Agreement Association of the signature the with June 2014 in materialised that ambition Union, an European the with co-operation its able institutionalise to was Tbilisi 2009, in initiated programme Partnership Eastern the to Europe). Thanks United away States towards the from shifted had foreign policy vector of war, the Georgia’s Russian-Georgian (although the since apriority remained aspirations West Euro-Atlantic the and with continued rapprochement dimension, to power. external the In movement rose Dream Georgian the after not did orities change pri policy Georgia’s fears, internal foreign and initial Despite the camps. political were deeply both in rooted sentiments ern pro-West proof that a strong and for test Georgia passed cessfully asuc nonetheless was ballot the result, notdid election contest the team Saakashvili’s and democratically of power occurred transfer the that fact contribute the to did about possible its criticism cerns positionthe and of con firm West the While elections. democratic Georgia’s in one through took first that place the post-Soviet history 2012–2013 years was the in occurred ofThe government that change 2. investment of foreign The influx period. same the in ranking International’s Transparency position to in 52 position from 124 climbed and 2012, 13 12 11 of the improvementof image. Georgia’s the in international

course T tor/ST.INT.ARVL 2013; http://data.worldbank.org/indica in 5.3 million and 2010 in million 2.03 2007, in million 1.05 to again rise to thousand 560 to increased had number this 2005 by 2002, in Georgia visited tourists international thousand 298 http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=140&lang=eng 2009; in million 658 US$ and 2008 in billion 1.56 US$ –to decreased of FDI volume the followed, that years the In 2007. in billion 2.014 US$ and 2006 in billion 1.19 US$ by followed FDI, in million 449 US$ received Georgia 2005 In by the EU national parliaments was completed in December 2015. December in completed was parliaments national EU the by process Theratification 2014. September in already force into entered Both ream continues Dream he pro- Georgian the 11 and international tourists international and 12 was a tangible measure measure atangible was W estern estern 13 - - - - -

16 15 14 2015). (August Tbilisi near wKrtsanisi in Centre Training Georgia NATO– of the launch the and NATO Afghanistan the in operation in involvement troops of Georgian further included -operation co- of this manifestations The tangible Alliance. join to the was Tbilisi’s objective that NATO, declared repeatedly with has and continued co-operate to government has Dream The Georgian 2016. place in take mostlikely will which regime, visa EU the from nationals exempt to Georgian underway also Negotiations are Georgian political scene have been emphasising that the country country the that scene have emphasising been political Georgian Prosecutor’s the the Office, of orhealthcare). Ministry, Observers (e.g. rule Interi the West Saakashvili’s the from during criticism drew which implemented being areas in also are reforms cases, some continuing. In are they have momentum, lost some of their Rose Revolution. of reforms legacy the the not the rejected While has coalition Dream Georgian the dimension, internal the in also government, previous the towards Despite negative its attitude the EU presidency), which ended the Russian-Georgian war. presidency), EU the Russian-Georgian ended the which holding then (or by France, ment, negotiated fact in by Brussels agree the compliance monitoring with and Georgia in operating still is 2008, in war the after established (EUMM), was which gia

press-release_IP-15-6368_en.htm http://europa.eu/rapid/ Union; European the by set conditions the met had countries both as Ukraine and of Georgia nationals for the regime visa the abolishing recommended Commission European 2015 the December 18 On http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28528 unit; notaseparate it is centre; training army of aGeorgian part is The Centre facts_and_figures http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/ regions); of both territory the to access representatives its denied has and mission the with co-operating not is side Russian (the territories Georgian adjacent the and Abkhazia and Ossetia South in zones conflict patrols mission the Zugdidi, and Gori Mtskheta, in bases three its from Operating 18.3 million. abudget of EUR had mission the year same the In 2015 figures. to according Republic, Czech the 17 from and each, Sweden and Poland from 21 Romania, from persons 30 including tries, coun EU the from officials delegated 205 of staff a permanent has The EUMM 14 Finally, the European Union Monitoring Mission in Geor Union in Mission Monitoring European the Finally, 15 16 - - - -

17 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 18 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 visits by Western leaders, including US president by Western leaders, George including in Bush visits frequent through expressed was Support for Georgia afterwards. deployment EUMM the of and the Russia with war the ending in involvement political (2014), EU the the of as Brussels well with as Agreement Association of (2009), the signature the Partnership Policy Neighbourhood Eastern (2005) European the and into the (2008); of inclusion Bucharest Georgia in the summit Alliance the at NATO prospects (and Ukraine) membership Georgia granting the by included West taken measures political The most significant ofcourse action. aspecific into taking leadership Georgian the rectly, persuading di intervened 2012, in elections of the or ahead 2007 in crushed moments, opposition e.g. demonstrations the during crucial at and not it uncritical was although actions, its and leadership Georgian the supported unequivocally and West, directly which agenda of the political on the high stood For Georgia years many period. Georgia’s as that regarded during patron West the be should that such knowledge, was scale its and expert as as well support economic-financial and of political consisted West. the Western assistance and Georgia between collaboration effective place the without have taken they could Neither Poland. including Western states individual as EU, well the as and ington involvement Wash and from support West, of especially the and would not have possible Georgia been the in without The reforms 3. havemates become much less frequent. of of police in lawlessness reports or and freedom mistreatment now enjoy more non-governmental organisations rule, ishvili’s of Ivan period initial improved the in has media offreedom the Moreover, past. of the now is amatter circle, anarrow in made decisions arbitrary and on improvisation based governance, state ‘revolutionary’ the of model become and more democratic also has W estern involvementestern - - - - 17 Russia. confront to reluctance its and first despite who to doubtsas fire its opened war, Russian-Georgian the after for support its Georgia withdraw the did that 2008). notWest (August Russia Itwith significant is war the during of Lithuania ValdasAdamkus and ko of Ukraine Yushchen of Poland,Viktor Kaczyński or presidents Lech 2005, sations (in areas such as infrastructure, regional development, regional infrastructure, as such (in areas sations development agencies,non-governmental organi and embassies by Western year havement implemented projects been after year of develop Hundreds functionaries. state and service for civil the etc.) training and NATO and to EU adaptation forms, standards, implementation the of re (which support concerned mainly pert the ex form of in assistance from benefited Western also Georgia US$ 4.5 billion. worth for ofa package post-war Georgia assistance EU, (USA, EBRD, World others) adopted and participants Bank the which in of Brussels, aconference held donorsin 2008 was (2005–2010). Corporation Challenge October In Millennium the etc.),via placed persons, US provided US$ 395 million the while dis development, private for sector, support the ture internally infrastruc energy (budget and communication support, gramme pro ENPI the under million 452 Union provided EUR European 2009).2007–2013 in years the the In transferred was amounts est (the high Development Assistance Official in billion US$ 5.663 received 2004–2013 Georgia the years in to World figures, Bank According important. equally was support financial and Expert

starting the war and of acting on a Russian provocation. on a Russian of acting and war the starting of him accusing been have Georgia in opponents political Saakashvili’s port.pdf tions; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_iiffmgc_re provoca numerous staged had separatists Ossetian the and side Russian the when weeks, and days of previous developments the from isolation in sidered con be not could events those that concluded also commission However, the 2008. August of 7-8 night the during army Georgian the by of Tskhinvali shelling the with started operations armed the that found Tagliavini Heidi diplomat Swiss the by led and EU the by appointed commission The special 17

------19 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 20 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 ment in Iraq. ment Iraq. in US force). the after applieslargest The same Georgia’s to involve mission’s the contingent currently second is Georgian the far; so troops thousand at 11 contribution stands (theeration Georgian co-op military element of Western-Georgian important an been also has NATO Afghanistan the in mission in troops of Georgian officers. of soldiers and The involvement training equipment and army, provided Georgian the in reforms funded United States has the (SSOP; programmes, placeof 2005). since in these part As Program Operations Stability and Sustainment the and 2002 in (GTEP) initiated Programme Equip and Train Georgia cluded: the United States).the The USA’sin respect this in flagship projects from mainly coming case this from support benefited (in Western has Georgia which in area important aparticularly is Security etc.). support, agriculture port, sup groups, entrepreneurship social disadvantaged to assistance Soviet area (the Ukrainians have invited Georgian politicians and and politicians have Georgian invited (the Ukrainians area Soviet post- the in seen is how indeed is Georgia this proveswhich that Georgia’s from cues its experiences, taking been has of Ukraine leadership The current Partnership. Eastern of creation the the Policy Neighbourhood and of post-Soviet European into the states inclusion led the to which impulse provided an Theydova. also (2008), pro-Western Mol the Armenia in in and reforms elections riggedpresidential against protests (2013) the Maidan Ukraine, in Theytions. paved way Revolution Orange for the the (2004)the and transforma effective undergo could legacy Soviet with struggling countries that demonstrated post-Soviet and societies, and states for models other and provided inspiration aftermath, its place in took processes that the revolutions post-Soviet and the in area, colour alone. The Rose Revolution, so-called series of of a first the Georgia to is limited not reforms Georgian the of The significance 4. area T he impact of Georgia’s reforms on post-Soviet the ------19 18 lost control territories, of these Georgia and Ossetia South and of independence Abkhazia the recognised Moscow 2008, in then Russia with aprice: at paid it war found itself for Georgia which Russia, with confrontation open a huge choice Their an meant risk. took pro-WesternGeorgians the afirmly By course, adopting implementationedge the of help in reforms). and knowl their early 2015,governor in share to oblast Odessa of the the became who himself, Saakashvili Mikheil including officials, of inspiration for the Ukrainians in this regard also. also. regard this in Ukrainians forof the inspiration Georgia’s Donbas. in success have asource and been war example Russian-instigated the and loss despite of course the Crimea ern decidedon to stay pro-Westits has which post-Maidan Ukraine, by rejected first apractice West Russia, the and navigate between to for tried years Moldova Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Ukraine, including states The of other 2009. Independent States in wealth Common the from by withdrawal its symbolised course, a radical such take to states Baltic the than other country former Soviet first the was imports). Georgia Georgian embargo an imposed sia Rus (in 2006 market Russian previously lost accesshaving the to

ian police). ian Ukrain of the chief as serving (currently Dekanoidze Khatia Academy Police Georgian of the chief former or the Ukraine) in post equivalent an holds now (who Zguladze Eka minister interior deputy former the of Health), Ministry Ukrainian the (who heads Kvitashvili Sandro for health minister former the include also Ukraine in working currently officials Georgian Former from the territories in question. in territories the from Georgians thousand of several exodus an in resulted This Ossetia. South in enclaves of Georgian control took troops Ossetia and Kodori seized forces ian Abkhaz the operations, war of the aftermath the In villages. gian-populated Geor of many control loose very only had separatists the Ossetia, in and zia Abkha in Gorge Kodori the controlled government Georgian the 2008, Before 18 19 ------­

21 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 22 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 tion, such as corruption and nepotism. nepotism. and corruption as such tion, Rose Revolu prior it the to condition which was in the to verting mayre be Georgia that suggesting symptoms and organisations, of pro-Russian activity West, the increased with disenchantment growing foreign reforms, policy, in changes concern stagnating pro-Western ones the The approach. mostimportant within sis cri point adeepening to that life political and country’sthe social however.ferent, in Tendenciesobserved be phenomena can and dif be to seems Georgia in situation The stable. current remained Georgia’sproblems not did pro-Western undermine which course, those Nevertheless, Dream. of Georgian rule the present during but also period, Saakashvili of the typical practices, undemocratic Russia). with Theproblems concerned most serious relations tense (the circumstances opposition into account), external as well as the take to leadership’s the refusal and and reforms, arrogance top-down rapid the pace 1990s, of radical the in disintegration (the legacy, Soviet situation mestic state’s consequences of the do difficult the from mainly stemming tensions, problems and internal experienced also Georgia beginning the from because however, picture, of the part only successes are and The reforms III. ternal stability (mainly criminals, but in some cases also political political also but some in cases criminals, (mainly stability ternal country’s the to in athreat as people regarded against measures illegal sometimes and employed which service) prison drastic the as well ofas leadership Vano the under Merabishvili, istry Min Interior the (especially of enforcement bodies power by the government abuse included employedpractices Georgian by the The undemocratic democratisation. than more important as seen was country the modernising and repairing leadership, which in of Georgian adopted priorities by the hierarchy due the to was This team. Saakashvili’s against were astaple allegation methods government’s the of concerning use authoritarian Accusations 1. C

hronic problems democracy with T he cr isis ------in prisons). in publication box (asof the did footage ballot at torture the showing –apledgepolice state considerably contributedsuccess its to that to fight to powerSaakashvili’s promising came Dream Georgian Policy. Neighbourhood pean Euro on context of Georgia’s the the in reports EU riodic progress West, pe by the the for in example criticised principles were also democratic incompatible with methods and tendencies itarian ade factoprocesses and opaque decision making government control media, strong of the with ahybrid as regime described was Georgia Index, mocracy Unit Intelligence US De Economist reforms). the in For instance, positiveof (as effects were the rankings sition international in Georgia’sin reflected po above were also The described issues amajor problem. also prosecution was the with relations in pliant were not independentand courts the (asset confiscation). that private property fact The not respecting government) de facto and the to links with neurs (e.g. form circles of elite for privileges the in ruption in entrepre state’sthe cortolerating finance to projects, entrepreneurs ing 2007), in televisions forc Kavkasia and Imedi of down the closing (e.g. freedom temporary media of the curbing accused through 21 20 foremergency weeks. two of of state introduction the and 2007 autumn in demonstration suppression opposition forceful of an by the marred record was Saakashvili’s used. frequently was where torture prisons and the overcrowded detentionfacilities problems affected mostly The surveillance. massive regime),opponents of as the well as resorted to methods that were doubtful from the point of of view the from were doubtful that methods to resorted

presidential election in January 2008, which he won by a majority of 53%. won he amajority by which 2008, January in election presidential early an called and down stepped Saakashvili legitimacy, democratic regain and crisis political 2007 of the consequences negative the undo to order In parliamentary elections in 2012, has been dubbed the “Georgian Abu Ghraib”. Abu “Georgian the dubbed been has 2012, in elections parliamentary the before shortly published was which footage, the to related The scandal 21 Nonetheless, Ivanishvili’s team has also repeatedly repeatedly also has team Nonetheless, Ivanishvili’s single-party political system. The author system. political single-party 20 The Saakashvili team have also been been have also team The Saakashvili monopolies, and and monopolies, ------23 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 24 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 recordings of Saakashvili’s conversations with UNM politicians. UNM conversations with of Saakashvili’s recordings opposition’stion into the out acoup, plot on alleged based carry to investiga an opened also has of Georgia Service Security National government. The the to links with by youth organisations trated (October 2015). orches demonstrations been had acts The latter anti-opposition during Georgia cities of offices several in UNM against of vandalism acts 2011) and in tortured being inmates ing government previous (new show videos the discrediting terials publication of the ma opposition, including the targeting actions of anumber government took or the inspired time 2015. At that Autumn in momentum gained UNM the The witch-hunt against were sued). 100 former officials around total in among others; Gigisi Ugulava mayor the of and Tbili Akhalaia Bacho defence minister bishvili, Vano Mera chief sentences (meted Ministry Interior out the to zenship). long imprisonment ended with Some lawsuits of these citi Ukrainian assumed he had after citizenship of Georgian him government stripped 2015 Georgian December the in him; against issued was warrant arrest an after who emigrate to had himself, Saakashvili (including former leadership of the members ranking high- were filed against motivated lawsuits politically numerous tendency, of this policy. manifestation mostvisible the As ternal Dream’s force of Georgian in driving the witch-hunts became media and exploited institutions state that revanchism political Movement United hold National the and it aresult, account. to As to as oust programme political muchimplement so to aspecific not objective been had main its and together coalition Dream gian West. by the Geor The force for the binding this criticised been Movement United National the –has –like and state, a democratic 22 Statements by the then prime minister Irakli Garibashvili, who Garibashvili, Irakli minister prime then byStatements the

published by one of Ukraine’s internet portals. internet of one by Ukraine’s published were Therecordings television’s buildings. the seize to it try should ment, govern the resist to politicians two the encouraged reportedly Saakashvili Gvaramia, Nika UNM with associated television Rustavi-2 the chief the and Bokeria Giga leadership of UNM member the with conversations telephone In 22 ------

litically-motivated lawsuit (August–November 2015). (August–November lawsuit litically-motivated of apo government tookaftermath over the controlthe which in UNM, with associated station Rustavi-2 television the cerned representatives. However, con commented most widely case the opposition included debates also which political popular casting broad stopped government, Imedi the from pressure 2015, facing August In situation. asimilar in network found itself Maestro the 2014 in and television, took Imedi over control the ernment of the gov the to links with entrepreneurs 2012, In media. ence of the independ the to limit measures taken also has Dream Georgian tension. added the to further politics, sation” no be should Georgian place in for there which organi Movement United a“criminal National the was that said 23 years the in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi with treaties of alliance ture Russia’s to only protests tine Moscow’s provocations (such as signa rou with responded has and initiative, on own its issues Ossetian South and Abkhazia the not raise to trying been has Tbilisi takes. not it provoke and sia actions Moscow, hostile of the irrespective Rus with relations government for normalise to apriority the is It Saakashvili. by that pursued from different been has policy its concerned, are Russia with relations as policy,eign far as although, pro-Western continued the has for coalition Dream The Georgian 2.1. 2.

crisis Symptoms of pro- the repealed the decision concerning the chief and restored Gvaramia to his post. his to Gvaramia restored and chief the concerning decision the repealed court the later days several and criticism international attracted The ruling dismissed. be to Gvaramia Nika chief television the ordered time same at the and transaction the nullified request, his granted Thecourt prices. at reduced them sell to him forced had Saakashvili president that claiming returned, be to time that sold at assets television’s the and nullified be to transaction sale 2006 the demanding lawsuit a filed Dream, Georgian the to links with neur entrepre an Khalvashi, Kibar owner television’s former 2015 the August In

Foreign policy Dream adjustment under Georgian W estern course slipping course estern into 23 ------25 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 26 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is concerned. is conflict Russian-Ukrainian the as far as circumspect very been also government has Georgian border posts at the administrative border of border Ossetia). South administrative at the posts border of moving frequent the and of abatis 2012–2015 construction or the 26 25 24 sold by was aprivate company but (the stake port Poti sea the in A daughter company of Russia’s a49% stake acquired has Rosneft of asource domesticconcern. been also has transport and energy as sensitive areas such in Russia with co-operation The increasing cow as it served to make Georgia dependent once on Russia more. Georgia make to itcow as served benefited Mos mainly relations ofrestoration Russian-Georgian the pointed out that has and Dream, by Georgian capitulation to it amounted that claiming dialogue, the Movement criticised has The United National nationals. for Georgian regime visa the ise liberal to promised has and Georgia, from on imports embargo its lifted Moscow have has resumed, Georgia and Russia between flights direct for instance ready produced results, some tangible al has The Grigorydialogue Karasin). foreign deputy minister its by Russia and Abashidze Zurab minister byrepresented prime its envoys, is (where 2012 December commenced in Georgia special level at of the have involved been dialogue they 2008, political in broken diplomaticin relations have their not resumed still Russia

EUMM then mediates their release). their mediates then EUMM the (and Tskhinvali in prison up in end who then zone, border the in villages of Georgian inhabitants detain often groups armed of Ossetian members and soldiers Russian border. the of sides both on who fields have farmers pecially - es and population, local for the problem amajor is border of the The moving 9 months of the year. of the 9 months first 47.1% by the in decreased Federation Russian the to exports Georgian 2015, in Russia in recession of the aftermath 2012). the in In 11 position from (up in general exports Georgian of recipient largest fifth the was and exports wine forentire for Georgia’s 50% destination the was of 2013 Russia as a result, As status. pre-2006 the to reverted situation the lifted, was on imports ban Russian the EU). When the to mainly selling (it started exports its orientate re- to managed successfully Georgia products, on Georgian embargo an posed im Russia After mechanism. of this example an as serve may exports Wine involved in Ukraine as officials or advisers to the Ukrainian government. government. Ukrainian the to advisers or officials as Ukraine involved in now are team Saakashvili of the members many that is reasons of the One 25 While Georgia and and Georgia While 24 The The 26 - - - -

29 28 27 Georgia’ssify foreign policy. Abashidze’s Zurab the to statement diver and continent” “Eurasian the in partners with operation co- intensify to necessary it 2015 was September that in argued 2015) December since minister (prime Giorgi Kvirikashvili ister Economic foreign Union,min and Eurasian the joining Georgia option out of he would the not rule that for said instance ishvili Ivan minister, Georgia’s prime foreign policy. still he was While of re-orientation of aradical possibility the concerning signals ry contradicto have sending been team ruling of the Some members side. Russian the with co-operate and act to Georgia in groups sian it it pro-Rus for made easier the liberties, itwhile broadened civil effect: produced asimilar has which less widespread, veillance sur mass less and been active have also services secret Georgian The propaganda. for itbecause opened new possibilities Russian pro-Western the not did serve option time same at the which sia, Rus to gesture afriendly place was 2008, since in been had which broadcasting, television on Russian restrictions of the The lifting government could havetransaction the blocked the gas, Russian buying to start for Georgia possibility 2015 the concerning Russia’s with tions October since have Gazprom underway been to Tbilisi and Yerevan, which has been closed since 1992. since closed been Yerevan, has and which Tbilisi to Abkhazia via Russia from line railway of the possible unblocking

http://publicdialogues.info/en/Paata%20Zakareishvili%3A%20The%20

would be beneficial. be would supplies of diversification and Azerbaijan, from on gas dependent heavily too was Georgia that said Ivanishvili plies). interviews However, of one his in sup of gas form the (in settlements of barter possibility the and Armenia to gas of Russian transit of the terms negotiating were parties two the that said Thegovernment Miller. Alexei CEO Gazprom the and Kaladze Kakha minister energy the between meetings the by surprised was opinion Public Russia%20to%20Normalize%20Its%20Relations%20with%20Georgia New%20Government%20of%20Georgia%20is%20a%20Chance%20for%20 rosneft-to-invest-georgia Analyses OSW Georgia, in invest to Rosneft Matusiak, Marek see: For information, more 28 and Tbilisi has been sending unclear signals concerning the the concerning signals unclear sending been has Tbilisi and ; http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-01-14/ 27 ), negotia ), 29 ------27 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 28 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 regard to the future direction of Tbilisi’s foreign policy. direction future the to regard with signal aworrying perceived as was government coalition the from West, exit its the and in by partners trusted was and policy Euro-Atlantic of the charge in fact in was sania). Thus, party the (Ala defence minister and Petriashvili) (Alexi integration ropean for Eu Panjikidze), (Maia minister of foreign minister posts the held (November Democrats coalition 2014).Free of the Members government the quit to Alasania of Irakli party Democrats Free provokedthe leadership Dream Georgian the when significant point of of view the From foreign policy, and symptomatic it was led to some embarrassment, also Russia with done Union consultation been in had European the with Agreement Association theGeorgia’s that of effect signature 32 31 30 (ostensibly of Saakashvili’s the anti-Russian) antithesis an as seen to be wishes however, party more Ivanishvili’s important, that neighbour. It is northern the with relations proper to build sary it neces is that belief i.e. the realism, political is Russia towards Dream’s policy Georgian conciliatory underlying It that appears anti-Western views. and pro-Russian about open their quite who are of Industrialists) (e.g.government coalition Topadze, Party leader of Gogi the the

http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=618198 php?id=27751 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. com/2014/11/13/is-georgia-slipping-away/; e.g. See http://www.the-american-interest. coalition. the leaving were crats Demo Free the that announced return his upon and agreement, the signed nonetheless Theminister system. defence tank and air of an purchase for the side French the with adeal conclude to authorisation Alasania’s withdrew government the that fact the concerns stance, Dream’s pro-Western gian Geor on the doubt casts which scandal, the in element additional An states. of European tour Alasania’s voiced during Staff, General the and of Defence Ministry the at and officers officials high-ranking some against corruption of accusations and detentions by preceded was coalition the from exit Their VioYp37hDcs ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=108b0483c8232c18eb533a928fb748cc#. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43672&tx_ 31 30 and there are politicians in the the in politicians are there and 32 - - - - - ishvili is “Moscow’s is ishvili man”. public, Ivan wider it even that is believed the commonly ence. In influ Russian to more be susceptible Heapproach. may therefore Western the than world him to of perception closer the and are mentality Russian the and elite, Russian the in contacts many has work, business and politics how Russian well very he knows time same At the there. contacts no extensive has it and not understand West, about the does little knows have Ivanishvili pointed out that 33 It inert, is characteristics. such lacks policy Dream’sgian internal leader. Geor led by acharismatic accomplish to was mission and it ahistorical had convinced that motivated, well-integrated team by astrongly implemented was energetically reforms lutionary of revo program at His publicised widely home abroad. was and country, the which of vision how grandiose) transform to and sial andbold defined controver aclearly if (even had often team vili’s on only, reality. Saakash impact dimension have little and had Moreover, have legislative implemented been reforms the in many but stagnating. been implementation reforms, its has ernisation of mod programme not the abandoned has camp The Ivanishvili 2.2. 2000s. and 1990s the in Russia in afortune made camp’s governing the leader, who Ivanishvili, of informal Bidzina to Russia links and past Russian the views, political ambiguous and unclear into doubt the context people have calling been this Moscow?). on from orders or maybe even acting pro-Russian, In Dream’s (is intentions it covertly aboutsuspicions Georgian real to given rise has and Russia, with relations in naiveté political government of opposition, the have whose accused ern members pro-West by the criticised been has policy programme). This cal party’s politi his built has Ivanishvili on which paradigm the is (it dimension policy, external the in and internal in both regime

See e.g. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23761199.2013.11417276

Stagnating reforms Stagnating 33 His opponents His ------29 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 30 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 organisations. mafia the to relation in including regimes, prison softer ons, and pris from were released inmates, of all quarters people, i.e. three 17 thousand which under 2013 of the amnesty aresult as mainly increased, Rose Revolution. have ofalso common Levels crime the of wake the in corruption fight of the against part as positions who of lost those their re-hiring before and 2012 hired tionaries lower ranks of power, of ranks lower the in nepotism of and i.e. corruption cases rule: Saakashvili’s during improvement achieved which in was areas in regressing country of the symptoms as some interpreted of be could which tendencies, worrying certain experiencing been has Georgia heading. be should country the which in direction the to as clarity lacks and unenthusiastic 36 35 34 opposition. the ploys against political various These havein groups used been criminals. and of inmates formations former prison paramilitary of former members enforcement functionaries, ofings retired group informal and Generation) Free the as such organisations, (mostly youth of creation organisations the support to begun also

Issues_ENG_VF_0.pdf ps://www.ndi.org/files/NDI%20Georgia_April%202015%20Poll_Public%20 htt fallen; it had 6% –that and increased had levels crime that saying ents of respond 48% with results similar 2015 delivered April in NDI by conducted A poll org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf. improved); http://www.iri. it had believed 11% only while deteriorated had situation crime the that 2015 said of February poll Institute Republican tional Interna the in 62% of respondents as many As vinovat-v-roste-prestupnosti. groups again; http://ru.rfi.fr/kavkaz/20140920-v-gruzii-sporyat-o-tom-kto- mafia lead to able were and at large criminals with contacts re-established (v bosses mafia imprisoned the of which aresult As files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf http://www.iri.org/sites/default/ improved; it had said 15% while teriorated, de had situation the corruption, to regard with that said of respondents 35% Institute Republican International 2015 the by February in conducted a poll In www.apsny.ge/analytics/1444883122.php http:// Abkhazia; in war the and Georgia in war civil the involved in was and 1990s early the in operated which formation, Mkhedrioni the For instance, 36 35 According to some sources, the government has government has some to the According sources, 34 or mass dismissals of officials and func and of officials dismissals or mass in Russian) Russian) in vzakone ory ------great authority in Georgia, in authority great who II, enjoys Ilia Patriarch relations. close maintains Church Georgian the which with Church, Orthodox Russian the to imity prox civilizational and areligious emphasising and cherishing identity, Georgian to athreat as values West liberal its the and see clergy the in pro-Western many but practice in aspirations Georgia’s supports officially Church The Orthodox initiatives. political and tonomy social own come its to freedom up and with enjoys much nowmore au also Saakashvili, under politics from Russia). in kept away The Putin Church, (as does Vladimir ally government’s considersit the be to and issues on views many its shares Church, the to links close maintains atheist, an as himself The latter, despite Church. describing of perception ishvili’s the and Ivan Saakashvili’s between difference the concerns causes 39 38 37 of society. sections most conservative theamong and public especially over opinion, politics influence even more gained Georgia, sway in held strong always has which Church, Orthodox Georgian Dream’s the Georgian rule During 2.3. public opinion, which often adversely affects Georgia’s adversely public often affects opinion,which attitude ure in Georgia). in ure mostauthoritative fig the as regarded commonly is himself holdpublic and public life, much sway over (the the patriarch in active very are communities and organisations Orthodox ous numer and Church Representatives of the Russia. ation with

minister nonetheless considered to be a good idea. agood be to considered nonetheless minister prime the which proposal, the withdrawn since has patriarch The influence. rising Church’s Orthodox of the example 2015) asymptomatic is (December individuals convicted pardon to authority the Church Orthodox Georgian the grant would that bill for alegal II Ilia patriarch by put forward The proposal See e.g.: http://www.interfax-religion.ru/gry/?act=news&div=60240 most trusted institutions included the army, the media and the police. the and media army, the the included other institutions the trusted most sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf; http://www.iri.org/ activities; Church’s of the views positive held Institute Republican International the by 2015 poll aFebruary in 91% of respondents as many As Georgia. in institution trusted most the is Church The Orthodox

Rising conservative sentiments and growing tensions conservative growing Rising sentiments and 39 These groups thus have These amajor thus groups on influence 38 has repeatedly called for reconcili called repeatedly has 37 One of the underlying underlying of One the ------31 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 32 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 mostly in western Georgia (Ajaria, Guria, Samtskhe-Javakheti) Guria, (Ajaria, Georgia western in mostly communities, Orthodox-Muslim) in local (especially conflicts of religious commented widely cases led several to has trend This younger among the generation. especially minorities, sexual and religions other towards intolerance and sentiments of nationalist rise the with in parallel more influence more and gaining been have communities Orthodox conservative the and The Church sian propaganda. sian of Rus instrument an as seen be fact may in Church rights) the minority defence of the to sexual Western reducing to values when it comes (especially situations West. many the In towards 43 42 41 40 situation in Pankisi. in situation economic difficult the and East Middle developments the the in to as Georgia, in situation internal not muchthe so to related is origin). problem, of The mostly Chechen however, latter Syria, in fighting currently be to believed are nationals Georgian 200 to 50 young (between people jihad many join to have for the left Syria and haveexacerbated been conflicts local of which aresult as amajor Gorge) problem, also is Pankisi Chechen-populated the in ple (May 2013) peo of thousand tens brought which several together clergymen, led by Orthodox acounter-demonstration in part taking values al by of defenders tradition of LGBT activists demonstration a small of use violence incident concerned the against striking Another

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22565723

ticles/20133.html EU;http://humanrightshouse.org/Ar the with Agreement Association the of signature the to prior enact to required was Georgia which bill, ination anti-discrim contested of ahighly adoption the over debate heated of the occasion on the criticised much were values liberal European For instance, Islam in the former USSR and the phenomenon of the post-Soviet militants in in militants post-Soviet of the phenomenon the and USSR former the in Islam Homo Jihadicus: Lang, Józef Falkowski, Maciej see: For information, more construction of amosque). construction the over (a conflict Samtskhe-Javakheti in Adigeni or in of a minaret) tion construc the against protested people (where Ajaria in villages Chelo the in madrassa), of a construction the (over Kobuleti in conflicts the For example, 42 . The radicalisation of Muslim youths (especially (especially youths of Muslim . The radicalisation 40

43 Still, it is a fact that during UNM’s rule, the UNM’s the during rule, that it afact is Still, 41 ------. – – – 44 public own opinion have and conducted their es, demonstrations, pressconferenc and research have organised they media, the in active have very been organisations and parties The pro-Russian projects. tegration Kremlin’s in into the incorporated be should Georgia that argue even they some In cases normalised. be to Russia with relations and scrapped be to aspirations Euro-Atlantic West the want and the with for a break for post-Soviet They the call area. strategy tone of propaganda Russia’s the and priorities the reintegration identity, with line in Eurasian the under operate of them Many cludes: in community Thea new pro-Russian phenomenon Georgia. in is parties, political and old new organisations and both cluding in communities, of pro-Russian upThe stepped activity recently 2.4. escalating. from prevent them phenomena much more such decisively to order to in reacted state

– – – http://sputnik-georgia.ru/; http://www.geworld.ge default/files/homojihadicus.pdf Iraq, and Syria the media (e.g. Sputnik Georgia or Georgia and the World). the and (e.g. or Georgia media the Georgia Sputnik Rtskhiladze); baat of Gul Institute Eurasian the and Chkoidze of Archil Georgia Choice (e.g. of Eurasian non-governmental organisations the Kukava); of Kakha Georgia Free and lashvili, Nate of Shalva Party Labour the by David Tarkhan-Mouravi, led of Georgia of Patriots Alliance the of NinoBurjanadze, gia (e.g. Movement Democratic parties –United Geor the political Growing influence groupsof pro-Russian OSW Report OSW , September 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/ 2015, September , 44 ------33 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 34 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 the EU would have EU society. negativethe consequences for Georgian with association people country,that the telling around travelling 49 48 47 46 45 means they could make it into parliament. make could they means 16%, 12% and which between ranges parties pro-Russian for the support 4.7%). total mostrecent polls, In gaining ofots Georgia of Patri Alliance the (with similar was elections local 2014 the in of party her 10% result vote, of the the and garnered janadze NinoBur election, 2013 noticeable. the presidential barely In and marginal option was pro-Russian UNM’s the the rule during audible become an voicetheless Georgia’s in while life, political none has it sia).should notbe influence its overestimated, While from Rus funding the over (forinstance by conflicts ridden and divided internally fragmented, is community The pro-Russian polls. Russian sphere of influence. sphere Russian the for entering return in Ossetia South and control of Abkhazia regain could Georgia that view the promoting been They have also meets high-ranking Russian politicians. Russian high-ranking meets to Moscow travels and frequently leader its NinoBurjanadze as Movement exception, only The Democratic the is discreet. rather been has assistance, and media form of financial the sations, in

http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1915893.html#ixzz3Y8Itpoej lic%20Political_ENG_vf.pdf janadze’s party; https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_August_2015_Survey_pub for 3% Bur and Party Labour 4% for the of Patriots, Alliance for the support of 5% 2015 showed August in Institute Democratic National the by ducted con poll a sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf; http://www.iri.org/ each; get 5% could group Burjanadze’s Nino and Patriots of Alliance the while vote, 6% of the gain to expect could Party Labour the Institute Republican International the by 2015 poll aFebruary to According ers; http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28423 oth among Karasin, Grigory minister foreign deputy Russian the and shkin Nary Sergei speaker Duma Russian the with met 2015 Burjanadze July In priyazni-k-Rossii.html 40% were against; http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/articles/U-gruzin-net-ne as many as NATO, while with integration supported of 32% Georgians only that showed which apoll conducted has Institute Eurasian the For example, See e.g.:See http://sputnik-georgia.ru/politics/20151219/229528650.html 45 According to some sources, their representatives have been some to their According sources, 47 Russian support for these organi for support these Russian 48 49 The fact that amas that The fact 46 ------

a threat, believe that Russia has a negative influence on Georgia anegativeGeorgia on influence has Russia that believe a threat, be to consider Russia sive 80%) (around majority of Georgians 52 51 50 November respectively) 2015 and 24%, and – 28% 20% August of from respectively, respondents, polls later in and by 16% backed option and was Eurasian the 2014 August and April conducted polls in previous in Union against; 41% (with Eurasian the 31% entering of as were for respondents many Georgia as that showed 2015, which April in Institute Democracy US National the conducted opinion poll of by an results byoption the were shocked pro-Western public. of Supporters the general among the served mayob be sentiments slow ofticeable spread pro-Russian albeit active, ano have groups increasingly been pro-Russian the While account. on into views foreign policy their take and groups pro-Russian the forces with co-operate to political main 2016 force and the autumn place in due to take elections the after parliament to a fragmented may lead situation This roomfor manoeuvre. their ences expands prefer political sive have of no clear people majority Georgia in ents, compared to 30% in August 2015. 30% to August compared ents, in by 20% of respond shared was view this 2014 April in increasing: been also has integration European of pursuing instead Russian with relations normalised vector foreign policy and Euro-Atlantic it the more if rejected would gain people Georgia who that believe https://www.ndi.org/georgia-polls https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_August_2015%20survey_Public%20Issues_

http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28728 ballot; the boycotted had groups political Theremaining of 45%. a showing with in came slogans, anti-Western under who campaigned Inashvili, Irma candidate Alliance Patriots’ the while vote, of the 49% garnered relative) minister’s (the Khidasheli Tamar candidate Dream The Georgian liament. par in seat her from resign to had and for defence, minister appointed was Khidasheli Tina deputy Sagarejo the because held It was 2016. autumn in held be to elections parliamentary the in showings get good could groups pro-Russian that suggest may Georgia) (eastern of Sagarejo constituency date single-man the 2015 in October in place took that of by-elections The results ENG_VF.pdf 50 52 Moreover, adeci while 51 . The number of. The number ------35 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 36 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 3.1. tion is internally divided. In November 2014, the Free Democrats Democrats Free the November 2014, In divided. internally tion is coali Dream Georgian the that clear increasingly been also It has unaccountable. politically him makes he does not position hold that official any fact the and charismatic, as described be hardly can Ivanishvili time, same facto de are government Giorgi Kvirikashvili) head of current the and Garibashvili Irakli minister former prime the (including holding top posts politicians opaque and is Georgia process in decision-making the aresult, As reprimands. he often whom Margvelashvili, president including officials, state ranking of high- activities the supervises scenes. He also the behind from government the steering and keydecisions taking politics, gian the is he function, does not hold official any movement. Even he Dream though Georgian of sponsor the and er the found Ivanishvili, Bidzina the Georgia’soligarch is keyfigure class. public’s the in thepolitical a deep decline in confidence of country, for vision party’s lack the and ruling the Dream, gian by Geor created system opaque political the include Its elements crisis. political internal deepening a multidimensional, concerns of Georgia’s crisis of causes the ofOne pro-Western the course 3. conflict, Russian-Ukrainian the in Ukraine or side with 53 sia and support the government’s steps in this direction. government’s the support this in and steps sia Rus with of relations normalisation for the overwhelmingly also

C Issues_ENG_vf.pdf https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Georgia_August-2014-survey_Public- test; pro verbal than other of Ukraine support in action any take should ernment gov Georgian the that believed 46% only although of Crimea, annexation the condemned 66% fault), and Ukraine’s been it had said 15% (while crisis Crimea for the responsible was Russia that believed 62% of Georgians 2014, April In

auses of crisis the Internal political crisis political Internal éminence grise figureheads. At the At figureheads. 53 they are are they of Geor ------According to a poll conducted by NDI in October 2015, as many many 2015, as conducted October apoll to byAccording in NDI in public polls. opinion reflected scene is political of the The crisis conflicts. remotely, internal generating been has which party control to his trying still is Saakashvili post, his quit having citizenship). However, of Georgian stripped he was despite after leader party as resign to had led by acollectivebody (Saakashvili 2015been December since has and personnel, and programme its in Movement,United undergoing National a been crisis too, has The leaders, etc. programme, political a clear structures, gional re and central with developed party into afull-fledgedpolitical movement not has Dream Georgian the by Ivanishvili, trolled con individually and elections parliamentary 2012 run-up the to the in hoc ad Created crisis. in also is system party The Georgian position weak. is his own, of However,exception here. his camp no political he has as country’s the pro-Westernand only the is course, foreign policy principles democratic of president’sguardian asa act office and of independence the the preserve to who strives Margvelashvili, PresidentGiorgi views. political his never who articulated has vili applies Ivanish to also ideology; this political by particular any do not guided be to seem politicians individual and course future country’s of vision the no clear has group Moreover, ruling the Dream. of leadership Georgian the and speaker) parliament (the of David Usupashvili Party Republican the lition members, one coa of the with relations tense the in and Tkemaladze) Zurab Topadze and –Gogi of (e.g. Industrialists of leaders cians Party the anti-Western openly by some the politi statements in visible also concerned is is foreign policy as far as cohesion consensus and internal lacks coalition openly. the them that The fact criticised and leaders Dream Georgian the from himself distanced had situations president, other, who many on the the in and bashvili, Gari minister prime protégé, then his the and Ivanishvili hand, the one on between, surfaced aconflict and coalition, the quit ------37 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 38 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 from migrant workers abroad continue to play an important role workers continue abroad play to important migrant from an for accounts 10% which amere of GDP. agriculture, in Remittances working population of amajor 53% the problem,ment also with is of employ US$ 340). GEL 818, i.e. was around 2014 Thein structure 40%, respectively). 40%, elections), (down 15% and 10% only from UNM and supported tary parliamen 2012 in 2015 54.9% April (down and in 24% from Dream Georgian supported position: 16% only they of said respondents op by the showings into better not yet has translated popularity government’s vote. to the Meanwhile, dwindling would willing be for they which aparty 60% of not could as respondents name 55 54 young generation, the in 30% much as as as and unemployment 15% overall high of around problems persistent concern woes. The mostimportant social and have able been resolve to economicDream country’s the chronic nor Georgian UNM investments) neither foreign direct attract to economic managed and package aliberal introduced functionality, state’sthe itrestored effectively that fact owesthe reforms, to gia country’s (whichDespite 2003 the Geor economic success after 3.2. mentary elections. mentary 2016 of parlia the scene ahead political Georgian the disrupt and wholeaders and maygroups emerge for populist opportunities new opens situation This class. thepolitical ofsis in confidence of indicative people a deep cri doare not feel byrepresented them that fact the and parties political in of trust precedented decline showing.The un aslightimprovement haveto their reported in

https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Winter%20poll_2015_Public%20presenta they have no permanent jobs; https://www.ndi.org/georgia-polls permanent no have they that suggest may “unemployed”, be which to themselves 60%) consider than (more of respondents amajority respect: this in symptomatic also are polls Opinion case. the not often is which employed, be to considered automatically are land who own inhabitants rural all because higher is unemployment Real tion_ENG_version%20FINAL_0.pdf Economic apathy problems social and 54 The pro-Russian parties are the only ones only the are parties The pro-Russian 55 as well as low as wages well (the as average wage ------have even reported worse living conditions in recent months conditions in worsehave living even reported (or of living standards no improvementhave their in experienced majority the and Georgia’s line poverty live population below the 58 57 56 8 high): it ranked quite ranks (albeit it still World ranking Doing Business Bank’s the in downgraded been of 17.2% also onhas year year. Georgia adecline of 2015 US$ to 1.019 amounted FDI million, quarter third the slower: been in also has investments direct of foreign influx remittances). The 40% of for accounts total which around Russia, of case 39% the (by by 25% in working fell abroad Georgians from by 10% remittances and declined imports Meanwhile, quarters). three first the in 47.1% Azerbaijan to (by by 53.2% and Russia to by 44% down CIS the to exports by 23% 2015, with in dropped ports Ex months. nine first 22% the in much as by as States declining of Commonwealth Independent the with exchange trade with by 13% volume on year year, decreased the of and trade estimates preliminary 2.5%to by amere according GDPriorating. increased Moreover, dete 2015 in Georgia’s started economic performance economy, the in for accounting 12% of GDP. than 23.8%). than even more, by more shrunk has areas of population rural (and the of emigration aresult as 14.7%), (by mainly 2014, in 3.7to million 2002 in million 4.4 from Georgia’s shrunk census, has population latest the to according Georgians: the economic ficult situation of dif the to evenly.distributed Huge testify numbers emigration 2014). in US$ to 3676 (from However, US$ 1763 2006 in not is wealth even though Georgia’seven though

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/population/Accord org/files/NDI_August_2015%20survey_Public%20Issues_ENG_VF.pdf https://www.ndi. change); no been had there said 47% and improvement an (9% reported year preceding the in deteriorated had conditions living their that said 43% of respondents 2015, August in NDI the by conducted apoll In tion%20census%20Final.pdf ing%20to%20preliminary%20results%20of%20the%202014%20popula 58 th th in 2013,in 15 per capita per th in 2014 and 24 and 2014 in income has been slowly been income has rising th 56 in 2015. in More than 14% of 14% More than 57 ), ), - - - - - 39 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 40 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 quences of the economic collapse that followed economicquences of break-up the collapse that the of the conse the problems, i.e. primarily internal chronic and tations some differences). theliesin limi rootTheproblemsobjective of despite (the economic have policiesernment of similar been both gov previous or the by this made mistakes not the located be in However, of source Georgia’s main economic the problems should measures. populist via spending social increasing ofeconomic accused been development. also The government has down slowing investors, discouraged thus and entrepreneurs hit policy) have visa amore restrictive foreign to and operators sale on land ban the (e.g. 2003 code amendment, labour ed after the solutions adopt liberal thesomeof of rectification his outing that economic have point policy, been Ivanishvili’s hand, other on the of Critics businesses. family small than rather companies large benefited mainly liberalisation the that argued been also It has contractors). Turkish, by mostly foreign, construction rather but(and companies moreover, out by Georgian were not carried economic an point from of were pointless view that investments costly many for undertaking criticised employment. been He has increase to little did which loans, and assistance investments, economy the excessively dependent of on foreign making accused been has economic for policies. Saakashvili their criticised been have Dream Movement United Georgian National the and Both 2015,2015. 4.9% 3.1% to compared in was year on rateyear inflation the – inflation faster triggered turn in has dollar. The lari economy of depreciation the to the tied strongly is the that fact the and due imports more to expensive decreased has people’s as power nearly everyoneGeorgia in fecting purchasing af been 2015). in has problemdollar that amajor is internal This lost 28.3% the against currency (the Georgian partners trading Georgia’s by experienced main recession or economic difficulties the and markets by low caused issue, global prices in oil social economic and important an been also has Novembersince 2014, underway been has which lari, The Georgian of depreciation the ------2014 the proportions were almost the reverse, and in November in reverse, and the were almost proportions the 2014 60 59 unchanged appeared situation the 31% –that and direction, right going it the said was in 18% direction, wrong the in heading was Georgia that of said respondents 44% as many November by evidenced publicclearly 2015 In opinion polls. as as Georgia, in apathy have growing been social and pessimism economy, the negative and Alongsidepolitics in tendencies the nearly 60% 45%. to pro-Western from the decreased course it quitting would from than integration moreEuropean from would gain Georgia that 2015 percentage August of the people and 2014 whoApril believed between sentiments: Eurosceptic breeds of thus apositive change would improve. The absence things ahope that kindled has forms of re years initial success of the the as of living, standards their improvement Union, lead to an to of European the with especially West, the and with rapprochement the expect Georgians lations. re external to regard with Dream’s popularity), and gian waning (Geor domesticdimension society,the in both within perceptions influenced directly have economicNonetheless, difficulties the longer the in only nomic term. situation for households), apositiveGeorgia’s may yield on effect which eco prices electricity in increase or e.g. tions, the legislation, labour (the EU need of adopt to regula EU anumber the concluded with DCFTA the sometheby short-term adversely of effects affected of been economy also has Georgian the 2015). 2014, in from Starting problems of causes the one main (whichsion of Russia was the in reces or the markets global in situation adeteriorating crisis, cial finan beyondgovernment’s global factors the the as control, such external public as poverty, well market, as internal asmall USSR, https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_August_2015%20survey_Public%20Issues_ https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Winter%20poll_2015_Public%20presenta ENG_VF.pdf tion_ENG_version%20FINAL_0.pdf 59 60 (back in August August in (back ------41 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 42 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic prospects, together with the positive and the with together Georgia’s prospects, Euro-Atlantic about EU’s the declarations and everywhere visible assistance EU see, US clearly and could plus the pathy, Georgians the which sym Westernand support area. this in policy Russian assertive less and corridor), weak relatively the was as transport portant im an as seen then was (the Caucasus regard this in important also was Iraq and The Westernsia. involvement Afghanistan in Rus bypassing while Europe to resources energy Asian Central and Azeri it would possible be that export to and democratise, and transform post-Soviet the would quickly states hopes that the and 2003) in Georgia events in the with (which started countries these of pro-Western series the revolutions including ofber factors in Western involvementUnion. The anum to increased related was European the alesser to extent, United States and, the especially ofWest, of attention centre werethe at i.e. countries, the Asian post-Soviet other even some and Central the states, as well as Georgia term, first his during especially and Under Saakashvili, ago. years several it was as thesame and is it not significant also is found itself has Georgia which context in The international dynamics. favourable internal notshould un located be only in crisis The Georgian of causes the 3.3. were change not any seeing they said 28% and tion, direc wrong 9% going thought it the was in direction, right the in heading was country the 2013, of that believed 53% respondents 62 61 on the optimist side) optimist on the 25% side, with pessimist on the (55% pessimistic were equally tute Insti Republican 2015 International by the poll aFebruary in ents https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Public-Attitudes-Poll-121813-ENG.pdf http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_fi 63% were optimistic and only 12% were pessimistic. pessimistic. were 12% only and optimistic were 63% elections) parliamentary the after (immediately 2012 November In nal_0.pdf.

Disenchantment with the West the with Disenchantment 62 . 61 ). Respond ). ------63 respect hold could this in Georgians the that illusions any who dispelled by Westerntions politicians declara open to extent no small in owing –and sion. time Over aggres offace Russian the in militarily them States not did back United the that fact by the were disappointed The Georgians 2008. in war of onset the the with change to started situation This idealised. commonly Georgians West, for the the which enthusiasm massive into translated all reforms, noticeableSaakashvili’s of effects the United States, also the Pacific region. region. Pacific the United States, also the of case the in and, East Middle the in situation the crisis, gration mi the the problem,Greek crisis, financial the as problems such internal on own its focused it as became Georgia in lost interest West the noticeably time, same At the Russia. with into arivalry entering theandSoviet former Union in of sphere influence pean aEuro at building mainly not project aimed ageopolitical was Partnership Eastern the that West, realise to the to had clichés applied Russian and Soviet who unwittingly hopes, Georgians, initial to their Union. Contrary accession European and to the sas automatic not did mean abolition of vi Partnership Eastern the in participation out that felt when disappointed it turned gians The Geor Partnership. idea Eastern of the the not understand public but Europe, do at the large towards a step a success and as DCFTA the and Agreement Association of the signature sented the Plan).MAP, Action i.e. repre The Membership government has its not granted been still has country the Georgia, to open be cally hypotheti could membership to path the that declare did charest Bu in NATO 2008 (while the summit Ossetia South and Abkhazia control of regaining would not lead Georgia to Alliance the with co-operation that and foreseeablewould the future not in happen Union European NATO the and with integration that realise to

March 2014 that Georgia and Ukraine were not on path to NATO membership. to on path not were Ukraine and Georgia that 2014 March in who said Obama Barack President US the by statement the For example, 63 – Georgians also started started also –Georgians ------43 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 44 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 to Iraq and Afghanistan and Iraq to of troops sent thousand Russia, West, with the vexed relations its with integration of name the in Ossetia andSouth ficedAbkhazia sacri has Georgia ingratitude: political as regard of them many policy, its with people which and have becomegia disenchanted Geor in de-mythologised West gradually been the has a result, As values. liberal accept such themselves Georgians that the condition offered is on Georgia to assistance further when identity, a foundation getofas European irritated they and see heritage, Georgians which Christian their from themselves distanced actors European why mostofficial understand to gled people strug have also The Georgian Georgia. with relations their agenda on of the rights) high minority sexual (such as tive issues sensi have put socially organisations and Western states the that fact the but values, also traditional so-called and liberalism treme ex choice alleged between West an to Russia the and between choice reduces which the propaganda Russian ofuct successful is not a prod only conflict This values. Georgian conservative sus values ver European liberal values: dueof aconflict to riorating dete been also has The imageWest eyes of of the the Georgians in 65 64 ing integration with NATO 81% from 69%. to dropped with integration ing 10% from 21%), to increased percentage support of the those while 61% to 85% of from opponents number (while decreased the EU the with integration of people number 2015, supporting the August in 2013publicNovember between and polls: opinion reflected is the with West disenchantment growing The theDCFTA. from fits bene conceivable vaguely abolition and of future visa a promise it got that is – all prosperity or provinces, universal breakaway control of the of or a regaining promise prospects membership nor guarantees security neither obtained it has but return in

https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Public-Attitudes-Poll-121813-ENG.pdf; https:// www.ndi.org/files/NDI_August_2015%20survey_Public%20Issues_ENG_VF.pdf https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Public-Attitudes-Poll-121813-ENG.pdf; in June 2013). June in attack bomb asuicide in of 7troops death the was of life loss single largest (the Afghanistan in killed been have 31 and died, have soldiers 3 Georgian Iraq, In 64 and met the conditions set by the EU, conditions setby the met the and 65

------rebuilding Russian influence in the area, through a policy policy a of through fear, area, the in influence Russian rebuilding sia sia by Rus taken actions by the Those processeshave furthered been closed).Union’s remains market labour go to work to Russia to European (as for the Georgians possibility the hypothetical and instance) first the in products (agricultural of goods Russia’s aresult as Georgian to market its decision open to economic of improving situation the prospect the inces, concerns prov the in people, convinces many especially that argument an Finally, Russia. in living members or family Russians with tacts con extensive maintain still and nostalgia with era Soviet the ber older remem and generations which middle among the especially government).and have Suchopinions enjoyed apositive reception, (despite majority’s the state culture negative Russian of view the Russian people the as and Russians towards positive attitude erally gen by Georgians’ strengthened public in discourse, prominence more gain to started history) (Orthodoxy, Russia shared with ity proxim of acultural by mostGeorgians, The shared perception, it gained. more than paid for Georgia which adventurism political as Russia with confrontation the regard to have started Georgia in West, public of the somethe sections ofwith integration prospects absence of of view the In found itself. has Georgia which uation in no sit is way out the from there that asense and resignation tism, pragma understood aspecifically from as Russia with sympathies not deeply elite) much so from stems among held the ideological also (and alesser to extent of society some in sections observed Russia regime). towards of The attitudes change Saakashvili the levelled against of(alongside authoritarianism accusations the group’s contributed that to and 2012, in opinion polls in surge back Dream Georgian by intointroduceddiscourse public first idea was This popular. become increasingly has relations, proper have developed it instead which should with Russia, confronting by openly amistake made Georgia notion that the context, this In 3.4. vis-à-vis The Russian alternative Russian The Georgia and other post-Soviet states with a view to to aview post-Soviet other with and states Georgia ------45 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 46 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 Russian state institutions and were depicted in anegative were depicted in and way in institutions state Russian repressionfaced from nationals (Georgian Russia in Georgians towards attitude new positive the or neutral role, has so tant and altogether, playeda pledge haveimpor also an visas abolish to 2015, combined in with liberalisation visa the and connections air Dream’s of direct victory, re-opening Georgian election the after goods on Georgian embargo of the lifting the of Georgia, case the In events, etc.). conferences, cultural exchanges, student as such power measures and controlled by Moscow, financed andsoft usually media, mass gia anti-Turkish.gia of Geor case anti-Western, the in but predominantly been also have whose accompanied by propaganda been massive tone has of actions types threat). Both Islamic the against Asia Central to defend or promising control of Karabakh, of regaining sibility pos hypothetical aBaku offering Russia with countries, different benefits for (different political as well as market, labour Russian huge access the the to in and common market participation from West).the economic benefits potential includes message This also of “rotten” opposition in the to (presented liberalism tive values conserva shared and proximity to cultural message referring apositive sending been it has hand, other the On etc. Syria, in intervention military Union, the Eurasian join to the Azerbaijan on latter, pressure the fences around deployment wire of barbed the Ossetia, South and Abkhazia in bases velopment of military the de Kazakhstan, against threats the Donbas, in conflict of the instigation the of Crimea, annexation the as such gressive steps ag taken has Russia one hand, the On measures. among other 66

to Russia. turn should Georgia threat, Turkish of the view in that, aperception create to is Theaim etc. Batumi, in settling been Turks recently have that fact the and charities), and organisations religious (including organisations Turkish of Turkey, activities with ties the economic region’s stronger ever the to ing point Turkey by imminent, is of Ajaria annexation acreeping that view the promoting been have Georgia in groups pro-Russian and media The Russian 66 This propaganda relies on Russian and local local and on Russian relies propaganda This ------the West. the with disillusionment as well as reforms, stagnating problems and economic and political processes, Georgia’sto including internal of Georgia’s crisis the pro-Western secondary been It course. has of cause Russia’sthough main the as not should policy regarded be sentiments), pro-Russian (the al some rising ing positive results generat be to seems method this of Georgia, case the In again. of sphere influence Russian concerned enter the countries the if gained be to of benefits concrete expectations –kindle other the of helplessness sense the vis-à-vis intensify they one hand, messagepost-Sovietthe On the in area. understandable ofadd up courses action acoherentto two and these tradictory, con period). apparently While Saakashvili the during media the Russia, and on and Russia, - - - 47 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 48 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 social apathy and internal fragmentation. In the geopolitical geopolitical the In fragmentation. internal apathy and social malaise, into political deeper sliding a slow de-Europeanisation, more probably experience will worsens, Georgia crisis the As would wasted. be recent years in Georgia in built an”, has Russia positive that capital the and Maid form out, of possibly a“Georgian the break could in rest Un it of would mostprobably resistance. gia, meet asolid wall subjugate to took Russia) Geor more decisive measures towards ver, Moscow government if favourably (or disposed a Georgian ofsphere incomparablygreater. influence would nowbe Moreo into its Russia’s Georgia Ossetia, of South dragging and chances of independence Abkhazia the Moscow had not recognised and, Georgia’s contemporary been trauma, has greatest provinces The loss two of these Ossetia. South and ofquestion Abkhazia matter), of for Russia’s obstacle that the i.e. the making, own way of the Russia’s in (an standing policy obstacle greatest the aposition not remove in to be but it will Georgia, in something option. Moscow’s pro-Russian ofity the power soft may achieve popular into greater West translated not automatically the has with disenchantment the and limited, still is scale its afact, is Russia towards attitudes ofver, friendly rise the even though society. wider Moreo the and elite among the dominant still pro-Western because are sentiments Western mainly course, pro- its change suddenly should Georgia that It unlikely seems nature. inconspicuous and evolutionary due their to observers ternal ex to discernible not easily are they even if worrying, theless none are have years for apparent been that tendencies several yet, but the not is state’s alarming Its scale the vision. strategic in acrisis also is it there economic problems, but underpinning and or social perturbations political internal to It not is limited multidimensional. deep and is by Georgia experienced The crisis IV.

Pro sp ect for the future s for the ------most enthusiastically pro-Western nations, would be a painful pro-Western would apainful be nations, most enthusiastically one of the West’s still whothe are Georgians, auspices, the and leap under ahuge make to civilizational managed that a country Georgia, Union. Soviet collapse of Losing the the with began that processes of the areversal to would amount this dimension, cal geopoliti the In area. the in transition of ademocratic chances uncertain already the undo to Moldova, would threaten and and Ukraine especially situation, asimilar in countries other those would negatively course impact westward its decision abandon to country’s the potential, and size actual its than much larger area, post-Soviet the in of Georgia importance symbolic the to Owing out, for would not Georgians. simply ruled be representafailure cannot which Georgia, project in European Such adebacle of the concerned. are Georgia in ments develop future as far stage as decisive be to at seems this text reforms),con need continue to the the and this Georgians the made by effort the of significance the (including situation ternal Georgia’s Without relativizing in there. states the to prospects post-Soviet or the offer in membership Russia area with rivalry involvement enterits into ageopolitical Caucasus, South the in West up step to the not is prepared that fact the to mainly refers probably This not change. will exists Georgia which context in international the because materialise to more likely the all is Georgia’s which slowly in erode pro-Westernnario will stance The sce destabilisation. moregle violent or even lead internal to strug political the groups, make emergence of populist the to 2016), (autumn elections may lead which parliamentary coming theGeorgia’sahead in of scene deepen political conflicts the if factors). among other process may instability, accelerateing This engender (by Georgia in moregive roomfor Russia manoeuvre may situation this happen, to unlikely Moscow highly is wards to aturn sphere. While civilizational and political Russian the towards drifting and imploding gradually but reality rations in apro-Westernlevel decla at of Russia, the official and country become ano-man’s likely Europe it between will dimension land ------49 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 50 POINT OF VIEW 02/2016 defensive and afraid of the external world. external of the defensive afraid and neighbourhood, positively to ritories,own unable influence its ter by unstable surrounded isolated fortress formation into an defeat Union’s for It European Europe. up speed could the trans M ac i ej F ej alkow s k - - i