HAOL, Núm. 17 (Otoño, 2008), 97-111 ISSN 1696-2060
MUSLIM-STATE RELATIONS IN EAST AFRICA UNDER CONDITIONS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OR ONE- PARTY DICTATORSHIPS
Abdin Chande Adelphi University, United States. E-mail: [email protected]
Recibido: 1 Julio 2008 / Revisado: 31 Julio 2008 / Aceptado: 8 Septiembre 2008 / Publicación Online: 15 Octubre 2008
Abstract: This paper examines how Muslims in increasingly did). Muslims expressed communal East Africa have been alternately peripheralized, and regional frustrations at post-colonial politics coopted and even on one occasion favored in the that have favored up-country Africans, first the politics of military or one-party dictatorships. In Kikuyu (under Kenyatta) and later Kalenjin response to the regional or ethnically-based (under Moi) ethnic groups. The policies of these politics of the post-colonial period, Muslim two rulers promoted increasing social groups have devised strategies to promote their inequalities in the country. communities’ goals or interests either within or outside officially sanctioned organizational The second section will investigate the “Nubi” circles. These strategies have ranged from rule of Idi Amin which unleashed a reign of seeking accomodation with governing parties, terror in Uganda, partly in response to the positioning themselves as pressure groups perceived threat by the Ugandan exiles (Obote’s articulating the interests and grievances of their Langi and Acholi ex-soldiers) in Tanzania, with religious constituencies to, on rare occasions, the tacit approval of the Nyerere regime. This resorting to outright armed opposition against was a unique period in Uganda’s history in the government. which Islam was favored for the first time and in Keywords: Colonialism, education, ethnicity, a country where Muslims were a minority Islam, Muslim organizations, politics. (between 12 and 16 percent). Amin realized that ______he could not maintain his political grip on the country by falling back on the narrow support INTRODUCTION basis of his small ethnic group, the Kakwa, made up of both Muslims and Christians. He he role of religion in post-colonial East also could not rely entirely on the “Nubi” factor, African societies has been one of the a non-ethnic category, and slightly broader Tcontentious issues inherited from the embracing anyone who is a Muslim from the colonial past, especially in the light of concerns northwestern part of Uganda who spoke the over political stability, one-party and military language of Kinubi and shared in the Nubi dictatorships, human rights, democracy and culture. He needed a much broader political socio-economic justice. This paper focuses on legitimacy than that offered by the narrow-based some aspects of the relations between religion Kakwa and Nubi identities; for this, he and one-party and military dictatorships in the increasingly turned to Islam, especially in the three respective countries. latter part of his rule (1971-79), to court Arab/Islamic financial backers for his cash- The first section of this paper will examine the strapped regime. It should be remembered that growing Muslim critique of authoritarian rule in Amin had alienated his earlier Western Kenya, especially of Moi’s one-party rule with supporters (Britain in particular) and had rid the its record of corruption and widespread human country of its Asian financial/commercial elite. rights abuses. The Moi regime alienated Muslims who were marginalized by his politics The fall of the Idi Amin regime and the of privileging both ethnicity (as Kenyatta too establishment of the Obote II rule (plagued by had done) and religion (Christianity as Moi massive guerrilla activities in southern and
© Historia Actual Online 2008 97 Muslim-State Relations Abdin Chande western part of the country) and later the including most in up-country areas, joined the triumphant seizure of power by Museveni’s dominant African political parties such as NRM (National Resistance Movement) had their KANU and KADU in the struggle for political initial negative repercussions on the local freedom. Muslim community. One consequence was that some Muslims (although their number was Muslim efforts in the post-colonial period small) took up arms in opposition to the focused both on promoting a stricter form of Museveni regime. Islam, in opposition to the popular local version within the community, and on achieving The third section focuses on how Islam and educational modernization for their youth to Muslims fared during the period of Ujamaa or prepare them for the competitive job market. A one-party socialism in Tanzania. This was the disproportionate number of Christian mission era when Nyerere’s Ujamaa regime attempted to schools having been established in the interior of coopt all groups (Muslim ones included) to its the country, coupled with the fact that economic socialist agenda and intervened actively to shape development during the colonial period hinged institutions of civil society within its socialist on the prime farming lands (the so-called “white national narrative. While Tanzania’s political highlands” of upland Kenya where the capital, culture, as embodied in the Ujamaa ideology in Nairobi, was established) which African the era of socialism and one-party politics -mid- Christians inherited after independence, has 1960s to mid-1980s- aimed at changing meant that the Muslim community exists in the conditions that promoted inequality in the shadow of the dominant Christian population1. country, nonetheless, even there regional This fact explains to some extent why Muslims disparities and economic and political not just in Kenya but in many other countries of advantages that have disproportionately favored sub-Saharan Africa tend to be the least culturally products of Christian mission education (the Westernized (partly a function of exposure to basis for elite formation) became contentious Western, including Christian mission, type issues among some Muslim groups. schools)2.
1. SHIFT IN POWER FROM COASTAL TO The failure of coastal Muslims to introduce their HINTERLAND KENYA faith into the interior until the period from the second half of the 19th century onwards meant East African Muslims were once wielders of that Islam (like Christianity) was a newcomer in power on the Indian Ocean coast, many the region, but (unlike Christian missions) centuries before the era of the European lacked the backing of a major sponsoring power. Scramble for African territories. It was, Furthermore, unlike the case in Tanganyika, however, the process of European colonization, there was no development of major caravan moving from the coast to the interior, that routes from the coast to the interior to facilitate shifted the balance of power in favour of the the spread of Islam, certainly no significant hinterland ethnic groups. It was among the Swahili middlemen to play the role of followers of African ancestral/traditional intermediaries for the colonial administration in religions that the European Christian the interior as coastal Swahili did for the missionaries, with the introduction of Christian Germans3, and finally no major Sufi Mission schools, had the most success in brotherhoods such as the Qadiriyya to entrench evangelizing the local populations. Education in Islam and to popularize or indigenize it4. Worse, these schools (far more numerous than with economic development and the locus of government ones) became the basis for elite political power being centered in the interior of recruitment both in the colonial and post- the country, even the management of the coastal colonial periods. By the 1960s, the decade when economy, and especially that of Mombasa, came many African colonies obtained their under the direction of non-Muslims. In fact, by independence, the Muslims of Kenya found the end of the 1960s the relatively more themselves at a disadvantage as most high educated up-country Africans who had flocked positions in government fell to non-Muslims to the coast to take up employment there made educated in up-country Christian mission up about half, if not more, of Mombasa’s schools. Fearing their unfair treatment by the population5. dominant ethnic groups, some coastal Muslims even launched the Mwambao movement to agitate for autonomy, though other Muslims,
98 © Historia Actual Online 2008 Abdin Chande Muslim-State Relations
2. ISLAM, POLITICS AND LAW IN MOI’S such organizations through which they hoped to ONE-PARTY RULE exercise social control.
It has been difficult to separate religion and While the creation of a corporate identity politics, especially in newly independent states (through the establishment of SUPKEM in 1973 such as Kenya, where the State seeks to in the case of Kenya) supposedly will assist to monopolize legitimate authority and to exercize channel social influence, lobby for legalization it without tolerating any competitors or of Islamic law, promote Muslim educational challengers from any quarters. The political facilities and so on, nevertheless, leadership in East Africa as well as other parts institutionalization (i.e. bureaucratization) brings of Africa has discouraged criticism or any open its own problems7. While it provides an discussion of public policy on the part of opportunity for political leaders to control the religious figures or organizations, even as it has Muslim leadership, it also fosters the growth of sought to coopt them to the State’s political oppositional groups that will challenge the agendas, especially during the period of the one- central Muslim leadership for not representing party/military dictatorship. As far as these their interests or their radical activist organizations were concerned, however, who orientation8. Some Muslim groups have, in fact, else was going to speak for their disadvantaged viewed SUPKEM as an instrument to manage communities in countries where there were the State’s domination of the Muslim growing social inequalities, falling standards of community. This means that monolithic control living, and increasing arbitrariness of the State - is not possible owing to the fact that (as the which has in some cases exarcebated conditions example below will indicate) religious authority of ethnic tensions and inter-ethnic/communal in Islam is more diffused than it is in violence-, if not members of civil society? Christianity. Specific leaders such as Daniel Arap Moi (a Christian) and Idi Amin (a Muslim), in fact, In the early 1980s SUPKEM was placed in a made a big deal about their religions and were difficult situation during the Succession often seen in church or mosque, even as they (Inheritance) law crisis by being strongly flouted the teachings of their respective religions criticized by other more outspoken in their inhumane dealings and mistreatment of Muslims/groups for not being able to take a firm their fellow countrymen. For both any criticism stand on behalf of the Muslim community. The or hard headed evaluation of their policies was larger context within which to understand this interpreted as a sign of disloyalty. controversy was the intense Muslim pressure during the colonial period that had successfully The attempted bureaucratization of Muslim resulted in the establishment of Muslim communities in East Africa through the religious (Kadhi) courts, and in entrenching formation of national associations such as them in the 1963 constitution of Kenya. It SUPKEM (Supreme Council of Kenyan should be noted that during the late colonial Muslims), BAKWATA (Baraza Kuu La period the coastal strip of Kenya theoretically Waislamu wa Tanzania) and the Uganda belonged to the Sultan, but in practice was Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) is an attempt administered by the British. Therefore, despite on the part of politicians and Muslim leaders to the opposition of British missionaries, in order mobilize Muslims to protect and to advance to accommodate the needs of the different faith their interests in a single centralized body in the communities the colonial governments in East absence of institutions similar to those of the Africa took care to recognize Islamic and Catholics or the Anglicans6. Sunni Islam lacks a African customary laws. Ultimately, however, hierarchical organization such as that of the the British common law, which had been church through which the ruling elite might try influenced by Christianity, was made supreme to contact a leading religious figure who speaks over both. Later after independence African on behalf of the whole community. As a result, political leaders (themselves products of not just politicians, but Muslims themselves, Christian missionary schools) revisited these have sought to create such a centralized body to laws with the intention of harmonizing them into channel their energies and efforts in the uniform laws applicable to everyone. This was realization of their goals. For their part, the resisted by Muslims who objected to political leaders (with their own political Western/Christian values being imposed on agendas in mind) have supported the creation of them9. The Kenyan government’s intentions in 1982, when it drafted the Law of succession
© Historia Actual Online 2008 99 Muslim-State Relations Abdin Chande Act, was to unify all family laws among the initially) by the success of the Islamic revolution different communities into a single code in Iran12. This led Muslims to become more applicable to all people. Muslim opposition was assertive in this atmosphere of growing Muslim immediate as they saw the proposed law as political awareness. contravening their religious beliefs. They pointed out that they would not be bound to By January 1992 this growing Muslim self- obey it10. Nevertheless, through concerted confidence inspired young educated Muslims to efforts and much lobbying, Kenyan Muslims, establish the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK). whose Kadhi courts had been enshrined in and Shaykh Khalid Balala, a university of Madina protected by the constitution, managed to be graduate and self employed businessman, exempted from the proposed reforms. emerged as the leader of the movement. His main supporters were mainly the disenchanted 3. MUSLIM-STATE ENCOUNTERS IN Muslim youths of the coast province based in KENYA the old port city of Mombasa. Quite expectedly, IPK’s creation was greeted with hostility by the Turning to the arena of politics, Muslim-State Moi government that feared that the party might relations in Kenya were cordial under President erode Kanu (the ruling party’s) support in Kenyatta despite his Kikuyu-centric policies as Muslim areas. He was, therefore, quick to expressed in distribution of positions of power, condemn it as a fundamentalist group to be access to foreign aid, resettlement plans and avoided by Muslims13. But this failed to address other economic opportunities and privileges that the fact that the appearance of IPK represented a favored his kinsmen. President Moi made break with Moi’s divisive top-down “Nyayo” matters worse when he privileged both ethnicity politics, designed supposedly to promote the (Kalenjin) and religion (Christianity). Muslim politics of “peace, love and unity.” For coastal disaffection got worse when Moi’s increasingly Muslims Nyayo politics was associated with autocratic government continued to politically Muslim MPs who were thought to have enriched marginalize them. This became more apparent themselves in return for supporting the Moi during the period of worsening political and government14. IPK was successful in economic situation in the country. In a political capitalizing on the general feeling of alienation system plagued by patronage and ethnic on the part of coastal Muslims, though the lobbying, Muslim politicians (Moi loyalists) government moved quickly to deny it official accomplished little in terms of promoting the recognition (on the grounds that it was a interests of Muslim masses11. This situation led religiously based organization despite having a some Muslims, especially young preachers, to secular constitution). Tensions ran high in become active on behalf of their community by Mombasa and eventually erupted into a two-day relating their sermons to the issues of the day. A rampage on May 19 and 20 1992. This was noted feature of this era was the rising Muslim followed by the arrest of some Muslim political consciousness. preachers at a public rally. That action in turn ignited a two-day riot (cries of “Allahu Akbar” A number of factors contributed to this rise in could be heard in the city) in which four Muslim activism in the period between the mid- Muslims were reported shot dead by the Kenyan 1970s and the present. These include the growth police15. Further riots followed in Mombasa in of global Muslim networks that have expanded September 1992 and in Lamu in August and as well as promoted opportunities for higher September 1993. Islamic education in the Muslim World. This has led to the rise of a new group of ulama Clearly coastal Muslim alienation from the (religious scholars), locally or foreign trained, political process was reflected in a growing with a more pan-Islamic or global outlook to Muslim (and other civil groups’) critique of Islam. The process of Muslim activism was authoritarian corrupt rule of Moi’s one party- further facilitated by the growth of the number rule. Opponents of the regime blamed it for of Muslim graduates of secular education at the mismanaging the economy that stagnated by the country’s four local universities. Like other end of the 1980s, for endemic corruption and Kenyans, these Muslim youths have become a nepotism in favour of certain ethnic groups, for bit disillusioned by the performance of their promoting inter-ethnic tensions, as well as for post-colonial national State. One last factor contributing to the appalling human rights worth mentioning is the world-wide impact of record (with opponents being detained16, exiled, and heightened awareness created (at least tortured and in some cases even killed or found
100 © Historia Actual Online 2008 Abdin Chande Muslim-State Relations to have died in mysterious circumstances). Like countering the two largest ones. This policy not other post-colonial African nationalist only made IPK an unimportant player in the governments, the Moi government was seen as 1997 elections –it performed poorly even when predatory of its population, and it had failed to it aligned itself with opposition parties-, but the promote equality of opportunity for all ethnic, major parties themselves, plagued by ethnic religious and social groups. rivalries, were also unable to forge a united front to successfully challenge Moi’s KANU. It was Muslim grievances in Kenya focused on such only in 2002 that Moi was forced to step down issues as: low representation in public as President, as the constitution (reflected in the institutions and government ministries; lack of new rules of the political game as they had been even a single university on the coast -all the drawn up in a multi-party environment) did not public universities in post-independent Kenya allow him to run for another term of office. were established in the interior, including Moi Nevertheless, he managed to leave behind such University in Eldoret-; up-country African a horrendous legacy of an ethnically and Christians from certain ethnic groups being regionally divided nation that its outcome was given the lion’s share of jobs and profits from seen in the December 27, 2007 elections in tourism and hotels on the coast; and lack of Kenya, in which his successor, president Kibaki developmental projects (apart from those (a Kikuyu, like Kenyatta), is thought to have lost centered on tourism)17. Shaykh Balala’s the election to Odinga (a Luo, the main rival impassioned speeches to Muslim crowds in group to the Kikuyu). The outcome of this Mombasa made their case with reference to disputed election was the eruption of violence these concerns that those with political power and the expression of what some in the media had failed to address. have described as instances of “ethnic cleansing.” In any case, the coastal Muslims had Following the arrest of Sheikh Balala and a one- voted overwhelmingly for Odinga’s Orange day strike that paralyzed Mombasa, SUPKEM, Democratic Movement (ODM) -as did many the official Muslim national organization, led a Kenyans from different regions of the country-, Muslim delegation which called upon President which had promised to deal fairly with Muslims Moi to pledge support to the President and and to provide them with representation and a distance himself from IPK. Clearly the riots had voice in the government. pushed IPK to prominence and led like-minded Muslims to speak out on behalf of their One final note here on the Muslim situation in community in opposition to SUPKEM. Even Ali Kenya has to do with the tragic episode of the Mazrui, who was in Kenya at the time, was embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in denied permission to give a public lecture on the August 1997, as well as the 9/11 terrorist attacks situation, as he too (a native of Mombasa) in the U.S. in 2001, all of which took place agreed that the Muslim faced discrimination in during the Moi Presidency. These tragic events Kenya. To make matters worse, Moi had a hand in East Africa complicated matters for Muslims, in the formation of an association known as the particularly those of the coastal region of Kenya United Muslims of Africa (UMA headed by who complained of Muslim profiling and Masumbuko). This was a clear attempt to divide harassment by law enforcement agents. Even coastal Muslims along ethnic lines by prior to these events coastal Muslims had suggesting that UMA was a party for “Africans” complained for years about being treated as and IPK for “Arabs.” strangers, as there was a tendency in Kenya of assimilating/associating Muslim with Arab on As Kenya made its slow torturous journey of the coast. transition from one-party dictatorship to multi- party ethnicly-based factional politics, Moi was 4. RELIGIO-POLITICAL COMPETITION able to outmanouvre his opponents by IN UGANDA’S HISTORY subverting the electoral process to his advantage. He was aware, for instance, that the In Uganda, right from the earliest times relations two rival and most numerically significant between religions have been far more difficult, ethnic groups in the country, the Kikuyu and even belligerent, than they have been in Kenya Luo, would not vote as a bloc for each others’ and Tanzania. The long history of Islam on the candidates. Accordingly, his policy of divide East African coast, for instance, in Kenya partly and rule effectively built a coalition of support explains the willingness on the part of the among the smaller ethnic groups as a way of British colonial administration to accommodate
© Historia Actual Online 2008 101 Muslim-State Relations Abdin Chande Muslims by allowing a system of parallel courts, Kakungulu, was the uncle of Kabaka/King with Muslim Kadhi courts being recognized by Mutesa II. law. In contrast in Uganda a single court system was introduced after Christian forces triumphed 5. ISLAM AND POLITICS IN UGANDA: over Muslim ones in on-going religious OBOTE AND NAAM struggles18. Although Islam first reached Uganda in 1840, three and a half decades earlier than The pitfalls that have bedevilled the Ugandan Christianity, it lost out to Christianity, which Muslim community as reflected in its leadership arrived under the sponsorship of the British. As struggles partly mirror larger political struggles a result, the Christian missions came to wield far within the country and partly reveal factional more power and influence in Uganda than they competition in the absence of a hierarchically did in Kenya and Tanzania. organized church-like organization with clear lines of authority from the center to the local In the bitter rivalries and religious struggles that (mosque) level. As a result, local mosques mark Uganda’s political history in the southern throughout the country are not beholden to a part of the country known as Buganda (in which central or national “mosque” headquarters the Imperial British East Africa Company took based, say, in Kampala, but are autonomous the side of their religious compatriots), the units dependent on local Muslims for support to Anglican Protestants emerged victorious after stay financially afloat. Lack of this central first defeating Muslims in 1889-1890, then organization meant that it was easier therefore Catholics in 1892 and Muslims again in 1893. for politicians to take advantage of this situation The 1900 Uganda Agreement further validated to create or exercebate divisions within the this religio-political victory with allocation of Muslim community. lands to Christian missions (Muslims received none) and enshrining Christian religion as the The Obote regime did just that by supporting basis of secular law, with Muslims being left one section of the Muslim community (with alienated, despized and embittered19. many supporters outside Buganda) against another led by Prince Kakungulu who had ties to Clearly religion in Uganda was so highly the Buganda royal family. The government- politicized that economic status became a supported group came to be known as NAAM function of religious affiliation. Thus the (National Association for the Advancement of Protestants/Anglicans became the most Muslims), which was established in the mid- privileged, receiving the most land, getting a 1960s with the tacit involvement of a Muslim head start in education, and landing the best jobs minister in Obote’s cabinet who also happened in the colonial administration. If the Catholics20 to be his cousin, Alhaj Adoko Nekyon. Obote’s felt neglected -at least they had their schools and ruling party (UPC) supported NAAM in its health clinics and worked hard to expand them-, protracted struggles against the newly-formed the situation was even worse for Muslims who, Prince Kakungulu’s Uganda Muslim during the era of independence, found Community (UMC) to control mosques across themselves unable to influence legislation to the country. NAAM’s main mosque was located their advantage. The best they could do was to in Wandegeya, Kampala, while UMC’s central align themselves with the politically dominant mosque was based in Kibuli, a different part of Protestants against their Catholic rivals, hoping the city. The political significance of NAAM for some advantages. In fact, in 1956 (about six was its emergence as an official unit of the UPC years before the attainment of independence) government, which had cultivated it as a Muslim Catholics formed the Democratic Party (DP) to support base for the party. NAAM’s rivals or address their economic and political issues. opponents (supporters of UMC and Muslims had no party of their own and were predominantly Baganda, who detested Obote for actively courted by the Uganda People’s his mistreatment of Baganda, including exiling Congress (UPC, the party of Protestants outside their king) were subjected to detentions on Buganda), which was able to form a government certain occasions. In fact, Prince Badru at the time of independence with what would be Kakungulu was himself arrested in October a temporary alliance of convenience with the 1970 at the height of Obote’s one-party support of Kabaka Yekka (KY, the “King Only” dictatorship. party of Protestants in Buganda). The KY party also had its Muslim supporters within Buganda since one of the Muslim leaders, Prince Badru
102 © Historia Actual Online 2008 Abdin Chande Muslim-State Relations
6. ISLAM: FROM PERIPHERAL TO 7. THE “NUBI” FACTOR IN AMIN’S OFFICIAL RELIGION IN ONE-PARTY REGIME AND MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS The origin of the Ugandan Nubi goes back to a Idi Amin, head of the armed forces and initially small number of rural southern Sudanese an Obote ally, behaved like all other Muslim migrants who (in the second half of the officials during the rule of Obote by becoming a nineteenth century) first served in mercenary member of NAAM. Nevertheless, as a sign of roles which became the basis for their the growing rift between him and Obote that had subsequent recruitment in the colonial army. emerged by 1970, Amin began to patronize This initial migrant status (as scholars have Badru Kakungulu’s mosque in Kibuli, thus noted) has created a sense of openness and indicating his support for UMC. On one ethnic ambiguity24. The Nubi, however, cannot occasion, following prayers at this mosque, he be considered to be an ethnic group, despite also made the statement (clearly meant for speaking the language of Kinubi. The latter is a Obote) that he feared no one but God21. Clearly variant dialect/colloquial Sudanese trade Arabic Amin had not suddenly politicized religion, interspersed with words from the local Nilotic since the history of the country from colonial to languages. They are associated with garrison post-colonial periods was filled with instances towns in the south of the country where the of the intertwining of religion and politics22. language developed. They share certain cultural After all, was not the DP mainly for Catholics, traits, expressed in dress, food, way of life, Obote’s UPC for Protestants outside Buganda, distinct community features that set them apart and KY for Protestants in Buganda? Moreover, from others, and a connection with Islam. had Obote not himself mixed religion and politics by supporting NAAM, whose creation The criteria employed to determine their ethnic by Obote’s cousin had the purpose of cultivating status fail as there is no territory or homeland a Muslim support base for the party both inside associated with them. On the contrary, Nubi and especially outside Buganda23? communities exist as enclaves in different parts of the country, from West Nile in northwestern In 1971 the Obote government was overthrown Uganda to eastern and southern parts of the by Idi Amin, who became instrumental in country. Second, quite apart from their military mediating between the two Muslim factions by connection which goes back to colonial times, creating a single national Muslim association, their strong association with Islam is what known as the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council provides them with a strong religious (UMSC), to replace the two factionally-based consciousness and an identity rooted in this organizations. Shaykh Matovu was appointed religion. They are thus above everything else the Mufti of Uganda and Shaykh Mulumba, Muslims25. Finally, the Nubi, as the late Omari formerly a member of rival Muslim group UMC Kokole (himself a Ugandan Nubi) put it, are an (Uganda Muslim Community), became his open community or even a “Muslim club” deputy. Amin also provided the Muslim whose membership extends to those who meet community with land around the Old Kampala certain religious and cultural criteria (which Hill (since none had been allocated to them by includes speaking the language of Kinubi)26. the 1900 Uganda Agreement) on which to build their headquarters. As a consequence, the Nubi are known for their long tradition of military service in independent Once in power, Amin could not rely entirely on Uganda, although given their small numbers his numerically small Kakwa ethnic group (relative to most ethnic groups in Uganda) they (which included both Muslims and non- continued to be a marginal and minority group Muslims) to stay in power. He had to widen his within the wider ethnic landscape of Uganda. primary base of support by falling back on the Nevertheless, their fortunes changed in 1971 “Nubi” identity, far more inclusive and when a kinsman, Idi Amin, seized power in a expansive enough to absorb new groups. Thus military coup. Idi Amin came from the West the “Nubi” provided the core political Nile District, a long neglected area of the geography of Idi Amin’s army, which included country where the earliest descendants of Muslim Kakwa, Madi, Alur, Lugbara and other Ugandan Nubi had been stationed in military West Nilers. But first, who were these Nubi and garrisons. This and the fact that he was where did they come from? ethnically a Kakwa, a speaker of Kinubi, a professional soldier all his life, and a Muslim,
© Historia Actual Online 2008 103 Muslim-State Relations Abdin Chande made him meet all the criteria for being a Nubi 8. ISLAM DURING THE AMIN PERIOD in Uganda27. How did the majority of the Muslims in the rest But how was Amin going to keep this military of the country (who were non-Nubi) receive the alliance (primarily of Nubi, but also including Amin regime? Did they associate with it or shun some non-Muslim West Nilers) and provide it? For starters, it was not possible for all incentives for it to stay loyal? The solution was Ugandan Muslims to become Nubi even if they provided by evicting Asians (people of Indian wanted to and, in fact, this did not happen. and Pakistani origins whose presence goes back While it was the Nubi who gained the lion’s to the era of European colonialism) in 1972 - share of economic benefits in the country, other Amin did not care that among them were fellow Muslims belonging to different ethnic groups Muslims-, and by redistributing their property also gained advantages stemming from their among his soldiers. The Nubi had for the first membership in the wider Muslim/Umma time gained political power and their community community. The attention the previously had been thrust to the forefront of the army’s neglected Muslim community began to receive distributary system with relation to access to from Idi Amin came with risks of perceived business (especially that of expelled Asians) and close association with an unpopular regime, trade28. There were now privileges and especially as he courted Saudi Arabian and opportunities that accrued to being Nubi. This Libyan economic assistance to make up for what began the process of Nubianization on the part was lost when political relations with Britain of some Ugandans who sought social mobility soured. Within a short period of time, the through becoming Muslim, adopting the businesses of evicted Asians had been run into language of Kinubi29. Moreover, the process of the ground, as the country became plagued with incorporating different ethnic groups in the West shortages, unmaintained machinery, lack of Nile District into the Nubi identity, especially if spare parts and in general a declining economy, they had military connections, was encouraged. which meant that this association was a mixed Finally, as Amin’s rule progressed (particularly blessing for them. Some did benefit though, as after he had purged the army of Acholis and the system of rewards in Amin’s Uganda first Langis, former President Obote’s ethnic group, and foremost was directed toward the considered by him as rivals for the control of the Kakwa/Nubi, who became a sort of ruling elite. army), his power base in the army eventually Second, Muslims who had relatives in the army shrank to a group of Nubi/Kakwa Muslims and (with its distributary system) had access to mercenary recruits from his kindred Bari- business opportunities and did also benefit. speakers, part of the Anya Nya movement in Third, as Amin’s military regime increasingly southern Sudan30. This meant that former allies associated itself with Muslims, particularly from his home district of West Nile (that is, non- during its pursuit of pro-Arab foreign policy Muslim Lugbara, Madi, Alur, and others) now (which brought some economic dividends), he became enemies and were persecuted. Thus took some impulsive courses of action. This there was no group that was safe from Amin’s included, for instance, making Islam (with a 12- widening circle of terror, especially as his 16 percent share of the population)31 the official regime became more and more isolated. religion of the country during a conference he attended in Lahore, Pakistan in 197432. In absence of functioning political parties or opposition groups of any kind during the Amin As he tightened his political grip on the country, era -even his ministries struggled to establish he unleashed a reign of terror in which killings coherence to his erratic and ever changing (which included those of Acholi and Langi policy directives-, Amin, in fact, ruled the soldiers), disappearance of opponents and other country from a number of military barracks widespread human-rights abuses became the scattered throughout the country. His military order of the day. No one dared to criticize him commanders functioned as the coercive arm of or his oppressive policies. Those who did paid a the government. Finally, the Amin government high price (for instance, the Acholi archbishop established other coercive units with such fancy Luwum of the Church of Uganda). Even fellow names as the State Research Bureau and Public Muslims were not immune from the punishment Safety Unit (in addition to the military police), of death if they dared to criticize him or if they with the purpose of conducting interrogations, were perceived to be critics of his regime. For tortures and executions. instance, brigadier Hussein (himself a Nubi), considered an Obote loyalist, was killed quite
104 © Historia Actual Online 2008 Abdin Chande Muslim-State Relations early in the era of Amin’s rule. Shaaban Nkutu, Arabia. The graduates of this Saudi education a former minister in the Obote government, was became the torch bearers of a new wave of Islam also believed to have been killed for a similar that has impacted the country in the 1980s and reason. Even Ali Mazrui (arguably the most well 1990s and introduced the controversy over known professor at Makerere university in “true” Islam versus syncretic Islam33. Kampala at the time) had to tread carefully when voicing his opinions in his public Idi Amin also made Uganda a member of the lectures/speeches on the situation in the country. Jeddah-based Organization of Islamic In a strategy devised to reduce the number of Conference (OIC), a move that was later unnecessary killings in the country, Mazrui, for challenged by Christian groups in the post-Amin instance, attempted to make a subtle argument to period. Nevertheless, the Museveni government convince Amin that the Acholi and the Langi (which has pursued a policy of national were, in fact, two totally different ethnic groups. reconciliation) has maintained this membership The strategy failed to halt the killing of either in the hope of gaining certain economic benefits group. As the Amin regime became increasingly from rich oil-producing Muslim countries. This erratic, Mazrui himself was forced to flee the has included the establishment in 1988 of the country when he felt his life was in danger. Islamic University of Mbale (funded by OIC) Many of Amin’s own ministers had to flee the and other investment projects by Libya. Among country if they thought their lives were in them, the Tropical Bank, fruit processing danger, or in order to speak out against the (DAWDA), textiles (Tri-star), National Housing killings and human rights abuses without fearing Corporation, Uganda Telecom, hotels like reprisals. One such minister was H. Kyemba, Victoria Hotel in Entebbe and a coffee who wrote a book appropriately entitled A State processing plant34. of Blood: the Inside Story of Idi Amin. 9. ISLAM AFTER THE FALL OF AMIN In the light of the above, no religious leader in the Muslim community was willing to take the In the aftermath of the fall of the Idi Amin risk of crossing Idi Amin. In fact, their regime in 1979 following the invasion of the relationship with him was cordial as well as country by Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan opportunistic. They were, of course, thankful to Acholi/Langi and other exiles, many him for ending their squabbles by establishing a Kakwa/Nubi, blamed for the atrocities of the central organization, the UMSC, that unified Amin era, fled the country for fear of retaliation. leadership of the two main Muslim antagonistic Some Nubi lost their lives or their properties, camps under one umbrella organization. which were destroyed by neighbours or angry Moreover, he had provided this Muslim mobs. Some of the worst anti-Muslim backlash Supreme Council with financial assets, took place in Western Uganda, where the including some lands and property that belonged Muslims of Bushenyi were killed by a mob of to the evicted Asians. Furthermore, he had set attackers (as it is claimed), either at the up the system of Kadhiship (Muslim instigation or by tacit approval of the Ugandan consultants, not judges, and certainly not paid by exiles. the government as they are in Kenya) for different parts of the country, although they had In Amin’s own home district of West Nile the more of an advisory role than anything else. majority of the people, suffering persecution and More significantly, even if only symbolic, the mistreatment by Ugandan troops who occupied Constitution of Uganda, drafted during the the district, joined the remnants of what had Museveni era, empowered the Parliament constituted Amin’s Uganda National Army in (clause 1(d) of article 129) to establish Kadhis’ exile in southern Sudan and northeast Zaire35. In Courts for marriage, divorce, inheritance of this atmosphere of suspicion and revenge, all property and guardianship, as might be Ugandan West Nilers were labelled as Sudanese, prescribed by Parliament, though currently these Nubians or Anyanya (i.e. foreigners), and were do not exist. That such a course was even collectively associated with Amin’s regime, contemplated is a testimony of the legacy of Idi irrespective of their political involvement or Amin. Most importantly, through Idi Amin’s lack of it in his regime. This explains why they pursuit of a pro-Arab foreign policy Ugandan were neglected by UN aid agencies, as their Muslims became beneficiaries of Islamic guilt was implicitly assumed36. In fact, the education at foreign universities and especially demonization of the “Nubi” was justified on the the Islamic University of Madina in Saudi basis of the concept of indigeneity and nativism,
© Historia Actual Online 2008 105 Muslim-State Relations Abdin Chande by which they were constructed as being to officially open the Gaddafi National mosque, “foreign.” This is similarly how indigeneity with half a dozen African heads of State in defined national citizens in the case of the Hutu attendance. The mosque took many years to and Tutsi prior to the Rwandan tragedy of build and can accommodate up to 30,000 199437. Accordingly, the concept of nativism worshippers. Within its outside perimeter, it has (characterized by xenophobia) was at play in the space for shops for those who want to rent this public perceptions of the West Nilers in general property. Gaddafi National Mosque is touted to and “Nubi” in particular as foreigners. This is be the second largest mosque in Africa. All this the reason why at the end of the 1980s -by then is a legacy of the Amin era. the hated Obote II regime (1980-1985) was no longer in power-, when the majority of West The eventual return to power by Obote in 1980 Nile Muslims who had fled to Sudan returned, meant that the Muslim community witnessed most of them favoured to use designations such once more the old Muslim leadership conflicts as “Muslim Kakwa,” “Muslim Madi” and or alignments that pitted UPC/government- “Muslim Lugbara” rather than the label of supported Sheikh Kamulegeya against Sheikh “Nubi”38. The Kakwa, Madi and Lugbara are Mulumba of the UMC, and later Sheikh Kakoza recognizable Ugandan ethnic groups in the against Sheikh Luwemba. While the NRM northwestern part of the country. Nubi, on the administration, which assumed power in 1986, other hand, as we have already pointed out, are also played this game of supporting one rival not an ethnic group. One further legacy of the Muslim leader (for instance, President Museveni post-Amin era -which has been described as an supported Sheikh Luwemba) against another act of ethnosuicide by the Amin regime39- was (Museveni’s vice-President threw his weight the destruction of the close association between behind Sheikh Kakoza), nonetheless, by 1993 the Nubi as a social group and their military the NRM government established a committee service in the country’s armed forces. For the to attempt to get the different factions to first time in the country’s modern history, the reconcile41. army was now dominated by Bantu speakers from the southern half of the country, instead of By the 1990s there were new Muslim players on the northern Nilotic speakers. the stage, that is, the influential Salafi Tabligh (known locally Tabliq) movement which For the rest of the Ugandan Muslims the attracted many Muslim youth to join them. situation was slightly different. While they too These were the products of the Saudi suffered (especially those who had been part of universities and especially the Islamic the regime) and Islam was certainly demonized, University of Madina, which had trained many nevertheless, their victimization was not to the students in the period from the 1970s onwards. same degree as that of West Niler Muslims who On their return to Uganda, these students bore the brunt of this anger40. This was a clear became champions of a stricter form of Islam, indication that ordinary Ugandans had been able and started to challenge the traditional Muslim to distinguish between other Muslims and their scholars’ understanding of Islam. By the early Nubi co-religionists. Perhaps this had to do with 1990s the Tabligh movement fragmented into the fact that Muslims in Uganda did not live a two groups, the larger moderate one being led separate existence (the way the Nubi had done by Shaykh Kakeeto and the smaller and more in the past) as a minority set apart from their radical one by Shaykh Mukulu, who was critical kindred ethnic groups. This succeeded to some of the UMSC (Uganda Muslim Supreme extent in blunting any guilt by association or Council). Mukulu’s young activists began to animosity directed toward them by the more defy what they considered to be non-Muslim numerous Christian members of their ethnic authority. By 1995 not only had Mukulu fled the groups. country, but coincidentally the Uganda Muslim Liberation Army (UMLA) came into existence The Muslim situation was relatively better under to champion the rights of Muslims against what Museveni, who has attempted to woo Muslim they saw as President Museveni’s disregard for investors to the country, including retaining their rights and interests. They considered the Uganda’s membership in the OIC (Organization Museveni government as attempting to of Islamic Conference) and maintaining good undermine their religion and their community by relations with the oil producing nation of Libya. converting mosques into offices, as part of a In fact, President Gaddafi of Libya was in policy to return several properties (belonging to Uganda’s capital, Kampala, on 19 March 2008, Asians who had been expelled by Idi Amin in
106 © Historia Actual Online 2008 Abdin Chande Muslim-State Relations 1972) formerly under the control of UMSC to Muslim participation in the party was partly their former Asian owners42. Museveni motivated by the hope that they would be able to considers these young Muslims (who do not contribute to future policies that would redress enjoy the backing of their community) who have economic and educational imbalances in society. taken up arms against his government as being misled by disgruntled persons supported by the The above notwithstanding, some Muslims set Tourabi faction in Sudan43. up their own autonomous organizations to promote modern educational advancement and 10. MUSLIM-STATE RELATIONS FROM government employment. This was the case, for COLONIAL TO POST-COLONIAL ERAS instance, with AMNUT (ALL-Muslim National IN TANZANIA Union of Tanganyika), which attracted conservative leaders, mainly elderly TAA Muslim groups, responding to socio-economic activists. They wanted to organize and promote inequalities of the nineteenth and twentieth specifically Muslim goals independent of century colonial era, participated actively in TANU46. In 1959, AMNUT, like the Mwambao anti-colonial resistance of one form or another. movement in Kenya, called on the British More specifically, colonial developments, government to delay independence until particularly the Christian domination of the Muslims had achieved some parity with educational system, created conditions for Christians. This course of action was motivated increasing politicization of Muslim groups. by the fear that Muslims would not get a fair Coincidentally, this was also the period when share of the benefits of independence47. Islam in Tanzania, in its growth and Nevertheless, the majority of Muslim leaders consolidation in the hinterland of the country, rallied behind TANU and roundly criticized the became an integrating factor for the identity of organization. It was when individuals within Africans who participated in anti-colonial TANU advanced what were called “Muslim struggles44. demands” that the party moved quickly by creating an Elders Section within TANU48. It In the first regional opposition to the colonial came to be dominated by coastal Muslim order during the Maji maji uprising (1905- elements in Dar es Salaam and Tanga, in what 1907), adherents of tariqa (the Qadiriyya) was called the Elders’ wing of the party. In 1958 played a role in the struggle against German rule Nyerere expelled one of these elders, Shaykh for its abuses, including forced labour and the Taqdir, from the party for complaining that there introduction of a host of taxes. Similarly, at the were not enough Muslims on the TANU election end of the First World War, when Britain took slate. In other words, Taqdiri was accused of over the colony, it was the urban Muslims who mixing religion with politics when he drew were at the forefront of organized efforts for attention to TANU’s putting forward more change in the territory. Christian than Muslim candidates. Perhaps he thought that TANU was attempting to replace In 1922 the first such organization, TTACSA the Muslim trader-politician with the more (Tanganyika Territorial African Civil Servants’ educated Christian. Association) was set up in Tanga to promote the interests of civil servants. Later in the decade, a Similarly, in 1963, a few years after new association, TAA (Tanganyika African independence, another Muslim organization, Association), was established in Dar es Salaam, Daawa al-Islamiyya, was set up to promote another coastal town. It had a special appeal for Muslim educational advancement. When the Muslim townsmen who became its most active society sent a public letter to all bishops and members. After World War Two TAA began to religious leaders, complaining about the lack of develop into a national movement. It appealed to educational parity among the religious traders and farmers. In 1954 TAA leaders met to communities and the lack of support from the establish the Tanganyika African National government, serious consequences followed. Union (TANU). The new party inherited a good Khamis Abedi, President of the society, and political organization with a popular support Abdillah Plantan were sent to detention camps base among Muslims of the urban centers such in Mnulu and Chunya “in the interests of as Tanga, Tabora, Dar es Salaam and other security”49. towns. The Qadiriyya of Bagamoyo, who are worth mentioning, produced some of the staunchest supporters of TANU45. Widespread
© Historia Actual Online 2008 107 Muslim-State Relations Abdin Chande
11. THE MUSLIM CRISIS OF 1968: PAN- theological conflict between two factions of the ISLAMISM VS NATIONALIST UJAMAA Bukoba branch of the EAMWS later developed into a crisis of national proportions. What was at The most serious Muslim-State encounter in stake was the issue of leadership in Bukoba Tanzania was the Muslim crisis of 1968 during society. The territorial office, which sided with the period of the one-party/Ujamaa rule in one of the Bukoba factions, accused the regional Tanzania. At the center of the controversy was office in Bukoba (led by Adamu Nasibu) of the best established and most inclusive Muslim embezzlement of society funds and of anti- association in East Africa, the East African Indian and anti-Arab propaganda. Moreover, Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS). By virtue Nasibu, a pro-TANU Muslim, was one of the of its being pan-Islamic and nonsectarian, major organizers of a mass demonstration in EAMWS activities were felt all over post-World Bukoba in June 1967 in support of the Arusha War Two East Africa. It was, therefore, capable Declaration, which was said to be in keeping of unifying Muslims, coastal ones in particular, with the spirit of Islam. His faction cultivated into a bloc that could pose a threat to TANU. the support of anti-EAMWS forces in Dar es Moreover, the fact that it was supported by Salaam led by Shaykh Abdalla Chaurembo, a Asian Muslims -the Aga Khan, leader of the TANU central committee member. Clearly, Ismailis, was its patron-, put it at odds with the therefore, individuals with party connections government, which at the time was looking for were heavily involved in the dispute. This meant partners for its Ujamaa programs. The that two prominent African Muslims who government could not count on Asians, by virtue represented the head office of EAMWS, of their ownership of many businesses and President Said Tewa and Vice-President Bibi properties, to support its programs which would Titi Muhammad, both former ministers in the target them in the first place. Nyerere government, found themselves at the center of political intrigues that were beyond What started as a minor conflict within the their control. The fact that they had fallen out of EAMWS between the Bukoba branch and the favour with the party meant that they had little headquarters of the association soon developed power to influence events. Furthermore, into a full-fledged crisis that was exploited by Asian/Ismaili involvement with EAMWS made the government for its own purposes. The it less likely to be a Muslim national council that Tanzanian government engineered changes the TANU/Ujamaa regime could hope to within this Muslim organization similar to those promote as a Muslim support base for its brought about by Obote in Uganda when policies. They could not hope for that as long as NAAM was established specifically as a the office of the secretary-general and education bulwark against monarchical forces in Buganda. secretary-general were held jointly by an Indian To establish control over Muslims, especially in Ismaili Muslim, Aziz Khaki. the era of the one-party State Muslims, whether in Kenya (through SUPKEM), Uganda (NAAM The alleged capitalist political orientation of and later USMC) or Tanzania (as the discussion EAMWS’s territorial leadership was made into below will demonstrate), they had to be brought an issue by the rival Bukoba branch of the into step with the government’s political agenda. association led by Nasibu. In its June 1968 This was a clientalist strategy in which the meeting the pro-TANU elements passed government affirmed the leadership of the resolutions calling for the society to be led by Muslim organization and even legitimated it by those committed to the national ideology of invitations to important ceremonies, may even TANU and for office holders, including the award some funding for this or that program in chief patron (until then the Aga Khan, whose return for acting as faithful clients of politicians headquarters were in Western Europe), to be as the price to be paid for political Tanzanian Muslims committed to building the conformism50. nation by cooperating with TANU leaders52. It was when these resolutions were rejected by the The occasion for the State to interfere with the head office that the Bukoba branch used this as a affairs of the EAMWS was provided by a minor justification to secede, followed by other Muslim conflict in 1968, which pitted Pan- regional branches. Islamic African Muslims and their Asian financial supporters (of capitalist orientation) The EAMWS attempted as best as it could to against national/pro-TANU Muslims (supporters preserve the society from total collapse. These of Ujamaa socialism)51. What began as a minor efforts were frustrated by the State-controlled
108 © Historia Actual Online 2008 Abdin Chande Muslim-State Relations media (State radio and party press) which being a sectarian society organized for mainland publicized the crisis. Worse, the then first Vice- African Sunni Muslims55. President of Tanzania, Shaykh Abeid Karume (known for his anti-Asian views), exploited the The above examples illustrate TANU’s cynical situation to make political statements. For attempts to undermine institutions of civil instance, at a mass rally in Zanzibar he declared society in its efforts to eliminate sources of that the EAMWS was an instrument of the potential opposition to the regime and the one- capitalists who used it to exploit the common party Ujamaa policies during this period of the people53. one-party dictatorship. The nature of this State control over civil society, and of popular At the Iringa conference, organized by the perceptions of that control, lies at the root of regions that had seceded from EAMWS and Muslim groups’ dealings with the State. attended by 200 delegates from all regions and also by Muslim political leaders, including Religious issues, especially involving Islam and government ministers, regional commissioners Muslims, being considered too sensitive for and party regional chairmen, the destruction of public discussion in Nyerere’s Tanzania, the the EAMWS was carried out with the support strategy devised by him to deal with concerns and blessings of the ruling party. The first Vice- affecting the Muslim community was to let high President, Karume, opened the conference by ranking Muslim ministers in his government accusing the EAMWS of colluding with anti- manage the problem. This essentially meant that party foreigners. He also went on to assert that, their task was to coopt Muslims to the State’s contrary to the TANU policy of keeping religion political agendas. This was despite Nyerere’s and politics apart, “religion cannot be divorced continuous insistence that Tanzania’s politics from politics because politics was the lifeblood knew no religion. Not surprisingly, therefore, of society […] the people have risen to shake off during the period of Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s the remnants of the colonial era, including presidency (Nyerere’s successor), Muslim religious domination […] From now on the activism came out in full force. leadership of the Muslim religion must be in the hands of the people themselves, without any Factors that have contributed to Islamic activism attachment to pretenders from the outside”54. in post-Nyerere Tanzania include: the collapse The second Vice-President, Rashid Kawawa, of the one-party system, which allowed Muslims who was the last to speak, urged Muslims to to organize and to speak freely in the new multi- remain loyal to TANU as they had done by party environment of the 1990s (although no standing up for what was right. At the party based on ethnic or religious affiliation was conclusion of the conference, a new society to be allowed to function), the activities of known as BAKWATA (Supreme Council for external Islamic organizations, including Tanzanian Muslims) was formed. Its leaders Muslim embassies (in sympathy with Muslim consisted of Saleh Masasi, a TANU central aspirations), in financing new mosques, committee member, as the national chairman, scholarships, dispensaries, and so on, and the Shaykh Abdalla Chaurembo, another party importance of the Islamic revolution in Iran at faithful, as his deputy, and Adamu Nasibu, a the end of the 1970s56. Both external (global pro-TANU Muslim who had been at the center Muslim network) as well as internal factors of the crisis, as the acting secretary-general. explain why the 1980s and 1990s witnessed not only the intensification of organizational The creation of BAKWATA, with the open activities by groups that were critical of involvement of the ruling TANU followed by BAKWATA, such as Warsha, BALUCTA/the the banning of EAMWS, left a legacy of Council of Tanzanian Qur’an Reciters and mistrust concerning this new society. It was others, but also public interfaith debates by considered to be a “branch of TANU” precisely Muslim missionaries (UWAMDI) who engaged because EAMWS’s destruction had been on Christians on Bible-based discussions. political, not religious grounds. Moreover, the heavy involvement of political leaders, despite A combination of factors, including the size of being Muslims, was seen as a cause for the Muslim community57, the role of Muslims in suspicion. Finally, whereas the EAMWS had the politics of the country, and the on-going included Muslims belonging to different sects to concern of some Muslim groups regarding its leadership roles, BAKWATA was accused of equitable power sharing, has contributed to Tanzania’s opting for a system of presidency
© Historia Actual Online 2008 109 Muslim-State Relations Abdin Chande that alternates between Muslim (Mwinyi and Kikwete) and Christian (Nyerere and Mkapa) Bethesda, Austin & Winfield, Publishers, 1998, 37- candidates. This follows the abandonment of the 38, 167. statist approach to development in the country in 4 See, for instance, Nimtz, August, Islam and Politics the late 1980s, when the process of State control in East Africa: The Sufi Order in Tanzania. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1980. over the institutions of civil society began to 5 ease, especially with the collapse of the Ujamaa Strobel, M., Muslim Women in Mombasa, 1890- 1975. New Haven and London, Yale University system. Press, 1979, 36. 6 Constantin, François, “Muslims and Politics”, in CONCLUSION Hansen, Holger and Twaddle, Michael (eds.), Religion and Politics in East Africa…, op. cit., 19- This paper has demonstrated that it has been 21. difficult for the regimes in the three East African 7 Ibid., 21 States to separate religion and politics in their 8 Ibid. 9 one-party or military dictatorships and that, in Kasozi, A.B.K., “Christian-Muslim Inputs into fact, they have sought to coopt religious/civic Public Policy Formation in Kenya, Tanzania & groups to the State’s political programs, be they Uganda”, in Hansen, Holger and Twaddle, Michael (eds.), Religion and Politics in East Africa…,op. cit., Ujamaa or Nyayo. The plural and multi-ethnic 228-234. nature of the East African societies makes a 10 Ibid., 234. secular system of government best positioned to 11 Bakari, Mohamed and Yahya, Said (eds.), Islam in deal fairly and equitably with all its citizens, Kenya. Proceedings of the National Seminar on irrespective of their ethnic and religious Contemporary Islam in Kenya. Nairobi, Mewa, 1995, backgrounds. Unfortunately, the fact that the 243-244. State has been a captive of ethnic, regional or 12 Ibid., 168-183, 247-248. 13 other narrowly based interests has meant that Daily Nation, May 2 1992. See also Oded, Arye, religious minorities (Muslims in Kenya in the “Islamic Extremism in Kenya: The Rise and Fall of Moi period) or perceived enemy “ethnic groups” Shaykh Balala”. Journal of Religion in Africa, 26 (1996), 406-415. (the Acholi and Langi in Amin’s Uganda and 14 Cruise O’Brien, Donal, “Coping with the the Baganda of the southern part of the country, Christians”…, op. cit., 214-215. especially during the Obote II period) have not 15 Oded, Arye, “Islamic Extremism in Kenya”…. op. been well treated. In such situations, the cit., 406-407 and Bakari, Mohamed and Yahya, Said government has functioned through a network of (eds.), Islam in Kenya. op. cit., 256. personal patronage and clientage. This political 16 Among the most famous Moi detainees was Ngugi arrangement, however, did not promote wa Thiong’o, a novelist and leftist critic of what he calls neocolonial politics in Africa. equitable sharing of economic and social goods 17 in the country. On the contrary, it rewarded only Oded, Arye, “Islamic Extremism in Kenya”..., op. those who supported the regime and had entered cit., 406-415. 18 Kasozi, A.B.K., “Christian-Muslim Inputs”…, into some form of patron-client relationship op.cit., 238. based on ethnic, regional and other forms of 19 Ibid., 237. alliances. This was the basis for mobilization of 20 They were known locally as Bafaransa, as the faith the population to gain its political support. had been introduced from France. Its adherents form the second most significant political constituency. NOTES 21 Kokole, Omari, “Idi Amin, ‘the Nubi’ and Islam in Ugandan Politics”, in Hansen, Holger and Twaddle, 1 Cruise O’Brien, Donal, “Coping with the Michael (eds.), Religion and Politics in East Christians: The Muslim Predicate in Kenya”, in Africa…, op. cit., 52. Hansen, Holger and Twaddle, Michael (eds.), 22 Ibid. Religion and Politics in East Africa. London, James 23 Ibid. Currey Ltd, 1995, 201-202. Muslim sources estimate 24 Hansen, Holger Bernt, “Pre-colonial Immigrants much higher figures for the Muslim population in all and Colonial Servants. The Nubians in Uganda the three East African countries (35% for Kenya), Revisited”. African Affairs, 90 (1991), 559, and whereas Western/Christian writers/sources have Johnson, Douglas, “Sudanese Military Slavery from tended to underestimate Muslim numbers (5-10% for Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century”, in Archer, Kenya). The Muslim figure of between 20% and 30% Leonie (ed.), Slavery and Other Forms of Unfree is given in Bakari, see footnote 11 below. Labour. London, Routledge, 1988, 130-141. 2 Cruise O’Brien, Donal, “Coping with the 25 See the discussion in Hansen, “Pre-colonial Christians”…, op. cit. Immigrants and Colonial Servants”. op. cit., 559, 3 Chande, Abdin, Islam, Ulamaa and Community Rowe, John, “Islam under Idi Amin: a case study of Development in Tanzania. San Francisco and déjà vu?”, in Hansen, Holger B. and Twaddle,
110 © Historia Actual Online 2008 Abdin Chande Muslim-State Relations
Michael (eds.), Uganda Now: Between Decay and 38 Leopold, Mark, “Legacies of Slavery in North- Development. London, James Currey, 1988, 267-279, west Uganda”…, op. cit., 195. and Woodward, Peter, “Uganda and Southern Sudan: 39 Ibid. Peripheral Politics and Neighbour Relations”, in 40 In his book, Life of Prince Badru Kakungulu Hansen, Holger B. and Twaddle, Michael (eds.), (Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 2005), A.B.K. Uganda Now. op. cit., 224-238. Kasozi argues that this Muslim leader with ties to the 26 Kokole, Omari, “‘The Nubians’ of East Africa: Buganda royal family negotiated an honorable deal Muslim Club or African ‘Tribe’: The View from for Muslims and averted a Muslim holocaust. Within”. Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority 41 Museveni, Yoweri, “NRM United Muslims”…, op. Affairs, 6, 2 (1985), 420-428, and Kokole, Omari, cit. “Idi Amin, ‘the Nubi’ and Islam”…, op. cit., 45-55. 42 See “Who are the Tabliqs; What do they want”, 27 Hansen, Holger, “Pre-colonial Immigrants and New Vision, Kampala, Uganda, 27 November 1996. Colonial Servants”…, op. cit., 579. 43 Museveni, Yoweri, “NRM United Muslims”…, op. 28 Ibid. cit. 29 Hansen, Holger, Ethnicity and military rule in 44 Chande, Abdin, “Radicalism and Reform”…, op. Uganda. Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African cit., 359. Studies, 1977. On the Idi Amin regime, see Mazrui, 45 See Nimtz, August, Islam and Politics in East Ali A., “Religious Strangers in Uganda”. African Africa…, op. cit. Affairs, 76 (1977), 21-38, Kokole, Omari, “‘The 46 Bienen, Henry, Tanzania: Party Transformation Nubians’ of East Africa”..., op. cit., Kasozi, Abdu and Economic Development. Princeton, Princeton B.K., “The Uganda Muslim Supreme Council: An University Press, 1967, 64. Experiment in Muslim Administrative Centralization 47 El-Alawy, Tanganyika Standard, 20 August 1959. and Institutionalization, 1972-82”. Journal Institute 48 Bienen, Henry, Tanzania..., op. cit., 64. of Muslim Minority Affairs, 6 (1985), 34-52, and 49 Swantz, Lloyd, “Church, Mission, and State Southall, Aidu, “General Amin and the Coup”. Relations in Pre and Post Independent Tanzania Journal of Modern African Studies, XIII-1 (1977), (1955-1964)”, Syracuse University, Maxwell 85-105. Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 30 Hansen, Holger, Ethnicity and military rule…, op. African Studies Program, Occasional paper no. 19, cit., 579. 1965, 34. 31 The population of Muslims in Uganda is estimated 50 Constantin, François, “Muslims and Politics”…, at between 12 and 16%. See, for instance, the speech op. cit., 25. of President Yoweri Museveni, “NRM United 51 Westerlund, David, Ujamaa na Dini: A Study of Muslims, says Museveni”, New Vision-Uganda, 19 Some Aspects of Society and Religion in Tanzania, March 2008, where he mentions a figure of 12%. 1961-1977. Stockholm, Almquest and Wiksell Other sources put the Muslim population at 16%: see International, 1980, 103, and Chande, Abdin, Islam, Gall, Timothy (ed.), Wordmark Encyclopedia of Ulamaa and Community Development. op.cit., 133- Culture and Daily Life. Vol. 1 – Africa. Cleveland, 162 (chapter 4). Ohio, Eastwood Publications Development, 1998, 52 Kiwanuka, K.M. The Politics of Islam in Bukoba 448-449. District. BA thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 32 Mazrui, Ali A., “Religious Strangers”…, op. cit., 1973, 77-78. 21-38. 53 Ibid. with reference to The Standard, 9 November 33 See Chande, Abdin, “Radicalism and Reform in 1968. East Africa”, in Levtzion, Nehemiah and Pouwels, 54 Ibid. with reference to The Standard, 13 December Rindall (eds.), The History of Islam in Africa. 1968. Athens, Ohio University Press, 2000, 349-372. 55 Lweno, Hussein, “BAKWATA Needs 34 Museveni, Yoweri, “NRM United Muslims”…, op. Overhauling”, Daily News, 23 August 1976. cit. 56 Lodhi, Abdulaziz and Westerlund, David, “African 35 Leopold, Mark, “Legacies of Slavery in North- Islam in Tanzania”, posted at west Uganda: The Story of the ‘One-Elevens’”.
© Historia Actual Online 2008 111