Challenging Political Dominance in Montenegro
Master Thesis
For the award of the academic degree of
Master of Arts (MA)
at the Karl-Franzens-University of Graz
Submitted by
Alberto SARTORI
at the Centre for Southeast European Studies
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Dr. Hrvoje PAIĆ
Graz, 2019
Abstract
Much research on Montenegro’s political system focuses on the outstanding longevity in office of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), often granting limited attention to opposition parties’ role within such competitive authoritarian regime. This thesis aims at filling the gap with a case study addressing how political party opposition strategies impacted on DPS dominance in post- independence Montenegro. It starts by reviewing how DPS skewed competition to establish and maintain dominance from the first multiparty elections within the electoral, parliamentary, and executive arenas of party competition. It then looks into how non-governing political parties expressed their opposition after independence, through the analysis of their strategic behaviour in comparison with successful opposition strategies from other competitive authoritarian regimes (i.e. activist recruitment, creation of a ‘regime cleavage’, coalition building, and reliance on local level office). It finds opposition parties in Montenegro are engaged in competing against each other rather than pooling resources and efforts against the dominant, behaving as alternation in office solely depended upon external actors or DPS internal divisions. Rather than fragmentation, ceaseless intra-opposition competition represents the crucial problem when it comes to political party opposition strategies in post-independence Montenegro: it undermined their credibility in the eyes of the electorate and other actors, as well as evidenced limited ability to learn from past mistakes. Thus, this thesis points to political party opposition strategies as crucial in accounting for continued DPS dominance, facilitating its reproduction in all the arenas of party competition.
Keywords Montenegro; political parties; political opposition; dominance; competitive authoritarian regimes.
1
Table of Contents Abbreviations ...... 3
Introduction ...... 4
Chapter 1 – Research Structure and Approach ...... 5
1.1 State of the Art ...... 5
1.2 Research Question and Objectives ...... 11
1.3 Theoretical Approach ...... 12
1.4 Methodology ...... 18
Chapter 2 – A Review of DPS Dominance ...... 21
2.1 Montenegro’s Political Monolith: 1990 - 1997...... 21
2.2 (Re-)Configuring Dominance through Controlled Liberalisation: 1997 - 2006 ...... 26
2.3 Maintaining Dominance after Independence ...... 34
2.4 Conclusion ...... 41
Chapter 3 – Challenging the Dominant: Political Party Opposition Strategies ...... 42
3.1 Post-referendum: Re-alignment and Coalition Attempts (2006-2012) ...... 42
3.2 From Great Ambitions to Atomisation: The Season of Lost Chances (2012-2015) ...... 52
3.3 Fragmented Cohabitation: Gradual Progress or Hopeless Failure? (2015-2019) ...... 64
3.4 Opposition Strategies and their Impact on Dominance ...... 78
3.4.1 Outlining Montenegrin Political Party Opposition Strategies ...... 78
3.4.2 Impact on Electoral, Parliamentary, and Executive Arenas of Party Competition ...... 88
Conclusion ...... 94
Bibliography...... 98
Media Sources ...... 105
Appendix A – Data Collection Questions ...... 122
2
Abbreviations BS – Bosniak Party
DEMOS – Democratic Alliance
Democrats – Democratic Montenegro
DF – Democratic Front
DNP – Democratic People’s Party
DPS – Democratic Party of Socialists
EU – European Union
LSCG – Liberal Alliance of Montenegro
MANS – Network for the Affirmation of Non-governmental Sector
NOVA –New Serb Democracy
NS – People’s Party
NSS – People’s Socialist Party
OSCE/ODIHR - Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PCG – Positive Montenegro
PzP – Movement for Changes
RP – Worker’s Party
SD – Socialdemocrats
SDP – Socialdemocratic Party
SFRJ – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SKCG – League of Communists of Montenegro
SL – Serb List
SNP – Socialist People’s Party
SNS – Serb People’s Party
UCG – United Montenegro
URA – Citizens’ Movement of United Reform Action 3
Introduction Although leading the Western Balkans’ ‘regatta’ race for EU accession, Montenegro remains trapped in “stabilitocracy”.1 Among the salient traits of this political system, the most striking one is the extraordinary longevity in office of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), led by the charismatic and controversial Milo Djukanović. This “quintessential political survivor” steered the DPS through several critical turns and pragmatically transformed the party’s policy orientations, to ensure its continued stay in power since 1991.2 Through the “exploitative reconstruction of the state”,3 this fully-fledged dominance forestalled alternation in power and represents a serious constraint for a genuine democratic transformation in the small Adriatic republic.4
Spring 2018 presidential and local elections marked another electoral victory for the incumbent: Djukanović himself was elected President of Montenegro at the first round with an absolute majority of preferences, while his party colleagues won May 2018 local elections in 10 out of 11 municipalities, including the absolute majority in the city council of Podgorica.5 Although from the end of Montenegro’s ‘political monolith’ in 1997 old and new opposition parties were consistently unsuccessful against the incumbent coalition, the worst defeat since 2002 arrived after some years in which DPS rule seemed losing its previous stability. The consequences of the global economic crisis, scandals, EU conditionality, and cracks within the long-standing incumbent coalition seemed to offer chances for increased opposition efficacy.
Recent electoral results tell as much about opposition parties failures as about DPS successes, calling for a serious reflection on opposition strategies, if these actors maintain a genuine intention to threaten the incumbent.6 Such a verdict, however, is not a novelty at all. After 2006 independence
1 Pavlović, Srdja. 2016. Montenegro’s ‘Stabilitocracy’: The West’s Support of Đukanović is Damaging the Prospects of Democratic change. EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, 23 December 2016. Available at: http://bit.ly/2ihqgrs (accessed: 17 April 2019). 2 Morrison, Kenneth. 2009. The Political Life of Milo Djukanović. Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society 2009(1), 25. 3 Vuković, Ivan. 2010. The Post-communist Political Transition of Montenegro: Democratization Prior to Europeanization. Contemporary European Studies 2(1), 62. 4 See Bieber, Florian. 2010. The Party System of Montenegro, in Party Politics in the Western Balkans, edited by Stojarová, Vera. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 119–130; Džankić, Jelena and Soren Keil. 2017. State-sponsored Populism and the Rise of Populist Governance: The Case of Montenegro. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 19(4), 403-418; Kajošević, Samir. Biber: Crna Gora sa Đukanovićem teško može u EU. Vijesti, 2 May 2018. Available at: http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/biber-crna-gora-sa-dukanovicem-tesko-moze-u-eu-986787 (accessed 17 April 2019). 5 Tomović, Dušica. Montenegro Opposition Licks Wounds After Poll Disaster. Balkan Insight, 30 May 2018. Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegro-opposition-licks-wounds-after-poll-disaster-05-30-2018 (accessed 17 April 2019) 6 Murić, Darvin. Opozicija u ambisu jer greške DPS-a pretvaraju u svoju štetu. Vijesti, 3 June 2018. Available at: http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/opozicija-u-ambisu-jer-greske-dps-a-pretvaraju-u-svoju-stetu-991223 (accessed 17 April 2019); Kajošević, Samir. Bez saradnje opozicije nema dizanja iz nokauta. Vijesti, 12 June 2018. Available at: http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/bez-saradnje-opozicije-nema-dizanja-iz-nokauta-992343 (accessed 17 April 2019). 4 referendum, Montenegro’s opposition parties have been struggling to re-organise their ranks.7 What is striking, though, is that they do not seem to be following Cox’s expectation that it is “the pain of coordination failure that forces coordination success”.8 Thus, the consistent failure of Montenegrin opposition parties to capitalise on some weaknesses evidenced by the incumbent coalition and by the DPS itself during the last years is a rather controversial point, and one that deserves to be looked into.
In fact, due to the dominant position, the DPS and Djukanović have gathered most of the attention devoted to Montenegro and its political system. Opposition parties are often depicted, when mentioned at all, as somewhat passive, sparring partners for the election-winning machine called DPS. By these means they appear hopelessly ineffective, posing nothing more than a “futile political opposition”.9 This side of the party system is thus granted only superficial and limited attention in most accounts, almost implicitly deprived of the agency one would attribute to such actors in other contexts.
Considering the core role of the opposition in multiparty contexts,10 and the intrinsic relational nature of party systems,11 this thesis intends to address Montenegro’s political system focusing the analysis on the political losers of the long and ongoing transformation triggered by the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia. It will thus devote its attention to understanding the role of political party opposition in the competitive authoritarian regime established and reproduced by the DPS.
Chapter 1 locates the present work within the existing literature and exposes its rationale and methodology, while Chapter 2 compiles a review of the establishment and maintenance of DPS dominance in Montenegro in multidimensional terms. Building on this, Chapter 3 will consider the development of political parties’ opposition strategies after independence and address how they impacted on DPS dominance.
Chapter 1 – Research Structure and Approach
1.1 State of the Art Literature on Montenegro’s political system is not extremely vast, and the remarkable length in office of the DPS has been one of the topics that attracted most academic attention. A recent study
7 Bieber, The Party System of Montenegro; Dzankic and Keil, State-sponsored Populism, 5. 8 Cox, Gary. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press, 278. 9 Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. BTI 2018 Country Report — Montenegro. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 5 10 Blondel, Jean. 1997. Political Opposition in the Contemporary World. Government and Opposition 32(4), 462-486. 11 Wolinetz, Steven. 2006. Party systems and party system types, in Handbook of party politics edited by Katz, Richard S. and William Crotty. London/Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 51-62. 5 with contributions by several Montenegrin researchers presents the political system, then elaborating on parties’ internal democratic practices.12 Although informative, the publication provides a rather uncritical understanding of DPS’s hold on power. Goati, for instance, offers three hypotheses for explaining DPS longevity in office: a) the party leadership’s decision to implement “substantial democratic changes in the party and in Montenegrin society” since 1997; b) the inclusion of minorities in such political project; and c) “the weaknesses of oppositional parties, which failed to offer more convincing electoral platforms than the DPS”.13 While these factors should not be underestimated, the analysis ignores widely reported biases that characterise Montenegro’s political system and exclude any notion of dominance after 1997. In other sections, the authors focus their analysis on formal rules of institutional or intra-party politics, without exploring actual practices and overlooking the wide gap between norms and practices.14
Such uncritical views tend to be, at least partly, shared by other work produced by some Montenegrin researchers. For instance, Vuković understands DPS dominance after 1997 solely as a result of overwhelming popular support.15 A monochromatic portrait of opposition forces stresses ineffectiveness up to 1997 and simple alignment to Belgrade up to 2006. In another contribution, Vuković analyses main political parties’ statuses to present their structural organisation.16 Although only reflecting on formal rules, he shows that party leadership changes typically resulted from elite showdowns, often causing splits and fragmentation among the opposition.
Similarly, Vujović and Tomović, look into party statutory provisions, and find that parties present pronounced traits of presidentialisation, mostly through informal channels and as a result of mimicking DPS party model.17 Blurred ideological (i.e. classic left-right) divides are noted, as debate generally dwells around statehood and identity, foreign policy, and a consolidating rift between parties willing to cooperate with the DPS and others who strongly oppose it. Although at times presenting rather uncritical understandings of DPS rule and/or analysing only formal traits of
12 Goati, Vladimir and Srdjan Darmanović. (eds.). 2015. Electoral and Party System in Montenegro. A Perspective of Internal Party Democracy Development. Podgorica: CeMI. 13 Goati, Vladimir. 2016. Parties and Party System in Montenegro, in Goati and Darmanović, Electoral and Party System in Montenegro, 84-86. 14 Dedović, Vlado and Zlatko Vujović. 2015. Electoral System, in Goati and Darmanović, Electoral and Party System in Montenegro, 87-133; Vujović, Zlatko and Nikoleta Tomović. 2015. Perspectives for Development of Intra-Party Democracy in Montenegro, in Goati and Darmanović, Electoral and Party System in Montenegro, 151-180. 15 Vuković, The Post-communist Political Transition of Montenegro. 16 Vuković, Ivan. 2017. Party Organization in Montenegro: Structural Resemblance behind Political Divergence, in Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, edited by Sobolewska- Myślik, Katarzyna/ Kosowska-Gąstoł, Beata and Piotr Borowiec. Krakow: Jagiellonian Uni Press, 295-310. 17 Vujović, Zlatko and Nikoleta Tomović. 2019. The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Montenegro: A Limited Semi-presidentialism, in The presidentialisation of political parties in the western balkans edited by Passarelli, Gianluca. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 119-144. 6 the political system, such literature represents a source of information that can be cross-checked with other, more articulated and critical accounts.
Historical interpretations of political developments in the country are provided through various contributions by Morrison.18 He considers longer-term transformation processes of the Montenegrin polity, showing the importance of historical legacy and presenting DPS dominance as ingrained within Montenegrin society.19 Among the major post-independence challenges, he points to the complex task of including the substantial minority that did not celebrate the establishment of the new state, socio-economic divides between north and south, as well as the drive for inequality resulting from a “turbo-capitalist culture” for the benefit of a restricted elite.20
Presenting Montenegrin party system, Bieber saw dominance as the most characterising feature and argued that political developments will largely depend on its development.21 After independence, DPS faced an increasingly fragmented opposition, which tried to channel criticism against patronage and corruption networks of the incumbent. Besides also pointing at north-south development disbalances, he stressed the limited role of ideology and party programmes, due to the centrality of statehood and identity questions.
This last issue has been explored by an important stream of research. Bieber and Winterhagen spoke about the Montenegrin “identity continuum” between the idea of specific territorial identity within the Serb nation and the one of a separated nation.22 Independence and consolidation of a related national identity are the “rational project of a political elite”, in which statehood preceded nationhood. Džankić shows such pragmatic design included reconstructing the Montenegrin identity, stressing its civic-orientation to distinguish it from the ethnocentric Serb one.23 The Montenegrin “homo duplex” and its dual identity was gradually pulled apart by the policies promoted by the ruling DPS. Moreover, ethnic identification became associated with party affiliation: Being Montenegrin meant support for the ruling DPS, its “political project of independence”, and reinforced the blurring perceptions between dominant party and state.24
18 Morrison, The Political Life of Milo Djukanović; Morrison, Kenneth. 2008. Montenegro: A Modern History. London/New York: IB Tauris; Morrison, Kenneth. 2018a. Nationalism, Identity and Statehood in Post-yugoslav Montenegro. London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic; Morrison, Kenneth. 2018b. Change, Continuity and Crisis. Montenegro's Political Trajectory (1988-2016). Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society 66(2), 153-181. 19 Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood. 20 Morrison, Montenegro, 222. 21 Bieber, The Party System of Montenegro. 22 Bieber, Florian and Jenni Winterhagen. 2009. Erst der Staat-dann die Nation: Staats-und Nationsbildung in Montenegro. Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society 57(1), 4. 23 Džankić, Jelena. 2014b. Reconstructing the Meaning of Being “Montenegrin”. Slavic Review 73(2), 347-371. 24 Džankić, Reconstructing the Meaning, 356. 7
However, there is a discrepancy between elite’s design and popular support for the new civic Montenegrin identity category.25 Such reconstruction was rejected by large parts of the opposition, which allowed individuals who preferred the idea of unity between Serbs and Montenegrins to recognise themselves as members of a “Serb” identity category. DPS-promoted symbolic policies supported the creation of a cleavage through the politicisation of ethno-national categories, deeply influencing opposition’s orientations and activity.26 Džankić also showed how this was exploited by DPS through modifications to Montenegrin citizenship rules.27 Strong restriction in terms of dual citizenship blocked the extension of voting rights to individuals maintaining strong ties with Serbia, i.e. to possible opposition voters. This is crucial for electoral politics, as even limited variations in the number of voters are relevant in a country with such a small population.28
Vuković-Ćalasan and Đečević, addressing party positions on national identity, note how divides on statehood and state symbols retain importance in the current political debate.29 Due to entrenched polarisation and widespread reluctance to compromise on such matters to avoid losing connected electoral benefits, they do not express much hope for substantial change in the foreseeable future. Further, Todosijević, Pavlović and Komar, elaborating on the interaction between educational levels, ideological attitudes, and party preferences for shaping political divisions, hold that such factors are less central than the social cleavage on national identity.30
In sum, these contributions have shed light on the way state- and nation-building processes have been strategically manipulated and exploited by the DPS to sustain its rule, further blurring the lines between party and state, while shaping and appealing to identity categories among Montenegro’s population. However, such literature did not directly consider how political parties address the challenges posed by DPS dominance through different opposition strategies. Moreover, they do not aim to account for diversity between opposition parties, i.e. between the ones that rely on ethnic categories and the ones that do not.
Indeed, identity politics pairs with other features of dominance. Komar, analysing Montenegrin electorate, understands DPS dominance as the combination of: a) monopoly on state resources
25 Džankić, Jelena. 2014c. When two Hands Rock the Cradle: Symbolic Dimensions of the Divide over Statehood and Identity in Montenegro, in Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Europe edited by Kolstø, Pål. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 115-137. 26 Džankić, When two Hands Rock the Cradle. 27 Džankić, Jelena. 2014a. Citizenship between the ‘image of the nation’and ‘the image of politics’: The case of montenegro. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 14(1), 43-64. 28 Montenegro’s population amounted to 622.345 inhabitants in 2018. World Bank. 2018. World Bank Data, Montenegro. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ME (accessed 30 July 2019). 29 Vuković-Ćalasan, Daniela and Mehmed Đečević. 2015. Izazovi izgradnje građanskog identiteta u crnoj gori: Postreferendumske podjele i sporovi političkih stranaka. Migracijske i Etničke Teme 31(1), 7-37. 30 Todosijević, Bojan / Pavlović, Zoran and Olivera Komar. 2016. Education, Ideology and Politics: The Importance of Differences in Educational Level for Political Divisions in Serbia and Montenegro. 8 allowing for clientelistic/patronage relationships with voters; b) ‘image of invincibility’ of the dominant among the electoral body, resulting from the perception of power continuity dating back to socialist Yugoslavia; c) political cleavage on statehood/identity matters; and d) incentives for fragmentation among the opposition provided by the proportional electoral system.31 Although other political parties are seen as active and relevant, the combination of such constraints is provided without elaborating much on opposition’s role in this context. Similarly, Komar and Živković focus on DPS’s “image of invincibility”, stressing the importance of such a self-fulfilling prophecy in perpetuating dominance within Montenegro’s rather apathetic political culture.32
Recently, Džankić and Keil posed the accent on DPS populist discourse.33 Among other features, they speak about the “othering” mechanism used against internal and external opposition for its marginalisation, and of the potential role the small dimension of the country and its cultural substrate of “dense social links” have in sustaining patronage and clientelistic practices.34 Indeed, serious concerns regarding political influences and blurring lines between state and dominant party remain present in Montenegro, to the extent that “a majority of citizens believe that being a member of a political party is the main criteria for employment”.35
Relevant contributions have been produced also when it comes to effects of external actors’ influence in Montenegro. Bieber reflects on the role of such actors, especially the EU, in sustaining competitive authoritarian systems in the Western Balkans.36 They do so receiving in exchange a guarantee of stability by authoritarian-leaning leaderships such as the Montenegrin one. Another very important feature highlighted here is the persistent “centrality of informality”.37
Sošić and Marović elaborate on EU integration and party politics.38 With general agreement on the strategic priority of accession, Montenegrin parties attempt to frame themselves as the best fit to achieve such goal. However, only intense EU pressure helped overcoming polarisation and creating ad-hoc bipartisan support for legislative progress. Opposition parties are here weak and “unable over the years to rise above political infighting”, so that “the real opposition in Montenegro has
31 Komar, Olivera. 2013. Birači u Crnoj Gori: Faktori izborne i partijske preferencije. Beograd: Čigoja štampa & FPN UCG. 32 Komar, Olivera and Slaven Živković. 2016. Montenegro: A democracy without alternations. East European Politics and Societies 30(4), 785-804. 33 Džankić, Jelena and Soren Keil. 2017. State-sponsored Populism and the Rise of Populist Governance: The Case of Montenegro. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 19(4), 403-418. 34 Džankić and Keil, State-sponsored Populism, 11. 35 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018, 34. 36 Bieber, Florian. 2018. Patterns of competitive authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. East European Politics 34(3), 337-354. 37 Bieber, Patterns, 350. 38 Sošić, Marko and Jovana Marović. 2014. European Integration and Party Politics in Montenegro, in EU Integration and Party Politics in the Balkans, edited by Stratulat, Corina. European Policy Centre Issue Paper (77), 31-45. 9 arguably stemmed from the vibrant community of NGOs and media”.39 It is then argued that EU integration progress entails opposition’s hope for the undermining of the dominant party thanks to investigation and prosecution of mismanagement, e.g. the “Recording affair”.40 On a different note, Vuković links the overwhelming support for EU integration with the need of the main political parties to mark a discontinuity from the previous links with Milošević’s regime.41 Façade agreement disguises differences in the degree accession is actually supported, while polarisation on statehood matters keeps influencing the way such process is perceived by opposition parties. Although these contributions provide some insights on Montenegrin opposition parties’ points of view, they do not address in depth the way those parties adapt to the challenges posed by dominance during EU integration process.
This literature review shows that scholarly analysis has addressed a cluster of features characterising Montenegro’s political context that are to be held as reference points:
The importance of socialist legacy and the inherited monopolist access to state resources for the DPS during the 1990s, leading to “state-capture” and flawed economic transformation;42 Use of such advantage to ensure institutional and, ultimately, electoral advantages through extensive patronage networks,43 creating a context in which informality is central;44 Presence of a political culture in which voters are prone to passivity and follow charismatic leaderships;45 Lack of clear ideological differentiations between competing political parties;46 Strong polarisation between dominant and opposition,47 mostly due to the presence of a re- fashioned and politicised societal cleavage on ethnic/national identities;48 External actors influences tend to support the dominant;49 Political opposition is burdened by internal divisions and seen as unable to undermine DPS dominance. This was also the case due to the latter being keen in sustaining its position
39 Sošić and Marović, European Integration, 32. 40 Sošić and Marović, European Integration, 42. 41 Vuković, Ivan. 2014. The Determinants of Party Consensus on European Integration in Montenegro. Croatian Political Science Review 52(4), 74-98. 42 Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood; Uzelac, Slavica. 2003. Corruption in Transition Countries: “How to Capture a State” - The Example of Montenegro. South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs 1(2), 103– 116. 43 Džankić, Citizenship. 44 Bieber, Patterns. 45 Komar, Birači u Crnoj Gori; Komar and Živković, Montenegro. 46 Bieber, The Party System of Montenegro; Vujović and Tomović, The Presidentialisation. 47 Bieber, The Party System of Montenegro; Mochťak, Michal. 2015. Democratization and Electoral Violence in Post- Communism. A Study of Montenegro. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 15(1), 97-117. 48 Džankić, When two Hands Rock the Cradle. 49 Bieber, Patterns. 10
using populist methods, through which dissenting opinions and orientations are held as against the polity and the state in toto.50
Overall, the main gap to that remains to be addressed is an appropriate consideration of the point of view of the opposition parties. Put simply, accounts dealing with dominance in Montenegro risk conveying the impression that the actions of the dominant are straightforward predictors of opposition parties’ behaviour. This would be a result of the lack of political skills or will, and of fragmentation of opposition components. Oftentimes, however, these appreciations appear not to be going beyond a limited, superficial investigation on the way in which these actors bring forward their political activities, thus failing to account for the role they played in sustaining or undermining the regime in place. In particular, although the relevance of the ethnic/national divide is proven, such understanding of political dynamics in Montenegro risks being flattened on a narrative overwhelmingly relying on ethno-national themes, neglecting otherwise relevant political dynamics within the opposition.
1.2 Research Question and Objectives This thesis implies that understanding political parties’ opposition to the incumbent means achieving a fuller, empirical knowledge of political party dominance. It will do so by addressing the gaps above identified through the answer to the following research question:
How did political party opposition strategies impact on Democratic Party of Socialists dominance in post-independence Montenegro?
The answer to such question is constructed by addressing two sub-questions: undermine
1.a How did DPS skew political competition in order to establish and maintain its dominance from the first multiparty elections?
1.b How did non-governing political parties express their opposition to the dominant Democratic Party of Socialist after independence?
By these means, the objective of this work is to generate new empirical knowledge providing a deeper understanding of Montenegrin political party opposition to the incumbent, which in turn will allow grasping the way in which contenders contribute in shaping the nature of dominance through their actions and strategies. 51
50 Džankić and Keil, State-sponsored Populism. 51 Strategies are seen as “guiding principles for action that are based on a calculation of which means most efficiently lead to a goal in a certain context.” Hefftler, Claudia. 2018. Opposition Parties and EU Affairs in National Parliaments: Cooperation or Competition? PHD-Thesis. Köln: University of Köln, 53. 11
This thesis refers to political opposition directed towards the incumbent by political parties that are represented in parliament in a given term, but are not part of the governing coalition. It includes both parties that rely extensively on ethnic markers and the more “civic” ones. For the sake of brevity, these actors will be also referred to as opposition parties.52
Even though the role of civil society and other actors remain relevant and will be taken into account in some parts of the analysis, the ultimate focus remains on political party strategies. Indeed, literature on non-party opposition in hybrid regimes is vast and rich, so that its consideration would broaden the research beyond the limit of manageability. Moreover, in Montenegro’s case the nature of political party opposition appears particularly interesting, as it has shown the use of creative and non-conventional approaches that do not fit within legislative-focused research on political opposition.
1.3 Theoretical Approach The presence of a dominant party is a crucial feature of the Montenegrin political system, which presents democratic deficits that include it in the category of competitive authoritarian regimes.53 Levitsky and Way define such regimes as “competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but (…) not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of incumbents”.54 In this sense, the presence of a dominant party marks a particular class of competitive authoritarian regimes, in which biased competition is combined with “continuous executive and legislative rule by a single party for at least 20 years or at least four consecutive elections”.55
In order to account for the emergence, persistence, and collapse of dominant party regimes, a number of theories point to the prominence of specific factors:56 a) electoral rules, b) social cleavages, c) catch-all party approach and ideological flexibility,57 d) voter’s satisfaction with incumbent policies,58 e) resource sharing through clientelism,59 and f) intra-party dynamics.60 Such
52 See Norton, Philip. 2008. Making Sense of Opposition. Journal of Legislative Studies 14(1-2), 237-238. 53 Bieber, Patterns. 54 Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5. 55 Greene, Kenneth F. 2007. Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 12. 56 For an overview, see Ayan Musil, Pelin. 2014. Emergence of a Dominant Party System after Multipartyism: Theoretical Implications from the Case of the AKP in Turkey. South European Society and Politics 20(1), 71-92. 57 White, David. 2011. Dominant Party Systems: a Framework for Conceptualizing Opposition Strategies in Russia. Democratization 18(3), 655-681; Boucek, Françoise. 2012. Factional politics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 58 See Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose; Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 59 See Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose. 60 Factional conflicts, see Boucek, Factional Politics. 12 variety of theories can be analytically integrated in order to grasp what Boucek and Bogaards term the “multifaceted” nature of party dominance.61 According to the two researchers, this should be done through “multidimensional analysis (…) to look at salient features of party competition such as how political actors (dominant parties and opposition forces) interact with each other and institutions”.62
This thesis follows Boucek’s operationalisation of such multidimensionality, considering how the dominant distorts competition in the electoral, parliamentary, and executive arenas of party competition, triggering a “positive feedback process whereby repeated incumbencies allow ruling parties to capitalise on the advantages of office to entrench themselves in power”.63 In other words, such conceptualisation is used to describe how the dominant party acts to establish and maintain, respectively, primacy in support among voters, superior bargaining power with regards to other parties, and unmatched control over incumbency prerogatives. In this way, a party is dominant in a given moment in time to the extent it features “controlling majorities” in the above competition arenas.64 Such approach to party dominance provides guidance for the thorough description of the context in which political parties act when opposing the dominant in the case study at hand.
As configurations of party dominance vary in different political systems,65 the same goes for patterns of opposition.66 In effect, an intrinsic feature of dominance is the persistent aim of the dominant for marginalisation of actors opposing it, as it tends to “create quasi-permanent insider- outsider splits”.67 Consequently, “the capacity of a single party to skew competition” may be limited by effective opposition or fostered by the lack of it.68 Opposition to the dominant is thus an important component to understand political dominance itself.69 Nevertheless, the above literature review has shown this has not been fully considered in the case of Montenegro. From this standpoint, this thesis focuses on political opposition directed towards the incumbent, dominant
61 Boucek, Françoise and Matthijs Bogaards. 2010. Introduction: Setting a New Agenda For Research, in Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases and Comparisons, edited by Bogaards, Matthijs and Françoise Boucek. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 7. 62 Boucek and Bogaards, Introduction, 7-8. 63 Boucek, Factional Politics, 10-11. 64 Boucek, Factional Politics, 9. 65 Boucek, Factional Politics, 10. 66 Norton, Making Sense of Opposition, 249; Abdullah, Walid Jumblatt. 2017. Bringing Ideology in: Differing Oppositional Challenges to Hegemony in Singapore and Malaysia. Government and Opposition 52(3), 483-510. 67 Greene, Kenneth. 2002. Opposition Party Strategy and Spatial Competition in Dominant Party Regimes: A Theory and the Case of Mexico. Comparative Political Studies, 35(7), 759. 68 Boucek, Factional Politics, 10. 69 See Bogaards, Matthijs. 2004. Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa. European Journal of Political Research 43(2), 173-197; White, Dominant Party Systems; Wahman, Michael. 2011. Offices and Policies: Why Do Oppositional Parties Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes? Electoral Studies 30(4), 642-657; Ziegfeld, Adam and Maya Tudor. 2015. How Opposition Parties Sustain Single-party Dominance: Lessons from India. Party Politics 23(3), 262-273, Norton, Making Sense of Opposition, 244. 13 party by political parties that have parliamentary representation in a given term but are not part of the governing coalition.
In most cases, literature on political party opposition in democratic systems focuses on institutional functions and constraints, especially within parliaments.70 However, the analysis of formal institutions is not sufficient to achieve a deeper understanding of different party strategies within the same political system.71 It risks ignoring that parties often mobilise their “extra parliamentary organisation” as means of opposition and “cannot necessarily be seen to be operating within the exclusive confines of an autonomous institution”.72 This is all the more the case when it comes to competitive authoritarian regimes, where formal institutions’ functioning is distorted and incentives for non-institutional opposition strategies increase. As a result, relying heavily on formal, parliamentary modes of opposition can be even more misleading in accounting for political party opposition in such regimes.73
To avoid that bias, this thesis will follow Weinblum and Brack’s definition of opposition, presenting better applicability to a broader set of regimes. Political opposition is defined as “a disagreement with the government or its policies, the political elite, or the political regime as a whole, expressed in public sphere, by an organized actor through different modes of action”.74 This formulation, on the one hand, avoids a priori categorisations of responsible/irresponsible, system/anti-system opposition, particularly tricky given the hybrid nature of the political regime, and, on the other hand, refrains from functionalist approaches that can limit the consideration of repertoires and sites of action available to opposition actors.75
Offering a tool for conceptualising political opposition in a given empirical case, Blondel proposed to consider two main dimensions: a) cohesion or diffusion of opposition, and b) intensity of each opposition actor’s conflict with the government in terms of goals and policies.76 The first dimension points to the importance of opposition actors’ relative strength. Opposition is thus diffuse (and less efficient) when political parties’ strength is similar, whereas it cohesive (and more efficient) when opposition is clearly led by one main party. While telling about the general state of opposition
70 Helms, Ludger. 2008. Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues and Perspectives. Journal of Legislative Studies 14(1-2), 6-19; Norton, Making Sense of Opposition; Steinack, Katrin. 2011. Two Patterns of Opposition: Party Group Interaction in the Bavarian State Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies 17(1), 1-26; Hefftler, Opposition Parties and EU Affairs, 40. 71 Steinack, Two Patterns of Opposition, 21. 72 Norton, Making Sense of Opposition, 242. 73 Svåsand, Lars. 2013. The Concept of Opposition and the Structure of Opposition in Malawi. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 51(3), 306-325. 74 Weinblum, Sharon and Nathalie Brack. 2011. 'Political Opposition': Towards a Renewed Research Agenda. Interdisciplinary Political Studies 1(1), 74. 75 Weinblum and Brack, Political Opposition. 76 Blondel, Political Opposition, 470. 14 within a given political system, this dimension is not so useful in considering single opposition actors or parties.77 Instead, the second dimension allows portraying the “landscape of the opposition” according to each of its bodies’ distance from the incumbent, providing a reference for differentiating between moderate or radical opposition actors.78
Indeed, opposition might not necessarily imply continuous contrast with the incumbent. Opposition parties are normally contrary to incumbent’s continued rule and want to replace it, but may try to oppose it as “persuasive actors” rather than as “veto players”.79 In other words, when outright consensus is absent, conflictual stances between ruling and opposition parties can be resolved through cooperation and compromise or escalated through competitive, radical opposition. Cooperation or competition strategies are thus key choices of opposition parties from their position as minority in parliament, as they serve to “communicate critique or negotiate compromise”.80 The extent to which cooperative or conflictive behaviour are used represent “qualifying markers” of opposition parties’ roles and strategies, allowing them to differentiate each other in the process.81 Therefore, this thesis considers cooperative or competitive behaviour of given opposition parties as basic reference to infer about their strategic orientations in competing among each other and populate Montenegro’s ‘opposition landscape’.
As previously noted, opposition is convincingly addressed only through “an inquiry reaching well beyond the parliamentary arena”: in political systems with pronounced democratic biases and dysfunctional parliamentary institutions, this could also mean addressing the role of civil society or media actors as “ersatz opposition” stepping in to compensate for weak parliamentary one.82 This thesis, instead, precisely aims at considering the way in which opposition parties deal in the presence of such constrains and make use of cooperative or competitive behaviour in that context.
Insights in this sense are provided by a series of studies addressing the phenomenon through empirical analysis of political (party) opposition in hybrid regimes, exploring behaviour of opposition actors in such contexts.83 This literature shows that challenging dominant parties is a
77 Hefftler, Opposition Parties and EU Affairs, 65. 78 Blondel, Political Opposition, 470-471. 79 Norton, Making Sense of Opposition, 246. 80 Hefftler, Opposition Parties and EU Affairs, 55-56, 59. 81 Hefftler, Opposition Parties and EU Affairs, 40. 82 Helms, Studying Parliamentary Opposition, 10. 83 See Greene, Opposition Party Strategy; Scheiner, Ethan. 2006. Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press; Cavatorta, Francesco. 2009. ‘Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail’: Opposition Politics in Morocco. Democratization 16(1), 137-156; White, Dominant Party Systems; Hostrup Haugbølle, Rikke and Francesco Cavatorta. 2011. Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please Stand up? Opposition Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 38(3), 323-341; Svåsand, The Concept of Opposition; Langfield, Danielle. 2013. Opposition 15 particularly complex task, yet pathways to do so are available. As a starting point, though, it tends to see cooperative opposition behaviour as the worst possible one, so “that challengers should avoid strategies that allow their competitors to make them appear too similar to the incumbent”.84 Cooperative behaviour in such contexts can be easily interpreted as co-optation, rather than as constructive challenge to the dominant.85
When it comes to competitive behaviour, four possible strategies emerge: a) emphasis on activist recruitment, b) the creation of a “regime cleavage”, c) coalition building, and d) focusing on gaining local-level office.
The emphasis on activist recruitment through the expression of radical competitive opposition can help overcome the stronger position of the dominant, which receives support from moderate voters and through clientelism.86 By adopting radical positions on certain issues, an opposition party can consolidate its support basis attracting committed activists through programmatic appeals, as it cannot compete with the dominant’s capacity to share material resources. Such activists are “risk takers” that can help a party implementing its activities with limited costs and support non- institutional means of political struggle.87 This option, however, risks further alienating moderate voters, and, most importantly, requires programmatic appeals being powerful enough to dissuade voters from the material benefits provided by dominant’s patronage.
Indeed, providing such appeals is not a straightforward task. When emotional or ethnic appeals are not available, desired, or sufficient, challenging the dominant evidencing its democratic flaws and proposing clear political change can serve to mobilise the electorate in support of the opposition. Thus, a “regime mobilising strategy” would lead to the establishment of a crosscutting “regime cleavage”.88 It should help penetrating the pool of moderate voters targeted by the catch-all strategy of the dominant, thereby attempting to overcome the ‘activist-voter trade off’ generated by the activist recruitment strategy. Further, it can downplay opposition parties’ divisions, as ousting the authoritarian-leaning dominant should become their common, paramount goal, and support
Growth in Dominant Party Systems: Coalitions in South Africa. Government and Opposition, 49(2), 290-312; Gel’man, Vladimir. 2015. Political Opposition in Russia: A Troubled Transformation. Europe-Asia Studies 67(2), 177-191. 84 Greene, Opposition Party Strategy, 766. 85 Way, Lucan and Steven Levitsky. 2010. Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field. Journal of Democracy 1(2010), 66. 86 Greene, Opposition Party Strategy; Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose; White, Dominant Party Systems. 87 Greene, Opposition Party Strategy, 761. 88 Greene, Opposition Party Strategy; Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy; Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose; White, Dominant Party Systems; Langfield, Opposition Growth. 16 opposition voters’ strategic voting as well.89 This strategy can be hampered, for example, by limited access to media outlets and by effective reactions of the dominant.
Establishing and reproducing such a ‘regime cleavage’ can also reduce the hurdles towards the third strategy, i.e. coalition building.90 This is widely regarded as a crucial step, as it helps pooling resources from diverse party and non-party actors and fosters opposition’s cohesiveness, increasing both the efficiency and credibility among the public of the challenge moved against the dominant.91 However, effective coalition building requires willingness and capacity to compromise: ideological differences, religious/ethnic/tribal divides, personal rivalries, and contrasting strategic orientations in opposing the incumbent can severely hinder coordination processes.92
Finally, the achievement of local level office can help building credibility of the actors involved in the eyes of a wider pool of voters, allows gaining government experience, increases visibility, and provides access to valuable resources.93 As this strategy entails overthrowing the dominant through local elections, the endeavour is clearly not straightforward, but it can represent a springboard for increased national level support.
Overall, the efficacy of those strategies is also related to the circumstances in which they are adopted and implemented and the timing of increased opposition action.94 Indeed, “critical junctures”, e.g. crisis and scandals, could present an opportunity to “break the cycle of domination” for actors that apply effective opposition strategies.95 Regarding such circumstances, White builds on previous research considering changes when it comes to a) increased access to participation for new actors, b) instability in political alignments, c) presence of new allies for opposition actors, and d) factional conflict within the ruling party as providing opportunities for effective opposition.96
The above set of strategies will be used as conceptual guide for the analysis of Montenegro political parties’ opposition. As “authoritarian rulers often change their strategies in response to challenges from the opposition”, addressing whether and how these strategies were pursued by the considered
89 Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy. 90 Greene, Opposition Party Strategy, 779. 91 Blondel, Political Opposition; Howard, Marc and Philip G. Roessler. 2006. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science 50(2), 365-381; Ziegfeld and Tudor, How Opposition Parties Sustain Single-party Dominance; Wahman, Offices and policies. 92 Cavatorta, Opposition Politics in Morocco; Hostrup Haugbolle and Cavatorta, Opposition Coordination Failures; Langfield, Opposition Growth. 93 Scheiner, Democracy without Competition; Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy; Langfield, Opposition Growth Svåsand, The Concept of Opposition, 319. 94 Norton, Making Sense of Opposition, 246. 95 White, Dominant Party Systems, 663. 96 White, Dominant Party Systems, 664-665 17 political parties will facilitate understanding the way in which opposition impacted on DPS dominance in the three arenas of political competition theorised by Boucek.97
1.4 Methodology The thesis addresses its research topic through a qualitative approach, from the standpoint of an inquiry aiming to “improving understanding of how things work in their particular setting”.98 Therefore, research “draws heavily on interpreting by the researcher”, which, in turn, is dependent on achieving a good understanding of the context (the “stable” background) and situations (the “contingent” background) in which the studied phenomenon unfolds.99 This goal is pursued through a single case study design, using procedural steps formalised by Yin for data collection,100 and Creswell for interpretation.101 Further, the case at hand constitutes an unusual case, as opposition unfolds in an uncommon political context, in which the incumbent party has kept office without interruption since the establishment of a multi-party system.102 Within this framework, the thesis considers political party opposition strategies in various situations within the context of political dominance.
The case unfolds from the proclamation of Montenegro’s independence in 2006, to the present day. Within such scope, more attention is given to developments after 2012, due to a series of problems that hit the incumbent coalition, after the post-independence “honeymoon”.103 While consideration is also devoted to events preceding 2006, such a milestone represents the beginning of a new political season, with different challenges and debates.
The analysis of political parties’ opposition takes into account that, in Montenegro, the rules of the intra-party game are tailored and the game itself is mostly played following the will of party- and non-party elites.104 For this reason, this thesis focuses on the elite level of the political system.
Data was collected from documentary sources through the guidance provided by a set of data collection questions, as proposed by Yin (See Appendix A).105 These questions helped focusing on the relevant information and kept the researcher “on track” during the collection process.106 By
97 Gel’man, Political Opposition in Russia, 186. 98 Stake, Robert E. 2010. Qualitative Research: Studying How Things Work. New York: Guilford Press, 122. 99 Stake, Qualitative Research, 37, 50-51. 100 Yin, Robert K. 2014. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Fifth Edition. Thousand Oaks/London/New Dehli: SAGE. 101 Creswell, John W. 2007. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Method: Choosing among Five Approaches. Thousand Oaks/London/New Dehli: SAGE. 102 Yin, Case Study Research, 93. 103 Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood, 169. 104 Vuković, Party Organization in Montenegro; Vujović and Tomović, The Presidentialisation. 105 Yin, Case Study Research, 138-142. 106 Yin, Case Study Research, 138. 18 these means, the relevant sources were included within a case study database, to preserve the collected data in a retrievable form, and up to the point in which the researcher felt confident to have enough evidence as basis for interpretation.107
In order to achieve a better understanding of the context of the case study, a critical assessment and review of existing literature on political dominance in Montenegro was delivered, connoting this part of the thesis as compilatory.108 The outcome is the description of characteristics that mark political dominance in Montenegro through the lens of the framework presented in the theoretical section, in order to provide various dimensions to the competition bias that burdens opposition parties.
Given the limited resources and scope of the research at hand, addressing the phenomenon of opposition by political parties was guided by a set of strategies presented in the theoretical section, and retrieved from existing literature on political party opposition in hybrid regimes. The use of such “descriptive scenarios”109 or “prefigured codes”110 was a tool to simplify data gathering and analysis processes. However, such a design did not exclude a priori other possible strategies used by the considered actors.
Relatively limited resources and time available to the researcher are considered as main limitations of this study, which could, nevertheless, serve as fruitful basis for a broader consideration of the researched topic. Core documentary sources for data collection in this research were as follows:
- Reports by domestic and international non-governmental and governmental organisations; - Accounts by media outlets on political events (including reported interviews, analysis of political events or simple accounts); and - Academic literature dealing with Montenegrin political context.
Audio-visual data, when available, were considered too, yet treated as documentary sources, extracting relevant information, rather than attempting to frame specific content analysis.
Reports by non-governmental and governmental organisations presenting overviews of political events and trends allowed placing events in a broader chronological perspective. In other cases, they provided detailed analysis of specific events or topics. Similarly, academic contributions, including those within the literature review, were used for better describing political developments, taking into account their authors’ interpretation, when relevant for this thesis purposes.
107 See Yin, Case Study Research, 179-183. 108 Eco, Umberto. 1985. Come si fa una tesi di laurea. Milano: Bompiani, 13. 109 Yin, Robert K. 2003. Applications of Case Study Research. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks/London/New Dehli: SAGE, 26-27. 110 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry, 152-153. 19
The following Montenegrin and regional electronic media outlets were identified as major sources of detailed information: a) Vijesti Online (online version of national newspaper, opposition oriented); b) Monitor (weekly magazine, opposition oriented); c) Radio Slobodna Evropa (Radio Free Europe, regional internet portal). These outlets were chosen as they feature websites with extensive archive data and are particularly keen on reporting on developments within the opposition with fair, although critical, assessments. Other media were consulted ad hoc, mostly as means of triangulation and/or when it was relevant to take into account a pro-government approach.
Although the possibility of semi-structured interviews was considered to gather information not always easily accessible otherwise and in cross-checking and verifying data collected through other sources, the author’s job-related time and movement restrictions made such method hardly feasible. However, good availability of sources thanks to the knowledge of the Montenegrin language mitigated the risk derived from the lack of interviews. To further address that possible gap, triangulation was applied consistently, being vital to propose a more convincing and accurate account of the events.111 Throughout this process, the researcher behaved as a “vicarious observer”, applying a critical approach towards the content of the retrieved documents, as they were understood as part of a communication process between parties and with goals other than the ones at the base of this thesis.112
Relevant information was analysed following what Creswell conceptualised as “data analysis spiral”, which entails the researchers’ figurative movement back-and-forth within a set of analytical circles: 113 a) Data management: organisation of gathered data; b) Reading, memoing: scanning the database for identifying initial categories and related evidence, taking into account the identified strategies and including the ones emerging from the data; c) Describing, classifying, interpreting: development of themes from the initial categories through re-ordering of text images and “making sense of the data” through the development of lessons learned from the study;114 d) Representing, visualising: provisional, working presentation of the findings of the data in text, tabular or figure form.
111 Yin, Case Study Research, 175. 112 Yin, Case Study Research, 162. 113 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry, 150-155. 114 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry,154. 20
Such an approach emphasises the interrelationship of data collection, data analysis, and report writing and helps, ex-post, revealing strategic behaviour of opposition parties through the leads presented in the above theoretical framework.
The thesis proposes a review of the establishment and maintenance of DPS dominance to draw the context, to then delineate the temporal unfolding of political parties’ actions in challenging the dominant. This is done by sorting the description in sections that address given periods of time, in which opposition is marked by particular themes. The description is more detailed for events deemed important for the overall understanding of the studied phenomenon. Eventually, the results of the thesis are proposed as “lessons learned”, i.e. reporting the ‘meaning of the case’ as the outcome of the learning process triggered by the adopted methodology during the analysis.115
Chapter 2 – A Review of DPS Dominance This chapter reviews the establishment and development of DPS dominance in Montenegro, addressing its temporal unfolding and multilevel nature within the electoral, parliamentary, and executive arenas of party competition. The following analysis will answer the first research sub- question (1.a), thereby sketching the contextual framework to consider the way in which political parties expressed their opposition to the dominant during the post-independence period, in the third chapter.
2.1 Montenegro’s Political Monolith: 1990 - 1997 A central pillar of DPS dominance in the 1990s was the fact that dominance itself was, simply, already established. As successor of the League of Communists of Montenegro (SKCG), the DPS retained control on the majority of its assets and networks.116 Moreover, early successes were also sustained by the party’s uncontested legitimacy among the Republic’s population. The new, “young, handsome, and intelligent” SKCG/DPS leaders, Momir Bulatović, Svetozar Marović, and Milo Djukanović, could boast their appointment as a result of Milošević-sponsored “Anti- bureaucratic Revolution”.117 Thanks to Belgrade’s patronage and channelled popular mobilisation, these new leaders and many of their colleagues reached top party positions in a matter of months and at very young age. Although the party structure remained the same, the source of legitimacy was now the ‘will of the Montenegrin people’, voiced and fulfilled through the ‘politics of the
115 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry, 75. 116 Džankić, Citizenship, 58. 117 Morrison, Montenegro, 85. 21 street’ in 1988 – 1989, where the old communist leadership was toppled.118 As the monopoly of the party remained intact,
The change in the personal composition of the regime and some of its policies under popular pressure prior to the end of communism only rejuvenated and reenergized the authoritarian regime and thus improved its life- prospects, albeit in a very different form.119
The peculiar, fast-track career of the new leadership meant that, besides from being tightly linked with Belgrade’s regime, they needed to find ways to rule effectively, in spite of their inexperience and difficulties posed by the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ). This was done through reliance on an oligarchic decision-making system, that will soon become one of the main features of DPS internal organisation (and of Montenegro as well).120 In a party that was mainly “concerned with the preservation of vested interests”, such system proved vital in managing often conflicting interests of internal factions.121 In other words, DPS maintained political, organisational, and economic assets of the SKCG, yet lacked the latter’s “ideological pulse”: it was a “party of power”, whose ultimate goal remained “preservation of political dominance and economic benefits” for the ruling elite.122
To such ends, extensive mediation between its heterogeneous internal factions was a necessary, but not sufficient condition. The introduction of multiparty elections in 1990 required adaptation of the strategies necessary to ensure continued dominance, but not its ex novo establishment: inherited control over state institutions and economic sector was now used to diminish the chances of electoral success of political formations averse to the ruling SKCG/DPS.
Competing as a “state-party”,123 the SKCG achieved an absolute majority of seats in Montenegro’s first parliamentary elections in December 1990. Even after renaming itself DPS in July 1991, the party secured the absolute majority of seats in both 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections, while electing its candidate as President of Montenegro in 1990 and 1992.124 Tellingly, legislation was adapted to the ruling party’s wishes prior to each parliamentary election and helped maximising its
118 Vladisavljević, Nebojša. 2008. Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution: Miloševic, The Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 202-203. 119 Vladisavljević, Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution, 205. 120 Vuković, Ivan. 2013. Political Dynamics in the Post-Communist Montenegro: One-Party Show. Democratization 22(1), 81-83. 121 Morrison, Montenegro, 90. 122 Morrison, Montenegro, 147. 123 Vukovic, Political Dynamics in the Post-Communist Montenegro, 74. 124 Goati, Vladimir. 2014. Izbori u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori od 1990. do 2013. i u SRJ od 1992. do 2003. Belgrade: CeSID & NDI; Darmanović, Srdjan. 2007. Duga tranzicija u Crnoj Gori – od polukompetitivnih izbora do izborne demokratije. In Izbori i izborno zakonodavstvo u Crnoj Gori 1990 – 2006, edited by Pavićević, Veselin/ Darmanović, Srdjan/ Komar, Olivera and Zlatko Vujović. CEMI: Podgorica, 86-87. 22 seats in the Assembly.125 In addition, the grey zone created by citizenship policies in the new Yugoslav Federation and the residence-based franchising system in force in the Republic meant that DPS could broaden its voter base through inclusion in the electorate of Serbs sympathetic to the Yugoslav cause that fled from neighbouring war zones.126 Besides these and other manipulations (e.g. irregular voters’ list), extensive control of state administration and employment in the public sector became an important a tool for securing votes.127 In this way, DPS lived through the new ‘era’ of multiparty elections with popular legitimacy and full control of former socialist state apparatuses and assets. Srđan Darmanović, Minister of External Affairs in a DPS-led government since 2016,128 put it this way in 2003:
The DPS held the system together by assiduously using its complete control over state organs and resources in order to squelch critics and rivals and win elections. The usual range of methods was employed, including party domination of the state-owned media; the packing of offices with party favourites; the maintenance of slush funds; occasional intimidation of adversaries; the abuse of police authority to influence the electoral process; and manipulations of the electoral system. Backed by these kinds of tactics, the DPS easily bested its dispirited opponents and retained an absolute majority of seats in the Montenegrin parliament.129
When it comes to the economic texture, the consequences of war and international sanctions created the conditions for the rise of a new economic oligarchy, closely associated and often overlapping with DPS’s political oligarchy. During the period of international sanctions, the state had to sacrifice control over economic transactions to keep the economic system going. In this process, political elites began tightly cooperating with organised criminal groups in running complex smuggling schemes to circumvent the embargo.130 The revenues of such operations, besides making the individuals involved extremely wealthy and politically influential, were also channelled to finance the ruling party’s activities, which guaranteed smooth operative environment for such schemes through control of state apparatuses.131 During the sanctions, therefore, “state capture” was established with the consolidation of “unclear boundaries between the political and business interests of state officials”, effectively resulting in a system based on “the illicit provision of private
125 Darmanović, Srđan. 2003. Montenegro: The Dilemmas of a Small Republic. Journal of Democracy 14(1), 153, Fn 2. 126 Džankić, Citizenship, 54. 127 Djuranović, Draško. 1996. Crna Gora. Govor gladnih stomaka. NIN, 8 November 1996. Available at: http://www.nin.co.rs/arhiva/2393/4.html (accessed 19 April 2019). 128 Perović-Korać, Milena. Odliv bivših opozicionara. Monitor, 31 December 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/odliv-bivih-opozicionara/ (accessed 19 April 2019). 129 Darmanović, Dilemmas of a Small Republic, 147. 130 Uzelac, Corruption in Transition Countries, 106-107. 131 Džankić, Citizenship, 59; Sisti, Leo. 2009. The Montenegro Connection. Love, Tobacco, and the Mafia. Available at: https://www.reportingproject.net/underground/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7&Itemid=20 (accessed: 27 April 2019). 23 gains to public officials via informal, non-transparent, and highly preferential channels of access”.132
All of this meant that other political parties had to participate in elections in an environment that hardly allowed meaningfully contesting for power. Among such actors, two main streams of opposition gradually consolidated after 1990s elections: on the one side, the anti-communist and Serb-nationalist People’s Party (NS), and, on the other, the reformist and independentist Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). Members of this second bloc, together with Montenegro’s national minorities and some intellectuals, moved fierce anti-war opposition and remained strong advocates of cutting ties with Milosevic’s regime, although operating in very difficult circumstances. Rather untouched, DPS labelled such opposition as treacherous and presented its political line as one of moderation, a compromise between hard-line Serb nationalists and independentists.133
In this climate, a first anti-DPS coalition formed by the NS and LSCG for 1996 parliamentary elections did not gather more than a quarter of total preferences.134 With limited assets to count on and an evident incompatibility between their political values, the endeavour did not manage to gather more votes than the sum of their preferences in 1992 parliamentary elections. Due to changes to electoral legislation, moreover, the other main opposition party, the SDP, did not cross the threshold even though it gathered around 5% of the preferences. Overall, “opposition was too small to challenge the structure of power in Montenegro”: amidst elite and popular consensus on the pro- Serbian, Yugoslav line, DPS dominance held steady even during a harsh economic crisis.135
DPS success in 1996 parliamentary elections notwithstanding, the Montenegrin “monolith” did eventually fall apart due to an internal quarrel on continued support for Milošević. Although signals of disagreement with Belgrade emerged early on, internal conflict suddenly intensified only in 1997.136 As Morrison concisely explains, the split did not happen on nationalist motives, but was a “political, economic and personal (...) conflict between elites dictated to by elite interests”.137 Indeed, the economic disaster caused by Milošević’s wars was evident, with some among the ruling elite in Montenegro sensing the looming threat to their power base. Differing ideas in this field were also evidenced when the Republic kicked off its own privatisation plans in 1996. Although
132 World Bank. 2000. Anticorruption in Transition. A contribution to the Policy Debate. Washington, 3, cited in Uzelac, Corruption in Transition Countries, 104. 133 Morrison, Montenegro, 90, 108-109; Darmanović, Duga tranzicija u Crnoj Gori, 84-89. 134 Goati, Izbori, 115-116. 135 Morrison, Montenegro, 111. 136 E.g. Montenegro’s acceptance of Carrington’s plan in October 1991. despite Belgrade’s refusal, and the support of the latter to a different DPS candidate than Bulatović in 1992 presidential elections. See Goati, Izbori, 38. 137 Morrison, Montenegro, 148. 24 happening within an already captured state, economic liberalisation included the prospect of strong support from the international community, eager to stand by reformist forces in the war-torn post- Yugoslav scenario.138 At this point, political events in Serbia were perceived by Milo Djukanović as a fruitful moment to attempt a political U-turn.139 His famous interview to Belgrade’s Weekly Vreme, in which he described Milošević as “a man of obsolete political ideas”, marked the prelude to the conflict within the two federated Republics and the DPS itself.140
A split became inevitable throughout 1997, as Djukanović, backed by Svetozar Marović, entered in open contrast with the pro-Milošević faction of Momir Bulatović. Thanks to the informal network he built during the embargo and with remarkable political wit, Djukanović gathered influential individuals in his support and ensured the success of his faction in July 1997.141 Heading for an electoral show-down in October 1997 between Bulatović and Djukanović himself, a new era of Montenegrin politics was about to set in,142 one in which a ‘purged’ DPS leadership set about exploiting political positions that were, up to that point, prerogative of the reformist opposition. However, and differently from them, such endeavour could count on overwhelming control of state and economic assets.
Embedding this period within Boucek’s analytical framework, developments within the executive arena were central, given that DPS entered multiparty politics with established “hyper-incumbency advantages”.143 Indeed, assets and networks inherited from the socialist system remained prerogative of the party, which maintained its monopoly. An oligarchic management of the party structure was also functional in establishing and consolidating an overlapping economic oligarchy. Violent conflicts in the disintegrating Yugoslavia and war-related economic sanctions provided the context in which these new elites gained wealth and enduring political influence, thereby allowing the exercise of DPS dominance outside formal institutions. Uncontested use of state resources and apparatuses for partisan goals made the DPS de-facto a ‘state party’, marking continuity with the previous socialist system. With state capture in place, the following process of privatisation could be managed through the already established links. Controlled liberalisation actually cemented the power base of the ruling elite and their associates, instead of limiting it.
138 Uzelac, Corruption in Transition Countries, 107. 139 Caspersen, Nina. 2003. Elite Interests and the Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict. Southeast European Politics 4(2-3), 104-121. 140 Brajović, Velizar. 1997. Interview: Milo Djukanović. Milošević is an Obsolete Politician. Nedeljnik Vreme, 22 February 1997. Available at: http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/serbiandigest/ (accessed: 29 April 2019). 141 Caspersen, Elite Interests, 108; Džankić, Citizenship, 57. 142 Morrison, Montenegro, 148-157. 143 Greene, Opposition Party Strategy, 759. 25
When it comes to the electoral arena, the consequences of the “Anti-bureaucratic Revolution” made it so that the new leadership enjoyed a legitimacy capital that was robustly supported by both Serb-nationalist rhetoric and the idea of continuity with the strong role of the state in managing economy and distribution of resources. Adapting the latter feature to multiparty competition, a system of selective benefits for supporters of the ruling party was put in place, with particular attention to employment in the public sector. This way, patronage became a central pillar of DPS relationship with voters from the inception of multiparty competition in Montenegro. Amidst economic disaster, authoritarian practices, including threats and intimidation against minorities and oppositions, and a persisting legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of a population that never experienced any form of democratic rule, created a strong mix enabling the DPS to maintain electoral consensus.
Political opposition was depicted as extremist and dangerous, with the DPS occupying an ‘easy’ central position in the political space, underpinned by revision at will of electoral legislation and manipulation of the electoral process. Due to blatant resource asymmetry and support for the Yugoslav/Serb(ian) cause among voters, electoral dominance was rather easily established in this period.
Given overwhelming control of the state through authoritarian means, the parliamentary arena was hardly of any significance in this period. Oligarchic DPS-rule meant that parliament was only rubber-stamping decisions already taken elsewhere. It is telling that between 1990 and 1994, the Assembly of Montenegro gathered for an average of less than a month per year.144 Such data speak for the unimportant role of competition in this arena: achieving an absolute majority of seats in all three elections, there was no need for meaningful bargaining with other parties. Bargaining was going on within the dominant party, among its internal currents, and between party elites and their associates through informal channels.
2.2 (Re-)Configuring Dominance through Controlled Liberalisation: 1997 - 2006 Having ensured support of influential individuals through the promise of a share in case of a favourable outcome, the first test Djukanović’s DPS had to withstand were October 1997 Presidential Elections against his former ally, Momir Bulatović.145 In order to do so, he engaged in negotiations with other political parties, gathering a new parliamentary majority and signing, on 1 September 1997, an Agreement on Minimum Principles for the Development of Democratic Infrastructure in Montenegro by the Government, DPS, LSCG, NS, SDP and the representatives of
144 Goati, Izbori, 116-117. 145 Morrison, Montenegro, 155-157. 26
Bosniak and Albanian minorities.146 The agreement represented an ambitious declaration for democratic reforms, including commitment towards nationalisation of some SKCG/DPS property, rule of law, decentralisation, privatisation, and protection of human and minority rights.147 Central was the obligation to hold “free and fair elections” by May 1998, thanks to revised electoral law to be drafted by the signatories within a Multi-Party Working Group on Electoral Reform. Among other things, revisions included the (re-)introduction of a single-constituency proportional system and representation rights for the Albanian minority.148
Although the split was a unique occasion for opposition parties to push some of their core requests on the government’s agenda, diverging opinions were present. Within the NS, disagreement on whether to cooperate with Djukanović led to a split: the majority of officials sided with the cooperative stance of its leader, Novak Kilibarda, while the opposing faction left the party, founding the Serbian People’s Party (SNS).149 The latter will eventually prove a relevant actor among opposition ranks, especially after 2003, under the leadership of Andrija Mandić.
This notwithstanding, the political dialogue represented a symbolic cut with previous practice, although observers were quick to note that
The lack of independent counsel suggests that the process of electoral reform has become politicized, i.e. with political interests rather than technical and legal considerations driving the reform process.150
With hindsight, such platform represented a first step towards appropriation of some central programmatic points of independentist parties by Djukanović’s transformed DPS, a move that will become extremely relevant for future party strategies. For the moment, the harsh campaign for October 1997 presidential elections ended with a slight success of Djukanović, and immediate accusations of fraud by Bulatović and his supporters.151 Tensions run high, with Serbian government deciding to close the internal border between the two entities and protests in occasion of the presidential inauguration ending up in violence, on 14 January 1998. Although fears for a larger scale deterioration of the security situation were serious, Bulatović’s attempt to turn back to ‘the politics of the street’ failed, and actually backfired. Showing disregard for recognised electoral results, he strengthened Djukanović’s position in the newly-constructed image of reformist leader,
146 The Agreement was not supported by a fraction of the NS, that will later on form a new party, and by Bulatović’s grouping within the DPS. Nedović, Slobodanka. (ed.). 1998. Oko izbora 3. Izveštaj sa prevremenih parlamentarnih i lokalnih izbora u Crnoj Gori (Maj 1998.). Beograd: CeSID, 44. 147 See full Agreement in Barnes, Catherine/Levaditis, Alexandra and Daniel Finn. 1998. Republic of Montenegro. Voter Awareness Assessment Legal Review. Novmber 1997 – Februrary 1998. IFES: Washington, Annex VII. 148 Barnes, Voter Awareness Assessment, 20-21. 149 Bieber, Florian. 2010. The Party System of Montenegro. In Party Politics in the Western Balkans, edited by Stojarová, Vera. London/New York:- Routledge, 128. 150 Barnes, Voter Awareness Assessment, 21. 151 See Morrison, Montenegro, 161-163. 27 much appreciated and generously rewarded by Western governments.152 Defeated, Bulatović established the Socialist People’s Party (SNP) on 21 March 1998, closing a turbulent political year. The new formation sided with Milošević and followed an analogous “mixture of social populism and affinity with Serb nationalism”, although in a milder version than more nationalist Serb parties, such as the SNS.153 Having no appeal to minority groups, the main pool of voters came from northern and rural areas, mostly with lower social and educational background.154
As snap parliamentary elections were set for May 1998, in partial fulfilment of the aforementioned agreement, the power balance between DPS and its opponents was now different. In order to overcome the risk of missing a majority, re-asserted control over state apparatuses was deployed against SNP-led opposition, including intimidation, illegal house searches, harassment, and physical attacks.155 For the first time, DPS would run in coalition, with the NS, SDP, and Albanian minority parties within the “To live better” platform, gaining an absolute majority of seats. Belgrade- sponsored SNP proved a meaningful adversary with around 36% of total preferences, differently from a weakened LSCG that stopped at 6%.156 Thanks to these results, DPS went on sharing the spoils of victory, while building the institutions the new autonomist path would require and placing loyal individuals in all relevant power-positions.157
The Kosovo Crisis marked another delicate period, with concrete risks of violent spill over. As strong pressures from Serbia to alter the government’s neutral stance were met with increased militarisation of Montenegrin police forces, Djukanović gave its Republic an “army of loyalists” and deeper intelligence control.158 In this climate, ever-growing accusations of separatism coming from Belgrade and its Montenegrin loyalist against the ‘rebel’ government started configuring as a self-fulfilling prophecy: they fostered polarisation among the Montenegrin public, providing further incentives for elites to carve out competences (and power) from the federal centre.159
Meanwhile, democratisation progress announced in September 1997 lingered. Observers noted in 2001 that “the discrepancy between a rhetoric of reform and a reality of institutional inertia is striking”, while “the major ‘reform trend’ of recent years is simply the continuation of a decade- long Yugoslav dynamic, the transfer of responsibilities – in recent years for monetary policy and
152 Morrison, Montenegro, 163, 166. 153 Bieber, The Party System of Montenegro, 123-124. 154 Morrison, Montenegro, 163. 155 Mochťak, Michal. 2015. Democratization and Electoral Violence in Post-Communism. A Study of Montenegro. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 15(1), 105. 156 Goati, Izbori, 117-118. 157 Morrison, Montenegro, 176. 158 Morrison, Montenegro, 170-172. 159 Caspersen, Elite Interests, 109-111. 28 customs administration – from the Federal to the Republican level”, entailing further growth of the public and administrative sector thanks to stability-oriented and unconditional foreign aid.160
In this regard, it is crucial to stress the pragmatic, power-oriented rather than ideological reasons behind DPS-led “creeping independence”.161 Devoid of its democratic primacy after the fall of Milošević, the ruling party will start seeking legitimisation for separatist policies through a new, nationalist frame.162 If, up to 1997, traditional ambiguity between Montenegrin and Serb identities was not put into question due to its role in sustaining DPS alliance with Milošević, things changed after the split.163 As Montenegrin elites developed clearer interests in the separation of the Yugoslav entities after October 2000, discourse increasingly turned from contesting Belgrade’s democratic deficits and military threats to the “right to independent statehood”.164 Montenegrin-Serb differentiation became now functional, providing a readily viable discourse to retain and deepen Montenegrin self-determination. Accordingly, the ruling elite embarked in a top-down process of redefinition of Montenegrin identity, which included distancing from religious and ethnic connotations for a more civic character, emphasis on historical autonomy of Montenegrin lands, specific citizenship policies, and a whole set of revisions of the main symbols of the Republic.165 The civic imprint of such Montenegrin identity marked a strong difference with the traditional Serb one. Besides highlighting the ‘Westerness’ of the construct, it was to be appealing to previously marginalised Albanian and Bosniak minorities, thereby backing up the electoral alliance inaugurated in 1998.166
This elite-driven process allowed the construction of a politicised identity that could effectively work only against a ‘serbianised’ opposition, i.e. an ‘internal other’ promoting an intrinsic anti- Montenegrin agenda. The matter was different when it came to other independentist and reformist parties. While the SDP was already co-opted in 1998, LSCG remained stubbornly reluctant to establish stronger ties with the DPS, becoming in the eyes of the latter (and of parts of the public) the reminder of a party advocating independence since 1990 and that proudly asserted the related “moral high-ground”.167 This way, it represented the main obstacle between the DPS and uncontested ideological prominence over the forming independentist bloc. Accordingly, the LSCG
160 European Stability Initiative. 2001. Rhetoric and Reform. A Case Study of Institution Building in Montenegro 1998- 2001. Podgorica and Berlin: European Stability Inititative, 2. 161 Džankić, Citizenship, 46. 162 Bieber and Winterhagen, Erst der Staat, 9. 163 Džankić, Citizenship, 47. 164 Caspersen, Elite Interests, 116. 165 Džankić, Reconstructing the Meaning of Being Montenegrin, 352. Bieber and Winterhagen, Erst der Staat, 24. 166 Džankić, Citizenship, 47; Morrison, Kenneth. 2016. Ethnic Minority Parties in Montenegro. In Ethnic Minorities and Politics in Post-Socialist Southeastern Europe, edited by Ramet, Sabrina P. and Marko Valenta. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 138-153. 167 Morrison, Montenegro, 185-187. 29 was strongly targeted by the DPS, in a strategy following up on the gradual appropriation of most of its programmatic points started in 1998 and that will push the party into dissolution in 2005.168
On its part, the SNP attempted at polishing its image adopting a reformist platform and moving away from Milošević in February 2001. This also entailed leadership change and, a consolidating practice in Montenegrin politics, a party split. With the election of Predrag Bulatović as new president, Momir Bulatović left and established his People’s Socialist Party (NSS).169
While these processes unfolded, the focus on statehood caused NS withdrawal from the ruling coalition in early 2001, requiring snap elections and showing the first concrete consequences of the new line of conflict in the political system. After April 2001 elections, DPS-SDP coalition “The Victory is of Montenegro” formed a government with representatives of the Albanian minority and external support of the LSCG, while “Together for Yugoslavia” coalition, composed by SNP, SNS, and NS featured as the strongest rival in parliament.170
When the so-called Belgrade Agreement of March 2002 foresaw the transformation of the FRY into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the government lost its parliamentary majority again, opening a long politico-institutional crisis. In contrast with the agreement, LSCG withdrew its support for the incumbent and promoted a successful vote of no confidence with SNP, SNS, and NS. The new majority rested on contrasting basis and was to be ad hoc, limiting itself to unilateral amendments to electoral legislation during summer 2002. As the DPS refused to comply on procedural grounds, the institutional deadlock before snap elections could be overcome only through mediation by the European Union.171 The compromise allowed elections to happen, resulting in a DPS-SDP absolute majority in the Assembly.172 Far from resolving the crisis, the electoral outcome was rejected by most of the opposition, with LSCG immediately boycotting parliamentary works. Adding to this, main opposition parties decided not to field candidates for the upcoming presidential election. Due to a 50% turnout threshold for validity, they managed to invalidate two consecutive rounds before legislative amendments removing the quorum were approved. Afterwards, DPS candidate Filip Vujanović easily won an absolute majority of preferences, lacking any real competitor.173 This notwithstanding, the crisis persisted. By May 2003, all opposition parties decided to join the LSCG in the parliamentary boycott, formalising their
168 Several miscalculated decisions played their role as well. See Goati, Izbori, 119, 172-173. 169 Goati, Izborna Nadmetanja u SRJ, 24-26. 170 Goati, Vladimir. 2003. Izborna nadmetanja u Saveznoj republici jugoslaviji od 2000. do 2003. Beograd: CeSID, 22- 29. SrNS was formed in late 1997 from a split within the NS by a group of members that disagreed with Kilibarda’s decision to take part in the dialogue with the DPS and other opposition parties. The party was led by Andrija Mandic. 171 CeSID. 2003. Oko izbora 11. Beograd, 11-20; 172 Goati, Izborna nadmetanja u SRJ, 30-34. 173 Goati, izbori, 145-147. 30 commitment to further non-institutional actions through a “Declaration on Joint Activity” on 22 July 2003.174
During the boycott, the rift on identity matters between most of the opposition and the government was reinforced by a new law on Montenegrin national symbols, further polarising the electorate and fostering feelings of isolation among Serb Montenegrins.175 In this context, non-institutional acts of opposition included the attempt to mobilise voters through a politicised re-birth of tribal assemblies in Serb-inhabited areas. First seen during the Kosovo crisis, this SNP-sponsored initiative intended to provide legitimation for Unionist ideas, relying on a “grotesque mixture of pre-modern historical forms (tribal gatherings) and quite modern political contents (party political life)”.176 Although results were meagre,177 such attempts show how Unionist/Yugoslav opposition did not attempt escaping the Serb-Montenegrin identity dispute. On the contrary, it fully relied on it, using strategies that supported DPS’s claims of uncontested democratic primacy within the polity. Eventually, under substantial external pressure and seeing the overall lack of success of their strategy both in terms of results and voters’ support,178 the opposition parties resolved to end the boycott and return parliament in late 2004.179
This prolonged crisis testifies for the way in which the statehood and identity question took roots and polarised Montenegrin politics and, to a slightly lesser extent, society. Indeed, such divide can be misleading. There was never full compliance with DPS desired Montenegrin identity construct, and disputes over statehood did only disguise other problems within the polity.180 A case in point was regional inequalities. Unionist voters were not just closer to Serb identity, but also tended to reside in the least developed, northern areas of the country, and presented lower educational and economic profiles.
With the statehood issue clearly at the forefront, rare attempts to defy such scheme for the sake of maintaining a principled opposition to the dominant proved deleterious, and were eventually lethal for the LSCG. This meant that, with only few exceptions, opposition became monopolised by the Unionist bloc, including hardliners of Serb nationalism that proved a perfect fit for DPS accusations of disloyal opposition.
174 Goati, izbori, 134-135; Pavičević, Veselin. 2004. Partije i partitokratske tendencije. Raspad koalicije za bojkot. In Tranzicija u Crnoj Gori – Izvjieštaj br. 23, Septembar 2004. Podgorica: CEDEM, 3. 175 Morrison, Montenegro, 192-199. 176 Popović, Milan. 2002. Montenegrin Mirror: Polity in Turmoil (1991-2001). Podgorica: Nansen Dialogue Centre, 22. 177 Goati, Izbori, 135. 178 Despotović, Ilija. Isti Milo, isto odstojanje. PCNEN, 1 August 2004. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2004/08/01/isti-milo-isto-odstojanje/ (accessed 06 June 2019). 179 Pavičević, Partije i partitokratske tendencije. 180 Džankić, Reconstructing the Meaning. 31
As the independentist front formed around the idea of “Independence First, Democracy Second,” DPS dominance became the necessary means for fostering success chances of this option, assembling around Djukanović’s leadership.181 While backing Djukanović will pay-off, it implied the establishment of an indissoluble link between independence and the DPS with its leader. This represented a huge political capital to be spent after independence against a reorganising opposition and that lasted at least up to 2012.
Differently from the previous period, all three arenas of political competition were relevant for the maintenance of DPS dominance. In the electoral arena, the most interesting feature is represented by the way in which DPS capitalised on inherited control of state resources and clientelist networks to produce ideological legitimacy through a newly branded state nationalism, complete with (Western) friends and (Serb) foes.
While Montenegrin society has a longer history of debate regarding its ties with Serbia, the consequences of 1997 split and incentives created by the conflict with Belgrade (i.e. increasing power for local elites and foreign aid) were such that, by the turn of the century, DPS interest became clearly connected with independence, finding a readily available tool in the manipulation of identity discourse. This top-down process provoked the clearer polarisation along the previous “Serb-Montenegrin identity continuum”,182 and promoted direct connection between parties and voters’ positions along such continuum. The outcome was clear politicisation of identity affiliations, which became consistent predictors of voting behaviour.183 As evidenced in the context of 2006 referendum, the divide came to represent a cleavage of the political system: It found “organizational expression” through political parties, so that resolution of the statehood question did not resolve the conflict on different ideas of Montenegrin nation.184
Connoting itself as the referent of an independent Montenegrin identity, the DPS kept political discourse outside programmatic politics, mobilising the electorate on statehood and identity lines. Parties within the independentist bloc that previously opposed the incumbent had to accept co- optation or being pushed into irrelevance. True political space was present only for Unionist, pro- Serb political entrepreneurs, who competed among themselves for relative strength. Differentiation within this front allowed resorting to extremist and/or traditionalist positions that did not enjoy great support in Montenegro, let alone among Western governments. Ultimately, DPS proved fully successful in cornering its main competitors in the electoral arena through its continued use of
181 Morrison, Montenegro, 187. 182 Bieber and Winterhagen, Erst der Staat, 3. 183 Džankić, Reconstructing the Meaning, 352. 184 Mair, Peter. 2006. Cleavages. In Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Katz, Richard S. and William Crotty. London/Thousand Oaks/New Dehli: SAGE, 373. 32 incumbency advantages and the post-1997 gradual promotion of a reshaped, pragmatic Montenegrin nationalism.
Such developments are discernible within the parliamentary arena as well. Here, the true novelty of this period was the need for inter-party bargaining for the DPS to maintain its dominant position. This was crucial for the ruling elite to turn towards identity discourse. In this sense, previous flirting with Serb nationalism did not allow for meaningful bargaining with minorities. Now that minority parties became a determinant pool of votes, it was necessary to provide an ideological foundation for this interest-based alliance. The inter-party dialogue of summer 1997 and the change in rhetoric represented a clever move of Djukanović’s DPS. They allowed the use of state resources available to the dominant for co-opting both minorities and independentist parties. Among the latter, the ones who did not accept such prospects were to be placed under the pressure of the powerful state party and, with their programme practically stolen, did not possess resources and media access to fight back.
In this context, inter-party bargaining became central, as testified by shifting parliamentary alliances and the aspiring ‘kingmaker’ role some parties sought while negotiating with the dominant. Paradoxically, the parliamentary boycott by opposition forces signalled the increased importance of bargaining in this arena, as it tried to show publicly opposition parties’ refusal to take part in it, while attempting to include external actors as mediators, thereby reducing power asymmetry with the dominant. Although bargaining did not take place in parliament itself, as informality remained the main mode of political decisions, a relevant difference with the previous period can be noted. Decisions were not exclusively taken within the DPS (and agreed with Belgrade) anymore. Now, bargaining was happening both within the DPS and between the DPS and its shuffling, minor partners, although the power balance remained firmly in favour of the same party and its associated interest groups.
The post-split period was also marked by the uncontested centrality of Djukanović’s leadership, with more homogeneous top echelons within the DPS, and a decision-making system that had to be adapted to take into account the need for co-optation and, sometimes, cooperation with other parties, external groups or individuals. The oligarchic system remained in place and, although it needed to modify its strategies and actions, did reproduce itself with success within the executive arena.
Government action remained strongly in line with party interests, and the appropriation of federal competences responded to the need of the ruling elite to solidify its control on the institutions of a future independent state, even before its achievement. Partisan and divisive use of identity policies 33 meant that, once again, party positions became ingrained with the state, preserving the blurred lines between the two entities. Growing budget resources (thanks to foreign assistance, expansion of competences, and steady economic growth driven by liberalisation and foreign direct investments) were effectively exploited to maintain politicisation of state administration, now purged from disloyal officers.
To a certain extent, direct DPS control over the economy had to be outsourced during the ongoing privatisation process. However, previously established state capture meant that economic power remained tightly linked with the party through a dense network of personal and business relations among elites, while management of public enterprises remained prerogative of party members and their associates. State resources were consistently channelled towards loyal economic actors and fuelling the clientelist system that allowed DPS overwhelming electoral successes. These practices kept generating wealth for a few oligarchs and rents for the ruling elite, while ensuring the continuity of the dominant party rule.
2.3 Maintaining Dominance after Independence Having traced the development of DPS dominance since the introduction of multiparty elections, the analysis will now turn to characterise the way such dominance configured itself after independence. Attention to the dimensional features of dominance will give a better understanding of the context in which opposition parties’ actions will be considered in the following chapter.
A core pillar of DPS dominance in the electoral arena has been the patron-client relationship it established with Montenegrin electorate since the 1990s and the related “Image of invincibility” surrounding the party and its leader.185 Most voters never experienced non-DPS rule, so that it must not be that surprising if they assess its dominance as the default outcome of the electoral process.186 Practically, they “only need to decide if they want to be on the side of the winners or of the losers”.187 Siding with the winners or with the losers is not just a matter of political preference. It means being included or not in “the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support”.188 In this way, DPS consolidated its continued
185 Komar and Živković, Montenegro; Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy. 186 Kapor, Goran. 2019. Crne Gore prije Mila Đukanovića ne sjeća se 52 odsto građana. Vijesti. 6 May 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/crne-gore-prije-mila-dukanovica-ne-sjeca-se-52-odsto-gradana (accessed 21 May 2019). 187 Komar and Živković, Montenegro, 786. 188 Hopkin, Jonathan. 2006. Clientelism and Party Politics, in Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Katz, Richard S. and William Crotty. London/Thousand Oaks/New Dehli: Sage, 405. 34 dominance in this arena through its “political monopoly”, i.e. the monopoly over goods that can be controlled only through national political office.189 As with Stokes,
“Under a Political Monopoly, voters who wish to throw a patron out of office may face a collective action problem: his exit represents a public good, yet the voter who votes against him when a majority of others does not risks suffering the patron’s retaliation. Each voter minimizes her risk and maximizes her payoff when she votes for the unpopular patron but all other voters (or at least a majority) vote against him. Yet, because all voters face this same incentive, the unpopular patron remains in power.”190
Clearly, the relationship between voter and clientelist party happens within a given social context. Being able to sidestep vote secrecy represents a necessary condition for clientelist parties, as it allows holding individual voters accountable and managing the promised reward accordingly.191 In Montenegro, ballot secrecy is hindered by two contextual features: its very small population and a socio-cultural system that privileges personal and familial network over state structures.192 With a total population of around 630 thousands, preserving anonymity is challenging, and it is not unlikely that a politician, take Djukanović, may have reached each and every of some five hundred thousand Montenegrin voters during his electoral tours.193
This small-scale setting is coupled with socio-cultural practices marked by persistent prominence of kin-related institutions over the state system.194 As a result of historico-political trends and events, political culture in Montenegro entails seeing the state as untrustworthy and unstable, to be exploited if given a chance. The effect of such attitude is far from positive: Besides some indulgence for individuals who abuse state resources for their own interests, this being sort of ‘normal’, it also includes a passive stance as means of resistance against such biased system, a state- of-mind strengthened by the feeling that decisions are both made outside the direct control, and definitely not for the benefit, of its ordinary members.195 In this context, a political party ‘born’ with privileged access to public resources and willing to rely on clientelist practices had an easier hand overcoming ballot secrecy. Indeed, DPS’s control over Montenegrin “dense social links” through
189 Stokes, Susan C. 2007. Political Clientelism, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, edited by Boix, Charles and Susan C. Stokes. New York: Oxford University Press, 607. 190 Stokes, Political Clientelism, 607. 191 Stokes, Political Clientelism, 613-614. 192 Sedlenieks, Klavs. 2015. Buffer Culture in Montenegro: Bratstvo, Kumstvo and other Kin-Related Structures, in A Life for Tomorrow: Social Transformations in South-East Europe, edited by Cvetičanin, Predrag / Mangova, Ilina and Nenad Markovikj. Skopje: Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” Skopje, 199-216. 193 Vukičević, Boris. 2015. Electoral Campaign. In Electoral and Party System in Montenegro. A Perspective of Internal Party Democracy Development edited by Goati, Vladimir et alia. Podgorica: CeMI, 138. 194 Sedlenieks, Buffer Culture in Montenegro. 195 Djukanović, Borislav. 2018. Everyday Life and Lifestyles of Social Classes in Montenegro. Südosteuropa 66(2), 182-202; Sedlenieks, Buffer Culture in Montenegro, 200, 211-212; Komar, Birači u Crnoj Gori. 35 widespread informal pressures keeps representing a central pillar for reproducing its electoral dominance.196
Patronage comes with complementary rhetoric strategies. A common feature of clientelist parties is the combination of material rewards with other mobilising appeals, thereby aiming at maintaining a group of core voters while focusing material incentives towards unsure ones, either with the goal of avoiding abstention or shifting preferences.197 In Montenegro, DPS has been doing this through the exploitation of identity discourse with a sort of “regime, Montenegrin, ethnic, and state nationalism”.198 The focus on identity and statehood sustained the ruling party’s ‘catch-all’ approach towards voters, and has been characterised as a “state-sponsored populist discourse that justifies one-party rule”.199 Indeed, when it comes to policy-related ideological orientation, the DPS refrains from clear-cut positioning and most of its rhetoric develops on valence dimensions. Again, such strategy is both a classic of dominant parties and a useful tool for maximising the efficiency of vote-buying practices towards moderate, unsure voters, avoiding their alienation due to extreme ideological positions.200 The dominant frames itself as a reliable and experienced party, and achievements such as independence, economic growth, and the progress with NATO and EU accession are mentioned as proofs for those claims. DPS aims thus at representing the safe choice against the anti-Montenegrin agenda of its competitors: its rule protects Montenegro from an evil ‘other’, i.e. pro-Serb/pro-Russian opposition, but also by any other opposition, as criticisms undermines that very same defence against the ‘other’. Hence, any opposition to the DPS is considered opposition against Montenegro tout court.201 The fact that this discourse disguises rent- seeking agendas of the elite does not appear to provoke great anti-DPS electoral mobilisation. As mentioned above, voters in Montenegro have showed a passive attitude and enduring willingness to follow charismatic leaders, Djukanović being a case in point.202
196 Bliznakovski, Jovan/ Gjuzelov, Borjan and Misha Popovikj. 2017.The Informal Life of Political Parties in the Western Balkan Societies. Inform. Available at: http://www.formal-informal.eu/files/news/2017/Deliverables%20and%20Milestones%202017/IDSCS- Informal%20Life%20of%20Political%20Parties-Report-27092017.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019), 6-19; Portal Analitika. CeMI: Više od pola građana smatra da partija zna za koga su glasali. 25 September 2016. Avaialable at: https://portalanalitika.me/clanak/244942/cemi-vise-od-pola-gradana-smatra-da-partija-zna-za-koga-su-glasali (accessed 28 June 2019). 197 Stokes, Political Clientelism, 617. 198 Tikveša, Amer. 2014. INTERVJU Milan Popović: Posljednji dani oligarha Mila. Tačno.net. 5 May 2014. Available at: https://www.tacno.net/interview/intervju-milan-popovic-posljednji-dani-oligarha-mila/ (accessed: 12 May 2019). 199 Bieber, Patterns, 343; Džankić and Keil, State-sponsored Populism, 403. 200 Lupu, Noam. 2015. Parties and Party Systems. In Routledge handbook of comparative political institutions, edited by Gandhi, Jennifer and Ruben Ruiz-Rufino. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 133.Stokes, Political Clientelism, 615. 201 Džankić and Keil, State-sponsored Populism. 202 Komar, Birači u Crnoj Gori; Bliznakovski, Gjuzelov, and Popovikj, The Informal Life of Political Parties, 21. 36
Dominance in the electoral arena has been confirmed through repeated electoral successes after independence. The proportional electoral system in place in Montenegro does not provide extensive overrepresentation for the dominant, but supports opposition’s fragmentation, while closed lists help central party organs to control rewards to intermediaries and voters without risks of local ‘rebellions’. Further, DPS is keen on exploiting legislative shortcomings and informal practices to twist the electoral process. Selective concession of citizenship and related franchising remain in place, mostly excluding potential opposition voters, especially the ones possessing dual loyalties between Serbia and Montenegro.203 Voters’ list manipulation is critical in supporting the dominant as well, while legislative amendments in this sense were not fully responsive to international recommendations nor met with full implementation.204 Interesting is the use of positive discrimination for minority community lists as source of ‘cheaper’ seats. As an example, from 1998 until 2011, DPS managed to gain 1 to 3 of the 4 or 5 seats in the special electoral units designed for areas inhabited by the Albanian minority, making the best of divisions within such group.205 Another case in point regards the very low (0.35%) threshold for the election of Croatian minority representatives in place from 2011: strange voting patterns registered in 2016 elections for the Croatian Civic Initiative (HGI) have been connected to a calculated transfer of votes from DPS to HGI, electing a loyal MP with eleven times less votes than the ones needed by an ordinary MP in the 81-seat Assembly.206
Another matter of advantage remains primacy in campaign financing, likely supported through illegal practices as well.207 Media environment remains highly politicised, as the dominant maintained control over the public broadcaster RTCG and produces, directly or indirectly, pressure on critical outlets and journalists, favouring its mouthpieces.208 The presence of opposition-oriented outlets provides voters with diverse options, although quality standards have worsened after the economic crisis and most outlets suffer from financial hardships.209
203 Dzankic, Citizenship. 204MANS. 2013. Izvještaj o vrstama izbornih zloupotreba biračkih spiskova i inspekcijskog nadzora. Available at: http://www.mans.co.me/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Izvjestaj-zloupotreba-birackih-spiskova-inspekcijski-nadzora.pdf (accessed 19 May 2019); Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. BTI 2018 Country Report — Montenegro. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 8. 205 Dedović and Vujović, Electoral System, 112. 206Luković, Siniša. 2016. Izborni inženjering: Kako je DPS obezbjediio mandat za HGI. Vijesti. 19 October 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/izborni-inzenjering-kako-je-dps-obezbjedio-mandat-za-hgi (accessed 19 May 2019). HGI has been always a faithful DPS ally and before 2011 had an MP elected from within DPS coalition list. 207 Jovanović, Vladimir. 2012. Kako se finansira DPS. Monitor. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/kako-se- finansira-dps/ (accessed 19 May 2019). 208 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018. European Commission. 2019. Montenegro 2019 Report. Brussels: European Commission, 26-28. 209 Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2016. BTI 2016 — Montenegro Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, 10. 37
Overall, even after independence, most elections in Montenegro were won by the dominant “before Election Day”.210 Patterns of dominance in the electoral arena have thus been rather consistent, although the consequences of the global economic crisis hitting the country after 2008 hindered their smooth evolution. Especially since 2012, a series of scandals and opposition initiatives have posed serious threats to DPS power base in this arena. Even though in a context of widespread patronage it is difficult to link electoral results with the actual popularity of the dominant among the electorate,211 signals of weakening of DPS’ electoral dominance could be identified. The next chapter will show how parliamentary elections in 2012 and 2016 were less certain in their outcome than the previous ones.
When it comes to the parliamentary arena, DPS retained superior bargaining power towards all other parties. Almost unconstrained primacy in ruling coalition formation has followed usual pre- independence patterns, including success in the electoral arena, consistent co-optation of minority representatives, strategic party positioning, and sharing of rewards to its partners through appointments in key positions. As an example, dissolution of the long-standing alliance between DPS and SDP in 2015 meant that the dominant had to find new allies to maintain its majority. The support received by three MPs of the former opposition party Positive Montenegro (PCG) was a case in point of successful co-optation. PCG help was duly rewarded, including the nomination of its leader, Darko Pajović, as Speaker of the Parliament and then as Montenegro’s ambassador to China.212 As this episode shows, DPS was able to manage without major drawbacks even potentially serious threats to its rule.
The role of informality remained central, as bargaining occurred through meetings between influential leaders, in a non-transparent way, and outside formal democratic institutions. This modality is systematic, frequently including external actors as the EU, and produces agreements that are consistently incorporated in formal political decisions, thereby filling the functioning gaps of formal institutions.213 Examples of such practice have been presented above and keep being produced.214 Finally, the dominant managed its internal factions with success, rarely showing weaknesses and not providing evident chances for competitors to exploit and support divisions
210 Greene, Kenneth. 2010. The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance. Comparative Political Studies, 43(7), 808. 211 Stokes, Political Clientelism, 607. 212 Rudović, Miloš. 2018. Potvrđeno pisanje "Vijesti": Pajovića šalju u Peking. Vijesti. 7 May 2018. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/potvrdeno-pisanje-vijesti-pajovica-salju-u-peking (accessed 19 May 2019). 213 Bliznakovski, Gjuzelov, and Popovikj, The Informal Life of Political Parties, 20-25. 214 Most recently, the inter-party agreement leading to the ‘Government of Electoral Trust’ in 2015-2016. See the following chapter. 38 within the party. Although some signs of disagreement have leaked out at some point, the vested interests of the ruling elite were eventually regarded as best defended by the DPS.215
As Boucek notes, “in the long run, executive dominance gives incumbents agenda-setting powers and a proprietary lock-in over the spoils of office, which can be transformed into partisan resources to skew competition and maintain single-party dominance”.216 Montenegro’s case is a good example of this. After independence, the incumbent set its strategic agenda and implemented the charted course without much internal constrains, although it did not possess the qualified parliamentary majority to pass unilateral constitutional amendments. Main long-term political priorities after independence remained NATO and EU accession. While the latter was shared by the whole parliamentary forces, NATO accession remained hotly debated and almost half of the population was against or unsure regarding the matter.217 Testifying for the power the dominant can exert in the domestic context when political will exists, Montenegro managed to achieve NATO membership in 2017, avoiding a risky a referendum and thus securing an important Euro-Atlantic integration milestone. In this regard, after enjoying the ‘glory’ of independence, each and every further achievement was presented as a partisan one, so that incumbency kept being exploited for sustaining the DPS as state-party, reproducing a long-term trend.
Adding to this, the consolidated mix between economic liberalisation and large state sector was maintained, amounting to 48% of GDP in 2010, as public expenditure increased with the establishment of the institutions of the newly independent state and thanks to the economic growth driven by foreign direct investments in tourism and construction sectors that characterised the 2000s.218 The uneven growth process left northern, and often opposition voting, areas behind, while developing a “turbo-capitalist” culture that carries with itself corruption, graft, and collusion with powerful criminal groups, best visible in cities such as Budva and Podgorica.219 Although the consequences of the global crisis hindered the economic boom, overall progress allowed the government to boast its successes during electoral campaigning.
Further, DPS resource-sharing mechanism maintained two poles: on the one hand, the aforementioned patronage link with voter-clients, and, on the other hand, a “reverse clientelism” as the operative transposition of state capture, in which “parties receive funding from wealthy, or even
215 Gossip around divisions within the DPS emerged both around Lukšić’s premiership (2010-2012) and before 2018 presidential elections. Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood, 147. 216 Boucek, Factional politics, 28. 217 CEDEM. 2016. Politčko Javno Mnjenje Crne Gore - NATO integracija. December 2016. Available at: http://www.cedem.me/images/jDownloads_new/Program%20Empirijska%20istazivanja/Politicko%20javno%20mnjenj e/CEDEM_decembar_2016_istrazivanje.pdf (accessed 21 May 2019). 218 Uljarević, Daliborka and Stevo Muk. 2011. Nations in Transit 2011 – Montenegro. Washington/New York: Freedom House, 404. 219 Morrison, Montenegro, 222. 39 semi-criminal, patrons in return for implicit future favours”.220 In this sense, connection between members of the ruling elite and major criminal groups are often cited in organised crime investigative work and it is believed political coverage is provided for illegal activities.221 Sustaining both those strategies, politicisation of public administration and institutions remained high, with the party representing a point of reference in most layers of public life, from education to employment, and widespread use of state resources and public agencies for campaign purposes.222
Finally, the role of external actors for the reproduction of executive dominance must not be underestimated.223 Although things changed a lot after the unconditional financial support for Djukanović’s reformist plans of the late 1990s, a prevalent focus on stability and achievement of formal steps along EU and NATO accession processes allowed the incumbent to boast (more or less existent) approval from such organisations and their members states, gaining crucial legitimation for the domestic context.224 The DPS could thus establish a sort of “stabilitocracy”, devoid of true democratisation, yet imbued in rhetorical democratic commitments offered to Western politicians, willing to look away from the biases of such a system for the sake of regional stability.225
In particular, the EU started playing a central role in domestic matters from the early 2000s, both through informal mediation during moments of crisis or extreme polarisation (Belgrade Agreement, October 2002 elections, and referendum for independence) and with Montenegro’s accession requirements. Even though EU influence has had a significant role in fostering democratic transformation in the polity, the accession process produced formal compliance with EU benchmarks, yet, at best, partial implementation in crucial areas such as Rule of Law or Freedom of the Media, due to lack of political will among “gate-keeping” elites.226 Further, the process was
220 Randall, Vicky. 2012. Political Parties. In Routledge Handbook of Democratization, edited by Haynes, Jeffrey. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 232. 221 Patručić, Miranda. 2014. Montenegro: Prime Minister’s Family Bank Catered to Organized Crime. OCCRP. 08 April 2014. Available at: https://www.reportingproject.net/unholyalliances/prime-ministers-family-bank-catered-to- organized-crime.html (accessed 19 May 2019); Hotspots of Organized Crime in the Western Balkans. May 2019. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Available at: https://globalinitiative.net/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/Hotspots-Report-English-16May1245-Web.pdf (accessed 19 May 2019). 222 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018, 34; Perović-Korać, Milena. Pakao u raju. Monitor, 08 January 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/pakao-u-raju/ (accessed 16 June 2019); Bakić, Miloš. Unaprijed pokradeni izbori. Monitor, 03 August 2012. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/unaprijed-pokradeni-izbor/ (accessed 20 June 2019). 223 Bieber, Patterns. 224 Bieber, Patterns, 344. 225 Pavlović, Montenegro’s ‘Stabilitocracy’. 226 Kmezić, Marko. 2019. EU rule of law conditionality: Democracy or ‘Stabilitocracy’ Promotion in the Western Balkans? In The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans edited by Džankić, Jelena/ Keil, Soeren, and Marko Kmezić. Cham: Springer, 87-109. 40 often perceived by the public as just a different mode of the usual top-down and non-transparent decision-making system, this time only mediated by the incumbent party.227
2.4 Conclusion Intending to answer the question of how DPS skewed political competition in order to establish and maintain political dominance from the first multiparty elections, this chapter traced the development and entrenching of DPS dominance in Montenegro through temporal and multilevel analysis within the electoral, parliamentary, and executive arenas of party competition.
It showed how the DPS, as direct successor of the League of Communists of Montenegro, exploited its ‘in-built’ dominance in the executive arena to control liberalisation and entrench its position in the other arenas. The structural conditions for political dominance in Montenegro should be traced well-before the establishment of the post-socialist multiparty system. As with Helms, the cultural parameters that characterise a political system when its institutions are established tend to “have a strong impact on later decision-making processes, as they effectively constrain alternative choices and major alterations of the status quo”.228 As the design of formally pluralistic institutions after 1989 was fully controlled by the SKCG, multiparty elections did not mean “an effective de-linking of state and party” and forced opposition political parties to face biased competition from their inception.229 In particular, large public sector and politicised bureaucracy consistently ‘closed the circle’ between the executive and the electoral arenas.230 Showing impressive political resilience, DPS leadership transformed its strategies to control and make the best out of political and economic liberalisation processes kicked off in the 1990s. An efficient clientelistic resource-sharing system was put in place, favoured by the small population and kin-based relations that characterise Montenegrin society. Moreover, the question of statehood helped furthering DPS aim to blur differences between party and state, thus preserving the vested interests of its elite. In the process, politicisation of ethno-national identities provided voting references to the electorate and ‘serbianised’ political party opposition. Importantly, such strategies were possible thanks to DPS ability to maintain the support of influential external actors in charting its international politics course.
In the electoral arena, competition was twisted by the DPS through a patron-client relationship with Montenegrin electorate, the use of a ‘catch-all’ platform as reliable party of power, populist rhetoric
227 Komar and Živković, Montenegro, 786; Bliznakovski, Gjuzelov, and Popovikj, The Informal Life of Political Parties, 22-23. 228 Helms, Studying Parliamentary Opposition, 14. 229 Way and Levitsky, Level Playing Field, 64. 230 Greene, Why dominant parties lose. 41 portraying any opposition as an ‘enemy’, and manipulation of the electoral process. Electoral dominance, thus, furthered the historically rooted top-down nature of state-citizen relations and established an aura of ‘invincibility’ for the party and its leader.
When it comes to the parliamentary arena, DPS maintained unconstrained primacy in bargaining with other parties. It did so making the best of electoral dominance, strategically positioning itself in the centre of the political space as a ‘moderated’, pragmatic party, and consistently exploiting its superior financial and informal power to co-opt other parties with material (appointments, benefits, etc.) and non-material (identity) rewards, while preserving internal unity and interests.
In a nutshell, then, DPS combined an authoritarian and oligarchic system with the formal institutions of liberal democracy in order to maintain its dominance in the three arenas of political competition. As the Montenegrin dissident Milan Popović argued in 2012, Montenegro may well be in the phase of consolidating oligarchy, rather than democracy.231 Finally, the dominant was also particularly successful in marginalising its opponents, whether by co-opting them or pushing them to extreme positions. While this was relatively straightforward up to 1997, and identity and statehood issues helped throughout the 2000s, after independence such an endeavour became more complex. In this sense, the following chapter will consider the way in which parties opposed the dominant after the consequences of the global economic crisis depleted much of the political capital accumulated by the DPS with the achievement of independence.
Chapter 3 – Challenging the Dominant: Political Party Opposition Strategies
3.1 Post-referendum: Re-alignment and Coalition Attempts (2006-2012) Montenegro’s independence, on 2 June 2006, was a central achievement of DPS rule and brought with it new challenges for the opposition. Soon afterwards, in September, Parliamentary elections legitimised the Assembly to develop the new Constitution. Although confirmation of DPS rule was the expected outcome in this “second half of the independence game”, elections proved particularly interesting for the “reconfigured opposition bloc”.232 Rather than a ‘bloc’, however, political parties opposing the dominant divided in three groups. Two factions distinguished each other for the political transposition they gave to their pro-Serb orientation. The one led by the SNP (including
231Al Jazeera Balkans. 2012. Milan Popović o političkoj situaciji u Crnoj Gori. 26 July 2016. Available at: http://balkans.aljazeera.net/video/milan-popovic-o-politickoj-situaciji-u-crnoj-gori (accessed 01 June 2019). 232 Rudović, Neđeljko. Referendumski vetar u leđa. Vreme, 14 September 2006. Available at: https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=464961 (accessed 05 June 2019). 42
NS and DSS) focused on criticism of DPS rule, rather than insisting on the issue of statehood and relying on outright identity messages.233 On the other hand, Mandić’s SNS assembled minor hardliner groupings in the Serb List (SL). In contrast with SNP’s stream, SL advocated the status of Serbs as “constituent people”, i.e. with extensive and guaranteed community-based rights.234
Transcending this Unionist debate was a new party led by Nebojša Medojević, a former privatisation manager and SDP official who turned to civil society as sharp critic of DPS rule.235 Since 2003, his Group for Changes (GzP) claimed to represent an expert-based pressure group pushing political parties towards democratic reforms.236 Although signalling the intention to compete electorally since 2004, it delayed such move after the referendum to avoid getting involved in the statehood debate even though some already placed them closer to the Unionist bloc.237 It eventually became ‘Movement for Changes (PzP) in July 2006 to contest for parliamentary promising to end the ruling elite’s embezzlement.238
Electoral results showed how most independence voters remained DPS-SDP prerogative (41 seats out of 81). PzP performed well (11 seats), although it proved unable to significantly penetrate the independentist constituency, so that Unionist preferences split among the three streams above. Besides PzP newcomers, opposition voters rewarded SL hardliners (12 seats) and scaled back SNP ambitions to mainstream a coalition of moderate Serb parties within the opposition (11 seats).239 The failure of a strategy that was too ambiguous in comparison to the SL and not able to match PzP reformist appeal, caused Predrag Bulatović resignation.240 His substitute, Srdjan Milić, promoted a more pro-European, social-democratic course to distinguish from SL, aiming at lower society strata more than staunch Serb votes, thereby cutting formal ties with both NS and DSS.
Together with Parliamentary elections, local elections in 14 municipalities gave DPS and its minor partners majorities in all but three municipalities. In Kolašin, one of the three opposition
233 Panović, Zoran. 2006. Srpska lista ide naruku Đukanoviću. PCNEN, 21. August 2006. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2006/08/21/srpska-lista-ide-naruku-dukanovicu/ (accessed 05 June 2019). 234 Mandić: Srpska lista će nakon izbora unaprijediti život Srba u Crnoj Gori. Glas Amerike, 17 August 2006. Available at: https://www.glasamerike.net/a/a-34-2006-08-17-voa-mandic-87034882/760455.html (accessed 05 June 2019). 235 Grujić, Dragoslav. Nebojša Medojević. Vreme, 11 April 2002. Available at: https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=311818 (accessed 05 June 2019). 236 Didanović, Vera. Nešto će se desiti. Vreme, 20 May 2004. Available at: https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=379193 (accessed 05 June 2019). 237Grupa za promjene najavila unutrasnju transformaciju. PCNEN, 23. November 2004. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2004/11/23/grupa-za-promjene-najavila-unutrasnju-transformaciju/ (accessed 05 June 2019); Krcić, Esad. 2006. Grupa za promjene poziva na referendum. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 02 March 2006. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/661370.html (accessed 05 June 2019). 238 Nova politička partija Pokret za promjene osnovana danas na Cetinju. Glas Amerike, 15 July 2006. Available at: https://www.glasamerike.net/a/a-34-2006-07-15-voa10-86800922/739016.html (accessed 05 June 2019). 239 OSCE/ODIHR. 2006. Montenegro Parliamentary Elections. 10 September 2006. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw, 28 December 2006. 240 Rudović, Referendumski vetar. 43 strongholds, local government formation became a matter of national interest when, in an unprecedented move after failed negotiations with the SNS, SNP closed a deal with DPS.241 The SNS had previously accused its rival of being ready, for the right price, to govern with its former colleagues of the DPS.242 Kolašin events and Milić’s new course would further feed such polemics, showing the depth of the conflict between the main ‘Serb’ parties as they proved ready to come to terms with their political ‘nemesis’ rather than compromising among them.
Overall, post-referendum political atmosphere seemed to reward hard-line nationalist and harsh “regime cleavage” opposition strategies. SNP was too moderated in the first field, while it could not be too credible on the second, due to its still recent past. As a result, rather than reconfiguration through coalition building, this period marked confrontational repositioning among opposition parties.
The Constitutional debate could have represented, however, an occasion for the development of common action free from immediate electoral consequences. Indeed, in the attempt to maximise negotiation power, a joint opposition platform for negotiation with the incumbent coalition was formed, although different identity positions led to the eventual failure of such attempt.243 In front of SL principled contrast to any compromise, SNP showed uncertainty but did maintain its opposition to the end. Contrarily, PzP broke the impasse opening bilateral negotiations and later supporting the final text in October 2007. The matter fed polarisation between the incumbent and ex-Unionists, while the latter accused Medojević of betraying the opposition in support of DPS goals.244 Especially harsh was the SL: one MP ripped off the future Constitution, while Mandić invited Serbs to boycott it, as it allegedly “prepared the terrain for ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Montenegro“.245 Once again, regardless of the common dislike for the new Constitution, the SNP was far from matching SL radical statements, so that the common vote against the Chart did not contribute to soothe their differences.
Although the Constitution provides only ceremonial powers for the President of Montenegro, April 2008 elections promised an updated snapshot of ongoing trends in party relative strengths in sight of new parliamentary elections. Indeed, each of the three main opposition parties supported their
241 DPS i SNP ponovo zajedno. PCNEN, 20 October 2006. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2006/10/20/dps- i-snp-ponovo-zajedno/ (accessed 06 June 2019); Freedom House. 2007. Nations in Transit 2007– Montenegro. Washington/New York: Freedom House, 15. 242 Panović, Srpska lista. 243 Opozicija potpisala ustavnu platformu. PCNEN, 17 September 2007. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2007/09/17/opozicija-potpisala-ustavnu-platformu/ (accessed 06 June 2019). 244 Freedom House. 2008. Nations in Transit 2008 – Montenegro. Washington/New York: Freedom House, 6. 245 Ustav usvojen - Crna Gora se talasa. RTV, 24 October 2007. Available at: http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/politika/ustav- usvojen-crna-gora-se-talasa_36141.html (accessed 06 June 2019); Usvojen Ustav Crne Gore. Mondo, 19 October 2007. Available at: http://mondo.rs/a76607/Info/Ex-Yu/Usvojen-Ustav-Crne-Gore.html (accessed 06 June 2019). 44 own leaders against the incumbent, Filip Vujanović.246 Thanks to the advantages of blurring of state and party structures, however, DPS candidate headed for a safe first round victory, downplaying the need for its opponents to avoid mutual attacks for the sake of easier joint support for a possible runoff candidate. Thus, opposition leaders engaged in a tough competition for the second place with a campaign that served to emphasise differences and polarise mutual attitudes.247 Eventually, Mandić’s (SL) radical rhetoric gave him the second place at 19.5% surpassing Medojević (PzP, 16.5%), and clearly outvoting Milić (SNP, 11.9%).248
Even after the campaign, the three opposition fronts kept remarking their mutual distance. SNP and SL followed their divergent pro-Serb trajectories. Their clear difference of perspectives regarding the Serb question in Montenegro can be summoned with SNP idea of “Serb Montenegrins“ against SL idea of “Montenegrin Serbs“.249 The former claiming for a specific identity of Serbs in Montenegro against the latter firm belief of the full inclusion of Montenegrins within the Serb national corpus. This was evident in their relations with Serbian politics, as Milić social-democratic ambitions moved the SNP closer to Boris Tadić, while the SL liaised with Šešelj and Nikolić.250 Mandić’s relative electoral success however likely represented the maximum consensus his radical Serb nationalism platform could provide, as it seemed unable to appeal to the moderate orthodox, and dissatisfied young voters. In fact, that pool represented a central SNP-PzP electoral battleground. Besides their rhetorical claims, therefore, opposition parties kept competing for intra- opposition primacy, rather than seriously aiming at the dominant.
Soon, May 2008 RTCG decision to reduce live coverage of parliamentary debates provided a good reason for re-focusing on the dominant, leading to an all-opposition parliamentary boycott and a partial institutional blockade.251 Indeed, live coverage was sensitive because it represented one of the main channels opposition parties used to reach their electorate and propose their versions of the ongoing political debates.252 Often unwilling to play a more constructive role in the parliamentary works, but also marginalised due to the prominence of the executive,253 opposition parties had an
246 Janković, Srdjan and Biljana Jovićević. Rezultati predsjedničkih izbora. Radio slobodna evropa, 04 April 2008. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1050678.html (accessed 08 June 2019). 247 OSCE/ODIHR. 2008. Montenegro Presidential Election. 06 April 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw, 1 September 2008, 2, 3. 248 OSCE/ODIHR. Presdential Elections 2008. 249 PREDSJEDNIČKI IZBORI 2008: Obećanja i analize. Mondo, 20 March 2008. Available at: http://mondo.me/a9138/Info/Crna-Gora/PREDSJEDNICKI-IZBORI-2008-Obecanja-i-analize.html (accessed 08 June 2019). 250 Mondo. PREDSJEDNIČKI IZBORI 2008. 251 Neizvjesno održavanje sjednice zbog bojkota opozicije. PCNEN, 20 July 2008. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2008/07/20/neizvjesno-odrzavanje-sjednice-zbog-bojkota-opozicije/ (accessed 09 June 2019). 252 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2007, 12. 253 Freedom House. 2009. Nations in Transit 2009 – Montenegro. Washington/New York: Freedom House, 7. 45 easy choice sacrificing their little institutional agency to claim back what Norton calls “the oxygen of publicity”, representing parliamentary minorities’ “most important weapon”.254 Moreover, the NGO Network for Affirmation of NGO sector (MANS) proved RTCG alleged financial motivations were severely biased, raising concerns on the real reasons behind the decision.255 Eventually, pro- active OSCE mediation and five months were needed to reach a compromise solution and end the boycott.256
Once again, opposition parties’ withdrawal from participation in formal democratic institutions was the only way to start a meaningful dialogue on sensitive topics. Such tactic implied the use of informal forums that could easily incorporate external actors (this time the OSCE) in order to compensate for the superior bargaining power of the dominant with the presence of prominent external mediators. The final compromise secured the prosecution of institutional work, but consolidated opposition actors’ expectations that adopting extreme bargaining positions caused external intervention in support of their goals. Similarly, the dominant could embark in new discriminatory actions, to then reach a compromise to boast DPS image of ‘responsible’ party, capable to resolve the ‘crisis’ of the moment.
Contemporarily, Kosovo declaration of independence brought the identity question back to the forefront of the political debate, especially when the Montenegrin government decided to recognise such new status in October 2008. SNP was against recognition but avoided to raise tensions, while Mandić declared the matter was “in the hands of the people“, who “will help ascertain the majoritarian will the citizens of Montenegro”.257 All pro-Serb political parties (SNS, SNP, NS, and DSS) concurred in organising a protest meeting on October 13 that ended up with violent clashes with the police. The organisers’ appeals to peaceful behaviour notwithstanding, such an outcome only served the government to reiterate accusations of ‘extremist opposition’.258 Unabated, SNS and DSS decided to boycott once again parliamentary works, while the rest of the opposition claimed unitary commitment in challenging the incumbent, yet refused to leave parliament for the sake of avoiding further marginalisation.259
254 Norton, Making Sense of Opposition, 245. 255 MANS. 2008. Studije Slučajeva: Bojkot Parlamenta od strane opozicionih stranaka. October 2008. Available at: http://www.mans.co.me/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/studija-slucaja-7-bojkot-parlamenta-okt-2008.pdf (accessed 09 June 2019). 256 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, 7-8. 257Radio slobodna evropa. Crna Gora priznala Kosovo. 09 October 2008. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1328571.html (accessed 09 June 2019). 258 Deutsche Welle. Neredi u Podgorici zbog Kosova. 14 October 2008. Available at: https://p.dw.com/p/FYtN (accessed 09 June 2019). 259 Večernje Novosti. Opozicija u bojkotu. 24 October 2008. Available at: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:225262- 46
Capitalising on such atmosphere, the majority called for snap elections to be held on 29 March 2009. Seeking a new mandate in sight of the global economic crisis first effects, the ruling coalition also managed to catch its challengers in troubled times.260 First of all, Mandić’s SNS set about transforming the SL into a formal party, seeking a civic character through moderating its pro-Serb platform and recognising the changed political reality after independence.261 The formation of New Serbian Democracy (NOVA), however, alienated the staunchest members of the SL. Six out twelve MPs returned to parliament to create an autonomous club and their own Serb National List (SNL).262 This new formation will not pass the electoral threshold, but curbed a relevant pool of votes from NOVA.
Conflict emerged within the PzP, as well. Discontent among its moderate faction was sparked by Medojević closeness to SNS and SNP positions on Kosovo recognition, as he argued for the illegitimacy of such choice and personally took part in the protests.263 Also accusing him of authoritarian party management and of a meagre result in Kotor elections, four MPs and a vice- president left to establish the Democratic Centre (DC).264 As for NOVA, PzP splitting faction damaged the party’s rating, but did not manage to pass the electoral threshold.
Thus, engaged in internal disputes (PzP and SL/NOVA) or emboldened by polls because of its competitors’ troubles (SNP), opposition parties engaged in last-minute coalition talks with little success.265 This was, however, enough to exchange accusations for such failure throughout the campaign, adding to polemics with former party colleagues.266 As in 2008, they competed against each other rather than against the incumbent. The latter, with a recent coalition enlargement to include BS, SDP, and HGI, largely fulfilled the duty by gathering an absolute majority with support
%D0%9E%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0-%D1%83- %D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%98%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%83 (accessed 09 June 2019). 260Freedom House. 2010. Nations in Transit 2010 – Montenegro. Washington/New York: Freedom House, 4. 261 Begović, Kosara. Regulisana stvarnosti. Monitor, 24 February 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/regulisana-stvarnost/ (accessed 09 June 2019); Panović, Srpska lista. 262 Mondo. Srpska lista opstaje ali uz sufiks "nacionalna". 15 January 2009. Available at: http://mondo.me/a29903/Info/Crna-Gora/Srpska-lista-opstaje-ali-uz-sufiks-nacionalna.html (accessed 09 June 2019). 263 Morrison, Kenneth. 2011. Change, Continuity and Consolidation: Assessing Five Years of Montenegro’s Independence. LSEE Papers on South Eastern Europe 2(2011), 21. 264 Bivši poslanici PzP-a formirali poslanički klub. PCNEN, 12 January 2009. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2009/01/12/bivsi-poslanici-pzp-a-formirali-poslanicki-klub/ (accessed 09 June 2019); Kovačević, Duško. Promjene u Pokretu za promjene. Nova sprska politička misao, 21 January 2009. Available at: http://www.nspm.rs/srbija-i-crna-gora/promjene-u-pokretu-za-promjene.html?alphabet=l#yvComment2355 (accessed 09 June 2019). 265 Jorgačević, Jelena. Izbori, pa šta. Vreme, 26 February 2009. Available at: https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=830685 (accessed 09 June 2019). 266 Begović, Kosara. Kad jaganjci utihnu. Monitor, 05 March 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/kad- jaganjci-utihnu/ (accessed 09 June 2019); Begović, Kosara. Čelična jutra. Monitor, 01 April 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/elina-jutra/ (accessed 09 June 2019). 47 of some representatives of the Albanian minority lists (48 seats out of 81, 51.5% of preferences).267 On the opposition side, SNP could claim primacy back, with 16.8% and 16 seats, followed by NOVA (9%, 8 seats), and a weakened PzP (5.9%, 5 seats).
Milić’s ambitious course in the SNP seemed to pay back and consolidated his aim to maintain such trend thanks to the worsening economic outlook. Moreover, these elections marked the exclusion from parliament of radical Serb parties. Mandić managed to accomplish the task of changing strategy and claiming increased coalition potential without suffering excessive damage.268 On the other hand, PzP ‘technocratic’ ambitions were substantially scaled back. If, in 2006, Medojević could credibly aim at moderate independentist voters, approximation to Serb constituencies caused a split and blurred its distinction with SNP, who had the advantage of a more consolidated party network. In any case, they were all, once again, overwhelmed by DPS electoral machinery.269 The dominant maintained the absolute parliamentary majority to navigate through the upcoming economic storm, while also confirming local rule in Budva, Nikšić, Tivat, and losing only in opposition-oriented Herceg-Novi.270
Although power negotiations internal to the DPS slowed down government formation, dominance unfolded with renewed high handedness amidst progress within EU accession and the consequences of the global economic crisis.271 Following another debacle, opposition parties declared commitment for coordinated efforts in sight of the new round of local elections in 2009-2010. After presenting a united list for Žabljak municipal elections in August, they announced boycott in Kotor, as part of a new strategy based on two main pillars of criticism: First, refusal to contest with an electoral legislation not in line with the new Constitution, and, second, illegitimacy of elections marred by criminal groups’ involvement. Soon it became clear, though, that SNP nurtured less enthusiasm than PzP and NOVA for such principled boycotting.272 Under local cadres’ pressure, the SNP decided to compete in Cetinje and Mojkovac, unable to hold on to the local-level boycott strategy that caused direct damage to local politicians with the promise of unlikely future
267 https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna_gora_izbori_cedem_dps/1512534.html 268 Brajović, Katarina. Opozicija i perspektive. Nova srpska politička misao, 15 December 2008. Available at: http://www.nspm.rs/srbija-i-crna-gora/opozicija-i-perspektive.html?alphabet=l#yvComment1963 (accessed 09 June 2019). 269 Begović, Kosara. Mrtvo more. Monitor, 03 April 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/mrtvo-more/ (accessed 09 June 2019). 270 Begović, Mrtvo More. 271 Begović, Kosara. Apsolutna demokratija. Monitor, 8 January 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/apsolutna-demokratija/ (accessed 13 June 2019). 272 Begović, Kosara. Bojkot na sitno. Monitor, 16 October 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/bojkot-na- sitno/ (accessed 13 June 2019). 48 benefits.273 Resistance was strongest in Mojkovac, where the electoral competition was tight and, eventually, the SNP was unable to form local government precisely due to NOVA’s boycott.274 Such ‘political suicide’, gave way to further intra-opposition criticism that hindered PzP ambitions of a common “Democratic front”.275 If anything, this last episode strengthened DPS allegations that the opposition was boycotting out of fear of yet another electoral defeat.276
As local-level boycott proved a double-edged sword and despite criticism for SNP positions, the only viable option for cooperation in sight of local elections in 14 municipalities on 23 May 2010 appeared the establishment of a common list.277 After challenging negotiations, a compromise was found and “Better Montenegro” formed. 278 Milić, Medojević, and Mandić wore white shirts symbolising their clean records and conducted an energetic campaign aimed at mobilising abstainers through a focus on DPS mismanagement, corruption, and electoral abuses.279 Although such allegations were dismissed, the fact that elections were called for the day after the fourth year of independence celebrations seemed to indicate exactly the opposite. Undaunted, Djukanović considered opposition leaders’ white shirts as the proof “they had already surrendered”.280 Results proved his point. DPS and its partners achieved majorities in 12 out of 14 contested municipalities.281
Although opposition unity seemed a remarkable progress, it was hard to ignore the fact its components “appeared to have little to unite them but their almost pathological hatred of the ruling
273 Begović, Kosara. Bojkot na višem nivou. Monitor, 06 November 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/bojkot-na-viem-nivou/ (accessed 14 June 2019). 274 Sadiković, Sead. Putokaz za blagajnu. Monitor, 11 December 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/putokaz-za-blagajnu/ (accessed 14 June 2019). 275 Sadiković, Sead. Umorni od glasanja. Monitor, 04 December 2009. Available at:https://www.monitor.co.me/umorni- od-glasanja/ (accessed 14 June 2019); Begović, Kosara. Svi naši zidovi. Monitor, 20 November 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/svi-nai-zidovi/ (accessed 14 June 2019). 276 Begović, Bojkot na sitno. 277 Koprivica, Veseljko. Sigurna kriminalna kuća. Monitor, 22 January 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/sigurna-kriminalna-kua/ (accessed 15 June 2019); Begović, Kosara. Grlom u izbore. Monitor, 05 March 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/grlom-u-izbore/ (accessed 15 June 2019;. Begović, Kosara. Šansa ove generacije. Monitor, 09 April 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/ansa-ove-generacije/ (accessed 15 June 2019). 278 Begović, Kosara. Rješenje ili izgovor. Monitor, 26 March 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/rjeenje- ili-izgovor/ (accessed 15 June 2019). 279 Begović, Kosara. Siguran Strah. Monitor, 07 May 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/siguran-strah/ (accessed 15 June 2019). Begović, Kosara. Može li bolje. Monitor, 28 May 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/moe-li-bolje/ (accessed 15 June 2019); Ujedinili se da bi Crna Gora bila bolja. Mojenovosti.com. 21 May 2009. Available at: http://www.mojenovosti.com/lat/index.php?option=novosti&idnovost=11462#.XQSt24gzaUm (accessed 15 June 2019). 280 Begović, Kosara.Terenski radovi. Monitor, 14 May 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/terenski-radovi/ (accessed 15 June 2019). 281 DPS i saveznici apsolutni pobjednici u 7 opština. PCNEN, 24 May 2010. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2010/05/24/dps-i-saveznici-apsolutni-pobjednici-u-7-opstina/ (accessed 15 June 2019); Begović, Kosara and Mustafa Canka. Još jedan dan poslije. Monitor, 28 May 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/jo-jedan-dan-poslije/ (accessed 15 June 2019). 49 elite”.282 Nevertheless, such cooperation could be built upon for achieving the ultimate goal of toppling the dominant, whose victories were ascribed solely to manipulation.283 Although allegations and official complaints in this sense gave no concrete results, no external monitoring could address such concerns, as no funding for domestic groups were granted nor were international observing missions present.284
The post-electoral period was marked by coalition negotiations. In Podgorica, things got fluid when SDP refused to support incumbent DPS mayor Miomir Mugoša, due to its involvement in various scandals and controversial conduct.285 Although this could have been an attempt to capitalise on a ‘kingmaker’ potential, it evidenced growing disagreement within DPS-SDP coalition. Eventually, the situation was resolved with ‘assistance’ to the DPS by some ‘rebel’ NS and DSS councillors, who furthered a history of transversal agreements and switching sides in local assemblies.286 On a different note, in the small municipality of Andrijevica the local SDP leader ended negotiations with the DPS and sided with Better Montenegro, giving the latter the control of the council and being expelled from the SDP as a result.287 However, a reversal happened in early 2011, when a PzP councillor sided with the DPS, who now regained the council majority amidst accusations of political corruption.288 Both cases represent how shallow ideological backgrounds marked political behaviour at local level and produced relevant consequences at national level.
Signals of disagreement within the ruling coalition were practically unaddressed by the opposition. After some months remarkable only for the absence of further joint initiatives, PzP attempted to break the stalemate presenting a platform for a “Democratic Front – Better Montenegro”, building on the local level experiment.289 Cooperation between PzP and NOVA was not in doubt, but SNP proved once again sceptical in committing with the formation of an alleged “civic democratic
282 Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood, 144. 283 Kosara and Canka, Jos jedan dan poslije. 284 Uljarević and Muk, Nations in Transit 2011, 397. 285 Kosara and Canka, Jos jedan dan poslije; Janković, Srđan. DPS-u 12 opština, bez većine u Podgorici. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 24 May 2010. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna_gora_izbori_dps_podgorica/2050628.html (accessed 15 June 2019). 286 Pejović, Igor and Goran Kapor. Crnogorski preletači: Sve je počelo sa Gegajem. Vijesti, 01 December 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/crnogorski-preletaci-sve-je-pocelo-sa-gegajem (accessed 15 June 2019); Begović, Kosara. Hiljadu i jedna noć. Monitor, 3 December 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/hiljadu-i-jedna-no/ (accessed 15 June 2019). 287 Koprivica, Veseljko. Socijaldemokrata koji je DPS-u rekao – NE!. Monitor, 02 July 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/socijaldemokrata-koji-je-dps-u-rekao-ne/ (accessed 15 June 2019); Večernje novosti. Kazna za neposlušne. 01 July 2010. Available at: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:290719-Kazna-za-neposlusne (accessed 15 June 2019). 288 Sekulović, M. DPS preuzeo Andrijevicu. Večernje Novosti, 01 March 2011. Available at: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:321217-DPS-preuzeo-Andrijevicu (accessed 15 June 2019). 289 Koprivica, Veseljko. Možemo smijeniti DPS. Monitor, 10 September 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/moemo-smijeniti-dps/ (accessed 15 June 2019). 50 bloc”.290 After some uncertainty, Milić declared the dissolution of Better Montenegro, intending to determine its political strategy autonomously, giving way to further tensions, as the SNP was accused of striking secret deals with Serbia and DPS.291
Probably in the attempt to leave the economic ‘hot potato’ to someone else, in December 2010 Djukanović left premiership in favour of Igor Lukšić, former Minister of Finances and a ‘promise’ of Montenegrin politics.292 High level arrests in Budva immediately after his inauguration followed the new government’s reformist pledges. They were part of a sudden progress in the “Zavala case” proceeding, involving the current DPS mayor and men close to Svetozar Marović (including his brother).293 Exposing Budva’s mismanagement, biased development, and financial difficulties, the case confirmed year-long opposition accusations against the dominant elite.294 However, opposition ranks were freshly divided and unable, for the moment, to take full advantage of the scandal.295 On the contrary, the highly mediatic arrests boosted Lukšić’s claims of discontinuity, with some observers seeing hopes for Montenegrin “Sanaderisation”, i.e. the prosecution of high-level corruption thanks to Euro-Atlantic integration pressures along the line of recent events in Croatia.296 Optimism will fade away rather quickly, as Djukanović showed he had no intention to be marginalised.297 Indeed, the Budva episode itself might have been an internal settlement within the DPS, rather than genuine progress in tackling high-level corruption.298
290 Begović, Kosara. Rani zimski san. Monitor, 12 November 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/rani- zimski-san/ (accessed 15 June 2019). 291 Prelević, Ć. "Bolja Crna Gora" više ne postoji. Večernje Novosti, 03 December 2010. Available at: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:310096-quot-Bolja-Crna-Goraquot-vise-ne-postoji (accessed 15 June 2019); Jovanović, Vladimir. Slučaj SNP. Monitor, 4 February 2011. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/sluaj-snp/ (accessed 15 June 2019). 292 Janković, Srđan. Hoće li Lukšić donijeti promjene. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 22 December 2010. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna_gora_vlada_djukanovic_luksic/2256102.html (accessed 16 June 2019). 293 Komnenić, Petar. Crveno svijetlo državnog tužilaštva. Monitor, 05 February 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/crveno-svijetlo-dravnog-tuilatva/ (accessed 16 June 2019); MANS. Studija slučaja “Zavala”. 21 January 2009. Available at: http://www.mans.co.me/studija-slucaja-zavala/#prettyPhoto (accessed 16 June 2019). 294 Plamenca, Branka. Nasljednici preuzimaju vlast. Monitor, 14 January 2011. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/nasljednici-preuzimaju-vlast/ (accessed 16 June 2019). 295 Kovačević, Filip. “Nova” crnogorska “realnost”. Vijesti, 17 January 2011. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/kolumne/nova-crnogorska-realnost (accessed 16 June 2019). 296 Bošković, Milan. Milo kao Sanader?. Monitor, 22 January 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/milo-kao- sanader/ (accessed 16 June 2019); Lukšić: Ovdje neće biti "sanaderizacije". Vijesti, 30 December 2010. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/luksic-ovdje-nece-biti-sanaderizacije (accessed 16 June 2019); Kovačević, Duško. Šturanović drugog pokušaja. Vijesti, 31 January 2011. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/kolumne/sturanovic-drugog-pokusaja (accessed 16 June 2019); Ivanović, Željko. Staro za novo. Vijesti, 01 February 2011. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/kolumne/staro-za-novo (accessed 16 June 2019). 297 Rudović, Neđeljko. Lukšićevo suočavanje sa političkim ocem. Vijesti, 18 May 2011. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/luksicevo-suocavanje-sa-politickim-ocem (accessed 16 June 2019). 298 Jovanović, Vladimir. Udbom za Evropu. Monitor, 21 Janaury 2011. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/udbom-za-evropu/ (accessed 16 June 2019). 51
Unable to take real advantage of these opportunities, opposition parties seemed to be trying their luck with identity politics once again. Spring 2011 was marked by the debate around the national census, a sort of battlefield between different identity instances.299 The fact that a plurality of the population declared speaking Serbian rather than Montenegrin convinced opposition parties to pose the language question as one of the main requests to DPS and SDP in exchange of support for electoral process amendments requiring a qualified majority.300 The long-delayed alignment of electoral legislation with Constitutional requirements provided an “unusual leverage” to opposition parties,301 which was however used to achieve rather limited technical improvements and a symbolic identity concession, i.e. the inclusion of Serbian as official language of education besides the Montenegrin one.302 Such way of negotiating left the dominant free hands in shaping some electoral law technical matters to its favour, especially when it came to minority representation rights. With such milestone eventually reached, by the end of 2011 Montenegro made significant legislative progresses towards opening accession talks with EU. Implementation, however, lingered. Lukšić government failed to give proof of the promised substantial change, leaving initial promises largely unfulfilled.303
3.2 From Great Ambitions to Atomisation: The Season of Lost Chances (2012- 2015) While opposition parties discussed about the economic crisis without managing to undertake consistent actions, popular discontent was about to escalate in early 2012.304 Rising electricity bills triggered protests organised by MANS, together with trade and student unions, and demanding concrete government action against such financial burdens.305 After a failed negotiation, Lukšić suggested the organisers should establish a political party instead of threatening Montenegro’s EU
299 Sofos, Spyros A. Montenegro – a census like no other?. Transconflict, 14 July 2011. Available at: http://www.transconflict.com/2011/07/montenegro-a-census-like-no-other-147/ (accessed 16 June 2019). 300 Žugić, Vladan. Šef SNP tvrdi da zna rezultate popisa: Crnogorski jezik nije prošao. Vijesti, 22 April 2011. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/sef-snp-tvrdi-da-zna-rezultate-popisa-crnogorski-jezik-nije-prosao (accessed 16 June 2019). 301 Uljarević, Daliborka and Stevo Muk. 2012. Nations in Transit 2012 – Montenegro. Washington/New York: Freedom House, 401. 302 Jovanović, Vladimir. Jezici razdora. Monitor, 02 September 2011. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/jezici- razdora/ (accessed 16 June 2019). 303 Komnenić, Petar. Lukšićeva godina u premijerskoj fotelji. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 19 December 2011. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/luksiceva_godina_u_premijerskoj_fotelji/24427036.html (accessed 16 June 2019). 304 Milić, Rajko. Umjesto blagostanja imamo proteste i rupu u budžetu. Vijesti, 29 April 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/ekonomija/umjesto-blagostanja-imamo-proteste-i-rupu-u-budzetu (accessed 16 June 2019). 305 MANS. Annual Report 2012, 9-15. Available at: http://www.mans.co.me/wp- content/uploads/mans/MANS2012AnnualReport.pdf (accessed 16 June 2019). 52 path and criticised the “political” use they made of international donors’ funds.306 Beginning office with the promise of dialogue with CSOs, such remarks ended residual hopes for discontinuity with previous practices.307 Subsequent protest gatherings maintained their mass character and explicitly demanded government’s resignation under the slogan “It is time [to leave]”. Opposition parties pledged their support, yet took no concrete role in the matter.308 Instead, they tried without success to use institutional action in parliament to stop the government from offering financial guarantees for large companies’ debts accumulated after biased privatisations.309 Ultimately, even though protests died out after snap elections were called, the episode represented a powerful way to evidence growing discontent with ruling elite mismanagement.310 Lukšić’s clumsy reactions also showed DPS was not immune to non-institutional action, as the protests contributed in undermining his premiership, together with serious economic hardships.311 Most importantly, it signalled opposition parties that civic, discontent-driven popular mobilisation could be channelled in support of their politico-institutional activity. 312
In the meantime, judicial system reform talks were opened in line with EU accession requirements.313 Once again, opposition parties conditioned their support on identity-related revisions, stalling progress and leaving important technical matters to the dominant.314 If anything, opposition action confirmed SNP autonomous standing, while NOVA and PzP consistently supported each other.
306 Komnenić, Petar. Kritike Lukšićevog stava o protestima i evrointegracijama. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2 February 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/kritike_luksicevog_stava_o_protestima_i_evrointegracijama/24471536.html (accessed 16 June 2019). 307 Radulović, Zoran. Dobar, loš, Lukšić. Monitor, 24 February 2012. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/dobar- lo-luki/ (accessed 16 June 2019); Kovačević, Duško. Politika i NVO. Vijesti, 27 February 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/kolumne/politika-i-nvo (accessed 16 June 2019). 308 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Podrška novom građanskom protestu u Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 15 March 2012. Available at:https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/podrska_novom_gradjanskom_protestu_u_crnoj_gori/24516725.html (accessed 17 June 2019). 309 Janković, Srđan. Opozicija i NVO oštro protiv rebalansa CG budžeta. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 23 May 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/opozicija-i-nevladin-sektor-ostro-protiv-rebalansa-cg- budzeta/24590810.html (accessed 17 June 2019). 310 Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2014. BTI 2014 Country Report — Montenegro. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 9, 17-18. 311 Ćalović: Lukšić se potrošio štiteći svog mentora. Vijesti, 27 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/calovic-luksic-se-potrosio-stiteci-svog-mentora (accessed 18 June 2019). 312 Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood, 151. 313 Janković, Srđan. Počinju pregovori o ustavnim promjenama. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 20 February 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/pocinju_pregovori_o_ustavnim_promjenama/24490333.html (accessed 18 June 2019). 314Janković, Srđan. Bez dogovora o izmjenama Ustava Crne Gore, razgovori se nastavljaju. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 03 May 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bez_dogovor_o_izmjenama_crnogorskog_ustava_razgovori_se_nastavljaju/2456874 4.html (accessed 18 June 2019). 53
By June, it became clear that the ruling coalition intended to organise early parliamentary elections, probably to avoid voting after “another harsh winter of economic and social discontent”.315 Giving substance to previous talks, NOVA and PzP finally inaugurated a “Democratic Front” (DF), intended to unite as many opposition actors, including civil society and activists, downplaying previous identity and political divisions to finally topple the dominant.316 The ambitious initiative was meant to exploit the momentum provided by the protest campaign. The civic energy mobilised by the “Citizens’ front” might have fed its political spin-off to topple down DPS dominance. Indeed, workers’ and students’ unions were swift to declare their participation, while MANS said to support the effort without joining.317 The chosen leader was former Yugoslav diplomat Miodrag Lekić, a respected and moderate character, yet his official roles during the 1990s were to become matter of criticism for his opponents.318 Although a promising endeavour, the new coalition had a difficult time appealing Montenegro’s minorities, especially due to the Serb nationalist background of part of its constituents.319
Another immediate concern was SNP reluctance.320 Talks failed, as Milić requested a SNP-DF list as peers and DF refused such “coalition with a coalition” that crippled its ambitions of opposition leadership.321 As SNP maintained its independent course, some board members declared their intention to join the DF anyway.322 The rebel faction led by Milan Knezević and former president
315 Al Jazeera Balkans. 2012. Milan Popović o političkoj situaciji. 316 Pejović, Igor. Dobrodošli su svi koje nisu žigosali DPS i SDP. Vijesti, 23 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/dobrodosli-su-svi-koje-nisu-zigosali-dps-i-sdp (accessed 18 June 2019); Pejović, Igor. Demokratski front predstavio svoje simbole. Vijesti, 23 August 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/demokratski-front-predstavio-svoje-simbole (accessed 18 June 2012). 317 Pejović, Igor and Milica Bogdanović. Jovović: Pozvaćemo sve studente iz Građanskog fronta. Vijesti, 27 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/jovovic-pozvacemo-sve-studente-iz-gradanskog-fronta (accessed 18 June 2019); Bogdanović, Milica and Igor Pejović. Ćalović podržava, ali neće pristupiti Demokratskom frontu. Vijesti, 28 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/calovic-podrzava-ali-nece-pristupiti-demokratskom- frontu (accessed 18 June 2019). 318 Tomović, Predrag. Lekić na čelu opozicionog fronta Crne Gore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 24 July 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/lekic-na-celu-opozicionog-fronta-crne-gore/24655005.html (accessed 18 June 2019). Janković, Srđan. Bivši Miloševićev ambasador objedinjuje crnogorsku opoziciju. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 03 July 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bivsi-milosevicev-ambasador-objedinjuje-crnogorsku- opoziciju/24633944.html (accessed 18 June 2019). 319 Janković, Srđan. Crna Gora: Da li će manjinske stranke ući u Demokratski front. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 06 July 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/da-li-ce-manjinske-stranke-uci-u-demokratski- front/24637447.html (accessed 18 June 2019). 320 Bogdanović, Milica. Nova: Neka se Srđan Milić jasno izjasni o pristupanju Demokratskom frontu. Vijesti, 05 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/nova-neka-se-srdan-milic-jasno-izjasni-o-pristupanju- demokratskom-frontu (accessed 18 June 2019). 321 Bogdanović, Milica. Lekić: SNP traži nemoguće. Vijesti, 12 August 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/lekic-snp-trazi-nemoguce (accessed 18 June 2019). 322 Žugić, Vladan and Samir Kajošević. Dio SNP-a pristupa Frontu. Vijesti, 26 August 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/dio-snp-a-pristupa-frontu (accessed 18 June 2019). 54
Predrag Bulatović was thus expelled and granted two seats in DF presidency, threatening a consistent erosion of SNP consensus only two months before the elections.323
Clearly, then, new-born DF could claim only partial success in uniting opposition behind Lekić. Although a good number of opposition intellectuals declared their support for the initiative and were included in its “Political Council”, the largest opposition party remained outside the alliance.324 In fact, prolonged DF and SNP negotiations delayed campaigning and showed unwillingness to overcome previous contrasts. As they prepared to compete for similar constituencies, embittered recriminations could hinder both sides’ credibility in the eyes of unconvinced DPS voters.325
Such gap was precisely where the new ‘rising star ‘of Montenegrin party politics intended to profit, refusing any pre-electoral coalition.326 Intended as a civic platform based on expert contributions, Positive Montenegro (PCG) was established in spring 2012 and led by civil society activist and biologist Darko Pajović.327 The party campaigned supporting an “independent, sovereign, and democratic Montenegro” and presenting itself as an “alternative to both government and opposition” that did not ask external actors support for change but worked for it from the inside.328 Overall, it adopted a similar platform to PzP in 2006, with some relevant differences. While PzP relied heavily on Medojević’s inflammatory anti-DPS rhetoric, PCG maintained a moderate style. Further, PCG stood clearly in the independentist bloc, escaping PzP ambiguities. It was an attempt
323 Vijesti. Šizma u SNP-u: Formiranje paralelnih opštinskih odbora. 27 August 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/sizma-u-snp-u-formiranje-paralelnih-opstinskih-odbora?slika=0 (accessed 18 June 2019); Kajošević, Samir and Igor Pejović. Knežević i Bojović u predsjedništvu Fronta. Vijesti, 31 August 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/knezevic-i-bojovic-u-predsjednistvu-fronta?slika=0 (accessed 18 june 2019); Pejović, Igor. SNP: Oni koji su pristupili Frontu su time napustili stranku. Vijesti, 31 August 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/snp-oni-koji-su-pristupili-frontu-su-time-napustili-stranku (accessed 18 June 2019). 324 Pejović, Igor. Demokratski front formirao Politički savjet od 23 člana. Vijesti, 01 September 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/demokratski-front-formirao-politicki-savjet-od-23-clana?slika=0 (accessed 18 June 2019). 325 Vijesti. Muk: Dok vladajuće stranke rade, DF i SNP se bave ujedinjavanjem preko medija. 19 August 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/muk-dok-vladajuce-stranke-rade-df-i-snp-se-bave-ujedinjavanjem- preko-medija (accessed 19 June 2019). 326 Vijesti. Pozitivna Crna Gora: Samostalno na izbore. Vijesti, 03 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/pozitivna-crna-gora-samostalno-na-izbore (accessed 18 June 2019). 327 Pejović, Igor. Osnovana Pozitivna Crna Goru, na čelu Darko Pajović. Vijesti, 26 May 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/osnovana-pozitivna-crna-goru-na-celu-darko-pajovic?slika=0 (accessed 19 June 2019). 328 Koprivica, Veseljko. DARKO PAJOVIĆ, PREDSJEDNIK POZITIVNE CRNE GORE: Crnoj Gori nisu potrebni gospodari. Monitor, 07 September 2012. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/darko-pajovi-predsjednik-pozitivne- crne-gore-crnoj-gori-nisu-potrebni-gospodari/ (accessed 19 June 2019); Kajošević, Samir. Pozitivna: Neće nam Brisel određivati kada ćemo smijeniti vlast. Vijesti, 11 October 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/pozitivna-nece-nam-brisel-odredivati-kada-cemo-smijeniti-vlast?slika=0 (accessed 19 June 2019). 55 to propose a ‘third way’, targeting dissatisfied DPS-SDP voters without paying the toll of Unionist/pro-Serb sympathies, i.e. filling the void left by LSCG.
On the incumbent side, DPS and SDP overcame their recent disagreements forming a coalition that will later include the Liberal Party (LS).329 Even though DPS showed the usual confidence in the final success, the situation was not as promising as in 2009.330 The many problems of DPS-led transformation emerging with the consequences of the global economic crisis made these “the first interesting elections after a decade”.331 To downplay such problems, DPS campaigned heavily on its classic repertoire of divisive identity matters.332 The DF was thus a “camouflage” of Serb nationalists and PCG their ‘Trojan horse’, tasked with collecting independentist votes to then support anti-Montenegrin parties.333 Moreover, DPS top ranks were intensively deployed in public events throughout the country, led by the ‘omnipresent’ Djukanović.334
October 14 election results showed the effectiveness of such methods, although they were not enough for the absolute majority of seats. The DPS-SDP-LS coalition gathered 39 seats and 45.60% of total preferences. DF was the strongest opposition group with 20 seats (22.82%), while SNP fell to 9 (11.06%) and PCG performed well with 7 (8.24%).335 Although Lekić offered premiership to BS leader in a government of “national unity” without DPS, things seemed already settled between the incumbent and minority parties, eventually electing a new Djukanović government.336 However, opposition parties recorded a significant growth of their overall preferences at national level.337 This is all the more relevant considering that the time lost in fruitless pre-electoral negotiations and
329 Janković, Srđan. Zbog čega crnogorska opozicija ne uspijeva zajedno na izbore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 August 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/zbog-cega-crnogorska-opozicija-ne-uspijeva-zajedno-na- izbore/24675464.html (accessed 19 June 2019). 330 Vijesti. DPS-SDP: Jedinstveni front neće uticati na rezultate izbora. 03 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/dps-sdp-jedinstveni-front-nece-uticati-na-rezultate-izbora (accessed 18 June 2019). 331 Tomović, Predrag. Prvi put poslije decenije Crna Gora ima interesantne izbore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 22 September 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/prvi-put-poslije-decenije-crna-gora-ima-interesantne- izbore/24716671.html (accessed 19 June 2019). 332 Komnenić, Petar. Crna Gora: Izbori o budućnosti, kampanja o prošlosti. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 September 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-o-buducnosti-kampanja-o- proslosti/24719498.html (accessed 19 June 2019). 333 Petrić, Radomir. Đukanović uporan: Pozitivna želi da glasove prenese velikosrpskom Frontu. Vijesti, 06 October 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/dukanovic-uporan-pozitivna-zeli-da-glasove-prenese- velikosrpskom-frontu?slika=0 (accessed 19 June 2019). 334 Bakić, Miloš. Rezervne duše. Monitor, 05 October 2012. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/rezervne-due/ (accessed 20 June 2019). 335 Vujović, Zlatko. 2012. Izbori u crnoj gori: Novi povratak đukanovića. Politički Život, (6), 77. 336 Vijesti. Lekić: Početak kraja DPS-a i SDP-a. 14 October 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/lekic-pocetak-kraja-dps-a-i-sdp-a?slika=0 (accessed 20 June 2019); Vujović, Izbori u crnoj gori, 73. 337 Bakić, Miloš. Vođin tender za novog Ranka. Monitor, 19 October 2012. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/voin-tender-za-novog-ranka/ (accessed 20 June 2019). 56 frequent mutual attacks probably impeded them in taking full advantage of the economic crisis, as the DPS had to use all its available means to hold on to power.
Signals of diminishing DPS support came from local elections held in on the same day, as well. While in Budva and Kotor DPS dwindled but managed to maintain office, in Nikšić opposition parties gained a slight majority and the historic chance of ruling Montenegro’s second biggest city.338 Coalition talks between DF, SNP, and PCG started immediately, yet stuck around PCG request for full loyalty to Montenegrin state symbols, as DF councillors deserted the national anthem during Nicksic’s assembly inauguration.339 Opposition parties’ credibility was at serious loss here: finally given the chance to outnumber the dominant and substantiate their claims of superior administration capacity, national party leaders seemed willing to risk losing it by dragging into local-level talks symbolic identity matters and personal rivalries, in total disregard of the mandate provided by the electorate.340 Lekić, who initially left DF components to deal with inter- party talks, had to negotiate personally with Pajović to reach a compromise. When everything seemed settled, however, a PCG councillor suddenly changed sides and gave DPS the majority to elect its candidate mayor.341 The episode provoked a scandal and amidst accusations of political corruption, the new majority would eventually agree to call for new elections, to be held for similar reasons also in Andrijevica.342 Podgorica Council opposition (including the SDP) requested snap elections too, due to the fact that DPS kept ruling thanks to the three ex-opposition councillors that switched sides in 2010.343 In the capital, however, the dominant was not ready to take the risk, after the unpromising results obtained in October.
For the opposition parties, after the significant increase in preferences recorded in October, a solid post-electoral performance in Nikšić could have represented the perfect springboard for upcoming presidential elections. Instead, pointless discussions on national politics for the formation of a local government were perfectly fitting the accusations of irresponsibility moved by the dominant. Even
338 Bakić, Vođin tender za novog Ranka; Radio Slobodna Evropa. Lokalni izbori u CG: DPS nema apsolutnu većinu u Nikšiću. 14 October 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/24739316.html (accessed 20 June 2019). 339 Janković, Srđan. Opozicija se spotakla na himni. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 November 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/opozicija-se-spotakla-na-himni/24770824.html (accessed 20 June 2019). 340 Janković, Srđan. Nikšić i dalje bez vlasti: Konflikt opozicionih šefova. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 21 Novmber 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/niksic-i-dalje-bez-vlasti-konflikt-opoziconih-sefova/24777509.html (accessed 20 June 2019); Bakić, Miloš. Sto koraka nazad. Monitor, 23 November 2012. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/sto-koraka-nazad/ (accessed 20 June 2019). 341 Mandić, Svetlana and Igor Pejović. Sjednica SO Nikšić odložena, i odbornik Pozitivne napustio salu. Vijesti, 29 November 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/sjednica-so-niksic-odlozena-i-odbornik-pozitivne- napustio-salu?slika=0 (accessed 20 June 2019). 342 Mandić, Svetlana and Beća Čoković. Novi izbori u Nikšiću 3. ili 10. marta. Vijesti, 26 December 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/novi-izbori-u-niksicu-3-ili-10-marta (accessed 20 June 2019). 343 Bakić, Miloš. Začarani krugovi. Monitor, 11 January 2013. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/zaarani- krugovi/ (accessed 20 June 2019). 57 assuming the real matter of contention in Nikšić may have been the division of positions among ruling partners, it was difficult to ask voters for further trust after such poor display. Although PCG councillor’s co-optation raised plausible suspects, it could not completely obscure the extremely poor conduct of the opposition.
This event was all the more relevant considering that, differently from previous ones, April 2013 presidential elections appeared rather uncertain in their outcome. Talks for Lekić’s candidature as ‘independent’ opposition candidate emerged already in 2012. Moreover, increasingly explicit in its disagreements with its coalition partner, SDP opposed incumbent Filip Vujanović’s candidacy even after the Constitutional court confirmed his eligibility for a third mandate due to the changed status of Montenegro after independence.344
Adding to this, the “Recordings Affair” further threatened to undermine DPS candidate. The scandal erupted as pro-opposition daily ‘Dan’ published 2012 recordings from DPS party meetings, in which officials openly spoke about using public resources to employ party members and thus ensure votes for local and national elections.345 Exposing a sort of ‘public secret’, the affair strengthened opposition’s accusations and calls for more decisive international intervention, while judiciary institutions did not undertake concrete measures to address the case.346 Some called for total institutional and electoral boycott, although no tangible action whatsoever seemed to be taken. Journalist Miloš Bakić thought it “difficult to get rid of the impression that opposition considered disclosure in itself would end abuses”.347 Indeed, the scandal proved no obstacle for the DPS obtaining majorities in both Nikšić and Andrijevica.348 Results in Nikšić exposing a massive loss of consensus for PCG, the party dismissed its first internal dispute by simply dissolving its political council after a faction demanded Pajović’s resignation.349 Overall, instead of reflecting on the
344 Janković, Srđan. Crna Gora pred neizvjesnim predsjedničkim izborima. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 January 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-pred-neizvjesnim-predsjednickim-izborima/24883669.html (accessed 20 June 2019). 345 Bakić, Miloš. Snimak u oku. Monitor, 22 February 2013. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/snimak-u-oku/ (accessed 21 June 2019). 346 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Afera "Snimak": Opozicija optužuje tužiteljku za pristrasnost. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 20 February 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/afera-snimak-opozicija-optuzuje-tuziteljku-za- pristrasnost/24907755.html (accessed 21 June 2019). 347 Bakić, Miloš. Godina krađe. Monitor, 03 January 2014. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/godina-krae/ (accessed 21 June 2019). 348 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Izbori u Nikšiću: Opomena za opoziciju i vjetar u Vujanovićeva leđa. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 11 March 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/izbori-u-niksicu-opomena-za-opoziciju-i-vjetar-u- vujanoviceva-ledja/24925371.html (accessed 22 June 2019); Bakić, Miloš. Tijesna koža. Monitor, 13 March 2013. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/tijesna-koa/ (accessed 22 June 2019). 349 Vijesti. Politički Savjet Pozitivne prekinuo rad. 24 March 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/politicki-savjet-pozitivne-prekinuo-rad (accessed 24 June 2019). 58 consequences of the depleted political capital, opposition parties ascribed this electoral loss entirely to DPS manipulation, thereby missing an occasion to openly come to terms with past mistakes.350
Nevertheless, the presidential race seemed open for any outcome as opposition parties finally managed to unite behind a credible competitor.351 A polarised campaign full of personal attacks between the two competing sides ended with Vujanović’s slight success (51.2% and 161,940 votes against Lekić’s 48.8% and 154,289). As Vujanović came second in most major municipalities, both contenders proclaimed victory on election night.352 Lekić immediately cried foul and, after presenting legal complaints, DF started boycotting parliamentary sessions and organised “citizens’ protests”, demanding a “Special Law” to repeat the elections.353 A new political crisis opened, in which Ranko Krivokapić and his SDP flirted with the opposition through symbolic acts, such as boycotting Vujanović’s inauguration together with DF, SNP, and PCG.354 Concerned, EU officials attempted pushing for a compromise solution, declaring both the inopportunity of boycotts and the need for the government to address opposition’s concerns.355 External involvement seemed to bring immediate results. Lekić specified DF was actually “selectively participating or not participating”, explaining they would participate in every relevant debate to improve the political system, practically reconsidering its tactic.356 DPS partly complied as well. The “Special Law” was turned down, yet an investigation commission on the “Recordings Affair” was unanimously approved in parliament, together with bipartisan commitment for a working groups regarding EU-requested Constitutional amendments and increasing trust in the electoral process.357
This last political crisis resolved easier than expected, incumbent coalition internal problems kept characterising political circumstances throughout 2013. Disagreement emerged again regarding
350 Bogdanović, Milica. Najlakše reći da je DPS pokrao izbore. Vijesti, 13 March 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/najlakse-reci-da-je-dps-pokrao-izbore?slika=0 (accessed 22 June 2019). 351 Janković, Srđan. SDP poziva na bojkot izbora, podijeljena podrška stranaka Vujanoviću i Lekiću. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 04 April 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/podijeljena-podrska-stranaka-predsjednickim- kandidatima/24948019.html (accessed 21 June 2019). 352 OSCE-ODIHR. 2013. Montenegro Presidential Election. 7 April 2013. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw, 25 June 2013; Vijesti. Vujanović ubjedljiv u BP i Rožajama, Lekić uzeo Bar, Podgoricu, Nikšić... 08 April 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/vujanovic-ubjedljiv-u-bp-i- rozajama-lekic-uzeo-bar-podgoricu-niksic?slika=0 (accessed 22 June 2019). 353 Radio Slobodna Evropa. Opozicija sa protesta u Podgorici zatražila nove izbore. 20 April 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/opozicija-protestuje-u-podgorici/24963376.html (accessed 22 June 2019). 354 Janković, Srđan. Vujanović počeo novi mandat uz bojkot i proteste. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 20 May 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/inauguracija-vujanovia-uz-protestni-mars/24991515.html (accessed 22 June 2019). 355 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Intenzivirani politički razgovori oko postizborne krize. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 April 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/intenzivirani-politicki-razgovori-oko-postizborne-krize/24968608.html (accessed 22 June 2019). 356 Radio Slobodna Evropa. Crna Gora: Opozicija u Skupštini kada se bude raspravljalo o zahtjevima. 15 May 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/24986860.html (accessed 22 June 2019). 357Janković, Srđan. Odbijen zahtjev za poništenje izbora, odobrena istraga o aferi 'Snimak'. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 30 May 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/cg-rasprava-o-ponitenju-predsjednikih- izbora/25003187.html (accessed 22 June 2016). 59 government’s budget revision proposal to pay for Aluminium Plant Podgorica’s (KAP) debts, as the SDP showed its contrariness.358 This limbo between coalition partners gave opposition parties hopes for SDP switching sides in future elections, causing repeated attempts to call for early ones.359
Although events following 2012 protests showed the limits of DPS dominance, opposition parties could not take full advantage of them, mostly due to unwillingness to put aside differences and cooperate convincingly in the eyes of the electorate. In particular, DF proved a fruitful initiative, yet keeping momentum proved challenging. The coalition tried to do so expressing unabated opposition through its ‘selective participation’ tactic and attempting further expansion in sight of autumn 2013 local elections in Cetinje, Mojkovac, and Petnjica, a sort of warm up for 2014 round of local elections including Podgorica.360 After SNP and PCG declined the offer,361 evident differences will emerge also regarding Constitutional amendments negotiations. Differently from the DF, PCG and SNP showed willingness to compromise, contributing to end a process hindered by identity debates in 2012 and crucial for opening further negotiating chapters with the EU.362 DF offers were directed to SDP as well, yet Krivokapić’s party seemed still comfortable in office. Indeed, SDP clearly tried to ascribe itself the role of ‘kingmaker’, without doing so until the end. This because it could not exclude its exit would simply mean someone getting DPS rewards instead.363 After Andrijevica, Podgorica and Nikšić, half of the four PCG councillors in Budva changed sides to support DPS
358 Krcić, Esad. Budžetski rebalans: Da li će građani platiti i struju za KAP? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 28 June 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/budzetski-rebalans-da-li-ce-gradjani-platiti-i-struju-za- kap/25031050.html (accessed 22 June 2019). 359 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Rudović: Igra SDP-a neće moći vječno da traje. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 04 August 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/rudovic-za-rse-igra-sdpa-nece-moci-vjecno-da-traje/25065134.html (accessed 22 June 2019); Vijesti. DF i Pozitivna: Novi izbori jedini način za rješenje krize. 01 August 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/df-i-pozitivna-novi-izbori-jedini-nacin-za-rjesenje-krize (accessed 22 June 2019). 360 Vijesti. DF će parcijalno učestvovati u radu parlamenta. 18 June 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/df-ce-parcijalno-ucestvovati-u-radu-parlamenta (accessed 22 June 2019); Kajošević, Samir. Lekić: Demokratski front će se i dalje širiti. Vijesti, 24 july 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/lekic-demokratski-front-ce-se-i-dalje-siriti (accessed 22 June 2019); Knežević: Vijesti. Očekujemo saglasnost oko zajedničkog nastupa opozicije. 22 August 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/knezevic-ocekujemo-saglasnost-oko-zajednickog-nastupa-opozicije (accessed 22 June 2019). 361 Murić, Darvin. Pozitivna i SNP o ulasku u Demokratski front: Bolje ćemo proći sami. Vijesti, 13 August 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/pozitivna-i-snp-o-ulasku-u-demokratski-front-bolje-cemo-proci- sami (accessed 22 June 2019). 362Janković, Srđan. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 31 July 2013. Usvojene promjene Ustava, Crna Gora bliža Evropskoj uniji. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/usvojene-promjene-ustava-crna-gora-bliza-evropskoj- uniji/25062575.html (accessed 22 June 2019). 363 Kajošević, Samir and Vlado Žugić. Očijukanje: Perspektive moguće saradnje SDP-a i opozicije. Vijesti, 27 April 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/ocijukanje-perspektive-moguce-saradnje-sdp-a-i-opozicije (accessed 22 June 2019). 60 mayor, a concrete reminder of the same risk at national level.364 All the more so as the event deepened PCG post-Nikšić internal crisis, leading one of its MPs out of the party, later joining the DF.
After the “Recordings Affair” parliamentary commission ended its works without results, political parties focused on November 2014 local elections amidst the usual fraud allegations.365 Electoral results, however, signalled DPS recovery. It gained absolute majorities in both Cetinje and Mojkovac and ruled in coalition in Petnjica.366 SDP choice of competing independently did not interfere, while DF coalition with SNP in Mojkovac was not enough to oust the dominant in a municipality previously controlled by pro-Serb parties. Although these were minor elections, they provided the chance for DPS to dismiss doubts on its ‘invincibility’. Results called for renewed opposition action in view of 2014 elections, even though they had different views on what to do next.367 DF confrontational strategy was not shared by both PCG and SNP, fostering further polemics.368 In an unexpected move, SDP proposed a “Constituent Bloc” against the DPS to parties sharing its pro-NATO orientation, thereby excluding cooperation with the DF and hinting at PCG, eventually agreeing on such a platform for Podgorica.369 Faced with the impossibility of further expansion, DF decided to contest independently in all municipalities, inducing SNP to do the same.370 Soon after, Lekić’s alliance will begin another parliamentary boycott due to the delayed approval of electoral legislation amendments part of May 2013 compromise, calling for other opposition parties to follow its example.371 Again, this unilateral move found no support, as SNP and PCG saw no reason to do so when DPS was often outvoted thanks to SDP autonomous
364 Plamenac, Branka. Sve nijanse crvene i žute. Monitor, 03 July 2013. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/sve- nijanse-crvene-i-ute/ (accessed 22 June 2019). 365 Bakić, Miloš. Kontrola štete. Monitor, 08 November 2013. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/kontrola-tete/ (accessed 23 June 2019). 366 Krcić, Esad. DPS-u apsolutna vlast u Cetinju i Mojkovcu, pobjeda i u Petnjici. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 17 November 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-cetinje-mojkovac-i- petnjica/25169948.html (accessed 23 June 2019). 367 Jovićević, Dimitrije. DPS ubjedljiva, opozicija ukazuje na zloupotrebe. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 17 November 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/dps-ubjedljiva-opozicija-ukazuje-na-zloupotrebe/25170797.html (accessed 23 June 2019). 368 Vijesti. Pavlović: SNP odbacila opozicione principe. 24 January 2014. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/pavlovic-snp-odbacila-opozicione-principe (accessed 23 June 2019). 369 Komnenić, Petar. Koalicionim opozicionim blokom protiv Đukanovića? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 04 January 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/koalicionim-blokom-protiv-djukanovica/25224931.html (accessed 23 June 2016). 370 Vijesti. Lekić: DF samostalno u svim opštinama. 02 February 2014. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/eu- vijesti/lekic-df-samostalno-u-svim-opstinama?slika=0 (accessed 23 June 2019). 371 Vijesti. DF proglasio potpuni bojkot Skupštine zbog neusvajanja izbornog zakona. 19 February 2014. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/df-proglasio-potpuni-bojkot-skupstine-zbog-neusvajanja-izbornog-zakona (accessed 23 June 2019). 61 behaviour.372 Indeed, DF move is better understood as a tentative to show itself as the ‘true’ challenger and thus appealing to voters of other opposition parties.
On 26 May 2014, elections in 12 municipalities confirmed DPS unabated dominance. The most important contest took place in Podgorica where DF was led by Lekić himself and SNP proposed the young Aleksa Bečić against DPS’s Slavoljub Stijepović.373 DPS choice was unexpected as it substituted incumbent Miomir Mugoša and showed concern for appeasing the SDP for the sake of increased post-electoral coalition potential.374 A campaign that had a relevant internet and social media component showed harsh competition between opposition parties themselves and with the DPS, while SDP and PCG were often caught between these two fronts.375 Results led both DPS and opposition to claim success: DPS was only one mandate away from majority, whereas the DF and SNP could count on anticipated post-election cooperation with SDP and PCG.376 Within this bloc, Lekić underperformed yet maintained primacy, while the SNP could celebrate Bečić, who doubled up October 2012 party ratings.377 Still, optimism faded away as negotiations dragged for months due to SDP-PCG contrasts. When harmony seemed restored and agreement with DF and SNP finally reached, an internal crisis within PCG crushed any possible deal.378 SDP alone had now the final word. Only just preserving internal unity, it eventually accepted DPS rich coalition offer, thus failing historical change hopes for the capital after four months of uncertainty.379
This epilogue left opposition parties bitter towards the SDP, but also with important internal questions to deal with. PCG practically split between Pajović loyalists and the faction around
372 Vijesti. Pozitivna neće bojkotovati rad Skupštine. 19 February 2014. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/pozitivna-nece-bojkotovati-rad-skupstine (accessed 23 June 2014); Vijesti. SNP: Čudi da DF i Pozitivna nijesu za glasanje o nepovjerenju Vladi. 27 February 2014. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/snp-cudi-da-df-i-pozitivna-nijesu-za-glasanje-o-nepovjerenju-vladi (accessed 23 June2019). 373 Bakić, Miloš. IZBORI: Početak kraja? Monitor, 23 May 2014. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/izbori- poetak-kraja/ (accessed 23 June 2019). 374 Bakić, Miloš. PODGORIČKI IZBORI: Igra postolja. Monitor, 28 March 2014. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/podgoriki-izbori-igra-postolja/ (accessed 23 June 2019). 375 Janković, Srđan. Borba za Podgoricu: Politički rat unutar opozicije. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 22 April 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/borba-unutar-opozicije-za-podgoricu/25358611.html (accessed 23 June 2019). Tomović, Predrag. Negativna izborna kampanja i na internetu. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 May 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/negativna-izborna-kampanja-i-na-internetu-/25384506.html (accessed 23 June 2019). 376 Janković, Srđan. DPS bez apsolutne vlasti u Podgorici. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 May 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/dps-bez-apsolutne-vlasti-u-podgorici/25398064.html (accessed 23 June 2019). 377 Bakić, Miloš. NAKON IZBORA: Kružni tokovi. Monitor, 06 june 2014. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/nakon-izbora-kruni-tokovi/ (accessed 23 June 2019). 378 Janković, Srđan. Previranja u Pozitivnoj Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 30 July 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/previranja-u-pozitvnoj-crnoj-gori/25475587.html (accessed 24 June 2019). 379 Janković, Srđan. Da li su izborne poruke jednake epilogu? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 08 September 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/da-li-su-izborne-poruke-jednake-epilogu/26572697.html (accessed 23 June 2019); Portal Analitika. ANEKS SPORAZUMA: Raspodjela svih funkcija u Glavnom gradu, SDP-u jaka kontrola nad DPS-om. 09 September 2014. Available at: https://portalanalitika.me/clanak/161089/aneks-sporazuma-raspodjela-svih- funkcija-u-glavnom-gradu-sdp-u-jaka-kontrola-nad-dps-om (accessed 24 June 2019). 62
Mladen Bojanić and Dritan Abazović. Dissatisfying results in November 2013 and May 2014 local elections and loss of local councillors (see Budva) added up to previous discord. Eventually, Pajović ousted Bojanić and Abazović’s faction in a showdown that practically left the party with less more than its parliamentary club.380 Most of the exiting faction joined Rakčević and Abazović’s new initiative, the Civic Movement United Reform Action (URA), with a clearer opposition orientation.381 Internal turmoil developed within the SNP, as well. Milić’s appeasement with the DPS added to recent results in Podgorica to boost Bečić’s bid for party leadership.382 Although Milić held on to its congress majority, Bečić’s faction hardly recognised such outcome. Soon, poor results in Herceg Novi, a former SNP stronghold, triggered a motion of no confidence.383 As the attempt failed, the party definitively split and Bečić established his Democratic Montenegro (Democrats).384
Things went no better for the DF, torn with contrasting ideas for the future. Lekić and NOVA vice- president Goran Danilović advocated for further expansion, increased centralisation, and firm institutional opposition, while Mandić and Medojević resisted any such attempt. They intended to organise popular protests and begin another parliamentary boycott, further radicalising their appeals, not disregarding reliance on identity divisions.385 A compromise was found in Lekić’s attempt to engage in talks for a “government of national unity” to show renewed commitment for responsible, joint opposition action.386 As the initiative died out, NOVA and PzP were no longer
380 Janković, Srđan. Frakcija isključena iz Pozitivne, partiju napustio i Abazović. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 15 October 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/frakcija-iskljucena-iz-pozitvne-partiju-napustio-i- abazovic/26638732.html (accessed 24 June 2016). 381 The official denomination “Ura” (meaning “bridge” in Albanian), will be announced some months later. Janković, Srđan. Osnovan Građanski pokret Crne Gore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 22 December 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/osnovan-gradjanski-pokret-crne-gore/26756825.html (accessed 25 June 2019). 382 Kajošević, Samir. Da li SNP može ostati ucijelo? Vijesti, 22 November 2014. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/da-li-snp-moze-ostati-ucijelo (accessed 24 June 2019). 383 Radulović, Mila. Milić ne zakazuje sjednicu Glavnog odbora, plaši se da nema većinu. Vijesti, 23 January 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/milic-ne-zakazuje-sjednicu-glavnog-odbora-plasi-se-da-nema- vecinu (accessed 24 June 2019). 384 Radulović, Mila. Bečić uskoro kreće sa novom partijom. Vijesti, 02 February 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/becic-uskoro-krece-sa-novom-partijom (accessed 24 June 2019); Kajošević, Samir. Bečić: Ko će da se bavi podjelama, neka nam se ne javlja. Vijesti, 19 April 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/becic-ko-ce-da-se-bavi-podjelama-neka-nam-se-ne-javlja (accessed 28 June 2019). 385 Kajošević, Samir. Protesti dijele Front: Danilović, Bulatović i Knežević uz Lekića. Vijesti, 20 December 2014. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/protesti-dijele-front-danilovic-bulatovic-i-knezevic-uz-lekica (accessed 25 June 2019). 386 Murić, Darvin. Lekić: Odlazim iz Demokratskog fronta ako ne bude sloge. Vijesti, 13 January 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/lekic-odlazim-iz-demokratskog-fronta-ako-ne-bude-sloge (accessed 25 June 2019); Vijesti. Lekić o DF: Protivili su se koordinaciji zbog partijskih i ličnih interesa. 13 March 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/lekic-o-df-protivili-su-se-koordinaciji-zbog-partijskih-i-licnih-interesa (accessed 26 June 2019). 63 ready to surrender their radical approach.387 Marginalised and faced with the definitive failure to transform the DF into a stable, catch-all platform, Lekić left.388 Together with Danilović he formed “Democratic Alliance” (DEMOS), pursuing his desired moderated course. DF quickly attempted to shore up its coalition image as NOVA and PzP were nominally joined by two parties just established by its members: Knezević’s Democratic People’s Party (DNP) and Janko Vučinić’s Workers’ Party (RP). Unrestrained from its former moderate leader, DF entered a new season of highly confrontational opposition and populist motives, starting with the organisation of the announced protest campaign. Thus, after the dominant reasserted its ‘invincibility’, opposition parties’ internal disputes culminated in three major splits that deeply transformed the political scene. Most opposition leaders’ inability to compromise and unwillingness to lose the privilege of (internal) power led to sudden fragmentation that appeared perfect for the dominant.
In the meantime, DPS closer allies within the SDP grew increasingly uneasy with Krivokapić flirting with opposition and were contrary to his idea of leaving the ruling coalition after NATO accession. Nevertheless, this line managed to receive SDP congress approval in June 2015. The faction led by Minister Ivan Brajović, instead, stood for unconditional loyalty to the DPS and left the party, later refusing to comply with Krivokapić demands for leaving government positions.389 Followed by the establishment of the Socialdemocrats (SD), the split meant also that, after NATO invitation was granted, DPS had to look for additional partners to avoid snap elections.390 However, as DPS needed to consolidate its ranks and partnerships, it could do so without many concerns, as it could rely on an atomised opposition, still busy reorganising itself.
3.3 Fragmented Cohabitation: Gradual Progress or Hopeless Failure? (2015- 2019) In July 2015, DF eventually announced the organisation of its protest campaign adopting a dedicated platform, and inviting others to join in the effort for “free and fair elections”.391 Although contrasts within the ruling coalition might have been a helpful coincidence for DF plans, the
387Kajošević, Samir. DF kreće u obilazak terena radi pripreme protesta. Vijesti, 26 February 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/df-krece-u-obilazak-terena-radi-pripreme-protesta (accessed 25 June 2019). 388 Vijesti. Lekić: Preispitaću politički status u Frontu. 11 March 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/lekic-preispitacu-politicki-status-u-frontu (accessed 25 June 2019). 389 Janković, Srđan. Raskol u SDP: Brajovićeva struja napustila stranku, Krivokapić traži da vrate mandate. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 30 June 2015. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sdp-opstaje-a-ko- odlazi/27102328.html (accessed 26 June 2019). 390 Gudović, Ivana. Socijaldemokrate Crne Gore nova partija. Vijesti, 9 July 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/socijaldemokrate-crne-gore-nova-partija (accessed 26 June 2019). 391 For a detailed asssessment of the episode, see Sartori, Alberto and Joachim Pranzl. 2018. Politics Going Civil. Contentious (Party) Politics in Montenegro. Südosteuropa, 66(4), 554-576 and Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood, 153-157. 64 initiative was taken unilaterally without other opposition parties’ active participation.392 Both newly established ones and those who just experienced a split were in a delicate process of internal (re)organisation. DF leadership’s harsh rhetoric risked engulfing them in the very moment in which they presented their renewed political platforms to their constituencies. Thus, becoming minor partners of any DF campaign represented too risky an endeavour even for the parties that shared its principled approach to opposition. Most importantly, given DF recent transformation, DPS grip on power, and EU reluctance to support non-institutional party action, chances for success were slim, at best.
At any rate, Freedom Calling kicked off on 27 September with some hundred tents in front of the Parliament in Podgorica. Protesters would live in this ‘liberated territory’ until their demands were met, i.e. incumbent resignation and the formation of a new transitional government for ‘Free and fair elections’. Although the approach was indeed creative and well thought in the attempt to attract support from abroad through social media, it was clumsier in its concrete development. A case in point was the speech given by Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) leader in Montenegro, Amfilohije Radović. A controversial character embodying a conservative and nationalist worldview, his presence contradicted the civic political imprint the platform claimed.393
By mid-October, the campaign seemed to reach its end. Suddenly, however, police units decided to remove the camp forcefully, causing several wounded and arresting two MPs and two journalists.394 Subsequent outrage offered unexpected momentum to the protests. In the following week and contrary to most expectations, the atmosphere indicated the potential to transcend party boundaries, even though other opposition parties resisted pressures to join. On 24 October, DF leaders headed an impressive crowd in front of the National Assembly demanding Djukanović’s resignation. By the end of the gathering, however, a group of protesters targeted the police, whose units reacted charging the crowd. With disproportioned violence, police action brought chaos in Podgorica, injuring dozens and arresting two DF MPs in the process.395 The episode created a political crisis of relevant proportions and long lasting recriminations between DF and the incumbent. Contemporarily, other opposition parties requested EU mediation for the improvement of electoral
392 Komnenić, Petar. Uljarević: DF protestima želi ojačati svoju poziciju. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 15 July 2015. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/uljarevic-df-protestima-zeli-ojacati-svoju-poziciju/27128610.html (accessed 27 June 2019). 393 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Ideologizacija protesta DF-a. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 08 October 2015. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ideologizacija-protesta-demokratskog-fronta/27295192.html (accessed 26 June 2019). 394 Janković, Srđan. Podgorica: Policija prekinula novi pokušaj protesta opozicije. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 17 October 2015. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/policija-prekinula-demonstracije-podgorica/27311202.html (accessed 26 June 2019). 395 Vijesti. Situacija u gradu se smirila. 25 October 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/situacija- u-gradu-se-smirila (accessed 26 June 2019). 65 framework in sight of 2016 parliamentary elections, otherwise threatening to join DF non- institutional actions.396 Such concerns seemed to be taken seriously, as the EU supported Assembly Speaker Ranko Krivokapić in starting talks with representatives of all parliamentary parties.397 DF was the only exception, firm in its refusal to conciliate with the dominant and strongly attacking the ones who intended to do so.398 Instead, peaceful protests continued until spring 2016, although participation progressively diminished.
An interesting trait of Freedom Calling is that it showed the way in which DF attempted to look less pro-Serb than its actual constituencies’ values. It did so by utilising the populist topos of true expression of ‘the people’s discontent’, somehow claiming a quasi-civil society, ‘watchdog’ status due to a self-assigned civic background.399 Besides such considerations, Freedom Calling had also the ‘merit’ to expose the repressive side of domination, as it showed the ruthlessness of DPS’s controlled security apparatus in using unnecessary violence against opposition, rather than easing tensions. Although the politicisation of security forces in Montenegro was not a secret, its consequences had been disguised behind the official democratisation rhetoric. Such potential threat to political stability was quickly addressed by the EU, who duly supported efforts to de-escalate tensions. Talks also offered a chance to work through some consequences of the fragmentation crisis that hit opposition parties, as protests indirectly brought most quarrelling opposition parties to a negotiating table, eventually leading to a transitional government by May 2016.
It would take long for this process to develop into the final agreement, though. In the meantime, Montenegro received the invitation to join NATO in December 2015. Specific protests organised by some opposition parties only blurred differences between anti-NATO and Freedom Calling, the latter already losing momentum.400 More significant was that the final SDP-DPS coalition goal was achieved.401 In a somewhat surprising move, Djukanović himself called for a confidence vote to resolve the long-standing skirmishes with his once trustworthy partner. However, this was not a leap in the dark. A member of the SDP had already estimated that “As soon as we will start leaving
396 Vijesti. Ako DPS neće dogovor ostaju samo bojkot i masovne demonstracije svih subjekata. 22 October 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/ako-dps-nece-dogovor-ostaju-samo-bojkot-i-masovne- demonstracije-svih-subjekata (accessed 26 June 2019). 397 Vijesti. Krivokapić sa liderima partija počinje dijalog u parlamentu. 01 December 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/krivokapic-sa-liderima-partija-pocinje-dijalog-u-parlamentu (accessed 26 June 2019). 398 Vijesti. Medojević: Ostatak opozicije bliži DPS-u nego DF-u. 22 December 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/medojevic-ostatak-opozicije-blizi-dps-u-nego-df-u (accessed 26 June 2019). 399 Sartori and Pranzl, Politics Going Civil. 400 https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/anti-nato-skup-zavrsen-citanjem-testamenta-sv-petra-cetinjskog 401 Radio Slobodna Evropa. Krivokapić: SDP neće izaći iz Vlade dok ne stigne poziv za NATO. 19 October 2015. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/27314499.html (accessed 26 June 2019). 66 the cabinet, we will be stuck at the door with those who push to enter and take our place”.402 It proved to be true, as PCG had already started aligning with DPS positions and gave its crucial support to the government.403 In this manner, the SDP became now officially part of the opposition in Parliament.
Although inter-party talks seemed to fail, EU and USA representatives’ pressure seemed to be crucial in revitalising the forum and allowing an eventual deal.404 Signed by DPS, PCG, SDP, URA, and DEMOS, the agreement entailed the formation of a transitional government with key ministries and institutions controlled by the opposition under a “Special Law”.405 Somehow scaling back the initiative, the compromise was only supported by opposition parties controlling a total of 6 MPs. Democrats and SNP disagreed with it, while DF leaders defined the signatories as “former oppositionists, now satellites of the regime” absolving Djukanović of its past deeds before their post-electoral alliance.406 While the establishment of the government took more time than expected, DF returned to parliament using protests slogans and banners to further delay the process, practically beginning its electoral campaign as the direct extension of Freedom Calling.407
The “Government of Electoral Trust” started operating only in June and did not last for long. In early August, unilateral decisions of the parliamentary majority provoked URA’s exit, whereas SDP and DEMOS decided to keep controlling the Ministry of Interior up to October 2016 elections.408 Given the short period available and various obstructions, the results of the transitional government could only be limited. Indeed, it was the electoral campaign that dominated the scene throughout its mandate.
402 Bakić, Miloš. Političke Prilike. Raspad Sistema, Monitor, 17 July 2015. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/politike-prilike-raspad-sistema/ (accessed 27 June 2019). 403 Kajošević, Samir. Ponižavanje SDP-a, ili Pozitivna postaje Drago Đurović? Vijesti, 30 December 2015. Available at:. https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/ponizavanje-sdp-a-ili-pozitivna-postaje-drago-durovic (accessed 27 June 2019); Murić, Darvin. Skupština izglasala povjerenje Vladi. Vijesti, 27 Jauary 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/skupstina-izglasala-povjerenje-vladi (accessed 27 June 2019). 404 Tomović, Predrag. Polemika o Sporazumu: Plod dogovora ili pritiska stranih ambasada? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 11 May 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/polenika-o-sporazumu-plod-dogovora-ili-pritiska-stranih- ambasada/27728147.html (accessed 27 June 2019). 405 Janković, Srđan and Predrag Tomović. Potpisan Sporazum o fer i slobodnim izborima, korak do prelazne Vlade. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 26 April 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sporazum-opozicije-i-vlasti- u-cg-pred-parafiranjem/27697715.html (accesssed 27 June 2019). 406 Vijesti. Vučurović: Jedina budućnost države politika pomirenja DF-a. 16 May 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/vucurovic-jedina-buducnost-drzave-politika-pomirenja-df-a (accessed 27 June 2019). 407 Brajović, Slavica and Srđan Janković. Incident i vrijeđanja u Skupštini Crne Gore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 May 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/indicent-i-vrijedjanja-u-skupstini-crne-gore/27733010.html (accessed 27 June 2019). 408 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Predizborni raskol opozicione trojke: Otići ili ostati u Vladi. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 15 August 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/izbori-u-crnoj-gori-demos-ura-sdp-vlada-izbornog- povjerenja/27922152.html (accessed 27 June 2019). 67
As SDP exit threatened to hinder the smooth continuation of DPS rule promising an uncertain electoral outcome, opposition parties faced the consequences of recent atomisation.409 By the end of 2015, NATO accession re-proposed an identity-based intra-opposition dimension, as DF leaders started emphasising their pro-Russian stances, together with renewed reference to Unionist themes.410 Moreover, after PCG’s ‘third way’ ended up becoming ‘DPS way’,411 DF leaders had an easy hand accusing moderate opposition as a tantamount for ‘collaboration’. Radical rhetoric and ‘geopolitical’ stances further polarised relations internal to the opposition, so that DF cleared space around its position. The result was flattening differentiation among opposition parties on the use of pro-Russian (DF) or pro-Western (all the others) rhetoric, rather than on concrete programmes and policies. Such development proved a perfect fit for DPS campaigning: Radical opposition was equated with anti-Montenegrin motives, this time due to Russian, rather than Serbian ties. 412
The electoral campaign was thus marked by DF-DPS ‘exchange of courtesies’, as their messages were complementary: DPS slogan “With a Safe Step”, built on the guarantee of Euro-Atlantic stability against the threat posed by Russian lackeys in Montenegro, was diametrically opposed to DF’s “Us or Him”. As a consequence, other opposition parties struggled to cut into this axis. Undeniably, the transitional government proved rather dissatisfying in terms of electoral consensus: although a remarkable achievement, it could not proclaim sensational results to match DPS-DF bombastic assertions and placed the parties who took part in it under DF’s ‘(un)friendly fire’.413 This damaged DEMOS and URA more than the SDP, as the latter was not yet considered full member of the opposition. When it comes to SNP, its indecisive stances created further conflict within the party, a growing faction asking Milić to resign to avoid an electoral debacle.414 Making the best out of such inauspicious prospects, DEMOS, URA, and SNP tried to capitalise on their common moderate positions by uniting in the “Key” coalition behind Lekić’s leadership.
409 Radio Slobodna Evropa. Crna Gora: Najneizvjesniji izbori do sada. 12 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-/28051430.html (accessed 28 June 2019). 410 Rudović, Miloš.DNP sarađuje sa Putinovom partijom: Deklaracija potpisana uz blagoslov Amfilohija. Vijesti, 07 May 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/dnp-saraduje-sa-putinovom-partijom-deklaracija- potpisana-uz-blagoslov-amfilohija (accessed 28 June 2019); Vijesti. Nova i DNP: Ne odričemo se ideje o zajedničkoj državi sa Srbijom. 25 April 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/nova-i-dnp-ne-odricemo-se-ideje- o-zajednickoj-drzavi-sa-srbijom (accessed 28 June 2019). 411 Bakić, Miloš. U VRTLOGU VLASTI: Sateliti na sniženju. Monitor, 10 June 2016. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/u-vrtlogu-vlasti-sateliti-na-snienju/ (accessed 28 June 2019). 412 Janković, Srđan. Šta traži Moskva u crnogorskoj predizbornoj kampanji? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 10 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-rusija/28042923.html (accessed 28 June 2019). 413 Janković, Srđan. Nadigravanje trik ponudama. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 07 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-trikovi/28038135.html (accessed 28 June 2019). 414 Radulović, Mila. Žestoke optužbe na sjednici GO SNP: Nadigravanje dva tabora. Vijesti, 29 August 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/zestoke-optuzbe-na-sjednici-go-snp-nadigravanje-dva-tabora (accessed 28 June 2019). 68
The electoral results showed the entity of the above trends.415 Losing the voters of its historical ally, DPS victory was thinner than ever (41.4%, 36 seats), yet enough to govern with the help of SD (who just managed to pass the threshold and collect 2 MPs) and minority representatives (4 seats altogether). Contrary to earlier polls expectations that gave a lot of weight to Lekić’s exit, DF confirmed as opposition leader with a remarkable 20.3% of preferences and 18 seats. On the contrary, the ‘moderate’ ‘Key’ coalition did not pay back, as results were well below their declared expectations, amounting to only 11% of preferences and 9 seats.416 Focused on door-to-door political activity and emphasising Bečić’s young age and its member’s activism, Democrats run alone achieving a good result (10%, 8 seats).417 Similarly, the SDP passed its first test in opposition with a respectable 5.2% and 4 seats, confirming the viability of its role as pro-Montenegrin opposition party.
While ballots were still open, previous controversial accusations between DF and DPS regarding the risk of disorders on Election Day proved strangely prophetic.418 Montenegrin Police announced the arrest of twenty individuals from Serbia, charged of planning a coup d’état to proclaim the victory of “certain political parties”.419 Later on, specific allegations will be made against DF leaders, kicking off a controversial judicial proceeding.420 A new and prolonged political crisis opened, while Djukanović announced its (third) retirement and his successor and former vice- premier, Duško Marković, was about to form a new government.421
As a reaction, opposition parties refused to recognize the electoral outcome, blaming the dominant for creating an atmosphere of national crisis that prejudiced the electoral process.422 They seemed to find common ground in initiating a joint parliamentary boycott, to be reversed only after a fair
415 OSCE-ODIHR. 2016. Montenegro Parliamenary Elections 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw, 25 January 2017. 416 Murić, Darvin. Demos i URA čekaju samo da Milić potvrdi. Vijesti, 29 August 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/demos-i-ura-cekaju-samo-da-milic-potvrdi (accessed 28 June 2019). 417 Koprivica, Veseljko. ALEKSA BEČIĆ, LIDER DEMOKRATSKE CRNE GORE: DPS je partija prošlosti. Monitor, 25 March 2016. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/aleksa-bei-lider-demokratske-crne-gore-dps-je-partija- prolosti/ (accessed 28 June 2019). 418 Janković, Srđan. Zasoljavanje kampanje 'izbornim nemirima'. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-kampanja/28048082.html (accessed 28 June 2019). 419 Radio Slobodna Evropa. Tužilaštvo CG: Namera uhapšenih bio je uticaj na vlast. 16 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/28056895.html (accessed 28 June 2019). 420 Komnenić, Petar and Predrag Tomović. Optužbe opozicije oko puča stigle do Tužilaštva. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 18 October 2016. Available at:https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/mandic-sasluanje-drzavni-udar-crna- gora/28184625.html (accessed 29 June 2019). 421 Tomović, Predrag. Crnogorska opozicija traži dokaze o navodnom državnom udaru. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 27 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-nakon-djukanovica/28078328.html (accessed 28 June 2019). 422 Tomović, Predrag. Đukanovićeva stranka uvjerena u pobjedu, opozicija ne priznaje rezultat. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 18 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-opozicija/28060725.html (accessed 28 June 2019). 69 assessment of the alleged coup and if new elections were planned.423 The move was intended to question the legitimacy of DPS narrow majority in the eyes of both domestic public and international actors. However, the attempt to involve the latter inside this conflict failed: EU officials limited to monitoring and calling for dialogue, so that the new government had no incentive to discuss the matter.424 In case of an immediate intervention, the EU could have risked taking responsibility away from domestic political actors at the expenses of already tarnished democratic institutions once again, almost consolidating a controversial praxis: signalling EU’s readiness to intervene anytime domestic actors saw it fit to heighten tensions through the production of ‘on-demand’ crisis for the sake of short-term gains. One of such crisis can be identified in February 2017, when the parliamentary majority lifted Mandić and Knezević’s immunity to allow indictments for the ‘coup’ case, giving way to skirmishes between DF and majority MPs in the parliament’s hall, while DF activists protested in front of the building. Retaliating against the majority, opposition parties declared their joint boycott of Nikšić local elections in early March.425 One-party competition in the second biggest city of the country gave no particular foundation to both sides’ claims of success for their strategies, as much as the event remarked both the seriousness of current political polarisation and the lack of attention to local constituencies by opposition parties, once again made subject to national-level considerations.426
This last attitude is all the more questionable as October 2016 local elections brought important changes. DPS lost power in both Budva and Kotor, two municipalities marred by scandals that compromised the ruling party’s once overwhelming appeal. In Budva, the “Zavala case” caused Svetozar Marović’s arrest in December 2015, who later admitted involvement in a scheme subtracting millions of Euros from the municipality’s budget. His resignation from party functions in June 2016 was not sufficient to weaken opposition’s claim of DPS leadership involvement in the affair.427 The scandal proved fatal. Similarly, DPS lost its majority in Kotor due to SDP changed loyalties and the inability to tackle a war between organised crime clans having their headquarters
423 Janković, Srđan. Nova Skupština Crne Gore bez skoro polovine poslanika. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 24 November 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-skupstina/28137800.html (accessed 29 June 2019). 424 Janković, Srđan. EU posmatrač političke krize u Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 27 February 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/eu-crna-gora-kriza/28336447.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 425 Janković, Srđan. Bojkot izbora u Nikšiću prvi odgovor opozicije na najave hapšenja. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 February 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/najava-hapsenja-opozicija-bojkot-izbora- niksic/28309178.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 426 Bakić, Miloš. IZBORI U NIKŠIĆU: Pobjeda nevažećih. Monitor, 17 March 2017. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/izbori-u-nikiu-pobjeda-nevaeih/ (accessed 30 June 2019). 427 Lajović, Vuk and Mila Radulović. Marović vratio i člansku kartu. Vijesti, 15 June 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/marovic-vratio-i-clansku-kartu (accessed 28 June 2019); Spaić, Igor. Montenegro: Former President Signs Plea Bargain, Admitting Corruption. OCCRP, 18 May 2016. Available at: https://www.occrp.org/en/27-ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/5243-montenegro-former-president-signs-plea-bargain- admitting-corruption (accessed 28 June 2019). 70 in the municipality.428 As collusion among high-rank police officers emerged, DPS faced the electoral consequences of such situation after long rule.429 After May 2017 elections in Herceg- Novi saw DPS loss too, these three coastal municipalities could be administered by an opposition coalition with Democrats expressing the mayor.430 Finally ruling important municipalities represented an important test for opposition parties. Moreover, after these good performances, Democrats had to substantiate growing ambitions and the sustainability of their strategy combining firm opposition without reliance on divisive identity matters.431 Similarly, SDP was to prove its opposition commitments and the feasibility of ruling together with its new partners regardless of identity differences, most evident with the DF.
It seemed a hard task as the climate at national level did not improve: In June, DF leaders ventured speaking of Montenegro being “on the verge of civil war”.432 By this time, a third of DF MPs was facing criminal charges, as the ‘Trial of the century’ regarding the alleged coup was coupled with Medojević charges of money laundering and others for recent violence in parliament.433 With NATO accession completed and amidst this sequence of crisis, political debate was monopolised by complementary rhetoric clashes between DPS ‘patriots’ and DF ‘Pro-Russians’, much to the expenses of the other opposition parties, caught once again in a mediatic crossfire.434 Telling was the fact that Montenegrin media started referring to such parties as Civic Opposition, furthering the aforementioned downplaying of programme differentiations, providing identity-based categories for what were different strategic orientations instead. Confirming such discrepancy, this label was hardly indicative of any unity beyond the joint parliamentary boycott. During 2017, the unsatisfactory electoral result of the “Key” coalition fostered internal conflict in both DEMOS and
428 Tomović, Dušica. Gang Violence Shakes Montenegrin Resort of Kotor. Balkan Insight, 07 June 2016. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2016/06/07/gangs-sowdowns-shakes-montenegrin-resort-kotor-06-07-2016/ (accessed 29 June 2019); Radio Slobodna Evropa. Rat kotorske mafije. 06 September 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/kotorska-mafija/27970221.html (accessed 29 June 2019); Vijesti. Sastala se kotorska opozicija: Pobjedili smo i pored izborne krađe. 19 October 2016. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/sastala-se-kotorska-opozicija-pobjedili-smo-i-pored-izborne-krade (accessed 29 June 2019). 429 Radio Slobodna Evropa. Drugi čovjek policije u Kotoru priznao saradnju sa narko klanom. 13 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/28050400.html (accessed 29 June 2019). 430 Tomović, Predrag. Zašto Đukanovićev DPS gubi gradove? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 08 May 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-lokalni-izbori-herceg-novi/28474376.html (accessed 29 June 2019). 431 Janković, Srđan. Najmlađa crnogorska partija prijetnja najjačima. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 09 May 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/demokratija-crna-gora/28476347.html (accessed 29 June 2019). 432 Rudović, Miloš. Mandić: Napad na moje obezbjeđenje je moguć uvod u građanski rat. Vijesti, 15 June 2017. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/mandic-napad-na-moje-obezbjedenje-je-moguc-uvod-u-gradanski- rat (accessed 30 June 2019). 433 Janković, Srđan. Trećina poslanka opozicionog DF-a bez imuniteta. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 28 July 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/trecina-poslanika-df-bez-imuniteta/28645183.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 434 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Politički rat sputava građansku Crnu Goru. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 22 February 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/politicki-rat-dps-df/28324726.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 71
SNP.435 Within DEMOS, different orientations between Danilović and Lekić led to a split, as the former established United Montenegro (UCG).436 Similarly, rivalries in the SNP first caused the expulsion of prominent members, then Milić’s resignation and a controversial succession passing the conflict ridden party to Vladimir Joković in August.437 In the meantime, SDP attempted promoting its own ideas of opposition alliance proposing a “manifesto for gathering progressive forces” firm in the Euro-Atlantic perspective, while URA and Democrats were busy preparing for upcoming local elections rather than discussing any joint initiative.438 Polemics between the DF and all other parties did not halt, as well. When ‘Civic opposition’ representatives were received by USA Deputy President Michael Pence during his August 2017 visit in Podgorica, DF targeted Bečić’s Democrats as USA’s lackeys, thereby inaugurating a rivalry that will mark the following period and signalled increased competition in sight of the upcoming electoral contests.439 Overall, almost a year of parliamentary boycott left a discouraging taste for opposition chances as they did not achieve significant results. After initial activism, no joint activity could be agreed upon, not even in sight of the presidential elections scheduled for early 2018. Indeed, a boycott aiming to destabilise the dominant only managed to further destabilise opposition parties.
With no resolution in sight for the blockade and after the DF signalled intention to break ranks unilaterally ending its boycott, EU representatives decided to hold meetings with all opposition parties to push them into dialogue.440 The move resulted in new meetings among the ‘Civic opposition’ that had previously stopped for months. They confirmed the boycott and declined government’s offer to establish parliamentary working groups for electoral legislation amendments, without however making any substantial progress for future common action.441 In fact, most political forces focused on testing their relative strength with harsh campaigning for four local elections in November, including Cetinje.442 Amidst episodes of electoral violence between
435 Tomović, Predrag. Cjepkanje crnogorske opozicije. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 04 July 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ko-ce-profitirati-od-raskola-u-demos-i-snp/28595544.html (accessed 29 june 2019). 436 Rudović, Miloš. Danilović: Od danas funkcionišemo kao Ujedinjena Crna Gora. Vijesti, 13 September 2017. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/danilovic-od-danas-funkcionisemo-kao-ujedinjena-crna-gora (accessed 29 June 2019). 437 Kajošević, Samir. Joković preuzeo podijeljenu stranku. Vijesti, 14 August 2017. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/jokovic-preuzeo-podijeljenu-stranku (accessed 29 June 2019). 438 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Iz vrućeg ljeta u vrelu političku jesen? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 21 July 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/jesen-crna-gora-kriza-opozicija/28630712.html (accessed 29 June 2019). 439 Janković, Srđan. Opozicioni rat se rasplamsava. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 08 August 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-opozicija/28665611.html (accessed 29 June 2019). 440 Radio Slobodna Evropa. Crnogorska opozicija razgovara sa delegacijom EU. 18 September 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/28742046.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 441 Žugić, Vladan. Opozicija nakon propalog bojkota: Pobjeda u Podgorici za povratak iz mrtvih. Vijesti, 01 November 2017. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/opozicija-nakon-propalog-bojkota-pobjeda-u-podgorici-za- povratak-iz-mrtvih (accessed 30 June 2019). 442 Tomović, Predrag. Kampanja uvreda i optužbi. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 24 November 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-kampanja/28874828.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 72 supporters of different parties, DPS reported another absolute victory, shedding further doubts on the effectivity of opposition parties’ strategies.443 Increasingly isolated and probably best suited for gaining attention through animated discussion with the majority, DF reacted announcing its decision to end the parliamentary boycott, officially breaking the last guise of opposition coordination.444
Thus, preparations for April 2018 presidential elections and May local elections in eleven municipalities, including Podgorica, did not start in great fashion for the opposition. Talks for a common presidential candidate lasted for months and seemed to bring to no result, as a non-partisan candidate could not be agreed upon.445 Only in March, DF, Democrats, URA, and SNP finally found a compromise on former PCG MP Mladen Bojanić, while SDP and DEMOS chose SDP MP Draginja Vuksanović.446 With some delay, seen as sign of internal discord, DPS announced Djukanović as its candidate.447 Aiming at a first round victory, he campaigned as he had already won by means of his candidacy, attacking adversaries as being “certain losers” supported by traitors or minor opposition parties.448 Bojanić could rely on limited means and attempted to campaign without much reference to its supporting parties, as none of them seemed too committed in his favour and in order to avoid paying the toll of identity politics to SDP candidate with regards to moderate voters.449 Eventually, Djukanović reported the expected first-round victory with 53.9% of preferences, against Bojanić’s 33.4% and Vuksanović 8.4%. Monitor journalist Miloš Bakić noted that, although discouraging in comparison with 2013 and 2016 elections, opposition results “seem great in relation to how the opposition is in this moment and in which conditions it operates”, as it
443 Janković, Srđan. DPS-u najviše glasova, dio opozicije osporava regularnost izbora. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 26 November 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-lokalni-izbori/28877475.html (accessed 30 June 2019); Žugić, Vladan. Šta pokazuju prvi rezultati lokalnih izbora: SNP i SDP kopne, Bečić živi od DF-a. Vijesti, 28 November 2017. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/sta-pokazuju-prvi-rezultati-lokalnih-izbora- snp-i-sdp-kopne-becic-zivi-od-df-a (accessed 30 June 2019). 444Tomović, Predrag. 'Pad podrške vraća Demokratski front u parlament'. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 06 December 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/demokratski-front-povratak-parlament/28900513.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 445 Šćepanović, Lela. Ko će na crtu kandidatu Đukanovićevog DPS-a? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 01 February 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-lista-dps/29011893.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 446 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Može li Bojanić biti novi predsjednik Crne Gore? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 12 March 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-predsjednik-mladen-bojanic/29094406.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 447 Kulidžan, Jelena. Kad je teško – Milo. Deutsche Welle, 20 March 2018. Available at: https://p.dw.com/p/2udRa (accessed 30 June 2019). 448 Janković, Srđan. Finiš predsjedničke kampanje: Izdajnici, kumovi i srećna djeca. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 April 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-kraj-predizborne-kampanje/29165781.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 449 Murić, Darvin. Bojanić traži da lideri budu u sjenci. Vijesti, 15 March 2018. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/bojanic-trazi-da-lideri-budu-u-sjenci (accessed 30 June 2019). 73 experienced “two more years of feuds between oppositionists unable even to agree on whether it is day or night”, the conflict around the alleged ‘coup’, and a variety of further divisions.450
In an electoral campaign continuum, attention turned to local elections, especially in Podgorica. This time, opposition parties played a proactive role in the attempt to reverse the recent defeat. Usual last-minute coalition-making took place, providing a new asset that seemed to dismiss the ‘Civic opposition’ category. Already by the end of the presidential campaign, Bečić’s Democrats and Abazović’s URA formed “For the 21st Century”. Another coalition was established by DF and SNP, and by SDP and DEMOS, while DPS and his minor partners run independently. The first campaign weeks seemed to lead to another intra-opposition conflict, as allegations of academic plagiarism appeared against Bečić, considered by the accused a smear campaign initiated by the DF.451 Later on, campaigning focused more on local themes, a novelty,452 even though the atmosphere was marred by climaxing organised crime war. A series of daylight killings and an attack on a Vijesti investigative journalist working on cigarette smuggling refuted previous government reassurances about an “excellent security situation”.453 Nevertheless, DPS achieved majorities (absolute or with its partners) in all contested municipalities. Marking one of the worst opposition results ever, these elections showed growing abstention among their constituencies, while ordinary allegations of manipulations were integrated by those of electoral violence as DPS members beat opposition activists trying to prevent vote-buying in Podgorica.454 In the capital, the dominant celebrated an absolute majority after two terms in which it sustained its rule through ‘co- opted’ ex-opposition councillors. Democrats-URA coalition was the second strongest group in the city council attracting much of DF-SNP voters, who lost most of their previous consensus. Particularly negative was also the performance of SDP-Demos coalition, which remained without councillors to the benefit of the SD.455
Signalling the emergence of new opposition equilibria since last parliamentary elections, the first reactions to these results were mixed. SDP and DEMOS, and later SNP, ended their parliamentary
450 Bakić, Miloš. NOVI PREDSJEDNIK: Promjene su očite. Monitor, 20 April 2018. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/novi-predsjednik-promjene-su-oite/ (accessed 30 June 2019). 451 Vijesti. URA: "Bečićev plagijat" je prljava kampanja u korist DPS-a. 21 April 2018. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/drustvo/ura-becicev-plagijat-je-prljava-kampanja-u-korist-dps-a (accessed 30 June 2019). 452 Janković, Srđan. Novi test za vlasti i opoziciju u Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 May 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/lokalni-izbori-crna-gora/29250787.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 453 Perović-Korać, Milena. VLAST PRIČA, MAFIJA UBIJA: Samo se žrtve nižu. Monitor, 25 May 2018. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/vlast-pria-mafija-ubija-samo-se-rtve-niu/ (accessed 30 June 2019). 454 Radulović, Zoran. LOKALNI IZBORI – GLOBALNE POSLJEDICE: Trijumf Đukanovića, sumrak slobode. Monitor, 01 June 2018. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/lokalni-izbori-globalne-posljedice-trijumf-ukanovia- sumrak-slobode/ (accessed 30 June 2019). 455 Janković, Srđan. DPS osvojio apsolutnu većinu u Podgorici i pet drugih opština. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 27 May 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/lokalni-izbori-crna-gora/29252212.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 74 boycott, considering it failed after DF’s unilateral move and not having affected ruling parties’ rating.456 Democrats and URA refused any unconditioned return to parliament, but used their newly achieved status as best polling opposition coalition to propose an electoral reform plan to both opposition and incumbent, receiving immediate EU officials’ support.457 Indeed, such support seemed a reaction to DPS blatantly reasserted partisan control on RTCG, having removed the general director for alleged lack of independency after a contract for an EU-funded project was signed with a Montenegrin NGO.458
Optimism, however, was soon to fade, as DPS accepted dialogue, but wanted to lead the working groups, contrarily to the peer-based mode provisioned by URA and Democrats.459 The halt lasted for months, until DF unilaterally proposed accommodating conditions to the DPS, providing enough legitimacy to proceed without the initial proponents, thereby isolating them.460 Faced with such tactical U-turn, Bečić and Abazović entrenched in their positions. They stated DPS and DF only wanted to “simulate democracy and entertain people with nationalistic tricks”.461 Previous EU commitment in supporting URA and Democrats’ proposal seemed to backfire now. The two parties used EU endorsement to make a point about the quality of their proposal and the lack of willingness of the dominant to undertake serious electoral reform, now avoiding to do so thanks to the support of its oppositionist alter-ego. The DF, on its part, was eager to integrate its (re)consolidated Serb nationalist rhetoric with a public show of institutional responsibility. URA and Democrat’s expectations, however, proved prophetic, when the Assembly voted a controversial declaration on WWI events, continuing a ‘Serb versus Montenegrin’ debate that kept DF and DPS busy for
456 Lasica, Danijela. Lekić najavio prekid bojkota Skupštine: Uvažavamo činjenicu da su se drugi vratili. Vijesti, 29 May 2018. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/lekic-najavio-prekid-bojkota-skupstine-uvazavamo- cinjenicu-da-su-se-drugi-vratili (accessed 30 June 2019). 457 Democrats and URA. Plan izbornih reformi poslat poslanicima opozicije i NVO. 16 June 2018. Available at: http://demokrate.me/2018/06/16/plan-izbornih-reformi-poslat-poslanicima-opozicije-i-nvo/ (accessed 30 June 2019); Tomović, Predrag. Đukanović zateže sa Briselom. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 June 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/djukanovic-brisel-tenzije/29290418.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 458 Andrijana Kadija was nominated RTCG director 2016 negotiations for the transitional government at the opposition’s request and is widely recognised her administration significantly improved the impartiality of the public broadcaster ever since. Janković, Srđan. Koga u Crnoj Gori ugrožava pomoć EU? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 11 June 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/eu-pomoc-novac-brisel-cg/29283599.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 459 Murić, Darvin. DPS želi većinu u radnoj grupi za izborne zakone. Vijesti, 30 July 2018. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/dps-zeli-vecinu-u-radnoj-grupi-za-izborne-zakone (accessed 30 June 2019). 460 Murić, Darvin. Usvojili Odluku o formiranju odbora za reformu izbornog i drugog zakonodavstva. Vijesti, 30 October 2018. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/usvojili-odluku-o-formiranju-odbora-za-reformu-izbornog-i- drugog-zakonodavstva (accessed 30 June 2019). 461 Vijesti. URA i Demokrate nastavljaju bojkot, Bečić: Nećemo u odbor DPS i DF. 31 October 2018. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/ura-i-demokrate-nastavljaju-bojkot-becic-necemo-u-odbor-dps-i-df (accessed 30 June 2019). 75 months.462 At the end of the session, Medojević was arrested and Knezević escaped the same fate by remaining inside the building, both charged of failing to prove graft allegations they addressed to various individuals. Without having their immunity lifted, the controversial arrest caused two weeks of institutional paralysis before being revoked.463 As DF immediately restarted boycotting the assembly, such politicised judicial intervention effectively reversed any dialogue progress, raising serious doubts on the reasons behind the whole matter and leaving opposition parties as divided as ever in the process.464
An apparently never-ending succession of crisis continued in 2019. This time, controversial businessman and former Djukanović associate Ratko Knezević gave the press a recording in which he handed former DPS Mayor of Podgorica an envelope allegedly containing 97.000$.465 The episode was quickly called “Envelope Affair” and sparked a new row of popular protests led by a group of non-party activists.466 Gatherings under the slogan “Resist – 97.000” were organised on weekly basis and saw massive participation, strongly influencing the political debate.467 By March the protest organisers, led by Ulcinj activist and former LSCG cadre Džemal Perović, managed to unite all opposition parties in regular meetings and have them sign an “Agreement for the Future”, entailing commitments to joint non-institutional action and total electoral boycott unless a transitional government was formed, to then substantially amend the electoral framework.468
Although this development was a substantial way forward from the previous impasse, discord was hard to overcome.469 First, DF polemics around opposition parties’ financial duties for the protest organisation and then disagreement on the relationship with the controversial whistle-blower (DF
462 Janković, Srđan. Usvojena rezolucija pomirenja ili novog razdora u Crnoj Gori? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 29 November 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/rezolucija-pomirenje-razdor-crna-gora- srbija/29628741.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 463 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Ustavni sud oslobodio Medojevića i Kneževića. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 12 December 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sud-medojevic-knezevic/29652562.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 464 Jovićević, Dimitrije. Godine političke krize u Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 29 December 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-politika-2018/29681324.html (accessed 30 June 2019). 465 Vijesti. Pogledajte: Knežević uručio Stijepoviću 100.000 dolara. 11 January 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/pogledajte-knezevic-urucio-stijepovicu-100-000-dolara (accessed 30 June 2019). 466 Janković, Srđan. Slučaj 'Atlas' ukazuje na spregu biznisa i politike. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 18 January 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-afera-koverta/29717925.html (accessed 1 July 2019). 467 Janković, Srđan. Građanska odbrana Crne Gore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 February 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29790032.html (accessed 2 July 2019). 468 Tomovic, Dusica. Montenegro Opposition Parties Unite Behind Civic Protests. Balkan Insight, 30 March 2019. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2019/03/30/montenegro-opposition-parties-unite-behind-civic-protests/ (accessed 02 July 2019); Kajošević, Samir and Vladan Žugić. Vlada građanskog jedinstva ili bojkot svih izbora. Vijesti, 21 March 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/vlada-gradanskog-jedinstva-ili-bojkot-svih-izbora (accessed 07 July 2019). 469 Janković, Srđan. Afere i opozicioni sukobi odlažu dogovor u Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 06 June 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/afere-i-opozicioni-sukobi-odla%C5%BEu-dogovor-u-crnoj- gori/29984976.html (accessed 03 July 2019). 76 supported it, others did not) nourished conflict and hindered the whole initiative.470 In a period that saw DF leaders condemned in first instance in the “Trial of the Century”,471 local level politics further compromised national cooperation. Instead of exploiting the chance given after 2016 local elections, opposition parties’ coalitions gave another public show of disagreement. In Kotor, SDP councillors decided to revoke their support for Democrats’ Mayor and changed sides due to contrasts regarding public infrastructures management, thereby allowing return of DPS rule after two years and fuelling accusations of SDP treachery and DPS corruption.472 In Budva, similar disputes saw DF councillors voting with DPS against coalition partners, opening a serious and worsening conflict.473
As there seems to be no clear way forward for joint action, early preparations for 2020 parliamentary elections are underway. SNP, Danilović’s UCG and a RP (who left DF in the meantime) announced a new coalition,474 while DF calls for the establishment of a broader opposition coalition and Resist! movement struggles to maintain relevance.475 DEMOS joined the Democrats in coalition, although disagreement with URA might hinder the formation of a new ‘civic bloc’.476 Exploiting conflict and uncertainties among opposition parties, Djukanović’s reopened a long dispute regarding Montenegrin Orthodox Church autocephaly, setting another divisive identity question on the agenda to divert attention from the recent scandals.477 Overall, summer 2019 developments provide not much ground for optimism regarding opposition parties’ strategies, as they all seem busy in harsh competition against each other, whereas the dominant plays a safe hand with renewed appeals for national unity against ’traitors’ and their associates.
470 Vučinić, Željka and Samir Kajošević "Posvađane cifre" o finansiranju protesta: Hoće li priča o parama pomutiti teško stečeno jedinstvo? Vijesti, 12 April 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/posvadane-cifre-o- finansiranju-protesta-hoce-li-prica-o-parama-pomutiti-tesko-steceno-jedinstvo (accessed 02 July 2019); Kajošević, Samir. Protesters in Montenegro Split Over Controversial Businessman’s Role. Balkan Insight, 17 April 2019. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2019/04/17/protesters-in-montenegro-split-over-controversial-businessmans- role/ (accessed 02 July 2019). 471 Janković, Srđan. Svi optuženi za 'državni udar' proglašeni krivim. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 09 May 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/drzavni-udar-presuda/29929378.html (accessed 03 July 2019). 472 Luković, Siniša. Smijenjen Vladimir Jokić, ostaje vršilac dužnosti do izbora nasljednika. Vijesti, 24 April 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/smijenjen-vladimir-jokic (03 July 2019). 473 Vijesti. Krapović: Izašla na vidjelo kontinuirana saradnja DF-a i DPS-a. 04 June 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/krapovic-izasla-na-vidjelo-kontinuiranja-saradanja-df-a-i-dps-a (accessed 03 July 2019). 474 Murić, Darvin. Novi politički savez - Političko preživljavanje ili korak ka ujedinjenju? Vijesti, 01 May 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/novi-politicki-savez-politicko-prezivljavanje-ili-korak-ka- ujedinjenju (accessed 03 July 2019). 475 Kajošević, Samir. Front traži široki savez, Perović reorganizaciju. Vijesti, 07 July 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/front-trazi-siroki-savez-perovic-reorganizaciju (accessed 07 July 2019). 476 Kajošević, Samir. Abazović odbio Bečićev poziv u "Građanski blok". Vijesti, 05 July 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/abazovic-odbio-becicev-poziv-u-gradanski-blok (accessed 06 July 2019). 477 Janković, Srđan. Đukanovićevo obnavljanje crnogorske autokefalne crkve. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 10 June 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/djukanovic-crkva-autokefalnost/29991545.html (accessed 03 July 2019). 77
3.4 Opposition Strategies and their Impact on Dominance Having reviewed the multilevel nature of DPS dominance in Chapter 2 and traced opposition parties’ behaviour in the post-independence period in the previous section, this section proposes the ‘lessons learned’ from the Montenegrin cases. Opposition strategies adopted by political parties in Montenegro starting from the ‘descriptive scenarios’ outlined in the theoretical approach are presented, thus answering the second research sub-question (1.b). Afterwards, such findings are embedded within the arenas of competition compiled in Chapter 2 to answer to main research question of this thesis.
3.4.1 Outlining Montenegrin Political Party Opposition Strategies Activist Recruitment
Although other contexts of party dominance evidenced the importance of activist recruitment for opposition parties, this strategy was quite neglected in Montenegro. Most opposition parties feature hierarchical internal structures, with a small group or a single leader exercising power through the allegiance of party cadres rather than formal organisational mechanisms. Thus, the case confirms the reluctance of party cadres to empower radical-minded activists that might challenge their leadership.478 Limited reliance on this strategy may also be linked with the presence of well-known opposition-minded media outlets in Montenegro, so that the role of activists in sharing pro- opposition information results less relevant.
The only opposition party consistently signalling attention to activist recruitment has been Bečić's Democrats. The party made young activists’ door-to-door contacts with the electorate as part of its ‘political brand’, trying to place youth rather than Serb constituencies at the centre of its narrative. Given the nature of the present research, it is difficult to say whether this reliance is more rhetoric than factual, as Democrats never attempted to give proof of their following through protest gatherings. In any case, the radical messages it sent, for example through the prolonged parliamentary boycott since October 2016, seem to confirm the party’s attention to its more committed supporters.
Limited attention to activists, however, does not mean that opposition parties refrained from radical rhetoric and positioning on certain issues. With little exception, they heavily relied on the ‘regime cleavage’ strategy to do so. While some newer parties focused almost exclusively on such themes (PCG, Democrats, Demos, URA), former Unionist parties maintained their ethno-political narratives, although with different intensity and tactics (from the moderate SNP to the more radical
478 White, Dominant Party Systems, 670. 78 stances of NOVA). In both cases, however, rather than proposing clear programmatic rewards to potential activists, opposition parties tended to rely on a populist narrative similar, but contrary, to the one Džankić and Keil analysed regarding the DPS. Daliborka Uljarević, renowned Montenegrin civil society figure, noted in 2013 that “noisy opposition leaders (...) effectively fill the public space, but hardly fill the infrastructure of their own parties”.479 In other words, intensive reliance on populist “regime cleavage” appeals provided means to show radical positioning, but disguised the lack programmatic depth rather than downplaying ideological differences.
Instead, differentiation resided on moderate or radical character of populist opposition rhetoric and methods. Moderate parties preferred focusing on more institutional approaches to opposition, targeting dissatisfied DPS voters rather than radical opposition ones, i.e. potential activists. The cooperative behaviour showed with the Government of Electoral Trust in 2016 represented a case in point. On the contrary, DF was keen in pursuing non-institutional opposition activity. However, the latter showed limited interest in recruiting activists anyway, as sympathizers and members were mobilised in a centralised manner and left little, if any, space for grassroots initiative.480 Further, most party gatherings were possible thanks to the reliance on emotional, identity themes rather than party-activism.
In general, as opposition constituencies did not seem to grow remarkably, emotional populist narrative did prove no great pool for activist mobilisation. Such themes possessed little credibility in front of the small portion of committed and civic-oriented anti-regime voters, who, consequently, prefer joining the ranks of Montenegrin NGOs. This is indicated by the fact that non-ethnic mobilisation was meaningful only under civil society banners (see 2012 MANS protests and 2019 Resist!). The civil disguise of Freedom Calling implicitly recognised the need to compensate for the negative image parties built for themselves among potential activists, so that it became a relevant initiative only after ethno political identity was downplayed by regime violence.
Regime Cleavage
Since their establishment, Montenegrin opposition parties have campaigned focusing on the democratic deficits of the ruling party, trying to construct a crosscutting ‘regime cleavage’ that could allow downplaying differences and unite against the dominant. During the 1990s, leading proponents were the LSCG, and SDP and NS (up to 1997), while in 2000s Unionist opposition relied on it to further their position regarding the debate over statehood. Progressively, the ‘regime
479 Uljarević: DF može da funkcioniše i bez Miodraga Lekića. Vijesti, 05 May 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/uljarevic-df-moze-da-funkcionise-i-bez-miodraga-lekica (accessed 22 June 2019). 480 See Sartori and Pranzl, Politics Going Civil. 79 cleavage’ consolidated as the basic point of reference for political party opposition, with Medojević’s PzP becoming its first post-LSCG radical interpreter.
Even identity questions were framed within the democratic-autocratic horizon, testifying for the centrality of political, more than ethnic divides within the polity. As an example, ex Unionist parties consistently opposed the incumbent ascribing themselves the role of democratising forces. Aware of the possible contradiction of such narratives with their backgrounds, SL, NOVA, DF, and SNP strived to give themselves a ‘civic’ façade and appear less ethno-political than their leaders and constituencies’ behaviours and values suggested. Such attempts went as far as to entail the involvement of semi-fictive civil society organisations and other informal groupings.481 By emphasising ties with alleged non-partisan actors, such opposition parties wanted to be akin to civil society, claiming legitimacy as representatives of the ‘ordinary people’ tired of dominance.482 However, such strategies failed to penetrate DPS constituencies, which refrained from voting parties well known for their ethno-political background. When ‘civic-polishing’ proved insufficient to consolidate primacy among opposition parties, the deeper transformation proposed by Lekić within the DF was dismissed, bringing back old ethno-political themes. With a strong populist approach and bold use of opportunities provided by booming internet forums and social media platforms, such strategy helped the DF gaining an unexpectedly good result in 2016. Medojević’s PzP recent membership to Steve Bannon’s political initiative, together with Mandić and Knezević’s international ties, are telling about DF’s intention to continue such path.483 Similarly, by 2019 Bečić's Democrats became the strongest opposition party thanks to their populist and leader-centred anti-regime communication style, even though targeting more moderate ex-SNP constituencies and avoiding ethno-political themes.
Thus, it is possible to note how anti-regime populism became the main tool of party opposition to DPS rule. Given the slim chances for ousting the dominant, however, parties used populism against each other as well, leading to fierce intra-opposition competition. On these terms, fellow opposition parties are only tolerated, as they represent ‘deviances’ from the ‘true’ opposition path rather than partners. Such narrative, shared by both DF and Democrats, includes the classic differentiation between the ‘people’ against the ‘elite” embodied by the dominant and its lackeys, but the one between a ‘pure’ and a ‘corrupt’ opposition as well. This behaviour links the two major Montenegrin opposition parties to the category of “anti-political establishment parties”, defined as
481 See Begović, Svi naši zidovi. 482 Sartori and Pranzl, Politics Going Civil. 483 Janković, Srđan. Evropski populisti stižu u Crnu Goru. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 05 February 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/evropska-ekstremna-desnica-balkan-crna-gora/29752842.html (accessed 03 July 2019) 80 ones that a) challenge the political status quo, b) perceive themselves as challengers to parties included in the ‘establishment’, and c) propose a “fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people”, in which ‘establishment’ parties are all the same regardless of their being in opposition or government.484 Through such “discursive strategy” they aim to withdraw legitimacy to other opposition parties, yet mostly attack the government solely “for the sake of competition” rather than for achieving programmatic change.485
Particularly interesting is case of the DF, which repeatedly pursued behind the scenes cooperative behaviour with the DPS, although boasting maximalist rhetoric. Even if such actions are totally in contradiction with their narrative, radical messages are supposed to make them immune to criticism. This finding is in line with Heftler’s regarding anti-political establishment parties in Germany and Austria, where they combine harsh criticism in public communication with more cooperative behaviour at parliamentary committee level, leading to the conclusion that such parties tend to “show their teeth in public debate, but do not bite”.486
Overall, the populist approach to ‘regime cleavage’ strategies in Montenegro led democratic-based critics to the dominant becoming a sort of ‘blank label’ that contains everything and nothing at the same time. The straightforward availability of such opposition themes has meant they could be relied upon without attention to building programmatic alternatives and communicating them to the electorate. Although many scandals and investigations evidenced the strong foundation of fraud accusations, ‘regime cleavage’ strategies risk losing their appeal as they serve to disguise programme ambiguity rather than overcoming differences between the main opposition parties.
Coalition Building
Increasing opposition cohesion appears rather complicated an achievement on such premises. In this regard, the analysis conducted in this thesis shows coalition building has become a sort of ‘fetish’ in Montenegro. A long list of articles and opinion-pieces in opposition-minded media repeat the coalition ‘mantra’ as the most ‘rational’ option available to challenge DPS dominance, producing a ‘coalition duty’ imposed on all opposition parties. These, in turn, recognise the need to show such ‘duty’ is taken seriously and uphold it in their declarations. However, the lack of genuine will to reach meaningful compromises and sacrifice the benefits of autonomous action for its sake is evident. Unilateral announcements of new plans for improved, joint opposition have become the
484 Abedi, Amir. 2004. Anti-political establishment parties: A comparative analysis. London/New York: Routledge, 12. 485 Heftler, Opposition Parties and EU Affairs, 70-71,72. 486 Heftler, Opposition Parties and EU Affairs, 210-211. 81 norm, while their inexorable ending in failure is to be dumped on others, guilty of twisting or refusing the proponent’s idea.487
In fact, coalitions are formed only when concrete, short-term interests are palpable, such as in the case of pre-electoral coalitions (often to trespass thresholds), in reaction to scandals involving the dominant, or other pressing issues. In most cases, such agreements present ad hoc, tactical nature and recurrently fail to transform into longer-term platforms.488 As a result, when coalitions form in the first place, they dissolve rather quickly and noisily, leaving mutual grievances in their wake. This happens even in the midst of coalition negotiations, testifying for the fact that it is not always important if coalitions happen at all. What really matters is which party ends up being perceived as the most committed ‘coalitionist’.
When broader coalitions seemed entailing potential for development, such as 2010 “Better Montenegro” or Lekić’s DF in 2012, its constituents could not find much common ground beyond the aforementioned empty label of democratic change, failing to consolidate their platforms as soon as electoral deadlines were not in sight. In other words, Montenegrin opposition has engaged in ‘pseudo-coalition building’, whose credibility waned after each and every failure. Followed by usual polemics, such precedents only reduce the mobilising appeal towards opposition-minded abstainers future strategic coalitions might possess.
Regarding the potential causes of such behaviour, opposition party structures, their history, electoral system and legislation, and expectations towards external actors appear the most plausible ones. First, in the absence of well-developed programmes, most opposition parties are akin to informal elite groupings united around their leaders, in which factions are not welcome. Internal disputes often lead to splits, reducing possibility for generational changes. In this way, party destiny ends up depending almost exclusively on its leaders’ success or failure. Second, almost all opposition parties were born as a result of splits and their leaders have been active for a relatively long time. This means that a history of previous personal conflicts and coordination failures further hinders inter-party coordination efforts and worsens their longer-term outlook. Third, Montenegro’s closed- list proportional electoral system with a country-wide constituency allows for high proportionality in parliamentary representation.489 This is only marginally limited by a 3% threshold that is easily overcome through tactical pre-electoral coalitions, and tends to facilitate centralised party
487 Komnenić, Petar. Sa ili bez opozicionih partija: Dvostruka igra Demokratskog fronta. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 08 October 2015. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/dvostruka-igra-demokratskog-fronta/27305776.html (accessed 26 June 2019). 488 Kosović, Srđan. Crna Gora kao bolesnik koji očekuje spas. Vijesti, 15 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/crna-gora-kao-bolesnik-koji-ocekuje-spas (accessed 19 June 2019) 489 Cox, Making Votes Count. 82 structures. Moreover, the legislation provides readily and rather arbitrarily accessible privileges for party clubs and their members, such as paid premises and limited control over financing sources.490 Fourth, the expectation that DPS demise will come as a result of external actors pressures (mostly through EU accession) may mean the opposition parties have an interest in achieving and consolidating opposition primacy, rather than embarking in a costly ‘lost battle’ against the dominant at this point.
Indeed, this may be true for ‘moderate’ opposition parties as well. If DPS is expected to lose office as a result of external pressures or internal divisions within the dominant, they could just be waiting for this to happen and maintain their chances of coalescing with a potentially splitting DPS faction in that scenario.
Due to all this, ‘coalition-building’ is a sort of ‘fetish’ in Montenegro, too easily referred to as the ultimate solution to opposition parties’ problems. Indeed, previous experiences have failed due to their short-term horizon, losing meaning as soon as goals were achieved or their relevance faded. In the absence of well-developed programmatic offers and in presence of long-acting, unaccountable, and self-interested leaders that rule parties as their personal feuds, pseudo-coalition building may at best cure the symptom, rather than the actual diseases of Montenegrin political parties.
Even if generational turnover could overcome personal leaders’ contrasts, the appeal of pre- electoral opposition coalitions among Montenegrin electorate remains uncertain. Results of the “Key” as coalition of ‘moderates’ in 2016, as well as “Better Montenegro” coalition in 2010 indicate that pre-electoral coalitions might not be enough to ensure increased electoral success and mobilise abstainers or former DPS voters. Without the ability and willingness to develop more coherent coalition agreements, better electoral results have been reported when parties run alone, maximising the variety of political opposition offers to the electorate. Indeed, Langfield notes that hastily-built coalitions between opposition parties featuring profound disagreements or with a story of personal conflicts can be easily portrayed as ‘opportunistic power grabbers’ by the dominant and result in very complicated relationships that are likely to end up in failure, damaging opposition’s credibility in front of the electorate.491
Local Level office
A potential pathway to downplay previous failures was provided by weakening local support for the DPS in some important municipalities, like Podgorica, Nikšić, Budva, and Kotor. Given the
490 Lasica, Danijela and Marija Mirjačić. Komunisti skućili DPS i SDP, država opoziciju sa pola miliona godišnje. Vijesti, 24 June 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/ekonomija/komunisti-skucili-dps-i-sdp-drzava- opoziciju-sa-pola-miliona-godisnje (accessed 24 June 2019). 491 Langfield, Opposition Growth, 307. 83 problems with pre-electoral coalitions, independent competition and post-electoral cooperation could represent more effective a tool. Indeed, post-electoral coalitions avoid the need to sacrifice party labels’ visibility and values in the electoral campaign, allowing for cooperation between autonomous platforms.492
Indeed, given the country’s small dimensions and the great attention surrounding each local election, there is almost no such thing as ‘local level politics’ in Montenegro. This is a double- edged sword for opposition parties. On the one hand, it can be a great advantage as success at local level receives greater attention and can undermine DPS ‘image of invincibility’ even with small- scale opposition growth at the ballots. On the other hand, this means the dominant makes use of extensive resources for every local election to avoid defeat and makes sure any mistake by its competitors is duly amplified.
While increased hopes came repeatedly from municipal elections, opposition parties’ behaviour ended in almost total failure. The case of Nikšić is emblematic. To begin with, an easy chance to formalise a historical alternation in office was lost in 2012-2013 due to sterile intra-opposition disputes that opened the way for DPS controversial ‘resurrection’. In addition, 2017 elections were boycotted for reasons having no direct relation with the city’s problems and left opposition voters and activists devoid of any influence and local resources, as the local council operated at DPS will.493 Besides indicating the short-sightedness of opposition parties’ approach in the second biggest city of Montenegro, this example points to the way in which local party branches are easily ‘sacrificed’ for the sake of alleged national-level rewards. Thereby, instead of consolidating their base, opposition parties alienated their already disillusioned constituencies.
Further, when post-electoral coalitions were formed, governing records were marred by inter-party conflict. This was especially the case in Budva and Kotor. Instead of showing that a post-electoral coalition between its diverse components could work, representing a viable alternative to DPS rule and a credible precedent for similar solutions at national level, opposition parties did exactly the contrary. Policy disagreements, identity-based polemics, DPS-like sharing of rewards, and recurrent mixing of local and national level themes created bitterness and conflict within partners, leading to ruling coalition dissolution. The promises of change included in the extensive use of ‘regime cleavage’ rhetoric were thus refuted and failure was emphasised by the dominant. If anything,
492 Langfield, Opposition Growth, 298. 493 Vuksanović, Željko. Kako izgleda Nikšić bez opozicije: Sve odluke se donose jednoglasno, nema rasprave, svi dižu ruke... Vijesti, 03 January 2019. Avaialble at: https://www.vijesti.me/zabava/film-tv/kako-izgelda-niksic-bez-opozcije- sve-odluke-se-donose-jednoglasno-nema-rasprave-svi-dizu-ruke (accessed 06 July 2019). 84 opposition parties gave a blatant show of their inability to learn from past mistakes and reach viable compromises, as well as wasting precious opportunities provided by scandals that hit the dominant.
Such track-record is hardly facilitating the expansion of opposition support at national level, so that exploiting local level politics risked becoming another easy way to skew competition for the dominant, as it was repeatedly given the chance to divert attention from its previous mismanagement and graft.
Reliance on external actors
External actors, EU in particular, have been important in opposition parties’ strategic behaviour: they were thought able and willing to provide decisive contributions to end DPS dominance. Such expectations probably fostered opposition intra-party competition too, as parties sought for themselves the best position to rule in a potential post-DPS scenario. Indeed, hopes for a so-called “Sanaderisation” pointed to opposition parties’ belief this was the case. They seemed to think progress with Rule of Law and fight against corruption thanks to EU accession negotiations should have brought to the indictment of Djukanović and his allies, similarly to what happened with former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader.494 Voiced especially during early 2010s, such hopes faded as years of negotiations passed without substantial progress, yet never fully disappeared.495
At this point, opposition parties have actively tried to push external actors into action to support their positions against the dominant. This included polishing their international image through the aforementioned attempts to show a civic, non-ethno-political façade and the instrumental use of civil-society-like platforms and rhetoric, but also increasingly frequent parliamentary and local electoral boycotts, as a tool of non-institutional opposition. In general, boycotts tend to happen when incumbent’s misbehaviour is not convincingly condemned by third-party actors, opposition parties’ strength is relevant, and these perceive withdrawing participation likely to trigger third- party actors’ reaction.496 By these means, parties intend to signal they perceive competition conditions bad enough to justify the costs they incur in boycotting, including the chance of third- party actors continued non-intervention.497
In Montenegro, opposition parties’ boycotts intend to stop ordinary institutional activity, because such outcome is regarded as directly affecting EU interest in maintaining political stability in the
494 Sošić and Marović, European Integration, 40-41. 495 Radulović, Zoran. SANADERIZACIJA MILA ĐUKANOVIĆA: Partijska posla za ličnu korist. Monitor, 15 Februarz 2019. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/sanaderizacija-mila-djukanovica-partijska-posla-za-licnu- korist/ (accessed 02 July 2019). 496 Beaulieu, Emily and Susan D. Hyde. 2009. In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts. Comparative Political Studies 42(3), 402. 497 Beaulieu and Hyde, Democracy Promotion, 406. 85 country and in the Western Balkans at large.498 Considering the very low cost of this kind of boycotts, they have proved a rather convenient tool for triggering external intervention. In a typical case, external actors get involved to support the restoration of ordinary institutional political activity by facilitating the incumbent and the opposition in reaching a compromise. In this way, parties accept to negotiate with formulas that can fit external actors’ presence (formally or informally), thereby diminishing power asymmetry between dominant and opposition. When a final compromise is reached after months of debates, however, its implementation is often partial and leaves space for recrimination, creating the basis for further rounds of political crisis, after some time of ‘stability’.
In these terms and as long as external actors intervene at relatively low cost, opposition parties have an incentive in acting ‘irresponsibly’, potentially playing a central role in the rule-by-crisis governance method of ‘stabilitocratic’ incumbents, one of the main traits of these regimes.499
Even though the democratic biases contested by the opposition are well documented and the role of external actors is potentially beneficial for tackling competitive authoritarian regimes,500 the latter are faced with the difficult task of balancing between intervention and passivity. This has become even trickier since 2015. As the boycott-prone DF turned towards Putin’s Russia after its attempts at civic transformation did not find much Western support or electoral success, other opposition parties radicalised their opposition by becoming firmer in their boycotts than the DF itself. By the end of 2018, pro-Western opposition was acting in contrast with its potential external allies’ interests in stability, while pro-Russian DF signalled its intention for cooperation. This also meant that external actors’ support became another tool for intra-opposition competition, as showed by the events surrounding Pence’s visit in Podgorica in 2017 and Democrats-URA dialogue platform in 2018-2019.
Regardless of the eventual outcome of such re-alignments, opposition parties’ reliance on external actors, rather than addressing its constituencies longer-term interests through programmatic development could be included among the “enduring traces” of “stabilitocracies” in the Western Balkans foreseen by Bieber.501
Summary
The analysis of how non-governing political parties expressed their opposition to the dominant Democratic Party of Socialist in post-independence Montenegro has evidenced a rather bleak
498Kocijaničić: Bojkot parlamenta nije prihvatljiv. Vijesti, 25 February 2019. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/kocijanicic-bojkot-parlamenta-nije-prihvatljiv (accessed 1 July 2019); European Commission, Montenegro 2019 Report, 7-8. 499 Bieber, Patterns. 500 Way and Levitsky, Level Playing Field, 67. 501 Bieber, Florian. 2018. The Rise (and Fall) of Balkan Stabilitocracies. Horizons 10(2018), 185. 86 picture when compared to successful strategies adopted by opposition parties in other cases of political dominance in competitive authoritarian regimes.
Although expressing rather radical opposition stances, Montenegrin parties keep favouring emotional, populist appeals over activist recruitment. Their focus on creating a ‘regime cleavage’ disguises their programmatic ambiguity, rather downplay differences. The main opposition parties propose themselves as the ‘true’ opposition, similarly to Western ‘anti-political establishment’ ones. This way, the ‘regime cleavage’ strategy loses its role in facilitating inter-party coordination. Strategic coalition building appears thus overly complicated, yet strongly voiced by Montenegro’s media, analysts, and opposition parties themselves, becoming a sort of ‘fetish’ supposed to save opposition fortunes. To be sure, coalition building has been repeatedly attempted, but it was tactical in nature, short-termed, and each attempt left behind polemics between its components. Moreover, it was never clear to what extent voters would buy-in if such attempts became strategical, leading to put into question the viability and the opportunity of broad, pre-electoral opposition coalitions in Montenegro.
Lacking willingness, even ability, to compromise and renounce to the benefits of independent action, opposition parties had the chance to prove themselves in post-electoral coalitions at local level, thanks to DPS ratings weakening after the economic crisis and some scandals. Instead of making the best of such opportunities, inter-party conflicts gave the worst possible image to the public and further compromised the credibility of large non-DPS coalitions.
The absence of a cohesive challenge to the dominant notwithstanding, many hoped EU accession negotiations could have provided the proper conditions to end DPS rule. When such expectations proved too optimistic, opposition parties sought to gather their support both trying to appear more appealing to Western values and disrupting institutional politics to require external intervention to restore political stability.
Overall, this analysis evidenced that opposition parties in Montenegro were more engaged in competing against each other than against the dominant. Given growing fragmentation and the perception that chances of defeating the incumbent were slim, their main goal has been opposition primacy, probably in sight of a future alternation in office stemming from DPS internal disputes or EU pressures. Having in mind the way such parties acted up to this point and considering their local-level administration methods, however, alternation might not mean outright regime change. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether current opposition parties remain true to their rhetoric of
87 change and committed to “levelling the playing field” in the moment of taking office.502 The lack of clearly developed programmatic offers and the widespread resort to populist, anti-establishment platforms among opposition parties risks turning potential new incumbents in to-be dominants, rather than democratisers.
3.4.2 Impact on Electoral, Parliamentary, and Executive Arenas of Party Competition Having reviewed DPS dominance and considered political party opposition strategies, this section now turns to embedding the findings above to consider how political party opposition strategies impacted on Democratic Party of Socialists dominance in post-independence Montenegro. The answer to this question is given through the consideration of the way in which the dominant responded to the inputs provided by its political opponents within the three arenas of party competition.
Electoral Arena
The overall results of opposition within the electoral arena are pretty meagre. Party strategies proved inadequate to take advantage of the opportunities provided since 2012 by a combination of worsening economic outlook after the global crisis, the eruption of a series of scandals involving DPS officials, and the dissolution of the long-term DPS-SDP alliance. In fact, opposition parties’ strategies emerge in this thesis as crucial in sustaining DPS electoral dominance after 2012.
Unable to compete with DPS clientelist sharing of material resources, opposition parties provided appeals to voters relying mostly on the ‘regime cleavage’ dimension, and several of them added to it ethno-political narratives. In this sense, some parties’ failure to detach opposition from collective identity only supported the dominant’s image of defender of the state from the attacks of an ‘anti- Montenegrin opposition’, inherently disloyal. Indeed, non-institutional action by parties widely perceived and/or portrayed as pro-Serb was used to ‘prove’ those claims. Parties relying on such themes are perfect DPS alter egos and paradoxically benefit from its attacks by presenting themselves as ‘opposition martyrs’. The, at times blatant, politicisation of the judiciary against DF allowed their leaders to become ‘proud victims’ of the dominants’ abuse, and was also useful to allow the survival of seemingly worn-out politicians, e.g. Medojević. Indeed, labelling of all opposition actors as anti-system by the dominant led to what Brack and Weinblum suggested, i.e. ‘direct delegitimisation vis-à-vis the public’ of opposition parties, their ‘consequent process of self- redefinition’ and the use of radical and non-institutional opposition strategies.503
502 Way and Levitsky, Level Playing Field, 66; Hostrup Haugbolle and Cavatorta, Opposition Coordination Failures. 503 Weinblum and Brack, Political Opposition, 74. 88
Thanks to continued reliance on identity politics by some opposition parties, DPS was able to belittle ‘regime cleavage’ appeals of the whole opposition, presenting it to voters as only a disguise for ‘anti-Montenegrinness.’ However, as was once the case with LSCG, the real threat to DPS rule is represented by parties recognised as civic and potentially penetrating its moderate, dissatisfied voters. Hopes in this regard were raised by PzP, PCG, Demos, and URA, as well as by the attempted transformation of the SNP and Lekić’s DF. While PzP and PCG’s ’third way’ ended up, respectively, in ‘serbianisation’ and co-optation, civic-transformation attempts backfired too, being reversed in DF’s case and leading to several splits in the SNP. Democrats seem aware of the potential of such kind of opposition and present the best outlook for growth.
Moreover, the increased use of a populist, anti-establishment approach to ‘regime cleavage’ that targets both the dominant and other opposition parties only supported DPS delegitimisation of opposition actors. While such strategies were not completely new, events in 2015-2016 (fragmentation outburst, Freedom Calling, transitional government) and the growing appeal of Bečić’s Democrats gave way to increased intra-opposition competition and polarisation, both at local and national level.
This is also fostered by the extremely high frequency of elections in Montenegro, so that the political system is practically absorbed in a constant electoral campaign. All elections are presented as ‘crucial’ for the political system at large, and serve both to institutionalise resource-sharing and to reinforce the dominant’s image of invincibility among voters and elites.504 Indeed, the never- ending celebration of local DPS triumphs has become a fundamental feature of its ‘image of invincibility’. Given the aforementioned ‘lack of local level’ in Montenegrin politics, local elections preparation heavily involves central party structures, generates continuous difficult coalition negotiations among opposition parties and amplifies local level conflicts to national level and vice versa. In this context, the coalition building ‘fetish’ presented above is constantly revived by the opposition. Parties announce ground-breaking coalition initiatives and intra-opposition appeasement, to then quickly disregard such claims and blame other parties for such failures, exposing incoherence between rhetoric and behaviour in the process. This has been much to the benefit of the dominant, who could downplay its own troubles with the SDP and the scandals that involved some of its top-echelons, as well as focus on showing opposition parties’ ‘irresponsibility’.
DPS electoral dominance has recently entailed only the achievement of a plurality of parliamentary seats, just enough to keep the dominance cycle going. However, the slight decline at the ballots over the years was not met with consistent increase in opposition’s support, showing that the creation of
504 Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy, 8. 89 a ‘regime cleavage’ is not enough to mobilise potential opposition voters, who seem to prefer abstention instead. Similarly to what Scheiner noted in Japan, anti-clientelist appeals had limited effect in Montenegro, due to the benefits and institutional protection clientelist systems offer to the members of their network, reducing incentives for outright opposition behaviour among dissatisfied DPS voters.505 Scandals and evidence of embezzlement only disclose sort of ‘public secrets’, as most people already know about such methods. For a relevant part of the population the State remains something to exploit, as politicians ‘normally’ do, yet no credible alternative that outweighs the regular benefits granted by the dominant’s resource sharing is perceived.506 Many voters, therefore, tend to “practice accommodation” rather than engage in opposition activities.507
In 2012, DPS MP Miodrag Vuković provided a statement that well shows DPS discourse against the opposition. According to him, “oppositionists are perennial losers who will face another defeat” as
They always have the same story: the state is in chains, links between organised crime and regime… Who still believes in such stories? I do not think any reasonable person, regardless of economic hardships, will choose that [opposition’s] option.508
Overall, DPS duly emphasises opposition parties’ conflicts to reinforce its image among the public as the only credible solution to rule the country, the ‘lesser evil’ able to ensure growth through its ideological flexibility and pragmatic, ‘stability-oriented’ rule. Opposition parties are thus portrayed and perceived as unreliable because of intra-opposition radical rhetoric and harsh competition, rather than due to fragmentation per se. Taking proper advantage of backfiring opposition strategies, DPS managed to maintain its electoral dominance even in presence of declining support in several electoral rounds.
Parliamentary Arena
When it comes to the parliamentary arena, opposition parties’ track-record is as bad as in the electoral one. The consequences of coordination failure give way to mutual recriminations and invigorate intra-opposition competition for the sake of anti-DPS primacy.
At local level, post-electoral coalition formation difficulties and the noisy failure in maintaining them facilitated the aforementioned accusations of ‘irresponsibility’ by the dominant. Coordination fares no better at national level, where opposition parliamentary clubs have exposed diverse and
505 Scheiner, Democracy without Competition. 506 Sedlenieks, Buffer Culture in Montenegro. 507 Blondel, Political Opposition, 485. 508 Bogdanović, Milica. Nova: Neka se Srđan Milić jasno izjasni o pristupanju Demokratskom frontu. Vijesti, 05 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/nova-neka-se-srdan-milic-jasno-izjasni-o-pristupanju- demokratskom-frontu (accessed18 June 2019). 90 incompatible tactics, as some parties adopted cooperative and some others extremely competitive behaviour (e.g. participation in DPS led-reform committees Vs parliamentary boycott). Indeed, the adoption of cooperative behaviour represents a contradiction with populist ‘regime cleavage’ appeals, one that becomes object of heavy criticism by other parties as it gives legitimation to the ‘regime’ itself and withdraws it to competitive opposition strategies. Moreover, when not jointly agreed, cooperation is portrayed by other actors as co-optation or ‘political corruption’, i.e. ‘false opposition’.
In truth, while cooperative behaviour does not automatically signal co-optation, the bitterness caused by intra-opposition ‘anti-establishment’ competition provides fertile ground for co-optation by the dominant, who can exploit the bargaining advantages provided by its electoral dominance, informal power networks, and financial strength. Extremely keen in defusing conflict through interest-oriented bargaining and compromise, DPS made the best of the chances for co-optation provided by opposition conflict. Examples of co-optation are multiple, especially at local level where, among other things, it is also easier to avoid international attention. As signalled in other cases, the adoption of cooperative opposition behaviour may also be a signal that some parties, similarly to voters, see the dominant as ‘lesser evil’, in comparison with their opposition competitors.509
In addition, opposition parties had difficulties in playing the role of ‘kingmakers’. Only Krivokapić’s SDP had some success in doing so, yet this role progressively compromised party unity and ended in a split in the wake of 2014 Podgorica’s case. Troubles with such strategy are best exemplified by the eventually untenable ’third way’ proposed by PCG, due to its leadership inability to capitalise on the chances for peer-to-peer bargaining with other opposition parties that gave incentives for its less committed members to be co-opted by the dominant, in search of “patronage” or “a more secure political future”.510
Overall, opposition parties proved unable to manage such chances and their members frequently fell prey of generous DPS co-optation offers as a consequence. As much as favouring co-optation, intra- opposition competition is also helpful to support DPS internal cohesion. Adding to the role of electoral dominance in providing incentives for elites to remain loyal to the dominant exposed by Magaloni, the lack of coordination and failure of opposition parties to form viable post-electoral
509 Hostrup Haugbolle and Cavatorta, Opposition Coordination Failures, 328-329. 510 Way and Levitsky, Level Playing Field, 62 91 ruling coalitions further deters potentially dissatisfied DPS cadres to look for better conditions by defecting and breaking the dominant’s unity. 511
Executive arena
DPS has maintained executive dominance, even though it faced more effective opposition between 2012/2013 and 2015, due to worsening relationship with its long-term coalition partner, the SDP.
When it comes to agenda-setting and policy-making, opposition parties have managed to disrupt the dominant’s narrative and prime issues regarding governance, organised crime, and reform packages in several occasions, helped by mismanagement and corruption scandals (e.g. recordings affair) or thanks to their firm opposition action (e.g. protests post-2013 presidential elections), as well as benefitting from the support of external actors (e.g. 2016 transitional government talks).
Nevertheless, most such disruption had difficulties maintaining relevance or achieving enduring results. The dominant was keen in introducing divisive identity topics for the sake of distorting attention from unwelcome matters, while some opposition parties have often fallen in such ‘traps’. As already mentioned, this behaviour was helpful for the dominant and its alter egos, yet obscured other opposition parties’ messages, somehow pushing them into populist rhetoric to break their marginalisation. Probably the most relevant example was 2016 ‘Government of Electoral Trust’, in which opposition parties taking part managed to focus on some issues regarding mismanagement and electoral process biases. However, they were consistently targeted by both DPS and DF’s rhetoric and eventually tried to gain credibility putting into question the whole experience after the dominant unilaterally pushed through a vote in parliament. The time at their disposal was little and obstruction was probably well prepared, making it even more difficult to dismantle DPS resource sharing mechanisms in such a short time.
Opposition parties managed to have at least some impact in the executive arena thanks to the resolute support gathered at times from external actors. Their endemic division, however, was crucial when SDP increasingly critical stance against the DPS was not duly exploited because of intra-opposition disagreement (see DF’s decision to boycott parliamentary works before 2014 local elections). In this sense, divisions both hindered SDP ambitions of ‘kingmaker’ and other parties’ hopes that SDP exit could come to their help, effectively wasting one of the best opportunities opposition parties have had to seriously disrupt the dominant’s agenda.512
511 Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy. 512 Kopecky, Petr and Maria Spirova. 2008. Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Communist Democracies: Power of the Powerless. The Journal of Legislative Studies 14(1-2), 133-59; Norton, Making Sense of Opposition, 246; Langfield, Opposition Growth. 92
Overall, the results achieved by the opposition did not alter the longer-term orientation of the dominant with regards to control of executive power. DPS has secured progress in the achievement of its major strategic objectives, including the much disputed NATO accession, and managed to twist, delay or neglect the implementation of EU-accession reforms that could have touched upon its dominance and the connected clientelistic system (both patronage and ‘reverse clientelistic’). Thanks to external actors’ focus on political stability, such behaviour was rarely sanctioned and went on rather smoothly.513 In reproducing dominance, noteworthy is the way in which electoral legislation was slightly improved several times, so that further rounds of reforms are needed, including other extensive talks and producing the same, mixed results. Similarly, the long-delayed implementation of decentralisation measures perpetuates local administration heavy dependence from central transfers, tightly controlled by the dominant. Besides sustaining centralistic party organisation, this allowed selectively channelling founds in favour of dominant-voting areas and a powerful blackmailing instrument towards opposition-ruled municipalities.514
Moreover, although several scandals brought to public attention DPS authoritarian governance, the party managed to survive those crises without too much suffering. Even when enquiries into these cases were not covered up and led to several high-level trials, rumours pointed to previous marginalisation of such individuals within the ruling party. As a result, observers suspect that convictions where the result of internal showdowns within the ruling elite rather than genuine progress in Rule of Law sector.515 Regardless of the outcome, substantiated enquiries and in-depth analysis leading to such investigations were mostly prerogative of civil society organisations acting as “watchdogs” and generally benefitting from the aforementioned possibility to recruit committed and trained activists. Political parties remain in the background when it comes to this kind of opposition, besides stepping in with bombastic, populist declarations and limited institutional efficacy. They thus fail to boost their credibility in front of more committed and civic-oriented strata of the electorate, but also in front of external actors and observers, who tend to ascribe the role of ‘true opposition’ to civil society organisations rather than to political parties.
In conclusion, opposition in the executive arena was not successful due to the consolidated character of dominance and the well-developed means of formal and informal control established by the DPS throughout its long rule. Once again, failed coordination hindered opposition parties to exploit the opportunities they were presented with. DPS-controlled political and economic
513 Bieber, Patterns. 514 Scheiner, Democracy without Competition, 4. 515 Tomović, Dušica. 2015. Montenegro Arrests Ex-President Marovic for Corruption. Balkan Insight. 17 December 2015. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2015/12/17/montenegro-arrest-former-president-on-corruption-claims-12- 17-2015/ (accessed 21 May 2019). 93 liberalisation kept reproducing executive dominance, allowing to maintain “a large state and a politically quiescent bureaucracy” to be exploited for partisan purposes and surviving well into the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.516
Conclusion Research on Montenegro has often focused on the dominant DPS and its leader, granting only limited attention to opposition parties and the role of their agency within the competitive authoritarian regime in place. In order to integrate such literature and the opposition-related gap, this thesis intended to answer the question of how political party opposition strategies impacted on DPS dominance in post-independence Montenegro through an in-depth empirical analysis of political parties’ behaviour and its consequences on political competition as a whole.
Chapter 2 addressed the first of two sub-questions, related to how DPS skewed political competition in order to establish and maintain its dominance from the first multiparty elections. It did so reviewing the development and entrenching of DPS dominance through chronological description and analysis within the electoral, parliamentary, and executive arenas of party competition. It showed DPS exploited its ‘in-built’ dominance derived from its status as socialist-successor party in the executive arena to control liberalisation, maintaining monopolist access to state resources and a politicised bureaucracy. This allowed to skew competition in the electoral arena, through a patron- client relationship with the electorate and the manipulation of the electoral process, combined with the use of a catch-all platform as a ‘reliable’ party of power, as well as a populist rhetoric focusing on internal and external ‘enemies’. Within the parliamentary arena, it sustained its primacy in bargaining with other parties thanks to its proposing itself as a ‘moderate’, pragmatic party able to co-opt other actors thanks to superior financial and informal power, while preserving internal cohesion.
Chapter 3 answered the second sub-question, addressing how non-governing political parties expressed their opposition to the dominant DPS after independence. The analysis of opposition behaviour in relation to successful opposition strategies adopted by political parties in other competitive authoritarian regimes evidenced a bleak picture. It found Montenegrin parties prefer populist appeals over activist recruitment, providing rather empty promises of democratic change through the intensive use of ‘regime cleavage’ strategies to cover programmatic shallowness. Instead of downplaying intra-opposition differences, such strategy is used against potential allies as well as against the dominant, with parties akin to Western ‘anti-establishment parties’. Party
516 Greene, The Political Economy, 828. 94 coordination was at best tactical, while a ‘coalition building fetish’ is noted in this regard. Short- term, ‘pseudo-coalition building’ only managed to intensify competition and diminish opposition parties’ credibility among the electorate. They also failed to capitalise on the troubles affecting the dominant after 2012 by making the best of post-electoral coalitions at local level, missing the chance to show the viability of a non-DPS option. Further, opposition parties hoped external actors’ pressures would undermine DPS dominance and allow them an easier way into office, trying to appear more appealing to such actors as well as repeatedly attempting to foster pro-active intervention, at times disrupting institutional stability.
Overall, opposition parties in Montenegro engaged in competing against each other rather than against the dominant, behaving as alternation was less depending on their actions than on the ones of external actors or DPS factions. Moreover, the lack of clearly developed programmatic basis and the widespread resort to populist anti-establishment platforms by opposition parties does not dismiss the risk of new incumbents becoming to-be dominants, rather than democratisers.
Combining the answers to the research sub-questions, the analysis found that, rather than fragmentation itself, ceaseless intra-opposition competition is the crucial problem when it comes to political party opposition strategies in post-independence Montenegro, as it causes credibility deficits among the electorate and influential external actors.
DPS managed to maintain its dominance within the electoral arena thanks to backfiring opposition strategies even in presence of declining support in several electoral rounds that, at times, seemed capable to threaten its ‘invincibility’. Some opposition parties’ continued reliance on identity themes allowed the dominant to keep depicting opposition as united by the common goal of reversing the hardly-achieved independence of Montenegro. Contemporarily, in front of opposition’s coordination failures, DPS stressed its image as the only credible solution, the ‘lesser evil’ to ensure growth through its pragmatic, ‘stability-oriented’ rule.
In the parliamentary arena, coordination failure in the form of recurrent dissolution of coalition agreements and contrasting opposition behaviour in parliament fostered mutual recriminations and invigorated intra-opposition competition for the sake of anti-DPS primacy. At the same time, public shows of conflict gave weight to the aforementioned accusations of ‘irresponsibility’, as well as facilitated DPS co-optation efforts, both at local and national level. Intra-opposition competition was also helpful to support DPS internal cohesion, as the lack of credibility of opposition parties post-electoral coalitions further deters potentially dissatisfied DPS cadres to look for better conditions by defecting and breaking the dominant’s unity.
95
Finally, opposition in the executive arena was unable to alter the well-developed means of formal and informal control established by the DPS throughout its long rule, as opposition parties failed to exploit the opportunities they were presented with, especially by SDP defection in 2015. DPS- controlled political and economic liberalisation allowed hyper-incumbency advantages to endure well into the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Although opposition parties’ coordination might only “be the spark or the detonator rather than the real cause of the collapse of the regimes”, Montenegro’s case shows it as a necessary, yet missed condition to overthrow the dominant.517 In this regard, the present findings align with literature that sees political party opposition strategies as a major factor in accounting for continued party dominance.518
Differently to Greene’s consideration regarding Mexico, however, opposition parties in Montenegro are not hindered by ‘under competitiveness’, as they feature rather stable constituencies and can count on fairly good electoral results in the last decade.519 Rather, opposition parties deploy their resources in the attempt to outplay their fellow opposition actors, instead of pooling resources against the dominant. Therefore, the lack of coordination cannot be explained only through the divide et impera strategies of the DPS. Especially after 2012, opposition parties repeatedly and deliberately chose competition over coordination. By doing so, they can be seen as “pillars of authoritarian survival” themselves,520 as they undermined their own credibility and showed limited ability to learn from past mistakes and failures.
It follows that dominant party increased vulnerability is not sufficient to allow for alternation, and that such outcome is dependent on opposition strategies at least as much as on external factors or dominant party’s mistakes or factionalism. As with Langfield, “former dominant party voters need an alternative to vote for, or they will simply drop out of the electorate”.521 In order to do so, opposition parties could improve the nature of their coordination efforts “concerting” diverse strategies among autonomous segments of the opposition body, rather than proposing tactical coalitions as a surrogate for programmatic, strategic coalition building.522 Publicly recognising the viability and complementarity of diverse opposition options without denying each party’s right for autonomous action could represent a first, crucial step towards subtracting to the dominant of its strongest rhetoric perks against the opposition. As opposition parties have given proof of
517 Blondel, Political Opposition, 485. 518 Langfield, Opposition Growth; Hostrup Haugbolle and Cavatorta, Opposition Coordination Failures; White, Dominant Party Systems; Ziegfeld and Tudor, How Opposition Parties Sustain Single-party Dominance. 519 Greene, The Political Economy, 822. 520 Hostrup Haugbolle and Cavatorta, Opposition Coordination Failures, 328. 521 Langfield, Opposition Growth, 307. 522 Gel’man, Political Opposition in Russia, 185-186. 96 ideological flexibility and their competition stem from contrasts between party leaderships, often developed out of diverging tactical interests and negotiable identity platforms, ‘concerting’ seems not impossible to achieve.523 The presence of a proportional electoral system, moreover, means that, even in presence of strong intra-opposition competition, DPS seriously risked losing its previous grip on the electoral arena in several occasions. Thus, previous failures have not fully compromised the viability of autonomous, yet loosely coordinated opposition action, as a couple of thousands preferences may make the necessary difference to allow alternation in such ‘concerted opposition’ scenario.
In conclusion, these findings could be integrated by addressing the main theoretical and methodological limitations of this thesis. On the one hand, they would benefit from increased theoretical depth in the way dominance is conceptualised, for instance through the consideration of its structural features, transcending the contingency of political competition to include cultural and economic transformations. On the other hand, the integration of the methods through elite, activists, and voters interviews, as well as a more rigorous analysis of the communication strategies used by opposition parties and their leaders might add significance to this study.
Regarding further research paths, it appears fruitful to investigate the way in which opposition parties adapted their self-representation and strategies to the messages sent out by the dominant and external actors, and the effects such behaviour has in the longer-term. Moreover, the relationship of opposition parties and other opposition actors may be worth addressing, perhaps considering the way in which such traits resemble or differentiate from earlier phases of post-Yugoslav transformation. Another interesting lead concerns the comparative analysis of opposition parties’ behaviour and strategies in the Western Balkan countries. In particular, the reliance on boycott strategies by opposition parties in Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro represents a thought-provoking feature and a potentially fertile ground for the comparison of how such actors react to the challenges posed by the ‘stabilitocratic’, competitive authoritarian regimes of the region.
523 Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy, 263. 97
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______. Rani zimski san. Monitor, 12 November 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/rani-zimski-san/ (accessed 15 June 2019). ______. Može li bolje. Monitor, 28 May 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/moe-li- bolje/ (accessed 15 June 2019). ______. Terenski radovi. Monitor, 14 May 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/terenski-radovi/ (accessed 15 June 2019). ______. Siguran Strah. Monitor, 07 May 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/siguran- strah/ (accessed 15 June 2019). ______. Šansa ove generacije. Monitor, 09 April 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/ansa-ove-generacije/ (accessed 15 June 2019). ______. Rješenje ili izgovor. Monitor, 26 March 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/rjeenje-ili-izgovor/ (accessed 15 June 2019). ______. Grlom u izbore. Monitor, 05 March 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/grlom-u-izbore/ (accessed 15 June 2019). ______. Apsolutna demokratija. Monitor, 8 January 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/apsolutna-demokratija/ (accessed 13 June 2019). ______. Svi naši zidovi. Monitor, 20 November 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/svi-nai-zidovi/ (accessed 14 June 2019). ______. Bojkot na višem nivou. Monitor, 06 November 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/bojkot-na-viem-nivou/ (accessed 14 June 2019). ______. Bojkot na sitno. Monitor, 16 October 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/bojkot-na-sitno/ (accessed 13 June 2019). ______. Mrtvo more. Monitor, 03 April 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/mrtvo- more/ (accessed 09 June 2019). ______. Čelična jutra. Monitor, 01 April 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/elina- jutra/ (accessed 09 June 2019); ______. Kad jaganjci utihnu. Monitor, 05 March 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/kad-jaganjci-utihnu/ (accessed 09 June 2019); ______. Regulisana stvarnosti. Monitor, 24 February 2009. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/regulisana-stvarnost/ (accessed 09 June 2019). ______and Mustafa Canka. Još jedan dan poslije. Monitor, 28 May 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/jo-jedan-dan-poslije/ (accessed 15 June 2019). Bivši poslanici PzP-a formirali poslanički klub. PCNEN, 12 January 2009. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2009/01/12/bivsi-poslanici-pzp-a-formirali-poslanicki-klub/ (accessed 09 June 2019). Bogdanović, Milica. Najlakše reći da je DPS pokrao izbore. Vijesti, 13 March 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/najlakse-reci-da-je-dps-pokrao-izbore?slika=0 (accessed 22 June 2019). ______. Nova: Neka se Srđan Milić jasno izjasni o pristupanju Demokratskom frontu. Vijesti, 05 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/nova-neka-se-srdan-milic-jasno- izjasni-o-pristupanju-demokratskom-frontu (accessed 18 June 2019).
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______and Igor Pejović. Ćalović podržava, ali neće pristupiti Demokratskom frontu. Vijesti, 28 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/calovic-podrzava-ali-nece- pristupiti-demokratskom-frontu (accessed 18 June 2019). Bošković, Milan. Milo kao Sanader? Monitor, 22 January 2010. Available at: https://www.monitor.co.me/milo-kao-sanader/ (accessed 16 June 2019). Brajović, Katarina. Opozicija i perspektive. Nova srpska politička misao, 15 December 2008. Available at: http://www.nspm.rs/srbija-i-crna-gora/opozicija-i- perspektive.html?alphabet=l#yvComment1963 (accessed 09 June 2019). Brajović, Slavica and Srđan Janković. Incident i vrijeđanja u Skupštini Crne Gore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 May 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/indicent-i-vrijedjanja-u- skupstini-crne-gore/27733010.html (accessed 27 June 2019). Brajović, Velizar. 1997. Interview: Milo Djukanović. Milošević is an Obsolete Politician. Nedeljnik Vreme, 22 February 1997. Available at: http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/serbiandigest/ (accessed: 29 April 2019). CeMI: Više od pola građana smatra da partija zna za koga su glasali. Portal Analitika, 25 September 2016. Avaialable at: https://portalanalitika.me/clanak/244942/cemi-vise-od-pola- gradana-smatra-da-partija-zna-za-koga-su-glasali (accessed 28 June 2019). Crna Gora priznala Kosovo. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 09 October 2008. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1328571.html (accessed 09 June 2019). Crnogorska opozicija razgovara sa delegacijom EU. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 18 September 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/28742046.html (accessed 30 June 2019). Ćalović: Lukšić se potrošio štiteći svog mentora. Vijesti, 27 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/calovic-luksic-se-potrosio-stiteci-svog-mentora (accessed 18 June 2019). DF će parcijalno učestvovati u radu parlamenta. Vijesti, 18 June 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/df-ce-parcijalno-ucestvovati-u-radu-parlamenta (accessed 22 June 2019). DF i Pozitivna: Novi izbori jedini način za rješenje krize. Vijesti. 01 August 2013. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/df-i-pozitivna-novi-izbori-jedini-nacin-za-rjesenje-krize (accessed 22 June 2019). DF proglasio potpuni bojkot Skupštine zbog neusvajanja izbornog zakona. Vijesti. 19 February 2014. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/df-proglasio-potpuni-bojkot-skupstine- zbog-neusvajanja-izbornog-zakona (accessed 23 June 2019). Didanović, Vera. Nešto će se desiti. Vreme, 20 May 2004. Available at: https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=379193 (accessed 05 June 2019). DPS i saveznici apsolutni pobjednici u 7 opština. PCNEN, 24 May 2010. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2010/05/24/dps-i-saveznici-apsolutni-pobjednici-u-7-opstina/ (accessed 15 June 2019); DPS-SDP: Jedinstveni front neće uticati na rezultate izbora. Vijesti. 03 July 2012. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/dps-sdp-jedinstveni-front-nece-uticati-na-rezultate-izbora (accessed 18 June 2019). Drugi čovjek policije u Kotoru priznao saradnju sa narko klanom. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/28050400.html (accessed 29 June 2019).
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Grupa za promjene najavila unutrasnju transformaciju. PCNEN, 23 November 2004. Available at: http://www.pcnen.com/portal/2004/11/23/grupa-za-promjene-najavila-unutrasnju- transformaciju/ (accessed 05 June 2019). Grujić, Dragoslav. Nebojša Medojević. Vreme, 11 April 2002. Available at: https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=311818 (accessed 05 June 2019). Gudović, Ivana. Socijaldemokrate Crne Gore nova partija. Vijesti, 9 July 2015. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/socijaldemokrate-crne-gore-nova-partija (accessed 26 June 2019). Ivanović, Željko. Staro za novo. Vijesti, 01 February 2011. Available at: https://www.vijesti.me/kolumne/staro-za-novo (accessed 16 June 2019). Janković, Srđan. Đukanovićevo obnavljanje crnogorske autokefalne crkve. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 10 June 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/djukanovic-crkva- autokefalnost/29991545.html (accessed 03 July 2019). ______. Afere i opozicioni sukobi odlažu dogovor u Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 06 June 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/afere-i-opozicioni-sukobi- odla%C5%BEu-dogovor-u-crnoj-gori/29984976.html (accessed 03 July 2019). ______. Svi optuženi za 'državni udar' proglašeni krivim. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 09 May 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/drzavni-udar-presuda/29929378.html (accessed 03 July 2019). ______. Građanska odbrana Crne Gore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 February 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29790032.html (accessed 2 July 2019). ______. Evropski populisti stižu u Crnu Goru. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 05 February 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/evropska-ekstremna-desnica-balkan-crna- gora/29752842.html (accessed 03 July 2019) ______. Slučaj 'Atlas' ukazuje na spregu biznisa i politike. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 18 January 2019. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-afera-koverta/29717925.html (accessed 1 July 2019). ______. Usvojena rezolucija pomirenja ili novog razdora u Crnoj Gori? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 29 November 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/rezolucija-pomirenje- razdor-crna-gora-srbija/29628741.html (accessed 30 June 2019). ______. Koga u Crnoj Gori ugrožava pomoć EU? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 11 June 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/eu-pomoc-novac-brisel-cg/29283599.html (accessed 30 June 2019). ______. DPS osvojio apsolutnu većinu u Podgorici i pet drugih opština. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 27 May 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/lokalni-izbori-crna- gora/29252212.html (accessed 30 June 2019). ______. Novi test za vlasti i opoziciju u Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 May 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/lokalni-izbori-crna-gora/29250787.html (accessed 30 June 2019). ______. Finiš predsjedničke kampanje: Izdajnici, kumovi i srećna djeca. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 April 2018. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-kraj-predizborne- kampanje/29165781.html (accessed 30 June 2019).
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______. DPS-u najviše glasova, dio opozicije osporava regularnost izbora. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 26 November 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-lokalni- izbori/28877475.html (accessed 30 June 2019). ______. Opozicioni rat se rasplamsava. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 08 August 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-opozicija/28665611.html (accessed 29 June 2019). ______. Trećina poslanka opozicionog DF-a bez imuniteta. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 28 July 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/trecina-poslanika-df-bez- imuniteta/28645183.html (accessed 30 June 2019). ______. Najmlađa crnogorska partija prijetnja najjačima. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 09 May 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/demokratija-crna-gora/28476347.html (accessed 29 June 2019). ______. EU posmatrač političke krize u Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 27 February 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/eu-crna-gora-kriza/28336447.html (accessed 30 June 2019). ______. Bojkot izbora u Nikšiću prvi odgovor opozicije na najave hapšenja. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 February 2017. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/najava-hapsenja- opozicija-bojkot-izbora-niksic/28309178.html (accessed 30 June 2019). ______. Nova Skupština Crne Gore bez skoro polovine poslanika. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 24 November 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora- skupstina/28137800.html (accessed 29 June 2019). ______. Šta traži Moskva u crnogorskoj predizbornoj kampanji? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 10 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori- rusija/28042923.html (accessed 28 June 2019). ______. Nadigravanje trik ponudama. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 07 October 2016. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-izbori-trikovi/28038135.html (accessed 28 June 2019). ______. Raskol u SDP: Brajovićeva struja napustila stranku, Krivokapić traži da vrate mandate. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 30 June 2015. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sdp- opstaje-a-ko-odlazi/27102328.html (accessed 26 June 2019). ______. Osnovan Građanski pokret Crne Gore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 22 December 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/osnovan-gradjanski-pokret-crne- gore/26756825.html (accessed 25 June 2019). ______. Frakcija isključena iz Pozitivne, partiju napustio i Abazović. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 15 October 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/frakcija-iskljucena-iz-pozitvne- partiju-napustio-i-abazovic/26638732.html (accessed 24 June 2016). ______. Da li su izborne poruke jednake epilogu? Radio Slobodna Evropa, 08 September 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/da-li-su-izborne-poruke-jednake- epilogu/26572697.html (accessed 23 June 2019). ______. Previranja u Pozitivnoj Crnoj Gori. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 30 July 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/previranja-u-pozitvnoj-crnoj-gori/25475587.html (accessed 24 June 2019). ______. DPS bez apsolutne vlasti u Podgorici. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 May 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/dps-bez-apsolutne-vlasti-u-podgorici/25398064.html (accessed 23 June 2019).
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______. Borba za Podgoricu: Politički rat unutar opozicije. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 22 April 2014. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/borba-unutar-opozicije-za- podgoricu/25358611.html (accessed 23 June 2019). ______. Usvojene promjene Ustava, Crna Gora bliža Evropskoj uniji. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 31 July 2013.Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/usvojene-promjene-ustava-crna-gora- bliza-evropskoj-uniji/25062575.html (accessed 22 June 2019). ______. Odbijen zahtjev za poništenje izbora, odobrena istraga o aferi 'Snimak'. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 30 May 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/cg-rasprava-o-ponitenju- predsjednikih-izbora/25003187.html (accessed 22 June 2016). ______. Vujanović počeo novi mandat uz bojkot i proteste. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 20 May 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/inauguracija-vujanovia-uz-protestni- mars/24991515.html (accessed 22 June 2019). ______. SDP poziva na bojkot izbora, podijeljena podrška stranaka Vujanoviću i Lekiću. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 04 April 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/podijeljena- podrska-stranaka-predsjednickim-kandidatima/24948019.html (accessed 21 June 2019). ______. Crna Gora pred neizvjesnim predsjedničkim izborima. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 January 2013. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-pred-neizvjesnim- predsjednickim-izborima/24883669.html (accessed 20 June 2019). ______. Nikšić i dalje bez vlasti: Konflikt opozicionih šefova. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 21 November 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/niksic-i-dalje-bez-vlasti- konflikt-opoziconih-sefova/24777509.html (accessed 20 June 2019). ______. Opozicija se spotakla na himni. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 November 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/opozicija-se-spotakla-na-himni/24770824.html (accessed 20 June 2019). ______. Zbog čega crnogorska opozicija ne uspijeva zajedno na izbore. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 August 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/zbog-cega-crnogorska- opozicija-ne-uspijeva-zajedno-na-izbore/24675464.html (accessed 19 June 2019). ______. Crna Gora: Da li će manjinske stranke ući u Demokratski front. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 06 July 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/da-li-ce-manjinske-stranke-uci-u- demokratski-front/24637447.html (accessed 18 June 2019). ______. Bivši Miloševićev ambasador objedinjuje crnogorsku opoziciju. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 03 July 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bivsi-milosevicev-ambasador- objedinjuje-crnogorsku-opoziciju/24633944.html (accessed 18 June 2019). ______. Počinju pregovori o ustavnim promjenama. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 20 February 2012. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/pocinju_pregovori_o_ustavnim_promjenama/24490333.html (accessed 18 June 2019). ______. Hoće li Lukšić donijeti promjene. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 22 December 2010. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna_gora_vlada_djukanovic_luksic/2256102.html (accessed 16 June 2019). ______. DPS-u 12 opština, bez većine u Podgorici. Radio Slobodna Evropa, 24 May 2010. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna_gora_izbori_dps_podgorica/2050628.html (accessed 15 June 2019). ______and Biljana Jovićević. Rezultati predsjedničkih izbora. Radio slobodna evropa, 04 April 2008. Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1050678.html (accessed 08 June 2019). 110
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Appendix A – Data Collection Questions
Levels Questions
I How did political party opposition strategies impact on Democratic Party of (Thesis RQ) Socialists dominance in post-independence Montenegro?
Sub-Question 1.a - How did DPS skew political competition in order to establish and maintain its dominance from the first multiparty elections? - What events marked DPS Dominance development up to 1997? And from 1997 to 2006? - How was DPS Dominance maintained in the electoral, legislative, and executive arenas of party competition? - How did DPS dominance configure in each arena after independence?
Sub-Question 1.b - How did non-governing political parties express their II opposition to the dominant Democratic Party of Socialist after independence? (Case level) - - What were the most important opposition actions in this period (2006-2019)? - - Where there any opportunities opening for the challengers? - - What main themes of opposition can be identified within the considered time framework and what events marked their begin/end? - - Are any of the four identified opposition strategies noticeable (activist recruitment, creation of a ‘regime cleavage’, coalition building, and reliance on local level office)? Are other strategies discernible? - - How did the relationship between political parties evolve as a result of the considered opposition strategies?
- - What is this source about? - - When was it produced? III - - What message does it convey? (Source - - What actors are involved and what do they do/say? level) - - What relevant information regarding political party opposition and/or dominance is provided? - - Are further sources and/or triangulation needed?
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