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Non-lethality in reality: a defence technology assessment of its political and military potential

Orbons, J.B.J.

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December 2012 Sjef Orbons A Defence Technology Assessment Technology Defence A of its Political and Military Potential Non-Lethality in Reality

Sjef Orbons Non-Lethality in Reality 9789088920530 Non-Lethality in Reality

A Defence Technology Assessment of its Political and Military Potential

Sjef Orbons

December 2012 NON-LETHALITY IN REALITY A Defence Technology Assessment of its Political and Military Potential J.B.J. Orbons

Vormgeving Merel de Hart, Bureau Multimedia NLDA

Druk Bureau Repro, FBD Breda

© 2012 text J.B.J. Orbons

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, or stored in an automated retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the holder of the copyright.

ISBN: 978-90-8892-0530 NON-LETHALITY IN REALITY

A Defence Technology Assessment of its Political and Military Potential

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor

aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam

op gezag van de Rector Magnificus

prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom

ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde

commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel

op woensdag 30 januari 2013, te 14.00 uur

door

Jozef Bernardus Johannes Orbons

geboren te Heerlen Promotor: Prof. dr. J. Grin

Overige leden: Prof. dr. M.E. Glasius

Prof. dr. W. Klinkert

Prof. dr. M.R. Rutgers

Prof. dr. D.E.M. Verweij

Dr. J. Altmann

Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen ii Contents Acknowledgements vii

Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) ix

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

Introduction 3 Developments leading to the increasing emphasis on non-lethal weapons 4 Trends and developments before 1990 4 The 1990s: pragmatic examples and continuing debate 7 NLWs between doctrinal inclusion and critical debate 10 Technological optimism 10 Careful supporters 12 Sceptics 13 Deriving the research questions from the NLW debate 15 Claims related to Non-Lethal Weapons & Technology 16 Claims related to NLW target groups 16 Claims related to military users of NLWs 16 Claims related to the strategic effect of NLW application 16 The research approach 17 Sources and data collection 19 References 20

Chapter 2 Do Non-Lethal Weapons License to ‘Silence’? 25

Introduction 27 The Military Rationale of Non-Lethality 29 Between Expectation, Intent (‘The Ideal’) and Operational Reality (‘Friction’) 31 Realities on the Ground: Assessing NLWs 32 Three NLW Devices 34 The Weapon & Technology Complex 36 The User Complex 38 The Target Complex 41 Assessment Synthesis 42 NLW and Just War Tradition 44 Conclusions 45 Acknowledgements 46 Notes 46 References 47

iii Chapter 3 Non-Lethal Weapons: Peace Enablers or Troublesome Force? Assessing the Role of CS and Baton Rounds in the Northern Ireland Conflict 49

Introduction 51 A DTA approach to NLWs 53 CS 55 CS weapon/technology 55 CS user 56 CS targets 57 CS use-in-operational-context 57 The aftermath of CS deployment 61 Baton Rounds (BRs) 62 BR weapon/technology 62 BR user 62 BR targets 64 BR use-in-operational-context 65 Conclusions 69 CS 69 BRs 70 Synopsis and outlook for NLW assessment 71 Acknowledgements 72 Notes 72 Bibliography 75

Chapter 4 Assessing Non-Lethal Weapons Use in Detainee Operations in Iraq: Benign Force or Necessary Evil? 79

Introduction 81 Rationale and expectations of NLW deployment in support of detainee operations 82 Analytical approach for NLW assessment in Iraq detainee operations 83 Kinetic NLW characteristics 87 Kinetic NLW user force 88 Kinetic NLW target population 89 Kinetic NLW use-in-operational-context 91 Deploying the Active Denial System 98 Assessment synthesis and conclusion 100 Acknowledgements 103 Notes 103

iv Chapter 5 Are Non-Lethal Weapons a Viable Military Option to Strengthen the Hearts and Minds Approach in Afghanistan? 107

Introduction 109 Non-lethal weapons and the impact of tactical prudence 110 Analytical approach for NLW assessment in Afghanistan 111 Defining the Afghanistan research case 111 Laser Optical Warner technology and working principles 113 Laser Optical Warner use-in-operational-context at checkpoints 114 Laser Optical Warner use-in-operational-context by convoys 117 Assessment synthesis 120 Conclusions 121 Acknowledgements 122 Notes 122

Chapter 6 Conclusions 127

Introduction 129 Purposes, expectations and doctrinal underpinnings of NLW deployment 129 The Troubles in Northern Ireland 129 Detention facilities in Iraq 130 Checkpoints and convoys in Afghanistan 131 NLW military deployment: review of findings 132 The impact of environment and weather on NLW performance 132 Counteracting NLW physiological effects 134 User proficiency, performance and posture 138 Target group perception and attitude towards the user 140 Overall effects of NLW use 142 NLW performance is being degraded 143 NLWs perform counterproductive 144 NLW performance is intentionally degenerated 145 Conceiving an NLW counterfactual 145 The politico-strategic level 148 The political level / tactical level dialectic 149 Validating the claims in the NLW debate against the DTA results 151 Claims related to Non-Lethal Weapons & Technology 151 Claims related to NLW target groups 152 Claims related to military users of NLWs 153 Claims related to the strategic effect of NLW application 154 Revisiting expectations from an operational outcome perspective 155 Recommendations and outlook 156 Recommendations 156 Outlook 156 References 158

Appendix

Interviews, conversations and correspondence with subject matter experts 160 v vi Acknowledgements

This PhD project couldn’t have been completed successfully without the support and encou- ragment from:

Prof John Grin, who has been an invaluable mentor in guiding me on an at times difficult journey towards completing this book. Thank you John for your patience, intellectual creati- vity and professionalism during the many sessions we sat together and for pulling me throu- gh the narrow passages I encountered during my research enterprise.

Dr. Jürgen Altmann, who as a true subject matter expert provided me with thoughtful com- ments and suggestions and also made the effort to accurately review the articles that make up the core of the thesis.

Prof. Joris Voorhoeve and Prof. Julian Lindley-French, who helped me in getting started and in finding the right approach during the early stages of the research project.

Geert Verbong, who helped me to transform my policy adviser attitude into a research-orien- ted mindset.

Jan van Angeren, who always stood ready as a sparring partner to challenge my work and thus inspired me to expand my view.

Peter Jongejan and Erik de Waard, through their effort to review and edit substantial parts of the thesis.

Alex Alta, who advised me on English language use throughout the project.

The Netherlands Ministry of Defence and the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy as the sponsors of my research project.

The section Military Operational Art and Sciences of the Faculty, that served as the main ope- rating base for my project. I am particularly grateful to my colleagues for their openness and for sharing with me their military professionalism and their networks, which enabled me to better balance academic research with military knowledge.

The numerous respondents from the Netherlands Armed Forces and from armed forces abroad, who were prepared to sit down for lengthy interview sessions. Their contributions were indispensable for my research work.

Pascal Paulissen, who as a longstanding colleague scientist was always prepared to share with me his extensive knowledge of our common research area.

My friends, as their warm attention throughout the years kept me going to fulfill my mission.

My wife Margreet, who always kept her patience and filled the gaps that I left behind during the many hours of absence as partner and as father of our children Mischa, Kyra and Fenna.

vii viii Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)

Dit boek gaat over Niet-Letale (niet-dodelijke) Wapens (NLWs). Ze zijn bedoeld om het gebruik van geweld, vooral dodelijk geweld, tijdens gewapende conflicten te beperken. Er is een breed scala aan NLWs in gebruik en ontwikkeling. Hun fysieke effecten zijn uiteenlopend: kine- tisch, chemisch, elektromagnetisch en akoestisch. NLWs zijn ontworpen voor gebruik tegen personen of materiële doelen. Deze studie beperkt zich uitsluitend tot NLWs tegen personen. Een gangbare definitie luidt:

Niet-Letale Wapens zijn wapens die uitdrukkelijk bedoeld en ontworpen zijn om personeel uit te schakelen of tegen te houden, waarbij de kans op dodelijk of ernstig letsel klein is, dan wel materieel uit te schakelen, met minimale onbedoelde schade of negatieve gevolgen voor de omgeving.

Twee trends liggen ten grondslag aan het militaire gebruik van NLWs. De eerste was de groei- ende toepassing van NLWs door de politie sinds de jaren 60, waardoor NLW-technologie en praktische kennis en ervaring met de inzet van NLWs beschikbaar was. De tweede hing samen met militaire innovaties tijdens de Koude Oorlog. De opkomst van baanbrekende technolo- gieën leidde tot precisiegeleide wapens en technologisch overwicht, waardoor onder eigen militaire eenheden veel minder slachtoffers vielen, getuige de Golfoorlog van 1991. Beperking van eigen slachtoffers werd een belangrijk motief voor militaire innovatie. Technologie werd door sommigen zelfs gezien als de sleutel tot niet-dodelijke humane oorlogvoering. Het denken hierover kreeg een impuls toen intra-statelijke conflicten de overhand kregen en het voorkomen van burgerslachtoffers politiek en maatschappelijk wenselijk werd. In Somalië lieten VS militairen halverwege de jaren 90 zien dat toepassing van NLWs dit ondersteunde. Dit succes leidde tot de invoering van een NLW beleid, waardoor zowel de militaire behoefte aan NLWs en hun verdere ontwikkeling een formele grondslag kreeg.

Ondanks deze erkenning ontspon zich van meet af aan een kritisch debat over de betekenis van NLWs en hun toekomstige potentie. Hooggestemde verwachtingen over hun humanise- rende invloed op het verloop van conflicten werden betwist door anderen die meenden dat de militaire praktijk afbreuk doet aan de effecten van NLWs. De twee centrale vragen in dit onderzoek sluiten aan bij het debat:

In hoeverre beïnvloeden de operationele omstandigheden de taakgerichte prestaties en effecten van NLWs? Wat kan op grond van het antwoord op deze vraag gezegd worden over de mate waarin het gebruik van NLWs voldoet aan de verwachtingen die ten grondslag liggen aan de huidige strategische kaders?

De gehanteerde onderzoeksmethode is de zogenaamde Defence Technology Assessment (DTA). Deze analysemethode is toegesneden op het onderzoek naar de effectiviteit van in- novatieve militaire systemen en houdt rekening met de invloed van de operationele context waarin de systemen (zullen) worden toegepast. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de DTA nader gespeci- ficeerd voor de analyse van NLWs. De methode wordt aan de hand van drie case-studies uit de militaire praktijk toegepast op een beperkte verzameling van NLWs. Deze cases zijn in artikelvorm opgenomen als de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 van de studie.

ix Het tweede hoofdstuk gaat nader in op de rationale van NLWs, zoals die voortkomt uit de ver- anderde aard van conflicten waarin Westerse militaire organisaties moeten opereren. Het mi- litaire nut van NLWs hangt samen met het vervagende onderscheid tussen strijders en gewone burgers in hedendaagse conflicten. De theorie van de Rechtvaardige Oorlog schrijft voor dat uitoefening van militair geweld niet tegen burgers mag worden gericht en dat onbedoelde nevenschade tegen burgers niet meer mag zijn dan het beoogde militaire doel rechtvaardigt. Indien het onderscheid niet gemaakt kan worden, zou niet-letaal geweld uit rationeel oog- punt moreel aanvaardbaarder kunnen zijn dan letaal geweld, is de gedachte. Deze rationale van NLWs wordt in dit hoofdstuk geplaatst in het perspectief van het spanningveld tussen enerzijds de intentie en het ideaalbeeld van NLWs en de militair-operationele werkelijkheid en de daarin voorkomende ‘frictie’ anderzijds. Ik heb vervolgens de DTA methode bewerkt tot een contextueel raamwerk om de toepassing van NLWs in die operationele werkelijkheid te onderzoeken. In dit raamwerk staan drie complexe elementen centraal: het complex van de gebruiker van het NLW, het complex van het NLW als wapen en technologie en het complex van het menselijke doel waartegen het NLW wordt ingezet. Deze drie elementen zijn onder- hevig aan onderlinge wisselwerkingen, en zijn bovendien onderworpen aan de invloed van omgevingsfactoren, zowel fysieke als niet-fysieke, die samenhangen van de specifieke situatie waarin het NLW wordt ingezet. De omgevingsfactoren en wijze waarop de drie complexen zich manifesteren per specifieke inzetsituatie bepalen de operationele context van de NLW toepassing.

Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de inzet van NLW tijdens de ‘Troubles’, het bijna dertig jaar durende conflict in Noord-Ierland aan het einde van de vorige eeuw. Het brak uit door de onvrede van de Katholieke minderheid over hun politieke en maatschappelijke achterstelling bij de pro- testante meerderheid. Protestdemonstraties daartegen escaleerden, en de Noord-Ierse politie kreeg de hulp van eenheden van het Britse leger om het geweld te beteugelen. Een aanvaard- baar politiek compromis bleef uit, wat ertoe leidde dat het Bitse leger dertig jaar orde bleef handhaven. Het gebruik van NLWs werd als noodzakelijk gezien om tijdens gewelduitbar- stingen burgerslachtoffers te voorkomen en aldus de ‘hearts and minds’ van de (Katholieke) bevolking voor zich te winnen.

Aan de hand van een aantal concrete situaties is onderzocht in hoeverre de meest gebruikte NLWs tijdens de Troubles , traangas (CS) en plastic kogels (baton rounds), hieraan hebben bijgedragen. Aan de hand van de DTA methode is gebleken dat de toepassing van CS daarvoor een mislukking was, en zelfs heeft geleid tot een verwijdering tussen het Britse leger en de Katholieke minderheid. CS werd van NLW om slachtoffers te voorkomen tot een symbool van onderdrukking voor de Katholieken. De baton rounds (BRs) waren vooral bedoeld om agressieve relschoppers op afstand te houden en aldus voorkomen dat militairen uit zelfver- dediging met scherp moesten schieten. Uit het onderzoek is naar voren gekomen, dat het gebruik van de BRs, ondanks technologische verbeteringen, door de dynamische en vijandige context in Noord-Ierland veel ernstige verwondingen en zelfs doden hebben veroorzaakt. In de praktijk werden BRs soms niet conform de voorschriften te worden ingezet, deels bewust, deels omdat de specifieke omstandigheden dit sterk bemoeilijkten. Net als CS werden BRs als symbool van repressie door de overheid gezien, een beeld dat werd versterkt door media en mensenrechtengroepen.

x Uit deze casestudie is gebleken dat de toepassing van NLWs om op tactisch niveau burgerop- stand met beperkt en niet-letaal geweld te beheersen werden doorkruist door de politiek-stra- tegische context waarin de onlusten plaatsvonden. Technologische innovatie aan de NLWs en verbeterde instructies voor hun gebruik waren minder relevant voor hun effect dan de verhouding tussen de militaire gebruiker en de doelgroep. Hoewel toepassing van NLWs heeft bijgedragen tot het beperken van burgerslachtoffers, heeft het langdurige en als repressief ervaren gebruik van CS en BRs tot een blijvend negatief imago van deze NLWs geleid.

Het vierde hoofdstuk gaat over de casus van het gebruik van NLWs door VS militairen in Ira- kese gevangenenkampen tijden de operatie Iraqi Freedom van 2003 tot 2009. Bij de bestrij- ding van opstandelingen werden door de VS interventiemacht tienduizenden Irakezen voor langere tijd gedetineerd. Zij waren ondergebracht in tenten, die geplaatst waren op omras- terde stukken terrein, met honderden gedetineerden per omheinde sector. De militaire or- debewakers en de gedetineerden waren fysiek van elkaar gescheiden. Bij de ordehandhaving in de kampen werden vooral BRs gebruikt. In deze casestudie zijn NLW toepassingen in twee gevangenenkampen beschouwd. Behalve naar BRs is ook gekeken naar de hypothetische rol van een geavanceerd niet-letaal stralingswapen, het Active Denial System (ADS).

Ordeverstoringen moesten te allen tijde door het militaire bewakingspersoneel worden tegengegaan. Fysiek gebeurde dit door met BRs van buiten de omheining op relschoppers binnen opstandige sectoren te schieten. Uit de DTA analyse blijkt dat de fysieke context het effectief gebruik van BRs voor dit doel sterk bemoeilijkte en dat voorts tegenmaatregelen van gedetineerden de werking teniet deden. De gedetineerden zaten soms jaren vast zonder een duidelijke aanklacht, hetgeen hun verzet motiveerde. Sterk militante opstandelingen onder hen wisten meer gematigde gevangenen te rekruteren of te dwingen om massaal in verzet te komen tegen de bewakers. Zulke opstanden werden soms geïnspireerd door informatie over politieke gebeurtenissen elders in Irak. De ongeregeldheden konden langdurig en uitputtend zijn, omdat de BRs onvoldoende effectief waren om terugkeer tot rust af te dwingen.

De VS paste in Irak een hearts and minds strategie toe om de steun van bevolking te winnen tegenover de opstandelingen. Deze strategie werd later ook toegepast in gevangenenkam- pen, waarbij uitzicht op einde van de gevangenschap centraal stond. Hoewel deze nieuwe benadering een kalmerende werking had, was vooral de houding en ervaring van het mili- taire personeel een kritische factor voor ordehandhaving. De invoering van het stralingswa- pen ADS had volgens de DTA benadering een deel van de belemmerende fysieke factoren van de militaire gebruiker van NLWs kunnen wegnemen, maar het onbekende en onzichtbare hitte-effect zou als een middel tot pijniging-op-afstand kunnen worden gezien. Dit zou het militaire personeel en de gevangenen verder van elkaar kunnen vervreemden, contrair met de politiek-strategische ‘hearts and minds’ gedachte. NLWs bleken in mindere mate effectief in deze context. De tactische taakstelling om onder alle omstandigheden orde te handhaven, werd evenmin nauwelijks ondersteund door de inzet van de NLWs. Daar staat tegenover, dat ordehandhaving zonder NLWs het risico op do- delijke slachtoffers onder de gevangenen zou vergroten, met mogelijk grote politieke reper- cussies.

xi De derde casestudie (hoofdstuk 5) speelt zich af in Afghanistan. In deze casus staat de hypo- thetische toepassing een niet-letale verbindende laser (Laser Optical Warner) door Neder- landse ISAF militairen centraal. Deze ‘prospectieve’ DTA richt zich op concrete situaties van militair bemande checkpoints en konvooien die zich in 2009 en 2010 in Uruzgan hebben voorgedaan, waarin de Laser Optical Warner achteraf fictief wordt ingebracht. In de analyse wordt afgeleid welk effect dit NLW zou hebben gehad op de afloop van de situaties, om aldus een antwoord te kunnen geven op de vraag of de Laser Optical Warner een bijdrage kon leve- ren aan de strategische doelstelling van ISAF, waarin het winnen van de hearts and minds van de Afghaanse bevolking centraal staat.

De dreiging van zelfmoordaanslagen en bermbommen tegen ISAF-militairen door de Taliban zette hun optreden bij checkpoints en tijdens konvooien onder druk. Het onderzoek laat zien dat voor ISAF militairen daardoor een spanningsveld bestond tussen zelfbescherming en het ontzien van de lokale bevolking, dat regelmatig leidde tot verkeerde inschattingen van de dreiging en daardoor de dood van onschuldige burgers. De DTA analyse van een viertal situa- ties laat zien dat inpassing van de LOW om ongewenste slachtoffers te voorkomen effectiever is in voorbereide confrontaties (checkpoints) in rustige en overzichtelijke omgevingen dan in onvoorziene confrontaties van konvooien in de drukkere bewoonde omgeving. De bruikbaar- heid van de Laser Optical Warner blijkt in alle gevallen gevoelig te zijn voor fysieke factoren zoals het weer en tegenmaatregelen tegen het verblindende effect. Enige verbetering daarin door het technologisch slimmer maken van de Laser Optical Warner lijkt reëel. Het met behulp van de Laser Optical Warner scheppen van een veilige zone rond een konvooi dat zich tussen de Afghanen verplaatst blijkt onmogelijk. De Taliban benut die onzekerheid waar mo- gelijk. In een dynamische operationele context wordt het dilemma tussen de eigen veiligheid van militaire eenheden en die van de lokale bevolking door het NLW dus niet opgeheven.

De studie laat daarmee zien dat de intentie van de ISAF-leiding om met de inzet van tactische NLWs zoals de Laser Optical Warner de hearts and minds strategie te versterken wordt on- dergraven door complexiteit van de operationele omgeving waarin ISAF eenheden moeten optreden. Bovendien is in het rurale en tribale Uruzgan de koppeling tussen het politiek- strategische niveau en plaatselijke tactische gebeurtenissen relatief zwak door de beperkte informatie-infrastuctuur en de geringe media aanwezigheid op het platteland. Tactische resultaten zijn daardoor strategisch moeilijk verzilverbaar.

In de eindconclusies worden de resultaten van de drie case studies bijeen gebracht en aan de hand van de DTA systematiek tot geïntegreerde bevindingen. De NLWs die zijn onderzocht hebben hun primaire effect op het tactische niveau, maar hun toepassing en uitwerking hebben ook implicaties voor het politieke niveau. Gebleken is dat het NLW systeem en tech- nologie in veel gevallen minder goed functioneert dan bedoeld. Dit is niet alleen het gevolg van ongunstige fysieke omgevingsomstandigheden, maar ook van tegenmaatregelen door de doelgroep. Langdurig en herhaaldelijk gebruik van het NLW werkt dat laatste verder in de hand. Technologische innovaties blijken dit effect onvoldoende te compenseren. Indien door de doelgroep haar politieke situatie als nadelig en onacceptabel wordt ervaren, heeft dit een negatieve en vaak contraproductieve invloed

xii op de effecten van NLWs. Er ontstaat een negatieve spiraal, doordat ook de relatie tussen de doelgroep en de militaire gebruiker politiseert. In een aantal gevallen heeft dit ertoe geleid dat de militaire gebruiker de veiligheidsrichtlijnen voor de toepassing van NLWs heeft gene- geerd. Dergelijk ontaard gebruik van NLWs heeft op zijn beurt weer politieke repercussies, want de schadelijke gevolgen voor de doelgroep worden door media en belangengroepen als repressief en vijandig naar buiten gebracht. Er blijkt een dialectiek te bestaan tussen het politieke en tactische niveau over wat met NLWs wordt beoogd en wat in de praktijk gebeurt. Die dialectiek werkt de bijdrage van NLWs aan hearts and minds strategieën tegen.

De toetsing van de onderzoeksresultaten aan de oorspronkelijke claims laat zien, dat de verwachtingen van de technologische optimisten over NLWs sterk overtrokken zijn. De im- pliciete aannames die aan de verwachtingen ten grondslag liggen, worden ontzenuwd door de cruciale rol van de operationele context van de NLW inzet. Operationele frictie blijkt het meestal te winnen van politiek idealisme. Ook de voorzichtige aanhangers van NLWs blijken door hun overwegend technocratische visie op NLWs de praktijkproblemen te onderschat- ten. De claims en argumenten van de sceptici blijken een hoger realiteitsgehalte te hebben en worden grotendeels bevestigd door de uitkomsten van de DTA.

Ten aanzien van de eerste onderzoeksvraag laat de studie zien dat de invloed van de om- standigheden op de prestaties van NLWs divers en groot zijn. De oorspronkelijke intentie van NLWs wordt door de rol van de drie DTA elementen, hun interacties en de invloed van de operationele context doorkruist. Het daardoor niet uitkomen van de verwachtingen en de po- litieke bedoeling van NLW gebruik heeft ook tot gevolg dat ze nagestreefde hearts and minds strategieën niet ondersteunen en hun effect soms zelfs averechts werkt. Deze bevinding neemt overigens niet weg dat het plausibel is dat militaire toepassing van NLWs in sommige conflictsituaties onschuldige burgerslachtoffers heeft helpen voorkomen.

Het perspectief voor NLWs kan worden verbeterd door betere inschattingen te maken van de situaties waarin ze worden gebruikt. Vergroting van het inzicht in de wijze waarop de opera- tionele context de effecten van NLWs beïnvloedt, vraagt om meer gedetailleerde informatie over het verloop van de situaties met militaire NLW inzet. Experimenteel (DTA) onderzoek naar de gecombineerde toepassing van meerdere NLWs is interessant om te bepalen of de daarmee te verkrijgen synergie in de effectiviteit van de NLWs de geïntroduceerde complexi- teit rechtvaardigt.

xiii xiv Chapter 1 Introduction

Introduction

This book discusses so-called non-lethal weapons (NLWs). Most basically, such weapons seek to minimize violence, especially deadly violence, during war. Technologies, concepts and devices designed for non-lethal use are wide-ranging. Taxonomies of NLWs are subdivided into categories according to their physical and biochemical-effects. These include mechani- cal/kinetic, acoustic, electromagnetic and chemical-based effects. NLWs are tailored either to application against humans, or to anti-materiel/anti-infrastructure use. The NLW policy adopted by NATO provides the following broad definition:

Non-Lethal Weapons are weapons that are explicitly designed and developed so as to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal unde- sired damage or impact on the environment.1

While we will use this as a working definition throughout this study, the focus will be on NLW use against humans. Conceptually, this has a long history. For instance, Sun Tzu, a Chinese strategist who lived over 2000 years ago, was the first who considered restraint from killing and destruction and thus limiting casualties and damage to the environment as of strategic importance.2 As another example, during the 1930s, Non-Lethal Weapons (NLWs) were recommended in colonial policing, to prevent undesired casualties by police forces (Gwynn 1934). Since the late 1960s, NLWs have started to play an increasing role in domestic policing, in response to the civilian deaths during clashes between security forces and large groups of protesters in the US.3 A steady development of NLW technologies and concepts followed, primarily in response to the need of police forces throughout the world (Davison 2009). As we will discuss more extensively in the next section, in the two decades since the end of the Cold War, these weapons have rapidly gained importance in especially western military forces. NLWs became a doctrinal requirement in the military domain as a consequence of the shift in the role of Western armed forces from preparing for massive interstate war to interve- ning in intrastate humanitarian crises and conflicts. Starting in the US, the military rationale became enshrined in dedicated policy documents and ensuing development programmes, both at national and international level. Also, NLWs have indeed been deployed by military forces in recent and current intervention operations, and increasingly so in the last decade. Yet, the utility, problems and risks of NLW use are still object of significant debate. Ever since their inception as a a military capability, NLWs have been hailed as well as contested regarding their appropriateness to meet the requirements to military force after theCold War. Proponents expected and claimed that NLWs would enable the accomplishment of military

1 NATO (1999) NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons (Brussels: NATO). 2 In his book “The Art of War” he expresses this strategic maxim as follows: The general rule for use of the military is that it is better to keep a nation intact than to destroy it. It is better to keep an army intact than to destroy it. It is better to keep a division intact than to destroy it, it is better to keep a battalion intact than to destroy it, it is better to keep a unit intact than to destroy it”. (Sun Tzu 1963: 77-9). 3 See for instance Human Effects Advisory Panel (2001) Crowd Behaviour, Crowd Control, and the Use of Non-Lethal Weapons (Penn State University: Institute for Non-Lethal Technologies). 3 missions with a lower risk of innocent civilian casualties by providing for more fine-tuned military responses in violent confrontations. Sceptics questioned the claimed potential of NLWs and of military organisations’ ability to manage and conduct military operations invol- ving both NLWs and lethal force. This study assesses the performance of NLWs in such real world operations, in the tradi- tion of the field of Defence Technology Assessment (DTA) that evolved in the 1980s from the work of the US Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment and its European sister organizati- ons, a variety of academic groups in the US and Europe and, in some cases, of specific depart- ments within Defence Ministries (Brauch et al. 1997). By doing so, it seeks to shed some light on the debate between NLW proponents and sceptics, who argue that such expectations may be dashed in the realities of operational circumstances and political tensions.

The next section sets out how conceptual thinking and actual use of NLWs has evolved since the 1970s. Next, the debate on NLW use will be concisely reviewed. On basis of these two sec- tions we will, in the final section, formulate more specifically the objectives of this study and briefly introduce the analytical (DTA) framework that will be used throughout.

Developments leading to the increasing emphasis on non-lethal weapons

Trends and developments before 1990

NLWs have gained novel military importance since 1990. Yet, the precise rationale for NLW use has evolved from two trends that started well before 1990. One is the transformation in law enforcement and policing that paved the way for the domestic implementation of NLW. The other is the emergence during the Cold War of new technological options that had a profound impact on military thinking, norms and design. Both trends inform the debate on NLWs that unfolded after 1990, and will be addressed hereafter.

Transforming law enforcement and police: introducing NLWs

Police use of NLWs started to become more common half a century ago. It resulted from a tension between police operations in specific contingencies and the legal restraints which apply to the police in exercising its monopoly of violence: proportionality of force and maxi- mum protection of life at all times, unless individual or collective aggression is imminently life threatening. These tensions came to expression, for instance, during the 1960s, when civil disorders and riots took place in the US over civil rights and the (Vietnam) war (Davison 2006: 2). Protesters were killed when police forces used firearms to suppress the riots. In Detroit, 43 Afro-Americans were killed during riots attributed to economic deprivation and social injustice.4 Following these incidents, two Presidential Commissions came with recom- mendations that the use of lethal force by the police be restricted and guidelines should be developed governing the use of control equipment and provide alternatives for the use of lethal weapons. It was also recommended that federal support for research in this area was needed (Davison 2006: 3).

4 4 Human Effects Advisory Panel (note 3): pp. 9-10. The riots in Detroit in 1967 coincided with the publication of a report from futurist Joseph Coates, one of the early explorers on the police application of NLWs. He examined situations for which NLWs are appropriate, taking into consideration a broad range of NLWs available or considered for development at the time (Coates 1967). Follow-up efforts generally focused on NLWs to deal with public order disturbances and riotous crowds, to provide for a more flexible police response short of lethal force in such situations.5 In Europe, the developments in policing during the Northern Ireland conflict can be considered as leading for the application and development of NLWs. The Royal Ulster Con- stabulary and the British Army were collectively charged with maintaining public order in a politically highly charged environment, with the British Army in a police supporting role.6 Especially after Bloody Sunday in January 1972, when 13 civilians were killed by lethal rounds from the security forces, the need for minimal force approaches and associated non-lethal ca- pabilities became crucial to prevent such a tragedy from happening again. The introduction and continuous development of non-lethal kinetic projectiles throughout the three decades of conflict was one of the instruments to assist these capabilities (Burrows 2002). Elsewhere in Europe police organizations went through transformation processes as well. The student movements and protests of the 1960s and 70s were the forerunners of the changes in Western societies that demanded a change in approach by constabulary organi- sations. In the Netherlands, for instance, the professionalization of the (military) police was judged necessary because society no longer accepted authoritarian rule of law enforced by the police. Hovens (2006) partly ascribes the transformation of the Royal Netherlands Mare- chaussee, a police organisation with a military status, towards socialisation and professiona- lization to the increase of control by society, to growing interaction between society and the armed forces and to the growing influence of technology on war fighting methods. Officers are bound to operate within the framework of human rights. This amongst others implies that the use of excessive violence is unacceptable by law and to society. Although not expli- citly stated by Hovens, the urgency for controlled use of violence called for a search for tactics and instruments to enable the police and Marechaussee to act accordingly. The concept of Crowd and Riot Control that evolved under Koninklijke Marechaussee supervision eventually included a limited though growing number of NLWs.7 By the end of the Cold War, the reform processes of police and law enforcement organi- zations had resulted in the fielding and continuous innovation, on basis of practical expe- rience, of a range of NLW devices and concepts that soon would be become relevant to the military domain.8

Evolving military thinking in the 1970s and 1980s

Meanwhile, in the military domain, various developments in doctrinal thinking had been going on which, at least in hindsight, have prepared the ground for the military use of NLWs. Much of this was rooted in the very destructiveness that any war was believed – at least since World War II - to have.

5 For instance by Brennan (1976), D. Riot Control without Bloodshed – Army’s Experimental Civil Disturbance Control System Re- port. At: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/digitization/47830N; Internet. 6 For an extensive analysis of NLW use in Northern Ireland, see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 7 Various NLWs in use with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMAR) have been demonstrated to the author during a visit to the LOKKMAR (Expertise and Training Centre KMAR) at Apeldoorn, The Netherlands (Fall 2007). 8 Davison concludes that despite the research and development programmes to further improve the performance and reliability of the NLWs used or considered for use by the police, most devices were still suffering from significant defi- ciencies by the late 1980s (Davison 2009: 39). 5 The ‘industrialization of war’ had enlarged the dimensions and physical effects of warfare through the exploitation of new technologies invented for or applied on the battlefield. The scale, intensity and destructiveness of firepower had shaped a new politico-strategic reality that made the major powers realize that the cost in terms of destruction of waging (nuclear) war amongst them would far outweigh the benefits of winning it. Notwithstanding this strategic stalemate, throughout the Cold War, the Western political and military establishments continued to calibrate the defence posture to a response to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). In the face of a perceived quantitative superiority of the WTO, they further developed and specialized for an - though unlikely to materialize - air-land military confrontation in Central Europe that drew on NATO countries’ technological edge so as to ‘outsmart’ the WTO. This approach and strong reliance on technological dominance became subject of debate ever since new enabling technologies, in particular in micro-electronics and information & communication technology (ICT), started to emerge, around 1970. This debate revolved around three subsequent developments: that of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), starting in the early 1970s, the US military doctrine of AirLand Battle (ALB) rooted in the late 1970s, and the NATO concept of Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) of the early 1980s. Canby (1974) questioned the way military-technological innovations were implemented. He argued that in the US, technology has often been seen as a panacea, or, as it was called, a ‘force multiplier’ that could offset quantity with quality; if the war is not going well, as in Vietnam, some new gadget is designed to make ‘experience proven’ doctrine workable. In his view, NATO has similarly sought technological solutions, but none has yet appeared that has significantly improved NATO’s relative position. For instance, Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) have been acclaimed as one way to compensate for NATO’s inferiority. Canby argues that, because of NATO’s force structure, symmetrical adoption of PGM may well work to NATO’s disadvantage. Without institutional and doctrinal adaptation, potential technological superiority can be meaningless. The utility and cost-effectiveness of PGMs continued to be debated during the 1970s and 1980s. A decade after, Metz noted that while over time PGMs made the physical task of destroying sensitive targets without collateral damage less difficult than before, the penalties in lost public and neutral support steadily grew (Metz 2001: 39). Change in doctrine called for in Canby’s PGM technology assessment came in the early 1980s. In the US, the ‘AirLand Battle’ (ALB) doctrine was adopted, defining a comprehensive battle space by extension of the battle area into the third dimension.9 ALB hinged on capa- bilities to integrate and synchronise multiple operations throughout the battle space. The required capabilities were to be enabled by a range of innovative technologies, of which ad- vances in ICT were the most salient ones.10 Military analysts, such as Booth (2006: 333) viewed ALB as fundamentally revolutionary to the US forces as it signifies a radical departure from the attrition strategy embraced before.11 ALB was soon complemented by NATO’s so-called Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept. The rationale of the concept was not so much the in-depth integration of the battle space, but

9 Doctrine change envisioned by Canby was different from ALB. He proposed a so-called ‘checkerboard defence’ concept that relied on less ambitious demands from technology, but more on a combination of technological innovation and infantry (Canby 1974). 10 Headquarters of the Army (1982) Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington DC: US Department of Defense). 6 11 See for instance Booth (2006: 333). compared to ALB it entailed the relatively modest ambition to disrupt and delay Warsaw Tre- aty Organization formations before they would arrive at NATO’s first line of defence. Against the backdrop of vehement public protests against nuclear weapons, Rogers (1983: 22-3) argued that FOFA could help prevent nuclear weapons use in an early stage of the war – in an affor- dable way through relying on technological advance rather than quantitative superiority. Throughout the 1980s, the new concepts raised questions and sparked new debate, both for reasons of doubts about their technical, financial and operational feasibility, as well as their security-political desirability. Lt Col Egter van Wissekerke (1989: 331) questioned the more of- fensive orientation of ALB, as the feasibility of highly coordinated and pre-planned in depth manoeuvre critically hinges on the opponent ‘complaisance’ with NATO’s military scheme. He thus stressed the vulnerabilities resulting from the internal complexities of ALB in a real world operational context. Siccama (1984: 43), in an assessment of ALB, saw the potential strategic implications of ALB as interfering with and possibly even undermining NATO’s defensive posture. Grin (1989) argued that the renewed emphasis on manoeuvre warfare not only significantly increased offensive capacity, but also that it implied a self-imposed need to do the same as the adversary, yet better or faster – so that advanced command and control sy- stems would, rather than form the intended ‘force multiplier’, become NATO’s Achilles heel. Romjue noted that the 1992 doctrinal revisions within the US Army reflected that technologi- cally enabled (near-) real-time capabilities ALB required were only beginning to mature.12 The concerns regarding the destabilizing effects of ALB and FOFA, as well as about their military-operational effectiveness and affordability, produced a range of alternative con- cepts emphasizing a defensive character of NATO’s conventional military posture in Central Europe.13 The majority of these concepts entailed territorially oriented, thus more defensive, postures that enabled benefiting from emerging technologies in a way that was claimed to be much more realistic and affordable (both financially and in terms of human resources) than in official proposals (Unterseher 1984; Hartwig 1989; Bebermeyer 1989; Grin 1990). A particular alternative in the defence reform debate was proposed by Alexander, who argued that engaging in a deep strike battle with PGMs would ultimately lead to a prohibiti- vely expensive armour/anti-armour arms race. Instead, he proposed a range of softer or non- lethal anti-materiel technologies to immobilize the more vulnerable and vital elements in the follow-on forces and their military infrastructure. Such options would be less demanding in terms of precision and at the same time reduce the risk of unintended collateral damage (Alexander 1989). At the time of his writing, Alexander could hardly foresee the potential of non-lethality and damage limitation after the fall of the Berlin Wall in the same month his article appeared. What official and unofficial conventional defence concepts during the 1980s had in- com mon, was a departure from indiscriminate large scale destruction in conventional warfare. Although certainly not undisputed, this notion would gain prominence in the first decade after the end of the Cold War.

12 Romjue, J., Canedy, S., Chapman, A. (1993) Prepare the Army for War – A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command 1973-1993 (Virginia, Fort Monroe, TRADOC Historical Studies), p. 145. 13 During the 1980s, in various NATO countries a range of alternative non-offensive conventional force structures to ALB and FOFA have been proposed by military experts and academics. See e.g. Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik (1984) and Afheldt (1983). 7 The 1990s: paradigmatic examples and continuing debate

During the Cold War era, Western military forces had never been deployed in a large war to bring their defence posture to the test. Hence, planning and equipping for armed conflict had been largely based on an imaginative war, that was defined by scenarios linked to a well defined battle space in Central Europe. The first opportunity to demonstrate real performance of Western military forces came with the 1991 Second Gulf War. It was fought as an interstate war between regular mechanized forces, allowing the intervening Western coalition forces to operate according to the same doctrinal principles and order of battle as applied in the conventional defence of Central Eu- rope. The Second Gulf War shaped an image of a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), as the technology-induced change of warfare is named, enabling the conduct of war that exposes own military personnel to lethal risk far less than used to be. Futurologists Toffler & Toffler (1993) recognized in this war’s events a novel reality, in line with their more general ideas of the transition from industrial society to information society, where information and legiti- macy would replace money and violence as primary sources of power. They used the phrase ‘de-massification’ of destruction, to mark the shift towards precision strike and more selec- tivity enabled by the technological advances. The Western military had moved from ‘second wave’ to ‘third wave’ war, representing the industrial age and information age respectively. The Toffler couple cited Col Alan Campen, responsible for the US DOD Command and Control Policy, who stated that the Gulf War ‘was a war where an ounce of silicon in a computer may have had more effect than a ton of uranium’ (Toffler & Toffler 1993: 86). An important inheritance from the Gulf War concerned the felt political imperative to minimize the number of casualties of own soldiers. Janet and Chris Morris (1991: 1) were amongst the leading lobbyists for a (reverse) arms race to minimise lethality in warfare. They even used the label “Weapons of Mass Protection” for their approach, and demonstrated a preference to relate this idea to air power. These weapons were not only to substitute for ground combat that brings own personnel in harm’s way, it was also considered to offer the potential to more precisely distinguish between military targets and the civil environment (Morris and Morris (1995). Picking up such strands of thought, shortly after the Gulf War, Knight, Unterseher and Connetta (1992) noted that this was likely to become a dominant mode of thinking. All nations with any degree of responsibility to their citizens are casualty averse, in particular wealthy democratic countries, who’s political elites can be said to be risk averse in regard to war casualties. Political leadership feels a pressure to achieve military aims with very low casualty rates. They observe that in the US a trend emerges to invest in technology that can progressively contribute to minimizing own casualties in warfare, and subtly hint that this might offer a novel strategic legitimization for the R&D programs set in motion around the doctrinal renewals in the 1980s that saw technology as a force multiplier. To be sure, these early observers are skeptical of realism behind these ideas, warning that casualty reduction is a much more demanding requirement than the goal of winning the conflict. They caution for inherent system vulnerabilities due to excessive technological complexity resulting from the strive to minimize own casualties. It is therefore that Freedman calls the military revolution resulting from the Gulf War one of expectations, from which the features of a ‘Western Way of Warfare’ emerged. One of its key characteristics is that the tolerance of casualties from earlier times no longer exists. It puts a premium on framing strategies that keep casualties to a minimum (Freedman 1998). However, drawing from historical evidence, Freedman cautions that deriving claims about the effectiveness of particular military strategies in future armed

8 conflict from previous wars may well prove illusionary in reality.14 Van Creveld (1991) had already taken a more radical position regarding the changing face of war well before. He pre- dicted that the nature of conflict was going to become fundamentally different from the Gulf War, provocatively claiming that:

….the most powerful modern armed forces are largely irrelevant to modern war.

Along the same line as Van Creveld, Mazarr, anticipating the unfolding complexity of geo- political changes in the security environment, argues that US forces would have to operate in far more irregular environments than they had been geared to, and that technologies, doctrines and force structures needed modifications to make their capabilities more compa- tible with irregular operations.15 Haass cautions that modern technology useful on the open battlefield is often irrelevant in civil conflicts that take place in heavily congested areas where friend cannot be distinguished from foe.16 To speak with the Tofflers, a collision of war-forms was lying ahead, forcing third wave force planners to rethink and conceptualize war-forms and how they interrelate (Toffler and Toffler 1993: 110). This became apparent in various peacekeeping missions and interventions shortly after the Second Gulf War. In 1993 in Somalia, the operation “Restore Hope” degenerated from an humanitarian aid operation into combating warlords and their militias. The armed exchan- ges resulted in hundreds of casualties amongst the population, partly due to the fact that the US forces only had lethal weapons at their disposal. That changed in 1994/95, when US forces returned to Somalia, this time under the name United Shield to evacuate UN forces after the situation on the ground had severely deteriorated. The evacuation forces carried a range of NLWs, assisting them to enforce their mission objective without having to use lethal force. The mission was accomplished successfully and this prompted the commander of the US troops, Lt-gen Zinni, to declare that he would never go on a peace support mission again wit- hout NLWs (Alexander 1999). The operation United Shield in Somalia provided for a decisive leverage to formalizing the need for NLWs in terms of an agreed US Department of Defense (DOD) policy. A report written by the Council of Foreign Relations, shortly after United Shield, identified the advantage and need of NLWs in operations such as in Somalia.17 The report’s conclusion anticipated that US forces would be increasingly involved in peacekeeping opera- tions. The US policy was published in July 1996 as DOD Directive 3000.3 under the title: Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons.18 A NATO NLW policy followed suit.19 This was hardly surprising, since institutionalization of NLW-development and collaboration had been ongoing since 1993. Simultaneously with the NATO initiatives, national NLW R&D programmes were launched to inform the policy makers on the feasibility and applicability of NLWs for the armed forces. In the Netherlands

14 Freedman made a historical comparison with the advocates of strategic airpower and mechanised warfare after World War I, who promised quick and decisive and relatively pain-free victory. World War II demonstrated how exaggerated their claims had been. (Freedman 1998: 17). 15 Mazarr, M. (1993)The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework, , (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies, Final Report of the CSIS Study Group on the MTR). 16 Haass, R. (1994) Intervention – The Use of American Force in the Post-Cold War (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Interna- tional Peace). 17 Council of Foreign Relations (1995), Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force) 18 US Department of Defense (1996) Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, Directive 3000.3. (Washington DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict). 19 NATO (note 1). 9 a five year NLW-R&D programme started in 2000.20 The institutionalization created interest groups within the military establishments that, drawing from the declared NLW policies, actually recycled the need for NLWs, and invested in the development, improvement and testing of NLW-concepts and devices. Non-lethality was now born as a new military concept, as a child of the paradigm shift in warfare, and now adopted by the military establishment. Technology was the main avenue along which the development of both the performance and spectrum of NLWs was going to be pursued. Yet, these ideas were certainly not uncontested, as is reflected by Coker (2001: 22) who argues that the West is trying to humanise war, even if it would have to accept that selective targeting doesn’t work. The military is now expected to reflect civility and compassion in the way it prosecutes war, while elsewhere in the world war is becoming more inhumane, not less: it is asymmetric towards the Western way of war (Coker 2001: 92-3). It spoils the ideal world that the RMA needs to attain effect: separation of the military from the civilian, of combatants from non-combatants, of fire from society, as Freedman (1998: 17) sees it.21

It is against the backdrop of this wider debate on the promises of technological superiority in terms of its potential to make war less destructive and deadly, that the emergence and validation of NLWs should be appreciated. Conceptually, the step from the promises of preci- sion warfare towards those of military non-lethality is a short and logical one.22 While NLWs are intended to widen the spectrum of options to wage the Western way of war, the question about their potential to meet that requirement is debated from a variety of perspectives, but still largely unanswered.

NLWs between doctrinal inclusion and critical debate

From the preceding section it is clear that two issues got much emphasis in military and se- curity political establishments in the 1990s: innovating the conduct of low intensity conflict by employing less deadly modes of warfare, and the intermingling of and blurring distinc- tion between aggressors and civilians in such conflicts. In this section we will discuss how they were elaborated by NLW proponents, and disputed or at least framed more carefully by others.

Technological optimism

These two characteristics were articulated, and promoted, authoritatively by Smith (2006: 278), who as a senior operational commander had experienced them in the midst of the new types of conflict during the 1990s. He stresses that the fight is now amongst the people, amongst which the enemy is concealed. The fight is also over the people, the strategic objec- tive both sides aim for. The ultimate objective is capturing the will of the people, and this is at odds with the use of destructive force (Smith 2006: 376). From this perspective, the notion of non-lethality related to weapons appeals to those

20 TNO (2004) Eindrapportage programma V901- Bepaling geschiktheid Niet-letale wapens voor de krijgsmacht (Rijswijk: TNO report PML 2004-A10). 21 Freedman made a historical comparison with the advocates of strategic airpower and mechanised warfare after World War I, who promised quick and decisive and relatively pain-free victory. World War II demonstrated how exaggerated their claims had been. (Freedman 1998). 22 According to Freedman intolerance of collateral damage implies a morality that interacts with the trend towards weapons of ever greater precision, leading some to stress non-lethality. The concept of non-lethality is not new, but is 10 now being extended, almost as a prerequisite for any form of legitimate force (Freedman 1998: 16). who believe that NLW enable the waging of war without or with minimal killing. Janet and Chris Morris (1991) were amongst the first who outlined a new strategic theory explicating that non-lethal technology and concepts would subdue an opponent without fighting. Their vision of merging of humanity and warfare is best expressed in the following statement:

Nonlethality is the use of weapons of mass protection such as nonlethal and antilethal weapons and information warfare to project high-precision power in a timely fashion, delivering results that are life conserving, environmentally friendly, and fiscally responsible.

The concept of bloodless war was inspired by a climate of euphoria that accompanied the new world order that followed after the Cold War. The assumption was that the new strategic concept or doctrine would find worldwide acceptance when it embodied the intent of mass- protection applied on a global scale. Benign Intervention (BI) is a concept that comes close to the idea of bloodless war at the tactical level. Lewer and Schofield (1997: 113) proposed a United Nations Benign Intervention Force (UNBIF) that would predominantly rely on their Non-Lethal capabilities. The authors characterize BI as:

…..a holistic philosophy that would include and integrate a role for non-lethal weapons in the military element of conflict intervention. The term ‘benign’ is chosen to indicate that the ethos of the intervention is humanitarian, benevolent (with the intension to stopping violence and bloodshed), and philanthropic for all conflicting parties.

The idea of bloodless war persisted throughout the 1990s, as can for instance be noted with Coker (2001: 89), who reiterates the Tofflers’ view of the early 1990s:

Non-Lethality emerges not as a simple replacement for war, or an extension of peace, but as something different. It is something radically different in global affairs – an intermediate phenomenon, a pausing peace, an arena for contests where more outcomes are decided bloodlessly.

What these proponents share, is a firm belief in advanced technology to help realize poli- tical-strategic objectives. We will therefore designate this view as the ’technological optimist’ view. This view of a bloodless, or at least more humane, war has survived the geopolitical shock of the 9/11 attacks. Foster (2010), in an appeal to the US to reshape its national security policy towards one of global security, considers “delethalization”, i.e. the replacement of lethal by non-lethal weapons, as a precondition for such a transformation. He also considers delethalization as a condition for a necessary demilitarization by the military itself. Greig (2011) envisions a world in which technology enables the protection of territorial integrity and human rights without using lethal weapons and without killing or injuring humans, to an extent that NLWs have the potential to attain world peace.23 Staulus (2012: 5) concludes that NLWs could serve the purpose of completely replacing traditional weapons and methods of engaging in war. As noted, NLW proponents in addressing benevolence in warfare through NLWs share an (implicit) premise that non-lethal technologies and concepts in themselves are equivalent to non-lethality in military practice. Another underlying premise is that adversaries would respond ‘in kind’, implying meaning that they would under all circumstances comply with the demands of intervention forces that would rely on non-lethal capabilities only.

23 Greig, A., Educating the Community about Non-Lethal Weapons, in: 6th European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons (Et- tlingen, Fraunhofer ICT, 16-18 May 2011), pp. 1.1-10. 11 Careful supporters

Others, whom we will call the careful supporters, have indicated to be less optimistic. Most of them are (former) military professionals and scholars who generally subscribe to the military need for NLWs. While there have been, and still are, dozens of onlookers and analysts contributing to the NLW debate, a selection from this community are included as indicative for the scope of arguments in favour of the debate. Alexander (1999: 205) is one of the pioneers in the NLW debate. A former Colonel in the US Green Berets, he had a practical knowledge of a wide range of weapons, including NLWs. He argues that due to the complexity of military operations that current and future US had to undertake, the utility of lethal force would be limited. Conversely, NLWs are the tools neces- sary to accomplish the stated objectives. He contends that NLWs are instrumental in minimi- zing collateral casualties, hence supportive in gaining the support of the population in the effort to establish stability and peace. Bunker (1997: x-xi) contends that once NLWs are ready for wide-scale application, this will signal a development as significant in magnitude as the emergence of gunpowder based firearms during the European Renaissance. The introduction of nonlethals may allow for tailored employment of politico-military force. He projects the most important application of nonlethal technology in operations in “failed states”, to coun- ter the non-Western form of warfare that is emerging globally, and as a defence against the specter of further terrorist assaults upon our homeland. The ability to use NLWs effectively will be a critical component of US future capabilities The author identifies the need of the military user to adapt organisation and doctrinal principles to optimally use NLWs. Fenton (1999), a former US Marine, as a Director of the US DOD Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), envisions respect for human life as a basic tenet in contemporary US ar- med operations in line with de-lethalization school of thought. Combined with the advances in technology and precision engagement capability, the protection of human life underscores the importance of NLW in armed conflict. His expresses the ambitions regarding the NLW potential in aiming at ‘getting beyond the rubber bullet modality and develop non-lethal capabilities for the operational and strategic levels of war’. He obviously believes that techno- logically more advanced NLW concepts may even have immediate strategic level effects. Leech (2000: 20) sees introducing NLWs as a method to sensitize the blunt instrument of military intervention. He refers to the Kosovo war by stating that the most effective actions against Serbia was the carbon-filled bomb which blacked out power supplies without destroy- ing the generating stations. In ground operations, weapons that restrain but do not kill will preserve the peacekeeper’s principal shield: impartiality. In addition, the impact of the media such as CNN leads to demands for international policing rather than punitive wars. In a way, the author conceives a role of NLWs to support a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy. On the one hand such a strategy seeks the backing from the international community and the general public for the intervention by performing their mission non-destructively. On the other a hearts and minds strategy focuses on the support of the local population for the mission the interven- tion forces need to gain. According to Leech (2002: 161), the need to intervene in essentially civil wars has posed

12 a dilemma: traditional methods to meet force with force are inappropriate, as civil conflict lacks the clarity of friend and foe. Intervention for non-aggressive purposes requires disa- bling technologies. Appropriate response will be elusive unless we exchange superguns for tools of crowd control. After the attacks against the US of September 11, 2001, Alexander (2003) was the first to discuss the role of NLWs in the ‘post-9/11’ world. Feakin (2005: 59) quotes a personal interview with Alexander:

“In my opinion we are in World War ‘X’ and a good deal of this is going to take place in metropolitan areas….when we start talking about cities such as London, Paris, Rome, Cairo, and other places like that, then I think that we are going to need to have the ability to separate the real adversaries from the general public. In my view the requirement for NLWs is going to be even greater.”

He also seeks to conceptually fill the void between Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and conventional warfare by focusing on Counterinsurgency (CI) operations and claims a role for NLWs in CI mission success such as in conflict theatres as Iraq and Afghani- stan. He emphasizes the need for dedicated NLWs for area denial, meaning that people are denied access to a particular area or public space. He obviously envisions a discriminatory role for non-discriminatory NLWs such as area effect devices. Other proposals to pursue the promises of NLWs in contemporary conflict have been undertaken in the wake of the violent CI operations launched by the international coaliti- ons forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2009, the RAND cooperation published a study into ‘scalable capabilities for military operations amid populations’. It re-iterates Rupert Smith’s paradigm:

In CI, the epicentre of politics is the contested population. Failure to treat that population with care, even reverence – as good police treat even bad neighbourhoods – will affect and possibly determine a cam paign’s course and outcome. This is the light in which the utility of non-lethal weapons appears not only tactical and operational, but also strategic. Gompert et al. (2009: 2).

This viewpoint implies that NLWs are expected to be supportive to a ‘hearts and minds’ approach to strategy, focused on the local population. Furthermore, the authors believe that NLWs could contribute to scalable capabilities within a continuum of force, thereby gaining time for better decision making in tactical level scenarios. Such an approach defines require- ments during tactical engagements, including information sensing, two-way communication and educating the population. Resolving uncertainty is considered as important as physical effect (Gompert et al. 2009: 79-81) In accomplishing these requirements, the authors identify a range of advanced non-lethal technologies, superior in effect to the first generation NLWs such as tear gas and baton rounds. At the same time, they stress that the feasibility of a conti- nuum of force capability critically depends on the skill, sensitivity and preparation of mili- tary personnel (Gompert et al. 2009: 133) The authors believe that uncertainty in real world conflict can be mitigated by a technically more fine-tuned interplay between information collection and scalable force options.

Sceptics

Optimistic expectations regarding the military performance of NLWs, reinforced by a strong

13 confidence in technological fixes displayed in the NLW debate, have been disputed by other analysts throughout the debate. Col Siniscalchi (1998: 15) points out that the civilization of conflict in situations in which US forces intervene is a desire and expectation driven by various factors as the intrusiveness of the media and high regard for life in modern societies. In addressing the unrealistic expectations of NLWs, he notes the lack of objective data to test the effectiveness of NLWs. These data should be generated by combat testing, exercising and military experience, but are in short supply. Most outspoken on bloodlessness is Siniscalchi when stating:

The ability to use technology to defeat an enemy without casualties appeals to our sense of morality. This vision is inspiring but, unfortunately, unrealistic. While thoughts on “near bloodless battlefield” have long been abandoned, the visionary promise of non-lethality leads to widespread misconceptions that are “likely to prove counterproductive and potentially dangerous” 24

Hence, Siniscalchi stresses that assessment of NLW utility should rely on real world data rather than on technology-driven expectations, in order to prevent adverse consequences of their implementation. Lt Col Coppernoll (1999: 126), discussing NLWs in an operational context, stresses the dynamics facing military officers and operators on the ground, where often quick decisions have to be taken in difficult situations, She, therefore, considers leadership and initiative, dedicated training concepts and NLW employment more critical than the technology itself. Hence, the attitude and performance of the user of NLWs is to be conceived as a critical factor for effect of NLW deployment. Coppernoll’s emphasis on the importance of operational con- textual factors involving, amongst others, the performance of commanders and operators, has been picked-up by others several years later. Grin (2000) cautions that, in attempts to meet strategic objectives with NLWs, techno- logically determined expectations are over-emphasized, and operational limitations and strategic particularities are de-emphasized. He stresses the need to assess the strategic expec- tations of ‘Third Wave War’, under which non-lethality can be arranged, in the context of real operational circumstances and political contestation (Grin 2000: 91). Also others have clai- med that the assessment of NLWs has to take into account the validity of the claims that are stated over the effectiveness of NLWs. Rappert (2003: 27) expresses this as follows:

That much of the existing discussion about non-lethal weapons is highly optimistic means that much of the analysis that follows examines the production of such positive assessments.

From a conceptual-analytical perspective, Rappert (2003: 32) argues that one of the issues that inform the validity of the claims on NLW-properties, is the relationship between the technology itself and the context in which the technology is being employed, and both the context and the relationship between context and effect have to be understood. Framing debates in terms of characteristics of technologies alone, for instance by seeking to establish probable effects, misses out how NLWs function in practice (Rappert 2003: 265). Koplow (2006: 3) considers a number of scenarios and imagines how these scenarios could have evolved if NLWs had been used. He identifies a number of caveats that have to be addres- sed before the future role of NLWs can be appreciated. One concern refers to the operational considerations related to the realities of modern law enforcement and conflict. A second

14 24 Quote from Alexander, L., Klare, J. (1995: 71). refers to the risk of overreliance on and proactive use of -non-lethal- force by the security forces. The user might also meet complications when dealing with NLWs regarding decision making between his lethal and non-lethal options. Furthermore, due to their very different nature, NLWs require particular training, guidance into applicable doctrine, and dedica- ted Rules of Engagement (RoEs). He also cautions that NLW may not perform as advertised. Furthermore, explicit attention should be paid to the likely responses of opponents, inclu- ding countermeasures and the perception that an NLW is simply a ‘weak weapon ‘that can be resisted, or countered with stronger force (Koplow 2006: 129-33). Lt Col Pittman (2005) adds that NLWs will unnecessarily complicate combat operations. While he acknowledges that NLWs provide military commanders with a wider range of opti- ons, he cautions that this was applicable to the MOOTW, that dominated US military expedi- tionary operations in the early 1990s, but the fielding of NLWs will not change the nature of war in general. He considers that the gap between what is expected from NLWs and what they actually produce on the battlefield may have serious consequences. His message implies that one cannot shape a conflict scenario into one favouring NLW application. It also says that the context of the situation in which the NLW is deployed matters, as does the technical perfor- mance of the NLWs and the response of the opponent, and that the use of NLWs may potenti- ally be counterproductive. Regarding the military applicability of NLWs, Altmann and Reppy (2008) arrive at a similar conclusion as Pittman, though from a different perspective. NLWs are largely reserved for MOOTW, where minimizing casualties has a direct military utility, in the sense that it incre- ases the chances of mission success. They also argue that in conventional warfare NLWs are less attractive, as casualty avoidance in war fought against a highly lethal opponent is still focused on reducing one’s own casualties.

Deriving the research questions from the NLW debate

From the debate on NLW’s discussed above, the question arises: who is right? A first step towards answering this question is to identify the main issues from the claims and expecta- tions emerging from this debate. These will be categorized to frame and define the further analysis on the military utility of NLWs. To serve that purpose, the claims have been arranged according to the key analytical components on which the DTA in this study relies. These com- ponents are:

• the Non-Lethal Weapon & Technology

• the NLW target group

• the NLW military user.

The components are elaborated in Chapter 2.

Furthermore, claims have been identified that are specifically related to the strategic effect of NLW application.

15 Claims related to Non-Lethal Weapons & Technology

Claims from the technological optimists: • NLWs enable casualty-free military intervention

• The uncertainties encountered in real world scenarios can be mitigated and compen- sated by technological innovations

Claims from the sceptics: • In real world situations NLW devices and technology may not perform as designed, and may even malfunction

• The situational context in which an NLW is deployed influences its effect

Claims related to NLW target groups

Claim from the careful supporters: • NLWs may help discriminate between irregular militants and innocents within the target population, as they will respond differently to the NLW effect.

Claim from the sceptics: • The target population may respond in a different manner than expected in the design and purpose of the NLW.

Claims related to military users of NLWs

Claim from the careful supporters: • Doctrinal and organizational adjustments are needed to effectively incorporate NLWs in military operations.

Claims from the sceptics: • The attitude, preparedness and guidance of the user are more important for the NLW’s effect than the technology itself

• The user of the NLW may not perform as directed and expected.

Claims related to the strategic effect of NLW application

Claim from the careful supporters: • NLWs have positive strategic implications, either in terms of supporting a hearts and minds approach, or by immediate strategic effects of –future- NLWs.

Claim from the sceptics: • Overly optimistic expectations of the potential of NLW concepts and technologies are illusive and potentially counterproductive.

16 The claims taken from the sceptics community address issues that have not been considered or identified by the optimists and, to a lesser extent, by the careful supporters. They highlight the potential adverse implications of these issues for the accomplishment of the political objectives envisioned with the deployment of NLWs. These issues are incorporated in the ana- lysis approach.

From the extracted claims and viewpoints above the central research questions of this study are formulated as follows:

• To what extent do real world operational circumstances affect NLW mission performance and effect?

• Given the answer to the previous question, what may we say on the degree at which NLW use meets the expectations that underlie current strategic frameworks?

The research approach

The analysis in this study to find answers to the research questions has to consider the technological advances that enable NLWs to materialize, and also the complex of factors of influence that in one way or another interact with the technical NLW concepts. This complex mix of factors is wide-ranging. A proper method to investigate these issues comes from the field of Technology Assess- ment (TA). For a long time, the world’s most prominent TA institute was the US Office of Technology Assessment, founded in 1972 to support US Congress on highly complex techni- cal issues with a long-term impact on US policy decision making.25 Similar TA organisations emerged in other countries, such as the NOTA in the Netherlands. In the wake of TA, assessments on defence technology have been emerging.26 Reflecting increasing public concern with defence policies, from 1978, OTA also conducted assessments of military-technological developments. A similar trend could be observed in European countries, including the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the wake of NOTA, INSTEAD was founded, aimed at studying the technological aspects of defence.27 Some of the Defence Technology Assessments (DTA) have been motivated for their implications for arms control.28 Official government advising TA establishments ceased to exist in the 1990s. Since then, DTAs have been performed on an occasional basis, mostly initiated from acade- mic institutions. While it is worthwhile to reconsider the value of re-initiating a government- supported TA institution, in absence of its existence this study is to be viewed as particular example of a DTA study. Smit et al. (1992), seeking to establish some generic methodological guidelines for DTA studies, frame DTA as follows:

In DTA studies, assessments of the effectiveness of advanced military systems need to take into account the operational context (including human and procedural factors) in which the system has to be applied, as well as on the available number of systems and their vulnerability. (Smit et al. 1992: 163)

25 The OTA was established through the Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Public Law 92-484, 92d Congress, H.R. 10243, of 13 October 1972. Joseph Coates, mentioned above, was one of the initiators and would contribute to OTA’s defence technology assessments. 26 The Netherlands Organization for Technology Assessment (NOTA) was founded in 1986. 27 The Interuniversity Network for Studying the TEchnological Aspects of Defence (INSTEAD) was also founded in 1986. 28 In the Netherlands, such an assessment was for instance made on the Patriot missile. Akkermans et.al.(1985). 17 In the research approach used in this study, the operational context will be a focal point, around which a dedicated reference model will be defined in Chapter 2. The reference model provides orientation to bringing together into a coherent account the data that are collected on the various issues to be considered of key relevance for the assessment. It helps to achieve what Weiss (1994: 157 ff) calls inclusive integration when investigating phenomena which comprise various aspects, each if which complexes of factors, which come together in actual processes. Quintessential in such cases is a framework that helps to establish a coherent account of how all these factors come together. (Weiss, 1994: 160) The reference model will serve as such a framework for analyzing the impact of the operational context on NLW per- formance. Stoop (2005) follows a similar approach by using a diagnostic model to guide the interest of issues in the research process. In this thesis the reference model has initially been taken as a heuristic model to inform the development of the interview questionnaires. It will support a qualitative assessment of NLWs, applied to three concrete research cases:

• The use of NLWs in the conflict in Northern Ireland and its aftermath between 1969 and 2006 (Chapter 3)

• The use of NLWs in US controlled detention centres in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 (Chapter 4)

• The hypothetical use by Dutch ISAF forces in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2010 (Chapter 5)

Given the exploratory nature of this project, these cases have been selected to vary in terms of the nature of the various ‘complexes’ of the reference model. These complexes, which are elaborated in Chapter 2, entail phenomena that perform differently, depending on the real- world context of the respective cases. This approach is in line with Yin (2003: 54), who argues that multiple cases offer contrasting situations that strengthen the external validity of the research findings. More specifically, the choice of these particular cases has been based on the following considerations:

• Although the conflict in Northern Ireland was of a domestic and policing nature, the deployment of military forces to manage the conflict provides insights into the perfor- mance of military units within the context of an internal security mission. Furthermore, the accessibility of operational data on the NLW use during a prolonged conflict offers particular insights in the evolvement of NLW performance over an extended time span. A particular feature of this case is the availability of sources originating from the ‘receiving side’, i.e. the target population that was engaged with NLWs

• The Iraq detention centres presented a special military operational configuration, namely a confined space, in which security forces and the detainee community physically resided in separate zones. Given this condition, together with the long endurance of detentions, recurrent patterns of interaction between the two sides developed. It is important to understand the performance and appreciation of NLWs within such a context over time, in particular when the use of lethal force against the unarmed detainees is prohibited

18 • The Afghanistan case was selected because of the open space environment in which NLWs were to be used in unanticipated engagements between the military security forces and target persons. The open space environment also implied uncertainty about the identity and intent of target persons. These circumstances were further compounded as hostile individuals intermingled with the civil population. The case offered an opportunity to hy- pothetically assess the performance of NLWs in a Counterinsurgency environment, where the deployment and use of lethal and non-lethal force is highly integrated.

All cases will address a limited set of NLWs used again humans. The findings based on the experiences with these NLWs will also provide for considerations regarding the military uti- lity of a wider range of NLWs. Instances of NLW use will be investigated that reveal different degrees and kinds of impact.

Sources and data collection

A DTA requires extensive search for data in open military literature and in military reports and manuals. As this study is to a large extent based on case studies to analyse the operatio- nal employment of NLWs, data are to be drawn from real world military (operational) events. This has proven to be a challenging effort, as access to such data was often denied for various reasons. The most important reason is the sensitivity related to military tactical events where armed force has been applied. Military authorities are reluctant to provide information of such events to outsiders, including myself, despite my status as a civil servant in the Minis- try of Defence (MOD) of The Netherlands. The US Army and Marine Corps are potentially the richest providers of sources on real world military events in which NLWs have been used. Yet, dedicated reports and data on NLW use during military operations have proven to be in short supply, as reporting and feed back from military missions is predominantly focused on events involving the use of lethal force, at the detriment of reporting on incidents in which ‘only’ NLWs were used. Hence, data on NLW use in real world events during military missions were primarily obtained through qualitative interviews with military personnel involved in such NLW events, as far as personnel with such experience could be identified. Throughout the case studies, the method of triangulation has been used in order to ex- ploit as many different sources as possible to optimize the reliability of the research. Through synthesizing the data from a variety of sources with different perspectives on the same topic, reliability of the data and validity of the analysis are ensured (Olsen 2004). Triangulation has been common practice in other DTA studies, as can be taken from e.g. Grin (1990), Stoop (2005) and Altmann (2008). These authors also note that in pursuing such triangulation, the analysts´ own “thorough understanding” (Grin 1990: 34) of the subject matter may be very significant to help in interpreting differences in viewpoints, and in pre-empting, or where necessary noting, misinformation. Scientifically unfounded claims of new weapon concepts made by both their advocates and their opponents can be demystified by independent acade- mic research to produce thorough knowledge based on scientific-technical analysis (Altmann 2008: 12). Combining different methods for data gathering also serves to cast an as broad as possible net over the research object (Stoop 2005: 15-16). It should be noted that the author could include these techniques for triangulation by dra- wing on his own expertise on the research topic, which he acquired between 1994 and 2001 while serving in staff positions in the Dutch MOD’s Defence Staff in exploring the potential

19 of NLWs for the armed forces and formulating policy guidelines on the topic. This added significant background knowledge, which helped to interpret data from different sources so as achieve proper triangulation. In the present study triangulation is accomplished by using data gained from a diffe- rentiated set of sources, namely open military literature, official and technical reports, and interviews with military practitioners and experts. The reliance on the respective categories of sources varied between the case studies, depending on the characteristics of the case. In the Northern Ireland case (Chapter 3), being a historical and domestic case, much of the data is available in open literature and reports. These sources were complemented by structured and semi-structured interviews. In the cases of the Iraq detention centres (Chapter 4) and Afghanistan (Chapter 5), data collection more relied on inputs from interviews, as reports on events were not available or non-existing, in particular in the Afghanistan case. Interviewees are listed in the Appendix. Interviews were mostly semi-structured, to provide opportunity for respondents to tell their own story, in order to optimally inform the reference model supporting the analysis. Interviewees were asked to provide unclassified information only, so that all data could be actually used. Since the military application of NLWs primarily resi- des in the military-tactical domain, key respondents were military practitioners who could provide first-hand accounts of the selected tactical event for the NLW assessment, in order to optimally inform the complexes in the reference model. This real world data collection was strengthened by taking inputs from multiple respondents on the same tactical situation. Real world data input for the complexes in the reference model was complemented with data from technical and tactical documentation. Thus a reliable picture of the phenomena defining the various complexes and the operational context was constructed to determine the perfor- mance of the NLW.

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24 Chapter 2 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’?*

* Orbons, S. (2010) Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’?, Journal of Military Ethics, 9(1), pp. 78-99.

Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 78Á99, 2010

Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’?

SJEF ORBONS Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT Most contemporary conflicts can be characterized as ‘wars or conflicts amongst the people’. International military forces deployed in such conflicts are confronted with complex operational environments where the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is often impossible to make. At the same time, there is a moral requirement imposed on Western coalition forces to perform in a humane manner and to keep casualties to a minimum. Non-lethal weapons are expected to enable military forces to accomplish their mission without having to kill or destroy. The extent to which these weapons meet that promise in real world conditions is the subject of debate. A defence technology assessment of non-lethal weapons is proposed that validates their utility and moral implications by considering the user, the weapon and the target in the context of the deployment situation. It will be illustrated that the technical parameters of the non-lethal weapons are no guarantee that the weapons will perform as intended as the user and target introduce many factors of uncertainty in real world situations. Although such uncertainties undermine the moral acceptability of non-lethal weapons, it is argued that the principle of non- lethality is compliant with the Just War Tradition principle of proportionality. The principles of non-combatant immunity and discrimination need to be re-calibrated given the human-centricity of many military intervention operations.

KEY WORDS: Non-combatant immunity, non-lethal weapons, discrimination, proportionality, defence technology assessment, baton rounds, CS gas, active denial system

Introduction In the post-Cold War security environment, military intervention forces have increasingly been facing situations where the use of lethal force in the presence of the civil population is prohibitive.1 The complex circumstances under which peacekeeping intervention forces have to accomplish their tasks are further exacerbated by the irregular methods and tactics warring factions employ to deny traditional military practices and weapons used by peace- keeping forces. The blurred distinction between combatants and non- combatants, including warriors’ chameleon behaviour, has become especially troublesome with the operational scene often being the urban environment. The nature of this new operational context can be described as a ‘war

Correspondence Address: Netherlands Defence Academy, Faculty of Military Sciences, to: Sjef Orbons MSc, PO box 90002, 4800 PA Breda, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected] 1502-7570 Print/1502-7589 Online/10/010078Á22 # 2010 Taylor & Francis 27 http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/15027570903353828 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 79

amongst the people’ (Smith 2006: 267). It is the people that have become the critical ground in most contemporary conflicts. Military options during such UN-led interventions have mostly been constrained by political mandates to which the missions are submitted. Forces are facing the dilemma between either doing nothing or talking and using lethal fire as the last resort. They perform their tasks and operations under scrutiny of the media and any mistake, including the Á unintended Á killing of innocent victims, is magnified and may politically jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Soon after the end of the Cold War non-lethal weapons (NLWs), some of which were already in use with police forces for several decades for domestic purposes, have been claimed as promising to close the conceptual gap in the spectrum of military capabilities to meet the challenges in contemporary conflict patterns. Since then, a broad range of technological concepts has been explored, developed and tested for employment by military forces in current operations. However, despite the promises ascribed to NLWs and the efforts invested in such concepts, only a very few new devices have been fielded so far. Today, more than 15 years after the emergence of the military requirement for non-lethality, considerable scepticism and even opposition still exists concerning the military employment of NLWs, including ethical controversy on their applicability and acceptability as military instruments. It is still the subject of intensive debate whether non-lethal weapons are as benign as to provide the military with a license to ‘silence’ when the use of traditional military force is prohibitive or undesirable. The ethical dimension of the debate is informed by the Just War Tradition, to explore to what extent non- lethality as a military capability can be justified under Rupert Smith’s new paradigm of ‘war amongst the people’. The moral dimension resides in the military organization and its personnel that field and operate NLWs, as their practical application depend on the norms, values and virtues incorporated in military education and training. Some analysts discuss issues of ethics and morality with NLWs based on assumptions that these weapons function precisely as expected (Mayer 2007). This article takes as the departure point that NLW performance is not perfect and effects can be different from those intended. This article therefore endeavours to discuss and explain factors that underlie the discrepancy between the design expectations of NLWs and their military utility and how the associated uncertainties affect the ethical acceptability of NLWs and the moral implications of their use. After a brief discussion of the military rationale of non-lethality and the official policies that define and guide the development and use of NLWs, this article addresses two main questions: (1) Do NLWs always perform as they are designed for? One of the problems with NLWs is that while they are designed and intended to attain a well defined non-lethal effect, this is not always accomplished under real operational circumstances. This article introduces an assessment approach 28 that takes into account factors other than merely technological to enable a 80 S. Orbons more comprehensive validation of NLWs. Three NLW-devices have been selected, to which this assessment approach will be applied. (2) Given the outcome of the above assessment, can NLWs use be in compliance with the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality from the Just War Tradition? The technology assessment approach also informs the moral problematic which is associated with the application of NLWs. The author contends that while NLW design, employment and effects may raise moral concerns on the one hand, they can also alleviate existing moral dilemmas facing politicians and military operators on the other.

The Military Rationale of Non-Lethality In Western societies, drawing from their democratic culture and tradition, ethical and moral issues increasingly have come into play when dealing with conflict. War has begun to have a human face, or from an antagonist’s point of view: respect for human life was becoming a critical vulnerability for Western nations. The desire for a society without war, which emerged after the deadly wars in the first half of the twentieth century, was seemingly accomplished with the military introduction of ‘clean’ weapons that were far less destructive than the previous generations. The ethical imperative emerged that armed conflict should be far less lethal than before. In war amongst the people the utility of lethal precision weaponry that had excelled during the 1991 Gulf War would appear to be limited soon thereafter. The expectation of many analysts, such as forecasting that precision strike technology could mitigate war’s terror and even prevent to hit innocent civilians inadvertently, would soon appear overoptimistic (Freedman 1998). Others question the utility of precision-guided munitions if certain conditions are not met. For instance, when fighting non-state terrorists or insurgent groups in urban settings, the effectiveness of precision weaponry may end up being at its lowest because some targeting discrimina- tions are not simply a function of advanced technology (Mandel 2004). Although sensors and intelligence systems constantly improve, it is highly unlikely that the level of detail necessary to obtain perfect knowledge of battlefield conditions needed for a long range precision strike will be achieved. Furthermore, the role of the media continuously increases in shaping world opinion. Therefore it would be incumbent on the military to make an extra effort to limit collateral casualties, which should include rapid development of area effect NLWs (Alexander 2007a). The notion of non-lethality has been expressed in NLW definitions contained in official national and international policy documents on NLWs.2 For the purpose of this article, a definition of NLWs has been taken from a formal NLW policy document published by the North Atlantic Council:

Non-Lethal Weapons are weapons that are explicitly designed and developed so as to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal undesired damage or impact on the environment. (NATO 1999: 1) 29 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 81

The definition stresses the intended effect of an NLW. However, earlier experiences with NLWs, in particular of police organizations that have extensively used a growing set of NLWs, indicate that while non-lethals are an accepted core capability in policing, casualties and other unwanted effects still occur. These adverse effects have triggered a continuous debate between human rights organizations and law enforcement organizations on the moral and ethical acceptability of NLWs. While this debate generally focuses on the domestic use of NLWs, the sensitivity of the issue has the potential to be further compounded when peace-supporting military forces employ NLWs in a civil environment in foreign states. The NATO policy document provides guidance for the development and use of NLWs. It includes aims and requirements that express expectations on non-lethality. NLWs should enhance the capability to accomplish military missions and tasks in situations and conditions where the use of lethal force, although not prohibited, may not be necessary or required. Furthermore, they should enhance the capability to limit or control escalation, to discourage, delay or prevent hostile action and to improve force protection. The policy also specifies that NLWs may be used in conjunction with lethal weapons to enhance the latter’s effectiveness and efficiency across the full spectrum of military operations. The latter requirement seems to be at odds with the original rationale of non-lethality and this policy clause immediately triggers the debate on the ethical acceptability of NLWs: NLWs would appear to be nothing else than just another means to raise the effectiveness of one’s own operations, irrespective of casualty reduction considerations. Hence this widened applic- ability of NLWs disregards the original benign motive to introduce NLWs, which precisely is to minimize fatalities, permanent injury and undesired damage. The explicitness in the NATO policy of a ‘dual use’ role of NLW potentially fuels political and public concern about the way NLWs will be used by the military. Although the policy does not explicitly state that NLWs are also to be used against non-combatants, it appears from scenario analysis and technical studies performed by NATO bodies that such options are fully taken into consideration. Whether non-lethal engagement of civilians by military forces is compatible with current international law and ethical standards is the subject of ongoing debate. It is questionable whether the intentional use of NLWs against non-combatants, ignoring the principle of discrimination and the associated non-combatant immunity (NCI) is ethically rejectible. It can be argued that military forces using NLWs should not be exempted from those principles (Mayer 2007; Kaurin 2008). Others contend that NLWs ought to be taken into consideration to diminish the disproportionate harm to civilians caused in contemporary conflicts (Alexander 2007a; Gross 2008). With the rationale of non-lethality in the military domain being translated into formal policies to guide its military implementation, the question arises whether the intent of NLWs as expressed in those policies is feasible when put to the test in real world circumstances. It is conceivable that NLWs cause 30 unwanted human suffering or even death due to the dynamics, particularities 82 S. Orbons and responses of the actors in relation to the political, operational and physical environment in which the military needs to act. The ideal of achieving political objectives relying on non-lethality is degraded by the friction resulting, amongst others, from non-cooperativeness and from hostile counteractions.

Between Expectation, Intent (‘The Ideal’) and Operational Reality (‘Friction’) The emergence and institutionalization of the military rationale of the concept of non-lethality and the associated questions on its real world performance and moral desirability can be put in a broader perspective based on the notions of ideal and friction applied to warfare. The idealist approach has been expressed in a maxim from Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist who lived over 2000 years ago. He was the first person who considered restraint from killing and destruction, and thus limiting casualties and damage to the environment, of strategic importance. In his book The Art of War the maxim reads as follows:

The general rule for use of the military is that it is better to keep a nation intact than to destroy it. It is better to keep an army intact than to destroy it. It is better to keep a division intact than to destroy it, it is better to keep a battalion intact than to destroy it, it is better to keep a unit intact than to destroy it. (Sun Tzu [ca. 500BC] 1963: 77Á79)

The concept of non-lethality is quite compatible with Sun Tzu’s thesis. From his perspective, non-lethality in warfare can be interpreted as the ultimate form of controlled use of military force: it strives to achieve a strategic or operational objective without destroying or killing. It is the idealistic approach to warfare. In 1831, in his famous opus On War, Von Clausewitz focuses on the natural features of warfare (Von Clausewitz [1831] 1984). He introduces the phenomenon of friction in warfare and argues that friction is the only concept that enables one to distinguish real war from war on paper. Friction, he contends, is the accumulation of many difficulties and is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. Friction is a force that can never be defined by theory. To Von Clausewitz the key challenge in the conduct of warfare is to remain faithful in action to the principles that have been laid down by ourselves. When related to the contemporary situation and the introduction of non- lethality, the concept of friction can help understand that while NLWs are designed to achieve a well-defined effect, it is still submitted to many factors of influence and chance that erode the effect in practice. Only from real world experience can one learn how far the principles of non-lethality and intended effects of NLWs are affected by specific situational conditions or even denied by friction due to resistance and countermeasures. During the early days of the contemporary debate on the promises of non- lethality, the idealist approach was adopted by analysts who believed that war could now be waged and opponents subdued without, or with minimal, killing (Morris & Morris 1990; Toffler & Toffler 1994; Lewer & Schofield 1997). Their 31 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 83

vision was inspired by a climate of euphoria that accompanied the new world order which followed after the Cold War. The idea of bloodless or humane warfare persisted throughout the 1990s, describing NLWs as instruments to eliminate the incivility of modern warfare (Coker 2001). The belief in benevolence in warfare through NLWs also relies on the implicit premise in the idealist’s views that non-lethal technologies and concepts in themselves are equivalent to non-lethality in military practice. Other analysts who adhere to a more realistic approach question such expectations of NLWs as being premature. They stress the lack of objective data to test the effectiveness of NLWs. These data should be generated by combat testing, exercising and military experience, but are in short supply. Bloodlessness of warfare by the use of technology to defeat an enemy without casualties appeals to our sense of morality but is, unfortunately, unrealistic (Siniscalchi 1998). The concept of ‘weapons of mass protection’ is considered one-sided, based on predominantly technologically determined expectations, emphasizing technological capabilities while operational limitations are de- emphasized (Grin 2000). Obviously, the tension between the ideal (expectation and intent) and friction (uncertainty and reality) can be projected on to the assessing of NLW designs on their performance on the ground. Three NLW concepts have been selected to consider the feasibility of their intended effect.

Realities on the Ground: Assessing NLWs NLWs, like any other technology, could be assumed and presented as neutral tools. In contrast, one school of thought, as expressed by Rappert, suggests that there is a subtle and complicated inter-relation of technology and action. Rappert argues that technology enters into, and helps reconstitute, existing patterns of social relations. The meanings ascribed to technologies in particular circumstances bear on the manner in which these technologies are used (Rappert 2002: 63). In an earlier study, Grin argued that an assessment of military technologies has to take into account the operational circumstances in which they are applied and judge their implications against the background of the securityÁpolitical situation (Grin 1990). Technology assessment (TA) is a research analysis approach that seeks to validate innovative technological concepts within a contextual framework to provide a balance judgement of its utility and political desirability. More specifically, defence technology assessment (DTA) considers new military concepts within the operational context, including human and procedural factors, in which the system is to be applied (Smit et al. 1992). The effect of NLW use, therefore, not only depends on the technical specification of the NLW, but also on the skills of the operator to employ the weapon in the prescribed manner. Still, optimal employment of NLWs against individuals or crowds is no guarantee that determined opponents are always incapacitated. Their attitude and response may even be based on an 32 entirely different code. 84 S. Orbons

These considerations highlight that the question of how lethal or excessively harmful non-lethality can become under real circumstances largely depends on the appropriateness of its application. Ongoing efforts in the technological domain to ensure reliability of the NLWs themselves have steadily improved the safety of the effect when properly employed. However, the risk of serious harm increases when the operator is forced to use the NLW beyond the design conditions. Technological system innovation may be supportive to prevent improper use by overruling the human operator. The probability of unintentional misuse much depends on the professionalism, preparedness and skills of the operator. Intentional abuse or disproportionate use is always possible with NLWs in the hands of those who disregard the human rights of the target individual. A DTA of non-lethal technology concepts should therefore take into account all factors that interplay and together determine the operational outcome of an NLW used. A scrutinized analysis, also considering the operational realities, should, complementary to the weapon-technological characteristics of the NLW, address issues specifically related to the user/ operator as well as to the target, as has been visualized below. All three components are presented as complexes, because of the numerous and partly unforeseeable factors affecting the responses and performance of each of them. The weapon & technology complex represents the physical and technical parameters and performance characteristics of the NLW, the immediate and longer term impact the weapon is designed and expected to have on the human target or target group, the manageability of target effects given the type of NLW and technology, and the sensitivity of the NLW effect for operator performance and intent. The technical properties and intended effects of the spectrum of NLWs vary widely and may, therefore, be validated from an ethical perspective. The user complex includes the factors that influence the attitude and performance of the military organization and personnel that deploy and employ the NLW. Factors such as skills, experience, training and education, concept of operation, guidance, rules of engagement, mental and physical state, judgement and perception of the potential target population or target individual are determinants of the user complex. These factors also shape, implicitly and explicitly, the moral attitude and approach of the military organization and its personnel. The target complex incorporates factors of influence that depend on the individual or group exposed to the NLW engagement. These include the attitude, mental and physical state of the individual(s), perception of the user and its organization and background, motivation, experience, preparedness for armed engagement and against NLWs, specific countermeasures and target group dynamics. The three components are interlinked into a system that in itself is embedded in a specific context coloured by the situation and circumstances in which the NLW is deployed. As the analysis will point out, the incomplete- ness and uncertainty of the system components, as well as the difficulty to 33 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 85

capture and anticipate the operational (and strategic) context of NLW deployment make performance prediction and control of NLW use under field conditions a fuzzy process. In turn, this unpredictability will complicate the judgement about the moral implications of the employment of NLWs. The analysis provided here is not exhaustive, but rather intended to be indicative with an aim to assess whether NLWs do what they are claimed to.

Three NLW Devices The spectrum of NLW effects is very diverse. NLW taxonomies and overviews of NLWs, including in some cases hundreds of NLWs, have been widely published (Rademaker 2003; Davison 2007). Categories of effectors specifically designed to be used against humans include kinetic and mechanical weapons, chemical agents, electrical devices, light emitters, directed energy and sound generators. What these effects have in common is that they inflict interaction with the physiology of the human being, with the intent to manipulate or influence the behaviour of an individual or even deprive a person from the control over his body. Each of the devices has a more or less critical window of design effect. Within these margins there is a high probability that the energy transmitted to the target individual produces the desired effect, i.e. a partial or full incapacitation or compliance of the individual or of a group of individuals. Outside the margins the effect may either be too weak or too strong. In the first case the target individual(s)’s behaviour is insufficiently affected by the NLW, in the latter there is a considerable risk that the target will be seriously or permanently injured, or even killed. Hence a residual risk remains that the effect will be excessive. Three examples from the spectrum of anti-personnel NLWs have been selected for this paper for a more scrutinized review. Two of them are first generation NLWs already in use for several decades, while the third is a technologically highly innovative second generation NLW design:

weapon-technology complex

c o n t e x t

user target complex complex

34 Figure 1. A simplified Defence Technology Assessment approach of NLWs. 86 S. Orbons

. the baton round, a widely employed kinetic impact weapon against individual target persons; . CS gas, better known as ‘tear gas’, a chemical agent in use as an area denial weapon against crowds of individuals; and . the Active Denial System (ADS), a directed energy weapon emitting millimetre wave radiation against individuals or small groups of individuals.

Baton Round The baton round is a kinetic energy projectile that for several decades has been deployed by law enforcement organizations worldwide. The baton round is designed to cause pain, irritation and minimal injury to the subject. The physiological effect is directly related to the location of the body where the projectile strikes the subject to induce blunt force trauma to the individual (Vilke & Chan 2007). The operator employs the weapon within a certain distance margin to the target. Firing the round from close distances has the potential to cause serious injury, while extended firing ranges may not result in insufficient stopping power to the target. In addition, the aiming accuracy, depending on technical performance of the weapon as well as the operator skills, declines with increasing range. This raises the risk that the round hits critical parts of the body, in particular the head. Adverse weather conditions and low visibility contribute to the probability of aiming errors. The desired target response is to dissuade or prevent a violent or potentially violent person from the intended course of action, thereby neutralising the threat.

CS Gas CS gas is an irritant agent which can be used to disperse large gatherings or to temporary incapacitate individuals. These agents are commonly dispersed as gases, liquid, smoke or aerosols. Dissemination can be achieved through explosive devices, spraying or by pyrotechnics. The effect of CS is irritation and inflammation of the skin, airways and mucous membrane tissues, starting within minutes of exposure and continu- ing as long as the individual is exposed to the substance. The sensation is typically one of skin burning. These effects worsen with increased concentra- tion and duration of exposure. The symptoms improve after the exposure is removed, and gradually disappear within an hour. Some types of CS are insoluble and can remain active for several weeks and therefore require decontamination of buildings or other items. This is critical due to the high- flammability of CS (Vilke & Chan 2007). CS can also be applied as a hand- held liquid irritant projector that fires a stream of irritant agent in solution, thus making it a better directive against individual persons (Davison 2006). High temperature and humidity make the effect of exposure to CS more severe and the eyes are strongly affected by CS and may not open for several hours. Some people can develop a tolerance to CS, especially after being exposed regularly (Sutherland 2008). 35 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 87

The Active Denial System (ADS) The Active Denial System (ADS) is a directed electromagnetic (EM) energy weapon. It is a millimetre wave (MMW) emitter at a frequency of 95Ghz. The system uses an antenna to direct a focused beam toward a selected target individual. The MMW energy strikes the subject and reaches a skin penetration depth of less than a millimetre. It produces a heat sensation that within seconds becomes intolerable and forces the targeted individual to instinctively move. The sensation immediately ceases when the individual moves out of the beam or when the operator turns off the beam. When the system is operated properly there is minimal risk of injury because of the shallow penetration depth of energy into the skin at the short wavelength, the safety features designed into the system, and normal human instinctive reactions (US Department of Defense Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program 2007). The heating effect experienced by target individuals is caused by the stimulation of pain nerves in the upper skin (Murphy et al. 2003). Only if the subject remained in a sustained beam while ignoring or resisting the pain sensation could permanent damage occur. From experimental research the risk of eye injury is found to be very low, as a subject will close or shield their eyes well before the heat induced pain threshold is attained. Nevertheless, it is to be evaluated whether long duration low-level exposure may affect vision (Annati 2007). The vehicle-based ADS incorporates computerized control systems to modulate the beam transmission to achieve a safe and effective non-lethal repel effect. The operational range can be chosen between 15 and 500 metres. The MMW beam can be slightly widened to target three or four individuals grouped closely together (Magnuson 2006). The ADS is to be positioned in such a way that an uninterrupted line-of-sight over a considerable sector is ensured. The system’s accuracy is advertised to enable discrimination between single target persons who are at least 2 metres apart from each other. Such accuracy levels can generally be attained at moderate engagement ranges and degrades with extending distances. Range-to-target measurement accuracy is a critical factor for selecting the correct emission power level (Alexander 2007b). ADS fielding is foreseen for 2010. The three NLW devices will be submitted to the assessment framework in order to consider their performance in a conceivable real world environment.

The Weapon & Technology Complex Many efforts have been and are still being undertaken to enhance the technical performance and reliability of non-lethal devices. What experience teaches us is that NLWs cannot be claimed to be technically perfect. As has been pointed out earlier, the margins between effective performance of the devices and unacceptable weapon impact are small. Even a slight malfunction can have severe consequences. Baton rounds should strike the human body only at specified parts. Yet, the 36 ballistic accuracy of the projectile to ensure safe impact appears to be limited. 88 S. Orbons

A considerable percentage of the projectiles fired during tests demonstrated unacceptable deviations from the aiming point (Kendig 2001). While this assessment might appear somewhat dated, the necessarily blunt front end of the baton round, required to prevent penetration of the skin, compromises accuracy. Whatever the design of a baton round or any other kinetic projectile, the need to optimize between the engagement range, the impact energy of the round, and its ballistic accuracy, results in a residual risk that can hardly be reduced with current technology. The experiences with baton round use in Northern Ireland since the early 1970s show a steady decline in casualties. This is, to a large extent, due to improved weapon design resulting in a more reliable performance. Between 1994 and 2001, a total of 13,500 baton rounds were fired with no fatalities (Burrows 2002). However, more recent evaluations of the use of such rounds conclude that the risk of unintended but serious harm is still real (Northern Ireland Office 2004). CS gas is designed and deployed as an area effect weapon. The technical limitations associated with the use of CS gas are related to the inherent impossibility to manage the amount and concentration of CS gas an individual in the deployment area inhales. As the CS gas doses an individual receives depends on a range of factors, including his proximity to the location of the releasing CS grenade or canister, the user’s ability to control the individual doses of the agent is very constrained. Usually considerable variations of concentrations in a given area occur, in particular during the first seconds after the agent has been released. Apart from the enhanced risk for individuals suffering from respiratory illnesses, such as asthma, who may be affected critically by the agent even at low doses, there may also be unknown long term effects to individuals who have inhaled considerable amounts of CS gas. Other factors, including the environmental circumstances in the area of deployment, can vary considerably, which potentially lead to variations of effect upon the target group. In Northern Ireland, where CS gas has commonly been used in urban areas, the combination of wind and specific built-up configurations has complicated the predictability and control of agent dispersal (Thornton 2007). Due to its indiscriminate effect against generally inhomogeneously composed crowds, CS impact on individual crowd members may vary widely, ranging from very limited or no effect on some individuals to excessive or even toxic incapacitation of others.3 The ADS system is still in a testing phase. As an anti-personnel directed energy device, its performance and reliability under practical circumstances is still unknown. An extensive testing programme including the exposure of thousands of volunteers has optimized the design. Tests are usually run under controlled conditions. Despite the highly successful performance of the system during extensive testing series, the technical malfunction of system components or improper tuning of energy levels transmitted may result in adverse effects against the target individuals. Given the extended engagement ranges of up to hundreds of metres, combined with the invisibility of the skin heating effect of the ADS, feedback of a possible harmful engagement caused 37 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 89

by technical unreliability may be difficult to detect in the absence of close observers. One of the factors that influences actual radiation energy levels received by a target person is his physical environment. If the operational setting is a confined space, as is often the case in urban missions, radiation reflections may occur which raise the energy level locally to unacceptable intensities. Furthermore, the response performance of the ADS control system to adjust the amount of energy transmitted and other tuning parameters of the radiation beam may be insufficient to follow the behaviour of individuals and group dynamics in the target zone. Such problems can be further exacerbated by poor visibility conditions. This brief account of the potential technical uncertainties and risks of NLW devices to perform beyond the non-lethal mode illustrates that even when operators of NLWs act as trained and expected, and target persons behave or respond as anticipated, the demarcation between effectiveness in terms of temporary incapacitation and undesirable harmful effects is fragile. It also shows that the effect of area denial weapons such as CS gas are fundamentally less controllable than those NLWs which are aimed against selected individuals, like baton rounds and ADS. The implication of the former category is that innocent civilians nearby may be harmed. Hence, from an ethical perspective, area denial weapons like CS gas should not be used if innocent people will be affected who are not part of the crowd or riot but nevertheless cannot leave the risk zone. This comparison of the two categories of NLWs also tells us that NLWs, from their technical character- istics alone, have to be judged on ethical acceptability on a one by one basis. As will be argued hereafter, in real world circumstances technical imperfection may be a lesser risk than the human factor, i.e. the attitude and performance of the holder and operator of the NLW.

The User Complex The baton round is intended to provide the policeman or soldier with an option to keep an aggressive or dangerous individual at safe distance. In Northern Ireland the weapon was used to prevent protesters being able to hit police and military forces when hurling stones and Molotov cocktails. Without the availability of the baton round, on many occasions they would have been authorized to use lethal weapons for self defence. The reliability and precision of CS gas when used in crowd and riot control situations depends, amongst others, on factors related to appropriate use by trained personnel. Such factors include the availability of a suitable range of capabilities to dispense CS gas and the selection of the most effective method of delivery for the situation at hand. General agreement exists among experts in the field of NLWs that these weapons have been, and potentially will be, misused by regular police and security forces as well as irregular actors in various parts of the world. International organizations as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have frequently reported on human rights violations in a range of 38 countries. Most of the cases documented refer to domestic situations, where 90 S. Orbons police or security forces have applied NLWs in an excessive and unlawful manner. Such abuses included CS gas in many cases, and also baton rounds, as well as electro-shock weapons. In particular, the use of CS gas in confined and even closed spaces, which is prohibitive given the unacceptably extended periods of exposure to high concentrations of the gas, has been reported. Human Rights Watch made public the abuse of CS gas in Venezuela. It reported that tear gas powder was being sprinkled on the faces and bodies of individuals in custody, as well as about the use of tear gas and pepper spray against prisoners kept in closed vehicles. Gas used in confined spaces is more concentrated and lasting in its effects than when used in the open and could cause individuals who are incapacitated or unable to move to suffocate. It is also potentially fatal to those with lung or heart ailments (Human Rights Watch 2004). There are situations, however, in which the use of CS gas in confined spaces is regarded as an effective and acceptable method to resolve a crisis situation in the absence of alternatives that would not put the security forces in considerable danger themselves. In Northern Ireland, in prison barracks where IRA detainees were held, the prisoners took control over their own prison building in 1972. As they had blocked their prison physically and were using improvised arms, security forces decided to chase the occupants out of their huts by inserting CS grenades before overwhelming the prisoners. The tactic worked, with no prisoners suffering from enduring after-effects of the exposure to CS.4 A similar use of CS gas in a confined space has occurred as an approved practice applied during inmate uprisings in US prisons. Here too, CS gas has been used to prevent security personnel from being exposed to high risk and also to avoid the use of lethal arms in these situations. Baton rounds have also been abused as a weapon of punishment in, amongst others, Northern Ireland and in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. This has led to fatalities in both conflict areas. Wright speaks of a systematic abuse in both situations where baton rounds have been used on a regular basis rather than in urgent cases. He lists a number of ways the abuse can take form:

These abuses include doctoring projectiles to enhance lethality, breaching guidelines on use only as a last resort, firing below the minimum distance, firing at areas of the body that should not be targeted (such as head, face, neck, or chest), shooting out of moving vehicles, use as street punishment during zone clearing operations. (Wright 2002: 80Á81)

Besides the numerous written accounts, the internet provides an abundance of footage of abuse of a variety of NLWs. To mention but one example, in March 2007, a video was posted showing Israeli soldiers firing rubber bullets indiscriminately from a range above 50 metres at a crowd of demonstrating Palestinian women. Various women were reported to have been severely injured, in part because some bullets had a steel kernel inserted in a rubber casing to give the round a false non-lethal appearance (Gaelli 2007). Abuse is a risk that may also arise in the context of suppression of people fighting for a just cause. Whether or not abuse may occur depends on a range of factors and circumstances, of which the attitude and intention of the user 39 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 91

of the weapon is the most important. Such behaviour is also determined by the enforcement ‘culture’ of the forces that deal with the conflict situation. Furthermore, it also depends on the way they view the non-cooperative ‘other side’, and on their professional skills, self control and self confidence. It is in the operator’s hand, or else in the unit commander’s directions, whether the effect is tuned such that the NLW performs within the design safety margins, or turns into an instrument of excessive harm, torture or lethal force. In physical terms this basically comes down to selecting the intensity of the energy or concentration of agent delivered to the target individual or group, the duration and repetition of the effect and, for a number weapon categories, the part of the body at which the effect is aimed. The technological status of the NLW is usually of limited relevance for the operator’s options to misuse it, as long as there is no automated self-control mechanism built into the device, similar for instance to controlling the speed of a car in cruise control mode. First generation NLWs, like the baton round or CS gas, allow the operator to freely choose the mode of employment. The ADS, as a new generation NLW, is integrated on an advanced platform and supported by a computerized weapon control system, facilitating the system to be set to disable operation beyond the predefined safety margins of engagement distance, radiation energy level and pulse emission duration. The operator can only select the targets to be engaged and decide when to activate the beam. The likelihood of abuse of NLWs to occur is correlated with the types of effect at the user’s disposal: electro-shock weapons, and to a certain extent, sound directed energy weapons such as the ADS and lasers, bright light sources and chemical agents, leave no traces on the victim, which makes after- action investigation into alleged abuse or excessive use of NLWs harder. In particular the electro-shock weapons have been reported in numerous cases to have facilitated human rights violations, including torture. In a 1997 report Amnesty International documented electric shock torture in 50 countries worldwide since 1990 (Wright 2002). What is easily overlooked or even ignored by security forces and police is the disproportional vulnerability of children to NLWs. The design parameters of most NLWs are based on what is required to temporary incapacitate an adult of average size. Using the same weapon indiscriminately against children mixed in crowds has caused fatal injuries or lasting damage to their body. The ADS, as a next generation NLW, may be one of the very few non- lethal system concepts exempted from this concern, as the radiation only interacts with the upper skin, hence it is indifferent for the size of the target individual. Whereas the possibility of intentional abuse of NLWs appears obvious, the unintentional improper employment of NLWs is of significance as well. This may occur in situations where the military or the police are pressed or feel forced to act. When, for instance, a crowd turns into a mob and threatens the security forces, personnel may use their weapons for self defence, including NLWs. Inaccurate aiming of the weapon or being pressed to use the weapon 40 too close to the target enhances the risk of non-lethals becoming lethal or 92 S. Orbons causing serious harm. Apart from kinetic energy weapons, such as the baton round, this also may occur with riot control agents such as CS gas. The initial intended effect of deploying NLWs, i.e. supporting the control of disorder using appropriate levels of violence, may not be achieved and occasionally rather the opposite may happen. This illustrates that the friction which Clausewitz refers to in conventional war is also present in military operations other than war. A specific example is the excessive use of CS gas by the British Army in Northern Ireland in a particular confrontation between Unionists (Catholics) and Loyalists (Protestants) that has been claimed to have decisively destroyed the confidence of the Unionists in the Army as their safeguard (Thornton 2007). There is a growing concern that the increasing availability of NLWs to security forces as a complementary capability to lethal options may give rise to a tendency that operators become more ‘trigger happy’. It is easier to physically incapacitate an individual or group to control behaviour than accomplishing compliance through negotiation or warnings. This translates into a trade-off between the security forces preparedness to accept risk and the exposure to forced action of the opposing or non-cooperative party. The moral consequence of this trade-off can be linked to Mayer’s analysis of the justification of NCI in relation to the question of targeting non-combatants non-lethally:

Combatants must make a concerted effort and accept risk to minimize noncombatant harm. (Mayer 2007: 223)

While Mayer considers non-combatants as complete ‘outsiders’ in the context of armed exchanges between warring parties, it becomes clear that minimiz- ing harm to civilians in a ‘war amongst the people’ context is a moral imperative as well, even when intentional Á non-lethal Á targeting of them is an option for the military intervention forces. What tends to be overlooked in the ethical debate is that military intervention forces operating in today’s conflict zones predominantly act as stabilization forces with a focus on de- escalation of force. They should not be defined as combatants in the traditional sense, bound as they are by strict rules of engagement (RoEs), prohibiting the deployment of a major part of their military power. Recognizing this shift in role and status of the military force would redefine the relative notions of combatants and non-combatants.

The Target Complex The reaction of a person struck by a baton round will vary depending on the area of the body struck and the degree of motivation of the individual. Responses may vary more when individuals are under the influence of alcohol, drugs or suffer from a mental disorder. Furthermore, very motivated individuals may be capable of continuing their initial resisting behaviour. There is evidence that it may require repeated firing to stop and incapacitate a very aggressive person.5 Crowds may anticipate the use of baton rounds by 41 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 93

security forces with improvised body protection. Countermeasures against CS gas are possible by covering the face with wet tissue or even gas masks. Protection against the ADS energy beam is possible by wearing a radiation reflective suit on the body. The level of preparedness of target groups significantly depends on the history of the conflict or crisis in which the NLW is being deployed. This is an illustration of the importance of context for the effectiveness of NLW use. Enduring conflicts are often characterized by fixed patterns of exchange between security forces and resistant groups. This may go as far as to trigger an arms race between both sides. This was the case in Northern Ireland where, after a short while, CS gas was considered largely ineffective against the intended targets and was even counterproductive as extended release of CS gas in populated areas did harm to local residents who were not involved in the confrontation.6 Ironically, whereas CS gas is designed to be used in open air, CS gas effects turn out to be more controllable in confined spaces as it is easier to tune doses. The development of counter tactics is also an outcome of prolonged and repetitive engagement between security forces and non-cooperative targets individuals and groups. The use of cover in dense built-up areas denies NLWs like the baton round and the ADS the ability to exploit the necessary stand- off distance due to lack of free line-of-sight. Militants in crowds may use innocent civilians as a fence and perform their aggressive act from behind. In general, mixed crowds composed of passive bystanders, peaceful demonstrators, militant persons and ringleaders pose a considerable chal- lenge to security forces in selecting the right approach. Selective engagement with NLWs is often complicated by chaos and by the impossibility to discriminate between aggressors and non-violent group members. The mental state of an individual or crowd, the motives for their resistance or fight and their perception of the forces and their political masters in charge of the security mission potentially have a deep impact on the susceptibility for and response to the employment of violence, including NLWs. Such contextual factors of NLW deployment may profoundly affect the impact of NLW use. If the use of (non-lethal) violence by security forces is seen as fundamentally unjust by the target population and wider public, it is possible that such use may escalate rather than de-escalate violent resistance. Hence, the target complex embodies frictional factors that potentially deny the NLWs’ intended effect.

Assessment Synthesis The discussion and assessment of the three ‘system components’ above has demonstrated that situational factors to a considerable degree determine the tactical and operational effect of the three NLWs considered. It appears that the general expectations of NLWs as expressed from an idealist point of view will often be thwarted by the Clausewitzian frictional factors encountered in the contextual reality. The fact that NLWs are designed to be effective in a 42 narrow window of technical opportunity is by no means a guarantee that this 94 S. Orbons window will always present itself in a real world scenario. It proves to be fairly easy for a creative opponent to escape that window of permissible non-lethal exposure. Upon that, it can not be excluded that military security forces would not, intentionally or unintentionally, operate the NLW beyond the safety margins of the designed non-lethal window. The planners of non-lethal force employment are facing fundamental uncertainties about the impact of its actual use. Any wrong outcome of NLW use causing excessive harm, in particular against civilians, will be perceived as disproportionate use of force and judged as morally rejectible behaviour of the user. The result of a DTA applied to NLWs may vary widely, as it depends on the particular type of non-lethal effect considered. It is difficult to generalize about NLWs as there is so much diversity in their characteristics and breeds that they are often not really closely related. Some analysts even suggest that it might be intellectually cleaner not to speak of a category of NLWs at all (Koplow 2006). Such an approach supports the preference for a conceptual separation of the notions of ‘non-lethality’ and of ‘non-lethal weapon’, as has been adopted in this paper. Whereas from a functional and technological point of view, non-lethality would seem instrumental to cope with the tactical, operational and even strategic problems of the impossibility of discrimination between benign and hostile targets in irregular scenarios, the question remains whether indis- criminate use of non-lethal force would be legitimate. As we have seen, in contemporary conflict scenarios the civilian population can often no longer be considered an outsider in relation to the type of mission and tasks the military intervention force is performing. To give another example, when a crowd in an urban scenario does not behave aggressively, but at the same time there is a high probability that hostile and armed elements hide in that crowd, would it be acceptable to neutralize or disperse the crowd by means of ‘mass- incapacitation’? In this situation, the NLW is used pre-discriminately, because after the mass-incapacitation has been achieved, forces could approach and single out the opposing militants (Enemark 2008). A particular group of NLWs that would facilitate such an operation can be labelled as area effect weapons. Their intent is to engage a group of individuals that are gathered within a certain space, either in the open or indoors. Advocates of the operational need for this capability argue as follows:

What are needed with absolute certainty, are NLWs that can reliably incapacitate, or otherwise initiate control of targeted persons dispersed over a fairly large area. Applications of NLWs in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peace support and other law enforcement-like operations, make these systems imperative. (Alexander 2007a: 4)

Resolving uncertainty through indiscriminate targeting is also a relevant issue in asymmetric conflict scenarios involving singular actors. In one case, international security forces in Afghanistan have been confronted with situations in which military convoys passing through villages or towns were attacked by vehicle borne suicide Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks.7 In response to the threat, force protection procedures ed to various civilian casualties when car drivers or motor bikers did not respond to 43 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 95

warning signs and warning shots from the passing military vehicles to respect the minimal safe distance from the convoy. Non-lethality is being considered by operational commanders as a method to be able to stop or neutralize individuals indiscriminately. In an effort to accomplish this, a stepwise approach is considered, with increasing levels of non-lethal physical effect when the target would continue to approach the convoy. Whether or not the capabilities called for are ultimately feasible, they inform the debate on the ethical implications of engaging a population indiscriminately to reduce the uncertainty problem beleaguering current military missions.

NLW and Just War Tradition The paradigm shift in the nature of conflict defines new roles and challenges for the military. The new roles are to a large extent other than war-fighting. These changed circumstances have implications for the interpretation of the Just War Tradition. In the absence of overt war, the jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination, as well as NCI, need to be re-calibrated. The ongoing NLWdebate, in particular the ethical and moral ramifications of the new military options, is a clear indication of this need. NLWs have already been deployed and used by the military forces of a variety of countries in a range of international intervention missions. This includes the use of NLWs against civilians in particular circumstances, and in situations where the discrimination between combatants and non-combatants is not possible. Some analysts criticize the use of NLWs as a technical fix to reduce this uncertainty problem. Kaurin (2008) argues against the use of NLWs as a way to circumvent or make irrelevant moral distinctions like combatants/non-combatants. However, the DTA approach in this article tells us that the military forces are morally still committed to accept a considerable level of risk and show restraint before using force, even with a non-lethal option at their disposal. While NCI obliges the military to treat non- combatants as different from militants, the blurring distinction between combatants and non-combatants requires the operational commander to take decisions on the use of force in situations where the universal immunity of non-combatants in the classic sense is no longer a workable concept. Those in favour of the permissible use of NLWs against non-combatants argue that the intentional harm to civilians requires that the principle of NCI be subjected to a ‘lesser evils’ test that compares the small intentional harm with a greater level of non-intentional harm that comes from lethal force. If the former is significantly less than the latter than there are moral grounds to targeting civilian non-combatants with NLWs (Gross 2008). NCI needs a new interpretation in order to effectively serve as an effective moral compass for the military commander and operator in complex situations when the use of NLWs is contemplated. The DTA method can be used to match NCI ‘new style’ with the application of non-lethal force against non-combatants, in part by checking the moral standards educated and trained to the military forces 44 equipped with NLWs. 96 S. Orbons

Abuse and proliferation are by-products of non-lethal technologies and weapons that deserve due attention and response. Immoral uses of NLWs will occur, and have the potential of becoming political showstoppers for non- lethality, even when regular forces would generally use NLWs in an operationally and morally rightful manner. Any technology, including dedicated non-lethal ones, has the potential of human rights violations, although particular technologies which leave no marks pose a particular challenge to finding evidence of abuse. Besides abuse of NLWs, it is important to assess the likelihood of an NLW to be unreliable regarding its non-lethal performance. It would appear ethically inappropriate to field any NLW that poses a significant risk of excessively harming people, albeit unintentional. One of the issues interfering with the rationale of non-lethality is the permissibility and acceptability of intentionally inflicting pain, harm and suffering against civilians. The principle of proportionality of a certain military action is usually tested by assessing whether the significance of the military objective of the action outweighs the unavoidable civilian casualties. Asymmetrical warfare, by its very nature, carries a greater risk of dispropor- tionate, unnecessary and intentional harm than conventional fighting between two relatively well-matched forces. NLWs may not solve these problems entirely, but do offer an avenue for limiting disproportionate harm to civilians in contemporary armed conflict (Gross 2008). In analogy to the DTA approach to consider the military utility of NLWs contextually, a judgement of NLWs on moral and ethical acceptability and on proportion- ality could be performed contextually as well. Some analysts consider the use of NLWs by military forces directed against civilian populations as a radical change in military strategy (Enemark 2008). For the appreciation of the moral acceptability of such a strategic shift it is relevant to refer to Fidler’s proposal suggesting an amendment in interna- tional law that reflects the changing nature of conflict and its implications for the position of NLWs:

The Selective Change Perspective, which accepts that the nature of conflict have changed and will continue to change. Consequently, rules for NLW can be different from those for lethal weapons, but NLW needs to be clearly defined to enable change of particular parts of international law regimes on a case by case basis. (Fidler 2001: 198)

Fidler requires a clear definition of (an) NLW, in order to enable that a change in international law can be formulated. DTA tells us, however, that it is not only the NLW itself that has to be clearly defined, but also the attitude and approach of the user who employs it. A change in international law, therefore, seems premature for NLWs with effects that are ‘user sensitive’.

Conclusions In Western societies, drawing from their democratic culture and tradition, moral and ethical issues increasingly have come into play when dealing with conflict. In the Western way of war, in particular in wars of choice rather than necessity, respect for human life has become a key issue. A need has emerged 45 Do Non-Lethal Capabilities License to ‘Silence’? 97

for more fine-tuned effects of weapons as to make them perform non-lethally. The Just War Tradition, in particular the jus in bello component expressed in the requirements of proportionality and discrimination, needs to be adjusted to the human-centric operational environment. From an idealist perspective, NLWs are technologically designed and expected to make military operations more benign and even bloodless. In reality the performance of NLWs is submitted to operational friction, comprising many factors of influence and chance that erode the expected effect. Contemporary conflict is therefore characterized by uncertainty. A Defence Technology Assessment of NLWs considers the user, the weapon and the target as complex components of a system that is exposed to the influences of the specific context of the scenario of deployment. The DTA application demonstrates that apart from technical constraints, NLW effectiveness is strongly affected by independent factors within the user and target complexes. The target population may respond in widely diverging ways, depending on situational circumstances. The risk of serious harm or fatalities predominantly depends on the training, skills and attitude of the military user. Hence, a home-tested functioning technological concept in itself is no guarantee for successful operational utility in real scenarios. Instead, the DTA approach would help to unravel the operational complexity and thus enable an uncertainty reduction. This approach also informs the ethical and moral issues that guide NLW use. The occurrence of abuse of NLWs is impossible to rule out, as any technology can be employed in a harmful manner, especially with types of NLWs that leave no traces on the victim. In this respect it would be ethically appropriate to consider the infliction of temporary harm as a lesser evil. The concept of non-lethality appears to be implicitly compliant with the imperative of proportionality. Ultimately, a partial review of International Humanitarian Law would facilitate the mitigation of the risk of inflicting innocent casualties by allowing a wider deployment of non-lethality. Such a review would provide the military with a license to non-lethally and temporarily silence a violent or risk situation in international intervention missions. It is therefore recommendable that a thorough assessment of NLW performance in a contextual framework precedes amendment of law.

Acknowledgements I want to thank Professor John Grin for his suggestions and constructive remarks on a draft of this article.

Notes 1 The article is based on a paper that I presented at the international conference Emerging Technologies, Ethics and Leadership, organized by the Netherlands Defence Academy, 5Á7 November 2008, 46 Amsterdam. 98 S. Orbons

2 A distinction is made between the notions of non-lethality and non-lethal (weapons or capabilities). Non- lethality refers to wider strategic and operational concepts that guide the use of force that is supposed to deliver non-lethal effects. Non-lethal refers to the properties and effects of weapons. Compare Rappert (2002: 55, 73). 3 In an interview with the author, J. Bolle stated that in US prisons the spraying of CS gas to control turmoil in gatherings of inmates was less effective and led to replacement of the agent by the much stronger pepper spray, also dispersed as an area effect aerosol (Ossendrecht, Netherlands Police Academy, October 2007). 4 Interview by the author with Col (rtd) J. Wilson, who gave an account of the prison incident that took place in the 1970s (Upavon, HQ UK Army, 16 December 2008). 5 Interview by the author with a commander of an arrest team in the Dutch armed forces. The name of the interviewee is not disclosed for security reasons (March 2008). 6 Interview by the author with Brig (rtd) T. Longland (Shrivenham, DCDC, 18 December 2008). 7 Anecdotal accounts of such situations have been taken from interviews by the author in 2007 and the first half of 2008 with Dutch officers who have served with the Dutch Battle Group of Task Force Uruzgan in Afghanistan. Respondents are not quoted in this paper for security reasons.

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Biography Sjef Orbons joined the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands in 1989. He is currently a researcher at the Netherlands Defence Academy and preparing a PhD thesis on the topic of non-lethality. Previous staff positions include the Department of Defence Concepts of the MOD and the NATO Defense College in Rome. He received his Master of Science from Eindhoven University of Technology. 48 Chapter 3 Non-Lethal Weapons: Peace Enablers or Troublesome Force? Assessing the Role of CS and Baton Rounds in the Northern Ireland Conflict *

* Orbons, S. (2011) Non-lethal weapons: peace enablers or troublesome force? Assessing the role of CS and baton rounds in the Northern Ireland conflict, Small Wars & Insurgencies,22(3), pp. 467-494.

Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol. 22, No. 3, July 2011, 467–494

Non-lethal weapons: peace enablers or troublesome force? Assessing the role of CS and baton rounds in the Northern Ireland conflict Sjef Orbons*

Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

This article seeks to assess the utility of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) under ‘real world’ conditions. A defence technology assessment framework is applied to analyse the use of NLWs during the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland in the late twentieth century. Case analysis demonstrates that the effects of NLW employment in real scenarios significantly depend on the operational context of its use. The approach followed and the assessment outcome can be used to inform the ongoing debate on the utility of existing and novel NLWs to support stabilisation operations in current and future conflict settings. Keywords: British Army; Bogside; baton rounds; CS gas; defence technology assessment; Royal Ulster Constabulary; non-lethal weapons; rubber bullets; Provisional IRA

Introduction Non-lethality: origins and debate Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) have been in use with security forces since the 1950s. During the Cold War era NLWs were predominantly adopted by police and law enforcement agencies for domestic purposes. The military started to

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 introduce these weapons during conflict intervention missions in the early 1990s. What are NLWs for? In essence NLWs emerged from the need felt among Western armed forces to have at their disposal less destructive and less lethal instruments than those intended for large-scale warfare.1 Military forces should become better capable of accomplishing their mission without inflicting unintended and innocent casualties, in particular among the civil population. NLWs should also provide for measured force responses in a range of situations where the use of lethal force would be politically and legally prohibitive. Such situations frequently occur during operations in conflicts dominated by irregular warfare (IW). Meanwhile, NATO member states, first of all the US, have adopted formal NLW policies, as has the Alliance itself. A useful definition of NLWs is the one used by NATO:

*Email: [email protected]

ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online q 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2011.581494 51 http://www.informaworld.com 468 S. Orbons

Weapons which are explicitly designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal undesired damage or impact on the environment.2 However, even after their formal military acknowledgement, NLWs remain the subject of intensive debate. On the one hand, their availability raises high expectations with some analysts by portraying them as ‘weapons of mass protection’.3 Such optimism coincides with the responsibility felt in Western states to humanise war and to comply with the associated imperative of casualty aversion intensified by media presence in conflict zones.4 Others, such as McNab and Scott in 2009, add that in an increasingly complex operational environment NLWs may reduce the level of violence (US) forces both incur and experience in IW operations.5 New NLW-concepts have also been claimed to be promising for military tasks due to their potentially broad applicability and the novelty of the technologies applied.6 Such claims are disputed by sceptics, who stress the unreliability of NLWs on the basis of accounts of incidents in which the application of NLWs led to severe harm or even fatal injury to individuals. In most of the cases NLWs were mostly used by the police. Such views are reinforced by reports from human rights organisations on the abuse, or excessive use, of such devices by law enforcement agencies.7 In addition, legal objections have been raised against the military use of NLWs abroad, drawing from international humanitarian law and arms protocols.8 A key question underlying this debate is whether existing and novel NLWs meet their promises under real world conditions. Where NLWs are claimed to help manage violence in the complexity of today’s operational environment, in reality this complexity may also backfire on NLW performance. Most analyses of NLWs, however, lack operational evidence of the military performance of NLWs and tend to rely on design-based assumptions of utility and outcome rather than on assessments from hard data. Some analysts, such as Rappert in 2003, have recognised this shortfall and argue that the outcome of NLW use in real operations 9 Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 depends on the circumstances of the specific situation in which the NLW is applied. Against this background, this article seeks to assess NLWs under ‘real’ operational conditions. It investigates how and to what extent the context of an event with NLW use is responsible for the outcome of its application compared to its original purpose. It will be demonstrated that the effect of NLW use is a result not so much of its technological sophistication, but rather of contextual factors. The case used for the analysis is the conflict in Northern Ireland that emerged in the late 1960s, also known as the ‘Troubles’. For the purpose this article, this case is an appropriate one, because of the following considerations:

. there are sufficient data and accounts on the use and effects of NLWs available to inform the analytic approach of a defence technology assessment; . some ‘intermediary variables’ can be reduced, especially communication and 52 cultural gaps between interventionist forces and the local society; Small Wars & Insurgencies 469

. the long duration of the conflict and the experiences and lessons learned by the security forces throughout has driven innovations in technologies and methods of operations of the NLWs employed, which helps us to investigate to what extent technological advances may help overcome the influence of operational circumstances. Thus, it can be argued that the analysis of NLW use in Northern Ireland is relevant for assessing contemporary intervention forces’ NLW use. Of the NLWs that have been used in Northern Ireland (CS or ‘teargas’, baton rounds, the water cannon, the baton (night stick), and the electric shield), I will focus on the two most prominent and frequently used ones: CS and the baton round (BR).10 An assessment of precisely these two NLWs is also meaningful from a wider perspective, as both types are currently employed by military and police forces across the entire world.11 The next section shows an outline of the analytical framework, drawing upon the method of defence technology assessment (DTA). After a synopsis of the Troubles, this framework is applied to several episodes of the conflict in which NLWs have been used. The results of this analytic approach provide some lessons learned to inform the perspective of NLW use in current conflicts.

A DTA approach to NLWs Technology assessment (TA) is a research analysis approach that seeks to evaluate innovative technological concepts within a contextual framework to provide a balanced judgement of their utility and political desirability. DTA is specifically designed for a systematic approach to new military concepts within the operational context, including human and procedural factors, in which the system is to be applied.12 Within the domain of non-lethality, the significance of operational context in analysing NLWs has been emphasised by various analysts. Rappert explains that 13 Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 an account of technology relies on context as a way to understand its meaning. Feakin expands on Rappert’s views and seeks to capture the notion of context in a formula that defines effect as an outcome of the ‘ICE’ equation of non-lethality: Intent Context Effect. He argues that if an NLW is used with the correct intentþ and within¼ an appropriate context, this will equal a desired ‘non-lethal’ effect.14 However, representing effectiveness as a simple addition understates the complexity involved in a range of factors that also influence the outcome. Even under ideal circumstances, including the user’s correctness of intent and an appropriate situational context for using a particular NLW, considerable uncertainty remains regarding the variability of targets’ attitudes and their available response options against its working principle. The DTA model aims at capturing this complexity. Rather than an equation, the model aims at framing the essential elements that through their interaction shape the outcome of the operational use of an NLW. The framework consists of three compo- nents that are to be understood as complexes: the user, the weapon & technology, and 53 470 S. Orbons the target.15 The term complex is an expression of the variety of factors of influence that can be attributed to each of the components that shape the process of obtaining a particular non-lethal effect. The user complex, for instance, includes training of personnel and doctrinal guidance, organisational deployment of the non-lethal capability, experience, attitude, and familiarity with the deployment environment. Every single situation where NLWs are used is defined by a particular context. Besides the fact that the situational context directly affects the outcome, it also influences each of the three components separately, as is shown in Figure 1. The following case studies on CS and baton rounds (BRs) are used in the investigation into how the contextual dependency of the three components and their interactions during operational use of the NLW are responsible for potential differences between what is required and expected from NLW deployment and what the actual outcome is under field conditions.

The security context of Northern Ireland The conflict in Northern Ireland ensued from a growing resistance among the Catholic community against their political and social marginalisation within the ‘Province’. The protests were inspired by the civil rights movements that arose in the US during the 1960s.16 However, the Catholic minority’s call for reforms was perceived by the Unionist dominated government as a threat to the legitimate status of the state. The government’s view of the protests as being illegal led to intervention by force. Catholic civil rights marches met heavy-handed responses from the predominantly Protestant Northern Irish police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The civil unrest and violence that followed grew to such a level that it could not be contained by the RUC, and the Northern Irish government felt no longer capable of assuring security in the province.17 The British Army was deployed to intervene between the sectarian groups for the first Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011

Operational

Weapon–technology complex

Policy c o n t e x t Strategic Outcome expectations User Target Needs complex complex

Use

Figure 1. The NLW defence technology assessment model. The central box represents the framework to analyse and explain differences between expectations and the actual 54 outcome of NLW employment. Small Wars & Insurgencies 471 time in 1969. Initially, the British regarded the political unrest and violence in the province as a local and ‘law and order’ problem, and the British Army was therefore deployed in a peacekeeping role.18 The absence of any solid political strategy towards a stable province-wide end state created a political vacuum in which the British Army developed its own strategic approach with a focus on the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Nationalist community.19 The (Provisional) Irish Republican Army (PIRA) did not accept the military presence and aggressively countered the British Army to try to eventually push it out of the province. By 1972, the British Army’s initial ‘hearts and minds’ approach was totally destroyed.20 Rather than providing a short-term solution, militarisation inevitably became part of a long-term problem. As Dodd noted, there was no way for the British Army to leave the province in the absence of a political settlement of the conflict, as this would result in civil war.21 A Catch-22 situation had been created: abandoning the military approach–by withdrawing the British Army from the province–would unleash the potential anarchy of all-out inter-communal violence. Relying on the military solution alone would fuel extremist violence.22 To defuse the dilemma, the concept of police primacy was chosen. The British Army would maintain a supporting role to the RUC within a law and order framework. However, the effect on the ground was that the RUC was drawn into a conflict with the Catholic community, which generated further recruitment for the insurgency.23 During more than three decades the British Army faced the challenge of applying a minimal force approach in an environment that had become increasingly hostile to its presence. It had to strike a delicate balance between force protection against serious and life-threatening attacks on the one hand, and maintaining public order during public manifestations and sectarian confronta- tions on the other. The complexity of the situation was further compounded by the blending of paramilitary, hostile elements, and the normal community. A need for dedicated capabilities emerged to cope with a mixed non- cooperative environment at an early stage of the conflict. The British Army could

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 initially rely only on riot control equipment it had already employed in former colonies, in particular CS, to control mass events like demonstrations and marches. Rubber bullets and BRs should deal with direct threats, as an alternative to the use of lethal force. In the next section the method of assessing the operational use of these NLWs is outlined.

CS CS weapon/technology CS, commonly referred to as teargas, is an irritant chemical agent which was first synthesised in 1928. Although it is often presented as being a gas, in its basic form it is a crystalline solid. When used in devices designed for military or police purposes, such as cartridges or grenades, CS is mixed with a pyrotechnic substance and, on ignition, is expelled in the form of a vapour that immediately condenses to form minute liquid droplets or particles. Furthermore, in water or body fluids, CS rapidly 55 472 S. Orbons breaks down into far less active substances.24 Some types of CS are insoluble and can therefore remain active for several weeks and require decontamination of buildings, cloths, or other items. This is also critical due to the high flammability of CS.25 CS can be used to disperse large gatherings, deny an area, or to incapacitate individuals temporarily. The physiological response of the human body to CS is irritation and inflammation of the skin, airways, and mucous membrane tissues. These effects worsen with increasing concentration and duration of exposure. The symptoms lessen after the exposure is removed, and gradually disappear after 30–60 minutes.26 Medical analysis studies of CS exposure claim that the safety margin of inhaled CS for a person who is exposed to the agent in open air is very large. Under such conditions, CS is therefore considered not to cause any unacceptable health risks to people, including less healthy persons.27 However, more recent medical evidence indicates that already with relatively low concentrations medical risk groups may be seriously harmed.28 Other studies warn of health damage at higher levels of CS exposure, such as chemical burns to the skin, heightened blood pressure, and even heart failure.29 Individuals who are exposed to CS for an extended period of time and deprived of fresh air run a higher health risk, especially those with a weak physical condition. The bottom line claim is that, assuming CS is used by properly trained officers and exposed combatants leave the area rapidly, few, if any, significant long-term human disabling effects should occur.30 The agent is typically delivered from a handheld launcher into an area at a range of dozens of metres away. Other techniques for CS release exist. In Aden in 1966 and 1967 the British Army dropped CS canisters from helicopters from altitudes of several hundreds of yards.31 A more recent application of CS is based on a handheld spray dispenser that fires a stream of irritant agent in solution, thus making it better directive against individual persons.32 In this way, the risk of harming bystanders is much smaller than is the case with area release of CS. However, medical experts and human rights groups are concerned about hazardous consequences of both the 33 Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 agent and the propellant, and their combination in particular.

CS user In Northern Ireland CS was first used by the security forces in 1969. The aim was to disperse crowds not reacting to warnings, or to force the break-up of public disturbances. The agent could be delivered as hand-thrown grenades or as cartridges fired from a 1.5-inch signal pistol.34 This required only few additional basic skills, as practising with gas masks and hand grenades was part of regular military training. Given the limited capacity of a cartridge, forces had to deliver CS dispensers continuously to keep up effective concentration levels of the agent in the target zone. A platoon was usually issued with around 20 CS grenades, distributed over a quarter of the unit’s personnel.35 During operations involving CS, the wearing of gas masks reduced 56 communication among the forces, degraded vision, and was generally experienced Small Wars & Insurgencies 473 as cumbersome. Eventually, the use of masks did not protect security forces against CS effects during its protracted use. Instructions issued to the British Army forces in early August 1972 were that BRs were to be used in preference to CS.36 Some respondents have stated that the British Army was reluctant to use CS, as its effect was too indiscriminative.37 Occasionally security forces used CS in house searching operations, when looking for dangerous suspects, which obviously went against the general recommen- dation to employ CS in open air only.38

CS targets In Northern Ireland CS was normally used to control a crisis or a public disturbance in which large numbers of people were involved. Across such gatherings, individual’s intentions, responses, and levels of determination vis-a`- vis the security forces varied widely. Bystanders and residents in the crisis zone often found themselves drawn into the disturbance. The view the target group had of the security forces played a significant role during actual engagements. Ellison and Martin signal the shift from issue- motivated disturbances caused by the Catholic community towards activism directly aimed against the RUC: Complaints about discrimination quickly gave way to complaints about the RUC, and from the outset the response of the state and the forces of law and order to Catholic mobilization was an issue capable of arousing far more anger and activism than the issues around which mobilization had begun.39 Determined members of targeted groups could develop methods to resist CS for extended time. Rioters covered their faces with handkerchiefs soaked in vinegar or lemon juice to mitigate the weapon’s effect.40 Improvised gasmasks were used whenever available to protect the eyes and to prevent respiratory discomfort. Hardened demonstrators could remove or return the gas canisters 41 Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 before these had released and dispersed the agent. Moreover, tolerance to CS could develop after prolonged or repeated exposure, allowing targets to stay in zones with high concentrations of CS.42

CS use-in-operational-context Evidence of how the operational context affects the impact of CS employmentcan be found in accounts of major cases of CS use in the cities of Londonderry and Belfast.

Londonderry 1969 The first and most significant use of CS ever in Northern Ireland took place in Londonderry, between 12 and 14 August 1969. In the preceding months the security forces, then still only the RUC, had frequently clashed with local Nationalists during their protests against the Northern Ireland Government and its 43 agents. The event in mid-August, commonly referred to as the Battle of the 57 474 S. Orbons Bogside, and named after the Catholic residential area that was the centre of the confrontation, was triggered off by sectarian rioting arising from an Orange Order march close to the Bogside area. Acute tension grew after the authorities had refused to veto the march. After defenders in the Bogside had started to stone the marchers, the situation escalated into a battle between the Nationalists and the RUC that lasted for more than two days.44 The RUC aimed at entering the Bogside in order to seal off the march route and stop the stone barrage. Nationalists fiercely defended and barricaded the area against the security forces. As the RUC lacked the manpower to force through, it started to use CS. The RUC received its first instruction on the use of CS just 50 minutes before the agent was actually used in the Bogside area.45 The introduction of CS did not help the RUC to get the situation under control. Some defenders had taken up positions on the top floors of the high-rise flats in the Bogside district, out of range of the CS. They could continuously throw stones and petrol bombs on the police forces. During the siege that followed, the RUC used CS in large quantities to counter rioters on the barricades, who engaged them with stones and other missiles.46 CS hand grenades were used in the massive charges to force a breakthrough. As the RUC lacked the manpower to hold any ground gained, the stalemate with the Catholic defenders continued.47 This defined the context of the confrontation as a siege of the Bogside, and, in the absence of any alternative force options to the security forces, ensued in a protracted release of CS. Over 36 hours, over 1,000 CS canisters were fired inside the densely populated Bogside residential area. The situational context was further marked by the compact layout of the Bogside and the almost windless, extremely warm, and humid weather conditions. This resulted in a permanent CS ‘cloud’ over the Bogside, a condition very different from the ‘standard’ effect of CS, namely the quick dispersal of a target crowd. These conditions stretched the target context far beyond the physical scene of the rioters in battle with the security forces. Even before CS was deployed, the profile of the resistance from the Bogside community against the RUC had started to broaden

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 as police charges turned out to be a joint operation of the RUC and Loyalist militants, the latter being the sectarian opponents of the Nationalists.48 This perceived partiality of the RUC to wider parts of the Bogside community had dramatically changed its attitude towards the security forces in their role for the Northern Irish political authority. The massive and indiscriminate use of CS against rioters affected the Bogside community as a whole as it particularly hit children and elderly and weaker people in their homes. The effect was worse due to the weak health situation of the residents caused by the unfavourable climatic conditions in Northern Ireland, poverty and bad housing, together resulting in chronic respiratory illnesses.49 Some accounts from the Bogside speak of CS fired directly into houses.50 Raymond McClean, a medical doctor from Londonderry who treated the injuries during the battle, noted that the sheer amount of released agent and resulting concentration levels caused many citizens from the Bogside to suffer, hundreds of them so badly that they needed medical assistance.51 The excessive use of CS actually transformed 58 the target context from a relatively small group of rioters and fighters into a much Small Wars & Insurgencies 475 wider mobilised community. McClean describes how women handed out water and vinegar from their homes to passers-by to help them protect themselves against CS, while others went out to collect money to buy petrol for petrol bombs.52 Determined fighters were able to withstand the effect of CS. During the battle one of their leaders, Bernadette Devlin, kept telling people ‘it’s OK, once you get taste of it’.53 A news pamphlet, the Barricade Bulletin, provided instructions on how to throw petrol bombs to best effect and minimise the effects of CS.54 To the defenders, the battle was one for survival which prompted the use of the strongest force available to them. How essential the role of the target context was to denying the incapacitating effect of CS is illustrated by an anecdote taken from a report of the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science: Himsworth has even described Highland soldiers being tempted by a 5 £ note and a bottle of whisky to pass through a concentrated cloud of smoke and being unable to do so. Perhaps this shows the difference between financial motivation and fighting for a real cause or perhaps it shows the difference between laboratory and operational conditions.55 Tragically, it was precisely this motivation and resilience of the defenders that increased the harm done to innocent and helpless residents in the Bogside area. CS had merely served as the catalyst of a protracted and exhaustive battle, only to extend the target context far beyond the original local resistance of youngsters. The Battle of the Bogside thus became the climax of a gradual escalation of tension and violence in and around Londonderry that had been building up since the early 1969. McLean’s comments: An entire community had been at war with what was supposed to have been their own police force, a community determined and united, a community used to economic depression, emigration and hopelessness–now on its feet and with a spring in its step.56 During the siege the RUC was worn down by fatigue and had suffered so many casualties that it finally lost the battle. The Nationalists kept full control over the

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 Bogside. The British Army was requested by Northern Ireland’s prime minister to prevent further escalation. Neither the Stormont government nor the RUC were in complete control any longer. The battle had caused hundreds of wounded RUC- members and over 1,000 injuries were claimed among the residents, many due to CS. The large amount of CS released by the RUC gave rise to an official enquiry into the medical aspects of the use of CS.57 In conjunction with the report, the Home Office stated that the RUC was not properly instructed beforehand in the use of such massive quantities of CS.58 The second part of the Himsworth report included a new Army Directive on the use of CS in closed spaces, issued in December 1969.59 The Battle of the Bogside had turned the image of the agent from a crowd dispersal technique into one of indiscriminate repression. This became evident just some weeks later, when serious rioting had erupted again in the Bogside area. The British Army, now in charge of controlling Londonderry, had fired large amounts of CS canisters to stop the disturbances. A militant group within the Bogside responded by threatening that, unless the British Army ceased the use of 59 476 S. Orbons CS, the group would retaliate with explosives. The British Army decided to give in.60 CS had become a tripwire for opposing militant groups to escalate towards lethal levels of violence. In this way, the perceived abuse of CS had contributed to widening the gap between sectarian communities themselves and between the Nationalist community and the security forces. The establishment of a ‘no-go’ area as a result of the battle provided a sanctuary from where the militant elements of the PIRA could prepare and launch armed attacks against the British Army. The implications of the creation of this stronghold became evident in the years to come, including the tragic events of Bloody Sunday. The Report on the Bloody Sunday Enquiry of 2010 underlined the significance of the alienation between the Nationalist community and the security forces, with the latter only being able to enter the Bogside with large numbers of soldiers.61

Belfast/Ballymurphy 1970 On 30 March 1970 a second event involving massive CS use took place in Ballymurphy, a Catholic estate in Belfast. Again, violence was triggered by a Protestant march that would pass close to a Catholic residential area. The British Army was tasked to keep Catholics and Protestants separated. The rioting that evolved was thought to have been inspired or organised by the Provisional IRA in a deliberate attempt to disrupt relations between the British Army and civilians. In fact, the British Army had begun to look upon the Catholic community, which it was expected to protect, as the ‘problematic population’ at a very early stage. This defined the context of its deployment and it subsequently operated in line with this highly ‘political’ view of the situation.62 From a user context perspective, the British Army, facing an overwhelming numerical superiority of crowds opposing each other at Ballymurphy, was denied to follow the doctrine of minimum force, as such an approach hinges on the presence of relatively large troop numbers.63 In the absence of any alternative to

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 control the riots, the high stress conditions under which the force had to keep the two sides apart led it to use CS in large quantities. Despite its bias against the Catholics resulting from the context of the situation, the British Army still believed that it was using CS in an impartial manner in order to keep Protestant marchers and Catholic opponents apart. In reality the two sides were exposed asymmetrically: the Protestants were ‘out on the streets’, whereas the Catholics were ‘at home’. Moreover, in the target context, the Scots-Protestant identity of the British Army unit deployed was a critical factor, as they were perceived by the Catholics as sympathising with the local co-religionists.64 These contextual asymmetries together were essential in the context of the confrontation, as they dramatically degraded the intended effect of CS use to mitigate the violence. What had started as a conflict between the British Army and Catholic youth, over use of CS also antagonised senior sections of the population.65 The rioting and use of CS continued for four days, during which the British 60 Army was exposed as a destructive, and not constructive, force. Some commentators Small Wars & Insurgencies 477 saw the outcome as a strategic disaster, as it radicalised the Catholic community that thus became alienated from the British Army. To the Catholics, the British Army had transformed from being their defender and ally into becoming their enemy.66

The aftermath of CS deployment The experiences with CS in urban areas in Northern Ireland demonstrated that physical and environmental conditions complicated the control and predictability of the agent’s effect. The dynamics of confrontations between security forces and target populations further reduced the selective applicability of CS. At the physical level, simple countermeasures and increasing tolerance to the agent considerably reduced the intended effect of CS against determined target individuals.67 Peaceful residents suffered the worst effects, in particular under the protracted and intensified release of CS by security forces. From the outset of their deployment in Northern Ireland, British Army officers had been aware and morally concerned about the counterproductive effects of CS on popular support for the British Army’s presence. Yet, management of public disturbances and aggressive riots would have been almost impossible without the use of CS, as the identification of targets in order to single them out was often problematic. CS was to be used as a last resort, after BRs had been used first. Yet, once resistance from the crowd had become too strong, the employment of CS was inevitable.68 The security forces also felt the pressure to act decisively, preventively, and effectively, to uphold the state’s political credibility.69 Violent disturbances had to be contained by the security forces with maximum effort, even when the effect was indiscriminate. Londonderry and Ballymurphy show that CS as an area denial NLW could not counterbalance undersized security forces without seriously antagonising broader parts of the population. Northern Ireland has demonstrated that within the context of a charged political environment and in absence of an agreed political end state, the repetitive and

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 indiscriminate use of CS merely galvanised resistance, triggered escalation of violence, encouraged recruitment of more insurgents, and contributed to the loss of hearts and minds among the population. Media and civil rights groups’ accounts of the impact of CS use reinforced these effects, thereby politicising the confrontation between the BA and Nationalists at the national and international level. Other modes of CS use were practised, and on at least one occasion the agent was claimed to be successfully deployed against target subjects in a confined space. In 1972, in the Long Kesh internment centre, IRA prisoners who had taken control over their barracks were driven out by British Army personnel throwing CS grenades inside. No casualties or lasting injuries were claimed to have occurred among the IRA members.70 The rules for CS were tightened and after the mid 1970s it was rarely used.71 As an area denial NLW CS was last used in Northern Ireland in 1974.72 Notwithstanding the early negative experiences in Northern Ireland, CS made a comeback in the UK as a spraying device against individual close-in targets. Safety and health concerns persist. 61 478 S. Orbons Baton rounds (BRs) BR weapon/technology Baton rounds (BRs), also called ‘plastic bullets’, are blunt impact weapons launched against individuals. BRs are cylindrically shaped, have diameters between 30 and 40 mm, are between 10 and 15 cm long, and have a rounded impact face. The purpose of the BR is to induce pain, irritation, and minimal injury, in order to dissuade or prevent a violent or potentially violent person from pursuing the intended course of action. The physiological effect is directly related to the anatomical location where the projectile strikes the subject.73 The intended effect on the target individual resembles the punch of a boxer. Ideally, the BR strikes the abdomen, while hits on the extremities, in particular the legs, are also effective. The projectile’s velocity and ballistic stability are key factors for aiming accuracy. Launching velocities are around 80 m/s. Ballistic stability can be enhanced with spin-stabilisation of the projectile. Required accuracy on the target is usually defined as a probability that the projectile strikes in an area of 20 cm wide and 60 cm high. In 2004, a report of a UK programme for an improved BR set this probability at 85% for a minimum distance of 25 metres, and desirably up to 40 metres. Desirable accuracy on a target should be 20 cm wide and only 40 cm high, with the aiming centre on the abdominal part of the body.74 BRs were introduced in Northern Ireland in the mid 1970s. Until then rubber bullets were deployed, with lower ballistic accuracy standards. A medical report on injuries caused by rubber bullets states that due to firing the round from a CS canister launcher, the tumbling of the projectile in flight, and poor aerodynamic shape it was difficult to hit at 18 metres a target with a 2 metre diameter.75 Early versions of the BR deployed in Northern Ireland also had low performance standards, which were gradually raised through successive improved designs. The delivery system for BRs is usually a handheld baton gun. From the 1980s on, innovations of the launching device added to increased technical performance and reliability.76 Currently the launching device includes a mounted sighting Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 system for accurate aiming. BRs have limited potential for performance growth. Effectiveness at ranges above 50 metres is poor. Kinetic energy drops significantly at longer ranges, at 25 metres to about 75% of the level at a range of 10 metres. At longer engagement ranges, the flight trajectory of the round is more curved, reducing aiming accuracy.77 Shorter firing ranges enhance accuracy, but deliver a heavier impact on the target, thereby increasing the injury potential.

BR user Handling a BR-gun requires dedicated skills, drills, and procedures in order to ensure the officer or soldier acquires proficiency with the baton gun under real situation conditions to achieve the desired physical effect on the target. The 62 BR capability is complementary to other functions within a police or military unit. Small Wars & Insurgencies 479 Security forces in Northern Ireland equipped with rubber bullets and BRs were subject to specific guidelines on their use. These guidelines were based on the principle of minimum and reasonable force, both for the RUC and the British Army, and put restrictions on the use of the projectiles. Rules have been adjusted over time, partly as a result of operational experiences, ensuing policy changes, and technological advances in weapon design. A central issue was the minimum permissible targeting range. Former officers explained that during their deployment to Northern Ireland in the early 1970s a minimum firing range of 20 metres had to be observed. Firing at distances as near as 10–15 metres was only allowed for self-defence against very aggressive individuals.78 While rubber bullets should be aimed at the ground in front of targets to strike after ricochet, BRs should be fired directly at the target. The British Army started to replace the rubber bullet in 1974/1975 and the RUC from 1978 on.79 The 1980Yellow Card instructions for BA personnel specified the RoEs for BRs: General - BRs may be used to disperse a crowd whenever it is judged to be the minimum and reasonable force in the circumstances - The rounds must be fired at selected persons and not indiscriminately at the crowd. They should be aimed so that they strike the lower part of the target’s body directly (i.e. without bouncing) - The authority to use these rounds is delegated to the commander on the spot. Additional rules for the 25 grain PVC BR - Rounds must not be fired at a range of less than 20 metres except when the safety of soldiers or others is seriously threatened. - The BR was designed and produced to disperse crowds. It can also be used to prevent an escape from HM Prisons if it is, in the circumstances, still considered to constitute the use of minimum and reasonable force.80

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 BRs hitting target individuals within 20 metres can cause serious or even fatal injury. The option to employ BRs at close range actually provided for a dual use role, namely a non-lethal and (less) lethal one. In 1995, revised guidelines for the RUC on how to use BRs were largely similar to the above rules, but also gave more precise instructions regarding discipline in handling the BR-gun and the proportionality of the amount of force to be used. Any (first) use of BRs should be preceded by a verbal warning. BRs should not be fired without the express order of the group leader, and in circumstances where such authorisation was not practical, individual riot gunners could use their own initiative and judge if and how to act. The rules also specified that while persons firing BRs should preferably be dismounted from vehicles, firing from inside (stationary) vehicles would be permissible when circumstances justified such action. The revised instruction also included the provision to employ a medium range BR to attain ranges of up to 50 metres to engage riotous mobs. Finally, every 81 discharge of a BR had to be reported to supervising command levels. 63 480 S. Orbons Although the guidelines were more specific, they gave leeway for various interpretations. Leaving the judgement of the severity of a situation to the gunner, the risk of inappropriate or disproportionate use increased. In addition, the use of BRs to control riotous mobs at extended ranges could well be at odds with the rule that BRs should not be aimed indiscriminately at a crowd. In the mid 1990s British Army guidelines for BR use were more stringent than those of the RUC. British Army gunners could not fire BRs unless ordered to do so by a sergeant or higher-ranking officer. Another difference was that the British Army instructions prescribed that the medium range BR (45 grains) for ranges of up to 50 metres was neither to be fired at ranges of less than 35 metres, nor in circumstances in which persons between the firer and the target were within 5.5 meters of either side of the line of fire.82 The RUC instruction merely cautioned for the influence of wind conditions on the BR at extreme ranges. Thus, an RUC officer and a British soldier patrolling jointly in the streets of a Northern Ireland town would actually operate under different sets of rules.83 Almost a decade later, police regulations were made more stringent as BR release needed authorisation from the unit’s commander.84 Furthermore, an accountability procedure through the Police Ombudsman was introduced. For British Army personnel such a procedure does not exist.85 The above reflects that in Northern Ireland the police as well as the military as users of BRs were bound by–mutually different–and increasingly tightened rules. In practice, the capability of a police officer to assess risk in real situations depended on his confidence and resilience, which in turn depended on his training and personal equipment.86 The absence of language barriers in Northern Ireland between user and target reduced the pressure on police officers and soldiers to become overly reactive to perceived threats.

BR targets

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 The reaction of a person struck by a BR depends on a range of factors, including the impact energy, the area of the body struck, and the individual’s determination. Responses may vary more widely when individuals are under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or suffer from mental disorder. The intended effect of the BR on an aggressor is to stop his violent actions. Non- compliant and very motivated aggressive individuals may be capable of continuing their initial behaviour and use different ways to counter the BR effect. In Northern Ireland, tactics were used to evade BR strikes such as keeping exposure time to a minimum, using improvised weapons, and taking cover immediately after the strike, either behind barricades (which were often present in conflict scenes), or simply by moving quickly out of the engagement range of the BRs, or hiding in a crowd. BR effectiveness was also reduced by wearing protective gear. Motorcycle helmets were often used, as well as chin caps, improvised shields, and thick clothing.87 The use of the BR in a situation of public disorder could have a profound 64 effect on crowd dynamics. There was a potential risk that crowds would turn Small Wars & Insurgencies 481 riotous and become more aggressive in response to perceived unnecessary or excessive use of violence by security forces.88 The fact that occasionally target individuals take multiple hits indicates that a single hit has a certain probability to be insufficiently effective, or that the operator could not or did not assess the impact result of the first shot. The latter was also noted in accounts of police officers on BR firing incidents.89

BR use-in-operational-context Next the role of the operational context on the outcome of BR use both through addressing general contextual issues as well as through looking into a specific major case of BR employment in Londonderry will be examined. In the mid 1970s, when BRs were introduced in Northern Ireland, medical evidence on injuries caused by rubber bullets highlighted the high number of casualties due to striking prohibited vulnerable parts of the body. This was a result of unreliable technical performance, poor accuracy of the round, and wrongful aiming.90 Hence, at an early stage of the Troubles, the BR had inherited the dubious reputation of causing fatalities and severe injuries from its predecessor, the rubber bullet. As a result, the use of BRs by security forces against civilians was generally perceived by the public as a symbol of heavy force. From the user’s perspective, however, the introduction of the BR was received more positively. Rosenhead wrote: A liberal regime in an advanced Western country has to impose strict limitations on the brutalities it inflicts on citizens. So, the rubber bullets and after it the plastic bullet were developed specifically for use within the United Kingdom.91 The relatively ‘benign’ view of BRs on the part of the security forces, and the British Army in particular, could be understood within a historical context and was reinforced by the media. A former British Army officer explained: the press turned out to be enthusiastic about the baton round, as it was a weapon that Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 was used selectively. During the operations in Aden the press had been very supportive. The reason was that the population there was seen as ‘other people’. This created a feedback loop that encouraged the Army to proceed along the same (sometimes lethal) line.92 The label ‘other people’ could well fit Northern Irish Nationalists, too, given the democratically and economically inferior position of the Catholic population within Northern Ireland’s political and societal landscape. The decision in the UK to field BRs exclusively in Northern Ireland merely confirmed their self-image of being ‘different’. From the onset of its deployment, the BR was seen by the Nationalists as a weapon of sectarian discrimination rather than a discriminative NLW. In operational circumstances it was often difficult to determine whether the discharge of BRs by security forces served to prevent an individual from continuing unlawful or aggressive action or to protect the security forces against serious or life-threatening harm. Since militant elements intermingled with crowds during riots with the intent to engage security forces from concealed 65 482 S. Orbons positions, BRs were used to maintain a safe distance from crowds, rioters, and possible militants armed with improvised projectiles and other–lethal–missiles, such as stones, petrol bombs, and guns.93 From accounts from British Army officers who served in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s, it appears that in reality BRs were often discharged from fairly close range to the target individual. Although a minimum range of 20 metres should be respected, above that range the use became very inaccurate and the rounds lost too much kinetic energy to be effective. Furthermore, the BR should always be aimed low. Rioters were quite aware of these rules and would, therefore, not be deterred much by their use. For self-defence, ranges were down to 10 metres or less.94 Whether engaging targets at such short ranges was justified was often obscured by the ‘fog of war’, a phenomenon in warfare that may apply to the turbulence and chaos of riotous clashes as well. The ability of security forces to understand the intent of a mobilised crowd or mob was a critical factor in the operational context of BR use. Young rioters could confront the British Army in a sort of ritual, usually happening on Saturday evenings and often fuelled by their use of alcohol. Clashes could also arise from boredom; having a fight was a kind of entertainment.95 Security forces hence needed to differentiate between riotous recreation and seriously motivated disturbances. Such contextual intelligence was indispensable for a measured response aimed at control and de-escalation of violence. Overall, officers and soldiers of the British Army forces were not eager to engage members of the Northern Irish population with NLWs, as they considered this primarily a police task.96 BRs have inflicted serious injury in hundreds of instances and also fatalities in 17 cases. The majority of these incidents occurred well before the 1990s. Reviews of these cases point out that engagement ranges were mostly less than 20 metres, targets killed were often children and women who were not taking part in a riot. The fact that those killed were hit from close range in the head or upper body may indicate that the incorrect aiming was intentional.97 Civil rights organisations have repeatedly

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 claimed that BRs were used to cause serious harm to relatively innocent civilians, implying the indiscriminate use of a discriminate weapon. The question was publicly raised whether these were undisciplined responses of individual soldiers and policemen in circumstances of increasing stress caused by the recent IRA campaign, or whether such incidents were tacitly accepted by the authorities. The authorities’ response to civilian complaints strongly supported the second interpretation.98 In circumstances where undisciplined use of BRs was left unsanctioned, the threshold to wrongful use was implicitly lowered. In addition, contextual issues affecting the security forces, such as stressful experiences during deployment including lethal attacks by insurgents, moral fatigue, and political bias, may be responsible for the wrongful use of BRs. After the Hunger Strikes in 1981 violence in Northern Ireland diminished, and so did, at least in general terms, the use of BRs. To the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland, the BR had become a symbol of repression, 66 when any political perspective to improve its inferior position in the Province was Small Wars & Insurgencies 483 lacking. Some 15 years later, a major resurgence of BR use occurred in Londonderry, which will be discussed next.

Londonderry 1996 In July 1996, a major public disturbance arose after a decision by the RUC to let an Orange Order march through Garvaghy Road, a Catholic residential area. This sparked outbreaks of violence all over Northern Ireland. In Londonderry, the confrontation between the Nationalists and the security forces escalated into a massive use of BRs, which went on from 11 till 14 July. According to witness statements taken and reported by human rights watch organisations in Northern Ireland, over 5,000 BRs were fired by the RUC and the British Army, to which Nationalist activists responded with petrol bombs, stones, and bottles. Many of the rounds were reported to have been fired in barrages and volleys, not aimed at the lower body parts of selected targets, but mostly indiscriminately against crowds, including people not engaged in the disturbances. BRs continued to be used even against demonstrators kneeling down and covering their heads for protection.99 In one incident, after the closing of pubs in the city centre around midnight on 11 July, young people emerging from clubs and pubs were met by a hail of BRs from the RUC aimed at anyone who tried to leave the area. This resulted in a high level of injuries, partly due to the very close firing range. This pattern was reported to have been repeated in the following days.100 Over 300 residents of Derry injured by BRs needed medical care at the hospital.101 Medical analysis pointed out that a considerable number of them were hit in the chest or higher.102 In 1997, batches of BRs, which had been in use with the RUC and the British Army since 1994, were withdrawn after a defect was discovered. Almost 9,000 of these bullets had been fired by the RUC and British Army since 1994, the majority in Londonderry in July 1996. It had already been discovered in 1995

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 that a significant number of these BRs had muzzle velocities in excess of the upper limit in the equipment specifications.103 Hence the faulty rounds might also explain the high number of injuries from BRs. The Pat Finucane Centre, a human rights organisation based in Londonderry, stressed the RUC’s historical links to Unionism and Orangism.104 The highly charged situation before and during the Orange Order march created an operational context of sharp polarisation between the RUC, supported by the British Army, and the Nationalist community. This might to a large extent explain the escalation in the use of BRs below the minimum engagement range of 20 metres in situations claimed to be of no immediate threat to the safety of the security forces. The records of the events in Derry imply that on a number of occasions the security forces, in particular the RUC, have not followed the guidelines for the use of BRs. Accounts from the security forces on what was going on in Londonderry differed widely from those of witnesses in the streets. On 11 July RUC Superintendent Keatley declared on behalf of the Chief Constable: 67 484 S. Orbons

(Plastic bullets ...) are used in accordance with the principle of the minimum and reasonable amount of force necessary to the protection of life and property, the preservation of the peace and the prevention of crime, whereas the Londonderry Sentinel of 17 July wrote: Soon the air was filled with the fumes of burning petrol and the machine-gun like sound of plastic bullet gun being fired almost incessantly.105 These two statements reflect the widely different perceptions of what happened on the ground. The explanation can be found in the respective contexts of user and target. The RUC statement suggests consistency with a situation legitimising BR use for self-defence against life-threatening aggression, whereas from an independent observer’s point of view BRs were fired at an excessive rate with regard to crowd control and even with regard to self-defence. The outcome of the Londonderry event was that severe damage had been done to the fragile peace process, which had already been underway for a few years. ‘The peace process is in absolute ruins’ said Gerry Adams.106 As a result of these events, the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland called for a ban on BRs and recommended that the RUC be disbanded and replaced by a police service that would be acceptable to all traditions within the North of Ireland.107

After the Good Friday Agreement 1998 The Good Friday Agreement marked the end to the counterinsurgency and set the conditions for true democratic governance, recognising the rights of the Catholics. In this new political context BRs continued to play their part in maintaining public order in Northern Ireland. Despite technological improvements and tight regulations on their employment, serious injury through BR use still occurred. The new L21A1 BR which had been issued to the British Army and the RUC in June 2001 was expected to be more accurate and thus reduce the incidence of life- threatening injuries and of unintended hits.108 The actual results showed

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 otherwise, according to a report on 29 cases of BR injuries, of which seven required admission to hospital.109 From accounts on the results of BR discharges, it appears that, despite the increased technical precision of BR systems, considerable numbers of rounds miss their target. One report on RUC police officers with records of 122 firings of BRs between 1997 and 2000 states that only 48 people had been registered as having been hit. The report also notes that the vast majority of these firings took place in twilight or darkness.110 It provides evidence that BRs missing their target pose a considerable risk of uncontrolled hits against unintended targets. The operational context compromises aiming reliability as a result of the dynamic behaviour of target individuals and diminished visibility. Furthermore, aiming at the extremities of the body, in particular the legs, may have contributed to failure of striking, thus enhancing the risk of accidental hits due to ricochet. A Police Ombudsman study into the use of BRs in 24 events, mainly in Belfast 68 in 2001 and 2002, concludes that in all incidents the authorisation to use the BR and Small Wars & Insurgencies 485 their subsequent discharge was justified, proportionate, and without any misconduct. Half of the BRs fired were aimed at petrol bombers. Yet, although the discharge records indicate that 69% of the hits struck the legs or feet of individuals, half of the remaining 31% hit the buttock or groin. This implies that potentially 15% of hits involved considerable risk of permanent harm. Most rounds were fired from between 20 and 35 metres to the target, with a considerable number of the discharges during evening hours. This may explain why 29% of the rounds missed their target, implying a risk of unintentional hits.111

Conclusions This article has assessed the employment of CS and BRs under ‘real’ operational conditions during the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. The application of the DTA framework to this case was aimed at analysing and laying out the NLW-effects in terms of the framework’s three defining components and their interactions in an operational context. The results are presented here for CS and BRs, respectively.

CS From the field events examined it becomes evident that the CS weapon & technology basically produced the immediate physiological effect of discomfort on individuals. However, the level of the effect varies considerably, partly because of the large variety of the agent’s concentration in the deployment area. The limited control of the spatial distribution of CS caused collateral effects against unintended targets. No technological concept has been developed to avoid or reduce this collateral effect of CS release against crowds. The user–weapon & technology interaction was dominated by two mechanisms, namely the protracted use of CS over a course of several days and the increasing intensity of its release to excessive levels, including the use of CS in

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 closed spaces. This tendency of security forces to ignore the guidelines on CS use can to a large extent be considered as a desperate and forcing attempt to accomplish their mission, after the initial constrained use of CS didn’t achieve the desired outcome. The conduct of operations with CS beyond the rules of engagement can partly be ascribed to a lack of training, at least in the Bogside case. CS employment turned out to be progressively ineffective for the purpose it was meant to serve. In the target–weapon & technology interaction several paths can be distinguished. The first and most direct exchange resided with the active target groups, who quickly developed technical and tactical countermeasures to neutralise the CS effect. These countermeasures were steadily improved and proliferated as targets became more experienced and familiar with CS exposure. Moreover, over time resisting target persons tended to become physically less sensitive to the irritating effect, and their motivation contributed to this immunity. In contrast, secondary target groups, who were unintentionally exposed to the collateral effect of CS were generally unprepared for the exposure 69 486 S. Orbons and among them this created considerable health problems, in particular for those with a fragile physical condition. These problems worsened under prolonged exposure. Hence an increasing divergence grew between the two target groups with respect to the harming effect of CS. At the same time, a section of the second group indirectly joined the active target group by providing the activists with improvised logistical and medical support. The user–target interaction during the process of CS employment is marked by a considerable shift in the mutual perceptions and attitudes of target populations and security forces. From the onset of CS use, the Nationalists target group’s perception of the security forces, initially only the RUC, was one of partiality. Any use of force, including CS, was received as an act of repression rather than public order management. The image of partiality had been reinforced by the target group’s experiences with the user’s attitude and performance during disturbances and clashes that had taken place well ahead of the first use of CS. Furthermore, the composition of the security forces in terms of sectarian representation was too much off balance to be viewed as neutral by the target population. This aspect was also a significant factor of influence with the deployment of British Army units in some cases, as the Ballymurphy case demonstrated. The security forces’ attitude towards the target population was biased as well. Provocations by target groups could well be taken by the security forces as motivated by sectarian preoccupation, which in turn might have triggered robust responses, such as excessive use of CS. This mechanism was less prominent with the British Army, which started from a more credible neutral position. However, their employment of CS soon contributed to the alienation process with the target populations as well. Overall, the deployment of CS had galvanised resistance against the user by the target population not only at the tactical/physical level, but also at the political level as it mobilised a broader section of the Nationalist community for its cause. The general political context of the Troubles, in which the target population perceived the user as an agent of a

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 repressive regime, lifted the interaction between the two sides to a level that made the non-lethal nature of CS almost irrelevant. This was an important reason for abandoning its employment at an early stage of the conflict.

BRs Regarding the BR weapon & technology system, innovation efforts have been undertaken on a continuous basis throughout the Troubles and afterwards. This has brought higher ballistic accuracy of the BR at longer range and better safety control of its physiological impact on the target individual, thus reducing the risk of severe casualties. Nevertheless, BRs have inflicted many hundreds of severe injuries and also 17 fatalities, the majority during the first two decades of the conflict. BRs have limited potential for further technological performance growth. Unlike CS, for the BR the user–weapon & technology interaction is much 70 more critical to its appropriate employment. The operator’s skills, training, Small Wars & Insurgencies 487 self-confidence, and mental attitude during real deployments are pre-conditional for achieving the required physical effect on the target individual. Furthermore, the instructions on when and how to use BRs during the conflict provided for a control mechanism to the security forces, and were progressively tightened over time. Yet, security forces still faced the challenge of dealing with situations which called for the weapon to be fired at extensive ranges without compromising the rule prohibiting the indiscriminate use of the weapon. A similar challenge occurred at sub-safe range use of the weapon, which was only permitted in situations that posed an immediate threat to life. This introduced some ambiguity in the interpretation of instructions, as well as in assigning responsibility for authorising the use of BRs. In the major case considered, the rules could not prevent the user force from demonstrating a disregard of discipline and an inclination to punishment leading to the excessive and indiscriminate use of BRs at prohibited firing ranges. Central to the target–weapon & technology interaction is the dependence of the physical effect on the area of the body where the BR strikes. Given the fact that the intent of the BR is to cause considerable pain with acceptable minor injuries, it is obvious that a target’s dimensions as well as its dynamic behaviour represent considerable variations as regards the severity of the effect received. This can hardly be influenced by the technological sophistication of the BR. At the same time, targets have successfully used body protection gear as countermeasures to deny the BR effect. Furthermore, tactical methods, such as short exposure time to limit engagement opportunity to security forces, have been used. An implication of these countermeasures was that the behaviour of resisting target groups put at harm innocent bystanders, who unwillingly became part of a dynamic and often chaotic scene, and at least a considerable number of them were hit unintentionally. The user–target interaction reflects to a large extent the same mechanisms that are at work in operations involving CS. The atmosphere during the cases considered was much shaped by the preceding history and specific events. In a highly charged confrontation, the escalation of animosity and violence triggered the

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 massive and inappropriate employment of BRs almost as a surrogate for an area denial NLW. Against the background of an ongoing CI against the user, public disobedience of target groups had the potential to lower the user’s threshold to engage the target disproportionately. A relatively strong weapon such as the BR lent itself to that purpose. After the Good Friday Agreement, the significance of the user–target interaction was sharply reduced. Higher accountability standards imposed on the user, in combination with much improved political incentives for the target population to disengage, have significantly contributed to the sharp decline in BR use and the number of injuries caused.

Synopsis and outlook for NLW assessment The above findings demonstrate that the utility of the NLWs examined within the Northern Ireland case was to a large extent defined by contextual factors in the operational theatre of deployment. In particular it has been shown that the 71 488 S. Orbons relationship and interaction between the user and the target play a dominant role in the outcome of NLW use for mission accomplishment. The analysis also revealed that technological innovation of the NLW is much less relevant for the outcome than was intended and expected. It is therefore plausible that even with current technology standards BRs would not have made much difference to the course of events during the Troubles as discussed here. The assessment also reveals that the duration of the conflict and the consequent repetitive use of the two types of NLWs rendered them increasingly ineffective over time. Rather than performing as instruments to manage public order and de-escalate violence, the tendency of security forces to compensate for effect degradation by using them at an excessive rate actually transformed both NLWs into symbols of political repression for the target population and even large parts of the international community. NLWs thus became entirely counterproductive to the stabilisation missions they were supposed to support. Notwithstanding the above assessment results and in the absence of any alternatives for the security forces, the NLWs employed were indispensable in controlling and restoring public order without having to use lethal force, in particular for self-protection. This got increasing weight after Bloody Sunday. The long absence of a true political strategy to redress the political and societal balance in Northern Ireland has in the long run severely handicapped any use of (non-lethal) force in Northern Ireland. Looking at contemporary stabilisation operations, the ex post DTA of NLW use in Northern Ireland can be taken to reflect to what extent NLWs may help manage stability in the complexity of irregular conflict environments, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather than drawing on design-based assumptions of novel NLWs, a thorough assessment of their utility requires to take into account the contextual issues as addressed in this article. The use of empirical military data from the envisioned theatre of deployment is indispensable for that purpose, and could well be fitted into an ex ante DTA of NLWs. Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Professor John Grin and Dr Ju¨rgen Altmann for their suggestions and constructive remarks on a draft of this article.

Notes 1. Lorenz, ‘“Less-Lethal” Force in Operation United Shield’, 69. 2. NATO, NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons, 1. This article deals with anti- personnel devices only. 3. Morris and Morris, Non-Lethality. 4. Coker, Humane Warfare, 18. 5. Mc Nab and Scott, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and the Long Tail of Warfare’, 141. 6. Gompert et al., Underkill, 95–110. 7. Amnesty International, United States of America: Excessive and Lethal Force? 72 8. Mayer, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and Non-Combatant Immunity’. Small Wars & Insurgencies 489

9. Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces?, 29–30. 10. CS is named after the scientists Ben Corson and Roger Stoughton who synthesised the agent in 1928. 11. The widespread use of baton rounds and CS by security forces is apparent from, e.g. Hubbs and Klinger, Impact Munitions Data Base of Use and Effects, 5; Davison and Lewer, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project Research Report No. 6, 35. 12. Smit, Grin, and Voronkov, ‘Assessing Military-Technological Development Paths’. 13. Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces?, 29–30. 14. Feakin, Non-Lethal Weapons, 74. 15. Orbons, ‘Do Non-Lethal Weapons License to Silence?’, 85. 16. BBC, ‘Northern Ireland: The Troubles’. 17. Ibid. 18. Tuck, ‘Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency’, 167. 19. Nationalist refers to the section of the (Catholic) people of Northern Ireland that views itself primarily as part of the population of Ireland as a whole. Republicans are Catholics who wish to see Northern Ireland united with the Republic of Ireland. 20. Thornton, ‘Getting it Wrong’, 104. 21. Dodd, ‘The Corporal’s War’, 61. 22. Nı´ Aola´in, The Politics of Force, 43. 23. Newsinger, ‘From Counterinsurgency to Internal Security’, 99. 24. UK Home Office, Report of the Enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological Aspects of CS–Part II, 4. 25. Vilke and Chan, ‘Less Lethal Technology: Medical issues’, 343. 26. Davison, The Early History of ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons, 10. 27. UK Home Office, Report of the Enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological Aspects of CS–Part II, 46, 47. 28. Hu and Christiani, ‘Reactive Airways Dysfunction after Exposure to Teargas’, 1535. 29. Omega Foundation, Crowd Control Technologies, xxi. 30. Fraunfelder, ‘Is CS Gas Dangerous?’, 458–459. 31. Micky Barnes (major UK Army, retired), interview by the author, 16 December 2008. 32. Davison, The Early History of ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons, 10. 33. British Irish Rights Watch, Response to the 5th report on a Research Programme into Alternative Policing Approaches, 14. Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 34. Dunstan, The British Army in Northern Ireland, 50. 35. Mike Jelf (lieutenant colonel UK Army, retired), interview by the author, 13 April 2010. 36. Instructions were found in a pamphlet issued by the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), Plastic Bullets and the Law, 9. 37. Philip Schofield (lieutenant colonel UK Army, retired), interview by the author, 13 April 2010; Jelf, interview. 38. Jelf, interview. 39. Quote taken from O´ Dochartaigh in Ellison and Martin, ‘Policing, Collective Action and Social Movement Theory’, 691. 40. Gompert et al., Underkill, 91. 41. British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (BSSRS), The New Technology for Repression, 18. 42. Sidell, ‘Riot Control agents’, 311. 43. Museum of Free Derry, ‘History’. 44. McCann, War and an Irish Town, 59. 45. BSSRS, The New Technology for Repression, 12. 73 490 S. Orbons

46. McClean, The Road to Bloody Sunday, 78. 47. Stetler, The Battle of Bogside, Chapter 3. 48. McClean, The Road to Bloody Sunday, 70. 49. Paul O’Connor (Pat Finucane Centre, Londonderry), private discussion with the author, 18 February 2010. 50. BSSRS, The New Technology for Repression, 18. 51. McClean, The Road to Bloody Sunday, 70–2. 52. Ibid., 71. 53. McCann, War and an Irish Town, 60. 54. Museum of Free Derry, ‘History’. 55. BSSRS, The New Technology for Repression, 17. 56. McClean, The Road to Bloody Sunday, 74. 57. UK Home Office, Report of the Enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological Aspects of CS–Part I. 58. McClean, The Road to Bloody Sunday, 78, 154. 59. UK Home Office, Report of the Enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological Aspects of CS–Part II, 79. 60. McClean, The Road to Bloody Sunday, 91–2. 61. Tribunal of Inquiry, ‘Report on the Bloody Sunday Inquiry’, Volume I, 2.6. 62. See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/troops/chap4.htm#hearts, section: Easter 1970 (accessed 14 April 2010). 63. Perkins, ‘Soldiers or Policemen?’, 9. 64. Thornton, ‘Getting it Wrong’, 82–3. 65. BSSRS, The New Technology for Repression, 22. 66. Thornton, ‘Getting it Wrong’, 84–5. 67. Dunstan, The British Army in Northern Ireland, 50. 68. Schofield, interview. 69. Jelf, interview. 70. John Wilson (colonel UK Army, retired), interview by the author, 16 December 2008. 71. David Benest (colonel UK Army), interview by the author, 18 December 2008. 72. Rosenhead, ‘The Technology of Riot Control’, 211. 73. Vilke and Chan, ‘Less Lethal Technology: Medical issues’, 342. 74. UK Steering Group, Patten Report Recommendations 69 and 70 relating to Public Order Equipment–Fourth Report, 11–18. Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 75. Millar et al., ‘Injuries Caused by Rubber Bullets’, 480. 76. Burrows, ‘Operationalizing Non-Lethality’, 105–7. 77. Arnesen and Rahimi, ‘Military Non-Lethal Solutions for Medium to Long Ranges’. 78. Schofield, interview; Jelf, interview. 79. Bell, The Use of Rubber and Plastic Bullets in Northern Ireland, 13. 80. CAJ, Plastic Bullets and the Law, 9. 81. Royal Ulster Constabulary, Guidelines for the Use of Plastic Baton Rounds (1995). Document obtained from the Committee on the Administration of Justice. 82. The 45 grain charge dissipates almost the double amount of kinetic energy to the BR than the 25 grain charge. Bell, The Use of Rubber and Plastic Bullets in Northern Ireland, Appendix A. 83. McVerry, ‘RUC and Army Fire Guns to Different Guidelines’. 84. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, Baton Rounds Report 2002, Appendix 1. 85. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Baton Rounds, 37. 86. Burrows, ‘Operationalizing Non-Lethality’, 109. 87. Colin Burrows (chief superintendent Northern Ireland Police, retired), written 74 response to a questionnaire from the author, 19 April 2010. Small Wars & Insurgencies 491

88. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, Baton Rounds Report 2002, 3. 89. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Baton Rounds, 18. 90. Millar et al., ‘Injuries Caused by Rubber Bullets’, 480–6. 91. Rosenhead, ‘A New Look at “Less Lethal” Weapons’, 674. 92. Tom Longland (brigadier UK Army, retired), interview by the author, 15 December 2008. 93. Burrows, ‘Operationalizing Non-Lethality’, 102, 104. 94. Schofield, interview; Jelf, interview; Longland, interview. 95. Barnes, interview; Schofield, interview. 96. Schofield, interview; Jelf, interview; Longland, interview. 97. Weir, ‘No Weapon which Deters Rioters is Free from Risk’, 83. 98. Shallice, ‘The Harmless Bullet that Kills’, 6. 99. O’Connor, private discussion. 100. Pat Finucane Centre, In the Line of Fire, 16, 17. 101. Ibid., 17. 102. Steele et al., ‘Plastic Bullets Injuries in Northern Ireland’, 711–14. 103. CAJ, Plastic Bullets: A Briefing Paper, 14. 104. Pat Finucane Centre, In the Line of Fire, 8. 105. Quotes taken from Ibid., 14. 106. Ibid., 12. 107. Ibid., 29. 108. Burrows, ‘Operationalizing Non-Lethality’, 108. 109. Hughes et al., ‘Plastic Baton Round Injuries’, 111–12. 110. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, The Recording of the Use of Plastic Bullets in Northern Ireland, 12. 111. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Baton Rounds Report 2005, Belfast.

Bibliography Amnesty International. United States of America: Excessive and lethal force? London, Amnesty International, AMR 51/139/2004, 2004. Arnesen, O.H., and R. Rahimi. ‘Military Non-Lethal Solutions for Medium to Long Ranges’. Paper presented at the 4th European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Ettlingen, Germany, 21–23 May 2007.

Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 BBC. ‘Northern Ireland: The Troubles, 1963 to 1985’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ recent/troubles (accessed 24 February 2010). Bell, Dominic, ‘The Use of Rubber and Plastic Bullets in Northern Ireland’. Master’s thesis, University of Ulster, 1999. British Irish Rights Watch. Response to the 5th Report on a Research Programme into Alternative Policing Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict, London, December 2006. British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (BSSRS). The New Technology for Repression–Lessons from Ireland. Nottingham: The Russell Press, BSSRS-paper No. 2, 1974. Burrows, Colin, ‘Operationalizing Non-Lethality: A Northern Ireland Perspective’. In The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons: Technologies, Operations, Ethics and Law. Nick Lewer. 99–111, London: Frank Cass, 2002. Coker, Chris. Humane Warfare. London: Routledge, 2001. Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ). Plastic Bullets: A Briefing Paper. Belfast: CAJ, 1998. Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ). Plastic Bullets and the Law. Belfast: CAJ, July 1985. 75 492 S. Orbons

Davison, Neil, The Early History of ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons, Bradford, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Centre for Conflict Resolution Bradford Non- Lethal Weapons Research Project, Occasional Paper No.1, December 2006. Davison, Neil, Nick Lewer, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project Research Report No. 6, Bradford, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Centre for Conflict Resolution Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, October 2004. Dodd, Norman L., ‘The Corporal’s War: Internal Security Operations in Northern Ireland’. Military Review 56, no. 7 (July 1976): 58–68. Dunstan, Simon. The British Army in Northern Ireland. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984. Ellison, Graham and Greg Martin. ‘Policing, Collective Action and Social Movement Theory: The Case of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign’. The British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 4 (December 2000): 681–99. Feakin, Tobias, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Technologies for Lowering Casualties?’ PhD thesis, Bradford, University of Bradford, 2005. Fraunfelder, F.T., ‘Is CS Gas Dangerous? Current Evidence Suggests Not But Unanswered Questions Remain’. British Medical Journal 320 (19 February 2000): 458–9. Gompert, David C., Stuart E. Johnson, Martin C. Libicki, David R. Freulinger, John Gordon IV, Raymond Smith, and Camilla A. Sawak. Underkill: Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations amid Populations. Arlington, VA: RAND Cooperation, 2009. Hu, Howard and David Christiani. ‘Reactive Airways Dysfunction after Exposure to Teargas’. Lancet 339 (1992): 1535. Hubbs, Ken and Klinger David. Impact Munitions Data Base of Use and Effects. Washington DC: US Department of Justice, Report NCJ 204433, February, 2004. Hughes, D., K. Maguire, F. Dunn, S. Fitzpatrick, and L.G. Rocke. ‘Plastic Baton Round Injuries’. Emergency Medical Journal 22, no. 2 (2005): 111–2. Lorenz, F., ‘Less-Lethal Force in Operation United Shield’. Marine Corps Gazette 79, no. 9 (September 1995): 69–77. Mayer, Chris, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and Non-Combatant Immunity: Is it Permissible to Target Non-Combatants?’. Journal of Military Ethics 6, no. 3 (2007): 221–31. McCann, Eamon. War and an Irish Town. London: Pluto Press, 1980. McClean, Raymond. The Road to Bloody Sunday. Londonderry: Guildhall Press, 1997. Mc Nab, Robert M. and Richard L. Scott. ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and the Long Tail of Warfare’. Small Wars & Insurgencies 20, no. 1 (January 2009): 141–59. Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 McVerry, P. ‘RUC and Army Fire Guns to Different Guidelines’. Irish News, 29 August 1997. Millar, R., W.H. Rutherford, S. Johnston, and V.J. Malhotra. ‘Injuries Caused by Rubber Bullets: A Report on 90 Patients’. British Journal of Surgery 62 (1975): 480–6. Morris, Janet, Chris Morris, Chris. Non-Lethality: A Global Strategy, West Hyannisport, MA, 1990. Museum of Free Derry. ‘History’. Battle of the Bogside, http://www.museumoffreederry. org/history-battle01.html (accessed 7 June 2010). NATO. NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons. Brussels, NATO, 13 October, 1999. Newsinger, J., ‘From Counterinsurgency to Internal Security’. Small Wars and Insurgencies 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 88–111. Nı´ Aola´in, Fiona. The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. Baton Rounds: A Review of the Human Rights Implications of the Introduction and Use of the L21A1 Baton Round in Northern Ireland and Proposed Alternatives to the Baton Round by the Omega 76 Foundation, Belfast, March 2003. Small Wars & Insurgencies 493

Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. The Recording of the Use of Plastic Bullets in Northern Ireland, Belfast, May 2001. Omega Foundation. Crowd Control Technologies: An Assessment of Crowd Control Technology Options for the European Union, Luxemburg, European Parliament, STOA, May 2000. Orbons, Sjef, ‘Do Non-Lethal Weapons License to Silence?’ Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 1 (January 2010): 78–99. Pat Finucane Centre. In the Line of Fire: Derry July 1996, Londonderry, 30 July 1996. Perkins, K., ‘Soldiers or Policemen?’. British Army Review 45 (December 1973): 7–10. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. Baton Rounds Report, Research Report 1/2002, Belfast, 2002. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. Baton Rounds Report 2005, Belfast, 2005. Rappert, Brian. Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces? Technology, Politics and the Management of Conflict. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Rappert, Brian, ‘Shock Tactics’. Police Professional, November 2004: 15. Rosenhead, Jonathan, ‘A New Look at “Less Lethal” Weapons’. New Scientist, 16 December 1976: 674. Rosenhead, Jonathan, ‘The Technology of Riot Control’. New Scientist, 23 July 1981: 210–12. Royal Ulster Constabulary. Guidelines for the Use of Plastic Baton Rounds, Belfast, publicly released in 1997. Shallice, Tim, ‘The Harmless Bullet that Kills’. New Statesman, 14 August 1981: 6–7, 14. Sidell, Frederick R. ‘Riot Control Agents’. In R. Zajtchuk, ed., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Washington, DC: Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997, 308–25. Smit, Wim A., John Grin, and Lev Voronkov. ‘Introduction to Part III: Assessing Military- Technological Development Paths: Examples and Methodologies’. In Wim A. Smit, John Grin, and Lev Voronkov, eds., Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a Changing World, Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992, 161–166. Steele, James A., Samual James McBride, Jarlath Kelly, Christine H. Dearden, and Laurence D. Rocke. ‘Plastic Bullets Injuries in Northern Ireland: Experiences During a Week of Civil Disturbance’. Journal of Trauma, Injury, Infection and Critical Care 46, no. 4 (1999): 711–14. Stetler, Russell. The Battle of Bogside: The Politics of Violence in Northern Ireland. London: Sheed and Ward, 1970. Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011 Thornton, Rod, ‘Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army’s Deployment in Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)’. Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 73–107. Tribunal of Inquiry. ‘Report on the Bloody Sunday Inquiry’. http://www.bloody-sunday- inquiry.org (accessed 20 September 2010). Tuck, Christopher, ‘Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency’. Defense & Security Analysis 23, no. 2 (June 2007): 165–83. UK Army. Yellow Card 1980: Instructions for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland (Army Code No. 70771), and Rules of Engagement for PVC Baton Rounds (Plastic Bullets), UK Army, 1980. UK Home Office. Report of the Enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological Aspects of CS (Orthochlorobenzylidene Malononitrile) Part I Enquiry into the Medical Situation Following the Use of CS in Londonderry on 13th and 14th August, 1969. London: Home Office, 22 September, 1969. UK Home Office. Report of the Enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological Aspects of CS (Orthochlorobenzylidene Malononitrile) Part II Enquiry into Toxicological Aspects of CS and its Use for Civil Purposes. London: Home Office, July 1971. 77 494 S. Orbons

UK Steering Group. Patten Report Recommendations 69 and 70 Relating to Public Order Equipment: A Research Programme into Alternative Policing Approaches towards the Management of Conflict, Fourth Report, Belfast, January 2004. Vilke, Gary M. and Theodore C. Chan. ‘Lethal Technology: Medical Issues’. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 30, no. 3 (2007): 341–57. Weir, Stuart, ‘No Weapon which Deters Rioters is Free from Risk’. New Society, 21 July 1983: 83–6. Downloaded by [Sjef Orbons] at 02:57 12 July 2011

78 Chapter 4 Assessing Non-Lethal Weapons Use in Detainee Operations in Iraq: Benign Force or Necessary Evil? *

* Orbons, S. (2012) Assessing Non-Lethal Weapons Use in Detainee Operations in Iraq: Benign Force or Necessary Evil?, Defence Studies,12(3), pp.452-477.

ARTICLE Assessing Non-Lethal Weapons Use in Detainee Operations in Iraq: Benign Force or Necessary Evil?

SJEF ORBONS

Since the early 1990s, Western military forces have increasingly been deployed in conflicts worldwide. The nature of most of these conflicts requires the employment of military capabilities other than those devel- oped and fielded for the conduct of conventional regular warfare. A key characteristic of contemporary irregular conflicts, in particular those involving counterinsurgency (CI) operations, is the blurred distinction between civilians and combatants. In these ‘wars amongst the people’ military forces have to operate in the proximity of civilians, as the geo- graphical centre of gravity of the mission is often the urban environ- ment.1 The use of force should be proportional to these circumstances, in order to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. The extent to which the Non-Lethal Weapons (NLWs) are supportive to that objective has been the subject of ongoing debate.2 The achievement of mission objectives in CI operations is consid- ered to be hinging on the intervention forces’ ability to gain the support and cooperation of the civil population for the intervention mission objectives. Political leaders and military commanders therefore formu- late a mission strategy aimed at winning the population’s hearts and minds. Since 2003, this approach has increasingly been applied in the international mission in Iraq. One of the outcomes of CI is the capture of insurgents or suspects of having been involved in insurgent activities in the course of a CI Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 mission. In Iraq, between 2003 and 2009, nearly 90,000 Iraqis were

Sjef Orbons, Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda. Email: [email protected]

Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, (September 2012), pp. 452–477 ISSN 1470-2436 http://www.tandfonline.com http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2012.703847 Ó 2012 Taylor & Francis 81 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 453

detained in detention facilities predominantly run by US military forces. 3 The hearts and minds strategy that had begun to guide the interven- tion mission in Iraq, was gradually extended to include and redirect detainee operations as well. Adopting this approach for detainee opera- tions was motivated by a growing belief that the way in which detainees were treated was key to reshaping their political motivation towards a more positive orientation regarding the new Iraqi government and the coalition forces. The positive effect was expected to be propagated across Iraqi society, as the collective network of influence of the formerly detained Iraqis potentially counts millions of Iraqi citizens.4 Detainee operations were supported by NLWs as a proportional set of capabilities to maintain control in situations of serious non-compli- ance by the detainee populations. NLWs represent a dedicated category of weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or per- manent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal undesired dam- age or impact on the environment.5 This article focuses on their utility and effectiveness in conjunction with the strategy of winning hearts and minds.

Rationale and Expectations of NLW Deployment in Support of Detainee Operations The 2006 US Army and Marine Corps Joint Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24, states that excessive use of military force can fre- quently undermine the policy objectives at the expense of achieving the higher political goals. It stresses the importance of the measured applica- tion of force, also in detainee operations.6 Thus, FM 3-24 underpins the rationale for NLWs in CI operations. NLWs were already applied in a range of situations in the CIs of international military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The trend of increasing numbers of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 should be reversed by equipping military personnel with an NLW capa- bility. In a previous study an assessment of the military utility of NLW has been made within the context of recurring situations in Afghanistan in which civilians are at risk.7 The 1949 Geneva Conventions provide a framework for the treat- ment of detainees during war, stating that avoidance of detainee casual- ties has the highest priority.8 In 2006 a US DoD Directive was issued, 82 reviewing earlier policy documents on the treatment of detainees, to 454 DEFENCE STUDIES

ensure compliance with those conventions.9 All subordinated doctrine and manuals should adhere to the reviewed policy. A longstanding key principle guiding US military personnel in con- ducting detainee operations is to keep control of the detention facility. Deliberate disobedience, resistance, or conduct of a mutinous or riotous nature should be dealt with by force.10 Military guidance prescribed that the commander should exercise effective control of internees by quickly restoring order, while using the least amount of force possible.11 This minimal force imperative was elaborated as the ‘priorities of force’ con- cept, an escalation-of-force continuum ranging from verbal persuasion up to the use of deadly force. NLWs were designated as an instrumental part of this continuum, and claimed to facilitate post-incident stabiliza- tion by reducing internee alienation and collateral damage.12 In updated guidance for detainee operations, the priorities of force concept was reviewed and renamed the ‘use of force’ (UOF) continuum, incorporat- ing NLW as an instrument of control.13 US forces conducting detainee operations have used NLWs against detainees in numerous situations, in particular in cases of major distur- bance. As an extra step in the UOF continuum, NLW use was intended and expected to support the enforcement of control and order over the detainee population without having to resort to lethal force, except in cases of life-threatening situations for guard personnel, as the guidelines prescribed. Despite the casualty avoidance intent of NLWs, in various incidents in Iraqi detention facilities casualties have occurred.14 This article addresses the question to what extent the use of NLWs in US internment centres was supportive to the hearts and minds approach in Iraq. It is argued that, other than claims and expectations of NLWs performance extracted from NLW technology and design prop- erties, the performance and effects of NLWs heavily depend on the operational conditions in which they are applied. A Defence Technology Assessment (DTA) framework is applied to several cases in Iraqi detai- nee centres where NLWs have been used. The article starts with an out- line of the analysis approach, after which it will assess the NLWs used

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 within the context of the operational cases.

Analytical Approach for NLW Assessment in Iraq Detainee Operations Defence Technology Assessment Defence TA (DTA) provides an analytical framework specifically designed for a systematic approach to new military concepts within the 83 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 455

operational context, including human and procedural factors, in which a system concept is to be applied.15 The significance of the operational context has been highlighted by other analysts, such as Rappert. From NLW scenario analysis he concludes that the introduction of non-lethal force into military practices is not merely the addition of new types of force options, but the transformation of force capabilities. The possible unpredictability and novelty of situations should be acknowledged and thought through.16 He argues that the situational context presented for the deployment of weapons plays a key role in assessing the appropriate- ness of force.17 The NLW analysis framework reflects the central role of context. It aims at framing the essential elements and their interactions that in con- cert shape the outcome of the operational use of an NLW. The frame- work consists of three main components, namely the user, the NLW device and technology and the target.18 They are conceived as complexes as each embodies a variety of factors of influence that in interactive manner shape the process of obtaining a particular non-lethal effect. The user complex, for instance, may include training of personnel and doctrinal guidance, organizational deployment of the non-lethal capability, experience, attitude, and familiarity with the deployment environment. Every single situation where NLWs are used is defined by a unique context. Besides the fact that the situational context directly affects the outcome, it also influences each of the three components separately

operational NLW device& technology complex

policy c o n t e x t strategic outcome expectations user target needs complex complex Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012

use

FIGURE 1. THE NLW DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT MODEL. The central box represents the framework to analyse and explain differences between expectations and the actual outcome of NLW 19 84 employment. 456 DEFENCE STUDIES

(Figure 1). The present study examines how the operational context in US detention facilities in Iraq is responsible for differences between what is expected from NLW employment and what is the actual out- come resulting from engagements with detainee populations.

Defining the Research Object: NLW use in Detainee Operations in Iraq The largest detention facilities in Iraq operated by US military forces were Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca. Both camps were basically subdi- vided into multiple compounds (Figure 2). The surge in mid-2007, when US forces in Iraq were reinforced with an extra 30,000 troops, resulted in a rapid increase of the number of Iraqi detainees, doubling from 13,000 in early 2007 to over 26,000 by October of the same year, the greater majority of them being held in Camp Bucca (Figure 3).20 Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012

FIGURE 2. SATELLITE IMAGE OF ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY, IRAQ (EARLY 2004). Section 1 (Camp Ganci), comprises the 16 fenced compounds where the vast majority of detainees were held. The white dots are the tents, each providing shelter for 20 to 30 detainees. Compounds contained between 12 and 16 tents. The detainee abuse scandal took place in the Tier 1A cell block. (Source: www.globalsecurity.org) 85 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 457

FIGURE 3. IMPRESSION OF US DETENTION FACILITY CAMP BUCCA, IRAQ, (16 MARCH 2009), showing one of the general detainee compounds, shortly after evening prayer. (Source:)

The detainee population was guarded by US military personnel, primar- ily recruited from Military Police forces and supplemented from other units within the armed services, such as National Guards and reserve units. The situations of NLW use during detainee operations as examined in this article are major disturbances at compound level and beyond. In those situations, guard forces were physically separated from the detainees, as compounds involved in major riots were practically no-go areas. Under these circumstances, guard forces could only use force from outside the fences surrounding the rioting compound. Only a limited set of NLWs

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 was capable of striking rioting detainees inside their compound. These were predominantly kinetic energy projectiles, including baton rounds and sting grenades, providing for considerable stand-off range. Other NLWs, such as the baton, the taser or pepper spray, are essentially close-in and one-on-one NLWs, hence not suitable against an aggressive crowd. Types of other NLWs that could potentially be deployed in this stand-off setting were acoustic hailing devices, laser dazzlers and CS 86 gas. Given the severity of many major disturbances, and the amount of 458 DEFENCE STUDIES

noise accompanying them, acoustic devices would not deliver any significant effect.21 The laser dazzlers, although capable of attaining considerable range, are only suited to affect no more than a few individ- uals at a time, hence delivering insufficient effect. CS gas, while proba- bly effective, is usually intended to clear a space, which is impossible when crowds are kept within a confined space. Furthermore, CS might also do harm to adjacent compounds, risking a spill-over of the distur- bances. Another drawback of CS is the possible impact it may have on the guard forces as well. Theoretically, the Active Denial System (ADS), a novel long-range directed energy (DE) NLW, could have been deployed against rioting detainees. This study will assess its hypothetical deployment in detainee operations.

Kinetic NLW characteristics A variety of kinetic energy projectiles has been employed in the intern- ment centres considered. They range from rounds fired from hand-held guns of various calibres to hand grenades releasing multiple non-lethal pellets. Below some main characteristics of three frequently used kinetic energy weapons will be addressed. Baton rounds (BRs) are plastic blunt impact weapons launched against individuals. BRs are cylindrically shaped, have diameters of between 30 and 40 mm and have a rounded impact face. The purpose of the BR is to induce pain, irritation and minimal injury.22 The intended effect on the target individual resembles the punch of a boxer. Ideally, the BR strikes the abdomen, whereas hits on the extremities, in particular the legs, are also effective. Hits in the head or neck pose a high risk of seri- ous and even fatal injury. The projectile’s velocity and ballistic stability are key factors for aiming accuracy. Launching velocities are around 80 m/s. The delivery system for BRs is usually a hand-held baton gun. The launching device usually includes a mounted sighting system for accurate aim-

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 ing. Effectiveness at ranges above 50 metres is poor. Kinetic energy drops significantly at longer ranges, at 25 metres to about 75per cent of the level at a range of 10 metres. At longer engagement ranges the flight trajectory of the round is more curved, reducing aiming accu- racy.23 Shorter ranges enhance accuracy, but deliver a heavier impact on the target, thereby increasing the potential injury. In the US internment facilities in Iraq the M203 launcher was employed to fire 24 the BR. 87 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 459

Fin stabilized rubber projectiles are 12 gauge rounds, launched at muzzle velocities between 150 and 200 m/s, with a maximum effective range of 45 metres. The optimal range interval is between 5 and 25 metres.25 The impact surface is considerably smaller than with the BRs, hence the risk of severe injury with striking vulnerable parts of the body is high. In the internment facilities the FN-303 rifle was employed to fire the rubber round.26 Some of the 12 gauge (16 mm) rounds were plastic pellet rounds, containing similar pellets as in the stinger hand grenades.27 The stinger hand grenade is made of two hard cases of rubber. The cases are filled with many small rubber balls, designed to strike a num- ber of individuals simultaneously. The hand grenade can be thrown up to a distance of 50 meters, where it ejects the rubber pellets randomly after fragmentation. Pellets may strike individual targets effectively within a range of less than 10 metres from the grenade’s fragmentation position, intended to cause minor blunt trauma. Given the randomness of pellet distribution and the limited aiming accuracy of a thrown hand grenade, the hit accuracy is relatively poor. The device is a many on many weapon with no individual aiming capacity, hence the striking point on the target individuals is not controlled.28

Kinetic NLW user force The guard forces deployed in detention facilities in Iraq were tasked to control the detainee population. They were entitled to protect the detainees under all circumstances, in compliance with treaty obligations, including the Geneva Conventions with respect to the treatment of all detainees. This was publicly stated by US President George W. Bush in 2004.29 It was also formalized in official US policy guidelines to the Department of Defense Detainee Program.30 This policy guidance was implemented in the Joint Doctrine, providing a continuum of force (COF) guideline for guard forces, including the application of NLWs, in cases where force had to be used.31An earlier version of the Joint

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 Doctrine already appeared in 2005, and was reviewed on the basis of the new policy guidance.32 Doctrinal publications prescribing the principles and processes for Military Police forces when dealing with enemy pris- oners of war and civilian internees were already in place well before the military intervention in Iraq.33 While the doctrinal foundation was established and updated through- out the timeframe US detention operations in Iraq were ongoing, it was 88 still considered underdeveloped for it insufficiently addressed the 460 DEFENCE STUDIES

eventual scope of detention operations due to the high number of detainees resulting from the large-scale CI.34 Another shortfall was the lack of qualified guard personnel, as most of them were drawn from Military Police companies trained in standard law enforcement and not familiar with detainee operations or CI strategies and tactics.35 Some accounts reflect that guard forces were prepared for military operations such as convoys, rather than for their assignment to conduct detainee operations.36 In particular during the early days of the CI, in late 2003 and in 2004, manpower was insufficient and undertrained for the type of detainee operations required in Iraq.37 This problem resurfaced when the surge in mid-2007 produced thousands of additional detainees within a few weeks. Funding for detention operations had been reduced by the US Office of the Secretary of Defense even as the surge of forces approached.38 Detainee riots could vary considerably in size, and, in accordance with established doctrine and guidelines, had to be handled with a pro- portional use of armed force if warnings did not produce the required effect. The basic tenets to be followed entailed that violence could not be tolerated and that the guard forces should keep control over the facil- ity under all circumstances. 39 The use of lethal force was generally pro- hibitive, unless attacks became life-threatening.40 In most circumstances, non-lethal force was designated and used as an appropriate capability to engage the rioting detainees, while preventing the risk of unintended casualties. The most employed NLWs by far were kinetic rounds and stinger hand grenades.41 In the large scale riots considered in this study the guard forces’ space of manoeuvre was limited to the corridors between the fenced compounds in which the detainees were held, including the guard tow- ers next to the compounds. Smaller scale disturbances in which person- nel from guard forces had to deal with detainees in close contact are not considered.42

Kinetic NLW Target Population Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 The target group comprised the detainees held in compounds in US detention camps in Iraq. Each compound contained several hundreds of detainees within an area measuring 50 to 100 by 100 metres. Accommo- dation mostly consisted of tents and lightweight prefab fixed construc- tions, as the construction of smaller scale collective housing of brick and concrete could not keep pace with the steady flow of new detainees 43 into the facilities. 89 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 461

The prison community consisted of different groups and was a blend of real insurgents and relatively innocent persons.44 Incoming detainees were members of insurgent or militia groups fighting the coalition forces, or suspects involved in insurgency operations. A US Military Police commander, deployed to Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, commented that there were also ‘coincidental’ detainees, who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time when they were arrested. Based on accounts from US veterans who served in these detainee cen- tres, the vast majority of the detainees were innocent or only guilty of minor infractions.45 There were also differences regarding religion and tribal origin among the detainee populations, which could cause tensions between detainees held in the same compound, and could erupt into distur- bances.46 Given the widely different backgrounds of detainees, as well as the reason for their detention, their attitudes and behaviour, includ- ing their motivation to resist their internment varied accordingly. Although detainees wished to be released from internment as early as possible, this would not prevent them from engaging in disturbances and rioting, in particular when pushed to participate by the most extreme insurgent detainees. Many militant detainees were determined to continue combating US military personnel while detained, thus continuing the insurgency.47 Many members of the target group were highly educated, hence well capable of effectively organizing resistance against the guard forces. A considerable number of them, in particular imams, spoke English, enabling them to directly communicate with guard force personnel. Many detainees were held in the camps for many months or even years, depending, among others, on the charges put against them, on the risk assessment of their release, and on their progress towards re-integration. The long duration of detentions eventually created structured com- munities within the wire, including informal leadership and hierarchy. Such structures reinforced the detainee communities’ ability to organise disturbances and encourage non-compliance and opposition against the

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 security forces. Collective non-cooperative actions could be accompa- nied by the use of violence with improvised weapons against the guard forces.48 Revolts were also orchestrated between multiple compounds, by covertly exchanging messages with each other to announce a riot.49 Detainees were also very creative in crafting countermeasures to neutralize the effect of NLWs on them, in particular against kinetic NLWs. The combination of creativity, the availability of time and the use of their housing to conceal the preparation of countermeasures, 90 462 DEFENCE STUDIES

enabled them to prepare themselves for the next battle. The tools for self-protection were combined with offensive action by throwing rocks and by wielding weapons as tent poles and slingshots to engage the security forces.50 The repetitive confrontations with NLWs provided for lessons learned that helped detainees to enhance their capability to resist or deny the effect next time.51 Generally, bad weather conditions would be exploited by detainees to start a riot, particular when poor visibility would preventguard forces from identifying rioting detainees.52 The most serious events concerned collective disturbances by detainee populations in multiple compounds simultaneously, involving several thousands of detainees. Apart from intentional destruction of their housing, disturbances frequently resulted in large-scale active resistance against the security forces monitoring and controlling the camp. 53

Kinetic NLW Use-in-Operational-Context Hereafter, four operational cases will be considered, two of which took place in Abu Ghraib and two in Camp Bucca, all within the time frame between late 2003 and late 2007.

Detention Facility Abu Ghraib The US forces in Iraq opened the Abu Ghraib detention facility mid- 2003, initially as an interim detention camp. In the course of the year the number of detainees grew from 300–400 in the summer months to a tenfold (7,000) in the autumn of 2003. This surge of detainees was the result of the indiscriminate rounding-up of Iraqis, who were most probably innocent in many cases because they were caught in raids, despite little or no evidence of their involvement with the insurgency.54 There were hardly any releases of detained Iraqis, even though no clear charges were made against many of them. The image of Abu Ghraib was marked by the detainee abuse made

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 public in early 2004. Apart from the scandal that was brought into the open, Abu Ghraib was one of the detention facilities where abuses of detainees had been reported over an extended period of time.55 Commanding officers ordered not to release anyone, because nobody wanted to be accused of having released one of Saddam Hussein’s key henchmen.56 The facility was undersized, its construction improvisato- rial and chronically undermanned to hold and manage such a large population. US contractors had been tasked to build soft facilities in a 91 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 463

short period of time, consisting of fenced compounds holding tents for housing the detainees, in order to keep pace with the continuous influx of new detainees. Abu Ghraib was located close to Baghdad, and with the insurgency emerging, the capital’s vicinity soon became a source of severe threat to the facility. The site was frequently exposed to mortar attacks, which caused deaths and injuries, both among the detainees and the guard forces.57 The permanent threat created a general sense of insecurity within the facility affecting US military personnel as well as the detain- ees. Apart from the bad reputation of Abu Ghraib caused by the media release of images showing the severe abuse of detainees, this was another important reason to close down the facility in 2005, and to transfer the 7,000 detainees to Camp Bucca, situated close to the border with Kuwait, remote from populated areas.

Abu Ghraib Case 1 On 24 November 2003, shortly before Thanksgiving, the atmosphere in Abu Ghraib had become very tense. Detainees were angered because of the overcrowding, abuse and poor food.58 A major riot broke out when one detainee threw a rock into an adjoining compound, from where somebody threw it back. This exchange rapidly escalated into large-scale violence with 1,500 detainees throwing rocks and fighting in several compounds. In no time the remainder of the Abu Ghraib population, 6,500 in total, was also involved. The guard forces, at that time comprising only 300 troops, managed to calm down the majority of the rioters, using the compound represen- tatives as mediators. However, as a considerable number of rioters went on fighting, the guard forces used baton rounds against them. These turned out to be largely ineffective against detainees dressed for winter conditions, in combination with their tactics to stay out of baton gun range. Hence, non-lethal options capable of suppressing the riot were almost immediately exhausted. This prompted the commander of the Military Police (MP) battalion responsible for the detention facility to

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 order the use of lethal fire against the 700 detainees still rioting. After the smoke had cleared, three detainees lay dead, although another wit- ness account claims nine detainees were killed.59 The MP unit in charge of the facility had arrived only a couple of weeks before the event. Their rotation into Abu Ghraib coincided with the Military Intelligence Brigade taking over the tactical control of the facility from the Military Police. This change in regime had deep 92 implications for the approach taken, as the Abu Ghraib detainee popu- 464 DEFENCE STUDIES

lation was now exploited as an intelligence source, rather than being Iraqis held in custody for security reasons. The new command also imposed a more formal regime upon military personnel, including saluting superiors. This order violated established MP procedures: in detainee centres saluting should be avoided to prevent the opposing elements from identifying and targeting ranking officers. The new regime irritated the guard forces and also made the detainees more nervous.60 In addition, the guard forces, recruited from US Army Reserve Units, were undermanned, underresourced and improperly trained for detainee operations in the rapidly unfolding insurgency environment in Iraq, which inevitably led to fatigue, loss of morale and stress.61 Together, these unfavourable conditions rendered the guard forces less suitable and less capable to implement the Escalation of Force (EoF) procedures for the conduct of detainee operations when dealing with major riots.62 The detainee target population, in particular those fractions that con- tinued rioting despite the verbal intervention through compound repre- sentatives, was obviously very motivated to oppose the guard forces. The very poor circumstances of their living areas, combined with the disregard of the facility authority for their security needs and human rights in general, shaped an atmosphere of growing anger and aggression against the guard forces. With many detainees already held in custody for several months without any charges made against them, a general feeling of high frustration and humiliation developed. Against this background, the operational context of the riot was dominated by a disturbed relationship between the guard force and the detainee population, and had become one of confrontation and hostil- ity rather than cooperation, with a very low willingness to compromise. This almost inevitably had to lead to an escalation of the disturbance, in which the commander decided to use lethal force to restore order. The outcome of the confrontation, with several detainees killed by the guard forces, may well have further increased alienation, which in turn shaped conditions to breed more hardened insurgents within the 63

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 wire. The vicinity of Baghdad, from where insurgents could easily launch deadly attacks day and night, put high psychological pressure on the guard forces and intensified the confrontation with the detain- ees. Under these life-threatening conditions for the guard forces, the doctrinal imperative of proportionality by applying non-lethal force almost seemed at odds with their perception of being in a lethal war zone. 93 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 465

Abu Ghraib Case 2 One other major incident happened on 6 June 2005. That day, a sand storm raged and obscured vision, and detainees grabbed the opportunity to revolt.64 The riot started in a general compound where 2,000 prisoners were held in four separate areas. As in many situations of major distur- bances, the emergence of the riot announced itself, as there was more shouting by the detainees. The revolt itself was orchestrated in the sense that when one of four areas started and was put under control again by the guard forces, another area would start to keep the security forces ‘busy’. The whole battalion of guard forces was mobilized to cope with the riot. The total force was subdivided into three shifts, in order to cope with the sustained riot that went on for more than a day and prevent exhaustion among the guard personnel. The majority of the battalion deployed was Army National Guard Personnel. Of the 700 personnel only 100 were Military Police. The guard forces predominantly used their shotguns, stinger grenades and the FN-303 to counter the rioters. Some Military Police personnel had received training in the US at the Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapon Instructor Course (INIWIC). After their deployment to Abu Ghraib these instructors had trained the guard forces on the use of the NLWs on the facility shooting range. The available kinetic NLWs were all used during the riot, irrespec- tive of the bad visibility. The shotguns had not much accuracy and range, hence rioters could evade them by staying out of the weapon’s 25- metre range. The FN-303 was more accurate and had a longer range. Hundreds of personnel were positioned between and around the containment areas and every person had one or more non-lethal options. Not everyone had an FN-303 or a shotgun, but all were trained in using them. The sand storm had a significant impact on the operational context during the riot. Operators just fired into the dust, and aimed into the directions where they heard the rioters were standing, and the shouts of

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 pain when there were hits. While this could cause strikes at non-permissi- ble parts of the body, such as the head, no reports of major injuries came out. Obviously, the need for guard forces to get the disturbances under control forced them to use the kinetic rounds inappropriately, in absence of any other method to effectively engage the detainees. Given the dura- tion of the stand-off with all available guard forces mobilized, thousands of rounds were fired. There was continuous replenishment.65 The poor 94 466 DEFENCE STUDIES

visibility, however, complicated the guard forces’ ability to quickly realign their formation when the riot switched from one compound to another. A cease fire was no realistic option, as detainees would move towards the fence unhindered and together try to push it over in order to escape. The riot was a very intense physiological and stressful experience for the guard forces, as the earth was almost shaking, due to the shouting and jumping by the thousands of rioters. It felt like being in a war situa- tion. Rioters were massively throwing stones at the guards, which caused injuries. The availability of rocks was unlimited, as the ground on which the camp was built provided for sufficient material, including the con- crete on which the tents and other housing constructions were built. As long as the disturbances went on, guard forces were unable to provide detainees with their basic needs such as food, water and medical care. Given the hot weather in June, the need for water soon became critical and drained the motivation of detainees to continue their revolt. Guard commanders also tried to get in touch with compound leaders to try to convince them to stop the violence, which proved to be effective. In the aftermath of the disturbances the atmosphere between the guard forces and the detainee population remained tense for a couple of days due to the exchange of projectiles that inflicted injuries on both sides. As no further incidents emerged, the situation then stabilized.66 The extensive use of kinetic NLWs in itself had not stopped the distur- bance but contributed to conditioning the violence at a certain level, thus preventing further escalation. The wider situational context of the Abu Ghraib detention facility made its location unfavourable for its purpose. Escape attempts were potentially rewarding, as the facility was situated only a couple of hun- dred metres away from the city of Abu Ghraib, a stronghold of the insurgency.67 Riots were often started to cover an escape attempt.68 Dis- turbances in the Abu Ghraib detention facility could often be linked to particular political events in Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq, as messages to the detainees to encourage an uprising could be broadcast by the nearby mosques.69 Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 Detention Facility Camp Bucca Camp Bucca had been opened as a detention facility in February 2003. After the closure of the Abu Ghraib facility in 2005 it would gradually become the largest US detention facility in Iraq. Major riots in Camp Bucca occurred almost monthly, while there were minor disturbances every week.70 Two major incidents in which NLWs were used are discussed below. 95 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 467

Camp Bucca Case 1 In the morning of 31 January 2005, a major uprising of detainees devel- oped, involving most of the detainee compounds in the facility. The disturbances began after guard personnel entered one of the compounds to search for contraband, and a Muslim cleric accused them of having damaged several Korans. This enraged detainees, who started to push against the compound’s fence in an obvious attempt to escape. Guard forces responded, but this further escalated the situation as detainees started to hurl all kind of missiles at the guard forces. The exchange ended with four detainees shot dead and another six wounded by two Army guards using their M-16 rifles.71 The guard forces primarily used rubber pellet rounds against the large number of rioters and also some plastic rounds from shotguns. Half of the guard forces were from the Army National Guard 105th Military Police Battalion and had been on duty in Camp Bucca for four months. The other half belonged to the Air Force 732nd Expeditionary Security Squadron, which had arrived several weeks before. The guards were frightened by the chaos and scale of the riots, and by being con- fronted with barrages of projectiles hurled over the 5 metre tall fences and towards the 10 metre tall guard towers. In an attempt to control the increasingly volatile situation the facility commander had immediately deployed all available guard forces in the facility, The guards initially tried to curtail the violence, using verbal warnings. When this failed, they used their available NLWs. They tried to get the situation under control for almost an hour, firing kinetic NLWs at almost 3,000 detainees rioting in five different compounds.72 Then, two guards independently used lethal force from different towers, with no order to fire. Rules allowed the use of lethal force only if guard personnel felt endangered. The riot ended soon after the news spread that detainees had been killed by deadly force. The target group, consisting of thousands of detainees, used make- shift slingshots, hurled rocks and chunks of concrete torn from the floors of their cabins. They tossed sticks and plastic bottles filled with

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 sand, and lit plastic bags with flammable hand sanitizer. As defensive tactics, knowing the limited range of the shotgun, they would withdraw out of range of the NLWs used against them,. They also used their sleeping bags as shields against the baton rounds and rubber pellets.73 Rioters used dynamic tactics as well, switching between safe positions out of NLW range and quick rushes forward to hurl their missiles at the guards. They were even able to outrange the guards’ NLWs. 96 468 DEFENCE STUDIES

Within the operational context of the riot, in particular defined by the high numbers of rioters spread over five different compounds and their abilitys to quickly adapt their tactics, guard forces lacked the capa- bility to quell the disturbances using their NLWs. The intensity of offensive counter actions from the rioters prevented part of the guard forces from using their NLWs, in particular personnel in exposed posi- tions in the towers. This may explain why the lethal fire came from those towers. Given the orchestration level of the uprising, facility com- manders believed it was planned beforehand. One purpose of the riots might have been to test the new guard units that had just come in.

Camp Bucca case 2 On 18 December 2007 a major riot broke out. This riot has been recorded by one of the guard force personnel in a five-minute video.74 The following account is solely based on the footage. The images do not reveal what triggered the riot and how the confrontation was stopped. During the riot that was ongoing in one of the compounds, guard forces fired many baton rounds at the rioting detainees. Situated in the corridor between the compounds, they had to fire through the fence. Guard personnel also used stinger hand grenades and flash bang gre- nades against the rioters, thus engaging the rioters from the rear. At one point in time, the video shows that a commander gave new instructions to the guard force unit, as he was obviously not pleased with the unit’s performance. Rioters used mattresses to protect themselves, while stones were continuously being thrown at the guards. They also kept considerable distance from the fence, in order to prevent guards from using the baton gun effectively. The combined use of direct (baton rounds) and indirect (stinger grenades) NLW fire had some effect as the rioters could not keep up the defence barrier. Subsequently, rocks were also thrown from another compound next

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 to the first one. This changed the operational context in the sense that the guard forces now had to engage in a two-front battle. At one point, a fire was started by the detainees close to one of the watch towers. The footage showed that baton rounds as direct fire projectiles were insufficient to bring the riot to an end, but that in combination with hand-thrown grenades as a means of indirect fire some effect was achieved. Piles of baton round cartridges were visible on the scene, indicating that thousands of rounds had been fired. This indicates that 97 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 469

the riot had been ongoing for an extended time span, and was obviously difficult to control with the use of the kinetic NLWs available. Again, the separation of forces and detainees by the fence gave rise to a stalemate in the battle, resulting in a protracted exchange of projectiles. Especially after 2007, the US approach changed from a rather indis- criminate ‘group wise’ approach towards a more discriminate ‘individ- ual’ approach. This resulted in a more benign treatment of detainees, aimed at re-integration into Iraqi society.75 Before that time, there was an obvious disconnect between the declared politically guided top-down strategy to conduct CI in the open society of Iraq and the ad hoc and bottom-up CI within the closed societies of the detention facilities. Both approaches started to converge by mid-2007, when the new US detainee CI strategy was developed, refocusing detention operations from large- scale ‘warehousing’ of detainee populations to a discrimi- nate, individual approach towards detainees.76

Deploying the Active Denial System (ADS) The case analysis has demonstrated that a key deficit facing guard forces to quell massive disturbances by rioting detainees was the insufficient range of NLWs to effectively engage rioting detainees. With kinetic energy NLWs ranges limited to a few dozens of metres, detainees could always withdraw to a ‘safe haven’ within their compound, out of reach for kinetic energy NLWs, from where they regrouped and launched hit and run strikes against the guard force. The ADS is technologically the most advanced NLW-concept cur- rently available. Its technology and design enables the delivery of non- lethal effects over ranges exceeding those of kinetic energy NLWs by an order of magnitude. Hence it is worthwhile to consider the hypothetical use of ADS in the Iraqi detainee operations.

ADS Characteristics

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 The ADS is a millimetre wave (MMW) emitter at a frequency of 95Ghz. The system uses an antenna to direct a focused beam toward a selected human target. The MMW-energy strikes the subject and reaches a skin penetration depth of less than a millimetre. It produces a heat sensation that within seconds becomes intolerable and forces the targeted individual to instinctively move. The sensation immediately ceases when the individual moves out of the beam or when the operator 98 turns off the beam. When the system is operated properly there is 470 DEFENCE STUDIES

minimal risk of injury because of the shallow penetration depth of energy into the skin at the short wavelength, the safety features designed into the system, and normal human instinctive reactions.77 The heating effect experienced by target individuals is caused by the stimulation of pain nerves in the upper skin.78 Only if the subject remained in a sus- tained beam for more than a few seconds, a risk of lasting damage exists, depending on the focus and setting of the beam. The system incorporates computerised control systems to modulate the beam transmission to achieve a safe and effective non-lethal repel effect. The operational range can vary between 15 and 500 metres. The MMW-beam can be adjusted to target three or four individuals grouped closely together.79 The ADS is to be positioned in such a way that an uninterrupted line-of-sight in a considerable sector is ensured. The sys- tem’s accuracy is advertised to enable discrimination between single tar- get persons who are at least two metres away from each other. Such accuracy levels can generally be attained at moderate engagement ranges and degrades with extended distances, and at longer ranges with visual aids only if target persons do not move. Range to target measurement accuracy is a critical factor for selecting the correct emission power level.80

Deploying ADS in an Iraq detention facility For the guard forces it would be relatively easy to operate the ADS, after having received dedicated training, including employing the MMW-beam against selected individuals within a dynamic crowd. The system could be positioned in one or more guard towers over- seeing multiple compounds, even at fairly remote positions from the compounds. The mobile antenna allows for re-aiming of the beam into the desired direction, but slewing takes some time. With a range of sev- eral hundreds of metres, one ADS platform would facilitate the engage- ment of individuals or small groups of detainees scattered over multiple compounds, denying rioters the safe haven option enjoyed previously.

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 The system’s elevated position in the guard tower would also reduce masking effects from obstacles or innocent detainees when aiming at target populations at relatively long range.81 Hence, in the context of a major riot, ADS would technically be well suited to deliver an effect against rioters. The target population, usually rioting detainees, would be deprived from using some of the countermeasures that proved effective against kinetic NLWs. They would be facing an entirely different pain effect, 99 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 471

namely intolerable heat from an invisible beam. Conceivable counter- measures against the effect require the presence of sufficient amounts of water for the wetting of cloths and other protecting cover material such as sleeping bags. Furthermore, shielding against the beam would be possible by applying metal foil or fine grids. These materials would be hard to acquire in a detention context. Apart from the limited technical options for detainees to protect themselves against the heating effect, they might use their large numbers and split up to engage guards, as re- aiming the ADS DE beam and re-calibrating the beam intensity takes too much response time to deliver the desired energy level at the selected coordinates. Detainees would soon learn that dynamic behav- iour and spreading would outpace the ADS tactical and technical flexi- bility. This mechanism would work even better if they switched the riot between multiple compounds. From the user force perspective, such evading tactics could partly be compensated for by deploying multiple ADS-platforms, provided that all platforms were integrated into a single Command and Control struc- ture, to coordinate facility-wide target acquisition and engagement. In addition, close coordination between ADS operation and guard force units operating with kinetic energy NLWs would create a non-lethal ‘manoeuvre’ capability, thus confronting rioters with more operational complexity and surprise created by the guard forces. There is also a psychological issue involved in deploying an invisible ‘pain ray’.82 Detainees might well conceive it as unfair to be engaged by an opponent they cannot counter physically, as their improvised weap- onry would be outranged by the ADS. Deprived from their safe haven, they might perceive its effect as torture, which has the potential to trig- ger growing alienation between the detainees and the guards.83 Such appreciation could well be amplified in a context with many innocent detainees, as obviously was the case in Abu Ghraib and in Camp Bucca. It is unlikely that, given this wider mental and political context, ADS would be supportive to the hearts and minds strategy in detainee opera- tions. Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012

Assessment Synthesis and Conclusion This article has addressed the question to what extent the deployment and use of NLWs in US detention facilities in Iraq has contributed to the hearts and minds approach in the CI. The deployment of these NLWs in support of the UOF continuum in detainee operations was 100 472 DEFENCE STUDIES

intended and claimed to prevent and reduce the need of lethal force application to restore order in cases of violent major disturbances. In the target population’s context, riots in detention facilities were in many cases a continuation of the ongoing insurgency in the country. Yet, with many detainees actually being innocent and held in custody without having been charged, taking part in disturbances was an expres- sion of frustration and desperation over the many months and years they had already been detained under poor living conditions. Feeling treated unjustly and humiliated, they were susceptible for recruitment by hard-core insurgents, who organized and mobilized large-scale vio- lent resistance against the guard forces. Under these conditions, the deployment of kinetic energy NLW weapon technology and devices proved insufficiently effective to stop a riot. The user force, while in many cases far outnumbered by the target population, was charged to quell the riots at all circumstances and pre- vent escalation of violence to levels at which lethal force would have to be used against escapes. The operational context led to a stalemate and protracted battle, in which the user force kept the target population ‘busy’, while the latter would persist in rioting in an attempt to wear down the user force. Over time, detainees became better at shaping the operational con- text to their advantage, as they learned how to deny the effect of the kinetic rounds, both technically and tactically. The availability of virtu- ally unlimited preparation time to detainees, combined with creativity in using scarce resources, provided for ever better countermeasures. A sim- ilar pattern presented itself during the Troubles in Northern Ireland, where the target population also became increasingly proficient at neu- tralizing NLW effects delivered by the user force.84 As detainees in Iraq could choose the time of the riots, they could benefit from weather conditions favourable to them, such as reduced visibility, to further optimize the operational context to their advantage. Under circum- stances of severely reduced visibility, guards opted to use kinetic energy NLWs beyond the weapons’ safety limits. Countermeasures by rioters

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 created an operational context that tended to trigger a similar shift in NLW use practices. Protracted disturbances thus gave rise to a blurring of the dividing line between the disciplined application of non-lethal force and inappropriate NLW use, which increased the risk of fatalities. It was a varying combination of –occasional – escalation to lethal force, verbal persuasion of compound leaders by guard force command- ers, and an operational context prohibiting guard personnel from per- forming basic duties for detainees such as supplying water, food and 101 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 473

medical assistance, that put serious disturbances to an end. In particular during the hot summers in Iraq, drinking water was a critical asset, and a riot could not be sustained for long without. The wider insurgency context of the detainee operations, and the unpreparedness of US guard forces for these special conditions in the first four to five years, were responsible for the outbreak of many of the disturbances within detention facilities. The guard personnel and detainees found themselves locked to each other in the long term ‘pressure cooker’ environment of a closed detention facility. This pres- sure cooker operational context was the combined result of hot weather conditions exhausting guard force personnel in heavy military gear, the permanent exposure to external threat by insurgents through armed strikes, and the internal threat from hostile detainees with improvised weapons. In the detainee population context, recruitment practices by hard-core insurgents compounded the pressure. The pressure cooker context was not permissive for a constructive role of NLW in pursuing a hearts and minds approach in detainee oper- ations. Feelings of injustice and the lack of a perspective of release cre- ated an atmosphere of animosity, in which violence was the only decompression valve for the target population. Hence, in the absence of a more benign political context in terms of a positive end state for the individual detainee, the use of NLWs was counterproductive in enforc- ing compliance. Rather, it hardened the rioters to resist the user force’s efforts to quell disturbances non-lethally ever more strongly and more determined. Despite their ineffectiveness and in the absence of any alternatives to control order, NLWs at least helped to prevent more casualties than had already been inflicted during major disturbances. Hence they were a necessary evil, rather than a benign force. Deployment of ADS might have helped to reduce escalation risk in riots and might even have been effective in terminating riots, especially when operated in conjunction with the other NLWs. However, it might also have had an adverse role in the longer term, due to its potentially alienating effect, when per-

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 ceived by the target population as an invisible and untouchable instru- ment of pain. One important lesson learned was that, even with a constructive CI hearts and minds strategy to guide detainee operations in place, the skills and discipline of the guard forces are key to the successful con- duct of detainee operations. As one officer put it: ‘The key thing to remember is that one undisciplined Soldier can cause a major 102 474 DEFENCE STUDIES

disturbance that could result in the serious injury or death of soldiers or detainees and thus destroy CI within the wire.’85 From this lesson it can be taken that a more considerate military behaviour during the early years of detainee operations would have allowed for a better utility of NLWs than was the case in the alienated relationship between US guard forces and Iraqi detainees at the time.

Acknowledgements I want to thank Professor John Grin and Dr. Jrgen Altmann for their suggestions and constructive remarks on a draft of this article.

NOTES

1 As articulated in: Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force:- The Art of War in a Modern World (London: Penguin Books 2006). 2 The pros and cons of NLWs, as well as the complexity surrounding the concept of non- lethal force, has for instance been discussed by Wing Commander V.J. Wallace, ‘Non- Lethal Weapons: R2IPE for Arms Control Measures?’ Defence Studies 1/2 (Summer 2001) pp.83–108. 3 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index - Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq (Washington DC: Brookings, 30 Aug. 2011) p.12, . 4 Col. James Brown, Lt. Col. Eric Goepner and Capt. James Clark, ‘Detention Operations, Behavior Modification and Counterinsurgency’, Military Review 89/3 (May–June 2009) pp.40–7. 5 Various definitions exist in national and international NLW policy documents. This arti- cle adopts the definition of NLWs stated in: NATO, NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons (Brussels: NATO, 13 Oct. 1999). 6 US Army & Marine Corps. Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Univ. of Chicago Press 2007) p.54. 7 Sjef Orbons, ‘Are Non-Lethal Weapons a Viable Military Option to Strengthen the Hearts and Minds Approach in Afghanistan?’, Defense and Security Analysis 28/2 (June 2012) pp.114–30. 8 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide for the legal framework for the just treat- ment of war victims. Two of these conventions, one on the treatment of prisoners of war and the other on the protection of civilian persons in time of war, specifically apply to the protection of detainees. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 Aug. 1949); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 Aug. 1949). 9 Department of Defense, Directive 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 (Washington DC: DOD 5 Sept. 2006) pp.1–2. 10 US Department of the Army Headquarters, Field Manual FM 3-19.40 Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations (Washington DC 1 Aug 2001) pp.2.2–2.3. 11 Ibid. pp.B9–10. 12 Ibid. pp.B1–5. 13 US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-63 Detainee Operations (Washington DC 23 March 2005). 14 As reported in: Janis Karpinski and Steven Strassner, One Woman’s Army – The Command- ing General of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story (New York: Hyperion 2005), and: ‘US Guards 103 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 475

shoot dead 4 Inmates in Iraq Prison Riot’, China Daily, 1 Feb. 2005, . 15 Wim Smit, John Grin and Lev Voronkov, ‘Assessing Military-Technological Develop- ment Paths: Examples and Methodologies’, in idem (eds.),. Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a Changing World (Amsterdam: VU University Press 1992) pp.-161–6. 16 Brian Rappert, ‘Scenarios on the Future of Non-lethal Weapons’, Contemporary Security Policy 22/1 (April 2001) pp.57–82. 17 Brian Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces? Technology, Policy and the Manage- ment of Conflict (London: Frank Cass 2003) p.253. 18 A more detailed explanation of the DTA-framework can be found in: Sjef Orbons, ‘Do Non-Lethal Weapons License to Silence?’, Journal of Military Ethics 9/1 (March 2010) pp.78–99. 19 Sjef Orbons, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Peace Enablers or Troublesome Force? Assessing the Role of CS and Baton Rounds in the Northern Ireland Conflict’, Small Wars & Insur- gencies 22/3 (July 2011) p.470. 20 Lieutenant Commander Vasilios Tasikas, ‘The Battle inside the Wire – Detention Opera- tions under Major General Douglas Stone’, Military Review (Sept./Oct. 2009) pp.64–71. 21 US Military Police commanding officer in Abu Ghraib in 2005 and in Camp Bucca in 2007, interview 30 July 2009. 22 Gary Vilke and Theodore Chan, ‘Less Lethal Technology: Medical Issues’, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 30/3 (2007) pp.341–57. 23 Odd Harry Arnesen and Reza Rahimi, ‘Military Non-Lethal Solutions for Medium to Long Ranges’. Paper presented at the 4th European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons (Ettlingen, Germany: Fraunhofer ICT, 21–23 May 2007). 24 John Hussey and Robert Berry, ‘When the Earth Shakes! Detainee Disturbances in an Internment Facility’, Military Police 19/1 (Jan. 2008) pp.9–12. 25 Allard Kernkamp et al., Technologische Verkenningen Niet-Letale Wapens (Rijswijk, NLD: TNO-Rapport FEL-03-A126 2003) pp.20–2. 26 Hussey and Berry (note 24) pp.9–12. 27 Michael C. Allgood, ‘The End of US Military Detainee Operations at Abu Ghraib, Iraq’ (Orlando: University of Florida Master Thesis, Spring 2009) p.48. 28 Kernkamp et al. (note 25) pp.23–5. 29 US President George W. Bush. President’s statement to the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, Washington DC, 26 June 2004, . 30 Department of Defense (note 9) p.1. 31 US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-63 Detainee Operations (Washington DC: 30 May 2008). 32 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (note 13). 33 US Department of the Army Headquarters (note 10). 34 Cheryl Benard et al. The Battle Behind the Wire (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2011) pp.49–50. 35 Ibid. p.50. 36 Allgood (note 27) p.25. 37 Karpinski and Strassner (note 14) pp.164, 173. 38 Benard et al. (note 34) p.66. 39 Hussey and Berry (note 24) pp.9–12. Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 40 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (note 31). p.III.14. 41 As for instance stated by a US Air Force Security Forces Commander who was deployed in Camp Bucca in 2007, interview 9 Nov. 2009; and: Hussey and Berry (note 24) p.12. 42 Apart from the group wise orchestrated disturbances against the security personnel, smal- ler scale situations occurred in which NLWs were used to enforce compliance. Examples are the movement of detainees between compounds, with individual detainees refusing to cooperate, and events with fights between detainees within their compound. Military Police guards used the taser, kinetic projectiles and guard dogs in such situations. Stated by a Military Police Captain who was deployed in Camp Bucca in 2003, and a Military 104 476 DEFENCE STUDIES

Police Sergeant who was deployed in Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca in 2004, interviews Oct. 2009. 43 . 44 Military Police commander (note 21). 45 US Army General John Batiste (ret.), in a testimony in a US Senate hearing about Abu Ghraib prison on 26 Sept. 2006, said that ‘Probably 99percent of those people were guilty of absolutely nothing.... Chris Hedges, and Laila Al-Arian. Collateral Damage (New York: Nation Books 2008) p.72. 46 John Hussey, ‘Counterinsurgency Operations Within the Wire – The 306th Military Police Battalion Experience at Abu Ghraib’, Military Police 19/1 (Jan. 2007) p.4. 47 Hussey and Berry (note 24) p.10. 48 Robert L. Berry, ‘Attack on Abu Ghraib: Warrior Police in an Iraq Theater Internment Facility’, Military Police 19/1 (Jan. 2007) p.2. 49 Detainees from different compounds exchanged information by wrapping note messages around rocks which they would throw to the next compound. In this way they were able to prepare and coordinate a riot. Allgood (note 27) p.52. 50 Berry (note 48) p.2. 51 Col John Hussey, Military Police commander in Abu Ghraib from Dec. 2004 until Nov. 2005, conversation 14 Nov. 2011. 52 Col John Hussey, Military Police commander in Abu Ghraib from Dec. 2004 until Nov. 2005, interview 12 Nov. 2009. 53 Hussey and Berry (note 24) pp.9–12. 54 Hedges and Al-Arian (note 45) p.73. 55 Between 2003 and 2006, hundreds of individual cases of detainee abuse have been reported from several detention facilities, including Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca. Human Rights Watch, No Blood no Foul, 22 July 2006, p.2. 56 Karpinski and Strassner (note 14) p.190. 57 Allgood (note 27); Karpinski and Strassner (note 14). 58 Hedges and Al-Arian (note 45) p.85. 59 Karpinski and Strassner (note 14) p.204. While Karpinski, who was at the time of the riots the commanding general of US detention operations in Iraq, speaks of three Iraqis killed, the death toll was claimed to be nine by an Army Reserve Specialist, who wit- nessed the riot. Hedges and Al-Arian (note 45) p.85. 60 Karpinski and Strassner (note 14). 61 Ibid. 62 The lack of dedicated training was still existing with units serving in Abu Ghraib two years later, with only five days of detention operations training out of a two-month pre- deployment training programme. Allgood (note 27) p.96. 63 The term ‘detainee alienation effect’ indicates the degree that elements of the Iraqi popu- lation were driven to align with insurgents and other malign actors, due to actions by counterinsurgents. It was coined in: James Mason Brooks and Drew Miller (Institute for Defense Analyses) ‘Enhanced Multi-Criteria Decision Support: A Case Study in Iraq’, Paper for the 14th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS) Washington DC, 15-17 June 2009, p.6. 64 The account of the disturbances on this ‘D-day’ were provided by Col. John Hussey, Military Police commander in Abu Ghraib from Dec. 2004 untill Nov. 2005, interview Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012 12 Nov. 2009 and conversation 14 Nov. 2011. 65 Hussey (note 52). 66 Hussey (note 51). 67 Berry (note 48) p.1. 68 Allgood (note 27) p.49. 69 Hussey (note 52). 70 Ibid. 71 The account of this case was primarily taken from Bradley Graham, ‘Prisoner Uprising in Iraq Exposes New Risk for US – Non-lethal Weapons Proved Ineffective as Chaos 105 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS USE IN DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 477

Spread’, Washington Post, 21 Feb. 2005, . 72 ‘US Guards shoot dead 4 Inmates in Iraq Prison Riot’, China Daily, 1 Feb. 2005, . 73 Graham (note 71). 74 Camp Bucca TIF Riots – A typical day at Camp Bucca, video footage, 18 Dec. 2007, . 75 Benard et al. (note 34) Chapter 5. 76 The arrival in May 2007 of a new Commander (Major General Douglas Stone) of Task Force 134, an organization directly responsible for detention operations in Iraq, marked the beginning of a change in the strategy towards the so-called ‘CI within the wire’. Brown, Goepner and Clark (note 4) p.41. 77 US Department of Defense, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program 2007, 78 Michael Murphy et al. ‘Bioeffects Research in Support of the Active Denial System (ADS): A Novel Directed Energy Non-Lethal Weapon’. Paper presented at the European Working Group NLW 2nd Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Ettlingen, 13–14 May 2003. 79 Stew Magnuson, ‘Non-Lethal Weapon Readied for Battlefield’, National Defense 90/626 (2006) pp.1819. 80 John Alexander, conversation 23 May 2007. 81 The potential utility of deploying an ADS in this manner was confirmed by Hussey (note 51). 82 The ADS has been portrayed in the media as a ‘pain ray’ weapon, for its potential to tor- ture people. See for instance: Dangerroom, ‘Pain Ray, Rejected by the Military, Ready to Blast LA Prisoners’, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08>. 83 Alienation towards detainees is considered by some detention facility commanders as undesirable and counterproductive for accomplishing detainee compliance. This was one reason for a detention commander not to use the Long Range Acoustic Device to amplify verbal orders and messages to a detainee community. US Military Police commander (note 21). 84 Orbons (note 19) p.475. 85 Hussey (note 46) p.3. Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie] at 04:59 11 September 2012

106 Chapter 5 Are Non-Lethal Weapons a Viable Military Option to Strengthen the Hearts and Minds Approach in Afghanistan? *

* Orbons, S. (2012) Are Non-lethal weapons a viable military option to strengthen the hearts and minds approach in Afghanistan?, Defense & Security Analysis, 28(2), pp.114-130.

Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 28, No. 2, June 2012, 114–130

Are non-lethal weapons a viable military option to strengthen the hearts and minds approach in Afghanistan?

Sjef Orbons∗

Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, PO Box 90002, 4800 PA Breda, The Netherlands

Commanders of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have repeatedly stressed the hearts and minds approach in Afghanistan, in saying that the human terrain is decisive for a successful outcome of the mission. Avoidance of civilian casualties is considered of strategic importance, and by nature highly dependent on the management of tactical level Escalation of Force (EoF) situations. Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) are expected to enable tactical commanders to avoid innocent civilian casualties in such situations. This article considers a selected NLW on its potential to accomplish this requirement. It uses a defence technology assessment approach to analyse EoF situations experienced by Dutch ISAF forces in which the NLW is inserted. The analysis demonstrates that a range of contextual factors in the Afghanistan high-risk environment tend to narrow down the window of opportunity for the NLW to help defuse the risk of unintended civil casualties. Keywords: ISAF; non-lethal weapons; Laser Optical Warner; civilian casualties

Introduction Over the last two decades, Western military forces have increasingly been deployed in irregular conflict, while engaged in counter-insurgency (CI) missions. The NATO-led International Secur- ity Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan has been conducted as a CI against the Taliban. ISAF has been deployed to stabilise the country and to deny the Taliban coming back to power, thereby preventing a renewed creation of a sanctuary for a resurgent Al-Qaeda to prepare terrorist attacks worldwide. A dual strategy is being pursued by the Coalition forces: on the one hand combining military containment of Taliban armed strikes, intimidation and influ- ence; and on the other using Provincial Reconstruction Teams to rebuild the country to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan population.1 The hearts and minds approach has repeatedly been emphasised by ISAF commanders, when saying that the human terrain is decisive for a successful outcome of the mission. According to US General David Petraeus, when in command of the ISAF-mission between mid-2010 and mid- 2011, the people are the centre of gravity; only by providing them with security and earning Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 their trust will ISAF prevail.2 By its nature, the strategic objective of winning hearts and minds is dependent on tactical activities. Robert Egnell divides such activities into several categories, one of which implies a different mindset in the conduct of military operations, involving a less coercive approach and emphasing the minimum use of force.3 General Petraeus expressed this as a maxim by underlining

∗Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1475-1798 print/ISSN 1475-1801 online # 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2012.678163 http://www.tandfonline.com

109 Defense & Security Analysis 115

the strategic importance of avoiding harm to the civil population. He stated in his Counterinsur- gency Guidance for ISAF that

if we kill civilians or damage their property in the course of our operations, we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate. That’s exactly what the Taliban want. Don’t fall into their trap. We must continue our efforts to reduce civilian casualties to an absolute minimum.4

Minimising civilian casualties can be viewed as one side of the coin of “casualty aversion” that has influenced the decisions of western policy-makers and military commanders for several decades. The flip side represents the death among own military personnel during such missions. Gentry calls these two types of casualty-aversion “norms” in modern warfare,5 namely “standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations.”6 These are used by belligerents as “weapons,” by exploiting the sensitivity of Western societies and their political leaders to casual- ties.7 In Afghanistan, the Taliban seek to achieve this through tactical level “meeting” events between security forces and the population in which they face ISAF units with an “us or them” dilemma between their own security and that of the local people. Civilian casualties have occurred during ISAF CI operations. Fatal events include Escalation of Force (EoF) incidents, when a driver fails to comply after warnings from military forces to stop, resulting in civilian death or injury.8 In the second half of 2006, 45 civilians were unintentionally killed or injured by ISAF personnel, the majority of whom were in EoF incidents.9 2010 saw an increase in casualties of 15% compared to 2009, resulting in several large demonstrations by the Afghan people against ISAF and the Afghanistan National Security Forces, jeopardising the hearts-and-minds objectives of the ISAF mission.10

Non-lethal weapons and the strategic impact of tactical prudence Petraeus has pointed out that the situation at a checkpoint is where the control forces may mis- interpret unanticipated or non-cooperative behaviour and cause those in charge to make split- second decisions, sometimes with life-or-death consequences. There is a need, therefore, for ade- quate training and the means to stop a vehicle without having to open fire. Patraeus called for novel and effective ways to neutralise such a threat without having to use lethal force.11 In doing so, he also encouraged the use of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) and asked US force planners to identify their top 10 NLWs.12 Given the tactical uncertainties, do NLWs enable junior commanders to defuse the clash of casualty-aversion norms when meeting the strategic imperative of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people? The need to minimise civilian casualties in CI operations has been addressed by analysts such as McNab and Scott, who identified a number of recurring situ- ations involving the risk of civilian casualties, including that of checkpoints.13 They argue that the use of NLWs reduces the number of deaths for a given incident and mitigates the strategic effects Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 resulting from civilian deaths.14 Others, such as Altmann, warn against the danger of setting unrealistically high promises for NLWs, causing decision-makers to rely on a technological fix rather than political solutions.15 Mandel states that the relative absence of significant examples of publicly documented NLW applications makes it difficult to assess their utility. He also notes that the existing literature on NLWs is extremely scarce, and their conceptual context largely unexplored.16 A clearer understanding is needed about situation-dependent costs and benefits of a greater reliance on NLWs.17 Little research has been devoted to the performance of NLWs in military situations, leaving the debate between those with high expectations of their military value and others questioning 110 their utility largely unresolved. This article, therefore, assesses a selected type of NLW, using 116 S. Orbons

an analytical framework based on defence technology assessment (DTA) to determine the NLWs’ potential in the Afghan operational context and their contribution to ISAF’s strategic mission.

Analytical approach for NLW assessment in Afghanistan Defence technology assessment Technology assessment is an analytical approach aimed at evaluating innovative technological systems within a contextual framework. DTA is specifically designed for a systematic approach to new military concepts, with a focus on the operational context, including human and procedural factors, in which the system is to be applied.18 Addressing the operational context is essential as this enables an analysis of NLW performance under real conditions. The significance of the operational context in analysing NLWs has been identified and dis- cussed by other analysts. Rappert argues that an account of technology relies on context as a way to understand its meaning.19 Feakin has taken the role of context further by capturing it in his “ICE” equation of non-lethality: Intent Context Effect. He contends that if an NLW is used with the correct intent and within an+ appropriate¼ context, it will produce the desired “non-lethal” effect.20 His approach suggests that intent and context are variables that can be chosen independent of each other. It can be argued, however, that the intent of the user of the NLW may well be influenced by – and thus is dependent on – the context in which he operates. This has, for instance, been demonstrated in an analysis of NLW use during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland.21 Besides intent (of the user), a range of other factors come into play, such as the skills of the operator or the attitude of the individual or group exposed to the NLW. Moreover, engagements with NLWs also involve interactive mechanisms between the user and the person(s) engaged, as well as between the NLW and the targeted person(s). DTA seeks to unravel the complexity associated with NLW use. It frames the essential elements – and the interactions between them – which in their entirety influence the outcome of NLW use in real-world situations. The framework consists of three main components: the user, the NLW device and technology and the target.22 They are called complexes, as each embo- dies a variety of factors that influence the process of NLW engagement to acquire a particular effect. The user complex, for instance, may include training of personnel and doctrinal guidance, organisational deployment of the non-lethal capability, experience, attitude and familiarity with the deployment environment. Every single situation of NLW use is defined by a unique context. Context not only affects the outcome in a direct manner, but also indirectly, as it influences each of the three components sep- arately, as is visualised in Figure 1. The contextual dependency of the three components, as well as their interactions during operational use of the NLW, is responsible for potential differences between what is required and expected from NLW deployment, and what is the outcome under tactical field conditions. The DTA will be applied to a selected set of EoF cases and will consider Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 the most appropriate NLW to be identified thereafter.

Defining the Afghanistan research case The DTA analysis focuses on NLW utility in cases involving EoF incidents, in which the number of innocent casulties should be diminished. Suicide bombers use tactics exploiting the presence of civilians as a means to conceal their approach of military targets. The concealment tactics are reinforced by the absence of clues to help to distinguish the potential suicide bomber from inno- cent persons. Hence, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is fundamentally blurred and some of them even behave as chameleons in this respect. Once a suspect has 111 Defense & Security Analysis 117

Figure 1. The NLW DTA Model. Source: Orbons, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Peace Enablers or Troublesome Force? Assessing the Role of CS and Baton Rounds in the Northern Ireland Conflict’, p. 470. Note: The central box represents the framework to analyse and explain differences between expectations and the actual outcome of NLW employment.

closed with ISAF forces, there is no other option than to neutralise the individual with deadly force. Such sudden and unanticipated suicide threat scenarios emerge in a range of operational settings. As has been pointed out, these incidents predominantly occur in confrontations between civi- lians with military convoys and at checkpoints. Other EoF situations, such as Crowd and Riot Control events and at Entry Control Points of military facilities, occur at much lower rates and are accountable for relatively insignificant numbers of innocent civilian casualties. The analysis here will, therefore, focus on checkpoint and convoy situations. A key requirement to reduce the clash of casualty-aversion norms with the EoF procedure is to extend the distance at which approaching vehicles or individuals should receive a clear and non- lethal alert to stop. Such a range is estimated by military experts to be at least 100, and possibly 150 m.23 Currently, only a few limited NLWs are capable of delivering a significant effect at such ranges. Four devices are available: a kinetic weapon, called the long-range baton round; a sound generator, called the acoustic hailing device; a millimetre wave-directed energy weapon, called the Active Denial System (ADS); a directed energy laser beam emitter, called the Laser Optical Warner. While each of these systems has reached some stage of maturity or has technically been demonstrated, their applicability in EoF situations in Afghanistan should meet some additional basic criteria, given the high standards of reliability that NLWs should meet in delivering their effect at long ranges. These criteria include: deployability, safety of effect, aiming accuracy Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 and discrimination precision. The ADS, designed to engage individual targets with a millimetre wave heat effect at ranges up to hundreds of metres, is currently carried on a heavy truck platform. Given its large dimen- sions, its considerable logistic footprint and its political sensitivity due to the invisibility of the mmw beam that heats the target’s skin, ADS deployment in Afghanistan is unlikely in the foresee- able future. Only a few, if any, would be available.24 The long-range baton round, originally designed to strike human targets to achieve compli- ance by inflicting pain, would be used to hit the windscreen of vehicles at ranges of up to 100 m. Whereas this range is attainable when firing the weapon at a sufficiently elevated angle, the hit probability is compromised by the increasing loss of ballistic accuracy at ranges 112 118 S. Orbons

above 50 m. Its efficacy is further diminished against moving targets, as is the case of checkpoint and convoy situations.25 In addition, the risk of causing serious harm to the vehicle driver and co-passengers is considerable, due to possible break-up of the windscreen upon impact of the baton round. Acoustic hailing devices, while capable of attaining high sound levels out to hundreds of metres, are indiscriminate in their effect, as they were originally designed to warn or cause dis- comfort to crowds distributed over a larger area. In the case of an approaching vehicle, particu- larly in confrontations situated in a busy town or village, the noise may not be perceived by a driver as a warning explicitly aimed at him.26 The Laser Optical Warner, designed to emit a directed monochromatic laser beam up to hun- dreds of metres, has reliable aiming precision, as the laser beam projection on the targeted vehicle or individual is visible to the operator, which also enables him to keep the laser beam fixed on the aiming point. The system is already in use with military forces of several countries participating in ISAF. Real-world data of the use of Laser Optical Warner in EoF incidents in Afghanistan have proved difficult to acquire. Detailed records on NLW use in EoF procedures, which a DTA analy- sis requires, are hardly available or generally not releasable as open sources. Defence establish- ments dealing with NLW development when training ascribe the lack of NLW feedback data to the formats used in after-action reports from field commanders, which are not designed for docu- mentation of NLW usage data. Only anecdotal accounts of NLW use have been received on an occasional basis.27 Given the absence of real-world data on Laser Optical Warner use in EoF situations, the DTA approach predominantly draws on detailed accounts of checkpoint and convoy situations, which have been collected in interviews with Dutch junior commanders deployed in the Afghan province of Uruzgan. As Dutch ISAF forces in Uruzgan did not field the Laser Optical Warner, the device was inserted into selected situations in a fictitious manner, while using the expert judgement and imagination of individual Dutch officers with on-the-ground experience in Afghanistan to realistically and plausibly reconstruct the situation with the device implemented. This analytical approach can be conceived as a “prospective DTA, in contrast with the retrospective DTA that has been used to analyse NLW effects during The Troubles in Northern Ireland”.28

Laser Optical Warner technology and working principles The Laser Optical Warner projects a monochromatic (green) laser beam at a wavelength on the electromagnetic spectrum to which the human visual system is highly sensitive. The emitted energy does not harm the human eye at levels below a well-defined safety margin, provided that the eye’s physiological reflex is not disturbed. When the eye is hit, it causes discomfort and disorientation to the individual; and the target’s reflex is to close the unprotected eyes to Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 avoid the unpleasant and perhaps painful effect, or to look away in another direction. The device’s purpose is to draw the attention of an individual and to make him alert to other means of warning against approaching a protected object in a prohibited manner, or to deny actions of non-compliant persons by obscuring their vision.These systems are considerably softer in effect than, for instance, non-lethal kinetic projectiles or tear gas.29 As the beam slightly widens with increasing range, the laser energy intensity drops gradually to reach a safe energy level at a certain distance from the laser source.30 The device deployed by the Royal Netherlands Army, called the Green Laser Optical Warner (GLOW), can be operated in different modes. One is the continuous narrow mode with the beam cross-section of the size of an individual’s upper body part at a range of 100 m, whereas the wider mode emits a wider beam, 113 Defense & Security Analysis 119

consequently at a lower intensity level. Both modes can also be selected with a 4 Hz pulsed beam.31 The laser is eye safe above 6 m distance, if exposure time does not exceed 250 ms, which is the duration of the closing reflex of the eyelid.32 US forces use a stronger device, with a safe range of 5–10 m, depending on the mode used.33 A Laser Optical Warner generally weighs between 1 and 1.5 kg. The GLOW weighs 1.25 kg.34 The laser is usually mounted coaxially on a hand-held rifle or a vehicle-mounted gun. Such combinations allow for the simultaneous aiming of a laser source and a weapon.35 The laser beam has to be locked onto the target for several seconds to prevent the target from retaining vision. Accurate aiming of the laser at the target’s head is required to keep the target’s eyes within the brighter centre of the laser beam. When the laser is co-mounted with a rifle or gun, the difference between the ballistic flight of the kinetic round and the rectilinear propagation of the laser beam has to be taken into account when taking aim. The aiming points of the two sub-systems do not coincide; hence, aiming adjustment is required when switching between the laser and the rifle.36 This correction factor changes with range, and usually the adjustment is preset for a preferred engagement range. Precautions have to be taken to prevent eye damage to one’s own personnel who find themselves close to the device. Hence, the laser should be positioned and operated in such a way to ensure that a free field ranges above the eye hazard distance.

Laser Optical Warner use-in-operational-context at checkpoints An important task within the framework of a CI campaign is the checking of vehicles and pas- sengers for weapons and equipment to supply insurgent groups. Security checks of persons and vehicles also serve to prevent suicide improvised explosive devices (SIEDs) and suicide vehicle improvised explosive devices (SVIEDs) from moving into an ISAF controlled area. Checkpoints can be located in a wide variety of settings, ranging from transit roads passing through thinly populated rural areas to main roads leading into or through an urba- nised area. Checkpoints represent situations in which unidentified strangers may close in with security forces at very short range. The risk to personnel at such chokepoints is, therefore, considerable. Equally, there is a risk to civilians, as control forces may misperceive unanticipated and seemingly non-cooperative behaviour. Unintended casualties have occurred when drivers ignore stop signals when approaching a checkpoint. They were subsequently engaged with lethal force upon entering the zone of the checkpoint, where the Rules of Engagement (RoEs) authorise military personnel to open fire. Two concrete checkpoint situations that have occurred in the Afghan province of Uruzgan will be taken to analyse the Laser Optical Warner.

Checkpoint north of Singhowlah Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 During September and October 2009, Dutch ISAF units regularly set up mobile checkpoints on a road leading to a bridge across the River Helmand. The checkpoints were located several kilo- metres north of the village of Singhowlah, situated at an angle east of the River Helmand and north of the river Tiri Rud. The checkpoints were positioned close to the forward operating base (FOB) “Coyote,” sitting on a hilltop, which overlooked the road and an area several kilometres towards the south, the direction towards which the checkpoint was orientated. The purpose of the checkpoint was not only the checking of vehicles and other traffic and the bio- metric identification of Afghans, but also showing the ISAF flag in an area bordering the territory held by the Opposing Militant Forces (OMF). In this manner, the checkpoint also served as a 114 deterrent against OMF attempts to gain more ground. 120 S. Orbons

The checkpoint layout consisted of a traffic arrest line marked with a red-white ribbon just above the road, 150 m in front of the checkpoint baseline. A trigger line was marked with orange cones placed on the roadside, 50 m in front of the baseline. Drivers or pedestrians who would not halt at the arrest line would be warned by waving, shouting, flagging and, if necessary, a warning shot into the ground next to the vehicle or pedestrian. If all warnings were ignored and the trigger line crossed, checkpoint personnel were authorised to open direct fire. The road at the checkpoint was in a bad state, scattered with holes and rocks, prohibiting cars to drive faster than 30 km/h. With these conditions, there was no need to place extra obstacles on the road.37 Communication with FOB Coyote provided for additional observation support, as the checkpoint crew received an early alert on any traffic approaching when still several kilometres away. Visibility conditions were always very good and the checkpoint was operated during day- light hours only. The area near the checkpoint was practically uninhabited and vegetation was largely absent. Obscuration by sand due to a strong wind did not occur. Since the wider area was surrounded by high mountains, the blinding effect by the sun was not experienced, nor was it likely to create a problem for incoming traffic. Coyote also watched the behaviour of drivers and possible passengers in order to obtain a risk profile in advance. Checkpoint personnel were equipped with a high resolution camera to enhance early warning. The flow of traffic was very low, fewer than 10 vehicles, motorbikes and pedestrians per hour.38 Hence, the user context, as well as the context of the situation at the checkpoint location and timing, was generally favourable for effective operations. The fielding of the Laser Optical Warner contributed to the warning procedure. Although visi- bility conditions allowed for the use of the laser to alert approaching traffic at ranges well beyond the arrest line, this was considered a less desirable approach from a tactical and political point of view. The early use of the laser would potentially intimidate drivers and possible passengers.39 The transit time of the warning zone for a vehicle driving at 30 km/h and not slowing down, would be around 12 sec. If all softer warning measures failed, an estimated 2–4 sec would remain for using the Laser Optical Warner, before a warning shot was to be fired. From the operator’s perception, the laser would achieve the same effect as a flare, which was already available to his unit. It is also relevant that drivers sometimes wore sunglasses, which would probably have reduced the effect of any optical device. The likelihood of approaching persons misunderstanding the Laser Optical Warner was relatively small, as by 2009, the public information on their use by ISAF should have reached the vast majority of the Afghan population. The absence of distractions shaped the target context such that during the approach, the driver’s attention would almost automatically be focused on the checkpoint. Furthermore, the repeated use of checkpoints would most probably have familiarised the large majority of incom- ing drivers and foot passengers with its presence.40 This has been demonstrated in an experimen- tal study, indicating that drivers become better at understanding warnings and instructions after repeated experience with checkpoints.41 The threat level in the area around the checkpoint was generally low, as incidents did not occur Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 during the checkpoint operations. No OMF passed the position during any of the deployment times of the checkpoint. The absence of violence shaped a context of relatively low tension levels. Only personnel who had previously been exposed to suicide attacks or strikes with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or had witnessed such incidents may risk overreacting. If available, the deploy- ment of the Laser Optical Warner would have been a tactically useful option, even if not used.

Checkpoint on the west bank of River Helmand, south of Garam In July 2009, Dutch ISAF forces set up a checkpoint on a road running towards the west bank of the River Helmand. The checkpoint was deployed only once, between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. It was 115 Defense & Security Analysis 121

located some 3 km south of the village of Garam, next to a quala, which is a fortified family com- pound, with the number 1048. At that point, the road was flanked on the west side by a hill called Mount Suzy, on top of which a French ISAF unit was operating an observation post (OP). The purpose of the checkpoint was to prevent the road from being used for supply trafficking from OMF-controlled territory north of the checkpoint. During the check-point operation, armed hos- tilities were taking place near Garam, as the OMF wanted to defend and consolidate their control of the area against ISAF and the Afghan National Army. At the checkpoint, the road was narrow, about 3 m wide. Although the road surface was not metalled, it was easily negotiable. Checkpoint military personnel had placed heavy rocks on the road to further narrow the passage. North of the checkpoint, the fairly straight road was flanked by hills on the west side and a green zone on a steep downward slope on the east side. These circum- stances and preparations prevented motorised traffic coming from a northern direction to bypass the checkpoint. No additional markings were used on the road in front of the checkpoint to alert oncoming vehicles and/or motorbikes off the checkpoint ahead. At the checkpoint, military personnel, composed of Dutch ISAF soldiers and Afghan National Police, were positioned close to the rock obstacle on the road. Other military personnel armed with automatic rifles had taken up positions on top of quala 1048 to overlook the road ahead of the checkpoint and the checkpoint itself. No military vehicles were deployed to support the checkpoint. It was a sunny day, with a temperature of over 408C. Weather conditions were such that visi- bility was very good, allowing observation of the road from the French OP up to several kilo- metres north. There was clear visibility. to incoming traffic from the North, the checkpoint was visible from approximately 200 m distance. The EoF procedure started with personnel at the obstacle giving a hand signal as soon as a vehicle approached 150 m in front of the checkpoint baseline. If it ignored the hand signal, a warning shot would follow, either from the personnel at the road obstacle or from the quala roof. In the latter case, the personnel at the obstacle should take cover. The imaginary arrest line was about 75 m in front of the checkpoint baseline at the obstacle. Vehicles crossing the arrest line without permission would be engaged with direct fire aimed at the driver.42 The context of personnel manning the checkpoint also encompassed an offensive from the adjacent OMF-controlled zone, near the village of Garam, which occurred simultaneously with the checkpoint operation. The high level of violence and shootings audible at the checkpoint gave rise to considerable tension among those at the checkpoint. These circumstances, in combi- nation with the hot weather, were responsible for the heavy and stressful workload of the military personnel. They were rotated every 30 min to prevent fatigue and loss of alertness. This was deemed necessary by their Commander, despite dedicated prior training.43 During the day, fewer than five vehicles came through the checkpoint and an equal number of motorbikes. EoF incidents did not occur, though military personnel on guard came close to firing warning shots on a few occasions. Pedestrians passed in considerable numbers, many of them on Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 the run from the hostilities in the North. As they could also bypass the checkpoint off the road, spies hired by the OMF could obtain information on the checkpoint’s operations. A Laser Optical Warner should be used to alert incoming vehicles at a range of at least 150 m, given the average high speed of their approach. As hand signals at distances above 150 m are likely to go unnoticed, the laser signal would replace the hand signal within the EoF procedure and send a stronger warning message. After activation of the laser beam, the remaining distance towards the arrest line, some 75 m, would be covered in 4–5 sec, the time available for a laser warning and subsequent warning shots. These warning shots would have to be fired by the same personnel who operate the Laser Optical Warner, in order to minimise the time for switching 116 to the rifle. In practical terms, the time to activate the laser beam would be around 3 sec. This 122 S. Orbons

would also require the Laser Optical Warner to be co-mounted on the personal weapon. Co-ordi- nation of the Laser Optical Warner operator with the riflemen on the quala roof would be too com- plicated, given the increased time pressure. Given the physically and mentally difficult user context, handling and operation of the Laser Optical Warner would be a demanding task, in particular because the laser beam should be fixed on the windshield of an unsteady moving vehicle. Moreover, the poor contrast of the laser on a sunny mid-Summer day against the bright ambient light would not only restrict the operator’s ability to aim the beam at a vehicle at 150 m distance, but also fail to prevent the driver from looking into the beam unhindered due to the beam intensity loss at that range. Under these circum- stances, oncoming drivers might not be inclined to stop, especially when in a hurry.44 By the time the vehicle got close enough for the laser to achieve sufficient beam intensity levels, the need for escalation would already be acute.45 The checkpoint personnel, confronted with a fast approach- ing vehicle that refuses to slow down and stop, might wrongly perceive a hostile intent on the part of the driver, and under increased stress conditions might aim and fire their rifles at him pre-emp- tively, with the RoE legitimising their right of self-protection. Given this sequence of events, the incorporation of the Laser Optical Warner at the checkpoint would redefine the operational context in such a way that the actual warning time would be further compressed, ultimately to raise the risk of innocent casualties. Apart from the situation-specific contextual factors that interfere with the effective application of the Laser Optical Warner, other more general contextual factors may also impact upon check- point operations. One is the way drivers may perceive a checkpoint. In at least one case, this has resulted in the death of a driver, who refused to stop at a Dutch checkpoint. His passengers, who remained unharmed, declared afterwards that the driver supposed the checkpoint had been set up by a criminal group to collect fees from drivers in transit.46 Afghan car drivers generally tend to drive as fast as possible, even on bumpy roads, with heavy loads on their vehicles, including passengers.47 At the checkpoint, cars approached at a speed exceeding 60 km/h and motorbikes somewhat slower. Afghans have understandable reasons for driving fast, as time is money for the generally poor Afghans. This explains why Afghans resent being stopped at a checkpoint for a time-consuming search of the load. Other factors have a cultural origin, such as the macho culture among Afghan men, dictating that one must show courage when confronted. This implies that an Afghan should not stop at a checkpoint until a shot has been fired or, even better, he has been injured.48 The use of drugs by many Afghan men may add to this behaviour. It is also to be noted that in Afghanistan drivers are not required to pass a driving or medical test. The latter is also highly relevant as many Afghan drivers have poor eyesight.

Laser Optical Warner use-in-operational-context by convoys The movement of military units is an essential part of ISAF operations. Logistics and personnel Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 transports, as well as mounted patrols, make use of a thinly distributed road network. Therefore, the repeated and predictable movement along obvious routes expose ISAF units to insurgency attacks. ISAF movements, mostly in convoys of varying sizes, have regularly been targeted by IEDs, SIED or SVIEDs. For the latter two, EoF procedures have been developed to reduce the risk of such attacks.49 The aim of these procedures is to ensure a safe distance between the convoy and approaching subjects or vehicles, thereby preventing an insurgent from getting close and detonating an IED. ISAF forces are authorised to use lethal force for self-protection against such threats. Factors such as the lack of awareness of civilians of the presence of a convoy, or not noticing or under- 50 standing the warning signs, may lead to confusion and lead to the death of innocent civilians. 117 Defense & Security Analysis 123

The risk of fatalities due to miscommunication and misinterpretation increases when convoys pass through towns, villages and other populated areas. The application of EoF procedures is con- strained by the characteristics of built-up areas, a road network offering multiple approach options and the presence of many civilians. Many convoys have EoF incidents involving warning shots against civilian drivers.51

Convoy moving through zone north of Deh Rawod In July 2010, a Dutch ISAF convoy moved in a northerly direction on a road known as Singhow- lah East, situated slightly north of the town of Deh Rawod. The convoy, consisting of about 15 vehicles, was passing on a 2–3 km section of the road, when there was an enhanced risk of an IED attack. The quality of the road was good, with a speed ramp to slow down traffic every 100–200 m. The winding road was about 6 m wide, with limited free lines of sight, due to the presence of houses and vegetation scattered along the road. At the time, around 8 a.m., traffic was busy. With vehicles travelling at about 30 km/h, cars with heavy loads at 20 km/h, and motor- cycles somewhat faster, the convoy moved at a speed of 15–20 km/h. During the 10-min passage, around 10 motorbikes and an equal number of cars moved down the road in both directions. There were a few intersections with side roads and many narrow alleys between the houses. The probability of the need to fire warning shots was high because motor- bikes and cars could suddenly approach the passing convoy at a close distance coming out of side roads and alleys.52 Consequently, the user context was dominated by the risk of IED and SVIED attacks, putting the convoy’s personnel on high alert. In addition, the continuous presence of traffic created a situation in which they had to deal with a very short response time. This problem was exacerbated by the relatively short free line of sight ahead of the convoy. While regular EoF procedures prescribed a minimal tolerable distance of civilian traffic to the convoy of 50 m, the practical conditions reduced this distance to 30 m. Military personnel in every vehicle of the convoy were assigned the task to cover the flank of their section to protect them- selves against potential threats. The target context was such that civilian drivers and other approaching individuals, given the required distance from the convoy, would be challenged, bearing in mind the speed in which they approached. Moreover, early morning traffic is often in a hurry, in this case to Deh Rawod in a southerly direction. The majority of vehicles were heavily laden, with their drivers less concerned about safety and waiting to reach their destination as quickly as possible.53 Some of the Dutch ISAF commanders, who had experienced this situation before and were well aware of the circum- stances, preferred to take a rocky road bypassing built-up zones. In doing so, they avoided disturbing the daily life of the population.54 The deployment of the Laser Optical Warner should warn a driver of an approaching vehicle or motorbike to stop. The response time to activate the laser beam is, however, very short. The extremely limited time to decide which weapon to use would leave the Laser Optical Warner Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 to be co-mounted either with a personal weapon or attached to the gun mounted on the vehicle as the only viable option to minimise time to switch from one weapon to the other. In addition, if a laser warning were to be a capability available in an EoF engagement against a motorised civilian from any section of the convoy, every vehicle should carry at least two such devices to ensure coverage all around the convoy. That would imply that about 30 devices should be carried in this 15-vehicle convoy. While in the sitting or standing position on their moving vehicle, keeping the Laser Optical Warner aimed at the moving target is a task requiring great skill and intense pre-deployment train- ing.55 Irrespective of the skill levels, the operational context would reduce the time available to 118 activate the laser beam before firing a warning shot in less than 1 s. Targets may not always 124 S. Orbons

respond as desired, that is, halt their vehicle when blinded by the laser light, besides the 1.5 sec reaction time before any response to the blinding effect follows.56 Drivers not familiar with the meaning of the blinding light might also respond in ways that increase the risk of traffic incidents.57 An additional problem is the responsibility placed on most junior personnel to have to decide independently whether or not to use the laser or fire a warning shot. The convoy commander or sub-commander will often be too far away to give guidance, as the length of the convoy is several hundreds of metres and the distance between the vehicles around 15 m in built-up areas. If the laser light would not make the driver stop, there would be no time left for a warning shot. The extra stress due to the IED threat makes this problem even more pressing.58 Overall, the warning cycle in these circumstances would be too short, highly dynamic and compact for the effective deployment of the Laser Optical Warner.

A convoy moving between Tarin Kowt and Sorkh Morghab On a rainy morning in April 2010, a Dutch ISAF convoy of 15 vehicles was moving north on a road towards an FOB near Sorkh Morghab; the fairly straight tarmac road was of good quality, and between 6 and 7 m wide. Heavy rainfall reduced visibility to less than 200 m, and occasion- ally down to a mere 50 m at one point, where there was a slight bend in the road.59 As houses and vegetation flanked the road, the free line of sight was limited at that point. At a certain moment, the convoy was stationary, as a number of personnel had dismounted to search for a particular type of IED, the so-called directional focused charge, designed to produce a horizontal blast effect and, therefore, usually placed slightly away from the road. Precisely at that moment, a Toyota van came from the opposite direction around the bend in the road, heading towards the convoy at high speed, approximately 80 km/h. The vehicle driver noticed the convoy when he was at a distance of about 75 m. Frightened by the sudden confronta- tion, he abruptly applied the brakes, causing his van to skid uncontrollably on the slippery road towards the hard shoulder, where it came to a standstill, some 20–30 m away from the convoy. The driver and his 10 passengers remained unharmed. Afterwards, the middle-aged driver apol- ogised and explained that his car had bad brakes and defective windscreen wipers. Had the car not skidded and moved forward instead, the driver would have been hit by lethal fire when coming closer than 75 m, given the high velocity of his approach. This would have been a challenging and difficult task for a rifleman while standing in his vehicle and aiming to accu- rately hit a driver driving at high speed. There would be a considerable risk that he would miss and unintentionally hit a passenger instead, especially when the round would be deflected upon break- ing the windscreen.60 The context of this situation did not allow for warning signals to be fired before a direct shot. The convoy military personnel were mainly composed of Marines, who are trained to develop dedicated skills for rapid switching between widely different levels of violence. They apply a Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 three-stage EoF cycle to warn and stop non-compliant drivers. The first is a warning shot into the ground next to the vehicle. If the vehicle fails to stop, a shot into the vehicle’s engine block will follow. In case the driver still does not respond as required, he will be targeted directly.61 If the Laser Optical Warner had been deployed with a Marines platoon, the use of the device would have been prepared in a dedicated four-day training cycle to familiarise servicemen with it and to develop drills for quickly switching between using the laser beam and the rifle, also called “enhanced marksmanship.” However, attaching the laser device to a vehicle-mounted gun would be the preferred option, as the weight of the laser device would unacceptably disturb the balance of hand-held weapons. The extra weight is quite cumbersome, and therefore some commanders 119 Defense & Security Analysis 125

do not consider the device as effective.62 Under such considerations, in the convoy situation, only the guns mounted on the front vehicle and the rear vehicle would be suitable for the coaxial mounting of the Laser Optical Warner.63 In the situation described, the Laser Optical Warner should have made the driver of the vehicle slow down and stop. However, from the gunner’s (user’s) perspective, the time to use it against the fast-approaching car would have been less than 1 sec, since during that time the van would have covered over 20 m. Given the weather conditions on the day of the incident, the laser beam would most likely have been attenuated too much by the rain, preventing an effective warning to the driver. In reality, the circumstances for using the laser in this situation would have been even less favourable, due to the natural delay of the driver’s reaction to the blinding effect.64 Hence, the Laser Optical Warner use would not have effectively contributed to EoF pro- cedure to make the driver stop in time before he would have been engaged with lethal fire. In the course of deployment, the focus of military personnel may shift from respect for and education of the local population towards self-protection. This change is brought about by past experience, which undermines the high level of self-confidence acquired during the pre- deployment phase and the development of high skills.65 In the user context, this translates into a shift in mental attitude that is highly relevant when decisions have to be made on the level of force to deal with potential threats in a predominantly civilian environment. Whereas this may apply to highly-trained, self-confident and experienced personnel, an opposite trend can be been observed with less experienced and more junior personnel.66

Assessment synthesis This analysis has been conducted to address the question whether the employment of NLWs at the tactical level helps to ameliorate the clash of casualty-aversion norms, and contributes to ISAF’s strategic imperative of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. The debate on the potential and promises of NLWs to help reduce the number of unintended innocent civilian casualties is still unresolved. The approach taken here has sought to provide deeper insights into the difference which the deployment of a Laser Optical Warner would make if applied in situations where unintended fatalities have occurred on a regular basis. Laser Optical Warner devices are intended to produce a stopping effect at ranges in excess of 100 m. In relatively static situations such as at checkpoints, the situations can be redesigned such that the device can be incorporated into EoF procedures. This is mainly due to the fact that a suf- ficient line-of-sight is normally ensured, as the location and configuration of the checkpoint can be selected accordingly. Such opportunities are primarily available in less inhabited and fairly open areas. Under such conditions, the use of a Laser Optical Warner expands the time available for the EoF procedure, thus raising the probability of identifying the driver’s intent and making an inno- cent driver comply with the warning to stop. Even when optimal circumstances for checkpoint deployment are in place, operating the Laser Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 Optical Warner at extended ranges faces performance limitations, including accurate aiming of the laser beam at the drivers of irregularly moving vehicles; the loss of laser light contrast under bright daylight conditions, and a weakening of the intended blinding effect due to lower beam intensity.67 Unfavourable weather conditions, such as rain, snow, fog and sand storms, may seriously interfere with laser beam performance and may even totally block the effect.68 Some analysts argue that in such circumstances, the target’s vision is also degraded.69 Thus, the system may be least effective when most needed and most risky in cases where this is least desirable. The above drawbacks of the Laser Optical Warner have led system designers to start devel- 120 oping a next generation Laser Optical Warner, one fitted with technological upgrades, such as 126 S. Orbons

the ability to control and adjust the laser beam intensity to the target’s position and by measuring the atmospheric attenuation between the laser and the target.70 The application of the Laser Optical Warner in convoy operations encounters considerably more complexity than in checkpoint operations. Besides a general sense of the threat level in the area, military personnel in convoys often have no clue when and where a possible threat to their unit emerges. This might perhaps not be so much of a problem when moving through unin- habited terrain where sufficient visibility and little traffic make early warning of approaching vehicles possible. When on transit through a built-up area, the situation is often the opposite, as limited free lines of sight prevent Laser Optical Warner use in the EoF procedure. The dynamics associated with these scenarios tend to shut down the tactical window needed for rela- tively soft NLWs, such as the Laser Optical Warner, to produce their desired effect. Besides the technical and contextual factors that interfere with the device’s performance, targeted drivers have options to avoid the blinding effect. They may focus on the road directly in front of their vehicle, thus sharply reducing the amount of light entering the eye and may also use technical countermeasures to block the light beam from striking the face.71 Such non- compliant behaviour may identify the driver as a hostile subject, legitimising the use of force to stop the suspect vehicle. However, there may well be reasons other than a hostile intent for a driver to continue driving towards the military convoy. Military personnel are guided by RoEs issued and updated daily, yet their mindset in interpret- ing these rules is also defined by wider contextual influences. Although experienced junior com- manders and soldiers have developed a good understanding of the threat on the basis of their observation, stressful incidents of a highly lethal nature tend to reduce their own risk tolerance when confronted with a non-cooperative subject whose intent and identity is unclear.72 Appar- ently, the mental ability to reset the EoF procedure after a traumatic experience competes with the self-defence reflex.

Conclusions The prospective DTA of the Laser Optical Warner in the Afghanistan security environment has demonstrated that forces exposed to an open CI environment, the in situ material and human context denies the development of more tactical flexibility. It is not possible to create a state of permanent quarantine for military formations moving amongst the people.73 Consequently, in many situations, longer-range NLWs, such as the Laser Optical Warner, are unlikely to widen the response margins enabling the identification of friend or foe before the use of lethal force is imminent. It is the operational context that defines the feasibility of stand-off non-lethal engage- ment, not the NLW concept or technology itself. The contextual factors, that impact on a military unit moving in a potentially lethal environ- ment, tend to further narrow down the window of opportunity for a Laser Optical Warner or any other NLW to interrogate the intent of the unknown subject before strong force is used. Military Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 commanders and operators, facing the dilemma of making split-second decisions between using a non-lethal or a lethal capability in a highly dynamic context. They may feel further pressed when the availability of a Laser Optical Warner implicitly requires them to consider its use before using lethal force. This is but one explanation why military commanders might not be eager to introduce this capability. Keeping the RoEs simple, both for the junior commander and for their personnel, is a quality in itself under high-stress conditions. NLWs may overburden the intellectual potential of assigned operators and, in general, increase the complexity facing (junior) military comman- ders and their personnel.74 Political and military authorities hope that NLWs will contribute to casualty avoidance. This article has demonstrated that the situations in which ISAF forces move in transit through urban 121 Defense & Security Analysis 127

settings are the most challenging to prevent unintended civilian casualties with the use of NLWs. It is precisely these situations that are easy to exploit by insurgents to challenge Western casualty- aversion norms as their weapons of war. Thus, the ever-present threat of a lethal suicide strike against ISAF forces on the move amongst the people only allows for a very limited contribution by NLWs to resolving the clash between the casualty-aversion norms of the military intervention forces and the local population, the “us or them” dilemma. The analysis also reveals the gap between declared policies on casualty aversion and the rea- lities on the tactical level to make this happen. Petraeus’s call to military – junior and senior – commanders to identify the 10 most promising NLWs at least suggests that he expects NLWs to make a valuable contribution to the hearts and minds strategy. From a political perspective, this call is understandable, but it seemingly ignores the contextual complexity of the non- cooperative and lethal environment in which this vision has to materialise. Those who focus primarily on the NLWs to prevent unnecessary casualties are either ignor- ant, or underestimate the limitations of the ability of the military at the tactical level to switch between lethal and non-lethal levels of action. Whereas special forces have been selected and specifically trained in operational flexibility, including the use of NLWs, such skills are largely beyond the ability of the majority of ground forces. Insurgents will relentlessly nurture the self- defence reflex of ISAF personnel in order to maximise the chances of inflicting civilian casualties.

Acknowledgements I want to thank Professor John Grin for his suggestions and constructive remarks on a draft of this article.

Notes 1. US Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, ‘Country Profile Afghanistan’, August 2008, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Afghanistan.pdf (accessed June 15, 2011). 2. COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, August 1, 2010, http://www.nato.int/isaf (accessed January 18, 2011). 3. R. Egnell, ‘Winning “Hearts and Minds”? A Critical Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Operations in Afghanistan’, Civil Wars 12, no. 3 (2010): 282–83. 4. COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, August 1, 2010. 5. J. Gentry, ‘Norms as Weapons of War’, Defense & Security Analysis 26, no. 1 (2010): 11. 6. Gentry takes this definition from Stephen Krasner, who bases norms on the principles “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.” S. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences’, in International Regimes, ed. S. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. 7. J. Gentry, ‘Norms as Weapons of War’, 14. 8. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Afghanistan Annual Report 2010, March 2011, 28. Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 9. HQ British Forces Khandahar Airfield, Escalation of Force Mitigation – Initial Report, February 2007, 3. 10. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Com- mission, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 28–9. 11. D. Petraeus, ‘Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq’, 2–12, http://www. army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/april_2006/4_06_2.html (accessed January 17, 2011). 12. USCENTCOM Non-lethal Weapons Usage ISAF/US Forces Afghanistan – Questionnaire Ground Forces, September 2010. (Document received from USCENTCOM’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Liaison Office, 7 October 2010). 13. R. McNab and R. Scott, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons and the Long Tail of Warfare’, Small Wars & Insurgen- cies 20, no. 1 (2009): 145. 122 14. Ibid., 151. 128 S. Orbons

15. J. Altmann, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons Technologies: The Case for Independent Scientific Analysis’, in The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons – Technologies, Ethics, Operations and Law, ed. N. Lewer (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 121. 16. R. Mandel, ‘Nonlethal Weaponry and Post-Cold War Deterrence’, Armed Forces & Society 30, no. 4 (2004): 512. 17. Ibid., 534. 18. The impact of military-operational concepts and context on the ability of key military capabilities to play their desired role is discussed in J. Grin, ‘Command and control: Force multiplier or Achilles’ Heel?’, Defense & Security Analysis 5, no. 1 (1989): 61–76. A more general study on DTA is W. Smit, J. Grin, and L. Voronkov, ‘Assessing Military-Technological Development Paths: Examples and Methodologies’, in Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a Changing World, ed. W. Smit, J. Grin, and L. Voronkov (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992) 161–66. 19. B. Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces? Technology, Politics and the Management of Armed Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 29–30. 20. T. Feakin, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Technology for Lowering Casualties?’ (PhD thesis, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 2005), 74. 21. S. Orbons, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Peace Enablers or Troublesome Force? Assessing the Role of CS and Baton Rounds in the Northern Ireland Conflict’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 3 (2011): 467–94. 22. S. Orbons, ‘Do Non-Lethal Weapons License to Silence’, Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 1 (2010): 85. 23. Taken from conversation with Lt Col (rtd) Rick Bartis, American Systems Contractor, USCENT- COM’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Liaison Office, October 20, 2010. 24. Only two ADS systems have been produced during the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration phase of the ADS development programme. US Department of Defense Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, Active Denial System, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/ads/ads_info.html (accessed January 20, 2011). 25. O. Arnesen and R. Rahimi, ‘Military Non-Lethal Solutions for Medium to Long Ranges’, in Non-Lethal Weapons: Fulfilling the Promise? (Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Ettlingen, Germany, May 21–23, 2007), paper 12, 7. 26. The LRAD nominal beam width is about 158, striking a 20 m wide area at a range of 75 m. J. Altmann, Millimetre Waves, Lasers, Acoustics for Non-Lethal Weapons? Physics Analyses and Inferences (Osnabru¨ck: Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 2008), 45. 27. Information obtained during meetings with staff officers at the US Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center at Fort Leonard Wood, 27 October 2009, and at the US DOD Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Direc- torate at Quantico, 9 November 2009. British Army and Australian Army Lessons Learned Centers responded that they were either lacking specific data records of NLW use in Afghanistan, or such data were not releasable. 28. S. Orbons, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Peace Enablers or Troublesome Force?’, 487–88. 29. This “softness” should of course be related to the intensity of the dazzler beam, which must not lead to permanent blindness or any lasting ocular damage. Such harmful effects would violate Protocol IV of 1995 of the Inhumane Weapons Convention, prohibiting the design and use of laser causing permanent blindness. Massimo Annati and Ezio Bosignore, ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Possibilities, Programmes, Perspectives and Problems’, MilitaryTechnology, no. 27 (July 2003): 49. 30. Typical beam widening angles are in the order of 6 mrad when the laser is operated in the narrow beam mode. This results in a beam cross-section of 0.87 m at 50 m range, and 1.75 m at 100 m. Laser beam intensity drops off with the square of the range. Hence, the intensity is four times weaker at 100 m than

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 at 50 m. Furthermore, most devices have a non-uniform beam intensity cross-section, which is more intense at its centre, and typically has a Gaussian distribution. Data are taken and calculated from the test report WTA-Nr. 904930 E´ rgebnisprotokoll u¨ber die messtechnische Ermittlung der Strahlungsda- ten des Laser-Dazzlers mit der Bezeichnung “GLOW,” Wehrtechnische Dienststelle 9, Bundeswehr, Germany, August 17, 2010. 31. Voorschrift VS 7-519, Green Laser Optical Warner (GLOW), June 2009, pp. 3.13–3.15. Manual for the GLOW for the Royal Netherlands Army for use in Afghanistan. 32. Ibid., I.3. 33. Conversation with Lt Col (rtd) Richard Bartis, American Systems Contractor, USCENTCOM’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Liaison Office, January 13, 2011. 34. Voorschrift VS 7-519, I-3. 123 Defense & Security Analysis 129

35. As has been accomplished by Dutch ground forces, in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan. Interview on 26 October 2010 with Lt Col Marcel van Luit, Royal Netherlands Army, Army Ground Manoeuvre Knowledge Centre. 36. Ibid. 37. The above account of the checkpoint situation was obtained from 1Lt Dirk Ferwerda, Royal Nether- lands Army, who was deployed to Uruzgan as a platoon commander between July 2009 and November 2009. First interview, 3 February 2011. 38. Second interview with 1Lt Dirk Ferwerda, 5 April 2011. 39. These opinions and observations are made by 1Lt Dirk Ferwerda, second interview, 5 April 2011. 40. Familiarity with the purpose of the Laser Optical Warner is key to the way Afghans would respond to the blinding effect of the laser beam. Hence, public information is a prerequisite for compliant behav- iour. Interview on 21 April 2011 with Shakila Azizzada, who was a cultural adviser to Dutch ISAF forces in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009. 41. E. Mezzacappa, C. Sheridan, R. DeMarco, K. Tevis, G. Reid, K. Short, N. Jaffery, G. Cooke, and J. Riedener, Tactical Checkpoint – Hail/Warn and Suppress/Stop (Picatinny Arsenal, NJ: ARDEC, Target Behavioral Response Laboratory) May 2011 (article under review). 42. Interview on 28 April 2011 with 1Lt Sven van der Haas, Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed to Uruzgan as a platoon commander between July 2009 and November 2009. He provided all the data on the checkpoint operation. 43. As stated by the commanding platoon commander at the checkpoint, 1Lt Sven van der Haas. Interview on 28 April 2011. 44. According to experiments, both the poor contrast of the laser beam under bright daylight conditions and the confrontation with an unannounced and hastily deployed checkpoint, are indicators which strongly reduce the probability of innocent drivers to stop. Mezzacappa et al., Tactical Checkpoint – Hail/Warn and Suppress/Stop. 45. It should be taken into account that drivers, when confronted with the blinding effect, have an average reaction time of about 1.5 sec before decelerating the car after the onset of the loss of forward view. A. Toet and G. Westrale, Effects of High Intensity Light Sources on Vision through Windscreens, TNO report TNO-DV 2011 A127, 2011, 35. 46. Interview with Lt Col Marcel van Luit. 47. The fast driving style of Afghans has been mentioned by several military junior commanders during interviews, such as by Cpt. Rob Steehouwer, Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed as platoon commander to Uruzgan between November 2006 and January 2007 and dpty company commander between August 2008 and December 2008. Interviews on 3 February 2011 and 11 April 2011. 48. At checkpoints in four out of ten cases, men driving their vehicle without passengers refuse to stop until a round has been fired. Interview on 23 July 2009 with Maj Niels Roelen, Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed as a company commander to Uruzgan between January and July 2007. 49. HQ British Forces Khandahar Airfield, Escalation of Force Mitigation. 50. For instance, a total of 19 innocent civilian casualties across the whole of Afghanistan have been reported, mostly shot by ISAF soldiers in convoys or on patrol, in the second half of 2006. HQ British Forces Kandahar Airfield, Escalation of Force Mitigation. 51. One officer stated that he experienced EoF incidents in 75% of the convoys he operated. Interview with Cpt Rob Steehouwer on 3 February 2011. 52. Interviews on 17 February and 12 April 2011 with 1Lt Kevin van Loon, Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed as platoon commander to Uruzgan between March 2010 and September 2010. 53. These findings are based on the interviews on 17 February and 12 April 2011 with 1Lt Kevin van

Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012 Loon. 54. Interview on 23 May 2011 with 1LNT NLMC Anne Kemerink op Schiphorst, who was deployed as a platoon commander to Uruzgan between March and June 2010. 55. As stressed in the interview on 12 April 2011 by 1Lt Kevin van Loon. 56. Toet and Westrale, Effects of High Intensity Light Sources, 35. 57. Interview on 21 April 2011 with Shakila Azizzada. 58. As, for instance, stated in the second interview with 1Lt Tom Pasman on 12 April 2011, Royal Nether- lands Army, who was deployed as a platoon commander to Uruzgan between March 2010 and July 2010. 59. At map grid co-ordinates 74.5 by 22.5. 60. Interview on 23 May 2011 with 1LNT NLMC Anne Kemerink op Schiphorst. 124 130 S. Orbons

61. The 3g’s rule was a common procedure employed by Netherlands Marines units when operating in convoys in Afghanistan. Interview on 23 May 2011 with 1LNT NLMC Anne Kemerink op Schiphorst. 62. As stated on the UK composite beam green laser Dangerlight, in an Email received on 21 January 2011 from Lt Col (rtd) Martin Osborne, UK Army Warfare Development Centre. The GLOW of the Royal Netherlands Army, weighing over 1 kilogram, encounters similar objections, as stated in the first inter- view on 3 February 2011 with 1Lt Dirk Ferwerda. 63. These considerations were expressed by 1Lt NLMC Anne Kemerink op Schiphorst, during the inter- view on 23 May 2011. 64. Toet and Westrale, Effects of High Intensity Light Sources, 35. 65. The change in attitude has been observed during his deployment in Uruzgan by 1Lt NLMC Anne Kemerink op Schiphorst, and declared during the interview on 23 May 2011. 66. As has been experienced by Maj Larry Hamers who stated in the interview on 17 April 2011. 67. As indicated by various respondents in a survey reported in: Laser Optical Warning Device – Performance and Employment Update, US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, August 2007. 68. Conversation with LtCol (rtd) Richard Bartis on 13 January 2011. 69. D. Gompert, S. Johnson, M. Libicki, D. Frelinger, J. Gordon IV, R. Smith, and C. Sawak, Underkill – Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations Amid Populations (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 87. 70. As stated by Pascal Paulissen, senior scientist at TNO Defence and Security Laboratory, The Hague, The Netherlands, in a conversation on 30 June 2011. 71. As has been successfully tried during experiments and trials. Interview with Lt Col Marcel van Luit. 72. Several officers have indicated the correlation between recent deep impact events and the mental attitude and perception in current situations in which quick decision making on weapon use is required. Interview with Maj Niels Roelen; interview on 26 February 2008 with Col Hans van Griensven, Royal Netherlands Army, deployed to Uruzgan as Commander Task Force Uruzgan between January 2007 and August 2007; interview on 25 May 2007 with Maj Carlo Tempelaars, Royal Netherlands Army, deployed to Uruzgan as a company commander between July 2006 and January 2007; the latter declared that the population even intentionally challenged the forces during the days after an event with casualties. This same “checking” was done to units that had just arrived in Afghanistan. 73. Dutch interviewees have repetitively pointed out that the compact space in the small cities and villages in Uruzgan is an unfavourable environment in terms of operational space/time factors. As stated in an interview on 24 January 2011 with Cpt Tim Ros, Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed to Uruzgan as a legal adviser between January and July 2010. 74. As declared by various officers during interviews, for instance, Maj Lenny Hazelbag, Royal Nether- lands Army, who was deployed Infantry Platoon Commander to Uruzgan as a platoon commander between November 2006 and April 2007. Downloaded by [Nederlandse Defensie Academie], [Sjef Orbons] at 00:58 15 May 2012

125 126 Chapter 6 Conclusions

Introduction

In this study an assessment of the utility of NLWs in military operations has been made. As we have seen in Chapter 1, since the early 1990s, NLWs have been claimed, developed and fielded to serve particular political and military purposes. Much of the underlying rationale reflects expectations regarding the performance of NLWs under real world circumstances. Often, these expectations were expressed in general terms, and were largely based on the design specifications of the NLW, abstracting from the circumstances under which they were suppo- sed to be used. As a result they have been criticized by other analysts and practitioners.

The study has been undertaken to enrich and underpin this debate by generating operatio- nal evidence. Empirically, it focused on three specific contexts in which military forces were deployed and used various types of NLWs: British control over Northern Ireland (between1969 and 1998), detainees control in Iraq (between 2003 and 2009), and operations in Afghanistan (2009 and 2010). Within each context, various cases of NLW use were investigated. While most analyses have relied on actual events, in two cases, NLW use was discussed hypothetically, drawing on detailed information of the operational contexts, regular tactical proceedings and the informed judgement of experienced soldiers. Conceptually, the analysis was guided by the heuristic Defence Technology Assessment (DTA) framework presented in chapter 2, comprising the various classes of influence on the effect of actual NLW use: those related to the weapons, the users and the target population.

In this concluding chapter, the findings and phenomena that emerged from the case studies will be further elaborated and discussed. After a synopsis of the purposes and expectations of deploying NLWs in the three cases examined, the next section will review the findings from the NLW deployment, arranged by the components from the DTA framework. Section 4 will then aggregate the impact of these findings on the effect of NLW use. Next, these results will be used in terms of the relationships and interactions found between the tactical and strate- gic level. In section 6, the claims as extracted from the NLW debate will be validated against the research findings, and this will provide for the answers to the central research questions in section 7. The final section gives recommendations for the way ahead with NLW usage and closes with a perspective on DTA applicability on advanced defence technologies beyond NLWs.

Purposes, expectations and doctrinal underpinnings of NLW deployment

The Troubles in Northern Ireland1

The conflict in Northern Ireland emerged from a growing resistance amongst the Catholic community against their political and social marginalisation within the “Province”. The go- vernment’s view of the protests as being illegal led to intervention by force. Catholic civil

1 The background and aims of NLW use during The Troubles have been addressed at more length in Chapter 3, pp. 54-5. 129 rights marches met heavy-handed responses from the predominantly Protestant Northern Irish police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The civil unrest and violence that fol- lowed grew to a level that it could not be contained by the RUC. The British Army was deploy- ed to intervene between the sectarian groups in1969. The absence of any solid political strategy towards a stable province-wide end state created a political vacuum in which the British Army developed its own strategic approach with a focus on winning the “hearts and minds” of the Nationalist community. During more than three decades the British Army was deployed in an environment that had become increasingly hostile to its presence. Upon deployment to Northern Ireland, the British Army role was governed by a policy of minimal force. Minimal force implied that British Army personnel was to abstain from repression and from inflicting civilian casualties in its mission to prevent and contain vio- lence and to control over public areas. The policy and ensuing doctrine were implemented by adopting a policing posture, coordinated with the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which reflected the British Army’s focus on building and maintaining a positive relation with the population to win their hearts and minds, and to defuse inter-sectarian tensions. As this posture was challenged by insurgents early-on after its deployment, the British Army had to preserve the delicate balance between force protection against hostile strikes and maintaining public order. CS and baton rounds (BRs) were the primary NLWs assumed to accomplish this requirement. After Bloody Sunday in January 1972, when 13 civilians were killed when the British Army used lethal force, the reliance and expectation on CS and BRs in coping with massive and violent public disorder further increased, as lethal force was now de- clared as an instrument of last resort. CS was intended to accomplish area denial by causing discomfort to eyes and respiration to individuals present in a targeted area, while BRs should enforce compliance by inflicting pain. In the course of the Troubles, efforts were made to technologically improve NLWs, in particular of BRs, with the intent to enhance its performance in effectively coping with the public order task, and at the same time to mitigate the risk of serious harm to or casualties among the target population. The further fine-tuning and tightening of the guidelines to se- curity forces in employing NLWs created a Use of Force (UOF) continuum, intended to ensure the legitimate and safe use of NLWs. Within the framework of the UOF continuum, the NLWs were also supposed to help to discriminate between insurgents and ‘normal’ demonstrators, thus separating or isolating militant elements from the non-violent population.

Detention facilities in Iraq2

The achievement of mission objectives in international counter insurgency (CI) operations is considered to be hinging on the intervention forces’ ability to gain the support and coope- ration of the civilian population for the intervention mission objectives. In the case study dis- cussed in chapter 4, concerning detention facilities in Iraq (2003-2009), this was particularly crucial, given the political context. This ‘hearts and minds’ strategy was gradually extended to include and redirect detainee operations, and motivated by a growing belief that the way detainees were treated was key to reshaping their

2 The background and aims of NLW use in Iraqi detention facilities have been addressed at more length in Chapter 4, pp. 130 82-83. political motivation towards a more positive orientation regarding the new Iraqi government and the coalition forces. Initially, Iraqi detainees were predominantly exploited by US forces as intelligence source in support of their CI mission. This shift in approach in detainee opera- tions came after the US authorities were publicly confronted in 2004 with the atrocities done by their military personnel against Iraqi detainees in the Abu Ghraib detention facility. In situations of war and international conflict the Geneva conventions of 1949 provide for a legal framework for the just treatment of detained individuals, stressing the force’s respon- sibility to protect them. US authorities gradually redressed compliance with these fundamen- tal rights of detainees after the Abu Ghraib turning point. This was also articulated in policy documents, and in subordinated doctrine and manuals on detainee operations. A second doctrinal lead principle in detention operations was the imperative to keep control of the detention facility under all circumstances. This should be accomplished with the concept of minimal force, elaborated in a graduated response UOF continuum in cases of major disturbances, stressing the prevention of casualties. NLWs were incorporated in the UOF, with the intent and expectation to enforce control and order over the detainee popula- tion, without having to resort to lethal force. The principal NLWs deployed were BRs and other kinetic NLWs. Their deployment was expected to avoid casualties and serious injury while at the same time should enforce com- pliance by causing pain. Lethal force was only permissible in cases of detainee escapes and threat to life of guard forces. The graduated UOF response against major disturbances autho- rized the use of NLWs only when preceded and accompanied by verbal warnings to detainees and their leaders urging them to comply with facility regulations. NLWs were also considered compatible with the hearts and minds strategy that governed the CI mission, including detainee operations later on, as they were expected to be perceived by detainees as proportionate force in major uprisings, and as demonstrably reflecting a mi- nimal force doctrine safeguarding the wellbeing of the detainees.

Checkpoints and convoys in Afghanistan3

The third case (chapter 5) discusses NLW use in the context of the ISAF forces, deployed to stabilize Afghanistan and to deny the Taliban getting back into power, thereby preventing a renewed creation of a sanctuary for a resurgent Al Qaeda. A dual strategy has been defined by the Coalition forces: on the one hand military containment of the Taliban military strikes; and on the other to rebuild the country to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan popula- tion. The hearts and minds approach was essential to ISAF commanders, as they view the hu- man terrain decisive for a successful outcome of the mission. By its nature, winning hearts and minds is dependent on tactical activities and implies a different mindset in the conduct of military operations: a less coercive approach and emphasizing the minimum use of force. Minimizing civilian casualties can be viewed as one side of the coin of ‘casualty aversion’ as a lead issue for western policy makers and military commanders in Afghanistan. The flip side represents preventing killings among own military personnel during such missions.

3 The background and aims of NLW use at checkpoints and with convoys have been addressed at more length in Chapter 5, pp. 110-113. 131 Efforts to reduce the number of civilian casualties focus on recurring critical tactical level si- tuations, in particular events involving checkpoint and convoy operations. This is where ISAF forces are often confronted with unanticipated non-cooperative behavior of approaching dri- vers and, forced to take split-second decisions, misinterpretation of their intention may cause control forces to risk innocent casualties. This problematic is compounded by the persistent threat of vehicle borne suicide attacks. Laser Optical Warners represent a class of NLWs that are considered to be an effective capability to enhance Escalation of Force (EoF) procedures in meeting engagements at check- points and with convoys to reduce the risk of unintended civilian casualties. Their intended effect is earlier warning of approaching traffic and forcing drivers to slow down and stop. They are expected to reduce uncertainty by helping to de-conflict the dilemma between force protection of own military personnel and casualty avoidance of innocent civilians. Thus, the tactical level deployment of Laser Optical Warners is believed to effectively contribute to the strategic imperative of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population.

NLW military deployment: review of findings

This section reviews the findings from the cases investigated in the study and relates them to each other, in order to identify and discuss the mechanisms and phenomena that stand out in defining the outcome of NLW deployment and use. The analysis wil be guided by the DTA framework. While, strictly speaking, it will be confined to the set of NLWs examined in the three case studies (CS, kinetic energy NLWs , laser optical warners and the ADS), it will become plausible that these mechanisms will also hold more generally. The DTA model served to identify and address both the physical and non-physical factors of influence on the use of NLWs, and their possible interactions. Part of these factors feature in the engagement processes of all NLWs examined, whereas others appear to be tied to the application of one or more particular types of NLW. Yet, as we will see, more than the DTA framework assumed, the use of NLWs appears to be influenced by issues that reside at the politico-strategic level of the conflict. Similarly, at the politico-strategic level, policy issues and developments are at play that, once made public, have the potential to reshape the target population’s mindset and attitude towards the user force, and by consequence alter the target population’s physical response against the user’s employment of NLWs. After addressing the findings that stand out from the three cases at the technical/tactical level, the situation and developments at the politico-strategic level will be discussed separa- tely, in order to identify how they influence the course of NLW events at the – technical/tac- tical- ground, Conversely, the implications for the outcome of NLW use, both at the tactical level and in terms of mission accomplishment at the politico-strategic level, will be presen- ted.

The impact of environment and weather on NLW performance

A range of conditions related to weather and physical environment influences has the po- tential to influence the performance of NLWs. These conditions contribute to shaping the physical context of an event in which an NLW is used. The ways in which the physical context influences NLW performance have been gathered from the operational cases and will be discussed here.

132 Visibility conditions have an immediate impact on the operation and effectiveness of all NLWs that require accurate aiming. As these weapons are used at distances of dozens of meters from the target individual, unfavorable weather conditions due to fog and heavy rain or snow deny their reliable use. It has also been found that dust caused by sandstorms and smoke resulting from fires also disturb the applicability of these NLWs. Operations conducted in darkness also suffer from degraded aiming opportunity, unless vision is artificially suppor- ted.

Whereas aiming the Laser Optical Warner requires good visibility conditions, its performance in relation to daylight conditions deviates from that of kinetic NLWs. Dark ambient conditi- ons increase the capability to blind an incoming target individual, due to the sharp contrast of the bright laser light in darkness. The opposite occurs under bright daylight, when the la- ser light intensity has to compete with light intensity produced by the sun. This is particularly critical when the sun is aligned with the line of sight between the laser and the target indi- vidual. Apart from visibility conditions to be permissible for aiming the laser, bad weather, dust and smoke are responsible for a context that strongly degrades the laser beam intensity effectively delivered to the target person.

As with the laser optical warner, the ADS performance suffers from atmospheric attenuation. This loss of performance increases with range, as range dependent variations in atmospheric conditions, in particular of humidity, complicate the ability to tune the MMW beam intensity to the required level at target position range.4 Hence, due to the high sensitivity of safe ADS beam modulation to the atmospheric conditions, ADS applicability is highly dependent on a favorable physical context. In contrast with directional NLWs, non-directional NLWs as CS and the stun grenade are much less dependent on good visibility, and therefore less susceptible to variations in the physical context.

Strong and variable wind conditions interfere with the ability to accurately direct kinetic energy projectiles. This is again a problem that increases with range. In sandy environments, wind also causes dust and sand storms, creating conditions that are prohibitive to the majo- rity of NLWs. This also includes CS, as strong wind denies control over area distribution of the agent, thus enhancing the risk of harming innocent civilians, and early decline of the agent’s required intensity level in the targeted area.

Range issues are also triggered by the presence of buildings, vegetations and other material objects in the area of NLW deployment. They act as obstacles that interrupt the lines of sight and, in the case of ADS, they perform as undesirable and incalculable deflectors of the MMW beam. The probability of meeting such obstacles increases in proportion with target engage- ment range. Hence, relatively compact built-up environments create a less permissive physi- cal context for NLW, in particular for longer range directional systems.

4 The problem of atmospheric humidity degrading ADS performance is not revealed in the public demonstration videos posted on the JNLWD website. Tests and demonstrations are usually performed under clear visibility and dry weather conditions. At: http://www.jnlwp.defense.gov/multimedia/video.html. Accessed on 10 January 2012. 133 In sum, unfavorable environmental and weather conditions, in particular those degrading atmospheric visibility and directed energy propagation range, reduce the accuracy and per- formance of the NLW. The susceptibility of the window of non-lethality of most NLWs to the physical context is difficult to cope with the tolerance margins for an NLW to be on the one hand sufficiently strong to acquire a desired physiological effect, and on the other to keep the impact within safety limits, are relatively small. Target populations have in some cases exploi- ted this susceptibility to these contextual physical factors to their advantage.5

Counteracting NLW physiological effects

Virtually every deployed NLW proved to be susceptible to countermeasures. They were of a technical nature, or of tactical origine, or applied in combination. Target groups prepared and deployed technical countermeasures adjusted to the specific physiological effect of the NLW they encountered.

Against CS, highly motivated resistive target groups managed to sharply reduce the weapon’s effect by covering or wetting techniques to absorb the irritation effect. In addition, in an ope- rational context of protracted and repetitive exposure to the weapon, a decline in physiolo- gical sensitivity to the agent has been observed, which even develop into immunity of target individuals who had been frequently exposed to the weapon. The combination of countermeasures and reduced sensitivity against CS produced a context that contributed to a deadlock at the tactical level, with neither side willing to give way. The user force aimed at conditioning this state by protracted and excessive release of CS. By consequence, collateral damage was inflicted to citizens not involved in the stand-off. The political fall-out included the portraying of the security forces and political decision makers of having failed in properly dealing with the resistance, and a growing alienation and hostility of the target community towards the political leadership and its security agents, In addition, the collateral damage tended to galvanize wider public opposition and closed its ranks, and, politically, widened the gap between the parties involved.6

Technical countermeasures against kinetic energy NLWs, in particular BRs, consisted of makeshift body protection gear. Target individuals combined visible or conceiled protection gear with hit and run tactics to perform counterstrikes with improvised missiles against the BR user force. Tactics, relying on dynamic behaviour, reduced time windows available to user forces to engage the most violent elements in the target group. The opportunity to effectively apply dynamic tactics was dependent on particular contextual factors, such as the available maneuvering space, and on the presence of natural shielding in the operational space. Alter- native combinations of technical and tactical countermeasures were realized through coor- dinated operations of target group elements holding shields, to fence off other group mem- bers, to enable them to launch counterattacks from cover. Indirect kinetic energy NLWs could partly overcome such countermeasures, as their effect does not require particular aiming and works randomly, though their kinetic impact energy is much lower than that of BRs, due to their high risk of striking vulnerable parts of the target bodies from close range. A particular

5 As, for instance, occurred in the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq, Chapter 4, p. 94-5. 134 6 See Chapter 3, p. 70 and p. 72. set of tactics was practiced in the detention centres in Iraq, exploiting the particular context of physical separation of the maneuvering space available to the user force, i.e. the corridors, and the maneuvering space available to the target population, i.e. the detainee compounds.7 They could stay out of BR range, and quickly switch the scene of rioting from one compound to another. Finally, tactical countermeasures also exploited the context of the blending of target individuals in large and dense crowds, thus preventing exposure even to very precisely aimed BRs. A most daring tactic used by target individuals was to move as close to the user force as to enter the non-permissive range zone of BRs, thus taking advantage of the sanctu- ary that formally existed in which the use of BRs would officially be prohibited because of the high risk of lethal effect.

Countermeasures against BRs were generally applied by the most militant part of the target population. Their relative invulnerability in comparison with less prepared target individu- als in combination with the former’s intermingling with the latter, shaped an operational context that enhanced the risk of harmful strikes against the less militant target individuals. The dynamic behavior of multiple militant target individuals increased the probability of BRs missing their intended target, and by consequence, striking the wrong, relatively innocent targets harmfully, especially with large and dense target groups present. In an operational context marked by large target populations with many taking part in the rioting, the original one-on-one nature of the BR tended to degenerate into a many-on-many use, which came to bear as barrages of BRs with the synergetic effect of raising the risk of harmful strikes.8 The feedback of such adverse BR effects from operations was twofold: upgrading BR accu- racy by technical innovations, and by sharpening the RoE and accountability of the user force for BR employment.9 In Northern Ireland this has slightly reduced the number of harmful strikes over time. At the politico-strategic level, the negative effect of adverse effects of BRs was profound, as it was mostly directly reported to the outside world. Rather than a discrimi- native NLW serving to contribute to the hearts and minds approach pursued politically, the BR became an enduring symbol of repression and abuse, thus further alienating the target population from the political authorities. In Iraq detention centres, actually being closed communities to the outside world without any significant reports released on upraisings, the coupling to and feedback from the higher levels was largely insignificant. The effectiveness of the target population’s countermeasures against the BRs forced the user forces into protrac- ted stalemate battles within a confined operational space. The failure of BR use to physically enforce compliance and restore order during riots, contributed to defining a context respon- sible for a ‘pressure cooker’ effect in the closed detention centres, that further estranged the US guard personnel and the Iraqi detainees from each other10, further impeding a successful hearts and minds approach in the detention centres.

7 See Chapter 4. 8 The BR barrage effect has been observed during massive uprisings, in 1996 in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, and in 2005 in the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq. See Chapter 3, pp. 67-8, and Chapter 4, pp. 92-5. 9 The gradual evolution of the BR system in response to the harmful and politically counterproductive outcome of its use in Northern Ireland was possible only because of the protraction of the conflict over several decades. As regards the application of BRs in Iraqi detention centers, no technological system innovations have been reported. 10 The ‘pressure cooker’ effect has been addressed in Chapter 4, p. 102. 135 Countering laser optical warners, basically followed two tracks. In the first, a driver chooses to ignore the blinding effect of the green laser beam, simply by slightly looking away from the laser beam direction, which allows retaining some vision to drive ahead. Slightly ma- neuvering the car also enables the driver to avoid the laser beam. The other type of counter- measure is to attenuate the laser beam before it influences the target’s vision. This is accom- plished by the use of the vehicle’s blinds to interrupt the line-of-sight between the laser and the driver’s eyes, or by the wearing of sun glasses to reduce the beam intensity, making the blinding effect tolerable for the driver to keep moving forward in the same direction.

The motivation of drivers to apply such countermeasures was also depending on contextual factors as the availability of public information regarding the presence and purpose of the largely unknown laser optical warner, and the level of criminal activity in the area. More information on the laser use would increase the willingness to comply. By contrast, drivers unaware of the meaning of the blinding effect would be more inclined to try to ignore it. Non-cooperative behavior would be reinforced if the population would be alerted on the risk of encountering criminal groups who operate checkpoints. Another higher level issue at work to make drivers counteract the blinding effect was related to the deployment rotation of user forces. Some drivers had developed a tradition towards ISAF to provoke freshly incoming forces by ignoring their warning signals, as a means to check their posture and determina- tion. Such irrational behavior is difficult to anticipate or to detect, in particular because it is impossible to distinguish from the other motivations for non-cooperative behavior indicated above.11

The effect of the application of countermeasures on user forces could be confusion and misperception regarding the target individual’s identity and intent. It is most likely that non-compliance with the laser optical warning would mark the driver as a hostile subject, authorizing the user force to fire warning shots and, in case the driver would still continue his approach, to engage with lethal fire. Hence, in a worst case context, a driver ignoring the blinding effect creates an image of hostility to the user force, in absence of any other clues to identify the driver as hostile or innocent. The introduction of the laser optical warner, while intended to alert drivers to stop, thus forestalling the need for lethal engagement, may in incidents with drivers ignoring or denying the blinding effect, enhance the risk of wrong judgement of hostile intent and as a consequence may cause innocent fatalities.

The ADS has been deployed only hypothetically within the framework of a single case only, while the system has not been fielded in real world operations elsewhere. Hence, conceivable countermeasures can only be derived from its technical characteristics, taking into account the context of the detention operations case as examined in this study. The MMW directed

11 The ‘probing’ of newly arriving forces has been reported by Dutch ISAF forces deployed in Uruzgan in 2010. See Chapter 136 5, p.125 (note 72). energy beam emitted by the ADS can technically be countered by target individuals by wet- ting their cloths, as water strongly absorbs at this wavelength. The pre-absorption prevents the radiated energy to dissipate into the target’s skin. Furthermore, metal body shielding, such as with thin foils or fine-meshed grids, reflects and scatters the incoming DE radiation, thus preventing the MMW beam to reach and heat the upper skin of the protected individual. For these technical countermeasures, the operational context should facilitate the availabi- lity of sufficient amounts of water and suitable metal objects. Normally, these ingredients would have been in short supply within the compounds of the detention facilities in Iraq.

Potential tactical countermeasures include fast maneuvering patterns by the target indivi- duals, as the mechanical and electromagnetic inertia of the current ADS fails to support the agility required to slave, modulate and lock the MMW beam on quickly moving target indivi- duals. Target individuals may also choose to use the presence of large crowds to seek cover, as the MMW beam resolution and modulation is insufficient for discriminate engagement of an embedded target individual. Another potentially applicable tactic to escape the ADS beam for a target individual is to move as close to the ADS platform as to stay below the system’s minimal operational range, which measures up to dozens of meters.

Given the operational context of large groups of detainees rioting, even without the resour- ces available for effective technical countermeasures, the combination of tactics and mass provides for options to deny the ADS effect of helping to get a massive riot under control. If only one or a few ADS platforms are available, the ADS capability may soon become satura- ted. Although the pain sensation will produce some effect, it is short lived, as it expires very soon after the target’s exposure to the beam stops. The ADS engagement and target response might resemble a ‘dance’ to escape the heat. Target group tactics define a context that compli- cates accurate targeting of true rioters, as they intermingle with less militant detainees. Con- sequently, the risk of frequently striking unintended target is high, in particular as precision declines with range. Wrong targeting arouses more opposition. The invisibility of the MMW- beam, together with the platform located out of range for retaliation strikes, is likely to spark aggression that will find its way to the user force in an indirect sense.

If the target population is able to continue rioting massively, it would outlive the sustaina- bility of the ADS operation, depending on the recharging capability of the system. If indeed the rioting detainee population would be able to cope with a technologically superior system as the ADS, it would give them the mental boost of a victory. This, in combination with the alienating effect upon the target population and possibly even felt as torturing by an unt- ouchable opponent, would put the deployment of ADS at odds with the hearts and minds approach vis-à-vis the population. At the same time it would have failed to meet the user forces’ imperative to keep control over the facility under all circumstances. The negative ef- fect would be worsened if target populations perceive the ADS as a symbol of the unjustness of being detained innocently and without charges.

Summarizing, NLWs are generally susceptible to countermeasures from target populations. Such countermeasures tend to become more effective over time, both technically and tacti- cally. Extended or repetitive exposure to the same NLW generally triggers a learning process

137 amongst determined target populations to progressively resist the NLW effect. Hence, in real world operational contexts, the NLW effect proves to be time-dependent, in the sense that the effect tends to decline against experienced target individuals. Given the well defined characteristics and window of the NLW effect, targets seek to close down the window of regular NLW applicability as far as possible. This mechanism bears the potential to provoke a response by user forces to apply the NLW beyond the safety margins.

User proficiency, performance and posture

The effect of an NLW against a target person or group is viewed as a result of the combina- tion of the weapon’s dedicated design parameters and proper use of the NLW. The examined cases of NLW use demonstrate, that in many situations the physiological impact of NLWs is dependent on the level of skills the user has obtained, both through pre-deployment training and through experience gained during real world operations with the NLW. This observation especially applies to directional NLWs, as their effects critically rely on the operator’s decision making and target engagement process.

Ideally, the user deploys the NLW in such a manner that the weapon perfectly performs ac- cording to its specifications. For kinetic energy NLWs, this implies that they strike the target body at the permissible parts only, with the impact energy within the predefined safety margins. Equally, laser warner light projects a blinding but eye safe energy dose, and the ADS raises the skin temperature to level at which the heat becomes painful, but without causing burning wounds.

Although users had to operate within their RoEs to ensure correct NLW use, in reality they often did not meet this requirement, due to a range of contextual factors influencing their task performance. One was the lack of dedicated and realistic pre-deployment training on the weapon for some users, for reasons such as overburdened mission training requirements, forcing commanders to prioritize between training goals, in which NLWs marksmanship development training tended to be squeezed, both in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan.12 Another resulted from an operational context in real deployments, denying NLW operators a measured application of the NLW, even after dedicated training.13 In the case of BRs, situa- tional contexts brought users to fire above permissive weapon range, thus compromising the accuracy limits of the NLW and enhancing the risk of serious harm to random target indivi- duals, or to strike innocent targets. Equally, users have shot BRs at prohibitively short ranges, as happened during The Troubles, or fired without any intent or ability to aim the weapon launcher, as has occurred during detention operations. It is obvious that such behaviour cau- ses a higher risk of fatal consequences amongst the target population. Such manifestations of users to be capable of irresponsible uses of NLWs were mostly triggered by the operational context experienced by the user, both mentally and physically.

12 See Chapter 3, p. 69, and Chapter 4, p. 89. 138 13 See Chapter 3, p. 66, and Chapter 4, p. 101. The way NLWs were deployed also depended on the user’s attitude and perception vis à vis the target population. The sectarian divide in Northern Ireland also divided the security forces politically from the opponent during protests and riots. Due to their political partiality the user force was biased against the target population. This tended to influence their interpre- tation of the doctrine of minimal force. In Afghanistan, a minor part of the Dutch forces tended to view Afghans as potential insurgents. US guard forces in Iraq perceived detainees as enemies or terrorists or a threat to them, at least in the first years of the detention facilities (Hedges and Al-Arian 2008: 76). Accountability was marginalized. In Iraq and Afganistan, political implications of wrong NLW use in detainee centers were low, as long as no killings occurred. Media presence in Afghanistan in the events considered was close to zero, similar as in the detainee facilities, hence NLW use would mostly remain a tactical issue business, no onlookers were present in the closed and isolated settings of the detainee centres. Northern Ireland was entirely different, with the whole world watching the street battles, while the Western populations could identify themselves with the target population in Northern Ire- land. When a hearts and minds strategy were in place, this informed the operational context, in the sense that commanders had to implement the political framework in their operations, by tightening the guidelines, including those for NLW employment.

In many disorder incidents the user forces, when faced with the available NLWs failing to pro- duce the desired outcome of target compliance, were inclined to protracted use of the NLW, as to keep the target individuals or group under pressure. In the ensuing stalemate operatio- nal context, escalation mechanisms were at work through which users decided to intensify NLW discharges. If the stakes rose high, such as in a detainee facility with a massive riot threatening the integrity of the facility, the RoEs became ‘stretched’, for the sake of getting a critical situation under control. Within the charged context of the struggle for regaining con- trol, users have disregarded the safety limits of the NLW, either by extremely long duration of the effect as occurred with CS in Northern Ireland, by delivering excessive energy levels to targets, or by ignoring weapon aiming protocols.14

Whether users would correctly or prohibitively use the NLW also depended on their mental and physical state, as it influenced their ability to make adequate judgments and decisions. Users disregarded NLW guidelines for various reasons, many of which emerged from the context of an operation, including pre-occupational views, recent and occasionally stressful experiences, and particular perceptions. They are also influenced by political level issues, such as the insurgency by the IRA during the Troubles. While the security forces in Northern Ireland initially adopted a hearts and minds strategy Province wide, this was gradually under- mined by the IRA and its counterparts within the Northern Ireland community. Wider con- flict information about threat levels and insurgency strikes shaped the mindset and attitude of the user forces. This added to the pressure users experienced in some situations to make split second decisions on how to proceed, and so contributed to the probability of wrong use of the NLW. This problem was further compounded as operators are usually junior, with less experience and feeling less self-confident in complex and stressful circumstances than more seasoned personnel.

14 See Chapter 3, pp.69-72, and Chapter 4, p.101. 139 In all cases, the user’s Rules of Engagement include instructions specifying the conditions un- der which military personnel is allowed to use their armament for force protection and self- defence. A user who finds himself in a life-threatening situation is authorized to use lethal force to neutralize the lethal threat. The authorization to use lethal force includes the option to use an NLW lethally, provided that the weapon is capable of delivering a lethal effect. This option entails, that the RoEs implicitly define the NLW as a dual use weapon, both non-lethal and lethal, depending on the mode of employment. The user is tasked to apply the non-lethal mode to control target behavior, while the lethal mode is legitimized for self-defense or may present itself as a consequence of unintentional or intentional wrong use (Wallace 2001). As a result, operational contexts are conceivable, in which there is no sharp demarcation between lethal and non-lethal use of NLW, especially when civilians get seriously harmed in violent and chaotic confrontations. Such situations are apparent when the user has to cope with a relatively small time window available for the Escalation of Force (EoF) procedure, forcing him to quickly judge in which mode the NLW has to be used. This ambiguity that obviously primarily resides in the user domain, has in some cases sparked much controversy over the nature of NLWs, and put their utility into question.

As the user is often confronted with a mixed spectrum of target individuals in terms of their motivation and resistance against the user, some elements amongst the target population are relatively vulnerable when NLWs are used in the potentially lethal self-defence mode. The case of Northern Ireland and, to a lesser extent, that of the detainee operations in Iraq, pro- vide evidence that disproportionate use of NLW has occurred and inflicted lasting harm and casualties. This undesired outcome is more likely to occur in a context when the user’s mind- set in decision making is dominated by and reduced to an ‘us-or-them’ choice. The implica- tion of the use of an NLW in a lethal mode for self-defence is likely to be portrayed as a ‘false’ NLW, in fact as a lethal weapon, thereby undermining the political and military confidence in these weapons as genuine NLWs. The accusation of abuse, even if the self defence case was legitimate, will raise doubt and mistrust in regard of the higher level declared benign intent of deploying NLWs as exponents of the hearts and minds approach.

Summing up, the military user who is tasked to apply the NLW according to the weapon specification and guidelines, in reality does not always meet these requirements. The friction of war, a phenomenon that will be addressed at more length in the next section, is what users experience in highly stressful, lethal and unpredictable environments. Stress and uncertainty facing commanders and operators in the operational context bring some of them to regard the availability of NLWs to complicate their task as more response options have to be taken into account in decision making.

Target group perception and attitude towards the user

The behavioral response of target individuals and target groups against the user of NLWs has been demonstrated to be influenced by a range of contextual factors. Some of these factors are directly related to the presence and mode of operation of the user force. Others are infor- med by the wider context of circumstances and developments that originate from outside the actual physical confrontation. To illustrate, when the news of the arrest of Saddam Hussein

140 by US forces reached the detainees in the detention facilities in Iraq, they responded with a major riot directed against the US guard forces in the camps. Similarly, in other incidents in the cases considered, information about outside and higher level events infuse into the local situation to become, at least temporary, a dominating factor in defining the target group’s perception and attitude towards the user. Such external factors to the confrontation site originate from the politico-strategic level of the conflict environment. The upcoming section will address these factors more specifically.

The target group’s attitude to an important extent defines their response to the use of NLWs against them, in particular their determination to resist the NLW effect. Some specific pheno- mena at the tactical level stand out in defining the target’s attitude.

The clashes that occurred during The Troubles and in Iraqi detention centers have in com- mon, that the user force and target populations engage each other repetitively over a very long time frame. Target groups memorize previous confrontations, in a sense that the user force is gradually perceived as an instrument of repression. Once the target group’s attitude has evolved into one of predetermined animosity towards the user, any use of force, inclu- ding the employment of NLWs, is likely to be taken as an attack that serves as an ad hoc legi- timization for the target population to fight back. The target group’s learning curve resulting from the experiences in repetitive physical confrontations, provides for a relative advantage over the user who is bound by RoE, as increasing determination and improved techniques and tactics to resist NLWs reinforce each other. In the cases examined, the decline in NLW effectiveness against ever better prepared target groups has triggered the user force to pass the NLW’s beyond safety margins when restoring order was imperative, or considered to be imperative.

If the operational context is such that direct communication between the user force and target population is possible, this has the potential to mitigate the level violence and even prevent the outbreak of disorder. The success of verbal messaging critically depends on the benefits it entails for the target group to stop violence and resistance, and on the credibility of the promises made to the target group. The target group’s interpretation and acceptance is also much dependent on a range of contextual circumstances, such as the sectarian com- position of the user force and the user force’s attitudinal track record in the perception of the target population.

If, in the end, the confrontation cannot be defused verbally, the ensuing escalatory cycle tends to compress the NLW window of permissible use. As long as the user force is viewed by the target group as the physical extension of the ruling power it rejects, this image legitimi- zes and motivates for non-compliance with detainee rules, protest and violent opposition and rioting. Abu Ghraib perfectly demonstrates how political level controversy fuels resistan- ce, when the insurgency emerging in Iraq after the US-led intervention in 2003 was prolife- rated into the detention centers, and further reinforced after the abuses in a closed section of the center was made public in 2004, and the inhumane treatment of the detainees overall. Given this wider context, the user is not perceived by the target population as the legitimate agent to manage order or to provide for internal security. This negative appreciation is rein- forced in an operational context where the user responds to the target group’s protesting and non-cooperative behavior with NLWs to enforce its compliance. In Northern Ireland, cor-

141 relations have been found between events taking place in which target groups were engaged with NLW, and the outbreak of major disorder and armed resistance in the period after such an event.15

In Afghanistan/ Uruzgan, the user force, acting in a patrolling and controlling role, was often perceived by the population as disturbing their normal life pattern, as for instance was expe- rienced in Deh Rawod, Uruzgan, between 2008 and 2010.16 The ensuing irritation occasionally led target individuals to ignore the user force’s directions and warnings, which in turn forced the user to apply armed force within the framework of their EoF procedure, including the use of NLWs. Members of the target population also had developed the habit to probe freshly arriving forces on their alertness and courage. This could trigger the use of NLWs in situations that would appear harmless to more experienced user force personnel.

Concluding, the target population’s view of the military user force is informed by previous confrontations and by the wider political context and reasons of the force’s presence. The at- titude of the user force during operations shapes the target group’s response. In some cases, the presence of foreign military forces as such is received with skepticism or even with disap- proval, partly because it interferes with their normal pattern of life.

Overall effects of NLW use

The previous section has discussed various phenomena observed in the case studies that influence the effectiveness of the NLWs considered in this study. In terms of the DTA scheme, the findings at the technical/tactical level can be arranged as follows:

• weapon & technology complex / situational context interaction: the impact of environ- ment and weather on NLW performance

• target complex / weapon & technology complex interaction: counteracting NLW physiolo- gical effects

• user complex / weapon & technology complex interaction: proficiency, performance and posture

• target complex / user complex interaction: target group perception and attitude towards the user

This section addresses the above phenomena in conjunction, as together they shape the pro- cesses and mechanism that are ultimately responsible for the NLW effect. This approach will provide the insights into the extent to which the NLWs considered are effective to support the higher level political objectives of the mission. Three possible outcomes will be subsequently discussed:

15 After the use of NLWs, a systematic trend of increasing violence was observable in Northern Ireland. This indicates the feeling of repression and unjustness amongst the Catholics. See Wright (1981). 16 As reported in the case of the convoy moving through zone north of Deh Rawod in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. See Chapter 5, 142 pp. 118-119. • NLW performance is being degraded

• NLWs perform counterproductive

• NLW performance is intentionally degenerated, and complemented by:

• conceiving an NLW counterfactual.

NLW performance is being degraded

In all three operational cases, the environmental conditions and situational context has the tendency to reduce the performance of the NLW. The physical situational context as such is often less optimal than those under which the design performance characteristics of the NLW technology and complex are defined. Employing NLW under adverse situational conditions involves the risk that the weapon’s physiological effect falls beyond the design window of ef- fective, and at the same time safe, non-lethal performance.

Target complexes draw upon the situational context by applying physical countermeasures denying the regular employment of NLWs by the user. Countermeasures are much more relevant in the cases of Northern Ireland and the detainee centers in Iraq compared to the Afghanistan/Uruzgan case, as the protraction and repetition of engagements between user forces and target populations enable the latter to better prepare for counteracting NLW -ef fects. Spatial confinements and physical separation of the user force and target populations frame a context from which the latter can take extra advantage.

The ‘seeking’ engagement settings in the Northern Ireland and Iraq operational cases offered target complexes in many cases the initiative for confrontation, while the user complex were operating in a more responsive mode. In contrast, in the ‘meeting’ engagements of check- points in Uruzgan the user forces had the initiative, as they were the ones to decide about the time, duration and location of a checkpoint set up and its operation.This offered a relati- vely favorable context for effective NLW use. The opposite holds for most of the other cases examined. Dynamic scenario settings with target complexes enjoying tactical freedom of manoeuvre challenge the performance of NLWs and ultimately even deny their employment.

Initiative appears to be a key factor in NLW engagements between user and target complexes. To the target complex, which is usually the underequipped side in a physical confrontation, initiative serves as a force multiplier of the relatively scarce resources it usually enjoys. Ini- tiative translates into opportunity for technical and tactical preparation and orchestration, according to a code that focused on de-optimizing the user’s employment of NLWs to enforce compliance. Initiative further amplifies the target complex’s relatively weak and improvised instruments of violence and protection, by exploiting surprise and by matching the location and time of the onset of action with favorable ambient conditions. Once a confrontation is

143 set on, target complexes can further exploit initiative by confronting user complexes with dy- namic action. This further complicates NLW use, in particular that of directional NLWs. Such approaches have clearly been demonstrated in the Iraqi detainee centers, in particular in Abu Ghraib in 2005, when the rioting was switched from one compound to the other, thus forcing the security forces to reposition constantly.17 The significance of initiative was somewhat less in Northern Ireland, where initiative of target complexes to engage in confrontations was degraded due to a lead-in time, as they were usually correlated to a preceding political event or decision, such the announcement of a Protestant march. This allowed user complexes to anticipate an upcoming disorder.

The protracted conflicts went on for many years. As a result, recurrent patterns between the user complex and the target complex could develop over time that influenced the way NLWs were used and how target groups responded. This repetitiveness was particularly apparent in the Northern Ireland case and the Iraq case, as the user groups and target populations almost became acquainted to each other. As a consequence of the long duration of the status quo, target complexes had abundant amounts of time to develop and prepare countermeasures, even when lacking proper materials. Over time, the counter-optimization efforts tended to shut down the regular window of non-lethal effect of the weapon & technology complex. This was much less the case in Afghanistan, where encounters were of micro scale and scattered over many different locations across Uruzgan and with different user forces and target indivi- duals involved.

NLWs perform counterproductive

The motivations to start a stand-off were primarily rooted in existential discontent of the target complexes about the status quo, but could at times also emerge simply from boredom and for entertainment. The mobilization of larger target groups and the consequent sizing up of the responding user force led to many-on-many engagements, ensuing into a degenerated use of the available NLWs.

The origin and duration of the conflict, in absence of an outlook to a mutually agreed end state, were responsible for a ‘pressure cooker’ effect in the scenarios, in which user and target complexes were tied to each other, with one side fighting for a cause and the other keeping the fight under control and de-escalate the situation. This deadlock only built up more pres- sure, in absence of a way out. The pressure cooker effect was responsible for the degenerate employment of the non-lethal weapon & technology, and pushed its use off-limits towards abuse. NLWs designed as intended for one-on-one directional use were deployed massively and in barrages, as a substitute for the lack of a needed area denial NLWs.

144 17 As reported in the second case in Abu Ghraib, Chapter 4, pp. 94-5. The need for an area effect NLW was more urgent in Northern Ireland than in the detention centers in Iraq, as in the former case NLWs also served for force protection by keeping target populations at distance. In Iraq, force protection was to a large extent provided for by the physical separation of user force and target population, so the many-on-many engagement was to keep pressure on the target population to wear out their motivation. A possible de- ployment of ADS, as a long range directional NLW capable of engaging few target individuals simultaneously and quick re-aiming, could be viewed as a semi-area denial NLW. This me- chanism produced a counterproductive effect, in symbolizing repression leading to growing discontent of the target population, thus further enhancing animosity between the two sides rather than winning the target population’s hearts and minds.

The recurrent pattern of the many-on-many scenarios gradually rendered the deployed NLWs ineffective as an instrument to restore order, especially in confrontations were the stakes had risen high. The drop in their effectiveness was accelerated by the proliferation of techni- cal and tactical countermeasures across the conflict zone. In contrast to this trend, clashes that emerged out of a desire amongst target complexes for entertainment and ‘sport’, would extinguish quickly after NLWs were used. Obviously, the extent to which pain and discomfort effect of NLWs were felt and resisted, was much dependent on the seriousness of the wider contextual factors that mobilized the target complex into engagement of the authorities and their subordinated user forces.

Other than in Northern Ireland and Iraq detention camps, the use of NLWs in Afghanistan/ Uruzgan is much less determined by recurrent engagement patterns. In contrast with these many-on-many ‘crowded’ scenarios and contexts in the former two cases, stand the few-on- few or ‘individual’ scenarios and contexts in the Afghanistan/ Uruzgan case. From the target complex’s perspective, the confrontations with the user complex involve ‘meeting’ rather than ‘seeking’ events: they are mostly coincidental, not intentional or anticipated. As a result, the course of the engagement tends to be much more governed by contextual factors that re- side at the local technical/ tactical level rather than influenced by external issues at the higher level. Hence, the applicability and effect of the non-lethal weapon & technology deployed seems to be predominantly depending on the dynamics of the meeting engagement itself. External factors, related to the local context, can be at work to influence both the user and target complex. For instance, the level of the local hostile threat perceived by the user forces may vary on very short term, as is the target population’s perception of the user force.

The element of uncertainty and unpredictability and surprise that dominates the meeting engagements, can be considered as manifestations of a phenomenon called ‘friction in warfare’. The term was introduced in the early 19th century by the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, and implies that friction is the only concept that distinguishes real warfare from warfare on paper.18 Friction is the accumulation of many difficulties that one encounters that are to a large extent unconceivable, unless one experiences war or conflict. At the micro-level the friction of warfare pushes the user forces to make split-second decisions between ‘us or them’. It is a permanent dilemma plaguing the user forces

18 The notion ‘friction in warfare’ has been addressed more extensively in Chapter 2, p. 31. 145 when applying their RoEs, in which the use of NLWs is incorporated.19 As to the user com- plex force protection is usually imperative, the availability, as well as the employment of the non-lethal weapon & technology, may be counterproductive, as it complicates the decision making process and leads to wrongful judgment under time pressure.

NLW performance is intentionally degenerated

While degenerated use of NLWs may result from mechanisms emerging from stress and the pressure cooker effect, situations occurred in which NLWs were intentionally used in a non- regular or degenerated use. Such incidents took place in Northern Ireland, where civilians have been killed by BRs that where aimed at vulnerable parts of the body, or fired from very short distance.20 Non-permissive uses of NLWs, in particular kinetic NLWs, have been found in Iraq detention centers as well. It is difficult to determine to what extent user forces intenti- onally apply NLWs irregularly or not. The operational context shapes a grey zone in which the imperative of self-defense can hardly be distinguished from unnecessary and excessive harm. NLWs have been used as instruments of punishment and retribution for negative outcomes of previous events or confrontations to the user forces, as the Northern Ireland case demon- strates.21 A similar observation has been made in 2011, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Egypt.22 Lack of discipline and training, and insufficiently restrictive instructions and RoEs for user forces can contribute to the probability of such wrong uses to occur. It is an inherent problematic and risk of many types of NLW weapon & technologies that carry the potential for harmful and even lethal use, when specified safety margins are ignored.

Conceiving an NLW counterfactual

Notwithstanding the tendency that NLWs become susceptible to mechanisms mitigating their effect, induced by the wider context of the conflict, it is worthwhile to consider the counterfactual, i.e. the way scenarios would have evolved without the availability and de- ployment of NLWs, or alternatively, when governed by a fundamentally different operational context.

It is likely that, given the preparedness of target communities to engage the user force with fierce, the latter would ultimately be ordered to apply force to stop the violence and for self defence, which. in absence of NLWs, would necessarily be lethal force. While lethal force may to some extent be applied non-lethally, the aggressive posture of highly motivated protestors and rioters would inevitably lead to casualties amongst them, as Bloody Friday and a number of incidents in Iraqi detention centers have witnessed. The political ramifications of casualties caused by a force using lethal fire have a long half-life time, as history tells.23

19 For a more extensive discussion of the dilemma’s facing ISAF forces in Afghanistan, see Chapter 5, pp. 109-10. 20 See Chapter 3. 21 Both CS and BRs have been used consciously with that intent. See Chapter 3. 22 In November 2011, Protestors in Cairo were killed as a consequence of asphyxiation by particular types of tear gas, and others blinded or otherwise injured by rubber bullets intentially fired at the head and neck. Human Rights Watch: ‘Egypt: Protesters’ Blood on the Military Leadership’s Hands’. At: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/22/egypt-protesters-blood-military-leadership-s-hands. Accessed on 12 February 2012. 23 The inquiries into Bloody Sunday in Londonderry, on 30 January 1972, when 13 civilians where killed by security forces, 146 have been ongoing for almost four decades. Saville report, 15 June 2010. How may a favorable operational context be shaped, in order to provide for conditions under which the application of NLWs would come closer to what was initially intended? As many factors are simultaneously and interactively at play that are responsible for shaping the con- text, it is important to identify those factors that are found to be dominant in this respect. Two have appeared to be particularly significant.

One appears to be political, namely the existence of a widely agreed political end state of a conflict. This has been found in Northern Ireland, comparing the situation before and after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, and also in Iraq, after the shift in US detainee policy from an intelligence oriented and indiscriminate approach towards a hearts and minds approach, offering detainees fair treatment and outlook towards their release and reintegration. The clashes between the user complex and the target complex appeared to be less massive, less violent, less harmful to target populations and better to manage by the former after narro- wing the political gap.

A second factor relates to the user complex, partly in combination with the weapon & tech- nology complex. Preparing the user force more specifically and realistically to the conflict or setting where it is going to be deployed, helps to increase their capability to fine tune their physical and non-physical responses, including communication, vis-à-vis the target complex. Deepening cultural awareness and understanding the ‘couleur locale’ of the people amongst which the user complex is going to be deployed, is a pre-condition to understand their res- ponses to their EoF procedures.24

A third factor involves the performance of the user complex in relation to the weapon & tech- nology complex. As Northern Ireland has shown, sharper guidelines on NLW use and more reliable NLW technical performance reduce the probability of wrong and harmful NLW ef- fects, thereby better meeting the promises of non-lethality these weapons offer. Some results in this respect have been found in the Iraqi detention centers and, to a lesser extent, can be related to the checkpoints in Uruzgan.

The factors of influence addressed in this section, in particular those regarding the mutual perceptions and attitudes between the user complex and target complex, affected the delicate balance during a stand-off between escalation and de-escalation of violence. The next section focuses on the phenomena at work at the political strategic level and their implications for the use of NLWs and their effects on the ground.

24 The significance of the user force’s understanding of the people’s culture and habits in the area of operation is illustrated by the violence erupting from an incident in Baghran, Afghanistan in February 2012, when several copies of the Koran had –unintentionally- been burned by US military personnel. At: http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf- releases/isaf-commander-issues-directive-on-handling-of-religious-materials.html. Accessed on 15 May 2012.

147 The politico-strategic level

While NLWs are to achieve political-strategic objectives through the ways in which they work out at the tactical level, the preceding chapters have, ironically, shown that events at the political-strategic level may have crucial influence over the impact of NLWs. Such events may concern both actions from the political authorities governing the conflict, and from political and strategic stakeholders and interest groups in the wider international community.

At this highest level policies and strategies are formulated, decisions are made and guidelines issued, that clearly have implications for the actors on the ground, including the user forces as well as the target communities. If such policies, or rather, in some cases, lack of change in ruling policy, interfered with the interest of the target population, they met disapproval that found its expression in protest and physical resistance at the local level. While these tactical level responses were triggered by target community’s appreciations of politico-strategic level developments in both the Northern Ireland and Iraq detention centers case, it was less obvious in the Afghanistan/Uruzgan case. The much stronger galvanizing effect in the former two cases can be attributed to the fact that the target community was physically more con- centrated and interconnected, either because of clustering as a consequence of urbanization, or by forced concentration in a confined space. In contrast, in Uruzgan, predominantly a rural environment, the target community was much more scattered and much less linked to the central authority in the conflict. Hence, the impact of the highest authorities on develop- ments at the local tactical level was much less compared to the other two conflict cases.

The norms by which the user forces operate, provide the rationale underlying the deployment of NLWs, namely the prevention of civilian casualties, in support of the politico-strategic level ‘hearts and minds’ strategy. In cases with an insurgency going on, this norm is challenged by militant opponents, who, by launching terror acts and conducting IW, shape an atmosphere of lethal threat, fear and uncertainty. This operational context tends to prevent the user force from enhancing security and control, the conditions favoring the avoidance of innocent casualties. Proceeding along irregular and unpredictable patterns, insurgents add to the ‘friction in warfare’ facing the user forces. This friction thus becomes a weapon to the insur- gency in the political contest with the intervention coalition over the hearts and minds. The friction adds to the ‘us or them’ dilemma to user forces, which on the one hand are tasked to implement the overarching mission strategy of winning the hearts and minds in the conflict region, while on the other are expected to protect their own lives, for the sake of maintaining political support at home for the intervention.25 While NLW deployment is conceived as an instrument to de-conflict the ‘us or them’ dilemma, the friction induced by the insurgents creates an operational context that is less permissive for NLWs to serve that role.

25 In Afghanistan, the dilemma posed a fundamental problem at the strategic level. US General Stanley McChrystal (US Marines Corps), ISAF Commander until June 2010, stressed the importance of the hearts and minds approach over the force protection imperative. This position was vehemently disputed during his tenure, and was one of the reasons he left his position within less than a year. His successor, US General Petraeus (US Army), diplomatically redressed the 148 balance. See Chapter 5. A key role in the linkage between the political level on the one hand and the tactical level NLW events on the other, were played by the media and modern communication infrastruc- ture. Real time information dissemination of decisions and declarations at the political strategic level could therefore trigger short time responses at the local physical level that, depending on the content of the political message received, defined the approach during confrontations with the user force, including the response to NLW use. To illustrate, the political decision of approval of a contested Orange march to pass close to a Catholic neigh- borhood not only immediately infuriated and mobilized large number of the target commu- nity from the city involved, but also in wider parts of Northern Ireland. The decision by the Coalition Government in Iraq that detainees were to be kept in internment for an indefinite time, caused desperation amongst detainees and raised their motivation to riot against the user forces, as the only possible expression of their discontent and anger. This also triggered a rise in their level of pain acceptance against NLWs.

The relevance of the political and strategic situation for the course of physical confrontati- ons at the tactical level also becomes apparent when comparing the situation on the ground before and after a significant change in strategic policy and its implementation. Both the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland and the incorporation of detainee populations in the hearts and minds approach in Iraq marked an important shift in the level, scale and persistence of violent opposition vis-à-vis the user force. With an agreed or acceptable end in sight, the pressure cooker was decompressed, and the negative vicious circle of violence was broken. Violent confrontations were political largely defused, and the use of NLWs was obviously understood and accepted as a necessary evil to manage public order, leaving much less hard feelings behind. Obviously, NLWs work best when there is least at stake!

Media would also spread information about casualties amongst the target groups, in par- ticular when caused by NLWs. The media could magnify the news value by capitalizing the infliction of casualties by NLWs, as the use of NLWs presumes that no casualties at all should be caused by such weapons. This contrasts with incidents where the use of lethal force is authorized, implying that circumstances were such that lethal fire was legitimized. Hence, casualties caused by NLWs suggest innocence of the victims, thus shaping and disseminating a negative image of the user forces for abusing their power. At the same time, NLW are depic- ted as symbols of repression, far from the original intent of their purpose and deployment. The way NLWs were used during urban clashes in the Arab Spring between user forces and target populations, reinforced this negative reputation. Much depends on the presence of the capability to disseminate information of events, which sharply increases with the emergence of social media, but was largely absent in closed scenarios such as detention centers. Obvi- ously, a dialectic between the political and tactical level is at work that will be more closely addressed.

The political level / tactical level dialectic

At the political level mission accomplishment strategies call for instruments at the tactical level compatible with the spirit and objectives of the military mission. It means the balanced use of force, with a measured application of armed force. In situations where civilians are involved, compliance should be accomplished without causing harm. NLWs are considered

149 and assigned as appropriate instruments for that task: they are expected to enable humane military operations and performance, in support of the hearts and minds strategy. The im- plementation and purpose of NLWs is publicly announced: intentions and expectations are declared explicitly. As in real world situations NLW deployment is fraught with problems related to the operational context, the level of control over NLW effects is much less than what is militarily and politically desired. Most soldiers are far from perfect in dealing with the dynamics and uncertainty on the ground. Moreover, the political rationale for NLW deployment is counter- acted and undermined by opponents who force the military user into the lethal part of the spectrum of violence, thus denying the non-lethal intent. But progress in hearts and minds efforts at the tactical level, conversely and ironically, may under circumstances also be affected by trends and events at politico-strategic level. If these trends have the effect of antagonizing user forces and target populations, the ensuing operational context will frustrate the outcome of NLW deployment as politically intended and expected. Hence, the political level rationale of NLW deployment becomes annihilated at the tactical level if particular developments at the political level meet disapproval and trig- ger agitation on the ground. Obviously, with regard to the non-lethality incentive, a dialectic is at work between the political and tactical level. This dialectic is fueled when operational context mechanisms as friction and confusion produce fatal errors, and further amplified by the media connectivity between the tactical and political level. The tragedy is that the media are inclined to report only the mishaps (innocent casualties, despite or even caused by NLWs), while refraining from spreading good news about NLWs performing ‘normal’ as expected and announced: good news is “bad” news. Hence, if NLWs perform badly, their deployment backfires at the political level. If, howe- ver, the tactical/political dialectic link is weakened or cut through flaws in reporting along the chain of command or in public information, chances of optimal NLW increase. The flip side of this condition is the growing risk of abuse due to the tactical isolation of physical engagements, as accountability mechanisms would be dysfunctional, and only have a delayed political impact at best. In the latter case, abuse will surface sooner or later, and will give NLWs a bad reputation after all.

In coping with the dialectic, which in essence is a product of Rupert Smith’s (2006) ‘war amongst the people’ paradigm, some planners and developers search for non-lethal techno- logical options to physically disengage the user complex from the target complex. The ADS, with its long range and semi-area denial capability, is the ultimate material expression of this quest. Apart from the technical and tactical level operational contextual complications for this weapon & technology identified in this study, the technology fixed approach ignores that disengaging the user force from the target population is at odds with the hearts and minds approach. This reflects another dialectic, namely that between (community) policing and military operations.

150 Although Krulak invented the 3-block soldier to conceptualize the different manifestations of a military professional in a contemporary conflict setting,26 the reality check laid down in this study may refute the feasibility and existence of such a multi-tasking military chameleon.

Validating the claims and counter-arguments in the NLW debate against the DTA results

In this section, the set of claims and counter-arguments identified from the NLW debate in Chapter 1 will be matched and validated against the aggregated findings from the three research cases as presented and discussed in the previous section(s) of this chapter. The vali- dations have been arranged under the three complexes that frame the DTA model, and under the strategy effect of NLW employment respectively.

Claims related to Non-Lethal Weapons & Technology

Claims by the technological optimists (e.g. Morris and Morris 1991; Gompert et al. 2009; Fo- ster 2010):

• NLWs enable casualty-free military intervention

• The uncertainties encountered in real world scenarios can be mitigated and compen- sated by technological innovations

Claims from the sceptics (e.g. Grin 2000; Rappert 2003; Koplow 2006):

• In real world deployments NLWs may not perform as designed for, and may even malfunction

• The situational context in which an NLW is deployed influences its effect

The expectations of NLWs to enable ‘bloodless war’ or ‘war without casualties’ have been demonstrated to be far from realistic. Operational circumstances in real world contexts have in many cases denied the use of NLWs for the intended effect, as such conditions prevented accurate aiming of directional NLWs or weakened the intensity of the effect (Ch.6, pp.132-4). Most NLWs examined appear to be considerably susceptible to one or more types of adverse physical circumstances such as darkness, fog, humidity, wind and bright sunlight, interrup- ted lines-of-sight. Even worse, NLWs caused casualities or severe injuries, as has in particular been found for BRs (Ch.6, p.130). Hence, rather than offering compensation for uncertainties as unanticipated weather conditions in real world scenarios, performance of NLWs tends to be degraded by these circumstances. Assumptions on the potential of innovative NLW-concepts such as the ADS to overcome these problems so far have not been proven successful. Regarding variability in human behavioural response, no straightforward answer can be given about the potential of NLWs, even upgraded ones, to compensate for the uncertainties in this realm, without taking

26 See Krulak, C. (1999) The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, in: Marines Magazine (January Issue). At: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm. Accessed at 15 May 2012. 151 the full context of the specific operational situations into account. Moreover, it has been de- monstrated that the introduction of NLWs in itself may compound uncertainty, for instance by inducing a sudden change of the target population’s perception of the user force. Ultima- tely, their deployment may even end up to be counterproductive (Ch.6, pp.141-2). As the context of the situation appears to be of strong influence on the NLW effect, coping with uncertainty rather calls for a better understanding of the context, including the ‘couleur locale’, than by merely relying on injection of NLW ‘solutions’ (Ch.6, p.147). A combined ap- proach of non-violent measures and NLW deployment is likely to enhance the acceptability of the use of NLWs.

Claims related to NLW target groups

Claim from the careful supporters (e.g. Leech 2002; Alexander 2003):

• NLWs may help discriminate between irregular militants and innocents within the target population, as they will respond differently to the NLW effect.

Claim from the sceptics (e.g. Pittman 2005; Koplow 2006):

• The target population may respond in a different manner than expected in the design and purpose of the NLW.

The underlying assumption here is that the compellent effect of NLW by inflicting pain or severe discomfort would enforce compliance amongst the normal, non-violent population from the motivated, resisting and militant elements. It has been found that in ‘meeting engements’ such as road blocks, the scenario is prepared, hence largely manageable. The use of NLWs to ‘interrogate the intent and identity’ of the target person(s), thus supporting the discrimination between benign and malign individuals, is relatively effective (Ch. 6, p.143). It is important that in this situation the target population is unprepared, and the initiative in the confrontation is with the military forces. Furthermore, the innocent target individuals and the hostile ones are largely unconnected from eachother. Yet, in more complex and to the military forces less unpreparable scenarios such as riots, the ‘seeking events’, the utility of NLW for discriminative purposes is problematic. The use of non-discriminative NLW such as CS against crowds in which hostile elements are inter- mingled, has the potential to blur the distinction between militants and innocents, as mem- bers of the latter group may become motivated to support or join the former, which as occur- red in the Nothern Ireland case (Ch. 6, p.144-6). Such mechanisms have also been provoked with directional NLWs, as the use of BRs in the Iraq detention centres has demonstrated, due to the ‘pressure cooker’ effect resulting from the repetitive and protracted engagement of target populations (Ch.6, pp.135-6). Counteractions against the use and effect of NLWs have been found to be wide-ranging, and have been applied in all seeking event scenarios considered in this study. Every NLW as- sessed in this study is susceptible to countermeasures, either of tactical nature, or as techni- cal measure, or in combination (Ch.6, pp.134-6). Counteractions tended to become progres- sively effective after repetitive exposure to the NLW effect, which was an important factor in the protracted cases in Northern Ireland and in the Iraqi detainee centres (Ch. 6, p.135).While the NLW effect does not change significantly over time, motivated target populations ma- 152 naged to invent and proliferate increasingly effective countermeasures.The non-cooperative behaviour of target populations is largely motivated by contextual factors as dissatisfaction with the political situation (Ch.6, p.136 and p.144). Furthermore, the target populations’ perceptions of the military forces using NLWs is another determining factor in obstructive be- haviour, and are also correlated with and informed by previous confrontations (Ch. 6, p.141). Over time, combinations of behavioural and technical countermeasures tend to be increasin- gly effective to close the window of regular and permissible use of the NLW, in particular in protracted conflict settings (Ch.6, pp.138-40). Yet, in protracted conflicts, the flip side of the coin is the possibility and application of direct verbal communication and negotiation between the military forces and the target population. This may have a mitigating effect on the opposing behaviour from the target population, which the continued use of NLWs would fail to achieve (Ch.6, p.141).

Claims related to military users of NLWs

Claim from the careful supporters (e.g. Bunker 1997):

• Doctrinal and organizational adjustments are needed to effectively incorporate NLWs in military organizations.

Claims from the sceptics (e.g. Siniscalchi 1998; Coppernoll 1999):

• The attitude, preparedness and guidance of the user are more important for the NLW effect than the technology itself

• The user of the NLW may not perform as directed and expected.

The claim and counter-arguments made regarding the military user force are compatible. Yet, although doctrine and organizational adaptations are a pre-condition to adopt NLWs, further specification in terms of dedicated guidance and instructions are required. Dedicated and realistic pre-deployment NLW training have been proven to be pre-conditional for the military user to employ the NLW as intended (Ch.6, p.138 and p.147). RoEs are to provide for specific fine-tuning of the military user’s posture with respect to the specific conditions in the deployment area. These necessary conditions of preparedness were not always met in the cases considered in this study (Ch.6, p.138). Irrespective the level of preparedness of the military user force, and the appropriateness of guidance, and the RoEs, operational circumstances had an important impact on the extent to which the forces correctly applied the NLWs. In situations where countermeasures had become so effective that regular use of the NLW no longer produced the desired effect, user forces became inclined to employ the NLW beyond the pre-set safety margins (Ch.6, pp.138-9). The wrongful use of NLWs could also be triggered by intentional disregard of the RoE, in cases

153 where the user forces’ developed a negative attitude towards the target population, leading to a disregard of the human rights and safety of the target population (Ch.6, pp.138-40). Even stronger, in the CI context, insurgents sought to provoke the military forces into de- cision dilemmas between their own safety and that of the target population. This phenome- non has been found in all three case-studies. The awareness of military forces of the continu- ous presence of lethal threat creates conditions and dynamics that are less permissive to NLW employment, thereby jeopardizing the security of the potentially innocent target population. Insurgents thus induce ‘friction in warfare’ facing the user forces with unpredictability of threats, which in effect serves as a weapon to heat up the ‘us or them’ dilemma of the user force. (Ch.6, p.148).

Claims related to the strategic effect of NLW application

Claim from the careful supporters (Fenton 1999; Leech 2000, Gompert et al. 2009):

• NLWs have positive strategic implications, either in term of supporting a hearts and minds approach, or by immediate strategic effects of -future- NLWs.

Claim from the sceptics (e.g. Grin 2000; Pittman 2005):

• Overly optimistic expectations of the potential of NLW concepts and technologies are illusive and potentially counterproductive.

It has been demonstrated, that in a considerable number of situations of NLW use examined in this study, the target population does not comply with the objective that the intervention forces were tasked to achieve. The pre-dominant motivation of target populations for non- cooperative behaviour was their discontent with their political and societal status and with the lack of perspective on improvement of their political situation. The outcome of tactical level deployment of NLW was influenced by events and developments related to the politico- strategic level communicated across the conflict zone by the media and alternative sources of information, as has become evident in the Northern Ireland and Iraq cases.(Ch.6, pp.148-9). While the politico-strategic level rationale of employing NLWs is to prevent innocent casualties to win the hearts and minds of the local population, in reality a dialectic exists between the political and tactical level. The mere fact that intervention forces actually use ar- med force, irrespective their non-lethal properties and intent, against the target population, in itself is counterproductive to a hearts and minds approach (Ch.6, p.150). The counterpro- ductive effect is compounded when insurgents push the military forces into an ‘us-or-them’ dilemma, and subsequently exploit accidental innocent casualties by spreading the news on such mistakes (Ch.6, p.150). Hence, winning the hearts and minds of the local population is subject of a struggle between multiple actors, rather than a one-side strategy of the interven- tion forces, promoted by the deployment of advanced NLWs to prevent innocent casualties. It is a contest with the insurgents and dissatisfied population who, although in different levels of intenstity, oppose the actions of the intervention forces, including their effort to mitigate violence by the deployment of NLWs.

154 Revisiting expectations from an operational outcome perspective

The findings from the validation of the claims in the previous section regarding the military and political effects and implications of NLW deployment will now be related to the two cen- tral research questions of this study.

• to what extent do real world operational circumstances affect NLW mission performance and effect?

The DTA framework served to analyze the real world use of NLWs, within the specific opera- tional context and against the political backdrop of the situation where they were deployed. It has become apparent that the generalistic nature of the claims of the technological optimists prevented them from being instrumental to a DTA approach using real world case studies of NLW employment. Their claims largely ignore the fact that NLWs are tactical level capabili- ties that are used to produce direct tactical level effects, with the intent to indirectly support political level objectives. It is therefore the tactical level at which the analysis needs to focus. The claims from the careful supporters and the sceptics reflect the significance of the tactical level phenomena that influence the outcome of NLW deployment. By validating the claims from these groups, some of the assumptions underlying the claims from the technological optimists group have been tackled, thereby serving to validate the optimists’ claims in an informed manner.

The operational cases have made clear that many situational circumstances interfere with the original aim of deployment of NLWs, which is the use of minimal force to prevent innocent casualties on the one hand and protect own forces on the other. The interactive mechanisms between the forces using the NLWs to keep their operational area of influence under control, and the groups and individuals that were to be submitted to the control conditions, and the performance of the non-lethal weapon and technology, tended to reduce the NLW effectiven- ess and, ultimately, compromised the utility of NLWs to support the control task. The inter- actions also appeared to be strongly influenced by the political situation: in case of confron- tation (‘seeking’) events, the use of NLWs by security forces became counterproductive for achieving compliance. Political imbalances created a permanent climate of discontent and at times armed resistance amongst large parts of target communities that could not be resolved by NLWs. At best, NLWs could merely contain the violence to a certain level, but at the cost of a widening gap between the security forces and the targeted community.

The narrowing window of NLW effectiveness, caused by the posture and counteraction of target populations, also pushed the user to apply NLWs beyond the non-lethal mode, under the panacea of legitimized and authorized force protection. While the feedback loop of ope- rational experiences into technological innovations and reviewed RoEs provided for slightly better results for some of the NLWs, these were not as decisive and revolutionary as to meet the initial expectations of their effect.

155 In ‘meeting engagement’ scenarios, other than the ‘seeking engagement’ (crowd) scenarios, the element of uncertainty about a target’s intent also played a key role. The underlying ratio- nale to deal with uncertainty is gaining (decision) time by enlarging the NLW range, in order to enable the identification the intent of the unknown target individual. However, similar as with the seeking engagement scenarios, the situational context frequently denies NLW engagement opportunities that optimally fit the NLW design characteristics. The analysis has demonstrated, that the more the user was able to reduce uncertainty by defining, preparing and managing the operational scenario in which the NLW was deployed, the more the inten- ded effect of the NLW could be attained.

• given the answer to the previous question, what may we say on the degree at which NLW use meets the expectations that underlie current strategic frameworks?

In the cases considered in this study, the strategic frameworks are relying on the winning of the hearts and minds of the local population. The strategic imperative to accomplish this is to prevent excessive harm and casualties amongst the population during military intervention operations, and the deployment and application of NLWs is expected to meet that require- ment.

Moreover, the study has demonstrated, that the extent to which the deployment and use of NLWs is supportive to winning the population’s hearts and minds decisively hinges on the po- litical perspective offered to the population. Without an acceptable political perspective for the target community, NLWs are not perceived as an expression of a benign hearts and minds approach. Rather, NLWs become increasingly viewed as instruments of repression, aggra- vated when declining physical effectiveness of NLWs result in large scale protracted battles. Even under conditions of optimal technical performance and use, NLWs lack strategic yield to substitute for the absence of a desired politico-strategic end state. NLWs appear to perform optimally under the existence of such a broadly agreed or projected political end state.

Recommendations and outlook

Recommendations

R&D efforts on NLWs have predominantly been focused on the development and testing of novel NLWs and innovations in existing NLW concepts. However, merely concentrating on the precision of the technical performance of NLW ignores the impact of many other factors influencing NLW performance. As this study has endeavored to point out, the collection and analysis of data from real world uses of NLWs is of key importance to provide a more tho- rough assessment of NLW performance. Analogously to law enforcement organizations, the military establishment should therefore put more effort in the detailed analysis and evalua- tion of the performance of NLW used by military forces in real world events.

156 A deeper analysis of NLW performance in real world operational cases could benefit from the DTA approach applied in this study. A more extensive collection of data to feed the DTA model components would enhance the quality and validity of the findings.

Given the susceptibility of NLW performance to the operational context of its deployment, and in particular the intentional denial of NLW effects by target complexes, a closer look into the operational context is required in order to reduce the probability that NLW employment becomes counterproductive. The more accurate the situational picture is, the better the mili- tary user force can assess the effect the use of NLW will produce.

The risk of performance degradation of NLWs due to countermeasures may be reduced by pre- senting target individuals or populations with more complexity by applying multiple types of NLWs simultaneously. Such an approach could be embedded in a non-lethal manoeuver concept, including the employment of airborne NLW capabilities.

To the extent that forces perform in a well-restrained, de-escalating and just way, more inten- sified public information campaigns, for instance by using social media, might support the target population’s perception of the forces, thus enhancing the acceptance of the employ- ment of NLWs.

Outlook

The military employment of NLWs must be contextualized in a type of military force deploy- ment. It is intended to deal with non-combatants, and to deliver precision effects. Given the current emergence of technological advances, more precise effects will be feasible, using novel system concepts. The introduction of invisible effects, like the MMW energy delivered by the ADS, is likely to be the opening of a new era. The fielding of microsystems to deliver dedicated and invisible effects against individuals has the potential to make the monitoring of military actions an increasingly challenging task. Effects may become more intrusive to the human body, yet less visible to observers and to society in general, including the media.

The emergence of capabilities fusing ‘micronization’ with unmanned effect delivery will in- troduce new forms of warfare. They will further stretch the spectrum of military options and coexist with current modes of warfare. As these new options increasingly draw from civilian technologies it is conceivable that they will become available to irregular military actors as well. They will provide the empowered individual with still more options. The risk of this type of proliferation increases with the relatively low cost of small system concepts. Similar as with various types of NLWs, they will become available through the internet. Hence it is important to assess the wider implications of such novel concepts before fielding and marke- ting them. DTA methods may be further tailored to support such assessments.

157 The growing probability of warfare to become more urban oriented will make military opera- tions more delicate and complex. On the target side the distinction between combatants and non-combatants will further blurred, while on the user side the divide line between policing and military action will be more diffuse as well. The vulnerabilities inherent to current and future urban infrastructure will require more discriminative and restrictive operational capa- bilities to apply in mega cities.

The military applicability of technology to avoid human casualties was the central theme of this study. Although many challenges in this area are still unresolved, it will be complemen- ted by the avoidance of environmental damage, as human security will increasingly depend on the uninterrupted availability of critical services and connectivity provided by the urban infrastructure. In a quickly urbanizing world Sun Tzu’s idealistic approach to warfare will become a conditio sine qua non to prevent Von Clausewitz’s friction in war to become apoca- lyptic.

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159 160 Appendix Interviews, conversations and correspondence with subject matter experts 162 Chapter 2

Alexander, John, colonel (retired) US Army, private conversation (Ettlingen, 23 May 2007).

Chapter 3

Barnes, Mickey, major (retired) UK Army, interview by the author (Reading, 16 December 2008).

Benest, David, colonel UK Army, interview by the author (Shrivenham, 18 December 2008).

Burrows, Colin, chief superintendent (retired) Northern Ireland Police, written response to ques- tionnaire (19 April 2010).

Jelf, Mike, lieutenant colonel (retired) UK Army, interview by the author (Warminster, 13 April 2010).

Longland, Tom, brigadier (retired) UK Army, interview by the author (Shrivenham, 15 December 2008).

O’Connor, Paul, Pat Finucane Centre, Londonderry, private conversation (Londonderry, 18 Fe- bruary 2010).

Schofield, Philip, lieutenant colonel (retired) UK Army, interview by the author (Warminster, 13 April 2010).

Wilson, John, colonel (retired) UK Army, interview by the author (Warminster, 16 December 2008).

Chapter 4

Alexander, John, colonel (retired) US Army, private conversation (Ettlingen, 23 May 2007).

Hussey, John, colonel, US Military Police commander, interview by the author (New City, 12 No- vember 2009).

Hussey, John, colonel, US Military Police commander, telephone conversation (14 November 2011).

US Military Police commanding officer in Abu Ghraib in 2005 and in Camp Bucca in 2007, telephone interview by the author (30 July 2009).

US Air Force Security Forces commander who was deployed in Camp Bucca in 2007, interview by the author (Quantico, 9 November 2009).

US Military Police Captain who was deployed in Camp Bucca in 2003, interview by the author (Fort Leonard Wood, 27 October 2009).

US Military Police Sergeant who was deployed in Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca in 2004, interview by the author (Fort Leonard Wood, 27 and 28 October 2009). 163 Chapter 5

Azizzada, Shakila, cultural adviser to Dutch ISAF forces in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009, interview by the author (Nieuwegein, 21 April 2011).

Bartis, Rick, lieutenant colonel (retired) US Navy, American Systems Contractor, USCENT- COM’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Liaison Office, telephone conversation (20 October 2010).

Bartis, Rick, lieutenant colonel (retired) US Navy, American Systems Contractor, USCENT- COM’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Liaison Office, telephone conversation (13 January 2011).

Hamers, Larry, major Royal Netherlands Army, telephone interview by the author (17 April 2011).

Ferwerda, Dirk, 1st lieutenant Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed to Uruzgan as a platoon commander between July 2009 and November 2009, interview by the author (Oirschot, 3 February 2011).

Ferwerda, Dirk, 1st lieutenant Royal Netherlands Army, interview by the author (Oirschot, 5 April 2011).

Griensven, Hans van, colonel Royal Netherlands Army, deployed to Uruzgan as Commander Task Force Uruzgan between January 2007 and August 2007, interview by the author (Oirschot, 26 February 2008).

Haas, Sven van der, 1st lieutenant Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed to Uruzgan as a platoon commander between July 2009 and November 2009, interview by the author (Oirschot, 28 April 2011).

Hazelbag, Lenny, major Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed to Uruzgan as an in- fantery platoon commander between November 2006 and April 2007, interview by the author (Breda, 25 February 2008).

Kemerink op Schiphorst, Anne, 1LNT Netherlands Marine Corps, who was deployed as a pla- toon commander to Uruzgan between March and June 2010, interview by the author (Doorn, 23 May 2011).

Loon, Kevin van, 1st lieutenant Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed as a platoon com- mander to Uruzgan between March 2010 and September 2010, interview by the author (Oirschot, 17 February 2011).

Loon, Kevin van, 1st lieutenant Royal Netherlands Army, interview by the author (Oirschot, 12 April 2011).

Luit, Marcel van, lieutenant colonel Royal Netherlands Army, Army Ground Manoeuvre Knowledge Centre, interview by the author (Amersfoort, 26 October 2010).

Osborne, Martin, lieutenant colonel (retired) UK Army, UK Army Warfare Development Cen- tre, written correspondence (21 January 2011).

164 Pasman, Tom, 1st lieutenant Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed as a platoon com- mander to Uruzgan between March 2010 and July 2010, interview by the author (Oirschot, 12 April 2011).

Paulissen, Pascal, senior scientist at TNO Defence and Security Laboratory, The Hague, telep- hone conversation (30 June 2011).

Roelen, Niels, major Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed as a company commander to Uruzgan between January and July 2007, interview by the author (Oirschot, 23 July 2009).

Ros, Tim, Captain Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed to Uruzgan as a legal adviser between January and July 2010, interview by the author (Breda, 24 January 2011).

Steehouwer, Rob, Captain Royal Netherlands Army, who was deployed as platoon commander to Uruzgan between November 2006 and January 2007 and dpty company commander bet- ween August 2008 and December 2008, interview by the author (Oirschot, 3 February 2011).

Steehouwer, Rob, Captain Royal Netherlands Army, interview by the author (Amersfoort, 11 April 2011).

Tempelaars, Carlo, major Royal Netherlands Army, deployed to Uruzgan as a company com- mander between July 2006 and January 2007, interview by the author (Oirschot, 25 May 2007).

Various staff officers at the US Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center (ANSEC), private conversations (Fort Leonard Wood, 27 October 2009). Various staff officers at the US DOD Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JN- LWD), private conversations (Quantico, 9 November 2009.

165 166