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Iran's Nuclear Program, 1979-2015: a Study in Nuclear Proliferation and Rollback Farhad Rezaei Faculty of Arts and Social

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Iran's Nuclear Program, 1979-2015: a Study in Nuclear Proliferation and Rollback Farhad Rezaei Faculty of Arts and Social IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, 1979-2015: A STUDY IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ROLLBACK FARHAD REZAEI FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR 2016 IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, 1979-2015: A STUDY IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ROLLBACK FARHAD REZAEI THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR 2016 UNIVERSITI MALAYA ORIGINAL LITERARY WORK DECLARATION Name of Candidate: Farhad Rezaei Registration/Matric No: AHA 120010 Name of Degree: Ph.D. Title of Project Paper/Research Report/Dissertation/Thesis (“this Work”): Iran’s Nuclear Program, 1979-2015: A Study in Nuclear Proliferation and Rollback Field of Study: International and Strategic Studies I do solemnly and sincerely declare that: (1) I am the sole author/writer of this Work; (2) This Work is original; (3) Any use of any work in which copyright exists was done by way of fair dealing and for permitted purposes and any excerpt or extract from, or reference to or reproduction of any copyright work has been disclosed expressly and sufficiently and the title of the Work and its authorship have been acknowledged in this Work; (4) I do not have any actual knowledge nor do I ought reasonably to know that the making of this work constitutes an infringement of any copyright work; (5) I hereby assign all and every rights in the copyright to this Work to the University of Malaya (“UM”), who henceforth shall be owner of the copyright in this Work and that any reproduction or use in any form or by any means whatsoever is prohibited without the written consent of UM having been first had and obtained; (6) I am fully aware that if in the course of making this Work I have infringed any copyright whether intentionally or otherwise, I may be subject to legal action or any other action as may be determined by UM. Candidate’s Signature Date 25-Jan-2015 Subscribed and solemnly declared before, Witness’s Signature Date Name: Designation: ABSTRACT This study constitutes the first full and systematic account of Iran’s nuclear program since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 analyzed within the context of proliferation, rollback and sanction theories. Extant literature suffers from polarization; some scholars embrace the neorealist postulation that proliferators are rational actors and, by extension, when overwhelmed by sanctions, they would respond in a rational way and embrace rollback. Others contend that neorealist rationality cannot be applied to new proliferators of the Second Nuclear Age, notably Iran. The goal of the study is to find out whether Iran fits the profile of a rational proliferator and as such, is likely to respond to sanctions in a rational way. Two questions central to this inquiry are: whether Iran followed the neorealist precepts of proliferation and whether the increasingly punitive sanctions imposed by the intentional community caused it to reevaluate the cost of the nuclear program. The detailed research based primarily on Farsi language sources indicates that Iran can be described as a rational proliferator; seared by the war with Iraq, its leaders decided that a nuclear capability would provide protection from predatory neighbors as well as shield it from the United States. The relative ease of access to nuclear technology and the weak penalties for proliferation reinforced Tehran’s conviction that the cost of running the program was low and manageable. When faced with harsh sanctions that increased the price tag of the nuclear program to a level deemed catastrophic to the economy, the regime embarked upon an unprecedented open debate on the cost-benefits of the program. The debate has been complicated by structural segmentation of the political system. But there is a growing recognition among key elites to embrace a rollback in order to obtain sanctions relief and indeed, reintegrate into the community of nations. iii ABSTRAK Kajian ini merupakan usaha pertama ke arah suata penjelasan sistematik yang pertama terhadap memahami program nuklear Iran sejak Revolusi Islam pada tahun 1979, yang dianalisiskan dalam konteks pertambahan dan unduran nuklear dan teori sanksi. Tinjuan keatas kajian lepas masih mengalami polarisasi; sebahagian golongan cerdik pandai menerima postulasi neorealist yang menyatakan pihak yang terlibat dalam meningkatkan penggunaan nuklear adalah pelakon rasional dan, selanjutnya apabila terdesak dengan sanksi, mereka akan bertindak balas dengan cara yang rasional dan menerima unduran nuklear. Yang lain berpendapat bahawa rasional ini neorealist tidak boleh digunakan untuk memahami pertambahan nuklear (proliferator) baru dalam Zaman Nuklear Kedua, terutamanya di Iran. Matlamat kajian ini adalah untuk mengetahui sama ada Iran sesuai dan berpadanan dengan profil proliferator rasional, dan mungkin bertindak, balas terhadap sanksi dengan cara yang rasional. Dua persoalan yang menjadi pokok kepada siasatan ini ialah: sama ada Iran mengikut persep neorealist pertambahan nuklear, dan sama ada sanksi punitif yang dikenakan oleh masyarakat antarabangsa akan menyebabkan ia menilai semula kos projek nuklear. Kajian terperinci adalah berdasarkan kepada sumber-sumber bahasa Farsi yang menunjukkan bahawa Iran boleh disifatkan sebagai proliferator rasional; yang disebabkan oleh perang dengan Iraq, pemimpinnya memutuskan bahawa senjata nuklear akan mempertahankannnya dari dimanasakan oleh jiran serta melindungi negara dari Amerika Syarikat. Akses kepada teknologi nuklear yang agak mudah itu dan tindakan punitif yang agak lemah terhadap proliferator memperkukuhkan lagi keyakinan Tehran bahawa kos pengendalian program tersebut adalah rendah dan terkawal. Apabila berhadapan dengan sanksi atau sekatan keras yang meningkatkan kos projek nuklear ke tahap yang dianggap boleh membawa bencana kepada ekonomi, rejim iv itu telah memulakan perdebatan terbuka yang luar biasa terhadap kos serta-manfaat projek berkenaan. Perbahasan menjadi rumit kerana segmentasi struktur sistem politik. Tetapi ada pengiktirafan yang kian meningkat di kelangan golongan elit utama untuk mengundur supaya menerima pelepasan dari sanksi/sekatan dan dengan itu sudah tentu dapat diintegrasikan kembali ke dalam komuniti negara-negara sedunia. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude and regards to my supervisor Associate Professor Dr. Jatswan Singh, for his exemplary guidance given by him throughout the course of this thesis shall carry me a long way in the journey of life on which I am about to embark. I am also grateful to Dato' Mohamad Bin Abu Bakar for his contribution and assistance. I would like to thank my wife Kate, who was always willing to help and give her best suggestions. It would have been a lonely lab without her. She was always there cheering me up and stood by me through the good times and bad. Throughout this endeavor, my professional acquaintances, friends and family have supported and assisted me in a variety of ways. I am deeply indebted to all of them for their contributions in the making of this thesis. This thesis could not have been written without considerable support from these people. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT III ABSTRAK IV ACKNOWLEDGEMENT V TABLE OF CONTENTS VI LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS X CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 The puzzle of Iran’s Proliferation and Rollback 2 1.3 Research Questions 7 1.4 Research Objectives 7 1.5 Scope of the Study 8 1.6 Literature Review 9 1.6.1 Introduction 9 1.6.2 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Motivation For Proliferation and Rollback 9 1.6.3 International Sanctions 14 1.6.4 The Non-Unitary Actor: The Negotiated Political Order 29 1.7 Methodology and Sources 32 1.8 Contribution and Significance of the Study 34 1.9 Limitations of the Study 35 1.10 Structure of the Study 36 CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 38 2.1 International Relations Theories and Nuclear Proliferation 38 vii 2.1.1 Neorealism 42 2.2 Nuclear Rationality in the First Nuclear Age: The Emergence of the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) 46 Doctrine 2.3 The Second Nuclear Age: Proliferation and Nuclear Rollback 47 2.4 55 Nuclear Rationality in the Second Nuclear Age: Is MAD Dead? 2.5 Definition of Terms 60 CHAPTER 3 THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM 64 3.1 The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: The High Cost of Exporting the Revolution 64 3.2 Building a Respectable Façade: Completing the Shah’s Peaceful Nuclear Program 78 3.3 Conclusion 83 CHAPTER 4 RAFSANJANI’S NUCLEAR TAKE OFF 84 4.1 Hiding In Plain Sight: The Legitimate Infrastructure Of A Secret Program 84 4.2 Building Its Own Scientific Cadre: Iran As a Nuclear Science Beacon To The World? 95 4.3 The Pakistani Connection: Making the Dream of a Muslim Bomb a Doable Reality? 98 4.4 Shopping in the A. Q. Khan Nuclear Bazaar: the Centrifuge Blueprint Purchase 102 4.5 Beyond the “Khan Bazaar”: Making Pakistani Proliferation Official? 107 4.6 Iran’s Compliance with the Non-proliferation Regime 111 4.7 Conclusion 115 viii CHAPTER 5 KHATAMI’S NUCLEAR DISAPPEARING ACT 117 5.1 Khatami’s Vision of Foreign Policy: The Dialogue Among Civilizations 117 5.2 On Khatami’s Watch: Speeding Up the Nuclear Project 128 5.3 The MEK‘s Disclosure and its Aftermath; Adjusting Tactics without Changing Strategy 132 5.4 Khatami: Out of the Loop or Part of the Program? 148 5.5 Slow-Playing The West While Developing The 155 Nuclear Program 5.6 Conclusion 158 CHAPTER 6 AHMADINEJAD: THE RISE OF THE NUCLEAR PRINCIPALISM DOCTRINE 159
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