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2009 Kinds and Their Terms: On the Language and of the Normative and the Empirical Joseph C. Long

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

KINDS AND THEIR TERMS:

ON THE LANGUAGE AND ONTOLOGY

OF THE NORMATIVE AND THE EMPIRICAL

By

JOSEPH C. LONG, JR.

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2009

Copyright © 2009 Joseph C. Long, Jr. All Rights Reserved The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Joseph C. Long, Jr. defended on October 28, 2009.

______J. Piers Rawling Professor Directing

______Philip L. Bowers University Representative

______David McNaughton Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.

ii For my wife, Katherine

iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my wife, Katherine, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. Her love, support, and insight have enriched my life beyond what words can express. I am grateful to Piers Rawling, David McNaughton, and Phil Bowers for serving on my dissertation committee. I would like to thank David McNaughton also for his friendship as well as for introducing me to the Harman/Sturgeon debate, without which introduction this dissertation would not have been. I would like to thank Piers Rawling for his guidance, comments, and criticisms, which have been crucial to the development of this dissertation. I would also like to thank Michael McKenna for his friendship and for sharing with me his very useful insights regarding the profession. Finally, I would like to thank the disc golf crew–Michael Robinson, Travis Rodgers, and Justin Capes–for forcing me to enjoy my Saturday mornings.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ...... v i i

Abstract ...... viii

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1. Non-reductive Ethical Naturalism and the Ethical Naturalist’s Challenge ... 1 2. Chapter Summaries ...... 4

2. NORMATIVITY AND THE EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE ...... 10

1. Two Objections and a Problem ...... 12 2. The Empirical Challenge ...... 21 3. How (not) to Empirically Discover Normativity ...... 26 4. Conclusion ...... 33

3. THE EXTERNALIST’S PARADOX AND DILEMMA ...... 34

1. Descriptive and Causal Kind term Semantics ...... 37 2. Descriptive Semantics and Foundational Semantics ...... 44 3. The Externalist’s Paradox ...... 48 4. The Externalist’s Dilemma ...... 53 5. Defending the FBFI View (Sort of) ...... 59 6. The Need for Unions ...... 64 7. A Concluding Moral ...... 76

4. A NONNATURAL DEFENSE OF MORAL TWIN EARTH ...... 80

1. Debating Descriptive Internalism ...... 84 2. Causal ...... 90 3. Inter-world Moral Debate ...... 93 4. Merli’s Error Theory ...... 99 5. Future Experts Objection ...... 104 6. Dilemma of the Judge ...... 107 7. Conclusion ...... 115

5. NORMATIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALUABLE SYSTEMS ...... 116

1. Natural Kinds and Multiple Realization ...... 118 2. Functions and Natural Normativity ...... 127

v 3. Natural Function and Nonnatural Value ...... 133 4. Conclusion ...... 136

6. CONCLUSION ...... 138

1. Future Work ...... 139

REFERENCES ...... 140

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 153

vi LIST OF TABLES

1.1. The Oppenheim-Putnam Hierarchy of Sciences ...... 2

6.1. The Causal-Normative Hierarchy ...... 139

vii ABSTRACT

At the intersection of meta-ethics and philosophy of science, Nicholas Sturgeon’s “Moral Explanation” ([1985] 1988), Richard Boyd’s “How to be a Moral Realist” (1988), and David Brink’s Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (1989) inaugurated a sustained argument for the claim that moral kinds like RIGHT ACTION and VIRTUOUS AGENT are scientifically investigable natural kinds. The corresponding position is called “non-reductive ethical naturalism,” or “NEN.” Ethical nonnaturalists, by contrast, argue that moral kinds are genuine and objective, but not natural. This dissertation is largely a challenge to non-reductive ethical naturalism from the viewpoint of ethical nonnaturalism. An introduction, four fairly independent chapters, and a conclusion comprise this dissertation. The introduction (chapter one) situates and summarizes the arguments in the four chapters that immediately follow, and the concluding chapter (chapter six) describes future work related to the arguments in this dissertation. I now turn to chapters two through five. In chapter two, I shore up what I believe are weakness in ’s Triviality Objection to reductive ethical naturalism and then present a challenge to the NEN theorist, which, I argue, the NEN theorist must but ultimately cannot meet. The challenge is to sketch an empirical experiment whereby we can adjudicate between competing moral hypotheses. I explain in terms of experimental design and evaluation why the challenge cannot be met. Chapters three and four focus on the semantics and reference relations of kind terms. In chapter three, I defend the Causal Externalist (CE) theory of semantics and reference against an objection distilled from two articles by Åsa Marie Wikforss. The objection is that CE implies a paradox, escape from which forces the CE theorist upon the horns of a dilemma. I show how the CE theorist can avoid the dilemma by allowing that the intensions of some artificial-kind terms (e.g., ‘jade’) are not given by descriptions associated with the terms. One consequence of this move, however, is that it casts doubt upon the coherence of the claim that moral-kind terms (e.g., ‘morally required action’) are natural-kind terms. In chapter four, I defend Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Moral-Twin Earth argument from three critical responses put forward in recent paper by David Merli. NEN

viii theorists claim that CE can account for the semantics and reference of moral-kind terms. As per Horgan and Timmons (H&T), however, our responses to the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment give us reason to doubt the NEN theorists’ claim. Against H&T’s argument, however, Merli presents three independent, critical responses, and in this chapter I defend H&T’s argument in a way that is friendly to the ethical nonnaturalist. One upshot is, I contend, that the ethical nonnaturalist can and indeed should co-opt H&T’s argument for his own use. In chapter five, I return to kinds themselves, specifically those in biology. I first point out that ethical nonnaturalism appeals to a metaphysical thesis about nonnatural value, which need not be limited to the moral domain. Then, I argue that biological naturalism alone cannot give a satisfying realist account of biological kinds like HEART and NEURON. Finally, I show that by conjoining the of Cummins functions as recently defended by Paul Davies, a thesis about nonnatural value, and Ned Block’s Disney Principle regarding structural properties, the nonnaturalist, unlike the naturalist, can offer a satisfying realist account of biological kinds.

ix CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A kind is a taxonomic category of substances and events, and a kind term is a term that

refers to a kind. Now, there are different types of kind: natural kinds (e.g., ELECTRON, H2O, and HEART), artificial kinds (e.g., VIBRAPHONE MALLET, ANTIQUE FURNITURE, and JADE) and, some claim, nonnatural-nonartificial (or just “nonnatural”) kinds (e.g., RIGHT ACTION or VIRTUOUS

AGENT). But whether a kind is natural, nonnatural, or artificial kind, there is often a kind term that refers to it. According to one semantic theory of kind terms, the semantics of a kind term co-varies with the type of kind term it is. The semantics of ‘electron’, for example, is different from the semantics of ‘vibraphone mallet’. But it is often unclear what type a kind a particular kind is; and where there is unclarity, there is debate. One such debate, located at the intersection of meta-ethics and philosophy of science, was inaugurated with the publication of Nicholas Sturgeon’s “Moral Explanation” ([1985] 1988), Richard Boyd’s “How to be a Moral Realist” (1988), and David Brink’s Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (1989). According to Boyd, Brink, and Sturgeon, moral kinds are, in fact, natural kinds, and thus moral-kind terms are natural-kind terms. As I describe below, this dissertation is largely a challenge to that claim. As far as this introduction goes, I do two things. First, I give an overview of the meta- ethical project proposed and defended by Boyd, Brink, and Sturgeon and locate my challenges to that project. Second, I summarize the four chapters contained in this dissertation.

1. Non-reductive Ethical Naturalism and the Ethical Nonnaturalist’s Challenge

In “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis” (1958), Paul Oppenheim and advance a conception of science as consisting in a hierarchy of levels and offer a

1 2 putative means for reducing higher levels to lower levels.1 About sixteen years later, (1974) and–perhaps somewhat ironically–Putnam himself (1975a) gave us good reason to think that such inter-level reduction is unlikely. The hierarchical arrangement of sciences, however, remains received wisdom. In more recent versions of the Oppenheim-Putnam Hierarchy, fundamental physics, whose domain is represented by the Standard Model, stands at the bottom. Just above fundamental physics we find atomic physics, above that, physical chemistry, and above that, the so-called special sciences (see Table 1.1):

Table 1.1: The Oppenheim-Putnam Hierarchy of Sciences. The following is the hierarchy as it is often described in the literature. I shall assume this conception in what follows. 6. Sociology 5. Psychology 4. Biology 3. Physical chemistry 2. Atomic physics 1. Fundamental physics2

Since the mid-1980s, there has been a sustained attempt by certain scientific realists to append a naturalized non-reductive ethical realism somewhere near the top of the hierarchy.3

1I say ‘advanced’ because, as Oppenheim and Putnam point out, hierarchical conceptions of science were posited prior to Oppenheim and Putnam’s (1958, 29-30 n. 10). See, for example, von Bertalanffy (1950).

2Regarding Oppenheim and Putnam’s (1958) version of the hierarchy, there are two points worth mentioning. First, whereas Oppenheim and Putnam’s version is in terms of the entities comprising the various sciences’ respective domains, the hierarchy is most often today described in terms of the sciences themselves, as presented above. Second, psychology and the entities comprising its domain are notably absent from Oppenheim and Putnam’s version, perhaps due to the influence of at the time.

3See, for example, Boyd (1988, 2000, 2003a, 2003b), Brink (1989), and Sturgeon ([1985] 1988, 1986, 1992, 2003, 2006a, 2006b). See Boyd (1983, 1988) for his defense of scientific realism. 3

The resulting blend of scientific realism and ethical naturalism is often called “non-reductive ethical naturalism” (or just “NEN”).4 The NEN theorist’s argument for augmenting the hierarchy goes essentially as follows. Some natural kinds and properties play ineliminable roles in our best explanations of certain phenomena, and a natural kind’s or property’s playing such an ineliminable explanatory role helps to justify one’s realism about that natural kind or property.5 So, given an antecedent commitment to naturalism, if a moral property were to play a similarly ineliminable role in explaining certain phenomena, then one could be justified in being a realist about moral properties qua natural properties, and indeed ethics could become methodologically similar to and just as respectable as any other science. So, for NEN theorists, much hangs upon whether moral kinds and properties are explanatorily ineliminable.6 Whether moral kinds and properties indeed are explanatorily ineliminable has been the subject of much controversy. The seminal debate–the now famous “Harman/Sturgeon debate”–began with Nicholas Sturgeon’s ([1985] 1988) response to Gilbert Harman’s (1977) argument that moral explanations cannot be tested against the world.7 But, as indicated in Nick Zangwill’s (2005) and two polemical entries–one by Sturgeon, the other a response by Zangwill–in the recently published Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (2006), the issue is far from settled.8

4For, NEN theorists generally take Saul Kripke [1980] to have shown that some necessary truths about natural kinds are synthetic a posteriori, which NEN theorists take to be a way around Moore’s ([1903] 1993) so-called Open Question Argument. See Horgan and Timmons (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 2000) for arguments to the contrary.

5The world ‘helps’ is used here to point out, as per Brian Leiter (2001), that a property or kind’s explanatory ineliminability may be necessary, but it is insufficient for realism about that property or kind. I shall assume this is true.

6Brad Majors (2003) argues that the debate over whether moral properties are explanatorily ineliminable is really a disguised dispute over whether they are causal. I assume that if moral properties are genuinely causal (unlike, for example, mere-Cambridge properties), then they are explanatorily ineliminable.

7The Harman/Sturgeon debate continued through Harman (1986) and Sturgeon (1986).

8See also Leiter (2001) and Brad Majors’s (2003). 4

But the controversy has not been about only whether moral kinds and properties are explanatorily eliminable: The NEN theorist’s proposed meta-ethics has been challenged also on its epistemological, metaphysical, and semantic fronts–especially by ethical nonnaturalists. According to ethical nonnaturalism, moral kinds and properties are real (i.e., objective, - independent, etc.), but they are decidedly not natural properties and kinds. Ethical nonnaturalists are, in a way, the defenders of the commonsense conception of morality. Although it has always had its supporters,9 ethical nonnaturalism has recently been taken up and defended by an increasing number of moral philosophers.10 This dissertation is largely a challenge to NEN from the ethical nonnaturalist point of view. I now turn to summaries of the chapters contained herein.

2. Chapter Summaries

2.1. Chapter Two: Normativity and the Empirical Challenge Ethical naturalism has come in three forms: Analytic Ethical Naturalism (AEN), which identifies the intensions of evaluative terms with the intensions of non-evaluative terms; Synthetic Ethical Naturalism (SEN), which identifies the facts that make evaluative statements true with facts that make non-evaluative statements true; and Non-reductive Ethical Naturalism (NEN),11 which by contrast requires no such claim. What all three forms of ethical naturalism hold in common, though, is the claim that evaluative properties are objective and wholly natural. In a forthcoming manuscript, Derek Parfit levels two objections against ethical naturalism, which objections are described in Jonathan Dancy’s (2006). The Triviality Objection

9See, for example, G. E. Moore ([1903] 1993) and David Ross ([1930] 2002.

10Recent work from ethical nonnaturalists includes McNaughton (1988, 1996), Stratton- Lake (2002), McNaughton and Rawling (2003), Shafer-Landau (2003), Huemer (2005), and Dancy (2006).

11See, for example, David Brink (1989), Richard Boyd (1988, 2003a, 2003b), and Nicholas Sturgeon ([1985] 1988, 1986, 1992, 2002, 2006a, 2006b). 5

to AEN and SEN is supposed to show that identifying evaluative entities with non-evaluative entities strips evaluative terms of their “normative significance” (Dancy 2006, 132). The Normativity Objection to NEN is designed to show that evaluative properties by their nature cannot be natural properties. But Dancy and Parfit concede that as they currently stand, neither of the objections is compelling (Dancy 2006, 131-3, 143 n. 8).12 In chapter two, I take up both the Triviality Objection and the Normativity Objection. I attempt, first, to shore up the Triviality Objection. If I am successful, then ethical naturalists must jettison AEN and SEN, embrace NEN, and thus concern himself with the Normativity Objection. But the Normativity Objection cannot, I believe, be made to work. The problem is, as Dancy points out, the Normativity Objection requires its proponent (i) to give a principled way to tell whether evaluative properties and non-evaluative properties are members of distinct categories (viz., the category of natural property versus the category of non-natural property) or are distinct members within the same category (viz., the category of natural property) and (ii) to do so without begging any questions against the NEN theorist. I believe the ethical non-naturalist cannot accomplish this task. The second thing I do in this chapter is to present what I call “Empirical Challenge.” As noted above, the NEN theorist calls for nothing short of a moral-science research project. The Empirical Challenge challenges the NEN theorist to show that this call is more than mere hubris by providing at least a sketch of how one might empirically investigate evaluative properties. I argue that such an investigation cannot be conducted. To make my case, I draw from recent studies within moral psychology which reveal a deep difference between self-identified American conservatives and self-identified American liberals regarding what counts as a genuine

12In his manuscript, Parfit presents the Normativity Objection first, admits that “Though this objection, I believe, correct, it would persuade few Naturalists,” and then presents the Triviality Objection seemingly as if it were a “further [argument] to consider” (528), implying that the Triviality Objection is (or would be, when the kinks are worked out) more forceful than the Normativity Objection. But Jonathan Dancy rightly points out that while the Triviality Objection might be successful against some forms of ethical naturalism, “it gets no purchase on Sturgeon at all” but that it is with the Normativity Objection that “we reach the heart of the matter” (2006, 132). So, it is the Normativity Objection that addresses the disagreement between non-naturalists like Dancy and Parfit and NEN theorists like Sturgeon. 6 moral consideration (Haidt 2001, 2007; Haidt and Joseph 2006; Haidt and Graham 2007). My claim is that if moral realism—whether naturalistic or non-naturalistic—is true, then either the conservatives or the liberals are wrong. If NEN is true, then who is wrong can be discovered empirically. The Empirical Challenge challenges the NEN theorist to sketch an empirical experiment whereby we could settle the issue. I explain in terms of experimental design and evaluation why the Empirical Challenge likely cannot be met: Essentially, experiments need to be justified, and attempts to justify an experiment that empirically tests moral hypotheses seem to fall into vicious circularity. 2.2. Chapter Three: The Externalist’s Paradox and Dilemma Chapters three and four deal with the semantics and reference of kind terms. Now, a kind is a category of substances or events. For example, the kind term ‘electron’ names the kind

ELECTRON,13 which is a category whose members are among the fundamental particles, namely, individual electrons. Notice, though, that there are different types of kind: There are natural

14 kinds (e.g., ELECTRON, H2O, and perhaps TIGER ) and there are artificial kinds (e.g., JADE, VIBRAPHONE MALLET, and LAMPSHADE). Consequently, there are natural-kind terms and artificial kind terms.15 Now, according to a prominent theory of kind-term semantics, which I call “Causal Externalism” (“CE”), the intension16 of a natural-kind term is at least partly given by facts external to the speaker. But when it comes to artificial-kind terms, the typical CE theorist claims, the kind term’s intension is given by a description the speaker has associated with the

13I use “small capitals” to indicate kinds.

14I say ‘perhaps’ because there is considerable debate within the philosophy of biology over whether species are really natural kinds. Many–myself included–believe species are human constructed categories imposed upon the world not discover within the world.

15According to the ethical nonnaturalist, there are also nonnatural-nonartificial-kind terms, which I just call “nonnatural-kind terms,” like RIGHT ACTION or VIRTUOUS AGENT. I take these up in chapter four.

16I use ‘semantic value’ in the actual chapter. 7 term. But, in some recent articles, Åsa Maria Wikforss (2005, 2008) presents a set of objections from a single but difficult problem for the CE theorist can be stilled. The problem is this. It seems pretty clear that we language users stipulate a term’s semantics, that is, whether or not its intension is given by a description a speaker associates with the term or whether it is given by facts external to the speaker. After all, a kind term just is an arbitrary symbol; so, surely it is we who determine the term’s semantics. But the case of the kind term ‘jade’ seems to indicate that the world can override our decision. For, although the kind JADE was long thought a natural kind of mineral stone, philosophical lore (apparently experts on jade knew better) has it that we mistakenly applied the term ‘jade’ to two different kinds of mineral stone, viz., JADEITE and NEPHRITE. We thought ‘jade’ was a natural-kind term, but it turns out it is an artificial-kind term. But if ‘jade’ is an artificial-kind term, then, CE seems to imply, ‘jade’’s intension is given by a description we associated with the term despite what we tried to stipulate. So, CE seems to imply that so long as we attempt to stipulate that ‘jade’’s intension is given partly by the external world, the world can determine that ‘jade’’s intension is given by a description we associate with ‘jade’. But, of course, it is an empirical question for every putative natural-kind term whether it really refers to a natural kind; therefore, the problem of ‘jade’ extends to all natural-kind terms. CE therefore seems to imply that we are caught in a semantic tug-of-war with the external world. The remainder of chapter three consists in a solution to the above problem and a concluding moral. Regarding the former, I argue that the CE theorist should extend CE to artificial-kind terms of a certain kind. Regarding the latter, I point out that the solution to the problem seems to undermine the possibility that CE can account for the semantics of moral-kind terms. 2.3. Chapter Four: A Nonnatural Defense of Moral-Twin Earth In 1903, G. E. Moore, himself an ethical nonnaturalist, presented his so-called Open- Question Argument against AEN. Shortly thereafter, so-called ethical non-cognitivists–meta- ethical theorists who claim that moral utterances are merely expressions of attitudes like desires 8

or disapproval–co-opted Moore’s argument for their own use.17 Since the 1980s, NEN theorists, however, have attempted to avoid Moore’s argument by appeal to CE. But in a recent series of papers, two non-cognitivists, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (H&T), collaboratively constructed a thought experiment–the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment–that seems to show that even with this new linguistic theory, ethical naturalism is false.18 My contention in chapter four is that, in the same way that the non-cognitivists co-opted Moore’s Open-Question Argument against ethical naturalism, ethical nonnaturalists can–and, indeed, should–co-opt H&T’s argument from Moral-Twin Earth. To make my case, I show in this chapter how an ethical nonnaturalist might defend H&T’s Moral-Twin Earth argument from three critical responses made by David Merli (2002). The upshot is that while the argument can withstand Merli’s criticisms–thereby evincing the falsity of non-reductive ethical naturalism–certain adjustments to H&T’s thought experiment need to be made. Once those adjustments are made, it becomes clear that H&T’s argument is available and indeed useful to the ethical nonnaturalist. 2.4. Chapter Five: Normative Functions and Valuable Systems Ethical nonnaturalists, largely because they defend what we might call the “commonsense realist” view of ethics–according to which moral properties and kinds are nonartificial and nonnatural–have tended just to dig in and fend off objectors and rarely offer a positive argument. But even if the ethical nonnaturalist (hereafter just “nonnaturalist”) has little room to expand within the domain of meta-ethics, he should consider expanding into the special sciences. In line with that claim and in light of recent developments within theories of biological function, I show, in chapter five, how a nonnaturalist can succeed, where naturalists fail, in giving a realistic account of functional kinds like HEART, NEURON, and RETINA.19

17See, for example, Ayer (1952). Mark van Roojen (2009) makes a similar point when discussing motivations for non-cognitivism.

18See Horgan and Timmons (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 2000).

19I use “small capitals” for kinds’ names. For more on naming kinds, see Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975b). 9

The argument consists in three parts. In the first part, I respond to arguments that seem to presuppose that merely showing that the so-called multiple realization relation occurs is sufficient to show that functional kinds in biology are nonartificial, natural, and irreducible. I argue that the properties of mechanical waves–specifically, fundamental frequency–provides a counterexample. In the second part, I turn to theories of biological functions, describing Paul Davies’s (2000b) argument in support of his version of the theory of Cummins functions vis-à- vis theories of proper functions. One drawback of Davies’s theory, like most Cummins functions theories, is that it allows too many things to count as a function. It seems that Davies needs normativity to shore up his account. Therefore, in section four, show how the nonnaturalist can conjoin Davies’s theory with the notion of nonnatural value and Ned Block’s so-called Disney Principle to provide a theory of biological functions that is more line with our . With that, I turn now to “Normativity and the Empirical Challenge.” CHAPTER TWO

NORMATIVITY AND THE EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE

Ethical naturalism comes in a variety forms. While Analytic Ethical Naturalism (AEN) identifies the meanings of evaluative terms with the meanings of non-evaluative terms, and Synthetic Ethical Naturalism (SEN) identifies the facts that make evaluative statements true with facts that make non-evaluative statements true, Non-reductive Ethical Naturalism (NEN)20 requires no such identity claim. But regardless of their preferred form, all ethical naturalists claim that evaluative properties are objective, natural properties instantiated in the world. But against the various forms of ethical naturalism, Derek Parfit levels two objections, both of which are described in Jonathan Dancy’s (2006). The so-called Triviality Objection—aimed at AEN and SEN—is supposed to show that identifying evaluative entities with non-evaluative entities strips evaluative terms of their “normative significance” (Dancy 2006, 132). The Normativity Objection—aimed at NEN—is designed to show that evaluative properties by their nature cannot be natural properties. But while Dancy and Parfit think both of these objections are essentially right, neither finds the objections compelling as they currently stand (Dancy 2006, 131-3, 143 n. 8).21

20See, for example, David Brink (1989), Richard Boyd (1988, 2003a, 2003b), and Nicholas Sturgeon ([1985] 1988, 1986, 1992, 2002, 2006a, 2006b).

21In his manuscript, Parfit presents the Normativity Objection first, admits that “Though this objection, I believe, correct, it would persuade few Naturalists,” and then presents the Triviality Objection seemingly as if it were a “further [argument] to consider” (528), implying that the Triviality Objection is (or would be, when the kinks are worked out) more forceful than the Normativity Objection. But Jonathan Dancy rightly points out that while the Triviality Objection might be successful against some forms of ethical naturalism, “it gets no purchase on Sturgeon at all” but that it is with the Normativity Objection that “we reach the heart of the matter” (2006, 132). So, it is the Normativity Objection that addresses the disagreement between non-naturalists like Dancy and Parfit and NEN theorists like Sturgeon.

10 11

In this chapter, I shall do two things. First, I shall shore up the Triviality Objection. If I am successful, then ethical naturalists will be forced to jettison AEN and SEN, embrace NEN, and, if it can be made to work, to face the Normativity Objection. But the Normativity Objection cannot, I believe, be made to work. The problem is, as Dancy points out, the Normativity Objection requires its proponent (i) to give a principled way to tell whether evaluative properties and non-evaluative properties are members of distinct categories (viz., the category of natural property versus the category of non-natural property) or are distinct members within the same category (viz., the category of natural property) and (ii) to do so without begging any questions against the NEN theorist. I call this problem the ‘Category Problem’, and I believe it is intractable for the ethical non-naturalist. But I also believe that the Category Problem can be leveraged into a formidable challenge—the “Empirical Challenge”—for the NEN theorist. Presenting the Empirical Challenge is the second thing I do in this chapter. First, in a characteristically clear description and defense of NEN, Nicholas Sturgeon (2003) claims that even if evaluative properties are not identifiable with non-evaluative properties, evaluative properties are nonetheless empirically investigable. NEN thus offers nothing short of a moral-science research project. But notice, if that research project is to be anything more than armchair fantasizing, the NEN theorist needs to provide at least a sketch of how one might empirically investigate evaluative properties. Second, recent studies by Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, and Jesse Graham within moral psychology reveal a deep difference between self-identified American conservatives and self-identified American liberals regarding what counts as a genuine moral consideration (Haidt 2001, 2007; Haidt and Joseph 2006; Haidt and Graham 2007). Now, if moral realism—whether naturalistic or non-naturalistic—is true, then either the conservatives or the liberals are wrong. If NEN is true, then who is wrong can be discovered empirically. The Empirical Challenge challenges the NEN theorist to sketch an empirical experiment whereby we could settle the issue. Notice, though, that by providing such a sketch, the NEN theorist will also solve the Category Problem—and do so in his favor. For, by showing how one can empirically investigate evaluative properties, the NEN theorist will show that evaluative properties are natural properties just like any other scientifically investigable property. So, the NEN theorist has at least as much reason as a non-naturalist like Parfit or 12

Dancy to do what would solve the Category Problem; the Empirical Challenge challenges the NEN theorist to step up and do it. Until the NEN theorist gives us reason to think he can meet the Empirical Challenge, the non-naturalist need not, I believe, concern himself too much with solving the Category Problem. A brief outline of the chapter will be useful. In the next section, section two, I describe the Triviality Objection, the Normativity Objection, and the Category Problem. In section three, I present the Empirical Challenge. In section four, I explain in terms of experimental design and evaluation why I think the Empirical Challenge likely cannot be met: Essentially, experiments need to be justified, and attempts to justify an experiment that empirically tests moral hypotheses will likely fall into vicious circularity. I should mention that I assume, along with the NEN theorist, that evaluative properties are causally efficacious. Whether or not being causally efficacious is sufficient for a property’s being empirically investigable is, however, another matter.

1. Two Objections and a Problem

As noted in the introduction, the Triviality Objection is aimed at AEN and SEN and the Normativity Objection is aimed at NEN. In this section, I present both of these objections, and then I describe the Category Problem. 1.1. The Triviality Objection The Triviality Objection is essentially an objection against identifying an evaluative entity with a non-evaluative entity, whether the entity be the meaning of a term (as per AEN) or it be some fact (as per SEN). 1.1.1. Against Analytic Ethical Naturalism (AEN). AEN identifies the meanings of evaluative terms with the meanings of various non-evaluative terms. So, AEN implies that the a phrase like ‘is right’ means the same thing as does, say, some functional phrase like ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’, where ‘flourishing’ is understood non-evaluatively.22 Against

22For example, ‘flourishing’ might be understood as a conjunction of overall biological fitness, minimal , a sense of contentment and satisfaction, etc. Following Elliott Sober 13

such a claim, the Triviality Objection points out that if these two phrases meant the same thing, then applying both of them to a particular action would result in a trivial redundancy. It would be as if one were to say,

(1) That quantity of water, w, is in a state of bubbling heat and is effervescent.

The phrase ‘is effervescent’ is a trivial addition to ‘is in a state of bubbling heat’, since the latter means just what the former means. Take, then, sentence (2):

(2) That action, a, maximizes flourishing among one’s kin and is right.

If ‘is right’ and ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ meant the same thing, then applying one of those predicates to a after applying the other would result in a trivial addition. To put the same point another way, if both predicates meant the same thing, then applying one after applying the other would add no new information. But clearly applying either predicate to a, whether or not the other has been applied, gives further information; sentence (2) does not express a trivial redundancy. And the reason is obvious: The phrase ‘is right’ has what we might call ‘normative import’–its meaning has a normative element such that when it is used to predicate rightness of an action the phrase expresses a normative claim, for example, that one ought to have performed the action in question. In saying that a is right, we express the claim that a ought to have been performed. But the description ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ has no normative import. It perhaps describes the action which one ought to have performed, but it does not express the claim that one indeed ought to have performed that action. Rather, the task of expressing that one ought to have performed action a is left to the phrase ‘is right’.

(2001), we might take overall biological fitness to be the product of the probability of a member of a population will reach adult hood and the organism’s expected number of offspring. I shall take flourishing in this non-evaluative way throughout this chapter. 14

Now, at this point, the AEN theorist is faced with a dilemma. He can either maintain that ‘is right’ and ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ mean the same thing or admit that they do not. Admitting that they do not mean the same thing is to give up AEN. But maintaining that these phrases do mean the same thing commits the AEN theorist to one of three untenable positions. He must either (i) claim that the terms’ shared meaning includes and does not include a normative element, (ii) affirm that the description ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ has normative import after all, or (iii) simply deny that phrase ‘is right’ has normative import. Option (i) is a blatant inconsistency. Let us, then, consider option (ii). In taking option (ii), the AEN theorist claims that the description ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ has normative import after all. It is not clear how such a claim even could be true. I can see how a description like the one in question might acquire normative import–for example, we might discover that the set of right actions is also the set of actions that maximize flourishing of one’s kin–but such a discovery would not be a discovery about the description’s meaning but about the relation between the set of actions of which the description is true and the set of actions to which ‘is right’ applies. So, it seems highly implausible that the description ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ has normative import. Therefore, let us turn to option (iii). Taking option (iii) amounts to biting a bullet the AEN theorist cannot bite. The reason is, the AEN theorist is a moral realist, and moral realism implies that some normative sentences are true. But if some normative sentences are true, then at least some terms have normative import–they express a true claim, for example, that a certain action or certain kind of action ought to be performed. So, the AEN theorist is committed to at least some terms’ having normative import. The phrase ‘is right’ seems like a paradigm case of such a term. Denying that ‘is right’ has normative import would therefore need to be well motivated. But in this case, it looks like the only motivation would be that it fails to fit with the AEN theorist’s favored form of ethical naturalism. An AEN theorist’s denying that ‘is right’ has normative import because AEN cannot account for its normative import is like my denying that the large object under my car’s hood is an engine on the grounds that my favorite mechanic cannot fix it. Taking option (iii) would be perversely ad hoc. 15

So, it looks like the AEN theorist is committed to either embracing inconsistency, claiming that a non-evaluative description like ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ has normative import, or stripping the normative import away from terms like ‘is right’. Since none of these options is available to the AEN theorist, the ethical naturalist will need a different theory of how evaluative and natural properties relate. Perhaps SEN can fill the bill. 1.1.2. Against Synthetic Ethical Naturalism (SEN). As with AEN, an identity claim stands at the center of SEN. But while the AEN theorist claimed that some evaluative terms’ meanings are identical to the meanings of some non-evaluative terms, the SEN theorist jettisons this claim and, instead, identifies evaluative facts with certain non-evaluative facts. So, for example, the following sentences might report the same fact:

(3) That action, a, is right. (4) That action, a, maximizes flourishing among one’s kin.

Since the SEN theorist does not identify the meanings of evaluative phrases with the meanings of non-evaluative phrases, he avoids the Triviality Objection as it is leveled against the AEN theorist. Parfit and Dancy believe, however, that the Triviality Objection can nonetheless be altered into an objection against the SEN theorist. Here is why. Sentences of the simple, declarative variety attribute a property to particular entity, say, an object, an event, or an action. So, if (3) and (4)–both simple, declarative sentences–express the same fact, then they both attribute the same property to the same action, viz., a. But if (3) and (4) attribute the same property to the same action, then (3)’s and (4)’s respective constituent predicates would have the same meaning, in which case statement (2) above would express a trivial redundancy. To quote Dancy,

[W]hat could be meant by saying that this act of [maximizing flourishing among one’s kin] is right? All that can be meant by this–since, according to the [SEN theorist], the predicates [‘maximizing flourishing among one’s kin’] and ‘is right’ ascribe the same property–is that this act of [maximizing flourishing among one’s kin], and that, as 16

another way of reporting the same state of affairs, we could say that it is right. (Dancy 2006, 132)

So, it looks like the SEN theorist is, like the AEN theorist, also committed to (2)’s expressing a trivial redundancy on the grounds that ‘is right’ and ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ have the same meaning. SEN adds only an explanation of why these phrases have the same meaning: It is in virtue of their picking out the same property. If ‘is right’ and ‘maximizing flourishing among one’s kin’ have the same meaning, then since the former has normative import but the latter does not, the SEN theorist is forced to choose between one of the three, untenable options that faced that AEN theorist. That is the Triviality Objection applied to the SEN theorist. But difficulty lurks, as Dancy notes (143, n. 8). The crucial premise in the Triviality Objection is that if two predicates mean the same thing, then applying both predicates to the same object within the same sentence results in a trivial redundancy. But there is reason to doubt that two predicates’ picking out the same property is sufficient to give both predicates the same meaning. For, notice that trivial redundancy arises only when one already knows that both predicates pick out the same property. Take the following sentence:

(5) That quantity of liquid, l, consists in H2O and is water.

In 1750, sentence (5) would not have been trivial despite the fact that ‘consisting in H2O’ and ‘being water’ pick out the same property; and the reason is, in 1750 no one knew that both predicates pick out the same property. Sentence (5) might have expressed a redundancy in 1750, but the redundancy was hardly trivial. Thus, we see that even given two predicates’ picking out the same property, it does not necessarily follow that applying both predicates to the same object results in a trivial redundancy. If it does not necessarily follow that applying both of those predicates to the same object results in a trivial redundancy, then it does not follow just from two predicates’ picking out the same property that those predicates have the same meaning. So, the Triviality Objection as it currently stands fails to show that the two predicates that pick out the 17

same property in fact have the same meaning, and thus the Triviality Objection fails to undermine SEN. I believe there are two responses the Triviality Objector, as it were, might make to the defender of SEN: one epistemological, the other metaphysical. Let us consider the epistemological response first. Notice that even though sentence (5) would not express a trivial redundancy to an English speaker living in 1750, if (5) were uttered in 2009 by someone who

firmly that consisting in H2O is the same thing as being water, (5) would, so far as the speaker himself goes, express a trivial redundancy. In fact, if our speaker were to travel back to 1750 and assert (5), our speaker would still have uttered a trivial redundancy so far as he is concerned. The same would be case, mutatis mutandis, for him who firmly believes that being right is the same thing as maximizing flourishing among one’s kin: For him, to utter (2) would be to utter a trivial redundancy. We can thus generalize: To the degree that a person believes that two predicates pick out the same property, that person will also believe that a sentence in which both predicates are applied to the same entity expresses a trivial redundancy. But to the degree that a person believes that such a sentence expresses a trivial redundancy, he will believe that the two predicates have the same meaning. I believe that ‘consisting in H2O’ and ‘being water’ have the same meaning because I believe they pick out the same property. If firmly believing that two predicates pick out the same property is sufficient for believing that both predicates have the same meaning–and after all, as Dancy says, regardless of the words one uses what else would one mean in attributing to a the property of being F but that a has the property of being F–then to the degree that the SEN theorist believes that ‘is right’ and ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’ pick out the same property, the SEN theorist will believe these predicates have the same meaning. And if the SEN theorist believes those predicates have the same meaning, then he is confronted with the Triviality Objection. Notice that if all of this is right–and it is at least plausible–then the SEN theorist is faced with an interesting epistemological dilemma. So long as he does not believe that being right and maximizing flourishing among one’s kin (to continue with our example) are indeed the same property, he avoids the Triviality Objection. But as soon as he believes he has garnered enough evidence to believe firmly that being right is identical to maximizing flourishing among one’s kin, the SEN theorist faces the Triviality Objection. So, the SEN theorist can believe his own 18

thesis only at the expense of being faced with the Triviality Objection. If SEN is true, the SEN theorist had better not believe it! The Triviality Objector’s metaphysical response gives us reason to think that SEN is in fact not true. Instead of showing that the SEN theorist faces the Triviality Objection because he (the SEN theorist) is still committed to identifying the meaning of ‘is right’ with the meaning of ‘maximizes flourishing among one’s kin’, the metaphysical objection simply alters the Triviality Objection so that it applies to the SEN theorist in virtue of his commitment to the identity of two properties, viz., being right and maximizing flourishing among one’s kin, one of which is evaluative, the other of which is non-evaluative. Here is how the objection goes. Let us call the fact reported by (3) the ‘(3)-fact’ and the fact reported by (4) the ‘(4)-fact’. Since the SEN theorist claims that (3) and (4) report the same fact, it thus follows that the (3)-fact is identical to the (4)-fact. Now, identifying those two facts requires identifying the properties that “make up” those facts–i.e., identifying the property of maximizing flourishing among one’s kin with the property of being right. But, as we have noted, the property of being right is evaluative, while maximizing flourishing among one’s kin is non-evaluative. It follows, then, that identifying the (3)-fact with the (4)-fact entails or requires one of two things. Either (i) it entails identifying an evaluative property with a non-evaluative property, or (ii) it requires claiming that the evaluative/non-evaluative distinction is a distinction without a difference, as it were. Option (i) is a flagrant violation of Leibniz’s Law (the Indiscernibility of Identities), and option (ii) is inconsistent with the SEN theorist’s moral realism, since moral realism (whether naturalistic or not) requires the evaluative/non-evaluative distinction to be both real and objective. In short, the SEN thesis is, as a realist thesis, incoherent. The problems with AEN and SEN lie in their respective identity claims. On the one hand, AEN’s identifying the meaning of evaluative terms with the meaning of non-evaluative terms forces the AEN theorist either to hold inconsistent claims, to claim implausibly that non- evaluative terms have normative import, or to claim, contra moral realism, that evaluative terms do not have normative import. On the other hand, SEN’s identifying evaluative facts with non- evaluative facts forces the SEN theorist either to embrace inconsistency or to claim, again contra 19 moral realism, that the distinction between evaluative properties and non-evaluative properties is no real distinction at all. So, neither AEN nor SEN is a viable option for the ethical naturalist. 1.1.3. On Non-reductive Ethical Naturalism (NEN). But in a recent paper (2003),23 Nicholas Sturgeon advances a version of ethical naturalism that avoids the above objections altogether: That version is NEN. First, Sturgeon allows that evaluative properties may fail to be identical to non-evaluative properties. Then, second, he argues that evaluative properties may, contra Moore ([1903] 1993), be natural properties nonetheless. So, even if we have reason to think evaluative properties cannot be identical to non-evaluative properties, it has only been assumed, Sturgeon claims, that evaluative properties cannot be natural properties. Against this Moorean assumption, Sturgeon then presents the following argument. According to Sturgeon, (i) there are strong reasons to think there are no supernatural entities or properties. As Sturgeon points out, science has experienced much more success than theology in explaining the empirically observable.24 If there is no supernatural realm, then there are of course no supernatural properties. Sturgeon goes on to claim that (ii) the category of property called “non-natural” really amounts to nothing other than a supernatural category. After all, a non-natural property looks like a supernatural property by another category name. Together, (i) and (ii) entail that (iii), for any property, that property is possibly instantiated iff it is a natural property.25 (Call (iii) the ‘natural-ontology criterion’.) But if all possibly instantiated properties are natural properties, then given that evaluative properties are instantiated–as the non-naturalist and the naturalist both claim–it follows that evaluative properties are natural properties. Thus, the NEN thesis: Even if evaluative properties are not identical to non-evaluative properties, evaluative properties are nonetheless natural properties. Notice, moreover, that if evaluative properties are natural properties, then evaluative facts are natural facts whether or not they can be described using non-evaluative terminology.

23See also Sturgeon (2006a; 2006b).

24Presumably, the NEN theorist would take the so-called evidential problem of evil as well to weigh against the likelihood of there being a supernatural realm. William Rowe’s (1979) is perhaps the classic article concerning the evidential problem of evil.

25The notion of possibility at work here is nomological possibility. 20

Sturgeon’s argument does not directly appeal to any conception of naturalness at all. Rather, it appeals to an antecedent (and perhaps even vague) conception of supernatural-ness and then argues that any instantiated property that is not supernatural–and none is, according to Sturgeon–is natural. This is a nice move for the NEN theorist. First, it allows him to rule out of his ontology God, the angels, and their respective properties, and at the same time it obviates the need to take on the exhausting task of determining exactly what naturalness consists in just in order to show that nomological possibility does not preclude the instantiation of evaluative properties. Moreover, since there is no accepted conception of naturalness, Sturgeon’s move sets up the NEN theorist to claim that any forthcoming characterization of naturalness according to which evaluative properties cannot be natural properties likely begs the question against the NEN theorist. 1.2. The Normativity Objection and the Category Problem Dancy (2006) claims that Parfit’s (forthcoming) Normativity Objection should provide the appropriate response to Sturgeon. The Normativity Objection states that to claim that evaluative facts are natural facts is to commit a category mistake: It implies that evaluative properties are natural properties, but claiming a evaluative property is a natural property is like claiming “that rivers were sonnets, or that experiences were stones” (Parfit forthcoming, 527). There is, though, as Dancy points out, a problem faced by those wishing to advance the Normativity Objection. Specifically, the objector must make it clear–again, without begging the question against the NEN theorist–that the difference between evaluative properties and natural properties is a difference between categories of property rather than just a difference between properties within the same category. I call this the “Category Problem.”26 Now, to solve the Category Problem, Dancy (2006) attempts to give a characterization of normativity that implies that evaluative properties cannot be natural properties. But as Dancy admits and Parfit seems to admit (see Dancy 2006, 131), all attempted solutions to the Category Problem have so far been inadequate. I believe, in fact, that the Category Problem is intractable

26The Category Problem can be stated more formally as follows: Show, for any evaluative property F and for any natural property G, that either (i) F is in a distinct category from that of which G is a member, or (ii) F is in the same category of which G is a member. 21 to the non-naturalist. But I also believe that it can be leveraged into what I call the “Empirical Challenge” for the NEN theorist. I present this challenge in the next section.

2. The Empirical Challenge

I begin this section with Sturgeon’s characterization of moral properties qua natural properties. According to Sturgeon, “[(i)] such ethical properties as the goodness of persons, character traits, and other things, and such as the rightness or wrongness of actions, are natural properties of the same general sort as the properties investigated by the sciences, and [(ii)] that they are to be investigated in the same general way that we investigate those properties” (Sturgeon 2006a, 92). Let us assume, in the spirit of (ii), that we have good reason to think evaluative properties are natural only if such properties could be investigated in the same general manner as scientific investigation occurs.27 In fact, let us go further and grant also that if an evaluative property is natural, then it is at least in principle scientifically investigable.28 Let us call the resulting biconditional the ‘scientifically-investigable criterion’ of evaluative-property naturalness: An evaluative property is natural iff it is scientifically investigable.29 Now, according to (i) above, evaluative properties are natural properties. But recall the natural- ontology criterion from Sturgeon’s argument against the existence of non-natural properties. According to that criterion, a property is possibly instantiated iff it is a natural property.30 Taken

27Sturgeon advances a similar claim in his (2002).

28First, by ‘scientifically investigable’ I mean the modal claim that it could be scientifically investigated iff it were instantiated in a world with human investigators, etc. Second, regarding the claim itself, I quote Sturgeon: “What I find plausible (even if not a conceptual truth) is that ethical facts could not be natural if they could not be investigate empirically; that is what makes it important for me to argue that they can be” (Sturgeon 2003, 534 n. 24).

29As per Sturgeon (2003), the scientifically-investigable criterion may not apply to all natural properties. But it does apply to evaluative properties.

30See note 6. 22

together, the natural-ontology and scientifically-investigable criteria entail that evaluative properties are possibly instantiated iff they are scientifically investigable. Notice two things. First, as just seen, Sturgeon’s characterization of moral properties implies that if moral properties are indeed natural, then they are scientifically investigable. So, Sturgeon’s claim implies nothing short of a empirical research project.31 So, the NEN theorist has–by his own lights–reason to concern himself with describing an empirical experiment whereby a “moral scientist” could test normative hypotheses. The second thing to notice is that if the NEN theorist were to provide such an experiment, he would also thereby solve the Category Problem–and do so in his favor. For, any such experiment would show that moral properties are scientifically investigable and thus are natural. The Empirical Challenge asks the NEN theorist to describe such an empirical experiment. In short, with the tools of science at his disposal, the NEN theorist has reason and, if moral properties are indeed natural, the tools required to solve the Category Problem; the Empirical Challenge challenges him to step up and do it. Now, it will be useful to state the Empirical Challenge in terms of actual, current research. For, evaluating whether a proposed empirical experiment would meet the Empirical Challenge is, I believe, very difficult when speaking at the fairly high level of abstraction at which surrounding discussions tend to occur.32 Therefore, the Empirical Challenge itself will be

31To quote Sturgeon: “[I]n my view, there is in fact [contra Moore] a naturalistic discipline that deals with ethical judgments. This discipline is called ethics. Moore’s example [of what a natural science is, viz., ‘the natural sciences or Psychology’] shows that he forgot to put sociology on his list, even though it belongs there, since it deals in an empirical and naturalistic way with what we have every reason to believe are natural properties. I think he should have had ethics on his list, too, and for exactly similar reasons” (Sturgeon 2003, 552-53). I call the implied research project the ‘Moral Science Research Project’.

32For example, at one point in his “How to be a Moral Realist,” Richard Boyd asks, “What plays, in moral reasoning, the role played in science by observation?” Boyd promptly answers, “Observation” (Boyd 1988, 206). Among what counts as observation, Boyd includes observing oneself, , and observing others, all in the light of “trained judgment and the operation of [the observer’s] sympathy” (206). But is observation of this sort sufficient for the Moral Science Research Project? Will it allow one to empirically adjudicate between normative hypotheses? To my mind, the only way to assess these questions is to take them out of the abstract and consider them in light of a real case. The Empirical Challenge allows us to do 23

presented in terms of recent work within moral psychology. In the remainder of this section, I describe this research and present the Empirical Challenge. In the next section, I show why the Empirical Challenge likely cannot be met. 2.2. The Social Intuitionist Model and Moral Disagreement In a series of recent papers, evolutionary psychologists Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, and Jesse Graham present what they refer to as the “Social Intuitionist Model” of moral judgment formation (Haidt 2001, 2007; Haidt and Joseph 2006; Haidt and Graham 2007). (Call the model ‘SIM’.) Interestingly, the behavior that Haidt et al. count as moral behavior and thus behavior to be explained by SIM goes beyond what previous theorists have counted as moral behavior. To present the Empirical Challenge I will need to describe (i) how Haidt et al. justify this expansion of the moral domain and (ii) how Haidt and Graham (2007) use this justification to explain why debate between self-identified liberals and self-identified conservatives in the United States seems unresolvable. But, first, I will need briefly to describe SIM itself. 2.2.1. Intuitions and moral judgment formation. According to SIM, “moral ” precedes “moral reasoning” such that, Haidt et al. claim, moral reasoning consists mostly in post hoc rationalizations of our moral judgments. Now, unlike Moore, Ross, and other ethical intuitionists, by ‘intuition’ Haidt et al. mean “bits of mental structure” that link our perceptions of the social world to “moral emotions (e.g., anger, contempt, admiration)” (Haidt and Joseph 379-380). According to SIM, our initial moral responses to another’s action consist in these “thick” moral-emotional responses. It is only after these initial responses occur that conscious moral reasoning occurs.33 The result is that moral judgments are often–though not always–made prior to moral reasoning and that moral reasoning, “when it occurs, is usually [though not always] a post-hoc process in which we search for evidence to support our initial intuitive reaction” (Haidt 2007, 998).

just this.

33Haidt. describes moral reasoning as “conscious mental activity that consists of transforming information about people and their actions in order to reach a moral judgment or decision” (2007, 998). 24

Now, the bits of mental structure that link perception to moral emotions–so-called “intuitions”–are grouped, in SIM, by their respective relevance to selection pressures arising from living within social groups (Haidt and Joseph 2006). For, social groups among humans are selectively advantageous, but they are also the source of novel selection pressures: Surviving within such groups requires our evaluating other group members very quickly. Haidt et al. have identified five broad evaluative axes which, they claim, arose in response to these in-group selection pressures and along which most humans evaluate their fellow group members: harm and fairness, ingroup loyalty, a recognition of and respect for authority, and living a spiritually pure life “rather than [living in] a carnal way” (Haidt 2007, 1001). (Haidt et al. label these five axes, respectively, ‘harm/care’, ‘fairness/reciprocity’, ‘ingroup/loyalty’, ‘authority/respect’, and ‘purity/sanctity’.) Finally, Haidt et al. claim that since the individual human mind is plastic, it is thus responsive to a variety of environmental factors that can shape our individual intuitions. The result is that although our intuitions may be generally grouped into five foundational axes, the plasticity of the mind allows for the considerable variation in moral codes and traditions that are peculiar to various cultures. So, in summary, according to SIM, our moral evaluations of others are based upon moral-emotional responses to their actions, and the intuitions which are responsible for these responses can be grouped into five broad categories that allow for considerable cross-cultural variation but which nonetheless provide the fundamental moral considerations most of us utilize when forming moral judgments. 2.2.2. Justifying an expansion. Now, any description of how we arrive at moral judgments must delimit what counts as a moral judgment, and what counts on SIM as a moral judgment is considerably broader than what counted on previous models.34 Such a break with the past needs to be justified. For this justification, Haidt et al., first, appeal to cross-cultural studies and studies between groups within the United States and the United Kingdom.35 They describe the results of these studies thus: Whereas “well-educated secular liberal Westerners”

34See, for example, Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) and Carol Gilligan (1982).

35See, for example, Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993), Jensen (1998), Haidt and Hersh (2001), and Haidt and Graham (2007). 25

view morality as concerned primarily with harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, “social conservatives in Western cultures” and people in most other cultures take moral considerations to include, in addition, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.36 Second, Haidt and Joseph simply point out that most researchers are (like themselves) political liberals (Haidt and Joseph 2006, 367). As Haidt and Joseph put it, “the lack of moral and political diversity among researchers has led to an inappropriate narrowing of the moral domain” (2006, 367).37 So, what justifies Haidt et al.’s expanding the moral domain beyond what previous researchers took to be the moral domain consists partly in the fact that the previous researchers themselves had an impoverished view of morality vis-à-vis their subjects (and everyone else, apparently!). 2.2.3. Explaining moral-political debate. According to Haidt and Graham (2007), the disparity that occurs between the researchers and their subjects also accounts for moral disagreement between self-identified conservatives and self-identified liberals in the United States.38 The difference itself is strikingly depicted in Haidt (2007) by a graph showing the results of an online web survey. Those self-identified as “very conservative” tended to take all five of Haidt et al.’s considerations to be relevant in making a moral judgment. But the more liberal a person identified himself as, the more he thought harm/care and fairness/reciprocity were relevant to moral evaluation and the less he thought ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity were relevant. So, while Haidt et al. take this specific data to support their claim

36Haidt and Graham (2007) think that the disparity between the Western liberal culture and most other cultures can likely be explained in the terms of an interaction between the plasticity of the human mind, on the one hand, and, on the other, technological development, the growth of free markets, the increase in social mobility, and so on all of which “make a morality based on shared valuation of traditions and institutions quite difficult” (113).

37From the point of view a pluralistic intuitionist, a similar point is made in McNaughton (1988) regarding moral philosophers:

There are, in fact, several reasons why he [the moral philosopher] might be particularly ill qualified to give moral advice. [...] [J]udging moral questions aright requires a wide experience of life and a suitable range of emotional response. Academic life neither attracts people with these qualifications nor encourages them once they have entered the profession. (McNaughton 1988, 204)

38Haidt (2007) says the patterns are similar for those in the United Kingdom. 26 that the models of moral judgment formation posited by previous researchers are impoverished, Haidt and Graham (2007) use this same evidence to explain why the disagreements between conservatives and liberals in the United States seem unresolvable: At an intuitive level, conservatives and liberals take different considerations to be relevant to drawing moral conclusions (2007, 98-99). With that, I can now present the Empirical Challenge. 2.3. The Empirical Challenge First, suppose our best science consistently shows that SIM is largely correct and also that (i) most liberals in the United States take only harm/care and fairness/reciprocity to be genuine moral considerations and (ii) most conservatives take all five putative moral considerations to be genuine. Second, let us (albeit somewhat ironically) call the claim that only harm/care and fairness/reciprocity are genuine moral considerations the ‘Liberal Moral Doctrine’, and let us use ‘Conservative Moral Doctrine’ to refer to the claim that harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity are all genuine moral considerations. Now, notice that Sturgeon’s moral realism commits him to the falsity of either the Liberal Moral Doctrine or the Conservative Moral Doctrine (or both): For, moral realism–whether naturalist or non-naturalist–implies that if, say, purity/sanctity is a genuine moral consideration, then that it is, is a matter of objective fact. Notice also that Sturgeon’s naturalism commits him to the claim that whether the Liberal Moral Doctrine or the Conservative Moral Doctrine is more likely true can be discovered empirically: For, if, as per Sturgeon, ethics is an empirical enterprise, then each of its claims are either purely theoretical (logical, mathematical, etc.) or derivable from an empirical claim, and purity/sanctity’s status as a genuine moral consideration or a merely apparent moral consideration is not, for the ethical naturalist, a purely theoretical claim. So, given our suppositions above, Sturgeon is committed to the claim that whether the Liberal Moral Doctrine is more likely than the Conservative Moral Doctrine to be true (or vice versa) is empirically discoverable. The Empirical Challenge is therefore this: Given the suppositions above, describe a scientifically respectable empirical experiment whose results would show whether the Conservative Moral Doctrine or the Liberal Moral Doctrine is more likely true. 27

3. How (not) to Empirically Discover Normativity

I think the Empirical Challenge cannot be met. To show why, I first sketch the best experiment I can think of for meeting the challenge and then show why it fails. 3.1. Natural Kinds and Experimental Design.39 Moral kinds such as right action or vicious agent are, according to the NEN theorist, natural kinds. Science reveals which natural kinds there are by revealing the causal structure of world, and since experiments test causal hypotheses, experiments are the means by which science reveals the world’s causal structure.40 Now, the experimental method itself is based on what Mill called the “method of difference” ([1874] 1900, 280).41 In employing the method of difference, one runs a test twice such that all but one of the initial conditions are held constant across both runs of the test. Any observed differences between the outcomes of the test can (ideally) be attributed to the causal powers of the feature that differed across the test-runs. Following tradition, let us call the variable that ranges over the values of the feature hypothetically responsible for the effects in question the ‘independent variable’ (or ‘IV’), and let us call the variable that ranges over the values of the effects the ‘dependent variable’ (or ‘DV’). As it is often (albeit somewhat fast-and-loosely) stated in undergraduate psychology courses: The experimenter manipulates the IV and measures the DV. Now, if there is a statistically significant correlation between the IV and DV across some number of tests, then we have (again, ideally) some justification for inferring a causal relation between the feature represented by the

39This sub-subsection draws largely from (Davis and Rose 2000).

40By the phrase ‘the causal structure of the world’ and it cognates I basically mean that feature of the natural world that allows some causal relations and prevents other causal relations from being instantiated (realized, or whatever).

41To quote Mill:

If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. (Mill [1874] 1900, 280) 28

IV and the feature represented by the DV.42 So, in short, empirical experiments, by testing causal hypotheses, reveal the causal structure of the world by revealing statistically significant correlations between IVs and DVs. It thus follows that only causal hypotheses are empirically testable. Given this, I shall now sketch what I think is the most plausible empirical experiment for meeting the Empirical Challenge. 3.2. Causal hypotheses and Human Normativity-Detectors To empirically discover whether the Conservative or the Liberal moral doctrine is more likely true, we need an appropriate causal hypothesis. Fortunately, one can be formulated. To see how, let us take note of two things. Notice, first, that on a moral realist of SIM, when humans attempt to discover whether an action is morally required, they do so by judging the action in light of various moral considerations. It is when those moral considerations converge that one usually renders a moral judgment, which, according to the moral realist, may be either true or false.43 We thus see that, according to SIM, which considerations a person brings to bear when evaluating an action will determine whether he arrives at a true or false judgment, and it is only the set of genuine moral considerations that will tend to converge on true moral judgments. So, to see whether the Liberal or the Conservative moral doctrine is the more likely true, the moral scientist needs to solve the following problem: What is a principled way to empirically discover when a convergence of potentially genuine moral considerations is a convergence upon a true moral judgment? I call this problem the Convergence Problem. If the moral scientist can solve the Convergence Problem, then–and only then–can he meet the Empirical Challenge.

42In actuality, the IV and the DV range over values of features that are taken to represent the cause and the effect, respectively. For example, one might employ a Geiger counter when testing the effects of radiation on a population of pine trees such that the IV ranges over the Geiger counter’s readout and the DV ranges over the health of pine trees (operationally defined) in different locations. But clearly the Geiger counter’s readout would not be the cause of any differences in health across pine-tree groups. So, while a statistically significant correlation between an IV and a DV indicates a causal relation, the relation need not be between the most proximal cause of the IV’s and DV’s respective values.

43As noted above, moral judgment formation occasionally occurs, according to Haidt et al., after a person engages in conscious moral reasoning. 29

Here is the second thing to notice. Assuming, with the moral realist, that the correspondence theory of truth is right, a moral judgment about an action is true or false in virtue of whether or not that action has the moral property predicated of it by the judgment. Now, it is an empirical fact that in the natural world only humans can detect the presence of an evaluative property. It is also a fact, as per our stated assumptions, that evaluative properties are causally efficacious–specifically, they cause certain human responses such as lauding and statements of disapproval. Since only humans can detect the presence of evaluative properties, but humans can respond audibly to instances of these properties, we see that human responses provide the means by which moral scientists may tell whether or not a particular action is, say, morally required. So, in a way, humans are the moral scientist’s Geiger counters, instruments that detect the presence of normativity. Therefore, in the spirit of dispassionate science, let us call a human capable of detecting evaluative-property instances a ‘human normativity-detector’ (or ‘HND’).44 Given the causal relationship between moral properties and HND-output, we can thus make and utilize the following causal claim in searching for our causal hypothesis:

(MC) An action x’s being morally required causes a properly working HND to laud x.

So, the lauding of an action by a properly working HND will indicate an action’s being morally required. Now, some might balk at the ‘properly working’ qualifier. But that response would be premature. For, as we all know by now, every experiment presupposes that its apparatus is working properly. Since an HND is a piece of normativity-detecting apparatus, the ‘working properly’ qualifier stands as an instance of that required presupposition. With (MC) in place, we can now formulate causal hypotheses. Given that (i) only the set of genuine moral considerations will tend to converge on true moral judgments, and that (ii) evaluative properties can be detected only by a properly working HND whose output alerts us to the presence of an evaluative property, then we know that (iii) if the Conservative (or Liberal) Moral Doctrine is true, then the Conservative (Liberal) Moral Doctrine’s constitutive

44Perhaps not every human is an HND. The amoralist is perhaps a human that fails to be an HND. Also, some HND will be better at detecting normativity than others. 30 considerations will tend to converge on what the HND lauds. This consequent, viz., (iii), gives us our causal hypotheses:

(CMD) The convergence of the Conservative Moral Doctrine’s constitutive considerations causes the lauding of what is morally required. (LMD) The convergence of the Liberal Moral Doctrine’s constitutive considerations causes the lauding of what is morally required.

To empirically discover whether (CMD) or (LMD) is more likely true, let the IV range over the relevant self-identifications, viz., conservative and liberal (and perhaps a control group of self- identified independents, or “mavericks”), and let the DV range over lauds by a properly working HND.45 Then, present the persons in the different groups with a set of morally relevant actions to which they respond with ‘laudable’ or ‘not laudable’. Next, present, in the same order, the same actions to properly working HND. Finally, run an analysis to see if there is a statistically significantly difference between, on the one hand, a statistically significant positive-correlation between conservative-lauds and HND-lauds and, on the other, a statistically significant positive- correlation between liberal-lauds and HND-lauds. If the HND are working properly, then a statistically significant difference between these positive correlations will indicate whether the Liberal or the Conservative moral doctrine is more likely true. 3.3. Evaluating an experiment Now, I hope the experiment I just described sounds a bit like a farce. It should–even though I think such an experiment gets closest to what the NEN theorist’s research project would require. But merely pointing out that something seems farcical is not (contra Voltaire) an argument against it. I need to show why such an experiment cannot lead to genuine discovery. The short answer is that experiments themselves must, as any psychology student knows, be evaluated before one can be justified in accepting its results. As I will now show, however, attempting to justify an experiment like the one just described leads to vicious circularity.

45See note 24. 31

There are two axes along which an experiment may be evaluated: validity and reliability. Concerning the former, an experiment is valid just in case it measures what it is intended to measure–just in case, that is, its results really do imply the truth or falsity of the causal hypothesis in question. To use a quirky example, an experiment in which a bathroom scale is used to measure the barometric pressure in one’s home is invalid for the simple reason that data from a bathroom scale do not represent barometric pressure.46 Regarding reliability, an experiment is reliable to the degree that it is consistent across runs of the test. Even if a particular bathroom scale is taken to measure a person’s weight, if the scale gives wildly divergent output when persons of equal weight stand on it, the scale and the experiment that relies upon its use are unreliable. So, an experiment is reliable if, across several replications of the experiment, the DV values cluster when and only when the IV is held constant. An experiment can justify inferences to causal relations–and thus justify inferences to claims about what causally-defined natural kinds there are–only if that experiment is both valid and reliable. Consequently, if an experiment cannot be properly evaluated, then it cannot justify our beliefs. No experiment like that in the previous subsection can be properly evaluated. Here is why. While describing my proposed experiment, I stated that it would be improper to balk at the researcher’s assuming that the HND is working properly since all experiments presuppose properly working apparatus. But we are no longer describing the experiment; we are now evaluating it. As we have said, evaluating an experiment requires evaluating the validity and the reliability of the apparatus used in the experiment. Let us set reliability aside,47 and focus on validity.

46The biggest challenge to validity are so-called confounding variables. Confounding variables are variables that unintentionally co-vary with the IV. Confounding variables are particularly problematic because, since they co-vary with the IV, their effects on the DV may go unnoticed across tests. The consequence is that the DV’s values may reflect the effects of both the hypothesized cause and various other feature(s) rather than the effects of the hypothesized cause alone. Thus, confounding variables can cause us to draw spurious inferences regarding the hypothesis being tested. Attempts to control for confounding variables has resulted in some of the most ingenious work in experimental design.

47It would be fairly easy to determine whether an HND is reliable. If an HND lauds similar actions in and only in similar circumstances, then it is probably reliable. 32

To evaluate the validity of the experiment above, it will be crucial to evaluate the validity of a particular HND’s output. Here is why. Moral disagreement indicates the falsity of at least one interlocutors’ claims. Since moral disagreement among humans is ubiquitous, it is very likely that many of the moral claims put forward by humans are false, in which case the probability that any particular HND produces invalid output is considerably high. So, we need to give a principled way to distinguish between valid and invalid HNDs. Call this the ‘HND- validity Challenge.’ It is here that we run into trouble. The problem is, the HND-validity Challenge is just a more general version of the Empirical Challenge. Recall that to satisfy the Empirical Challenge we must solve the Convergence Problem: We must give a principled way to determine when considerations’ convergence is upon a true moral judgment. But HND just are humans capable of detecting the presence of moral properties, and so, assuming SIM, HND also arrive at moral judgments by a convergence of what they take to be moral considerations. It thus follows that to distinguish between valid and invalid HND, we must give a principled way to determine when a particular HND’s considerations converge upon a true moral judgment. And it is here that we are pulled into a vicious circularity in trying to meet the Empirical Challenge: Satisfying the Empirical Challenge requires our solving the Convergence Problem; solving the Convergence Problem requires running a HND experiment that is judged reliable and valid; but judging an HND experiment reliable and valid requires our having solved the Convergence Problem. So, until someone can describe how to empirically detect the presence of moral properties in the world without the use of humans, it seems that evaluative properties will lie beyond empirical science. Finally, notice that while the Empirical Challenge is presented in terms of a particular theory of moral judgment formation–viz., the theory characterized by SIM–the Empirical Challenge itself does not presuppose the truth of this particular theory. The Empirical Challenge presupposes only that (i) humans distinguish between moral and non-moral considerations, that (ii) humans primarily utilize only the putative moral considerations when forming moral judgments and (iii) that there is a difference between the considerations that conservatives and liberals count as specifically moral considerations. I have utilized SIM only to present the Empirical Challenge in terms of a concrete case. Consequently, so long as my presuppositions 33

are “approximately true,” to use Richard Boyd’s terminology (1988; 2001, 2003a, 2003b), the Empirical Challenge can still be put forward even if the theory of SIM becomes falsified.

4. Conclusion

When augmented in the ways I have described, the Triviality Objection, put forward in Parfit (forthcoming) and described in Dancy (2006), can force the ethical naturalist to deny any claim that identifies evaluative meaning with non-evaluative meaning or evaluative facts with non-evaluative facts. But the Triviality Objection misses the NEN theorist altogether, and so Parfit and Dancy advance the Normativity Objection. But the Normativity Objection faces the intractable Category Problem. In this chapter, I noted that the NEN theorist, too, needs to solve Category Problem, and I put forward the Empirical Challenge which challenges him to solve it. To avoid the confusion that often occurs when speaking in the abstract, I presented the Empirical Challenge in terms of current empirical work being done in moral psychology. Then, I gave reasons to think that the Empirical Challenge cannot be met. If for these reasons the Empirical Challenge cannot be met, the non-naturalist need not worry too much with either the Category Problem or the Normativity Objection. CHAPTER THREE

THE EXTERNALIST’S PARADOX AND DILEMMA

Kind terms refer to different types of kinds. ‘Electron’ and ‘up-quark’, for example, refer to natural kinds (call such terms ‘natural-kind terms’); ‘right action’ or ‘virtuous agent’ refer, perhaps, to nonnatural kinds (call such terms ‘nonnatural-kind terms’)48; and ‘jade’, ‘antique furniture’, and ‘fobo’ refer to artificial kinds (call such terms ‘artificial-kind terms’; also, an entity is a fobo just in case it is either a piece of furniture in my office or a book in my wife’s office). Now, according to externalism about natural-kind terms, if a kind term refers to a natural kind, then the term’s semantic value is determined at least partly by the external world. But, in her (2005) “Naming Natural Kinds,” Åsa Maria Wikforss puts forward a set of objections and rejoinders against such externalism. Then, later, in her (2008) “Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism,” Wikforss discusses several of these objections in light of Robert Stalnaker’s (2003) distinction between what Stalnaker calls ‘foundational semantics’ and ‘descriptive semantics’. Interestingly, when we put Wikforss’s (2005) objections and her (2008) discussion of them together, a unified objection to externalism about natural-kind terms may distilled. The objection is essentially that externalism implies paradox escape from which is blocked by a dilemma for the semantic externalist. (I call the paradox the ‘Externalist’s Paradox’ and the dilemma the ‘Externalist’s Dilemma’.) Now, in light of her (2005) objections–whence the dilemma’s horns–Wikforss urges the reconsideration of a so called ‘descriptivist’ theory of natural-kind term semantics, according to which the semantic value of natural-kind terms consists in a set of descriptions associated with the term. In this chapter, I shall defend externalism about natural-kind terms against the Externalist’s Dilemma by showing how the externalist can avoid the Externalist’s Paradox.

48Until the last section, I shall set aside nonnatural kinds and their referring terms and assume that, if a kind term fails to refer to a natural kind, then it refers to an artificial kind. Since it is unlikely that H2O, nephrite, or jadeite are nonnatural kinds, nothing in the arguments presented in the main part of this chapter will be affected.

34 35

An overview of the chapter will be useful. In the next section–section two–I briefly describe descriptivism about kind terms, describe Hilary Putnam’s (1975b) Twin Earth thought experiment which is taken by many to have overturned such descriptivism, and discuss externalism about natural-kind terms a bit more. In section three, I describe Stalnaker’s distinction between descriptive and foundational semantics. In section four, I present the Externalist’s Paradox; and, in section five, I present the Externalist’ Dilemma. In section six, I describe one response to Wikforss an externalist might be tempted to make and show why that response likely fails. In section seven, I show how the externalist might give up one of the claims upon which the Externalist Paradox is premised and thus avoid the paradox. In section eight, I conclude with some general remarks. Terminology Before going on, though, I offer some remarks concerning terminology. First, by the term ‘kind’ I mean a category49 of concrete particulars, specifically, of substances and events; and a category, I shall assume (for this chapter), is an abstract entity to which reference may be made. There are, as noted above, different types of kind. Let us define ‘natural kind’ thus:

(NK) For any kind K, K is a natural kind iff there exists exactly one natural property FK 50 such that FK defines K.

Furthermore, let us say,

49I mean ‘category’ in the sense of a taxonomic category, not in the sense of highest genera. Regarding the latter see, for example, Chisholm (1996) and Lowe (2006).

50The phrase ‘exactly one...property’ follows from Wikforss (2005) and indeed tradition, I take it. To quote Wikforss: “It is of course quite right that if ‘water’ is a natural kind term then it cannot pick out several different chemical compositions in the same world. Indeed, this seems close to a definitional truth, at least on the standard conception of natural kinds” (2005, 82). The “exactly-one-property view,” we might call it, is consistent with multiple realization, if multiple realization occurs, since being a member of a multiply realized kind would require having the disjunctive property that “defines” (see below) the kind. See Louise Antony (2003; 2008) and my “Non-natural Kinds” (this dissertation) for a discussion of this view. 36

(KDF) For any property FK and any kind K, FK defines K iff FK is a natural property such

that (i) all and only members of K have FK, and (ii), for any member of K, it is a

member of K in virtue of its having FK.

Until the last section of this chapter, let us assume that if a kind is not a natural kind, then it is an artificial kind.51 Second, I shall, for this chapter, assume a fairly standard realism about natural kinds: Which natural kinds there are is a fact about the objective, mind-independent external world;

and, while there may be other kinds than the following, this much is the case: ‘H2O’ and ‘gold’, as the latter is used today, refer to natural kinds, while ‘jade’, ‘air’, and ‘fobo’ refer to artificial kinds.52 Third, I should say a few words about meaning and semantic value. I use ‘meaning’ throughout to pick out a property of a sentence such that the meaning of a sentence P is, roughly, given by the conditions–actual and counterfactual–under which P is true.53 The term ‘semantic value’ refers to that which a term contributes to the truth-conditions of a sentence. So, where some (e.g., Lewis 1970) speak of a term’s meaning, I shall speak of a term’s semantic value. Finally, I shall rely at times on the distinction between a reference fixer and a de facto rigid designator; so, let me say something about those. By ‘rigid designation’ I mean the following: A term jTk rigidly designates a thing T iff jTk refers to t in every possible world in which T exists. Now, since kinds are abstract entities, and abstract entities exist in all possible worlds, then a kind term rigidly designates the kind to which it refers. Let us say, also, that a kind term jKk applies to a concrete particular (a concretum) iff the concretum is a member of the kind that jKk rigidly designates. Now, there are two types of rigid designator which Kripke (1980) distinguishes: de jure rigid designators and de facto rigid designators. A de jure rigid designator is a term that rigidly designates an entity in virtue of, say (and roughly), a causal

51See note 1.

52Below, I consider terms like ‘phlogiston’ which fail to pick out an objective kind.

53The sort of theory I have in mind is in the vein of Lewis (1970) and may be called a ‘possible worlds’ theory of meaning. I say more about the theory in section seven, below. 37

interaction (a “baptism”) between the person who introduced the name into the language and that to which the name refers. For example, the name ‘Mort’ is a de jure rigid designator of my black cat, and ‘electron’ is a de jure rigid designator of the natural kind, electron.54 A de facto rigid designator, by contrast, is a rigid designator that refers to (or picks out) an entity in virtue of some fact about that entity–in virtue of, that is, the entity’s satisfying some definite description. For example, the definite description jx = 7 + 5k de facto rigidly designates the number 12, since the description picks out 12 in very possible in world. Of course, not all definite descriptions de facto rigidly designate everything that satisfies them.55 For example, the definite description jx is Joe’s black catk–I have only one black cat–does not de facto rigidly designate my black cat, Mort, since there are some worlds in which Mort exists, but he is not mine. But notice that a definite description may be used to fix a rigid designation relation between a term and the term’s referent. I could, for example, have used the definite description jx is Joe’s new black kittenk to fix the reference of ‘Mort’ to Mort. So, even if a definite description is not a de facto rigid designator of some entity, it may, perhaps, be relied upon in order to fix a rigid designator’s reference. (Call a definite description that fixes the reference of a rigid designator that term’s ‘reference fixer’.) With that, I turn to theories of semantics.

1. Descriptive and Causal Kind Term Semantics

1.1. Mill’s Descriptive Internalism In a way, John Stuart Mill’s “Of Names” ([1881] 2001) stands at the inauguration of contemporary theories of kind-term semantics and reference. To see how, let us first distinguish between theories of semantics and theories of reference. By ‘theory of reference’, I mean a

54Since ‘electron’ names a natural kind, and kinds themselves are abstract entities, obviously one does not introduce a kind term by causally interacting with that which the kind term refers to. Putnam’s theory of how natural kind terms come to rigidly designate is discussed below.

55It might be the case, however, that every description de facto rigidly designates something, viz., the kind of thing whose members satisfy the description. See LaPorte (2000; 2006) and Schwartz (2002) for a discussion of such a view. 38

theory about what explains a term’s reference relation. ‘Mort’ refers to my black cat; so a theory of reference for individual names will, if successful, explain what is involved in ‘Mort’’s referring to my black cat. By ‘theory of semantics’ I mean a theory about what a term contributes to the meaning of the sentences in which the term occurs. As mentioned in the introduction, that which the term contributes to the meaning of a sentence in which the term occurs, I shall refer to as the term’s ‘semantic value’. Now, Mill offers little in the way of a theory of reference for a singular term (i.e., the name of an individual, e.g., ‘Mort’); however, according to Mill’s theory of semantics, singular terms simply “denote the individuals who are called by them, but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals” ([1881] 2001, 269). Thus, on a Millian theory of singular terms, a name’s semantic value is exhausted by the names’ referent: An named individual just is the name’s semantic value. By contrast, according to Mill, a kind term (or what Mill calls a ‘general name’) “expresses certain qualities, and when we predicate it of [its referents], we assert that they all possess those qualities” (Mill [1881] 2001, 267). So, according to the Mill, a kind term’s semantic value is to be identified with the set of descriptions associated with the term. What is more, for Mill, a kind term’s referent is anything which satisfies the term’s associated descriptions.56 So, for example, the term ‘water’, on Mill’s theory, may–say, in 1750–have been associated with the description jx is the liquid of which seas, lakes, and rivers are composed, which falls as rain and issues from springs, and which, when pure, is transparent, colorless

56To quote Mill,

All concrete general names [kind terms] are connotative. The word man, for example, denotes Peter, Jane, John, and an indefinite number of other individuals of whom, taken as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them because they possess, and to signify that they possess, certain attributes. These seem to be corporeity, animal life, rationality, and a certain external form which, for distinction, we call the human. Every existing thing which possessed all these attributes would be called a man; and anything which possessed none of them, or only one, or two, or even three of them without the fourth, would not be so called. (Mill [1881] 2001, 268) 39

(except as seen in large quantity, when it has a blue tint), tasteless, and inodorousk.57 ‘Water’’s semantic value would, at least in 1750, have consisted in this description, and its referent would be the category all and only of whose members satisfy this description. We see, then, that according to Mill, a natural-kind term’s semantic value consists in a description that determine’s the term’s referent, but, for an singular term, the term’s semantic value is just the term’s referent. Now, let us pause to discuss terminology a bit more. Let us call semantic theories, like Mill’s, according to which the semantic value of a kind term consists in the description competent users of the term associate with the term ‘Semantic Descriptivism’. Reference theories, like Mill’s, according to which a kind term’s associated description determines the term’s reference, has come to be called a ‘descriptive theory of reference’ (or ‘DTR’). I shall follow this tradition. Theories of semantics are distinct from theories of reference, but often the two are presented together, and Semantic Internalism and DTR are a case in point. Therefore, for readability, let us call a linguistic theory which conjoins DTR and Semantic Descriptivism ‘Descriptive Internalism’ (or ‘DI’). Now, since the mid-1970s, it has come to be widely held that a semantic theory more like Mill’s theory of singular terms can account for the semantics of kind terms that refer specifically to natural kinds. In the remainder of this section I shall do three things. First, since DI seems to be experiencing something of a revival, I shall describe a more recent and sophisticated version of DI. Second, I shall describe Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment, which is believed by many to show the falsity of DI. Finally, I shall briefly describe the general contours of semantic and reference theories inspired by Putnam’s thought experiment. 1.2. Descriptive Internalism The standard challenge to DI is, perhaps, the problem of ignorance and error. Essentially, the challenge asks the DI theorist, how is it that one may be competent enough to use a term to refer to natural kind about which one has little or inaccurate knowledge? If DI were true, the challenge goes, then one should be able to use a term to refer to a natural kind only if one has associated with the term a description that is satisfied by all and only members of the natural kind. But people who are ignorant or have false beliefs about a particular natural kind

57This definition was adapted from the Oxford English Dictionary. 40

are often quite competent with the term that refers to it. Many persons are able to use the term ‘electron’, for example, to refer to electrons despite their knowing only that an electron is one among several different kinds of fundamental particle. If DI were true, then such competency should not obtain; but it does obtain; therefore, DI must be false. Disjoined descriptions are thought by many to supply the solution to the DI theorists’ troubles. The is this. A kind term is, perhaps within a linguistic community, associated not with a single description but with a cluster of descriptions which are disjoined together.58 It is in this cluster of descriptions that the term’s semantic value consists; and since the cluster is disjunctive, one need not have associated all of the descriptions with the term in order to be a competent user of the term. Rather, according to this version of DI, a person knows the semantic value of the term when he has associated with the term enough descriptions to uniquely pick out the term’s referent. But which descriptions are associated with the term may vary across persons. Notice that the descriptions may be very sparse. Take, for example, this description: jx is the kind referred by Dirac when Dirac uses the term “electron” to refer to a fundamental particlek. This description is sufficient to pick out uniquely the natural kind, electron. Consequently, if one associates this description with the term ‘electron’, then, according to our DI theorist, one can use the term to refer to the natural kind, electron, even if one is very ignorant or has erroneous beliefs about electrons. So, our DI theorist claims, by identifying the semantic value of a kind term, not with a single (perhaps conjunctive) description, but with a cluster of descriptions disjoined together, the DI theorist avoids the problem of ignorance and error. Since this more sophisticated version of DI seems to have supplanted the older version, I shall from hereon use ‘DI’ to refer only to the more sophisticated version. What is more, I shall assume from hereon that DI offers the only viable internalist theory of semantics.

58John Searle (1958) presents a descriptive-cluster theory of semantics for proper names. The descriptive-cluster theory for semantics seems to be a fairly direct application of Searle’s theory to natural-kind terms. 41

1.3. Twin Earth In his (1975b), Hilary Putnam introduced his Twin Earth thought experiment from which he argues that merely identifying the semantic value of a natural-kind term with a disjunctive cluster of descriptions does not solve the DI theorist’s problem of ignorance and error. According to the thought experiment, there is a world–perhaps a far away planet or perhaps another possible world–that is at the macro-level exactly similar to Earth. Putnam calls the other world ‘Twin Earth’. The only difference between Earth and Twin Earth is that what Earthlings

call ‘water’ consists of H2O, but what Twin-Earthlings call Twin-‘water’ consists of some complex chemical compound abbreviated XYZ. At the macro-level, water and Twin-water appears, smell, behave, and so on exactly similarly. Putnam has us suppose that on Earth and Twin Earth it is 1750, and that an Earthling called ‘Oscar’ visits Twin Earth. Since Earth and Twin Earth look exactly similar, and since Earthlings have yet to discover that what is called

‘water’ on Earth consists of H2O, and Twin Earthlings have yet to discover that what call Twin- ‘water’ consists of XYZ, Oscar would believe that ‘water’ and Twin-‘water’ have the same referent, viz., water, and thus the same semantic value–or, as Oscar, who is not a student of kind- term semantics, might put it, ‘water’ and Twin-‘water’ mean the same thing. But, Putnam has us notice, our intuitions are that Oscar would, in fact, be wrong and that Oscar himself could be corrected by our explaining to him that what Earthlings call ‘water’ consists of H2O, while what Twin Earthlings call Twin-‘water’ consists of XYZ. That is the Twin Earth thought experiment. Here is the argument from Twin Earth against DI. Notice that since Oscar is from a time, viz., 1750, when Earthlings had not yet discovered that what they call ‘water’ consists of H2O,

then the only descriptions of H2O available to Oscar and his fellow Earthlings are those about

H2O’s macro-level qualities–its being tasteless, odorless, colorless in small quantities, etc. So, any description that Oscar and his fellow Earthlings might associate with the term ‘water’ will be insufficient–too coarse-grained, to be specific–to uniquely pick out just one natural kind; any

description of H2O available to Oscar can be satisfied also by XYZ. It follows that if Oscar and his fellow Earthlings can nonetheless use the term ‘water’ competently enough to refer uniquely

to H2O, then associating ‘water’ with a description that uniquely picks out H2O is not, pace the DI theorist, necessary for Oscar’s knowing the semantic value of ‘water’. 42

Now, that Oscar can indeed use ‘water’ to refer uniquely to H2O is evinced by our intuitions that Oscar’s use of ‘water’ on Twin Earth is wrong. If, as per the DI theorist, the semantic value of a term is the set of descriptions associated with the term, then when the term is used to refer to any entity that satisfies the description, the term is used correctly. Since the only descriptions Oscar and his fellow Earthlings could have associated with ‘water’ are satisfiable by both H2O and XYZ, then, if DI were true, Oscar’s using ‘water’ to refer to XYZ would have been a correct usage. But our intuitions are that Oscar’s usage was incorrect; we seem to think that Oscar made a mistake when he called XYZ ‘water’. If Oscar made a mistake in his usage, then the semantic value of ‘water’ must be given by something other than whatever descriptions Oscar came to associate with the term ‘water’; and if a kind term’s semantic value consists in something other than descriptions associated with the kind term, then DI is false. So, our intuitive responses to the Twin Earth thought experiment evince DI’s falsity. 1.4. Causal Externalism In light of the argument from Twin Earth against DI, various theories of kind term semantics and reference have been advanced, perhaps the most important of which can be broadly grouped within what I shall call ‘Causal Externalism’ (or ‘CE’).59 CE, like DI, conjoins a semantic thesis about natural-kind terms (call the thesis ‘semantic externalism’) and a reference thesis (call it the ‘causal theory of reference’ or ‘CTR’). According to semantic externalism, the semantic value of a natural-kind term consists at least partly in the natural kind to which the term refers. So, what ‘water’’s semantic value (at least partly) consists in is, according to semantic externalism, the natural kind to which ‘water’ refers, viz., H2O. Now, let us consider CTR. According to Kripke’s (1980) causal theory of reference for singular terms, a singular term comes to refer to an individual in one of two ways. On the one hand, the term might be introduced by means of a baptism: a person with the appropriate authority–say, a person’s parents or a kitten’s new owner–causally interacts with the entity to be named and does so with the intention to name the entity. On the other hand, the entity may be picked out by means of a definite description, and then the person with the right authority uses that description fix the reference relation between the name and the entity. Now, with regard to

59Causal Externalism originates with Putnam (1975b) and Kripke (1980). 43

natural-kind terms, according to Putnam (1975b), a person within the language community who introduces a natural-kind term “baptizes” an exemplar of the natural kind in question and does so with the intention of naming the natural kind of which the exemplar is a example. So, take the kind term, ‘water’. On Putnam’s account, ‘water’ was introduced into the language by means of someone’s, say, pointing at a sample of water and calling it, qua member of a kind, ‘water’. According to CE, then, the baptism of an entity qua exemplary member of a natural kind explains how a natural-kind term’s reference relation is fixed. Now, allow me to pause for a moment and point out an important distinction between an individual’s baptism and a natural kind’s baptism. According to Kripke, the reference relation of a singular term is fixed by either causally interacting with the entity named or by picking out the thing with a definite description. Notice, though, that the “baptism” of a natural kind requires an additional definite description. The reason is, natural kinds are abstract entities, and one cannot causally interact with abstract entities. Therefore, in order to name a natural kind, one must pick out that natural kind by means of a definite description. According to Putnam (1975b), such a definite description is indexed to the exemplar (or exemplars). For example, the person who

baptized the natural kind, H2O, with ‘water’ causally interacted with (pointed to, definitely

described, etc.) existent samples of H2O and then, in order name the natural kind, H2O, used a definite description indexed to that (or those) sample(s)–a definite description on the order of, say, j‘water’ names the kind K of which that stuff is a samplek or jwater is that kind K of stuffk. From hereon, when I speak of a natural kind’s being “baptized,” my use of ‘baptism’ should be taken to include reference to the definite description required to pick out the named natural kind. Furthermore, when I speak of an exemplar’s being baptized, my use of ‘baptism’ should be understood as something of an abbreviation for the exemplar’s being used to baptize a natural kind. Thus, my use of ‘baptism’ is a bit ambiguous, but context should provide a reliable means for avoiding confusion.. Now, going on, according to Putnam, all and only entities that stand in the “sameness” relation with the baptized exemplar are members of the natural kind referred to with the newly introduced kind term. In the terminology introduced in the introduction, two entities stand in the sameness relation iff they both possess the same kind-defining property. Since the kind-defining property of water, for example, is the property of consisting of H2O, it follows that all and only 44 other entities that consist of H2O are, along with the baptized sample of water, members of the natural kind, water. Consequently, anyone who, like Oscar above, uses the term ‘water’ to refer to an entity that does not consist of H2O makes a mistake, whether or not anyone knows that water consists in H2O. That, then, is CE, and from hereon I shall assume that CE offers the only viable externalist theory of semantics. Having briefly described and discussed DI, described the Twin Earth thought experiment thought to undermine DI, and described CE, I shall in the next section describe Stalnaker’s (2003) distinction between descriptive and foundational semantics and then, in the following two sections, I will present the Externalist’s Paradox and Dilemma.

2. Descriptive Semantics and Foundational Semantics

The Externalist’s Dilemma, as mentioned in the introduction, is a distillation from a set of objections to CE appearing in Wikforss (2005) and from Wikforss’s (2008) description of these objections in light of Stalnaker’s (2003, 166-67) distinction between descriptive semantics and foundational semantics. Over the next three sections, I shall describe the Externalist’s Dilemma. Now, since I am concerned only with the CE theorist who wishes to avoid straying very far from a broadly Kripke/Putnam-style semantics of natural-kind terms, I include in my presentation of the Externalist’s Dilemma only those objections by Wikforss (2005) that would directly affect such a semantics. So, for example, I do not include Wikforss’s objection to Michael McKinsey’s (1987, 1994) semantic theory, since McKinsey’s theory is predicated upon what might be called a broadly Wittgensteinian ‘meaning-is-use’ conception of semantics.60 Furthermore, Stalnaker’s distinction between foundational semantics and descriptive semantics figures prominently in the Externalist’s Paradox and Dilemma. (Descriptive semantics should not be confused with Descriptivism or DI. To avoid confusion, let us abbreviate ‘descriptive semantics’ with ‘D-semantics’ and ‘foundational semantics’ with ‘F-semantics’.) Therefore, I shall describe in this section that distinction. To begin, notice that there are two questions one must answer when giving the semantics of a particular kind term jKk. One question is, what is jKk’s semantic value? The other question

60See, for example, Wittgenstein (1953). 45

is, what determined that jKk has the particular semantic value it has? Now, a D-semantic theory attempts to answer the first question; it assigns semantic values to particular terms within a particular language. If DI theorists are right, then the semantic value of a natural-kind term is the disjunctive description associated with the term: For ‘water’, the semantic value is, perhaps, jx is the liquid of which seas, lakes, ...k. (Call a semantic value that consists in a description a ‘descriptive semantic value’.) If CE theorists are right, then the semantic value of a natural-kind term is given (at least partly) by the external world: The semantic value of ‘electron’, for example, is given (at least partly) by facts having to do with the natural kind, electron. (Call a semantic value that is given at least partly the external world an ‘external semantic value’.61) Now, an F-semantic theory attempts to answer the second question above; it is a theory about what determines the semantic value of a kind term. (Call that which determines a particular term’s semantic value the term’s ‘value determiner’.) According to DI, ‘water’’s value determiner (call this type of value determiner an ‘associative-psychological value determiner’) consists in a speaker’s having associated ‘water’ with the description jx is the liquid of which seas, lakes, ...k. According to CE, ‘water’’s value determiner (call this type of value determiner a ‘baptismal value determiner’) includes a causal connection between samples of water and a baptizer, who used ‘water’ with the intention of naming a natural kind (viz., water). It is important to see that DI and CE theorists disagree not merely about the semantic values of natural-kind terms or about how a particular natural-kind term came to have that semantic value. The disagreement is much deeper: DI and CE theorists disagree about the type of thing that could be a natural-kind term’s semantic value and about the type of thing that could be a natural-kind term’s value determiner. Regarding D-semantics, DI theorists argue that the semantic value of a natural-kind term is a description–something internal to the speaker. (Let us call a D-semantic theory that assigns a descriptive semantic value to a kind term ‘D-semantic internalism’ or an ‘internalist D-semantics’) CE theorists, by contrast, argue that the semantic value of a natural-kind term is given (at least partly) by the external world. (Let us call a D-

61This is somewhat an unfortunate terminology choice, since ‘external’ is usually contrasted with ‘internal’ and I have chosen to contrast ‘external semantic value’ with ‘descriptive semantic value.’ I think, however, that ‘descriptive’ is, well, more descriptive than ‘internal’ and therefore easier to keep in mind. 46

semantic theory that assigns an external semantic value to a kind term ‘D-semantic externalism’ or an ‘externalist D-semantics’.) Now, when it comes to F-semantics, DI theorists argue that a natural-kind term’s value determiner is a (viz., the state of having associated a term with a disjunctive description)–which is internal to the speaker. (Let us call an F-semantic theory that assigns an associative-psychological value determiner to a kind term ‘F-semantic internalism’ or an ‘internalist F-semantics’.) CE theorists, however, argue that a causal relation–which is external to the speaker–and a particular intention determines the term’s semantic value. (Let us call an F-semantic theory that assigns a baptismal value determiner to a kind term ‘F-semantic externalism’ or an ‘externalist F-semantics’.) We see, then, that DI theorists argue for D- and F-semantic internalism for natural-kind terms, while CE theorists argue for D- and F-semantic externalism for natural-kind terms. Now, as will be discussed at greater length in the next section, the CE theorist allows that D- and F-semantic internalism accounts for the semantics of kind terms that are not natural-kind terms. So, the CE theorist denies that there is a “one size fits all” semantic theory for kind terms. It is therefore important to see that, when it comes to the distinction between D- and F- semantics, the CE theorist is committed to what we might call ‘exclusive co-variance’ of D- and F-semantics across kinds terms with regard to internalism and externalism. That is, according to CE, (i) a kind term’s semantic value is accounted for by D-semantic externalism iff its value determiner is accounted for by F-semantic externalism; (ii) a kind term’s semantic value is accounted for by D-semantic internalism iff its value determiner is accounted for by F-semantic internalism; and (iii) if a kind term’s semantic value (or value determiner) is accounted for by D- semantic externalism (or F-semantic externalism), then its semantic value (or value determiner) is not accounted for by D-semantic internalism (or F-semantic internalism). Let us put the point more formally:

(CoV) For any kind term jKk, D-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value iff F-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner, otherwise D- and F-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value and value determiner, respectively. 47

The phrase ‘accounts for’ in (CoV) should be understood to mean “exclusively accounts for.” Here is why the CE theorist is committed to the truth of (CoV). Again, F-semantics accounts for what determines a kind term’s semantic value, and D-semantics accounts for what that term’s semantic value actually is. Now, on the one hand, F-semantic externalism accounts for a kind term’s value determiner just in case that kind term has a baptismal value determiner.62 But a baptismal value determiner cannot determine a descriptive semantic value for the simple reason that a baptism does not result in a definition. But, D-semantic internalism accounts for a kind term’s semantic value just in case the term’s semantic value is a descriptive semantic value.63 Therefore, F-semantic externalism accounts for a kind term’s value determiner just in case the kind term’s semantic value is not descriptive. But if a kind term’s semantic value is not descriptive, then (assuming the term has a semantic value) the kind term’s semantic value is external, in which case D-semantic externalism accounts for the kind term’s semantic value. So, F-semantic externalism accounts for a kind term’s value determiner iff D-semantic externalism accounts for the kind term’s semantic value. Now, on the other hand, F-semantic internalism accounts for a kind term’s value determiner just in case that value determiner is associative- psychological. But an associative-psychological value determiner cannot determine an external semantic value. The reason is, an associative-psychological value determiner consists in associating a kind term with a description, the latter of which becomes, through its being associated with the kind term, that term’s semantic value. But according to both the DI and CE theorists,64 if a kind term has a descriptive semantic value, it cannot have an external semantic value.65 Therefore, according to both CE and DI theorists, F-semantic internalism accounts for a

62Recall from section two that we are assuming CE offers the only viable semantic externalism.

63Again, DI is assumed to offer the only viable semantic internalist theory.

64Obviously, I am not including within DI the so-called “two-dimensional semantics” theorists. This is no problem for the discussion here because I am not interested in defending in this chapter a two-dimensional theory of semantics.

65This conditional is trivially true according to the DI theorist because the DI theorist claims that the consequent holds for all kind terms. 48

kind term’s value determiner iff D-semantic internalism accounts for the term’s semantic value. Therefore, for the CE theorist, F- and D-semantics co-vary across kind terms with regard to internalism versus externalism. Having shown that the CE theorist is thus committed to (CoV), I now describe the Externalist’s Paradox.

3. The Externalist’s Paradox

The Externalist’s Dilemma arises from a paradox apparently implied by CE. I present the Externalist’s Paradox in this section. First, Wikforss (2005) tells us that it is widely held among current CE theorists that natural-kind terms–vis-à-vis artificial-kind terms–are particularly distinctive in that their respective semantic values are given (at least partly) by the external world. Wikforss suggests this in two places. In one place, she attributes the view to the Putnam of (1970). To quote Wikforss:

[W]hat characterizes natural kind terms, for Putnam, is precisely that no...list of necessary and sufficient properties [i.e., necessary and sufficient conditions for being a member of the term’s extension] can be given. [...] In order to account for this peculiar quality of natural kind terms, Putnam appeals to the idea that we use natural kind terms to pick out an underlying ‘essential nature’. (Wikforss 2005, 67).

So, according to Wikforss’s reading of Putnam, it is a feature peculiar to natural-kind terms that their respective semantic values are (at least partly) given by the external world. Now, in another place, Wikforss argues that this view is implied by the claims of those whom we–drawing on Kaplan (1989)–might call ‘Direct Reference theorists’ about natural-kind terms. Direct Reference theorists are a variety of CE theorist who apply Mill’s semantics of singular terms more straightforwardly to natural-kind terms, claiming that the semantic value of a natural- kind term is exhausted by facts having to do with the term’s referent (see, for example, Soames 2002; 2005). According to Wikforss, Direct Reference theorists are committed to the claim that if a kind term’s referent is not a natural kind, then an entity falls in the term’s extension only by satisfying some description associated with the term, in which case the semantic value of the 49 term just is the description associated with it. Here is how Wikforss puts the view in terms of ‘water”:

Either ‘water’ names a natural kind, in which case it is to be given an externalist semantics, or it names a superficial kind, in which case it can be given a traditional descriptivist semantics. (Wikforss 2005, 78)

We can put the view a bit more formally thus:

(A/D) For any kind term jKk, jKk has an external semantic value iff jKk refers to a natural kind, otherwise jKk has a descriptive semantic value.

From (A/D) and the assumption that a kind term is either a natural-kind term or an artificial-kind term,66 it follows that if a kind term refers to an artificial kind, then DI accounts for its semantics, otherwise CE accounts for its semantics. (For a mnemonic, the ‘A/D’ in ‘(A/D)’ stands for “artificial iff descriptive.”). Now, notice that (CoV) and (A/D) together imply a three-variable co-variance:

(1) For any kind term jKk: (i) jKk is a natural-kind term iff D-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value, and D-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value iff F-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner; (ii) jKk is an artificial-kind term iff D-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value, and D-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value iff F-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner; and (iii) jKk is not both an artificial-kind term and a natural-kind term.

66Again, we are setting aside nonnatural-kind terms; see note 1. 50

In short, the CE theorist who holds both (CoV) and (A/D) is committed to the claim that, of the two different types of kind term, the semantics of all and only natural-kind terms is accounted for by D- and F-semantic externalism, and the semantics of all and only artificial-kind terms is accounted for by D- and F-semantic internalism. Now, since the DI theorist claims that the semantics of all types of kind term, whether artificial or natural, are accounted for by D- and F-semantic internalism, it follows that the CE theorist is committed to a semantic distinction to which the DI theorist is not committed, viz., the distinction between kind terms whose semantics is accounted for by D- and F-semantic externalism and kind terms whose semantics is accounted for by D- and F-semantic internalism.67 Wikforss shows that the DI theorist can leverage this additional commitment into a challenge for the CE theorist by asking the CE theorist to describe just what determines whether a particular kind term gets a baptismal value determiner rather than an associative- psychological value determiner. That is, a kind term’s value determiner determines the kind term’s semantic value, and the CE theorist claims that there are two different types of value determiner. What, then, the DI theorist asks the CE theorist, determines which of the two types of value determiner a particular kind term gets? Now, the answer seems fairly obvious: Surely, the person who introduces the kind term into the language determines by stipulation what type of value determiner the term gets. After all, a word is just an arbitrary symbol. So, presumably he who introduced the kind term into the language stipulated whether the term has a baptismal or associative-psychological value determiner. Here is the claim more formally stated:

(2) For any kind term jKk, he who introduces jKk into the language determines by stipulation whether F-semantic externalism or F-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner.

67By the way, this raises a concern not mentioned by Wikforss but which lurks in the background. As described above, CE theorists claim that the semantics of natural-kind terms are distinctive vis-à-vis artificial-kind terms in that natural-kind terms have externalist D- and F- semantics, while artificial-kind terms have an internalist D- and F-semantics. We thus see that the CE theorist is committed to four semantic theories where the DI theorist is committed to only two. Clearly the DI theorist has the simpler theory. The question of course is, can DI account for all of the phenomena? That is the question raised by the Twin Earth thought experiment. 51

Now, since, as per (1), F-semantic type co-varies across kind terms with D-semantic type, it follows that when we stipulate that F-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner, we stipulate also that D-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value, if at a semantic value. Put another way, according to (1), in stipulating that jKk has a baptismal value determiner, we also stipulate that jKk takes only an external semantic value. So, even if the term fails to refer, we nonetheless limit by stipulation the sort of semantic value the term could have. But, Wikforss argues, difficulty arises for the CE theorist when one considers terms that we once believed to be natural-kind terms but which we later discovered in fact are not. These terms show us that attempts to baptize a natural kind with a particular kind term can fail because it may turn out that what appeared to be a natural kind is in fact not a natural kind. For example, according to philosophical lore68 the term ‘jade’ was long believed to refer to a natural kind, but through empirical investigation we discovered that ‘jade’ in fact does not refer to a natural kind. It turned out that we were calling two distinct natural kinds–jadeite and nephrite–‘jade’. ‘Jade’, we discovered, refers to an artificial kind. But, in virtue of his commitment to (1), the CE theorist is committed to claiming that if a kind term refers to an artificial kind, then the term has a descriptive semantic value. So, if the CE theorist is right, then when we empirically discovered that ‘jade’ refers to an artificial kind, we empirically discovered also that ‘jade’ has a descriptive semantic value. But if ‘jade’ has a descriptive semantic value, then ‘jade’’s semantic value is accounted for by D-semantic internalism. But, again, as per (1), D-semantic type co- varies across kind terms with F-semantic type. So, in empirically discovering that ‘jade’’s semantic value is accounted for by D-semantic internalism, we also empirically discovered that ‘jade’’s value determiner is accounted for by F-semantic internalism. Here, then, is the rub: If we empirically discovered that ‘jade’’s value determiner is accounted for by F-semantic internalism, then it seems quite clear that the world, and not we, determined whether ‘jade’ has a baptismal or associative-psychological value determiner and that the world, despite what we intended, chose the latter.

68See LaPorte (2004) for a more historically accurate description. LaPorte argues that the actual history of ‘jade’’s introduction into the language undermines Putnam’s argument from Twin Earth. I do not have the space to respond directly to LaPorte’s argument here, although I believe that the argument I offer below is powerful enough to counter LaPorte’s claim. 52

The case of ‘jade’ shows that the CE theorist committed to (1) is thus committed to a paradox, the Externalist’s Paradox. On the one hand, it seems fairly obvious that we stipulated ‘jade’’s type of value determiner and thus the type of semantic value that ‘jade’ takes. For, it seems that when we attempted to use ‘jade’ to baptize a natural kind, we stipulated that F- semantic externalism accounts for ‘jade’’s value determiner. On the other hand, our discovery that ‘jade’ refers to an artificial kind seems to show that the world determined that ‘jade’ in fact has a descriptive semantic value and thus that ‘jade’’s semantic value is accounted for by a D- semantic internalism. But if the world determined that ‘jade’’s semantic value is accounted for by D-semantic internalism, then the world also determined that ‘jade’’s value determiner is accounted for by F-semantic internalism. In short, we can stipulate that ‘jade’ has an externalist F-semantics only if it is possible that we determine whether ‘jade’ has an internalist or externalist D- and F-semantics. But if we in fact attempt to stipulate that ‘jade’ has an externalist F- semantics, then it is possible for the world to determine whether ‘jade’ in fact has an internalist or externalist D-semantics and thus an internalist or externalist F-semantics. The Externalist’s Paradox is that, on the CE view we have been considering, the world can determine whether ‘jade’ has an internalist or externalist D- and F-semantics iff we can determine whether ‘jade’ has an internalist or externalist D- and F-semantics. CE seems to imply that we are caught in a semantic tug-of-war with the external world. But, of course, the Externalist Paradox is not limited to ‘jade’; it generalizes to any putative natural-kind term. The reason is, for any putative natural-kind term, it is an empirical question whether that term in fact refers to a natural kind. Thus, for any putative natural-kind term, it seems that it is the world–and not we–who determines whether that kind term has an internalist or externalist D-semantics. Let us put the point more formally,

(3) For any putative natural-kind term jKk, the world determines whether D-semantic internalism or D-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value.

By (1), it follows from (3) that the world determines whether F-semantic internalism or F- semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner. In short, then, the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3) leads the CE theorist into the Externalist’s Paradox. The Externalist’s Dilemma, 53

then, goes essentially like this: Since the CE theorist is apparently committed to (1), the CE theorist must either maintain the truth of (2) and deny (3) or deny the truth of (2) and maintain (3). Wikforss considers each of these options and finds all of them untenable.

4. The Externalist’s Dilemma

The Externalist’ Dilemma consists in a conjunction of the Externalist’s Paradox and the set of arguments Wikforss puts forward to show that neither of the means described at the end of the last section for escaping the Externalist Paradox is a viable option for the CE theorist. In this section, I shall present Wikforss’s arguments and thereby the rest of the Externalist’s Dilemma. 4.1. Maintaining Stipulate Control Consider, first, a view that embraces (2) and denies (3)–a view, that is, according to which the person who attempts to introduce a natural-kind term into the language stipulates that the kind term has a value determiner accounted for by F-semantic externalism, that is, a baptismal value determiner. Here is the view. If a person attempts to introduce a kind term jKk into the world by means of a baptism, then he stipulates that jKk has a baptismal value determiner; and if the person stipulates that jKk has a baptismal value determiner, then, by (1), he determines that jKk takes only an external semantic value. It would at that point be an open question–left up to the external world, as it were–as to whether jKk actually has an external semantic value. So, for example, it was by someone’s stipulation that ‘gold’ has a baptismal value determiner; the person who introduced ‘gold’ into the language did so by deciding to attempt and then in fact attempting to baptize a natural kind with the term ‘gold’. By so attempting, he who introduced ‘gold’ into the language determined by stipulation that ‘gold’ can have only an external semantic value. It was then up to the world to determine whether or not ‘gold’ actually has that type of semantic value. Since it (presumably) turned out that ‘gold’ refers to a natural kind, ‘gold’’s semantic value is given (at least partly) by the external world; if ‘gold’ had not referred to a natural kind, then ‘gold’ simply would have failed to have a semantic value. 54

The problem with this view is, as Wikforss (2005) points out when considering a view with similar implications,69 that it has highly implausible consequences. Namely, as the last sentence of the last paragraph indicates, the view under consideration entails that if a putative natural-kind term turns out, in fact, not to refer to a natural kind, then the term has no semantic value–at all. But if the term has no semantic value, then the sentences in which the term occurs indeed fail to have specifiable truth-conditions and thus are incapable of possessing truth-value. So, the CE theorist who embraces (2) and denies (3) would, according to Wikforss, be committed to saying that when we discovered that jade is not a natural kind, we did not discover that the statement, “jade is a natural kind,” is false; rather, we discovered that the statement does not have truth-value. Similarly, if we were to discover that ‘water’ fails to refer to a natural kind, then we would discover that ‘water’ has no semantic value, in which case it is meaningless to say of water that it is wet. As Wikforss (rightly, I believe) points out, all of this seems highly implausible, and therefore the view should be rejected. 4.2. Losing Stipulative Control Now, on the other hand, the CE theorist may wish to maintain (3) and deny (2). Wikforss considers two ways that the CE theorist who takes this option could go. 4.2.1. The FBFI view. The CE theorist might claim that the baptizer does not determine by stipulation that jKk has a baptismal value determiner per se, but rather the baptizer merely believes that there is a natural kind K, intends to use jKk to refer to K, and then yields to the world to determine the baptizer’s success in satisfying his intention. The FBFI view, Wikforss suggests, would allow our CE theorist two things. First, embracing the FBFI view would allow the CE theorist to avoid the Externalist’s Paradox in two ways. Take ‘jade’ again. The person who introduced ‘jade’ into the language, the story goes, had a falsifiable that there is a natural kind, jade, and he intended to baptize that kind with the term ‘jade’. When we discovered that ‘jade’ is not a natural-kind term, we just discovered that what the baptizer intended to do, he failed to do, and we discovered also that our (and the baptizer’s) belief that jade is a natural kind is false. (Hence ‘FBFI’, which stands for falsifiable belief, fallible intention.) Wikforss does not say much about what happens after we discover that the baptizer’s

69She is at this point considering McKinsey’s (1987, 1994) view. 55

intention to baptize a natural kind K with the term jKk failed and that our belief that K is a natural kind was false. But one can see how things might go. Once we discover that jKk does not refer to a natural kind, then (i) we may, by stipulation, psychologically associate jKk with some description, thereby determining that jKk has a descriptive semantic value, or (ii) we might attempt to baptize with jKk what we (falsifiably) believe is a newly discovered natural kind. Regarding option (i), as noted above, one’s stipulating that jKk has a descriptive semantic value does not involve one in the Externalist’s Paradox. Regarding (ii), one would simply yield to the world so that it (the world) could again undermine one’s intention to baptize a natural kind and falsify one’s belief that one has succeeded. So, either way, the CE theorist would avoid the Externalist’s Paradox. The second thing that the FBFI view putatively does, is that it allows the CE theorist to explain our intuitions regarding Twin Earth. According to Wikforss, one could plausibly read Putnam’s (1975b) “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” as advocating the FBFI view. Evidence to support this reading, says Wikforss, comes from Putnam’s apparently arguing that it is the baptizer’s intention to use ‘water’ to refer to a certain natural kind that makes ‘water’’s semantic value differ from Twin-‘water’’s. To quote Wikforss’s interpretation of Putnam:

The reason we should conclude that ‘water’ has a different meaning on Twin Earth than on Earth, [Putnam] argues, is that when we ostensively defined ‘water’ on Earth, we intended ‘water’ to be used as a natural kind term–we intended it to pick out that substance which underlies our water-samples (Putnam 1975[b], 231, 238). (Wikforss 2005, 72; emphasis hers.)

Wikforss goes on to note that Putnam allowed for the possibility that the baptizer could have failed to baptize a natural kind, since water could have turned out to be like jade. But since, according to Putnam, it turned out that ‘water’ names a natural kind, then ‘water’ has a different semantic value on Earth than it does on Twin Earth, and the reason is, ‘water’ was intended to name a natural kind on Earth. The problem with the FBFI view is, according to Wikforss, that it allows a Twin Earth type scenario to actually falsify the claim that ‘water’ refers to a natural kind. That ‘water’ is a 56

natural-kind term, is an empirical claim, and therefore it is still open to falsification. Wikforss suggests that if we were to find on some distant planet a heretofore unknown chemical compound with all the superficial qualities possessed by water, we would discover that ‘water’ is not a natural-kind term. Again, I quote Wikforss:

[The] discovery of XYZ, after all, would show that there is more than one chemical composition that underlies and explains all of the superficial qualities that we associate with ‘water’. [...] The conclusion to be drawn when encountering Twin Earth, then, would not be that ‘water’ has a different meaning than on Earth, but that water is not a natural kind, that there are two kinds of water. (Wikforss 2005, 72)

So, according to Wikforss, when the baptizer introduced ‘water’ into the language, he did it with the intention and belief that he was baptizing the natural kind defined by a certain micro- structural property, viz., the micro-structural property that explains the superficial qualities the baptizer was observing. But if we were to discover XYZ-type stuff on some far away planet, then we would discover that more than one micro-structural property explains water’s superficial qualities. In that case, we would discover that the putative baptizer merely defined an artificial kind in terms of certain superficial qualities. So, the problem with the FBFI view is, according to Wikforss, that it allows a Twin Earth-type scenario to falsify our belief that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term, in which case the argument against DI and, therefore, the CE view itself become largely unmotivated. 4.2.2. The disjunctive-semantics view. The disjunctive-semantics view is the second way Wikforss considers that the CE theorist might reject (2) and embrace (3). On this view, the baptizer defers to the world with regard to whether the kind term gets an associative- psychological value determiner or a baptismal value determiner, and the baptizer merely believes that the term likely has a baptismal value determiner.70 The difference between the FBFI view and the disjunctive-semantics view is this: According to FBFI, the baptizer believes that the kind in question is a natural kind, and he intends to baptize that natural kind; however, according to

70A view like this is defended in Brian McLaughlin and Michael Tye’s (1998). 57

the disjunctive-semantics view, the baptizer merely believes it is likely that he baptized a natural kind. To quote Wikforss regarding ‘water’,

On this view, ‘water’ names that microstructural property that underlies and explains certain superficial properties, if there is such a property, otherwise it names the superficial kind. (Wikforss 2005, 77; emphasis hers)

So, when we discovered that the term ‘jade’ does not refer to a natural kind, we discovered that ‘jade’’s semantic value consists in a certain description, and, in discovering that, we discovered also that we had associated ‘jade’ with that description. The CE theorist who embraces the disjunctive semantics view thus avoids the Externalist’s Paradox by allowing the world wholly to determine the type of semantic value and thus determine whether the kind term has a baptismal or associative-psychological value determiner. Now, Wikforss’s objection to the disjunctive semantic view has two parts: one epistemological, the other metaphysical. The epistemological part begins by showing that the disjunctive-semantics view implies that the modal status of statements about natural kinds is an a posteriori question. As has been noted, if the disjunctive-semantics theory is right, then one can know whether a term is a natural-kind term only after it has been discovered whether the term refers to a natural kind. Such discovery is of course an empirical discovery. Thus, whether a particular term has an external semantics is itself an a posteriori question. So, on the disjunctive-semantics theory, it is an empirical question as to whether ‘jade’ is accounted for by CE or by DI. But notice, if it had turned out that ‘jade’ refers to a natural kind, then any description the baptizer associated with ‘jade’ would have served merely to fix ‘jade’’s reference and thus would have been contingently true. Since, however, ‘jade’ turned out not to refer to a natural kind, the descriptions are, on the disjunctive-semantics view, part of the semantic value of ‘jade’ and are thus necessarily true. It thus follows that whether a description associated with a potential natural-kind term is necessary or contingent is not an a priori question but an empirical one–an odd consequence indeed. Wikforss’s metaphysical concern goes as follows. If the disjunctive-semantics theory is true, then it is not we who determine any of the semantics of a potential natural-kind term. 58

Rather, the semantics of a potential natural-kind term is wholly determined by the external world. The world itself, on this view, according to Wikforss, determines whether ‘electron’ is a rigid designator or an abbreviation for a non-rigid description. Wikforss questions whether the external world is capable such semantic work. Now, there is a third concern which Wikforss does not address, but which should be mentioned. From what Wikforss has said, it is not clear what advantage the disjunctive- semantics view really has over the FBFI view. According to Wikforss, the disjunctive-semantics view claims that a putative natural-kind term refers a kind defined by the natural property “that underlies and explains certain superficial properties,” if, but only if, there is such a property (2005, 77); and if there is not such a natural property, then the term refers to a kind defined by a description. But if the success condition for naming a natural kind consists at least partly in there being only one micro-structural property that accounts for those observed superficial qualities, then why not think a Twin Earth scenario would falsify the claim that ‘water’ is a natural kind whether one assumes the FBFI view or the disjunctive-semantics view? If Wikforss is right about the success conditions for a term’s referring to a natural kind, then on either the FBFI view or the disjunctive-semantics view, a Twin Earth type scenario would falsify the claim that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term. Therefore, it seems that neither the FBFI view nor the disjunctive-semantics view is a viable option for the CE theorist. So, again, it looks like the CE theorist is in trouble. Let us summarize what has been said so far. It looks like the CE theorist is committed to a view that is threatened by the Externalist’s Paradox, which stems from the following three claims:

(1) For any kind term jKk: (i) jKk is a natural-kind term iff D-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value, and D-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value iff F-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner; (ii) jKk is an artificial-kind term iff D-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value, and D-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value iff F-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner; and 59

(iii) jKk is not both an artificial-kind term and a natural-kind term. (2) For any kind term jKk, he who introduces jKk into the language determines by stipulation whether F-semantic externalism or F-semantic internalism accounts for jKk’s value determiner. (3) For any putative natural-kind term jKk, the world determines whether D-semantic internalism or D-semantic externalism accounts for jKk’s semantic value.

If Wikforss is right in that the CE theorist is committed to (1), then to avoid the Externalist’s Paradox it seems that the CE theorist must either maintain (2) and deny (3), or he must deny (2) and maintain (3). Wikforss (2005) considers various ways in which the CE theorist might accomplish either of these options, and she (Wikforss) finds none tenable.

5. Defending the FBFI View (Sort of)

For the rest of the chapter, I shall consider two responses to Wikforss on behalf of the CE theorist. The first consists in a possible defense of the FBFI view, which I present in this section along with reasons to think the FBFI view cannot, however, be salvaged. The second response consists in showing why the CE theorist need not be committed to (1) since he need not be committed to (A/D). Now, though, I turn to the FBFI view. 5.1. Defense of the FBFI View Recall, Wikforss argued that if the CE theorist were to embrace the FBFI view, then a future discovery of something like XYZ on a distant planet would in fact falsify our belief that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term.71 The reason Wikforss gives is that “the discovery of XYZ, after all, would show that there is more than one chemical composition that underlies and explains all of the superficial qualities that we associate with ‘water’” (Wikforss 2005, 72). But the discovery that more than one natural property explains ‘water’’s superficial qualities would falsify our belief that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term only if we also believe that the definite

71The corresponding claim in terms of intentions is, recall, that he who introduced ‘water’ into the language failed in his intention to baptize a natural kind. 60

description water’s baptizer used to pick out the natural kind, water, made reference to nothing other than water’s superficial qualities. But Wikforss has not given us any reason to think that we actually believe that. In fact, Kripke (1980) has given us something of a reason, in the form of another thought experiment, to think that we believe Wikforss is wrong–she is wrong about what we think ‘water’’s referent is, and thus she is wrong to think that the discovery of XYZ- type stuff on a far away planet would undermine our belief that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term. So, the CE theorist wishing to defend the FBFI view could perhaps draw from Kripke. Here is roughly how the FBFI defense would go. The defender of the FBFI view would affirm that our belief that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term is indeed falsifiable, but he would deny that it is falsifiable for the same reasons Wikforss gives. Once again the FBFI defender, as did Putnam, can appeal to Kripke (1980). This time, though, the appeal is to Kripke’s thought experiment regarding ‘Gödel’ and ‘Schmidt’. Recall that, according to the fictitious thought experiment, it was, unbeknownst to us, not Gödel but Gödel’s neighbor, Schmidt, who discovered the incompleteness theorem; however, the story goes, in the dead of night Gödel snuck into Schmidt’s home, stole Schmidt’s proof of the incompleteness theorem, and published the proof under his (Gödel’s) own name. Now, we are to suppose that the only description we have associated with the name ‘Gödel’ is something like jx discovered the incompleteness theoremk. Given that scenario, we are then asked to consider to whom we refer when we say that Gödel discovered the incompleteness theorem. Intuitively, we do not accidently use ‘Gödel’ to refer to Schmidt; rather, we successfully use ‘Gödel’ to refer to Gödel and falsely attribute to Gödel the discovery of the incompleteness theorem. Kripke’s explanation for how it is the we refer to Gödel despite our having only (or mostly) false descriptions of him is that we stand in a linguistic-causal chain with the person who baptized Gödel with the name ‘Gödel’. Moreover–and this is crucial–what explains our having the intuitions we have regarding the thought experiment is that we believe that the referent of ‘Gödel’ is he who was baptized ‘Gödel’ by someone in our (broadly construed) linguistic community. Of course, the belief that ‘Gödel’ names a person is falsifiable because it could turnout that ‘Gödel’ refers to a fictitious character, in which case there would have been no baptism and thus ‘Gödel’ would be an empty name. In any case, our intuitions regarding the Gödel/Schmidt thought experiment evince our believing that the reference of ‘Gödel’ is limited to that person who was baptized ‘Gödel’. 61

The CE theorist can, as Putnam before him did, claim that an analogous explanation can be given of our intuitive response to the Twin Earth thought experiment. The idea would be this:

The intentional-causal interactions between various samples of what turned out to be H2O and the member of our (very broadly construed) linguistic community who introduced ‘water’ into the language–that causal interaction–limits ‘water’’s reference to a particular kind. Since the only stuff that the person within our linguistic community baptized with ‘water’ consists in H2O, the referent of ‘water’ just is the stuff that consists in H2O. Recall from section two that the definite description a natural kind’s baptizer uses is, according to CE, indexed to the exemplars of the baptized natural kind. Wikforss seems to overlook this aspect of CE completely. So, according to CE, to falsify the claim that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term, it is insufficient to show merely that there is some XYZ-type stuff on a far away planet that has the same superficial qualities we associate with ‘water’. Rather, one must show that the person in our linguistic community who introduced the term ‘water’ baptized more than one natural kind, say both XYZ and H2O, with the term. Wikforss’s objection to FBFI is premised on a faulty description of CE. Once he has reminded Wikforss that the definite descriptions water’s baptizer used are, according to CE, indexed to the samples of water that the baptizer causally interacted with, the FBFI defender can then point to the fact that we intuitively believe that the discovery of XYZ on some distant planet would not falsify our belief that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term. After all, it is our intuitive response that, when he applied ‘water’ to the stuff on Twin Earth, Oscar made a mistake. Moreover, since there is nothing special about the term ‘water’ and our beliefs about water and its baptizer, the above line of reasoning generalizes to other kind terms and our beliefs about their respective referents and baptizers. So, the CE theorist hoping to defend the FBFI view could appeal to our intuitions regarding the Gödel/Schmidt and Twin Earth thought experiments in order to argue that falsifying the belief that some kind term is a natural-kind term requires, pace Wikforss, more than the discovery of superficially similar natural kinds on a far away planet. Notice, also, that by so limiting a natural-kind term’s reference to that which was baptized with the term by a baptizer within our linguistic community, the FBFI defender has not only a tidy explanation for why the discovery of an XYZ-type natural kind on a far away planet would seem not to undermine our belief that ‘water’ is a natural-kind term. We also have reason 62

to think that had we discovered H2O and XYZ on Earth, then such a discovery would have undermined our belief that the liquid our baptizer named ‘water’ consists only in H2O and, thus, that water is a natural-kind term. For, if we had discovered H2O and XYZ on Earth, we would have little justification for thinking our baptizer baptized only samples of H2O ‘water’; in fact, if we had discovered H2O and XYZ on Earth, we would have justification for thinking that our baptizer of yore did not baptize just samples of H2O with ‘water’. But since we have never discovered XYZ on Earth, we are highly justified in thinking that only H2O was baptized with ‘water’ by our linguistic community’s baptizer. So, to put the point generally, our intuitive responses to the Twin Earth and Gödel/Schmidt thought experiments and a Kripkean causal theory of natural-kind term reference conjoin to give us reason to think, pace Wikforss, that

‘water’’s reference is limited to that bit of nature–namely, samples of H2O–that was baptized with the natural-kind term ‘water’ by an ancient member of our linguistic community. With the argument just given, the FBFI defender can avoid Wikforss’s objection and thus the Externalist’s Paradox as we shall see now. Essentially, the FBFI defender’s claim would be that the semantic value of a kind term is either (i) the natural kind defined by the natural property which explains the superficial qualities possessed by the samples of the kind which were baptized by our community’s baptizer or (ii) an empirically informed description that determines the kind term’s referent, viz., some artificial kind. If we should discover that, for some kind term jKk, jKk does not–contrary to our previous beliefs–refer to a natural kind, then we empirically discover that the world determined that jKk has a descriptive semantic value and therefore that the world determined that jKk’s semantics is accounted for by D- and F-semantic internalism. So, the FBFI defender avoids the Externalist’s Paradox by showing that we intuitively believe that a putative natural-kind term jKk’s referent is limited via indexing to that which was baptized with jKk by a member of our linguistic community. 5.2. Against the FBFI View’s Defense But should the CE theorist embrace (3) and deny (2)? There are two reasons to think not. The first reason is that, for all that has been said, the CE theorist is still left with embracing a disjunctive-semantics. For, recall that, according to (1), a kind term has an external semantic 63

value iff it refers to a natural kind,72 otherwise it has a descriptive semantic value. By denying (2) and embracing (1) and (3), a CE theorist allows that the world determines the type of F- semantics a kind term gets. Consequently, for this sort of CE theorist, the world, rather than the kind term’s introducer, determines whether the term’s introducer psychologically associated an empirically informed description with the kind term or whether the term’s introducer merely relied upon an empirical observation in order to introduce the term by means of a causal interaction with samples of the kind in question. Now, I can agree that whether a kind is a natural kind is an empirical question; however, the type of F-semantics a kind term has should not be an empirical question. But a CE theorist who embraces (1) and (3) while denying (2) is committed to claiming that the question of what type of F-semantics a particular kind term has is an empirical question. That claim just seems odd. So, even if the CE theorist shows how the FBFI view avoids Wikforss’s objection to it, the FBFI view remains open to the objection Wikforss leveled against the disjunctive-semantics view. Here, though, is perhaps a second reason to think that the CE theorist should not hold to (1) and (3) and deny (2). Since the term ‘jade’ is an artificial-kind term, then (1) and (3) imply that ‘jade’ has a descriptive semantic value which determines its reference. But notice that if ‘jade’ has a descriptive semantic value and that particular semantic value–that is, the associated description–determines ‘jade’’s reference, then the action performed by the person who introduced the term–specifically, the action of causally interacting with samples of some kind and doing so with the intention of establishing a reference relation between ‘jade’ and certain kind of mineral stone–is utterly otiose. If ‘jade’’s associated description determines ‘jade’’s referent, then the causal interaction between the posited baptizer and a set of stones did nothing at all either to establish the reference relation between ‘jade’ and jade or–and this is the crucial point–to limit ‘jade’’s reference relation in the way that ‘water’’s reference relation is limited. Rather, ‘jade’’s referent is, on this CE view, the kind defined by a description based on the superficial qualities associated with ‘jade’. But if the causal interaction is otiose, then the attempt by the baptizer to index a definite description that picks out the kind made no difference to the introduction of the kind term. Thus, anything could be a member of ‘jades’’s extension so

72Again, I am setting aside nonnatural kinds. 64 long as it matches the description which we have associated with ‘jade’. But if that is the case, then prior to our discovering that the members of ‘jade’’s extension consist of either jadeite or nephrite, jade, the kind, would have been defined by whatever descriptions previous experts about jade had associated with ‘jade’, and anything satisfying that description would be a member of the kind, jade.73 But does this really accord with our intuitions? I, for one, am dubious. Suppose that, prior to our discovering that everything on Earth that we have been calling ‘jade’ is either jadeite or nephrite, a lay person (call him ‘Jake’) goes to Jade Twin Earth, where he discovers a mineral–call it ‘greenite’–which possesses all the superficial qualities we Earthlings associate with the kind term ‘jade’. When confronted with a sample of greenite, Jake, naturally enough, uses the term ‘jade’ to refer to it. For, Jake would believe that the lustrous green mineral on Jade Twin Earth is of the same kind as minerals indigenous to Earth. But Jake’s belief would be wrong; and, I suspect, we would think that since greenite is not indigenous to Earth, Jake’s use of ‘jade’ is incorrect. Now, I admit that my intuitions regarding this narrative are not as strong as in the Twin Earth case, but the narrative has (to my mind) enough pull to think that the causal interactions between jade’s posited baptizer and samples of jadeite and nephrite are not so completely superfluous when it comes to determining ‘jade’’s reference relation. The modicum of confidence I have that greenite does not fall in ‘jade’’s extension and the truly oddness of the world’s determining whether a kind term has an internalist or externalist D- and F-semantics warrants, I believe, searching for a better solution to the Externalist’s Paradox and Dilemma. In the next section, I sketch such a solution.

6. The Need for Unions

In this section, I shall argue that the CE theorist need not be committed to (A/D) and thus can avoid the Externalist’s Paradox altogether. Showing that a CE theorist need not be committed to (A/D) requires two things, however. The first has to do with D-semantics.

73I mention experts about jade because on DI a lay person’s description may make no reference to superficial qualities. 65

Specifically, it needs to be shown how an artificial-kind term even could fail to have a descriptive semantic value and thus could have an external semantic value. In showing that, one shows the falsity of (A/D). So, I will, first, show that an artificial-kind term of a particular sort indeed fails to have descriptive semantic value. But, the CE theorist is still committed to the truth of (CoV). Consequently, the CE theorist needs to concern himself also with this sort of artificial-kind term’s F-semantics. Specifically, the CE theorist needs to show how such an artificial-kind term may be introduced into the language by means of only an intentional-causal interaction with concreta. If the CE theorist were to show that this sort of artificial-kind term fails to have descriptive semantic value, but he could not show that such a term can be introduced by some form of baptism, then, since he is committed to (CoV), the CE theorist would show nothing more than that he himself is committed to a false claim, viz., (A/D). Therefore, the CE theorist must account also for the F-semantics of artificial-kind terms of the sort in question. That will be my second concern. Now, though, I turn to a new division between artificial-kind terms. 6.1. Union Kinds In this subsection, I will do three things. First, I will give a slightly more detailed description of what it means to say that a natural-kind term fails to have a descriptive semantic value and thus has an external semantic value. From that description, I will, second, extract a sufficient condition for a kind term’s failing to have a descriptive semantic value. Then, third, I will show how a certain kind of artificial-kind term meets that sufficient condition. 6.1.1. External semantic value. Let us begin with meaning. According to our theory of meaning, the meaning of a sentence is given by its truth conditions. To put the same point another way, we can represent (4)’s meaning as the set of possible worlds at which (4) is true.74 Take, for example, the following sentence:

74As Lewis puts it:

A meaning for a sentence is something that determines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false. It determines the truth-value of the sentence in various possible states of affairs, at various times, at various places, for various speakers, and so on. (Lewis 1970, 22) 66

(4) Glumpl is gold.

Assume that ‘Glumpl’ refers to a lump of substance that looks superficially similar to the stuff that consists in an aggregate of particles describable has having atomic number 79 (what we today call ‘gold.’ I shall not say whether Glumpl is in fact what we today call ‘gold’, nor shall I assume that ‘gold’ in (4) refers to what we today call ‘gold’.) Since (4)’s meaning is given by the conditions in which (4) is true, we can represent the meaning of (4) as the set of worlds at which (4) is true. What is more, since (4) is true iff Glumpl falls in ‘gold’’s extension, we can characterize (4)’s meaning as the set of worlds in which Glumpl falls in ‘gold’’s extension. Now, let us consider semantic value. According to our understanding of ‘semantic value’, the semantic value of ‘gold’ is what ‘gold’ contributes to the meanings of sentences in which ‘gold’ occurs. Since ‘gold’ occurs in (4), ‘gold’ therefore contributes its semantic value to (4)’s meaning, that is, to (4)’s truth-conditions. Here is basically how ‘gold’ contributes its semantic value to the meaning of (4). Again, (4) is true at a world iff Glumpl falls in ‘gold’’s extension at that world. But Glumpl falls in ‘gold’’s extension in a world just in case ‘gold’ applies to Glumpl in that world. Let us call the criteria that a concretum in a world must meet in order for ‘gold’ to apply to that concretum in the world, ‘gold’’s ‘application conditions’.75 Given our notion of ‘gold’’s application conditions, we see that ‘gold’’s application conditions (partly) determine whether (4) is true at a world; for, those conditions determine whether Glumpl falls in ‘gold’’s extension at a world. But now recall from the previous paragraph that (4)’s meaning is given by the set of worlds in which (4) is true. Since (i) (4)’s meaning is given by the set of worlds in which it is true, and (ii) ‘gold’’s application conditions determine whether (4) is true at a world, then, we see, ‘gold’’s application conditions (partly) determine at which worlds (4) is true. Since ‘gold’’s application conditions (partly) determine at which worlds (4) is true, it follows that ‘gold’’s application conditions (partly) determine (4)’s meaning. And since ‘gold’’s

75What I am calling ‘gold’’s application conditions might be presented as a function from a world to sets of concreta within that world, which concreta fall in ‘gold’’s extension. 67

semantic value just is that which ‘gold’ contributes to (4)’s meaning, we thus see that ‘gold’’s semantic value is given by ‘gold’’s application conditions.76 Now, let us shift gears and consider what it means to say that a natural-kind term’s semantic value is determined by the external world. First, keeping our friends ‘Glumpl’ and ‘gold’, let us introduce a new character: the super-expert on ‘gold’’s referent. To begin, let us

say that Γt is the set containing all and only the descriptions of ‘gold’’s referent at time t, which descriptions experts on ‘gold’’s referent use at time t to identify members of ‘gold’’s referent

(i.e., members of the kind to which ‘gold’ refers). So, for example, Γ1750 would include a description such as the following: jx is a metal characterized by a beautiful yellow color, non-liability to rust, high specific gravity, and great malleability and ductilityk.77 By contrast,

Γ2009, would include a description like this: jx consists in an aggregate of particles describable as having atomic number 79k. Now, a super-expert at time t on ‘gold’’s referent (on, that is, the kind ‘gold’ is used at t to refer to) is someone with the following characteristics: A person S is at t a super-expert on ‘gold’’s referent iff S psychologically associates with the term ‘gold’ all and

only the members of Γt. So, a super-expert on ‘gold’’s referent is a person who associates with ‘gold’ all and only those descriptions of ‘gold’’s referent, which descriptions contemporaneous experts use to identify members of ‘gold’’s referent. For ease of discussion, let us assume that our super-experts are super-experts living in 1750, unless otherwise noted. Second, let us say that a kind term jKk’s application conditions are ‘determinate’ iff, for any concretum x, jKk’s application conditions determine whether jKk applies to x (whether, that is, x falls in jKk’s extension). The natural-kind term ‘electron’, for example, has determinate application conditions, since ‘electron’’s application conditions determine, for every concretum x, whether x falls in ‘electron’’s extension. Let us assume that if a kind term refers to a natural kind, then the kind term has determinate application conditions; and let us make this assumption on the basis of a natural kind’s being defined by a natural property and the fact that whether or

76Again, to quote Lewis, “a meaning [semantic value] for a name is something that determines what thing, if any, the name names in various possible states of affairs, at various times, and so on” (Lewis 1970, 23).

77This description was drawn from the Oxford English Dictionary entry for ‘gold’. 68

not a concretum possesses a natural property is a determinate matter. Importantly, though, notice that being a natural-kind term is not necessary for a kind term’s having determinate application conditions. For example, the artificial-kind term ‘golver’ has determinate application conditions, since ‘golver’ applies to all and only those concreta that consist in either what we today call ‘gold’ or what we today call ‘silver’. So, even artificial-kind terms can have determinate application conditions. Third and finally, notice that if jKk has determinate application conditions, but a super- expert’s descriptions of jKk’s referent (i.e., K) are insufficient to determine whether, for any concretum x, jKk applies to x, then jKk has an external semantic value.78 Or, in terms of (4), if in 1750 ‘gold’ referred to a natural kind, viz., gold, then ‘gold’ has a descriptive semantic value only if the descriptions available to a super-expert on gold are sufficient to determine whether Glumpl is a member of ‘gold’’s extension. Here is why. If ‘gold’ is a natural-kind term, then ‘gold’ refers to gold; and since gold’s kind-defining property is the natural property of consisting of an aggregate of particles describable as having atomic number 79, then ‘gold’ has determinate application conditions. But if the descriptions available to a super-expert on gold are all the descriptions available to experts on gold (which, by definition, is the case), but the super- expert’s descriptions are insufficient to determine whether our friend Glumpl falls in ‘gold’’s extension, then no available description can determine whether ‘gold’ applies to Glumpl. But if ‘gold’ has determinate application conditions, and no available description can determine whether ‘gold’ applies to Glumpl, then ‘gold’’s application conditions must consist in something more than just the super-expert’s descriptions of gold. But the super-expert on gold already has all of the available descriptions gold satisfies. So, there is nothing left to add but the external world, in which case the external world (at least partly) determines ‘gold’’s application conditions. If the external world (at least partly) determines ‘gold’’s application conditions, then ‘gold’ has an external semantic value. We can generalize the point and put it more formally like this:

78Notice that I am not saying that the super-expert himself has to be able to distinguish whether a kind term applies to a concretum. There is a host of reasons a super-expert may not be able to distinguish whether a kind term applies to a particular concretum. For example, the super-expert might be asleep, playing catch with his son, or visiting in another country. 69

(EX) For any kind term jKk and any concretum x, if (i) jKk has determinate application conditions, but (ii) the descriptions, which a super-expert on K associates with jKk, are insufficient to determine whether jKk applies to x, then jKk has an external semantic value.

Now, according to CE theorists, the Twin Earth thought experiment shows that natural- kind terms have determinate application conditions even when a super-expert’s set of descriptions is insufficient to determine whether an entity falls in the natural-kind terms’ extension. That is, according to CE theorists, natural-kind terms satisfy (EX)’s antecedent. What I shall argue is that being a natural-kind term is not, however, necessary for satisfying (EX)’s antecedent. In order to make that argument, I shall next introduce the notion of a cloaked property. 6.1.2. Cloaked properties and membership conditions. In this sub-subsection, I wish to offer a sufficient condition for meeting (EX)’s antecedent. In order to do that, I introduce the notion of a cloaked property79:

(CF) For any property F, F is a cloaked property at a time t iff at t (i) F is a natural property or a conjunctive property whose conjuncts are natural properties, (ii) F’s instances are empirically hidden, and (iii) F is indexically specifiable.

Let us unpack, in reverse order, the conditions listed in (CF). Regarding condition (iii), the claim that F is indexically specifiable is just the claim that F can be specified by means of a definite description indexed to particular instances of F. For example, jF is the property that explains those superficial qualitiesk or, perhaps, jF is the property whose instances explain those superficial qualitiesk. Regarding condition (ii), by ‘empirically hidden’, I mean basically that no non-indexed definite description is available to a super-expert whereby the super-expert could pick out F and only F. Regarding condition (i), by ‘conjunctive property whose conjuncts are natural properties’ I mean properties like, say, the property of having -1.602×10-19 C, 9.109×10-31

79I thank my wife, Katherine Guin, for the very apt term ‘cloaked’. 70

kg, and spin-1/2 or the property of consisting in one liter of H2O and three grams of C12H22O11. (From here on, I shall just assume that conjunctive natural properties are themselves natural properties.80) Regarding the term ‘natural property’, I will leave it to the reader’s intuition and future consensus, if such there should be, as to what demarcates a property as natural. In any case, take the property of consisting of H2O. We can see that, in 1750, the property of consisting of H2O was a cloaked property: Consisting of H2O is a natural property; no non-indexed definite description was available to a super-expert whereby he could distinguish H2O from XYZ; and, yet, the property of consisting of H2O was indexically specified as evinced by our intuitions regarding the Twin Earth thought experiment. Now, notice that if, in 1750, a kind term has determinate application conditions, and those application conditions require a concretum’s possessing a property that is in 1750 cloaked, then the kind term satisfies (EX)’s antecedent. To see this, suppose it is 1750, that jKk’s referent, viz., K, is a natural kind, and that K’s kind-defining property is cloaked. If K is a natural kind, then jKk’s application conditions are determinate; and if K’s kind-defining property is cloaked, then a super-expert on K cannot distinguish K’s kind-defining property from superficially similar properties. As we have already seen, if jKk’s application conditions are determinate, and a super-expert on K cannot distinguish K’s kind-defining property from superficially similar properties, then, to quote from (EX), (i) jKk has determinate application conditions, but (ii) the descriptions, which a super-expert on K associates with jKk, are insufficient to determine whether jKk applies to x. We can therefore conclude that,

(CX) For any kind term jKk, if, in 1750, jKk has determinate application conditions, and those application conditions require a concretum’s possessing a property that is in 1750 cloaked, then jKk has an external semantic value.

In the next section, I will show how a certain kind of artificial-kind term satisfies (CX)’s antecedent.

80See Armstrong (1989) for more on conjunctive natural properties. 71

6.1.3. Union kinds. Notice that nothing in (CX)’s antecedent bars a kind term from being an artificial-kind term. For, nothing in (CX) implies that no kind term can satisfy the following description:

(UK) jKk is such that there exists some finite number of cloaked properties, F1, F2, ...

Fn, such that (i), for any concretum x, x falls in jKk’s extension iff and virtue of

x’s possessing at least one, but not all, of the cloaked properties, F1, F2, ... Fn, and

(ii) the possession of one of F1, F2, ... Fn does not imply the possession of the others.

Of course, if jKk’s application conditions are determined by a set of cloaked properties as described in (UK), then jKk would not refer to a natural kind; it would refer to an artificial kind. There reason is, there would not be exactly one kind-defining natural property that defines jKk’s referent. But jKk could still have an external semantic value. To see this, consider the following indexed definite description:

(GSK) j‘Golver’ refers to the kind K such that (i) all and only of K’s members possess either the natural property that explains the superficial qualities of that lump or the natural property that explains the superficial qualities of this lump, and (ii) K’s members are members of K in virtue of their possessing either of those properties.k

Let us say that ‘That Lump’ names the lump of stuff ostensively referred to with ‘that lump’ in (GSK); and let us say That Lump can be superficially described as a metal characterized by a beautiful yellow color, non-liability to rust, high specific gravity, and great malleability and ductility.81 Let us say, also, that ‘This Lump’ names the lump of stuff ostensively referred to with ‘this lump’ in (GSK); and let us say, also, that This Lump can be superficially described as

81This description was drawn from the Oxford English Dictionary entry for ‘gold’. 72

a metal characterized by a lustrous white color and great malleability and ductility.82 Now, suppose that the natural property, call it ‘FG’, that explains That Lump’s superficial qualities is the property of consisting of an aggregate of particles describable as having an atomic number of

79 (gold’s atomic number), and suppose that the natural property, call it ‘FS’, that explains This Lump’s superficial qualities is the property of consisting of an aggregate of particles describable as having an atomic number of 47 (silver’s atomic number). As we can see from our definition of a natural kind, golver is clearly an artificial kind: Golver is not defined by exactly one natural property.83 Rather, an entity’s membership in ‘golver’’s extension is determined by its possessing one of exactly two natural properties. What is more, for reasons given above, ‘golver’ has determinate application conditions. So, although ‘golver’ is an artificial-kind term, it nonetheless has determinate application conditions, and it is such that an entity’s membership in ‘golver’’s extension is not determined by a set of descriptions available to a gold and silver super-expert.84 Consequently, although ‘golver’ is an artificial-kind term, it satisfies (CX)’s

82This description was drawn from the Oxford English Dictionary entry for ‘silver’.

83Not to mention, golver is not projectible either.

84It may be objected that there is a description associated with ‘golver’ such that Glumpl is a member of ‘golver’’s extension iff Glumpl satisfies that description. Such a description would be something like this: jx is a member of the natural kind defined by the natural property that explains the superficial qualities of that lump or the natural property that explains the superficial qualities of this lumpk. Since, for any concretum x, x is a member of ‘golver’’s extension iff it satisfies that description, there is a description associated with ‘golver’ whose satisfaction is necessary and sufficient for membership in ‘golver’’s extension. Two points are worth making in response. First, merely pointing out that there is a description that is satisfied iff Glumpl is a member ‘golver’’s extension is insufficient to undermine the CE theorist’s position. It would need to be argued that Glumpl is a member of ‘golver’’s extension in virtue of its satisfying that description. This would be a debatable point, but it is not a debate peculiar to the view I am advocating here, which is my second point. Such a description can be generated for any baptized natural kind. Whether or not the presence of such a description is a problem for the CE theorist’s position continues to be the focus of a very interesting debate, one outcome of which has been the advent of so-called two-dimensional semantics (see, for example, Jackson 1998a, 2007; Gendler and Hawthorne 2002, 39-55; Soames 2005; and García-Carpintero and Josep Macià. 2006). But if the presence of such descriptions are a problem for the CE theorist, it is a problem for any CE theorist, not just for the CE theorist advocating the sort of view I am describing here. Consequently, that debate lies beyond the scope of the present chapter. 73 antecedent and thus has an external semantic value. We can conclude, then, that an artificial- kind term can have an external semantic value and therefore that (A/D) is false. Now, since kinds are categories of concreta, we can present kinds as set-theoretic sets and kind members as elements of those sets, in which case we can represent golver as the union of what we today call ‘gold’ and ‘silver’. Let us therefore call an artificial kind that may be represented as the union of two or more natural kinds a ‘union kind’, and let us call a kind term that refers to a union-kind a ‘union-kind term’. 6.2. A Case of Mistaken Identity I have argued that (A/D) is false on the grounds that some sort of artificial-kind term–a union-kind term, specifically–can fail to have descriptive semantic value. But one question remains. Given (CoV), a union-kind term can fail to have descriptive semantic value only if it can also be introduced by means of a baptism. But is there reason to think that a union-kind term can be so introduced into the language? I think there is, and I shall say why. What I offer is, however, not a complete description, but rather a sketch. The sketch I offer, however, shows the kind of story the CE theorist who denies (A/D) will need to put forward and, I believe, gives reason to think such a story could be put forward. The first thing to see is just how little is required for a successful baptism of a natural kind. As mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of section two, baptizing a natural kind involves an intentional-causal relation not between the baptizer and the natural kind itself but between the baptizer and some concretum the baptizer picks out as an exemplar of the natural kind. Of course, a particular concretum may be an exemplar of multiple natural kinds, so the baptizer will need to decide which kind he wants to baptize and then to distinguish the kind to be baptized on the basis of that concretum’s superficial qualities. Let us assume he can do this.85

85This is a bit of a contentious assumption. The fact that one concretum can be an exemplar in multiple natural kinds that a baptizer must distinguish between gives rise to what Devitt and Sterelny (1999) call the ‘qua problem’. The qua problem is an ostensible problem for the causal theory of reference. The idea is essentially that in order to distinguish which natural kind the baptizer wants to baptize, the baptizer must rely on some description of that natural kind. Therefore, it seems, a causal theory of reference is insufficient to account for the introduction of natural-kind terms into the language. The qua problem has generated considerable debate, which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Wikforss (2005) herself 74

Now, since a natural-kind term’s introduction cannot occur by means of actual physical contact between a person and the kind, baptizing a natural kind must, if it occurs, occur by means of a definite description that picks out the natural kind, which description is indexed to instances of certain superficial qualities, viz., those qualities the baptizer takes to indicate membership in the kind. For example, the baptizer might, on the basis of certain stones’ having a lustrous green color, say the following: j ‘nephrite’ names the kind of which those mineral stones are membersk or jthat kind of mineral stone is nephritek. For natural-kind terms, this is how baptism has to go. Notice, also, that, for any particular concretum, there will, except in highly unusual circumstances, be a natural property that explains that concretum’s superficial qualities. Even for Twin-water, there was, as the story has it, a natural property that explained its superficial qualities, viz., the property of consisting in XYZ. So, unless a kind baptizer is a brain in a vat or, less dramatically, he attempts to index a definite description to a non-existent concretum, a baptizer will usually succeed in baptizing a natural kind with a kind term. Baptizing natural kinds is, we see, quite easy. But widespread mistaken identity of two natural kinds is also easy. Here is why. A natural kind’s defining property is usually cloaked. So, when we distinguish members of a natural kind, we usually do so on the basis of the superficial qualities these cloaked properties give rise to. But many cloaked properties can give rise to very similar superficial qualities. Therefore, so long as a cloaked property instance explains superficial qualities similar (to our ) to the superficial qualities of instances of other cloaked properties, then one could easily, but mistakenly, conclude that the two instances of superficial qualities are explained by instances of the same underlying cloaked property. Since natural-kind membership is usually posited on the basis of superficial qualities, it would therefore be easy to mistakenly identify two distinct natural kinds on the basis of two concreta having similar superficial qualities. But notice that such mistaken identification need not be made by a baptizer or an expert; it could be made by anyone within a language community. If the error is perpetuated throughout the community, and

simply assumes that there is a solution to the problem before launching her own objections to CE. Since this chapter is in response to a distillation of objections coming from Wikforss, I shall follow her lead. 75

there are no experts within the community to correct the error (think ‘jade’ circa 1700), then the mistaken identity can flourish. So, widespread mistaken identity of two natural kinds is also quite easy. But consider that mistaken identity need not undermine a prior baptism. After all, if a kind term was introduced into the language by a successful baptism, then there seems little reason to think that a future case of mistaken identity would undermine that baptism. Rather, we should say that a case of mistaken identity results in a single kind term’s referring to different natural kinds and that whether or not the kind term applies to a particular concretum is determined by whether the concretum possesses one of the baptized natural kinds’ defining properties. If the kind term applies in virtue of a concretum’s possessing one of, say, two distinct natural properties, then the kind term refers to an artificial-kind with determinate application conditions: it is therefore a union-kind term. In short, a kind term may be introduced into the language as a natural-kind term, but through its referent’s being mistakenly identified with another natural kind, the kind term in question becomes a union-kind term. We thus see that artificial-kind terms–at least union-kind terms–may be introduced into the language by baptism. There is, however, one nagging intuition with which our CE theorist would need to concern himself. That intuition can be expressed in terms of ‘jade’. Suppose that before we discovered that jade is an artificial kind, the term ‘jade’ was introduced by means of a definite description indexed to a collection of stones, which collection consisted of both jadeite and nephrite samples. The definite description employed in hopes of fixing ‘jade’’s reference relation, perhaps, would go like this: j’Jade’ names the natural kind of which those mineral stones are membersk. The question is, would a definite description indexed to a collection of concreta, who were not members of the same natural kind, result in a successful baptism? I think the intuition is, no. If some of the baptized stones consist of jadeite and the rest of nephrite, then the attempt to baptize the natural kind of which those stones were members simply failed; and it failed because the person making the attempt believed that those stones were members of a single natural kind, which he intended to baptize. Since no such natural kind exists, the person simply failed to baptize the kind he intended to baptize. 76

I admit that my intuitions run along similar lines. I do believe, however, that the CE theorist has a response. The response would be simply to point out that the introduction of ‘jade’ into the language was nonetheless indexed to instances of the natural properties which explained the superficial qualities the baptizer used in his attempt to fix the reference of ‘jade’ to a natural kind. Thus, while the baptizer failed to baptize the kind he had in mind, viz., a natural kind, the definite description is nonetheless indexed to the cloaked properties that the baptizer causally interacted with. Since cloaked properties just are natural properties, and the definite description was thus indexed to instances of more than one natural property, then, in current parlance, those cloaked properties define a “disjunctive kind”–that is, an artificial kind all and only of whose members possess the property of consisting in either jadeite or nephrite. But notice that such disjunctiveness undermines only jade’s status as a natural kind; it need not threaten ‘jade’’s being applicable to a concretum based on whether the concretum possesses one of the natural properties indexically specified–that is, consists of either jadeite or nephrite. Notice, also, that disjunctive kinds can be represented by the union of set-theoretic sets each set of which represents a natural kind. Disjunctive kinds, where the “disjuncts” are kinds defined by natural properties, just are union kinds. Finally, by embracing union kinds, we see that our CE theorist can avoid the Externalist’s Paradox by maintaining (2) and denying (3). For, the CE theorist can claim that although the baptizer of ‘jade’ failed to baptize a natural kind, he nonetheless determined that ‘jade’ has a baptismal value determiner. Consequently, it was the baptizer who determined what type of semantic value and what type of value determiner ‘jade’ has; the world determined only what that semantic value is, viz., a union kind rather than a natural kind. If, on the CE theorist’s view, the world can determine only a the semantic value of a putative natural-kind term, then the CE theorist avoids the Externalist’s Paradox and thus the Externalist’s Dilemma.

7. A Concluding Moral

From Wikforss (2005) and (2008), a powerful objection to CE may be distilled. The first part of the objection consists in an argument that the CE theorist’s commitments imply paradox–the Externalist’s Paradox–in which case it seems that we language users are caught in a 77 semantic tug-of-war with the external world over the semantics of our kind terms. The second part of the objection consists in a set of arguments drawn from Wikforss (2005) that together seem to show that escape from the Externalist’s Paradox leads to the CE theorist’s impalement upon the horns of a dilemma–the Externalist’s Dilemma. In this chapter, I showed how the CE theorist can safely give up one of the commitments that led to his difficulty, viz., his commitment to (A/D). First, I argued for a distinction between run-of-the-mill artificial-kind terms like ‘antique furniture’ and ‘fobo’ and artificial-kind terms I labeled ‘union-kind terms’, the latter of whose referent may be represented by the union of sets, which in turn represent natural kinds. Union-kind terms reveal the falsity of (A/D) by showing that some artificial-kind terms may fail to have a descriptive semantic value and thus may have a external semantic value. Then, I briefly sketched how union-kind terms can be baptized into the language. The conclusion was that so long as the kind terms were introduced by definite descriptions indexed to instances of cloaked properties–even if the properties defined “disjunctive kinds”–then the kind term can have an external semantic value. By embracing this fact, the CE theorist can avoid the Externalist’s Paradox and Dilemma. In closing, I wish to draw the reader’s attention to how far-reaching are the consequences of the present chapter’s topic of discussion. Notice that for any putative natural-kind term, it is possible that empirical research will reveal that the kind term in question is not, in fact, a natural- kind term. Therefore, a “responsible claim” that a particular kind term jKk is a natural-kind term carries with it a commitment to the possibility that jKk is not a natural-kind term. For many philosophers, if a kind term is not a natural-kind term, then it is an artificial-kind term; there is no third way. In fact, for the purposes of this chapter, we have been assuming there is no third way; however, unless we have antecedent commitments to so-called “naturalism,” we are free to jettison that assumption. But for those committed to naturalism, a responsible claim that jKk is a natural-kind term carries with it a commitment to the possibility that jKk is an artificial-kind term. Suppose, though, that our naturalistic philosopher embraces CE. For that philosopher, a responsible claim that jKk is a natural-kind term and the accompanying commitment to the possibility of jKk’s being an artificial-kind term places our naturalistic philosopher in the Externalist’s Paradox and Dilemma, unless he jettisons (A/D). Now, jettisoning (A/D) can be 78 done on a case-by-case (or term-by-term) basis. For example, one may jettison (A/D) for all terms in the physical and chemical domains but be committed to (A/D) in, say, the moral domain. But, for a naturalistic philosopher who embraces CE, any responsible claim that a kind term–regardless of domain–is a natural-kind term carries with it the implicit threat of the Externalist’s Paradox and Dilemma, unless he jettison’s (A/D). Now, consider those moral philosophers who are moral realists, metaphysical naturalists, and embrace CE. There are several such philosophers, and they call themselves ‘non-reductive ethical naturalists’. According to a non-reductive ethical naturalist, moral-kind terms like ‘virtuous agent’ and ‘morally required action’ are natural-kind terms. But if these moral-kind terms are natural-kind terms, then it is possible that, through empirical investigation, we will discover that these moral-kind terms are actually artificial-kind terms. It is just here, however, that a non-reductive ethical naturalist seems to run into difficulty. On the one hand, if he is responsible in his claim that a moral-kind term is a natural-kind term, then he is committed to the possibility that ‘virtuous agent’ and ‘morally required action’ are artificial-kind terms. It seems to me that that is dangerously close to inconsistency with the non-reductive ethical naturalist’s moral realism; for, moral realism is generally thought to imply an antecedent commitment to the non-artificiality of moral properties. On the other hand, if our non-reductive ethical naturalist denies that ‘virtuous agent’ and ‘morally required action’ are possibly artificial-kind terms, then it seems that our philosopher has either embraced the possibility of certainty about empirical matters or has become an ethical non-naturalist. But, now, let us suppose that our non-reductive ethical naturalist remains true to his antecedent naturalistic commitments and grants the possibility that ‘virtuous agent’ and ‘morally required action’ are in fact artificial-kind terms. In order to avoid landing in the Externalist’s Paradox and Dilemma, our philosopher would need also to jettison (A/D). Now, so far as I can tell, the only way to jettison (A/D) is to allow that some artificial-kind terms fail to have a descriptive semantic value–some artificial-kind terms have an external semantic values. But that would require admitting the possibility that ‘virtuous agent’ and ‘morally required action’ are union-kind terms. But union-kind terms name cases of mistaken identity of two natural kinds. I ask the reader, is it even a coherent for the moral realist to think that terms like ‘virtuous agent’ or ‘morally required action’ could name union kinds? Notice what that position would require. 79

It would require saying that ‘virtuous agent’, for example, names two natural kinds defined by superficially similar natural properties and that the union of these two natural kinds results in an artificial kind. Thus, in the same way that there are two kinds of jade, the union of which forms an artificial kind, there would, for our responsible non-reductive ethical naturalist, be two kinds of virtuous agent, the union of which forms an artificial kind. Similarly, but more damagingly for our non-reductive ethical naturalist, there would also be two kinds of morally required action, the union of which kinds forms an artificial kind. And it is here that our non-reductive ethical naturalist seems to run into trouble–once again–with his commitment to moral realism. This time, however, the trouble runs deep. For, our responsible non-reductive ethical naturalist would have to allow not just that that which we have been calling ‘morally required action’ names an artificial kind; rather, he would have to allow that there are two distinct morally-required-action kinds. Can a moral realist allow that possibility? Does it even make sense? I suggest–and for now it is only a suggestion–it does not make sense. But my argument for that claim will have to wait for another day. CHAPTER FOUR

A NONNATURAL DEFENSE OF MORAL TWIN EARTH

Not long after G. E. Moore, himself an ethical nonnaturalist, presented his so-called Open-Question Argument against analytic ethical naturalism (AEN),86 non-cognitivists placed that weapon in their own arsenal of arguments.87 Now, according to AEN, moral properties are identical to natural properties. Moore’s well-known Open-Question Argument against this claim goes as follows. According to Moore, if a moral property, say, being right, were identical to a natural property, say, maximizing happiness, then the terms that refer to them–‘is right’ and ‘maximizes happiness’–would be synonymous; and if those terms were synonymous, then upon being told that a particular actions falls in the extension of ‘x maximizes happiness, it would not be an open question as to whether the action falls into the extension of ‘x is right’. But the is, it would remain an open question. So, ‘is right’ and ‘maximizes happiness’ do not refer to the same property, and thus those properties are not identical. Since this argument generalizes, we can conclude that moral properties and natural properties are not identical–AEN, that is, is false. Now, non-cognitivism, by contrast, is the claim that moral terms are used to express non-cognitive attitudes like desire or disapproval. Since non-cognitivists therefore deny that moral terms either abbreviate descriptions or even refer to properties or kinds, non- cognitivists and Moore could agree that the Open-Question Argument reveals the falsity of AEN. During the past twenty five years, however, things have changed. Ethical naturalists have jettisoned the semantic assumption that if two property terms refer to the same property, then they are synonymous and replaced it with the semantic doctrine of Causal Externalism (CE). CE claims that (i) a natural-kind term’s intension depends upon facts external to the speaker and that (ii) a concrete particular falls in a natural-kind term’s extension iff the particular

86See Moore ([1903] 1993).

87See, for example, Ayer ([1936] 1952) and R. M. Hare (1952). Mark van Roojen (2009) makes a similar point when discussing motivations for non-cognitivism.

80 81

is causally linked to the term.88 This new ethical naturalism (now called “non-reductive ethical naturalism,” or “NEN”) has, by embracing CE, been able to sidestep Moore’s argument. But two non-cognitivists, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (H&T), collaboratively constructed a thought experiment–the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment–which, H&T argue, shows NEN’s falsity.89 My contention in this chapter is that, in the same way that the non-cognitivists co-opted Moore’s Open-Question Argument against ethical naturalism, ethical nonnaturalists can–and, indeed, should–co-opt H&T’s argument from Moral-Twin Earth. To make my case, I show in this chapter how an ethical nonnaturalist might defend H&T’s Moral-Twin Earth argument from three critical responses made by David Merli (2002). The upshot is that while the argument can withstand Merli’s criticisms–thereby evincing the falsity of non-reductive ethical naturalism–certain adjustments to H&T’s thought experiment need to be made. Once those adjustments are made, it becomes clear that H&T’s argument is available and indeed useful to the ethical nonnaturalist. Before presenting my case, however, I should give an overview of the chapter and discuss some terminology. I begin with the former. Since H&T’s Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment is an instance of what I shall call the “Debate Test,” and my argument relies upon the mechanics of the Debate Test, I describe the Debate Test in the next section–section two–and, in terms of DI, how the test is used to falsify theories of reference. In section three, I describe Richard Boyd’s (1988, 2000, 2003a, 2003b) version of CE, which Boyd and other non-reductive ethical naturalists then apply to moral terms. In section four, I do two things: First, I describe H&T’s Moral-Twin Earth argument, and then, second, I clear up a confusion on Merli’s part regarding H&T’s argument. In sections five, six, and seven, I present Merli’s criticisms of the Moral-Twin Earth argument and offer a response to each. In section eight, I conclude with a summary of the chapter. Now, let me now say something about terminology. Turning to ontology and kind terms, I shall use ‘kind’ to mean a category of substances or events (concrete particulars, or

88Various versions of CE offer different theories about the nature of the causal relation. I say more about this below.

89See Horgan and Timmons (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 2000). 82

“concreta”). I assume that a category is an abstract entity (an “abstractum”) to which a kind term refers. I assume, also, that there are different types of kind: natural kinds (e.g., ELECTRON and UP-QUARK90), artificial kinds (e.g., JADE, VIBRAPHONE, and PICTURE FRAME), and, perhaps, nonnatural kinds (e.g., VIRTUOUS AGENT and MORALLY REQUIRED ACTION). Now, a property defines a kind iff all and only members of the kind possess that property and those members are members of the kind in virtue of their possessing that property. For example, the (conjunctive) property of having -1.602×10-19 C of charge, 9.109×10-31 kg of mass, and spin-1/2 defines the kind ELECTRON. Now, a natural kind is a kind defined by a natural property, and a nonnatural kind is a kind defined by a nonnatural property (e.g., being right or being virtuous), if such there be. An artificial kind is a kind that is defined by neither a natural or a nonnatural property. I assume also that a natural-kind term refers to a natural kind, a nonnatural-kind term refers to a nonnatural kind, and an artificial-kind term refers to an artificial kind. Second, since the distinction between multiply realized and non-multiply realized (or “singly realized”) properties and kinds figures into my argument, I should say a bit about multiple realization. Let us define ‘multiple realization’ in the following way91:

(MF) A higher-level property F is multiply realized by lower-level properties, P1, P2, ...,

Pn..... iff F : (P1 w P2 w ... w Pn w ....), such that P1, P2, ..., Pn, .... are nomically distinct properties.

(MK) A higher-level kind KF is multiply realized by lower-level kinds KP1, KP2, KP3, etc.,

iff KF is defined by a property F, KP1 is defined by a property P1, KP2 is defined by

a property P2, KP3 is defined by a property P3, etc. such that F is multiply realized

by lower-level properties P1, P2, P3, etc.

90I will use small capitals to indicate the names for kinds.

91The following is a more formal rendering of Louise Antony’s (2008) description of multiple realization. According to Antony, a property is nomic iff its instances participate in “objective lawful regularities” (170). Therefore, we might say, two properties are nomically distinct just in case their instances fail to participate in the same objective lawful regularities. I say more about multiple realization below. 83

So, multiple realization is a relation that may be instantiated between higher- and lower-level properties and between higher- and lower-level kinds. Now, if a natural property is identical to a disjunctive property, then there is a natural kind defined by a disjunctive property. Therefore, it may be that a natural kind is defined by a disjunctive property: If the disjunctive property is itself nomic, then the disjunctive property is a natural property, in which case the kind defined by that disjunctive property is a natural kind. Now, if a kind is defined by a disjunctive property, then a concretum is a member of the kind iff the concretum possesses the disjunctive property; and the concretum possesses the disjunctive property, if it does, in virtue of its possessing at least one of the disjuncts.92 So, although a concretum’s possessing any one of the disjuncts is sufficient for its being a member of the kind defined by the disjunctive property, it is also necessary for the concretum to possess at least one of those disjuncts in order to be a member of the kind defined by a disjunctive property. We can thus see that for any natural or nonnatural kind, a kind is defined by exactly one property, even if the kind is multiply realized, in which case the property is a disjunctive natural or nonnatural property.93 Finally, turning to general doctrines, by ‘moral realism’ I mean the doctrine according to which moral kinds and moral properties are real (genuine, mind-independent, objective, etc.) kinds and properties. I also assume that moral realism implies the denial of non-cognitivism, so- called error theories, relativism, and subjectivism.94 By ‘non-reductive ethical naturalism’ (‘naturalism’ hereafter) I shall mean the moral realist doctrine according to which (i) moral kinds and moral properties are natural kinds and properties and scientifically investigable,95 and thus (ii) moral-kind terms and moral-property terms are natural-kind terms and natural-property terms, respectively. By ‘ethical nonnaturalism’ (‘nonnaturalism’ hereafter) I shall mean the moral realist doctrine according to which moral kinds and moral properties are not identified

92The use of ‘disjunct’ and ‘disjunctive’ is short hand. Concreta do not really possess disjuncts; they possess properties whose possession is represented as a disjunct.

93See chapter six of this dissertation for more on disjunctive natural properties.

94For more on moral realism and anti-realism, see Joyce (2009).

95See Sturgeon (2006, 92). 84

with any natural kinds or natural properties. Now, since naturalists and nonnaturalists both bill themselves as moral realists, and since I wish to respond in this chapter from the point of view of a nonnaturalist, I shall therefore assume that moral realism is true. With that, I now turn to the Debate Test.

1. Debating Descriptive Internalism

The Debate Test provides a means of falsifying theories of reference. In this section, I will briefly describe the mechanics of the Debate Test and then H&T’s re-description, in terms of the Debate Test, of Hilary Putnam’s famous (1975b) Twin Earth thought experiment, which Putnam used against DI. I begin with DI itself. 1.1. Descriptive Internalism As indicated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, DI is basically the application of Frege’s ([1892] 2001) theory of singular-term semantics and reference to kind terms.96 According to Frege, a singular term’s intension consists in a definite description that determines the term’s extension. For example, the intension of ‘Mort’ may consist in the definite description jx is Katherine’s black kittenk such that ‘Mort’’s extension is the individual who satisfies that description, viz., my wife’s black kitten, Mort. Now, according to DI, a kind term’s intension also consists in a description such that everything that satisfies that description “falls in” the term’s extension. For example, the natural-kind term ‘electron’’s intension might consist in a description like jx has -1.602×10-19 C of charge, 9.1090×10-31 kg of mass, and spin-1/2k, and everything that satisfies that description falls in ‘electron’’s extension. The extension itself of a kind term is the kind all and only of whose members satisfy the kind term’s intension: It is because all and only members of the kind ELECTRON satisfy the above description that

‘electron’’s extension is the kind ELECTRON. So, as with the Fregean theory of singular terms,

96Frege’s theory was amended by Searle (1958, 1953) to avoid certain problems regarding ignorance and error, and it requires further adjustment to accommodate a difference between individuals and kinds. I discuss the former in chapter three of this dissertation, and I discuss the latter in chapter five. In this chapter, I shall set these issues aside. 85

DI implies that a kind term’s intension determines its extension. Now, let us turn to the Debate Test. 1.2. The Debate Test The Debate Test rests upon the conjunction of two claims: the Extension Identity Requirement and the Explanatory Co-variance Assumption. Regarding the former, notice that a debate requires the interlocutors’ terms to have the same extensions.97 Despite Ned’s arguing that Tony is the best NFL quarterback and Nate’s arguing that Tony is not the best NFL quarterback, Ned and Nate are not having a genuine debate if Ned is using ‘Tony’ to refer to Tony Romo, while Nate is using ‘Tony’ to refer to Tony Soprano. Ned and Nate can have a genuine debate only if their respective terms have the same extensions. But notice, also, that even if Ned and Nate are both using ‘Tony’ to refer to Tony Romo, if Ned is using ‘NFL

quarterback’ to refer to the kind NFL QUARTERBACK, while Nate is using ‘NFL quarterback’ to refer to the kind FICTIONAL CRIME BOSS, Ned and Nate still fail to have a genuine debate. In short, if our interlocutors’ terms fail to have the same extensions, then our interlocutors fail to have a debate–they are, rather, talking past each other.98 Call the requirement that interlocutors’ terms must have the same extensions if they are to have a genuine debate, the “Extension Identity Requirement,” which we may put thus:

(EIR) Two interlocutors S1 and S2 debate whether a concretum a is a member of a kind

K only if S1 uses a kind term jK1k to refer to K, and S2 uses a kind term jK2k to refer to K.99

97I am using ‘debate’, in this chapter, to mean the verbal activity that occurs between at least two interlocutors and is the result of a disagreement in belief. I will not use ‘debate’ to include verbal sparring that results from a disagreement in attitude. Thus, as I am using ‘debate’, there are moral debates only if some form of cognitivism is true. I say more about this below.

98Ronald Dworkin (1986) and Timothy Endicott (2001), in discussing Dworkin, make the same point with regard to the term ‘law’ as it is used by legal theorists. Endicott uses ‘fulcrum of disagreement’ to mean a set of statements that two interlocutors must agree on before they can have a genuine disagreement. According to Dworkin and Endicott, legal theorists must include within the fulcrum of disagreement what they mean by the term ‘law’.

99 Of course, it may be the case that jK1k = jK2k. 86

Like most experiments–whether empirical or thought–the Debate Test relies also upon what we might call the “Explanatory Co-variance Assumption,” which we may put thus:

(ECA) A hypothesized explanatory feature explains the phenomenon in question iff the presence of the phenomenon co-varies with and only with the presence of the explanatory feature.100

Now, any adequate theory of kind-term reference–for example, that implied by DI–describes a feature (the “hypothesized explanatory feature”) that putatively explains a certain phenomenon, viz., how a person uses a kind term to refer to a particular kind. So, by (ECA), if a theory of reference is true, then a person has the feature described in the theory’s explanans iff he in fact refers to and only to the kind in question. But, of course, (ECA) also implies that if two persons have the same explanatory feature, then they both refer to and only to the kind in question. The Debate Test rests upon the conjunction of (EIR) and (ECA). Here is how. When we conjoin (EIR) and (ECA), we see that if a reference theory is true, then (assuming no confounding variables) two interlocutors attempting to have a debate succeed in having a debate when and only when they both possess the theory’s hypothesized explanatory feature.

Consequently, assuming S1 and S2 are attempting to have a debate about whether some

100What I am calling the “Explanatory Co-variance Assumption” is the assumption upon which John Stuart Mill ([1843] 1900) bases what he calls the “Method of Agreement” and the “Method of Difference.” Most empirical experiments are based upon either the Method of Agreement or the Method of Difference. Regarding the Method of Agreement, Mill states,

If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is that the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon. (Mill [1843] 1900, 255)

Mill describes the Method of Difference like this:

If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. (Mill [1843] 1900, 256) 87 concretum a is a member of a kind K, one can falsify a theory of reference by describing a scenario in which one of the following occurs:

(DF1) Despite S1’s having the hypothesized explanatory feature, and S2’s failing to have

the hypothesized explanatory feature, S1 and S2 succeed in debating whether a concretum a is a member of K.

(DF2) Despite both S1’s and S2’s having the hypothesized explanatory feature, S1 and S2 fail in debating about whether a concretum a is a member of K.

(DF3) Despite neither S1’s nor S2’s having the hypothesized explanatory feature, S1 and

S2 succeed in debating about whether a concretum a is a member of K.

The Debate Test consists in constructing a scenario such that there are two interlocutors attempting to debate whether some concretum is a member of a specified kind and at least one of the two interlocutors has the hypothesized explanatory feature of the reference theory in question. Then, by consulting one’s intuitions about whether the two interlocutors could have a debate, one attempts to discern whether the scenario satisfies one of the above three descriptions. If the scenario satisfies one of the descriptions, then the theory of reference in question is falsified. 1.3. The Twin Earth Debate Test One example of such a thought experiment is presented in H&T’s (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 2000) description of Hilary Putnam’s famous (1975b) Twin Earth thought experiment, which evinces the falsity of DI for natural-kind terms. Now, as described above, DI implies that a natural-kind term’s intension determines the term’s extension. One of the things Putnam points out is that, if a natural-kind term’s intension determines its extension, then what explains how a person uses a natural-kind term to refer to the term’s extension is the person’s having psychologically associated the natural-kind term with its intension. So, DI implies an explanatory hypothesis about natural-kind term reference, and thus DI can be tested using the Debate Test. The Twin Earth thought experiment, as described by H&T, comprises a Debate Test in which a (DF2) scenario is constructed, thereby evincing DI’s falsity, as I shall describe now. 88

To begin, take the term ‘water’. In 1750, ‘water’’s intension might have consisted in a description like the following: jx is the generally transparent, colorless, tasteless, and inodorous liquid of which seas, lakes, and rivers are composed, and which falls as rain and issues from springsk.101 According to DI, ‘water’’s extension is the kind all and only of whose members

102 satisfy that description. DI thus implies that if two persons S1 and S2 have associated that intension with the term ‘water’, then S1 and S2, refer to the same kind, in which case they can have a debate about whether or not some sample of liquid is a member of that kind. Next, H&T, drawing on Putnam, construct a (DF2) situation in which two persons indeed have associated ‘water’’s intension with the term ‘water’ and yet they fail to have a debate. The scenario goes as follows. There are two possible worlds, Earth and Twin-Earth, the latter of which is at the macro-level exactly similar to Earth. For example, what is called “America” on Earth looks very much like what is called “America” on Twin-Earth, and most American Earthlings use English, while most Twin-American Twin-Earthlings use Twin-English, which sounds and looks indistinguishable from English. Furthermore, there is on Earth an American, Oscar, who has a Twin-Earth dopplegänger, Twin-Oscar. Finally, we stipulate that in both worlds the year is 1750. Now, going on, we are to suppose that the only difference between

Earth and Twin-Earth is that what Americans call “water” consists of H2O, but what Twin- Americans call Twin-“water” consists of a highly complex molecular compound whose name we shall abbreviate with ‘XYZ’. But although at the micro-level H2O and XYZ are dissimilar–they are different natural kinds–they look, smell, and behave exactly alike at the macro-level. Since

H2O and XYZ are exactly similar at the macro-level, and it is 1750 in each world, the difference between water and Twin-water would, we are to assume, be undetectable by either Earthlings or Twin-Earthlings. H&T, next, have us suppose that somehow our Earthling Oscar ends up on Twin-Earth. When Oscar arrives on Twin-Earth, looks around at the various samples of XYZ,

101Drawn from The Oxford English Dictionary.

102A more sophisticated version of DTR, presented in (1958, 1983) and defended in Jackson (1998b), claims that a kind term refers to entities that satisfy a weighted majority of descriptions associated with the kind term. But for my purposes of describing the Debate Test, this simpler version of DI will suffice. 89 and learns that Twin-Earthlings refer to the stuff with term that is orthographically similar to ‘water’, Oscar mistakenly believes that the watery stuff on Twin-Earth is of the same kind as the watery stuff on Earth. In short, Oscar and Twin-Oscar have associated the same descriptions with ‘water’ and Twin-‘water’, respectively. Now, since DI implies that that which explains how a person can use a kind term to refer to its extension is a person’s having associated the kind term’s intension with the term and the kinds’ members’ satisfying that description, then since Oscar and Twin-Oscar associate the same intension with ‘water’ and Twin-‘water’, respectively, Oscar and Twin-Oscar refer to the same kind. But suppose that Oscar and Twin-Oscar find themselves attempting to debate whether the following is the case:

(1) That sample of liquid, l, is water.

Oscar is convinced that what (1) describes is the case; Twin-Oscar believes otherwise. Finally, as prescribed by the Debate Test, H&T ask us–who live in the twenty-first century and know that ‘water’ refers to H2O and Twin-‘water’ refers to XYZ–whether Oscar and Twin-Oscar are having a genuine debate. It seems pretty clear that despite their believing themselves to be in a debate, Oscar and Twin-Oscar are having no more a debate than were Ned and Nate when they attempted to debate whether Tony is the best NFL quarterback; and, moreover, it seems that Oscar and Twin-Oscar would come to the same conclusion if they were able to see their situation from our point of view. Consequently, although Oscar and Twin-Oscar have associated the same intension with ‘water’, they fail to have a debate. This just is a (DF2) scenario, and it shows that DI is likely false.103 I will now turn to H&T’s use of the Debate Test in an attempt to undermine CE as an account of moral-kind term reference. I begin, though, with CE itself.

103I say “likely” because, as H&T point out, the Debate Test is really an empirical experiment of sorts, in which case conclusions drawn from the use of the Debate Test are inductively inferred. 90

2. Causal Externalism

In place of DI, Hilary Putnam (1975b) and Richard Boyd (1988, 2000, 2003a, 2003b) have put forward two, respective, versions of a theory of kind term reference and semantics which I have been calling “Causal Externalism,” or “CE”. In this section, I will describe Boyd’s theory and how Boyd attempts to apply it to moral-kind terms. I have chosen to present CE in terms of Boyd’s theory because H&T present their thought experiment in terms of Boyd’s theory (although they think their argument generalizes to any version of CE), and it is a defense specifically of Boyd’s theory that David Merli offers.104 Now, CE is largely motivated by our intuition that when Oscar applies the term ‘water’ to liquid that consists in XYZ, he makes a mistake despite the fact that the particular samples to which he applies the term ‘water’ in fact satisfy ‘water’’s intension. Moreover, as the Twin- Earth thought experiment indicates, we seem to think that because ‘water’ applies only to

samples of H2O, and Twin-‘water’ applies only to samples of XYZ, ‘water’ and Twin-‘water’ have different intensions. Therefore, CE theorists conclude, when it comes to ‘water’–and indeed natural-kind terms in general–extension determines intension.105 Next, according to Boyd, what explains how a natural-kind term gets linked up, as it were, to its extension is a causal interaction of a certain sort between members of the natural kind and users of the term during empirical. Here is the basic idea. A natural-kind term (or

104Much of what follows comes from Boyd (2000, 2003a, 2003b), although Boyd’s oft- quoted statement of his view comes from his (1988):

Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a kind (property, relation, etc.) k just in case there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it about, over time, that what is predicated of the term t will be approximately true of k (excuse the blurring of the use-mention distinction). [....] When relations of this fort obtain, we may think of the properties of k as regulating the use of t (via such causal relations), and we may think of what is said using t as providing us with socially coordinated epistemic access to k; t refers to k (in nondegenerate cases) just in case the socially coordinated use of t provides significant epistemic access to k, and not to other kinds (properties, etc.). (Boyd 1988, 195)

105I argued in the previous chapter that CE theorists should deny that CE accounts for only natural-kind terms’ semantics and reference. 91

natural-property term) is introduced on the basis of certain observed instances of superficial qualities. During empirical investigation, instances of those superficial qualities “guide” the investigator’s use of the natural-kind term (or natural-property term): The investigator applies the natural-kind term to some concreta and not to others on the basis of whether the concreta are empirically observed to possess the superficial qualities in question. But, of course, the superficial qualities are themselves explained by hidden or “cloaked” natural properties. So, it is really instances of the cloaked natural property that “causally regulate” the use of the natural- kind term (or natural-property term) during empirical investigation. According to Boyd, a natural-kind term refers to the natural kind that is defined by the cloaked property whose instances uniquely causally regulate the use of the natural-kind term during empirical investigation.106 Consequently, we see that, for Boyd, a natural-kind term’s intension is determined by an extension that may be empirically discovered in the future.107 (For ease of

106Although he distinguishes between natural kinds and natural properties, Boyd does not really say much about the differences between using CE to account for natural-kind terms and using CE to account for natural-property terms. Furthermore, someone might see a difficulty in the fact that a kind’s essential property causally regulates the use of a term that refers to a property and causally regulates the kind term whose referent is defined by the property, viz., a particular kind. Difficulty can be avoided, however, by appealing to the intention of the investigators. For, whether the term refers to a kind or a property can be largely a function of whether the investigator intends to refer to a property or a kind. Nothing in this violates the spirit of CE.

107There is, of course, one problem: Instances of similar superficial qualities may be explained by instances of different cloaked, natural properties. According to Paul Churchland, for example, the use of the natural-kind term ‘gold’ was, during the late medieval period, causally regulated by the superficial qualities exhibited by pieces of gold that were impure to various degrees (Churchland 1989, 283). But even during that time, according to Boyd, ‘gold’ referred to the natural kind defined by the property of consisting of an aggregate of particles describable as having atomic number 79, and the natural-kind term ‘gold’ thus applied only to concreta having that property The reason is, claims Boyd, during empirical investigation, it was the instances of the property of consisting in an aggregate of particles describable as having atomic number 79 that explained the superficial qualities medieval alchemists associated with ‘gold’. The impurities merely detracted from those superficial qualities, and we discovered this fact through empirical investigation. In the case of ‘jade’, matters are different. As philosophical lore has it, the kind-defining properties of JADEITE and of NEPHRITE give rise to similar superficial qualities such that two cloaked properties–respectively, the properties of

consisting of NaAl(SiO3)2 and of consisting of Ca2(Mg,Fe)5Si8O22(OH)2–causally regulated the 92

reading, I will from hereon drop ‘instances of’ when speaking of a property’s causally regulating the use of a term. When I say that a property causally regulates the use of a term, it should be understood, however, that it is really the property’s instances that causally regulate the use of the term.) Now, according to Boyd and other naturalists, moral-kind terms are natural-kind terms, and thus CE can account for moral-kind terms’ semantics and reference. Extending the notion of unique causal regulation to moral terms, Boyd’s claim is that a moral-kind term refers to the natural kind whose kind-defining property is the natural property which uniquely, causally regulates our use of the moral term in ethical inquiry. Take, for example, the moral-kind term ‘right action’. If the naturalists are right, then there is a unique natural property that causally regulates the use of ‘right action’, which property future science will discover. According to

naturalists, that particular natural property defines the natural kind RIGHT ACTION, and therefore that property’s possession determines whether or not ‘right action’ applies to a particular action. In short, then, according to Boyd and other naturalists, if a moral-kind term is uniquely, causally regulated by a natural property during the course of empirical investigation, then that moral-kind term’s extension is the natural kind defined by the regulating property; and since a natural-kind term applies to and only to concreta that possess the natural kind’s defining property, then a moral-kind term’s extension–viz., a natural kind–determines the term’s intension. H&T present their Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment as a (DF1) type scenario that falsifies CE’s explanation of moral-kind term reference. I turn to that thought experiment now.

use of ‘jade’. (See LaPorte [2004] for a presumably more accurate history of ‘jade’. Also, the kind-defining properties of JADEITE and of NEPHRITE were drawn from LaPorte [2004].) So, ‘jade’ failed to be a natural-kind term because, according to Boyd, its use was not causally regulated during the course of empirical investigation by a unique natural property whose instances explain the superficial qualities we associate with ‘jade’. In short, whereas for ‘gold’ the associated superficial qualities were explained by pure and impure instances of just one natural property, for ‘jade’ there were two natural properties that explained the superficial qualities associated with ‘jade’. Consequently, we discovered that ‘gold’ is a natural-kind term and that ‘jade’ is not. I concern myself with this issue in the previous chapter of this dissertation. 93

3. Inter-world Moral Debate

3.1. Moral-Twin Earth Thought Experiment In a series of papers, H&T utilize the Debate Test in order to undermine the plausibility of the claim that CE can account for how a person can use a term to refer to a moral kind such as

RIGHT ACTION or VIRTUOUS AGENT (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 2000). Now, as described above, the Debate Test can be used to undermine DI by showing that two interlocutors can have DI’s hypothesized explanatory feature and yet fail to have a debate–a (DF2) scenario. H&T’s debate test, by contrast, attempts to falsify CE by constructing a (DF1) scenario–by showing that even if only one of two interlocutors has CE’s hypothesized explanatory feature, the interlocutors can nonetheless have a genuine debate. Following H&T (1992a), I shall describe the Debate Test in terms of Boyd’s theory, but I, like H&T, take it to generalize to all versions of CE. As described in the last section, Boyd claims that what explains a person’s using a kind term to refer to a natural kind is that the natural kind’s kind-defining property causally regulates the use of the term during empirical investigation. To put it a bit more formally:

(CSK) Each moral-kind term jKk rigidly designates the moral kind K whose kind-

defining natural property FK uniquely causally regulates the use of jKk by humans during empirical inquiry.108

Therefore, according to Boyd’s theory, what explains how S can use jKk to refer to K is that FK causally regulates the use of jKk during empirical enquiry within S’s linguistic community. (Let us call the property that uniquely causally regulates the use of a kind term, the kind term’s “causal use-regulation property,” or “CUR-property.”) Now, the “Moral-Twin Earth” Debate Test consists in a thought experiment similar to the Twin Earth thought experiment described above. As with the Twin Earth thought experiment,

108H&T’s original statement of B-CTR goes as follows:

(CSN) Each moral term t rigidly designates the natural property N that uniquely regulates the use of t by humans.” (H&T 1992b, 184) 94

H&T have us suppose that Earth has a macro-level twin, called “Moral-Twin Earth,” but that in both worlds the year is about 2010. The only relevant (for our purposes) difference between Earth and Moral-Twin Earth has to do with the term ‘right action’ and its orthographically similar counterpart, which I shall abbreviate with ‘Twin-“right action”’. But Earthlings and Moral-Twin Earthlings are very similar in their respective uses of ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’. For example, they respectively apply these terms to actions they systematically attempt to perform rather than other actions, to actions they often praise others for performing, and so on. Moreover, many of the actions Moral-Twin Earthlings call Twin-‘right action’ are actions an Earthling visitor (Moriah) would call ‘right action’. In fact, there is so much similarity between the application of ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ and the practices surrounding actions to which these terms are applied that, if Moriah were to visit Moral-Twin Earth, she would be convinced that ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ mean the same thing. There is, however, an important difference: On Earth, we are to assume, ‘right action’’s CUR-property is the functional property of maximizing happiness, while on Moral-Twin Earth, Twin-‘right action’’s CUR- property is some other functional property that is tracked by a deontological theory. H&T then have us suppose that Moriah visits Moral-Twin Earth, comes across her dopplegänger, Twin-Moriah, and attempts to have a debate with Twin-Moriah over whether some action is a right action given the circumstances in which it occurs. For example, suppose Twin-Moriah describes to Moriah a recent situation in which a ruffian accosted a passerby and threatened to shoot five adults standing along a wall unless the passerby shot a little girl playing a few feet away.109 Say that the passerby acted appropriately by utilitarian standards, but inappropriately by Moral-Twin Earthlings’ standards. Could Moriah and Twin-Moriah have a genuine debate over whether the fact described as follows is the case given the preceding scenario?

(2) That action, a, was a right action.

109This example is an adaptation from a case found in Bernard Williams (1973). 95

Our intuitions, H&T point out, seem to be that there could be a debate between Moriah and Twin-Moriah over the truth of (2). After all, it intuitively seems that Moriah and Twin-Moriah could debate about what would have been the right action in the scenario described. But if Moriah and Twin-Moriah could debate the truth of (2), then CE cannot account for how moral-kind terms refer.110 CE implies that a moral-kind term refers to the moral kind that is defined by the natural property that uniquely causally regulates the use of the moral-kind term. But, as described in the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment, Moriah’s use of ‘right action’ is regulated by a natural property that is distinct from the natural property that regulates Twin- Moriah’s use of Twin-‘right action’; and since, by (EIR), genuine debate requires both interlocutors’ terms to have the same extensions, it therefore follows that if Moriah and Twin- Moriah engage in genuine debate about whether (2) is true, then CE cannot account for ‘right action’’s reference relation. In short and in terms of the Debate Test, Moriah has CE’s hypothesized explanatory feature; Twin-Moriah fails to have that feature; and yet our intuitions are that Moriah and Twin-Moriah can nonetheless have a debate. Given our intuitive response to the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment, we have, according to H&T, good reason to believe that Moral-Twin Earth is a (DF1) scenario, which falsifies CE as an account for moral-kind terms’ reference relations. Now, since its introduction, H&T’s thought experiment has come under considerable fire. The most interesting and forceful of these attacks comes, I believe, from Merli (2002). In the next section, I will present Merli’s arguments, again in terms of the Debate Test. After that, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to defending H&T’s argument from Merli’s responses and drawing a concluding moral. 3.2. Clearing a Confusion Before going on, however, I need to take up an important bit of Merli’s exegesis regarding H&T’s thought experiment. According to Merli,

110Again, I an assuming that the thought experiment just describe generalizes to all versions of CTR. 96

Horgan and Timmons [grant for the sake of discussion] that the terms of our moral discourse here on Earth are causally regulated by, and so refer to, one set of natural properties [or natural kinds], despite variations in individual speakers’ moral views. (Merli 2002, 217)

Merli’s inclusion of the clause ‘and so refer to’ is important. For, the inclusion of that clause implies, in terms we have been using, that H&T grant not only that some natural property F causally regulates the use of ‘right action’ but also that ‘right action’ indeed refers to the natural kind defined by F and that it does so in virtue of F’s causally regulating the use of ‘right action’. So, on Merli’s reading of H&T, H&T actually grant the CE theorist the claim that ‘right action’ refers to a natural kind. To support his understanding of H&T, Merli includes the following footnote:

For example, they [H&T] suppose that the following claim is true:

There is indeed a unique family of functional properties that causally regulates the moral judgments and moral statements of human beings in general, despite the fact that humans widely disagree among themselves about matters of morality (‘Troubles on Moral Twin Earth,’ 245). [H&T 1992a]111

Later in the paper I’ll [meaning Merli will] argue that the concession is something we have reason to believe anyway. But why do Horgan and Timmons concede it? They present the Moral Twin Earth argument as a ‘knockout punch’ to [ethical naturalism], regardless [of] what happens with actual-world disagreement. This suggests that they think their argument is an additional problem for the realist [ethical naturalist]. If I’m right, this is false. This conclusion is interesting for another reason: it focusses attention

111The quote is actually from page 243, although H&T’s granting that statement occurs on page 245. 97

to the issue of disagreement and univocity [sic.] here on Earth, which is where the realist wants it. (Merli 2002, 217 n. 11)

So, according to Merli, H&T grant that ‘right action’ refers to a natural kind defined by a natural property F and that ‘right action’ refers to that natural kind because F causally regulates the use of ‘right action’; and, says Merli, H&T grant all of this in order to present a second problem–a problem over and above the problem of accounting for real world moral debate–to the ethical naturalist. I believe that Merli’s understanding of H&T, here, is confused. H&T neither grant that ‘right action’ refers to a natural kind, nor should they. H&T should–and indeed they do–grant (for discussion’s sake) that (i), on Earth, some natural property causally regulates the use of ‘right action’ by humans, that (ii), on Earth, this property is “captured” or tracked by some moral theory (H&T 1992b, 242), and even that (iii) despite the considerable moral disagreement on Earth ‘right action’ refers to just one kind (H&T 1992b, 244). But none of these claims nor any conjunction formed from them implies that ‘right action’ therefore refers to some natural kind.112 Let us consider the textual evidence. First, notice that the above block quote from H&T, which is cited by Merli, does not include any reference to a reference relation. The block quote provides evidence only that H&T would grant that a natural property causally regulates the use of ‘right action’ not that ‘right action’ therefore refers to a natural kind. The second piece of evidence comes from the fact that H&T take themselves to be arguing that,

it is a mistake to construe the relation of causal regulation between functional properties and moral terms as generating–or as constituting–the relation of (rigid) reference between these terms and properties. (H&T 1992b, 244; emphasis theirs)

112This is a crucial point, if the ethical non-naturalist is to co-opt the Moral-Twin Earth argument. 98

Here, we see H&T’s explicitly stating that they take Moral-Twin Earth to show that, for moral terms, a causal regulation relation does not imply a reference relation. The third piece of evidence consists in the just-quoted sentence together with the sentence that immediately follows it in H&T’s article:

Thus if objective moral properties exist at all, then they are not identical with the functional properties in question. (H&T 1992b, 244)

H&T take this claim to follow from the claim quoted just above. These two claims together indicate that although H&T are willing to grant that some natural property causally regulates the use of ‘right action’ and that ‘right action’ refers on Earth to a single moral kind, ‘right action’ does not refer to the natural kind defined by the natural property that causally regulates ‘right action’’s use. I offer the fourth piece of evidence, which comes from H&T’s (1991) and (1992a) presentations of the Moral-Twin Earth argument, on the plausible assumption that rigid designation is a reference relation. In both presentations of their argument, H&T conclude that it is false that, “Each moral term t rigidly designates the natural property [or kind] N that uniquely regulates the use of [the term] t by humans” (H&T 1991, 455; 1992a, 184). So, if H&T (1992b) were to grant the reference relation between “t” and “N,” they would be granting the falsity of their own conclusion in their (1991) and (1992a) presentations of the Moral-Twin Earth argument. So, granting that ‘right action’ refers to the natural kind that is defined by the property that regulates ‘right action’’s use would, for H&T, be spectacularly self-destructive. That this is so is, of course, also why H&T should not grant that ‘right action’ refers to that natural kind. Finally, let me say a word about Merli’s claim that H&T “present the Moral Twin Earth argument as a ‘knockout punch’ to [ethical naturalism]” and that this “suggests that [H&T] think their argument is an additional problem” for the ethical naturalist. H&T’s boxing metaphor comes from their (1991). In that particular paper, H&T describe ethical naturalism as coming in two varieties: an analytic version and a “synthetic” version. According to H&T, the first “punch” was leveled by Moore’s Open-Question Argument against the analytic version of 99

ethical naturalism, and “having returned to the philosophical ring in newly lean and mean naturalistic shape, [ethical naturalism] has been decked again” (461) and now lies “flat on the canvass” (462). The “knockout punch” has to do not with some further problem for non- reductive (or “synthetic”) ethical naturalism; rather, it has to do with ethical naturalism’s returning to the ring after it, in its analytic guise, was knocked out by the Open-Question Argument. From all of this, I conclude that H&T neither (i) grant that ‘right action’ refers to the natural kind whose defining property regulates ‘right action’’s use nor (ii) take themselves to be describing some problem for the naturalist that goes beyond that of accounting for actual world moral debate. It is important to clear this confusion. For, while clearing the confusion does not diminish the force of Merli’s critical responses to H&T’s thought experiment, it is crucial to my presentation above and my own responses below that the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment is a Debate Test–that is, that it is an attempt to falsify a theory of reference. The exegetical evidence above clearly indicates that H&T are, in fact, trying to falsify a theory of reference, viz., CE as it is applied to moral terms. That makes the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment a Debate Test, and thus I can proceed to my presentation of Merli’s three responses to the thought experiment.

4. Merli’s Error Theory

In his “Return to Moral Twin Earth” (2002), David Merli offers three critical responses to H&T’s Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment. Merli himself presents the responses as independent, stand-alone responses. So, in what follows, I present Merli’s responses in reverse order to how Merli himself presents them. The reason I present them in reverse order is that I believe that for the nonnaturalist who would wish to co-opt H&T’s argument, the response Merli presents first in his (2002) is the most formidable and interesting, and I wish to save the best for last. Since Merli presents his responses in defense of Boyd’s version of CE, I will do so, too. 4.1. Merli’s Error Theory Merli’s Error Theory begins with what he takes to be the motivation for H&T’s argument from Moral-Twin Earth. According to Merli, what motivates H&T’s argument is that, to H&T, 100

CE seems impotent to account for the practical role of moral utterances, for example, to dispute with others about whether to take some action.113 H&T use the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment, according to Merli, to force the CE theorist to admit that, even if CE is true, moral terms are nonetheless primarily used to express certain non-cognitive attitudes rather than refer to properties or kinds. The Merli version of H&T’s argument goes basically as follows:

(M1) If CE is true, then Moriah and Twin-Moriah use ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’, respectively, to refer to different moral kinds; and if Moriah and Twin- Moriah use ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ to refer to different moral kinds, then, by (EIR), Moriah and Twin-Moriah fail to have a genuine moral debate. (M2) Even if Moriah and Twin-Moriah fail to have a genuine moral debate, Moriah and Twin-Moriah can use ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ to engage in the practical role of disputing what to do. (M3) If (M1) and (M2) are true, then moral terms are used primarily not to refer to certain properties or kinds but to express non-cognitive attitudes. (M4) The Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment reveals the truth of (M1) and (M2). (M5) Therefore, moral terms are used primarily not to refer to certain properties or kinds but to express non-cognitive attitudes.

In a somewhat surprising move, Merli denies (M3)–that is, he grants (M1) and (M2) and then denies (M3)’s consequent. Here is his argument. First, Merli points out that there are two sorts of normative dispute: disputes that occur within a normative domain (e.g., morality, prudence, etiquette, etc.) and disputes that occur between normative domains. For example, a dispute between two British moral philosophers about whether one ought, for reasons of health, to spend the afternoon riding his bike or to spend it relaxing with a copy of Bleak House is a dispute within a normative domain, viz., prudence. If, however, these same moral philosophers were to dispute about whether one ought to spend the afternoon riding one’s bike or to remain

113As Merli puts it, “The practical role of these judgments [is] something that strikes noncognitivists as their core feature” (Merli 2002, 231-32). 101

home in order to arrive on time at a dinner party later that evening, then the dispute would be between domains, viz., between the domains of prudence and etiquette. Having distinguished between intra-domain disputes and inter-domain disputes, Merli, second, points out that although both sorts of dispute are about what one ought to do, the sort of reason one can appeal to distinguishes intra- and inter-domain disputes. According to Merli, inter-domain disputes often cannot be resolved by appeal to normative reasons alone because normative reasons are often domain specific. In order to decide whether to ride one’s bike or to be at a dinner party on time, one cannot appeal just to reasons of prudence or of etiquette; inter- domains reasons, if such there be, must be appealed to as well. So, according to Merli, in an important sense, there are at least two kinds of ‘ought’ that must be satisfied in order to settle an inter-domain dispute: the domain-specific ‘ought’ and the between-domains ‘ought’, the latter of which Merli, following Allan Gibbard (1990), calls the “last ‘ought’ before action” (Merli 2002, 232). Third, according to Merli, the CE theorist could just grant that CE implies that ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ refer to different moral kinds and therefore that Moriah and Twin-Moriah fail to have a genuine moral debate. Then, claims Merli, the CE theorist should interpret the dispute between Moriah and Twin-Moriah as one about whether one ought to act according to morality or according to “Twin-morality.” Once he does that, then the CE theorist is free to claim that ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ can still figure into disputes about what to do without being committed to the claim that the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment shows that moral terms are used primarily to express non-cognitive attitudes. Finally, Merli goes on to propose how inter-domain disputes may be settled: perhaps by appeal to some broader notion of rationality, or maybe some sort of inter-domain expressivism gets the story right. Merli prefers the latter, but, he claims, naturalists like Boyd and Brink will probably prefer the former since rationality may provide a means of making truth-apt evaluations of natural properties. 4.2. A Nonnaturalist Response The problem with Merli’s move is that either it implies the possibility of relativism, which is inconsistent with the naturalist’s moral realism, or it has highly implausible implications. First, as stated above, Merli grants that CE implies a distinction between morality 102 and Twin-morality, which Merli describes as the same sort of distinction as we find between morality and, say, prudence. But if Merli thinks that the difference between morality and Twin- morality is the same difference as that between morality and prudence, then we Earthlings have a right to wonder, in what sense is Twin-morality moral at all? What, we may ask, groups our morality and so-called “Twin-morality” under the heading ‘morality’, if Earthlings use moral terms and Twin-Earthlings use their orthographically similar terms to refer, respectively, to different properties and kinds? Now, perhaps moral principles, properties, kinds, and so on have some characteristic whereby we could distinguish moral normativity from other types of normativity. Perhaps that what distinguishes moral normativity from other types of normativity is the fact that the moral has to do with how we ought to treat others.114 But notice–and Merli himself is well aware of this–Merli’s response to the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment had better be available as a response to a case just like the Moral-Twin Earth case except that the interlocutors are Earthling inhabitants of different islands, citizens of different countries, or members of different social castes.115 After all, our concern is really about moral disputes between Earthlings, regardless of

114Julia Driver, for example, distinguishes the moral domain from other normative domains in terms of norms having to do with interpersonal relations: “Moral norms primarily concern our interactions with others in ways that have significance to their well-being” (Driver 2007, 1). I am highly dubious of distinguishing the moral domain from other normative domains in terms of how one ought to treat another: Does one commit a category mistake in saying that we have moral duties to avoid eating certain foods or to avoid using the name of God in a frivolous way? Surely not. I draw the distinction between the moral domain and other normative domains in this way only for the purposes of making a point. So far as I can see, nothing pertinent to that point hangs on particular characterization of the moral domain that I employ here. See Haidt and Joseph (2006) and Haidt and Graham (2007) for similar criticisms of distinguishing the moral from the non-moral normative domains in terms of interpersonal relations.

115That Merli is indeed aware of this requirement is evinced by his applying his solution to a case described by R. M. Hare (1952) in which a group of Christian missionaries visit a group of cannibals. The cannibals are like the missionaries in that they use a term that is orthographically similar to the English term ‘good’ as their (the cannibals’) “most general adjective of commendation,” but, unlike the missionaries, the cannibals apply the term to fellow tribesmen who, among other things, collect a great number of scalps (Merli 2002, 207). Now, Hare uses his thought experiment to argue that DI does not account for moral terms’ semantics. 103

what we say about Twin-Earthlings. So, let us bring Merli’s suggestion to jettison (M3) down to Earth. Suppose that Twin-island Earthlings’ moral terms refer to properties and kinds different from those that our terms refer to, but nonetheless Twin-island Earthlings’ principles and properties still count as moral. In that case, Merli’s response would allow that different linguistic communities may have their own moralities to which they are subject and thus that there is no single morality to which everyone on Earth is subject. This is relativism, and it is not consistent with the naturalist’s moral realism. Suppose, on the other hand, that moral normativity is not distinguishable from other types of normativity. In that case, what distinguishes the domain that we call the “moral” from other normative domains just is the set of properties and kinds our moral principles and claims make reference to. But in that case, every linguistic community who failed to have terms causally regulated by the very set of properties that regulate our moral terms are simply amoralists by default. Thus, if we Americans are naturally consequentialists, but, say, the British are naturally deontologists, then the British are amoralists! To many, that would seem counterintuitive. So, Merli’s first response is either not available to the naturalist, or it is too implausible. Let us therefore turn to Merli’s second response.

For, according to Hare, although the missionaries and cannibals have associated different descriptions with ‘good’, they can nonetheless have a moral dispute. From this, Hare concludes that moral terms are used not primarily to refer but to prescribe actions. Merli sees the Moral- Twin Earth thought experiment as just another version of Hare’s original missionary/cannibal experiment–but this time used against CE (see Merli 2002, 231-32; I have argued above, however, that Merli is wrong about this). To quote Merli:

The two challenges [Hare’s and H&T’s] provide us with just the kinds of disagreements that normative language should help us resolve: we need to decide to take scalps or to turn the other cheek; we need to decided whether to act rightly or twin-rightly. (Merli 2002, 231)

So, Merli takes his solution to apply to both between-worlds and within-worlds disputes. 104

5. Future Experts Objection

5.1. Future Experts Objection In his second response, Merli attempts to bring our present day intuitions regarding H&T’s Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment into doubt by point out that we should recognize our future selves as having more moral expertise than our present selves. Now, H&T, for the sake of discussion, grant the moral realist’s claim that there is, in fact, one true moral theory and that it is discoverable, as per Brink (1989), by the method of reflective equilibrium–that is, by reflecting on and making adjusts to (i) our intuitive judgments about particular moral cases, (ii) the moral principles we rely on in making those judgments, and (iii) our general moral theory so that we achieve a stable coherence between all three. But as Merli points out, if the true moral theory can be discovered by the method of reflective equilibrium, then we have reason to believe that our future selves will be better informed about morality than are we are today–our future selves will, that is, have more moral expertise. Therefore, claims Merli, we should consider what future experts would say if they were to engage in the sort of debate described in the Moral- Twin Earth thought experiment. In order that we may consider what our future selves would say if engaged in a Moral- Twin Earth type debate, Merli presents us with a Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment like the following. Suppose the year is 2050 and that Earthlings and Twin-Earthlings have both discovered, by the method of reflective equilibrium, respective end-of-the-day moral theories.116 Such theories would be characterizable, as per Merli, as “maximally stable, well-justified, and widely accepted” (2002, 226). Now, suppose the end-of-the-day moral theory discovered on Earth is a consequentialist theory, while the end-of-the-day moral theory on Moral-Twin Earth is deontological. Suppose, also, that our consequentialist theory tracks some natural property FC which causally regulates our use of ‘right action’ and that Moral-Twin Earthlings’ deontological theory tracks a natural property FD which causally regulates their use of Twin-‘right action’.

116I call into question the notion of an ‘end-of-the-day moral theory’ below. Given what I say there, we could alter Merli’s claim, without doing violence to Merli’s argument, by saying that the end-of-the-day moral theories our future experts and the Twin-experts have discovered are stable relative to their respective (and similar) historical contexts. 105

Next, suppose that sometime after each world has discovered its respective end-of-the-day theory, a group of Earthling moral philosophers visits Moral-Twin Earth for the first time and discovers that Moral-Twin Earthlings are deontologists. Finally, suppose that the Earthlings and Moral-Twin Earthlings come together in what we might call the “A.D. 2050 Conference on Inter-world Morality” in an attempt to resolve their moral disagreement through rational deliberation. As Merli points out, there are two (conceptually) possible results from the inter-world moral conference: either the Earthlings or the Twin-Earthlings reach agreement on a moral theory (say, one side comes to hold the moral views of the other side, or both sides adopt some third view) or no agreement on a moral theory is reached, in which case the debate is never resolved. Merli claims that if, on the one hand, agreement is achieved, then at least one of the groups did not have a genuine end-of-the-day moral theory. If, on the other hand, Earthling moral experts and Twin-Earth moral experts could not reach agreement, then these experts, knowing themselves to be experts, would conclude not that CE is therefore false but, rather, that they (the Earthlings and Twin-Earthlings) were talking past each other. According to Merli, since we have reason to defer to future moral experts, we should defer to their judgment regarding the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment. If we defer to our future experts’ judgment, and our future experts would believe that they and the Moral-Twin Earthlings would be talking past each other, then we have little reason to trust our own intuitions regarding the truth or falsity of whether CE can or cannot account for moral-kind terms. 5.2. A Nonnatural Response There are three points to make with regard to Merli’s argument. First, I would agree with Merli that there is good reason to appeal to what our future moral experts would say if they considered a Moral-Twin Earth type thought experiment. That reason can be stated in terms of Putnam’s original Twin Earth thought experiment: Although we believe Oscar would agree with our judgment regarding Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario–our judgment, that is, that he (Oscar) makes a mistake in applying ‘water’ to samples of XYZ–it is our intuitions that we have most reason to rely on since we have all of the facts about which natural properties define WATER and

Twin-WATER. Similarly, Merli is right, I think, that we should give more weight to our future 106 moral experts’ judgments than to our own regarding Moral-Twin Earth type thought experiments. The second point is this. Notice that the relationship between our future experts and Merli’s Moral-Twin Earth type scenario is not quite the same as the relation between us and Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario. Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario occurs in 1750, which is historically prior to when we make our judgment; however, Merli’s Moral-Twin Earth scenario occurs in the future such that those forming the judgments to which we are to appeal are themselves involved in the thought experiment. When we take this difference into account, we see that there are in fact two distinct sets of future experts’ judgments to take into account. The first set has to do with what our future experts would say about our engaging in debate with Moral-Twin Earthlings; the second has to do with what our future experts would say about their own engaging in debate with Moral-Twin Earthlings. It is the former that parallels the Putnam case, but it is the latter that Merli has us consider. The third point will come to light as we consider both sets of judgments mentioned in the last paragraph. Consider, first, what our future experts would say about our engaging in debate with Moral-Twin Earthlings. As per our moral-realistic assumptions, our future moral experts would be moral realists just as we are H2O realists. Moreover, they would know–by stipulation–whether ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ have the same extension. If ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ have different extensions, then indeed our future experts would claim that we and our Twin-Earthlings would not have a genuine debate. But consider what our future experts would say if they themselves were engaged in the Inter-world Moral Conference. Indeed, our future experts would probably judge that they and the Moral-Twin Earthlings were talking past each other. But if our future experts are, as per our assumptions, moral realists, then it seems they would conclude either (i) that Twin-‘right action’ does, in fact, refer to the same moral kind as ‘right action’, but that Moral-Twin Earthlings are simply confused–and thus are talking past Earthlings–when it comes to questions of moral justification, or (ii) that Moral-Twin Earthlings are simply amoralists whose use of Twin-‘right action’ is guided by a conjunction of, say, prudential reasons and reasons of etiquette, which happen (for now) to require action that is fairly similar to our morally right action. In any case, it seems unlikely that, if our moral experts are moral realists, they would conclude that Moral- 107

Twin Earthlings have their own morality. What is important to see is this. It need not be because of a committed to CE that our future experts would think that they and their Twin- experts are talking past each other if their debate were not resolved. If no resolution were to occur, our future experts’ commitment to moral realism would give them just as much reason to think that they and their Twin-experts were talking past each. Since Merli’s future experts objection describes not the view of a CE theorist, per se, but rather the view of a moral realist, Merli’s objection fails to give us any reason to think CE can account for moral-kind term reference and thus to think that our linguistic intuitions regarding the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment cannot be trusted. Therefore, let us turn to the last and most interesting of Merli’s objections to consider.

6. Dilemma of the Judge

6.1. Dilemma of the Judge As indicated in section four, the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment presents a (DF1) situation that, according to H&T, evinces the falsity of CE for moral-kind terms. Recall (DF1):

(DF1) Despite S1’s having the hypothesized explanatory feature, and S2’s failing to have

the hypothesized explanatory feature, S1 and S2 succeed in having a debate about whether a is a member of K

From (DF1), we can see that in order for the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment to work against the ethical naturalist, the thought experiment must be described so that it meets two conditions. On the one hand, the person to whom the thought experiment is presented (call him the “Judge”) must be convinced that S1 and S2–whom we are calling “Moriah” and “Twin- Moriah”–succeed in having a genuine debate about (2), that is, about whether a is a right action. Assuming the Judge is aware of (EIR), in order to convince the Judge that Moriah and Twin- Moriah succeed in debating the truth of (2), the Judge must be convinced that ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ have the same extension. On the other hand, the Judge must be convinced also that only one of the interlocutors, let us say, Moriah, has the feature which, according to CE, 108

explains ‘right actions’’s reference relation. According to CE, what explains ‘right actions’’s reference relation is the fact that the use of ‘right action’ by Moriah (and her linguistic community) is causally regulated by a certain natural property. Therefore, the Judge must be convinced that the natural property that causally regulates Moriah’s use of ‘right action’ differs from the natural property that regulates Twin-Moriah’s use of Twin-‘right action’. In short, H&T need to describe their thought experiment in such a way as to convince the Judge of both of the following:

(3) ‘Right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ have the same extension. (4) ‘Right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ have different CUR-properties.

Merli’s objection is that when we take into account (i) the fact that Earthlings’ use of ‘right action’ is closely tied to Earthlings’ moral practices and (ii) the fact that there is great diversity between Earthlings’ moral practices, it is untenable that the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment can be described such that the Judge will be convinced that both (3) and (4) are true. Here is Merli’s argument.117 On the one hand, in order to convince the Judge that (3) is true–that is, that ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ have the same extension–H&T must stipulate that the claims made and actions performed by Moriah when she uses ‘right action’ are similar to Twin-Moriah’s claims and actions when Twin-Moriah uses Twin-‘right action’. After all, since the extension of a kind term is an abstractum (specifically, a kind) we cannot observe it; so, to convince the Judge that (3) is true, H&T must stipulate that Moriah’s use of ‘right

117I have adjusted Merli’s argument a bit because, as noted above, Merli believes that H&T have granted to the Naturalist the truth of CE, and therefore he (Merli) presents his argument in that light. But, as I also showed above, Merli is confused on this point. H&T grant only that a natural property might causally regulate the use of a moral term; they do not grant that such causal regulation results in a reference relation. After all, as the quotes above from H&T show, H&T’s argument from Moral-Twin Earth just is that such causal regulation does not result in a reference relation. Consequently, while Merli presents his argument in terms of a reference relation, I present Merli’s argument in terms of the causal regulation relation. I do not believe, however, that my adjustments to Merli’s argument alters very much the argument’s force. 109

action’ and Twin-Moriah’s use of Twin-‘right action’ are surrounded by similar respective actions and claims. On the other hand, in order to convince the Judge that (4) is true–that is, that ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ have different CUR-properties–H&T must stipulate that Moriah’s and Twin-Moriah’s respective claims and actions surrounding their respective uses of ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ are different. After all, if Moriah’s and Twin-Moriah’s actions and claims were exactly similar, then the Judge would have no justification for thinking that ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ have different CUR-properties. But, according to Merli, when we consider the great degree of moral diversity within the population of just Earthlings, we discover that the practices surrounding Twin-Moriah’s use of Twin-‘right action’ would have to be very different indeed from Moriah’s practices surrounding Moriah’s use of ‘right action’ in order to convince the Judge of (4). The reason is, if H&T grant (as they do) that Earthlings’ use of ‘right action’ is causally regulated by just one natural property, then to convince the Judge that a different natural property causally regulates Twin-Moriah’s use of Twin-‘right action’, H&T seem forced to stipulate that Moral-Twin Earthlings’ practices surrounding their use of Twin-‘right action’ must be something wildly different from what we see on Earth. But, once it is stipulated that Moral-Twin Earthlings’ practices surrounding their use of Twin-‘right action’ is that different from Earthlings’ practices surrounding Earthlings’ use of ‘right action’, then, given the reasoning in the previous paragraph, it becomes a wonder that the Judge has any reason at all to believe (3)–to believe, that is, that Moriah and Twin-Moriah use ‘right action’ and Twin-‘right action’ respectively to refer to the same kind. In short, given the moral diversity we see on Earth, it seems well-nigh impossible to describe the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment in a way that would convince the Judge that both (3) and (4) are true. Consequently, Merli concludes, the argument from Moral-Twin Earth cannot even get off the ground.118

118As Merli points out, his argument might seem to pose a threat to the naturalist, too. The reason is, in order for Merli’s own argument to work, he himself must convince the Judge that there really is a wide variety of moral views and practices on Earth. But if Merli convinces the judge of that, then the Judge might become dubious that Earthlings themselves really use ‘right action’ to refer to a single natural kind. Merli tries to avoid this potential difficulty by 110

6.2. A Nonnaturalist Response In response, I think the nonnaturalist should concede that H&T’s argument falters, but not because the conclusion is false, but because the Moral-Twin Earth scenario as H&T have described it needs to be adjusted. What the nonnaturalist needs to do is alter the scenario in such

a way so as to bring out our intuitions that accord with RIGHT ACTION’S being a nonnatural kind that is multiply realized by distinct natural properties. Now, notice that Merli’s objection would be exactly right if one were attempting to construct an H&T type argument against CE’s accounting for a natural-kind term, like ‘water’, that refers to a singly realized natural kind. Take the following two sentences:

(5) ‘Water’ and Twin-‘water’ have the same referent. (6) ‘Water’ and Twin-‘water’ have different CUR-properties.

It seems impossible to convince the Judge that (5) and (6) could both be true. After all, it just is the fact that Oscar’s use of ‘water’ on Earth is causally regulated by the property of consisting of

H2O and the fact that Twin-Oscar’s use of Twin-‘water’ on Twin Earth is causally regulated by the property of consisting of XYZ that we think that ‘water’ refers to the kind whose defining property is consisting of H2O and that Twin-‘water’ refers to the kind whose defining property is consisting of XYZ. Matters are different, however, when we consider terms that refer to kinds that seem nonnatural but realized by various distinct natural kinds. I believe ‘right action’ is just such a term, and I believe the nonnaturalist can therefore describe a scenario that involves ‘right action’ and that satisfies (3) and (4) suitably adjusted. I shall describe how such a scenario might go by way of an example.

appealing to Boyd’s claim that our kind terms’ extensions are given by the end-of-the-day theory. We have reason to think that there will be an end-of-the-day moral theory, according to Merli, since it looks like Earthlings’ moral views are beginning to converge. So, by appealing to a likely end-of-the-day theory, Merli can preserve ‘right action’’s univocality and allow for the differences we see today between Earthlings’ respective moral practices. I mention this part of Merli’s argument to set it aside, since it does not directly bear upon my defense of H&T’s thought experiment. 111

Now, since multiple realization occurs against the background of a theory, let us begin with a sort of commonsense moral theory, which I shall call “variable-rule consequentialism.” Drawing on Brink (2006), rule consequentialism may be stated thus:

(RC) x is a right action iff “it conforms to a rule the general acceptance of which by humanity would have consequences at least as good for humanity as any alternative rule.” (384)119

(Let us understand ‘good’ in (RC) in terms of flourishing, and let us understand ‘flourishing’ non-normatively.120) Variable-rule consequentialism, by contrast, makes three changes to (RC). First, the first instance of ‘humanity’ is substituted with ‘individual persons’. Second, ‘humanity’ in ‘good of humanity’ is replaced with a variable whose substitution instances name the objects of which one has what McNaughton and Rawling (1998) describe as “duties which stem from special relationships” (39). Making these substitutions, we get the following schema:

(VRC) x is a right action iff it conforms to a rule the general acceptance of which by an individual person S would have consequences at least as good for S’s own x as any alternative rule.

The third change to (RC) is the addition of a function: That which is substituted for ‘x’ is a function of historical context.121 So, for example, in a Hobbesian state of nature, perhaps the

119I should note that although Brink is one of the initiators of non-reductive realism, this description of rule consequentialism is just a statement of the position. It should not be taken as a statement of Brink’s own position.

120For example, ‘flourishing’ might be understood as a conjunction of overall biological fitness, minimal pain, a sense of contentment and satisfaction, etc. Following Elliott Sober (2001), we might take overall biological fitness to be the product of the probability of a member of a population will reach adult hood and the organism’s expected number of offspring. I shall take flourishing in this non-evaluative (non-normative) way throughout the rest of this chapter.

121Variable-rule consequentialism may thus be seen as a variable form of what C. D. Broad ([1953] 1971) calls “self-referential altruism,” where the scope of altruism varies with 112

proper scope of a right-action rule would be the self, in which case ‘x’ would be replaced with the term ‘self’. Now, consider the following. Suppose the year is 1250, and the world is still a fairly dangerous place. The use of ‘right action’ in 1250 is causally regulated by the natural, functional property that corresponds to the right-hand side of the following biconditional:

(KMx) x is a right action iff x maximizes flourishing among one’s own kin.

(Let us call Earthlings living in 1250, “Kin-Earthlings.”) So, in 1250, the ‘x’ in (VRC) is replaced with ‘kin’. As it turned out, however, with the advent of the free market system, increased social mobility, technological advancement, and so on, it became feasible to give, without the high threat of danger, aid to others who are not members of one’s own extended family. Thus, by 2000, the use of ‘right action’ had become causally regulated by the natural, functional property that corresponds to the right-hand side of this biconditional:

(SMx) x is a right action iff x maximizes flourishing among one’s own species.122

(Let us call Earthlings living in 2000, “Species-Earthlings.”) So, in 2000, the ‘x’ in (VRC) is replaced with ‘species’. And that is the 1250/2000-context. Notice how the 1250/2000-context satisfies condition (4)–suitably altered–in a way that should be clear to the Judge, to whom we are presenting our thought experiment. Here is the altered version of (4):

(4') 1250-‘right action’ and 2000-‘right action’ have different CUR-properties.

historical context.

122One may substitute ‘sentient beings’ for ‘species’, if one desires. 113

First, notice that just in terms of natural relations, kinship relations are distinct from intra-species relations. Second, notice that (SMx) is not just a more general claim of which (KMx) is a particular version: On the one hand, (SMx) may imply that an action is a right action even if the act is detrimental to one’s kin, but that implication would be inconsistent with (KMx); on the other hand, (KMx) allows for aiding one’s kin despite whatever harms other members of the species may be enduring. Consequently, had the world never changed–had the free market system, industrialization, upward mobility, etc. never occurred–the end-of-the-day-moral theory would have reflected (KMx), not (SMx). Now, since kinship relations are distinct natural relations from intra-species relations, and (SMx) is not just a more general version of (KMx), it thus follows that the right-hand sides of (KMx) and (SMx) respectively pick out different natural kinds which are defined, respectively, by distinct natural properties.123 If the right-hand sides of (KMx) and (SMx) respectively pick out different natural kinds which are defined respectively by distinct natural properties, then ‘right action’ in 1250 and ‘right action’ in 2000 are causally regulated by different natural properties, which is to say that the 1250/2000-context satisfies (4').

Now, let us insert the following narrative into the 1250/2000-context. Suppose an Earthling living in 2000 (call him “Spencer”) time-travels to 1250 and comes across his Earthling dopplegänger (Kin-Spencer), and they enter into moral debate. For example, shortly after Spencer’s arrival in 1250, Kin-Spencer tells Spencer of a wealthy man who knew of and had opportunity to aid an ailing family in a faraway kingdom. Although the wealthy man could easily have helped the faraway family, he nonetheless refused, deciding to keep the funds for his own family. Spencer, as we might suppose, argues that the man should have aided the family, but Kin-Spencer argues that the man was justified in holding on to that part of his savings for his own family. Are Spencer and Kin-Spencer plausibly having a genuine moral dispute? It seems so.124

123By the way, as per LaPorte (2000, 2006), (KMx) and (SMx) may be seen as de facto rigidly designating distinct natural kinds.

124By the way, notice that even if we ourselves find the wealthy man’s actions repugnant, we think he is wrong about what he should have done, but we do not think that his view is 114

Let us therefore turn to (3'):

(3') 1250-‘right action’ and 2000-‘right action’ have the same extension.

Our intuitions regarding the 1250/2000-narrative are that Spencer and Kin-Spencer are having a moral debate, and thus our intuitions indicate that 2000-‘right action’ and 1250-‘right action’ have the same extension, viz., RIGHT ACTION. Thus, our intuitions indicate that we (and the Judge) are willing to believe that the 1250/2000-narrative satisfies both (3') and (4'). So, the 1250/2000-narrative seems to provide (DF1) scenario and thus seems to indicate that CE cannot account for moral-kind term reference, all the while avoiding Merli’s dilemma. 6.3. An Intuitive Explanation Now, given that the Judge can be convinced that 1250-‘right action’ and 2000-‘right action’ both refer to RIGHT ACTION despite their having different CUR-properties, we have an interesting phenomenon on our hands that needs to be explained. Just how could the Judge hold that a narrative could simultaneously satisfy (3') and (4')? But there is an explanation, and it is to be offered by the growing number of moral philosophers who are returning to “ethical intuitionism.”125 The explanation is that (i) moral kinds (e.g., RIGHT ACTION) are non-artificial, nonnatural kinds realized by (or “that supervene upon,” as nonnaturalists often say it) various, distinct lower-level natural kinds and (ii) that the moral (e.g., right action) which refer to those kinds and which moral terms express are in an important sense a priori, or at least derivable from concepts that are a priori.

incoherent. In fact, some (many?) would perhaps attempt to justify the man’s actions by saying, “Well, he just lived a different time; circumstances were different, and so he had different obligations.”

125For examples of intuitionists following Ross (1930 [2002]), see McNaughton (1988, 1996), McNaughton and Rawling (2000), Stratton-Lake (2000), and Huemer (2005). According McNaughton (1996), ethical intuitionists of the twentieth century admitted a plurality of self- evident principles. We can see that the above scenario accords with such intuitionism when we recognize that (VAR) is not a theory but a schema for a plurality of self-evident principles generated by substituting for ‘x’ the objects of different special relations. 115

We can also see that what is wrong with H&T’s original argument is not that it is unsound. Rather, it is that their thought experiment’s success depended upon the multiple realization of RIGHT ACTION’s defining property (viz., being right) by properties that seem too disparate to do the job of realizing a single nonnatural moral property. For, it seems that if consequentialism is right, then deontology is just wrong, and not wrong for just some historical period. What we have seen, though, is that even if we have to give up H&T’s original thought experiment, we need not give up their argument. We just need a new thought experiment–one that brings out our intuitions that RIGHT ACTION is not identical with a natural kind but is, rather, a nonnatural kind realized by multiple distinct natural kinds. The 1250/2000-narrative shows that such a thought experiment can be constructed, which in turn shows that our linguistic intuitions line up with our moral intuitions.

7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that the ethical nonnaturalist can and, indeed, should co-opt H&T’s Moral-Twin Earth argument against the CE account of moral-kind terms. I began this chapter with a description of DI and how the Debate Test may be used to falsify it as a theory of natural-kind term semantics and reference. Next, I described H&T’s Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment, which constitutes a Debate Test put forward to show the falsity of CE for moral- kind terms. Finally, I showed how the nonnaturalist can defend H&T’s argument–slightly adjusted–from three critical responses put forward by David Merli. As it turned out, the adjustments necessary to defend the argument imply an interesting phenomenon that requires explanation: How can different persons use different terms–causally regulated by different natural properties–to refer to the same moral kind? As I noted, ethical intuitionism seems to have the theory to do the explanatory job, and, what is more, it coheres quite well (in the American sense of ‘quite’) with our linguistic intuitions. CHAPTER FIVE

NORMATIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALUABLE SYSTEMS

Ethical nonnaturalists, most of whom these days are ethical intuitionists, rarely advance positive arguments on their own behalf.126 Section four of Jonathan Dancy’s (2006) entry in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, for example, is entitled “Arguments for Nonnaturalism” but consists only in three arguments against ethical naturalism in its various guises. Michael Huemer’s (2005) argument for ethical intuitionism–which Huemer equates with ethical nonnaturalism127–consists in one large disjunctive syllogism that finds the ethical intuitionist the last man standing. The reason for the scarcity of positive arguments is clear. Ethical nonnaturalism is a position defined half negatively: Ethical nonnaturalism is the claim that moral properties and kinds are real (i.e., objective, mind-independent, etc.), but they are decidedly not natural. Ethical nonnaturalism, that is, describes our commonsense, or “naive,” conception of morality. Consequently, ethical nonnaturalists themselves have tended just to dig in and fend off objectors.128 So, if the inference to the best meta-ethical explanation of moral phenomena leads

126Recent work from ethical nonnaturalists includes McNaughton (1988, 1996), Stratton- Lake (2002), McNaughton and Rawling (2003), Shafer-Landau (2003), Huemer (2005), and Dancy (2006).

127To quote Huemer:

...dualism is the idea that there are two fundamentally different kinds of facts (or properties) in the world: evaluative facts (properties) and non-evaluative facts (properties). Only the intuitionists embrace this. (Huemer 2005, 8).

McNaughton (1996) challenges this view by pointing out that the intuitionists in the early part of the twentieth century saw Moore as their primary opponent despite Moore’s embracing ethical nonnaturalism. Since my concern with the nonnaturalist’s , this difference in how the scope of intuitionism is viewed will not affect the outcome of this chapter.

128For example, in the section entitled “Non-natural Properties,” in his (2002) introduction to Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, Philip Stratton-Lake presents mostly a series of defenses against those who would argue that nonnatural properties are queer and mysterious.

116 117

one to ethical nonnaturalism, and all the competing views suffer from fatal flaws, then the end of the day–if such a day there be–will find ethical nonnaturalism’s vindication. In the meantime, the ethical nonnaturalist may bide his time deflecting blows from and pointing out flaws within the opposition. But even if the ethical nonnaturalist (hereafter just “nonnaturalist”) has little room to expand within the domain of meta-ethics, he should, I believe, consider expanding beyond meta-ethics and into the special sciences; and in line with that claim and in light of recent developments within theories of biological function, I show in this chapter how a nonnaturalist can succeed, where naturalists fail, in giving a realistic account of functional kinds

like HEART, NEURON, and RETINA.129 There are several motivations for offering such an account, but I shall mention only three. The first motivation has to do with the strong intuition that members of biological kinds are real, objective kinds but that their members are subject to certain norms having to do with biological function. But, as Paul Davies forcefully argues in his (2000b), such normativity cannot be derived from the causal push and pull of natural selection. I believe that nonnaturalism can take up the slack and thereby give a realist account of functional kinds. The second motivation has to do allaying the concerns that motivate the charge by Mackie (1977) and others that moral realism–by which is meant ethical nonnaturalism–implies an ontology filled with queer and mysterious entities. By showing that a realist account of functional kinds requires appeal to nonnatural properties, the nonnaturalist can show that moral properties and kinds of the nonnaturalist variety are not that queer–although, they may be somewhat mysterious even if pervasive. A third motivation lurks in the background: I wish to sketch a substantive metaphysical picture that accords with so-called virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is a cluster of normative ethical theories that assume that, among the moral properties, the virtues enjoy ontological primacy.130 Although I say little about virtue ethics in the course of this chapter, it should be seen as a motivation for the view sketched here.

129I use “small capitals” for kinds’ names. For more on naming kinds, see Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975b).

130There are, of course, many versions of virtue ethics; see, for example, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1999), Hursthouse (1999), Slote (2001), and Swanton (2003). 118

An overview of this chapter will be useful. In the next section–section two–I respond to Louise Antony’s (2008) argument for the occurrence of the so-called multiple realization (MR) relation, which, Antony seems to assume, shows that special-science kinds can be both natural and irreducible. I present a counterexample to this assumption. Turning, in section three, to theories of biological functions, I describe Paul Davies’s (2000b) argument in support of his version of the theory of systemic capacity functions vis-à-vis theories of proper functions. One drawback of Davies’s theory, like most theories of systemic capacity functions, is that it allows too many things to count as a function. So, in section four, show how the nonnaturalist can conjoin Davies’s theory with the notion of nonnatural value to provide a theory that is more line with our intuitions about biological functions. I give a summary of my argument in section five.

1. Natural Kinds and Multiple Realization

Kinds come in different types. Some kinds are natural kinds (e.g., electron and up- quark); others may be non-natural kinds (perhaps right action or virtuous agent); and still others are artificial kinds (e.g., jade, antique furniture, and fobo131). Sometimes it is unclear whether a given kind is natural, non-natural, or artificial; and where there is unclarity, there is debate. Now, over the past thirty five years,132 some philosophers have argued that there exists an objective, natural relation–the so-called multiple realization (MR) relation–between the lower- level physical kinds and the higher-level kinds found in the special sciences. Many of these philosophers suggest that to show the existence of the MR relation is to show how special- science kinds can be natural kinds and yet distinct from physical kinds. While much of the ensuing debate has centered on whether or not the MR relation exists,133 in this section I argue

131An entity is a fobo just in case it is either a piece of furniture in my office or a book in my wife’s office.

132See Fodor (1974) and Putnam (1975a).

133One of the most forceful arguments against the natural occurrence of MR has come from Jaegwon Kim (1992; 1998). 119

that the MR relation does exist, but that does not show special-science kinds may be natural and irreducible. An overview of this section and a few words about terminology will be useful. In 2.1, I present Louise Antony’s (2008) argument, which to my mind describes why we should believe that the MR relation exists. In 2.2, I introduce the ‘transmission-medium kind’ (or TM-kind) and show how it vindicates Antony’s argument for the MR relation. Finally, in 2.3, I argue that TM- kinds tell against the inference from the existence of the MR relation to the irreducibility and naturalness of special-science kinds. Regarding terminology, first, by the term ‘kind’ I mean a taxonomic category whose members may be substances or events.134 Second, since an entity x is a member of a kind K in virtue of x’s exemplifying a property FK, let us say that FK is the “defining property” of K iff (i) all and only members of K exemplify FK, and (ii) those K-members are members of K in virtue of their exemplifying FK. Third, regarding naturalness, a kind K is a natural kind iff K’s defining property is a natural property. As per Antony (2008), a property is natural iff it is nomic, and a property is nomic iff its instances participate in “objective lawful regularities” (170).135 So, two properties are nomically distinct just in case their instances fail to participate in the same objective lawful regularities. Finally, regarding the MR relation itself, kinds and properties may, if the MR relation exists, be multiply realized. A kind S is multiply realized iff S is defined by a

disjunctive property (P1 w P2 w ... w Pn w ....) such that P1, P2, etc. are nomically distinct physical properties. A property F is multiply realized just in case it is identical to a disjunctive property

136 (P1 w P2 w ... w Pn w ....) such that P1, P2, etc. are nomically distinct physical properties. For readability, I shall, until section four, use ‘MR relation’ to refer to a relation that holds between specifically natural kinds or properties. I turn now to Antony’s argument for the MR relation.

134A substance is a concrete particular that can gain and loose properties but can neither be gained nor lost by a property. It is a matter of debate what an event is, but whatever it turns out to be, I assume that an action is a kind of event, perhaps one that is intentional under some description and that there are kinds of action (e.g., right action or morally forbidden action).

135Antony does not explicitly distinguish between properties and kinds.

136This also loosely follows on Antony (2008). 120

1.1. Kim and Antony Perhaps the greatest challenge to those arguing for the existence of the MR relation comes from Jaegwon Kim’s (1992, 1998) argument. Following Antony (2008), we can present Kim’s argument as a reductio. Suppose natural kind S is a multiply realized natural kind. If S is

multiply realized, then S’s defining property is a disjunctive property (P1 w P2 w ... w Pn w ....) such that P1, P2, etc. are nomically distinct–that is to say, the disjuncts fail to participate in the same objective lawful regularities. But notice that if those individual disjuncts are nomically distinct, then their disjunction–that is, the disjunctive property (P1 w P2 w ... w Pn w ....)–is anomic. Here is why. If the disjunctive property were nomic, then its various instances would be nomically similar; and if its various instances were nomically similar, then the disjuncts themselves would be nomically similar. But if the disjuncts were nomically similar, then, trivially, they would not be nomically distinct. It thus follows that if the properties P1, P2, etc. are nomically distinct, then the disjunctive property that comprise–that is, (P1 w P2 w ... w Pn w ....)–is anomic. Now, consider that if S is a natural kind, then S’s defining property is a natural property, which is to say that it is nomic. Consequently, if S is both multiply realized and natural, then its defining property is both anomic and nomic, which of course is a contradiction. Therefore, S is either nomic or multiply realized, but it is not both.

In response to Kim’s argument, Antony challenges the claim that if P1, P2, etc. are nomically distinct properties, their disjunction is anomic. Now, Antony grants that in some cases–even most, perhaps–the disjunction of nomically distinct properties is indeed anomic. For example, the disjunctive “property” of consisting of either jadeite or nephrite is anomic. But there are cases, Antony claims, of nomic disjunctive properties; and, roughly, here is how to tell the difference. First, following Nelson Goodman (1979), Antony has us distinguish between predicates (or, presumably, kind terms137) that are entrenched within a linguistic community and predicates that are not. A predicate is entrenched just in case members of a community use that predicate to make successful inductive inferences regarding property instances. In Goodman’s

137Antony presents her argument in terms of predicates rather than kind terms. Within philosophy of language, the difference is often very important; however, since my concern is more with the properties and kinds–the metaphysics itself–I will use ‘predicate’ and ‘kind term’ fairly interchangeably. 121

terminology, a predicate can used be make successful inductive inferences just in case it is “projectible.” Clearly, not all predicates within a language community become entrenched, but some do. Now, although Goodman himself was a deflationist about laws of nature, Antony states (rightly, I believe) that we need not follow Goodman on that point, for, according to Antony, it seems that predicates (kind terms) would not be projectible unless the world cooperated. Consequently, the best explanation for the difference between entrenched and non- entrenched predicates is that entrenched predicates refer to projectible properties, while non- entrenched predicates do not. And since a property is projectible just in case it is nomic, a predicate’s being entrenched strongly evinces its referring to a nomic–and thus natural–property. Next, Antony simply points out that there are many irreducible, higher-level scientific predicates (kind terms) that are entrenched and seem unlikely to be discarded.138 Antony’s example is the kind term ‘bos taurus’, which names the species of which cows are the female members and bulls are the male members. According to Antony, since–to put things in terms of kind-defining properties–“the [disjunctive] property of being a cow or a bull” defines the species bos taurus, and since “the species is a biological natural kind par excellence” (168), we see that some kinds are defined by nomic disjunctive properties even if those properties’ individual disjuncts are nomically distinct. In short, claims Antony , species stand as counterexamples to Kim’s assertion that if nomically distinct properties or kinds are disjoined, the resulting disjunction anomic. Now, before proceeding to my response, I pause to raise a general concern. The truth of Antony’s claim that species are natural kinds “par excellence” is far from settled. But Antony’s claim is just one example of what I think is a general and unfortunate trend. Here is what I mean. Naturalistic moral philosophers hoping to show that moral kinds are non-artificial natural kinds, often claim that psychological kinds are examples of bone fide irreducible higher-level natural kinds.139 But philosophers of mind are still debating the issue. What is more, some philosophers of mind–Antony for example–claim that biological species are examples of genuine

138An entrenched predicate that was discarded might be ‘x is jade’ or ‘x is phlogiston’.

139See, for example, Sturgeon (1986) and Brink (1989). 122

irreducible higher-level natural kinds. But whether species are in fact examples of such kinds is, in the philosophy of biology, far from settled. In fact, within the philosophy of biology it is still very much a matter of debate whether biological kinds in general are non-artificial.140 In no area of philosophical inquiry has it been established that there are in fact non-artificial irreducible higher-level natural kinds. Appeals from within one area of philosophy to putative examples of irreducible higher-level natural kinds in another area is at present based on the stuff of urban legend. So, since the existence of such kinds has not yet been established, I shall respond to Antony from where irreducible natural kinds are most likely to be found–namely, among biological kinds like cells and organs. At least these kinds’ respective members seem to share a potential kind-defining property, viz., having some function. I do believe, though, that my response in terms of functional kinds generalizes to claims about other putatively natural higher- level kinds. 1.2. Transmission-medium Kinds I would now like to introduce the transmission-medium kind (TM-kind) into the debate over which non-artificial kinds there are. A TM-kind is a sort of natural kind defined in terms of the features of mechanical waves.141 Following standard textbook terminology, a system is a collection of two or more particles. A system is in stable equilibrium just in case, for any particle within the system, if that particle suffers some small displacement in any direction, then a force will return the particle to its equilibrium position. When a system in stable equilibrium is disturbed by some quantity of energy, oscillation occurs–the particles in the system move back and forth–until the system returns to a position of stable equilibrium. Pendulums swinging back and forth, boats bobbing on the surface of a lake, and vibrating piano strings are common examples of such oscillation. Now, a system that tends toward stable equilibrium provides a medium for the transmission of energy in the form of mechanical waves. A mechanical wave is distinct from electromagnetic waves in that the former, unlike the latter, requires some medium

140See, for example, LaPorte (2004 and Devitt (2008).

141Much of what follows is drawn from Tipler and Mosca’s (2007) Physics for Scientists and Engineers. 123

for its transmission.142 Sound waves, water waves, and waves that travel down a piano string are all mechanical; electromagnetic radiation, which may travel in a vacuum, is not. A particular system of particles that allows for the transmission of a mechanical wave is called a ‘transmission medium’. Air, water, and piano strings are transmission media.143 Notice that transmission media are substances that can often be described in two related, but nonetheless distinct, ways. The low E= bar on a particular vibraphone is an example. The bar may be described in terms of a large number of electrons and up- and down-quarks exchanging bosons and arranged a certain way. But it may be described in other equally natural terms: the wavelength, frequency, speed, and so on of the wave the bar transmits when the bar is struck. Our E= bar has the categorical property of consisting of some large number of particles arranged a certain way, but it also has the dispositional property of transmitting energy in the form of a wave with a certain wavelength, frequency, and so on. (Call such dispositional properties ‘transmission-medium properties’ or ‘TM-properties’.) Interestingly, the categorical and dispositional properties in question come apart. Our E=-bar’s TM-property of transmitting a wave with a particular frequency is, to be sure, determined by the bar’s constitutional (categorical) property. So, having the constitution it has is sufficient for the bar’s having the wave-frequency that it has. But having that constitution is not necessary for having that wave-frequency. Consider a string system within a particular piano. Suppose that this particular string system, when struck by the hammer inside the piano, sounds the E= just above middle-C. This E= is the same note sounded by the vibraphone’s low E=-bar. But piano strings are generally made of steel, while vibraphone bars are aluminum; so, the piano-string system and the vibraphone bar have very different constitutions. Now, suppose a trumpeter plays the note written as a low F on the treble clef. The concert pitch (i.e., the “real” note) is not an F but an E=–again, the same note as that sounded by our vibraphone bar and our piano-string system. Of course, the trumpet system is very different indeed in constitution from

142For readability, I will speak of waves’ transmission, but this is just short hand for the transmission of the energy that comprises the wave.

143The term ‘transmission medium’ applies to particular systems that are members of WTM-kinds. So, WTM-kinds are categories of transmission media. 124

the vibraphone bar and the piano-string system: The trumpet system consists mostly in brass but probably includes the trumpeter’s embouchure (i.e., his facial muscles and lips). But despite these different systems’ having very different constitutions, they all sound the same note, viz., concert pitch E=. Now, of course, vibraphones, pianos, and trumpets produce sounds with different qualities. One might therefore be tempted to think that having the disposition to sound the E= above middle-C is really an “artificial property”–again, like the “property” of being constituted by either jadeite or nephrite. But that would be a mistake. Here is why. Oscillating systems like the vibraphone bar, the piano-string system, and the trumpet system have resonance frequencies.144 A resonance frequency is a frequency an oscillating system will tend to sustain if the system is excited in the presence of no driving or dampening force. A system’s lowest resonance frequency is its fundamental frequency. The vibraphone bar, the piano-string system, and the trumpet system play the same note, when they do, because they all have the same fundamental frequency. The differences in sound quality are explained by their having different harmonic and non-harmonic frequencies.145 So, different systems sound the same note when they have the same fundamental frequency. Furthermore, fundamental frequencies are nomic: Notice, no matter which instruments are used, an E= and an A played together sound discordant, whereas an E= and a B= played together are cordant. So, a system’s having a certain fundamental frequency is just as natural a property as a particle’s having -1.602×10-19 C of charge. We see, then, that frequencies (and TM-properties in general) are genuine, multiply realized natural properties, and so TM-kinds are genuine, multiply realized natural kinds. What is more, the terms that refer to TM-properties can become very entrenched in a language community: ‘E=’ and ‘A’ seem to be going nowhere, and the explanation for this seems just to

144These frequencies are sometimes called ‘natural frequencies’.

145Harmonic frequencies are resonance frequencies that are integral multiples of the fundamental frequency (often musicians will use ‘harmonic’ to refer to frequencies other than the fundamental, although strictly speaking the fundamental frequency is also a harmonic). What are sometimes referred to just as “overtones” are non-harmonic frequencies. 125

be their referring to natural properties. Antony’s description of the MR relation is thus vindicated. Now, consider the human heart. Different human hearts are different in constitution: Different hearts have different quantities of particles; their respective particles are arranged differently; and so on. If heart were defined in terms of constitution, it would seem more like the artificial kind jade. But we do not categorize individual systems as hearts on the basis of their constitutions. Allegedly, we categorize such systems on the basis of how they behave in certain circumstances, and, it turns out, such behavior just is wave transmission.146 The sinoatrial node (SAN) in the right atrium generates a wave that travels down and through the right and left ventricles. A heart’s contraction, whereby blood is pumped throughout the body, just is the result of the heart’s transmitting the SAN generated wave. So, a particular system’s behavior, which allegedly accounts for the system’s being categorized as a heart, is explained by the system’s exemplifying a certain TM-property. Since TM-properties are multiply realized, it follows that a multiply realized property explains what allegedly accounts for a particular system’s membership in the biological kind heart. So, one might think the kind heart is a TM- kind. 1.3. Blocking the Inference In this section, I show why we ought not and, in fact, do not identify higher-level natural kinds with TM-kinds and why that is a problem for those claiming special-science kinds are irreducible and natural. First, non-reductionists should resist identifying biological kinds’ defining properties with TM-properties because such identification undermines the putative irreducibility of biological kinds. TM-properties are physical properties; they are described in terms of wavelength,147 speed of travel, and the magnitude of particle-displacement the wave causes. Since TM-kinds are defined in terms of TM-properties, and TM-properties are physical properties, TM-kinds are physical kinds. So, to identify a biological kind-defining property with a TM-property just is to reduce the biological kind to a physical kind.

146For more on “excitable media,” see Brian Goodwin’s (1994), How the Leopard Changed its Spots.

147Which of course can be re-described as spacetime. 126

Second, not only should non-reductionists not identify biological kinds with TM-kinds, biologists in fact do not identify biological kinds with TM-kinds. In fact, biologists categorize together particle systems that are dissimilar with regard to TM-properties. There are two ways in which this occurs. The first consists in biologists’ categorizing together diseased and healthy organs. Notice that a particular heart’s suffering from arrhythmia just is a failure of the heart to exemplify a certain TM-property. In fact, some hearts are so bad off that there is no nomologically possible world in which they would pump blood. Biologists do not say of such systems that they are “non-hearts” but that they are “bad hearts.” If biological kinds were defined in terms of TM-properties, then the very idea of a diseased heart would be incoherent, but, of course, it is not. Second, even systems taken to be healthy organs have dissimilar TM- properties. Not every healthy heart beats at the same rate; so, not every healthy heart has the same wave-frequency. We thus see that even biologists do not identify biological kinds with TM-kinds. But given that biological kinds are not defined by the natural properties of having some polarity and magnitude of charge, having some magnitude of mass, having half- or whole-integer spin, taking up some amount of spacetime, having some TM-property, or having some particular combination of such properties,148 and given that TM-properties account for what we think is distinctive about members of biological kinds, we may ask, just what sort of natural property is there by which an irreducible biological kind may be defined? In the next section, we will consider whether functional properties can fill the bill. Let us summarize what has been said thus far. After describing as a reductio Kim’s argument against the occurrence of the MR relation and Antony’s response, I introduced TM- kinds. Since TM-kinds show that the MR relation exists, they also show that Kim’s argument is unsound. We have just seen, however, that biological kinds cannot be identified with TM-kinds. Consequently, TM-kinds also indicate the falsity of Antony’s and others’ implicit assumption that in showing that the MR relation exists, one thereby shows that biological kinds are both

148Notice that conjoining these properties in various ways would make the conditions for counting as a member of some kind more stringent; there would be more criteria that a particular system would need to meet before counting as a member. 127

natural and irreducible. So, it takes more than showing the existence of the MR relation to show that biological kinds are natural and irreducible. Therefore, I now turn to theories of functional properties, which putatively account for biological kinds.

2. Functions and Natural Normativity

In the last section, we saw that TM-kinds are multiply realized but that biological kinds

like HEART, RETINA, and NEURON cannot be identified with TM-kinds because the former apparently allow for malfunctioning members, but the latter clearly do not.149 In this section, I turn to the issue of whether biological functions can account for the apparent normativity of biological kinds. This section goes as follows. In 3.1, I describe the two going theories of biological functions: the theory of proper functions,150 whose advocates claim that proper functions are normative, and the theory of Cummins functions, which Paul Davies (2000b) calls “systemic capacity functions” (which, following Davies, I abbreviate with ‘SC-functions’).151 In 3.2, I describe Davies’s (2000b) argument that proper functions are not normative. In 3.3, I present Davies’s argument that once we see that proper functions are not normative, we see also that proper functions just are a subset of SC-functions. The common objection to the theory of SC-functions is that since it leaves out reference to normativity altogether, the theory’s criterion for being a function is too weak; it counts too many things as functions. I critically assess Davies’s response to this objection and find it unsatisfying. The upshot of this section is that

149By the way, one might be tempted to thing that the kind E=-SYSTEM mentioned in the last section allows for malfunctioning members because one’s E=may be a little sharp. But the E=-SYSTEM’s kind-defining property is the TM-property of having a fundamental frequency of 311.1 Hz. If a system sounds a sharp E=, then the system fails to have that fundamental frequency and thus fails to be a member of the kind E=-SYSTEM.

150Larry Wright’s (1973) etiological theory is the ancestor theory to the theory of proper functions. Defenders of the proper function theory include Ruth Millikan (1984, 1989) and Karen Neander (1991, 1995).

151Robert Cummins introduced his theory of functions in his (1975), and it has been developed by Ron Amundson, George Lauder (1994), and Davies (2000b, 2001). 128

neither proper functions nor SC-functions capture the normativity that realists about biological kinds require. 2.1. Proper Functions and Systemic Capacity Functions Now, it will be useful to begin with a comparison of the theory of proper functions and the theory of SC-functions. On the one hand, the theory of proper functions claims that the function of a particular trait is identical to the explanation of its existence. Davies (2000b) describes the theory of proper functions as implying this:

(PF) Trait T in an organism o1 has a selected function f in an environment E iff,

(i) past instances of T in o1 did f in E, (ii) T was heritable,

(iii) past performance of f by T resulted in o1’s better satisfying salient

selective demands in E than organism o2 who lacked T,

(iv) the difference between o1 and o2 in satisfying selective demands resulted in organisms with T out-producing organisms without T, (v) the difference in reproduction explains why organisms with T, and hence instances of T, persisted or proliferated.152

The assumption of proper function theorists is that what explains the presence of a trait just is the trait’s function. For example, the function of a heart is to pump blood because pumping blood explains why hearts exist. So, taking condition (v) as the explanandum for which conditions (i)- (iv) comprise the explanans, we see that heritable trait T’s having performed f explains why T exists. Therefore, the function of T just is to f. Thus, as Davies points out, the theory of proper functions is employed to explain, in terms of evolutionary history, why a certain trait exists at a certain time.

152Some of the variables have been changed to remain consistent with rest of this dissertation. 129

On the other hand, the theory of SC-functions identifies the function of a particular trait with that which explains a given system’s having a certain capacity. Davies (2000b) offers this rendition of Cummins’s formal description of the theory of SC-functions:

(SC) Given a system s, the system’s capacity C which is to be explained, and the analysis A of the system’s components and those components’ capacities, the SC function of an item x in system s is to f iff (i) x is capable of doing f, (ii) A accounts for s’s capacity to C, (iii) A accounts for s’s capacity to C, in part, by appealing to x’s capacity to do f, (iv) A specifies the physical mechanisms in s that implement the systemic capacities itemized in A.153

Following Davies and staying with the example the heart, the SC-function of a heart is to pump blood. For, as per (i), the heart has the capacity for pumping blood; and, as per (ii), (iii), and (iv) a cardiologist’s analysis, which adequately accounts for the circulatory system’s capacity to deliver nutrients throughout the body, appeals to the heart’s capacity to pump blood and describes the heart’s physical structure whereby it has that capacity. Thus, we see, the theory of SC-functions is employed to explain how the capacities of a system’s component parts realize a capacity possessed by the system itself and to do so by appeal to the role a lower-level capacity plays in realizing a higher-level capacity. 2.2. Proper Function Normativity Ruth Millikan argues in her (1989a) that the theory of proper function is superior to the theory of SC-functions. The argument goes as follows. First, the notion of malfunction is theoretically useful. What is more, the proper function theory implies that a functional kind’s kind-defining property is both heritable and has resulted in selective success. Consequently, claims Millikan, proper functions are normative. SC-functions, by contrast, are not. So, proper

153See the previous note. 130 functions can account for malfunction, but SC-functions cannot, and that makes the theory of proper functions superior to the theory of SC-functions. Davies’s (2000a, 2000b) response to Millikan goes basically as follows. First, recall that a kind is defined by a property just in case every member of the kind has the property and each member is a member of the kind virtue of its having the property. Consequently, any individual that fails to have the kind’s defining property fails to be a member of the kind. But notice that, on the theory of proper functions, a functional kind’s defining property is a functional property, which is identified with the property that was selectively successful. But if a heart, say, is maladapted or malfunctioning, then it fails to have the property that was selectively successful and thus fails to be a member of the kind HEART. So, if a functional kind’s defining property is the property that was selectively successful, then any individual that fails to have that property is not a malfunctioning member of the kind but a nonmember of the kind. So, if only individuals possessing the selected-for property for are members of the kind, then the kind is not a normative kind. Since all proper functions are defined by properties that are in turn defined in terms of success, it follows that proper functions are not normative. I take Davies’s response to be decisive: proper functions are not normative. 2.3. Analysis and Systemic Capacities Functions Having refuted the claim that proper functions are normative, Davies then shows that the theory of SC-functions is itself a more general theory under which the theory of proper functions may be subsumed. In order to see how the SC-functions theory subsumes the proper functions theory, it will be useful to begin with a more detailed look at Davies’s description of the theory. First, the SC-functions theory applies only to hierarchical systems–systems that consist of two or more levels–such that the capacities of the lower-level components explain the higher- level capacities of the system itself. Take the circulatory system again. The circulatory system has the capacity to circulate nutrients, and what explains that capacity is the working in concert of the lower-level capacities possessed by the circulatory system’s component parts. Second, Davies presents us with an iterative strategy whereby the SC-functions theory can be employed to explain a capacity at any level within a hierarchical system. The iterative strategy goes as follows: 131

(IS1) Specify as the explanandum a capacity C possessed by a system s.

(IS2) Analyze s into its components parts x1, x2, ... taking into account those parts’

respective capacities, c1, c2, ...

(IS3) The function of x1, say, is identified with the capacity, viz., c1, which partly explains s’s capacity to C.

Notice that once a hierarchical system has been analyzed into its component parts taking into account those parts’ capacities, one can move “down” to a particular component part and utilize the iterative strategy to explain that part’s capacity. Of course, such an analysis will result in identifying that part’s own component parts and their respective capacities, the latter of which also may be explained by means of iterating the strategy again. So, the iterative strategy can be used to identify the function of any component at any level within a hierarchical system that exhibits some capacity. Third, Davies points out that so long as a hierarchical system has the capacity to produce change or even resist external forces, then that change can be explained in terms of SC- functions. Notice that a population can be viewed as a hierarchical system that has the capacity to produce and resist change. At one level, there is the population itself; at another level, there are the individual members of the population. What is more, the capacity of the population to change can often be explained by groups of individuals within the population. For example, a population has the capacity to change with regard to the distribution of some trait: If some segment of the population reproduces more quickly than the other segments of the population, then the population itself will change in terms of the trait’s distribution and that change can be explained in terms of the rate of reproduction. Therefore, a group’s capacity to reproduce can be viewed as having an SC-function that explains changes within a population. In this way, then, the theory of SC-functions can explain change through natural selection and thus, given that proper functions are not normative, everything a theory of proper functions can explain. Therefore, according to Davies, the theory of proper functions should be discarded. 2.4. Promiscuity The main objection to the theory of SC-functions is that it is too weak, it is promiscuous in attributing functions. Millikan’s (1989a) version of the objection is that by the theory of SC- 132 functions, the function of rain clouds is to water the ground thereby causing vegetables to grow. But surely it is odd to say that clouds have a function of any kind, let alone that of watering the yard. The proper function theory, by contrast, does not suffer from promiscuity and thus is superior. Davies’s response consists in two parts. He first notes that the objection rests upon the assumption that genuine functions are normative, but non-genuine functions are non-normative. Then, he simply points out that he rejects that assumption based on the argument described above. Second, Davies notes that not just any causal regularity counts as a function on the theory of SC-functions. Specifically, in order for an item to have an SC-function, it must be part of a hierarchical system that possesses some capacity which is partly explained by a capacity possessed by the item in question. Thus, on the SC-functions theory, clouds do not have the function to cause vegetables to grow, for although the vegetables have the capacity to grow, and clouds partly explain why vegetables grow, vegetables are not systems of which clouds are a part. Therefore, the SC-functions theory does imply that the function of clouds is to water the ground to make vegetables grow. 2.5. My Response to Davies Strictly speaking, Davies’s response is right; however, it is unsatisfying. The problem is, Millikan’s objection can be altered so that it avoids Davies’s response. For example, clouds have the capacity to rain. Part of what explains a cloud’s capacity to rain is its consisting in water droplets which have the capacity to fall to Earth. Since water droplets within clouds have the capacity to fall to Earth, and that capacity partly explains clouds’ capacity to rain, it follows, on the SC-functions theory, that water droplets in clouds have the function of falling to the Earth. This seems implausible. Take another example. A human has the capacity to have a heart attack in certain circumstances, viz., when an artery becomes blocked. The capacity of the human heart to fail when an artery becomes blocked partly explains the human’s capacity to have a heart attack when an artery becomes blocked. Therefore, according to the SC-functions theory, one of the functions of the human heart is to give humans heart attacks when an artery becomes blocked. At this point we begin to wonder in what sense an SC-function is a function at all. In the next section, I describe how a nonnaturalist conception of value can, along with three other 133

plausible claims, be conjoined with SC-functions theory to account for biological functional kinds.

3. Natural Function and Nonnatural Value

The difficulty we have with SC-functions is, I take it, that we intuitively believe that biological kinds of the sort we have been discussing are both nonartificial (we believe be discover that there are hearts) and contain an essentially normative element (hearts occasionally malfunction). Davies is right to claim that when, in accordance with the SC-functions theory, we strip the normative element from our concept of functions, then a plethora of kinds count as functional kinds. Davies sees this as a virtue of SC-functions, and I tend to agree but only insofar as we understand that Davies is no longer talking about functions as we intuitive conceive of them; he is now talking about something else. But, I believe that if we conjoin the theory of SC-functions with a nonnaturalist conception of value and a few other reasonable claims, then we can derive a most plausible realist conception of functionally defined biological kinds. Vis-à-vis “proper functions” and “SC-functions,” I call these functions “normative functions.” Central to a normative function theory is the idea that functional kinds like HEART and NEURON are defined by evaluative properties rather than non-evaluative properties. That is, a particle system is, say, a heart iff and in virtue of a particular non-artificial norm’s being objectively normative for the system in question. Now, it is not my aim here to give a fully worked out account of normative functions. What I offer, instead, is a sketch intended to evince the likelihood that an nonnaturalist account of biological kinds–functional kinds in particular–is in the offing. Therefore, in what follows, I limit my concern primarily to human biology, although perhaps the depiction offered here can be applied to other organisms. The sketch itself begins with three claims, which have to do with the fact that some biological systems are valuable because rational agents are valuable, and with Davies’s iterative strategy for discovering items’ respective functions. Now, when I say that rational agents are valuable, I do not mean instrumentally valuable, although they may be that, too. Rather, I mean that rational agents are intrinsically valuable. Since, as mentioned in the introduction, it is a 134 desideratum that the theory of normative functions I offer accord with some form of virtue ethics, I state these claims in terms of virtuous agents:

(VC1) There exists a biological system that has the capacity to become a virtuous agent. (VC2) It is not the case that all biological systems have the capacity to become virtuous agents. (VC3) A biological system that has the capacity to become a virtuous agent is intrinsically valuable.

Call a biological system that has the capacity to become a virtuous agent a “virtue-capacious system.” Regarding the phrase ‘biological system’, although I am concerned primarily with human biology here, I avoid calling virtue-capacious systems ‘humans’, since it is reasonable to believe that non-human rational agents might evolve and be, perhaps because of their rational capacity, subject to the moral constraints that bind us humans. Concerning the term ‘capacity’, although, as per Aristotle, a virtue is itself not a capacity but rather a state or characteristic (EN 1105b25-30154), being virtuous requires the capacity for being virtuous. Despite his undoubtedly lofty ideals, my wife’s kitten, Mort, cannot be virtuous; he just does not have it in him. By ‘virtuous agent’ I mean an agent who characteristically exhibits the virtues, whatever the virtues themselves may turn out to be. Finally, I do not claim that virtue-capacious systems are virtuous because they are virtue capacious; I claim only that virtue-capacious systems are intrinsically valuable. It may be that having the capacity for becoming a virtuous agent is merely a mark of a biological system’s being intrinsically valuable. Second, we can apply Davies’s iterative strategy to a virtue-capacious system in order to discover the system’s components’ respective normative functions. Notice, first, that the virtue- capacious system is comprised of lower-level systems such as the nervous system, circulatory system, reproductive system, muscular system, immune system, digestive system, and so on. Together, the effects of these various systems’ capacities account for a particular biological

154Hereafter, I shall use the conventional ‘EN’ to stand for Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1999). 135

system’s have the capacity to become a virtuous agent. Consequently, by applying Davies’s iterative strategy to one of these lower-level systems, we can discover the system’s SC-function. The SC-function of the circulatory system, for example, is to circulate nutrients and oxygen to the various parts of the body; the SC-function of the nervous system is to send and receive nerve impulses throughout the agent’s body and to process those impulses; and so on. Of course, each of these lower-level systems also consists of various component parts the effects of whose capacities account for that particular system’s capacity to circulate nutrients, process nerve impulses, etc. There are two important things to see. First, an item’s having a particular SC-function depends upon the capacity that the item contributes to the functioning of the system. For example, a mass of tissue has the SC-function of pumping blood just in case its capacity to pump blood partly explains some capacity possessed by a system. So, in order for an item to have a particular SC-function, the item must be part of a functioning system. Second, it is a system, rather than the system’s components, that is intrinsically valuable. Less abstractly: we think humans, rather than hearts, are intrinsically valuable. Since a system is dependent upon its component parts’ performing their respective functions, if the system is intrinsically valuable, then a part of the system is instrumentally valuable only so long as it continues to fulfill its function within the system. In short, hearts are instrumentally valuable only so long as they continue to work. So, what is valuable about a component part of an intrinsically valuable system just is the component’s performing its SC-function within that system. What is more, if the component were to cease performing its SC-function, there would be a loss in value, and that loss would be directly attributable to the component’s ceasing to perform its SC-function. If a heart were to cease working, then a human would die, which would be a loss of an objectively valuable entity, which loss would be directly attributable to the heart’s failing to perform its SC- function. It is in that sense that components of biological systems are objectively evaluable. Third, regarding grouping members of biological systems into categories (or kinds), we can appeal to what Ned Block calls the “Disney Principle”:

(DP) Laws of nature impose constraints on ways of making something that satisfies a certain description. (Block 1997, 120) 136

Although candlesticks and teapots can be rational agents in a Walt Disney world, the laws of nature, as Block points out when he introduces (DP), prevent such possibilities in the actual

world. Even if multiple structures can realize a biological kind like HEART or NEURON, “not just any old structure will do” (Block 1997, 120). Consequently, there will be considerable structural similarity between virtue-capacious systems.155 But, of course, a system’s component parts determine its structure. So, we would expect there to be considerable similarity between virtue- capacious systems’ component parts. Consequently, we could group token component parts on the basis of whether or not they would fulfill the same SC-function across some significant number of virtue-capacious systems. Given that we could group systems’ components on the basis of their SC-functions, we could have kinds defined by SC-functions; and since SC- functions within virtue-capacious systems are normative functions, we could have normative functional kinds. In short, assuming that some systems are intrinsically valuable, we can use Davies’s iterative strategy to discover SC-functions within those intrinsically valuable systems in order to discover normative functional kinds. Finally, notice how a theory of normative functions avoids the charge of promiscuity. We need not be committed to the claim, for example, that the function of water droplets within clouds is to fall to Earth. The reason is, we can plausibly deny that clouds are intrinsically valuable systems. So, the nonnaturalist can put the theory of SC-functions to good use: First, the nonnaturalist can use it to explain capacities possessed by non-valuable systems, and, second, he can conjoin the theory with a theory of value to create a theory of normative functions that better accords with our intuitions that biological kinds are both real and normative.

4. Conclusion

The main point of this chapter is that a nonnaturalist is in a position to offer a realistic account of biological kinds, whereas naturalists seem incapable of giving one. My argument that

155Of course, not all virtue-capacious systems need to be of the same biological kind. For example, would could perhaps group rational robots, extra terrestrial aliens, and humans in to their own categories based on internal structure. But within these categories there would be considerable structural similarity. 137 the naturalists are incapable of giving a realistic account of biological kinds occurred in two parts. In the first part, I first showed that while the multiple realization relation indeed occurs, the mere occurrence of that relation does not account for biological kinds. In the second part, I argued that while a theory of functions can be given that seems to explain some biological phenomena, that theory fails to capture what we normally think of as biological kinds. Since neither the occurrence of the multiple realization relation nor naturalistic theories of functions can account for our intuitive conception of biological kinds, I concluded that giving such an account lies beyond the naturalist’s reach. In the penultimate section of this chapter, I offered a sketch of how a nonnaturalist might conjoin Davies’s theory of SC-functions and the claim that entities with the capacity to become virtuous agents are intrinsically valuable to give a realistic account of functional biological kinds. One consequence of the argument put forward here is that biological kinds are nonnatural kinds. This is a surprising conclusion to be sure, but it also shows that moral properties may not be so unique after all. CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The picture that emerges from the preceding arguments is friendly to both scientific realism and ethical nonnaturalism: Both can be held simultaneously. Thus, at the fundamental level, physics is the best guide to what there is; however, as per the argument in chapter two, when it comes to moral kinds, science has little to say except in terms of practical application. The resulting ontological framework looks like this: At the lowest-levels are the fundamental and reducible natural kinds; moral properties, which are evaluative, are at the highest level; and between the moral domain and the lower domains are the special sciences, which study functional kinds, which have an essentially normative element. So, the Oppenheim-Putnam Hierarchy should be augmented, but not just by appending ethics somewhere near the top. The evaluative and the non-evaluative should be taken into consideration, giving rise to the framework in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: The Causal-Normative Hierarchy. Disciplines whose names are in bold study normative kinds, names in italics are of disciplines that study non-normative kinds, and the kinds are whose names are in bold and italics study normative kinds. 7. Ethics 6. Sociology 5. Psychology 4. Biology 3. Physical chemistry 2. Atomic physics 1. Fundamental physics

138 139

1. Future Work

Two things are worth pointing out. First, notice that normativity permeates the special sciences. Consequently, if one is willing to be a realist about the special-science kinds, then, for reasons I gave in chapter five, there should be few qualms with admitting nonnatural moral properties into one’s ontology. Second, the Causal-Normative hierarchy groups disciplines on the basis of their subject matter, not their methodology. Therefore, this hierarchy offers what I take to be a more complete view of the world we inhabit. The ethical nonnaturalists should continue to press this point by showing other places within the special sciences that a thoroughgoing naturalism has not the metaphysical tools to offer a realist account but which account can be given by a responsible nonnaturalism. REFERENCES

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Joseph Long received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Florida State University, his M.A. in philosophy from Texas Tech University, and his M.A. in theology from Southwestern Theological Seminary. His primary research interests include moral philosophy, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. He has presented papers at both graduate and professional conferences. While at Texas Tech and Florida State, he served as graduate instructor of logic, introduction to critical reasoning, and introduction to philosophy. At Florida State, he served two years as the organizer of Graduate Student Recruitment Weekend and one year as president of the Philosophy Graduate Student Association, during which time he instituted PGSA Friday Presentations, a forum for graduate students to present their own papers in progress.

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