Bottici, C. Rethinking Political Myth the Clash of Civilizations As a Self
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
01 065715 Bottici (bc-t) 29/6/06 1:50 pm Page 315 European Journal of Social Theory 9(3): 315–336 Copyright © 2006 Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi Rethinking Political Myth The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE AND EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE, ITALY Abstract This article argues for the need to recover the concept of political myth in order to understand the crucial phenomena of our epoch. By drawing on Blumenberg’s philosophical reflections on myth, it proposes to understand political myth as the continual process of work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group can provide significance to their political conditions and experience. In order to show how this understand- ing of political myth can throw light on important aspects of contemporary politics, the article analyses the work on one of the most conspicuous political myths of our time: the clash of civilizations. By reconstructing the mechanisms through which this myth works, the article shows how a paradigm that has been strongly criticized as too simplistic and scientifically inadequate could have turned into a successful political myth, i.e. into a self- fulfilling prophecy. Key words ■ culturalism ■ medias ■ Orientalism ■ political myth ■ theories of myth Social scientists have long since recognized the role that political myths play in both traditional and modern societies. Historians, sociologists and anthropolo- gists, each in their own way, have devoted an important part of their work to the analysis of these phenomena. While up to a point these studies have mainly focused on ancient societies, in which the influence of myth could still be attributed to the fusion of politics and religion,1 more recently a new series of studies focusing on modern societies has been initiated. The long series of studies on nationalism, together with a renewed interest in the symbolic dimensions of politics,2 have demonstrated that, to paraphrase Clifford Geertz, myths have not gone out of modern politics, however much of the banal may have entered it (1983: 143). www.sagepublications.com DOI: 10.1177/1368431006065715 01 065715 Bottici (bc-t) 29/6/06 1:50 pm Page 316 316 European Journal of Social Theory 9(3) The ever-growing literature on this topic might suggest the existence of a consolidated theoretical framework for the concept of political myth. However, this seems not to be the case. Much of the political science literature on politi- cal myth is still trapped in an ‘enlightened’ approach to myth which looks at it from the standpoint of the logos. For instance, Flood (1996) and Lincoln (1989) define political myth in terms of its claim to truth and fail thus to understand that political myths cannot be falsified because they are not scientific hypothe- sis, but rather the expression of a determination to act.3 Their approach, on the other hand, reflects a very limited view of what meaning and language are about. Indeed, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, human beings are ceremonious animals that perform with their language innumerable actions that do not advance any scien- tific hypothesis as to the constitution of the world (Wittgenstein, 1979). Furthermore, while most of the literature specifically dealing with political myth is confined to the analysis of single case studies, the theoretical literature usually deals with political myth under other headings, such as ‘political symbol- ism’ (Geertz, 1983) or, recently, ‘veil politics’ (Wingo, 2003). The problem, however, with these approaches is that they tend to assimilate political myths with other kinds of political symbols. For instance, by vindicating the import- ance of elements such as flags, national heroes, political myths and rituals all together under the heading of ‘veil politics’, the risk is not only of conflating very different phenomena, but also of ending up in a generalized defence of all sort of veils. For instance, it is debatable whether the massive recourse to the cult of national heroes and political rituals is compatible with the principle of individ- ual autonomy, as Wingo (2003), through his holistic treatment of all veils, seems to suggest. On the other hand, Wingo’s Veil Politics is perhaps the only recent work in political philosophy devoted to political myth. The reluctance of political phil- osophy to specifically focus on political myth is even more striking in the light of the richness of the philosophical studies on myth. Notwithstanding this richness, both enlightened thinkers who argue for the dismissal of myth and the romantics who advocate for its renovation have rarely dealt with the specific role that myth plays in politics. The aim of this article is to argue for the need for a philosophical reflection on political myth and the way in which it does so is partly philosophical and partly sociological. In the first section, we show that the philosophical debate on myth can provide very crucial insights as to the nature of political myth. By drawing on Hans Blumenberg’s work, we argue that a political myth is best understood as a continual process of work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group can provide significance to their political conditions and experience. In the second section, we try to show how this understanding of political myth can throw light on crucial phenomena of contemporary politics. In particular, we argue that it can help explain the mechanisms through which the narrative of the clash of civilizations, which has been strongly criticized as too simplistic and scientifically inadequate, could have turned into a successful political myth, i.e. into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 01 065715 Bottici (bc-t) 29/6/06 1:50 pm Page 317 Bottici & Challand Rethinking Political Myth 317 Philosophical Reflection on Political Myth One of the reasons why there is no vast tradition of philosophies of political myth is probably due to the fact that it is only in modern societies that the specifically political role played by myth has been recognized. In ancient societies, political myths and religious myths coincide most of the time in both their contents and their functions. Indeed, the appearance of purely political myths is a typically modern phenomenon – a consequence of both the modern separation of politics from its religious anchorage and of its democratization. To put it in Sorel’s words (1990: Introduction), it is when it comes to explaining typically modern phenomena, such as large social movements, that the role played by narratives appealing to people’s imagination becomes evident. On the other hand, though, there seems to be something intrinsic to politi- cal myth that renders it recalcitrant vis-à-vis philosophical treatment. Indeed, if one looks for a philosophical theory of political myth, one would find that the classical theories are the product of reflections on specific examples. For instance, both Cassirer’s The Myth of the State (1973) and Sorel’s Réflexions sur la violence (1990) are devoted to very specific examples, with the result that the general theories that can be derived from both of them remain too linked to their models and do not really allow for generalization. For example, are political myths a means of oppression, as one can conclude from Cassirer’s (1973) analysis of the myth of the Aryan race, or should we rather think of them as possible means of the liberation of a social class, as Sorel (1990) argues with regards to the general strike? Probably, both are correct in that political myths can be a means for both, depending on their nature and on the circumstances in which they operate. Indeed, political myths have an intrinsic particularistic nature, which links them to the particular circumstances in which they operate. For instance, what is a political myth in certain circumstances and for a certain group of people may not be so for another social group or even for the same social group in other circumstances, even if its content remains the same. Take, as an example, the myth of the millennium: there is nothing in the idea that the world is about to end which tells us why this image can work as a political myth. Notwithstand- ing this, as has been persuasively shown, this narrative has worked at times and in given contexts as a political myth (Tudor, 1972). This also suggests that what renders a myth specifically political is not its content – since, for instance, there is nothing intrinsically political per se in the idea that the world is about to end. It is rather something in the relationship between a given narrative and the way in which it can come to address the politi- cal conditions of a given group. This fact can also partly explain the difficulties in putting forward a general theory of political myth. On the other hand, there is nothing that a priori prevents a philosophical treatment of political myth. In particular, the debate on myth that took place in Germany in the 1970s can provide very useful insights. Indeed, if political phil- osophy is reluctant to take political myth as a specific object of inquiry, the 01 065715 Bottici (bc-t) 29/6/06 1:50 pm Page 318 318 European Journal of Social Theory 9(3) tradition of philosophical studies on myth without further qualifications is extremely rich. In particular, of those who have focused on the particularistic nature of myth, Blumenberg (1985) is perhaps the philosopher who best captured it with his theory of myth as a continual Arbeit am Mythos, or ‘work on myth’. A myth, Blumenberg argued, is a not a single narrative that is given once and for all, but is a process, a process of continual work on a basic narrative pattern that changes according to the circumstances.