The Top 10 Management Characteristics of Highly Rated U.S

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The Top 10 Management Characteristics of Highly Rated U.S The Top 10 Management Characteristics Of Highly Rated U.S. Public Finance Issuers Primary Credit Analyst: John A Sugden, New York (1) 212-438-1678; [email protected] Secondary Contact: Robin L Prunty, New York (1) 212-438-2081; [email protected] Table Of Contents Top 10 List WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT JULY 23, 2012 1 1001327 | 300126912 The Top 10 Management Characteristics Of Highly Rated U.S. Public Finance Issuers (Editor's Note: This is an updated version of an article published July 26, 2010.) U.S. public finance issuers are a varied group, but the management practices of the strongest borrowers show some distinct commonalities. Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has widely disseminated to investors and issuers its approach for assigning credit ratings in U.S. public finance (see "USPF Criteria: State Ratings Methodology," published Jan. 3, 2011; and "USPF Criteria: GO Debt," published Oct. 12, 2006, on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal). We have also developed representative ranges for key ratios that factor into our analysis of tax-backed credit quality (see "USPF Criteria: Key General Obligation Ratio Credit Ranges – Analysis Vs. Reality," published April 2, 2008). Although these ratios are the foundation of the quantitative measures Standard & Poor's uses when assigning a credit rating, Standard & Poor's also relies on qualitative factors to inform our credit analysis. In 2006, Standard & Poor's released its Financial Management Assessment, which offers a more transparent assessment of a government's financial practices, as an integral part of our credit rating process (see "Financial Management Assessment," published June 27, 2006). Our view of management factors, administrative characteristics, and other structural issues facing a government entity may be an overriding factor in a rating outcome. (Watch the related CreditMatters TV segment titled, "What Do Highly Rated U.S. Public Finance Issuers Have In Common?", dated Aug. 14, 2012.) We view management as contributing significantly to many of the individual credit ratios, which can positively affect ratings in a number of ways. On the whole, state and local governments have made many improvements to budget structure, reserve policies, and debt management during prior periods of budget stress. Whether these practices are developed as part of a comprehensive risk management plan or individually, they have, in our view, generally enhanced government's ability to manage through downturns and have contributed to credit stability over time. Conversely, we believe that the lack of strong management can be a significant factor in a weak credit profile. In our opinion, while the economy remains a key factor in assigning a rating level, our view of management and the institutional framework is usually one of the deciding factors in fine-tuning the rating. Overview • Our view of a government entity's management and administrative characteristics, along with other structural issues it faces, can move a rating up or down more significantly and swiftly than any other element of a credit review. • We've observed some distinct commonalities in the management practices of highly rated U.S. public finance issuers over the years. • Proactive budget and liability planning, strong liquidity management, and the establishment of reserves are among the factors the strongest issuers share. When assessing management, Standard & Poor's analyzes the political and fiscal framework that governs it, as well as WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT JULY 23, 2012 2 1001327 | 300126912 The Top 10 Management Characteristics Of Highly Rated U.S. Public Finance Issuers the day-to-day management procedures and policies. There could be a strong management team in place, but if there is political instability or lack of political will to make difficult decisions, we have found that management could be ineffective in many cases. Standard & Poor's also focuses on the "whole of government." Our view of oversight and management controls covering the disparate operations of a government with a focus on accountability at each department or function is critical to strong credit ratings. The following "Top 10" list of management characteristics associated with Standard & Poor's highly rated issuers is generally applicable to state and local governments as well as to other enterprise operations of government such as water, sewer, or solid waste. The relative importance of these factors may vary from issuer to issuer. Our view of credibility is an important part of a rating review process and management assessment. Every government has challenges, but we believe that identifying problems or issues and detailing how these will be addressed establish credibility and greater transparency in the rating process. Top 10 List 1. Focus on structural balance In our view, a structurally balanced budget is an essential characteristic of highly rated credits. There are many views of what constitutes a balanced budget. For some governments, a budget is balanced if current revenues plus available reserves match or exceed current expenditures. From Standard & Poor's standpoint, a budget is balanced if recurring revenues match recurring expenditures. In evaluating whether or not a budget is balanced, we analyze the underlying revenue and expenditure assumptions. We might not have a positive view of a budget that relies on optimistic revenue assumptions relative to the current economic environment to meet recurring expenditures. We consider recurring expenditures all of those that are typically incurred year after year and are required as part of a government's normal ongoing operations. This includes salaries, debt service, and pension payments among others. Consistent with our analysis of revenues, expenditure assumptions that rely on debt restructuring for budgetary savings, deferral of ongoing expenditures, and saving assumptions that have significant implementation risks could also color our view of whether a budget is balanced or not. A government's ability to maintain or quickly return to structural balance during a period of economic weakness can lead us to affirm or raise an issuer credit rating. The opposite is also true. Reliance primarily on one-time measures without the appropriate re-alignment of revenues and expenditures could cause us to lower the ratings. 2. Strong liquidity management An additional credit quality factor is management's ability to manage its cash flow and identify potential issues, internal or external, that could lead to a liquidity crunch. Potential for inadequate liquidity serves as a bellwether to the risk of immediate and potentially severe credit deterioration, particularly for those with significant budget misalignments and issuers of certain types of variable-rate debt, in our view. Ultimately, the possibility of having insufficient money to meet debt obligations is at the heart of our credit analysis. In the few instances where state or local governments may encounter genuine credit distress, it is likely accompanied and possibly exacerbated by problems with liquidity. Access to additional sources of internal or external liquidity and a plan on how, when, and in what amounts to access these, are a credit positive. However, just having access to additional liquidity, either through WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT JULY 23, 2012 3 1001327 | 300126912 The Top 10 Management Characteristics Of Highly Rated U.S. Public Finance Issuers pooled cash or loans from other funds, is not enough. The absence of clear accountability as to where the cash is coming from or when it will be paid back could create uncertainty about the sustainability of the cash flow and the potential implications of reallocating the cash from one use to the other. In addition, some obligors' debt profiles include liquidity risk exposure tied to variable-rate demand obligations, alternative financing products, and other debt instruments. Under some of these structures, the potential for accelerated repayment causing sudden and significant demands on an issuer's liquidity could have credit implications (see "The Appeal Of Alternative Financing Is Not Without Risk For Municipal Issuers," May 17, 2011). We have found that management teams of highly rated credits are able to limit, mitigate, or develop a careful plan to manage the potential exposure to these liquidity demands. 3. Regular economic and revenue updates to identify shortfalls early In our experience, having a formal mechanism to monitor economic trends and revenue performance at regular intervals is a key feature of stable financial performance. This is particularly true in the case of states, which we have observed tend to exhibit revenue declines during economic downturns because they rely on personal income tax, sales tax, corporate income tax, and other economically sensitive sources. We believe that evaluating historical performance of certain revenues is important to this analysis because each government will have different leading or lagging economic indicators that signal potential revenue variance issues based on its economic structure. The earlier revenue weakness is identified in the fiscal year, the more effective, in our view, the budget balancing response can be. We think it is important to monitor upside growth as well. In our opinion, it is also important to understand a surge in revenues to determine if the trend is an aberration or something that is likely to sustain. 4. An established
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