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Curriculum Vitae CURRICULUM VITAE Name: Philip Noel Pettit Address: 308 Marx Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1012, USA Email address: [email protected] Website: http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit Citizenship Dual: Ireland (from birth 1945); Australia (naturalized 1988); permanent resident, USA (2005). Education and qualifications 1950-58 Primary education: National School, Ballygar. 1958-63 Secondary education: St Joseph’s College, Garbally Park, Ballinasloe. 1963-67 Undergraduate and graduate at Maynooth College, Maynooth BA in Philosophy, First Class Honours, Autumn 1966 (National University of Ireland) LPh (by thesis) Summer 1967(Pontifical College, Maynooth). MA (by thesis), First Class honours, Autumn 1967 (National University). 1967-70 PhD student in Philosophy (part-time), Queen's University, Belfast. PhD conferred1970. 1972 MA (ex officio) Cambridge University, Autumn 2002 Appointments 1967-68 Lecturing Assistant at Queen's University, Belfast. 1968-72 Assistant Lecturer at University College, Dublin. 1972-75 Research Fellow, Trinity Hall, Cambridge. 1975-77 College Lecturer, University College, Dublin. 1977-83 Professor of Philosophy, University of Bradford. Chair, School of Interdisciplinary Human Studies. 1983-02 Professorial Fellow in Social and Political Theory, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra. Professor of Social and Political Theory, 1989, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University Canberra (Special appointment) Joint appointment within Social and Political Theory and Philosophy Programs, 2000. Merit Award 1999-2004 1997-2001 Multi-year Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York 2002- Laurance S.Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University Affiliate Professor, Dept of Philosophy, Princeton University (W.N. Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University 02-04) Awards and honours D.Litt. (honoris causa), Politics, National University of Ireland, June 2000 Ph.D. (honoris causa), Political Science, University of Crete, June 2005 Ph.D. (honoris causa), Philosophy, Université de Montreal, June 2006 D.Litt. (honoris causa) Philosophy, Queen’s University, Belfast, July 2007 D.Ph. (honoris causa), Philosophy, Lund University, May 2008 Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, 1987- Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, 1988- Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2009- Honorary Member, Royal Irish Academy, 2010- Guggenheim Fellowship 2010 2 Awarded Australian Federation Fellowship 2005 (not taken up) Old Dominion Faculty Fellow, Council of the Humanities, Princeton University, 2005-06, 2007-08 Emeritus Professor of the Australian National University 2004 Centenary Medal for service to Australian Society and the Humanities in the Study of Philosophy 2003 Invited International Member, The Tampere Club, 2001- University Medal, University of Helsinki, April 1992 Elected Honorary Member, Italian Society for Analytical Philosophy, Rome, 31 Oct 1992 Honorary appointments Honorary Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney 2008-11 Honorary Professor of Philosophy, Queen's University, Belfast 2009-2014 Commentaries Xavier Vanmechelen (ed.) (2002) Afhankelijkheid zonder dominantie. Over de sociale en politieke filosofie van Philip Pettit. Leuven - Leusden, Acco, 204 p. ISBN 90-334-5079-8 [Dependence without Domination. On Philip Pettit's Social and Political Philosophy. The authors are: Stefaan Cuypers, Barbara Haverhals, Stefan Rummens, Ronald Tinnevelt, Luc Van Liedekerke and Xavier Vanmechelen.] Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit eds, Geoffrey Brennan, R.E.Goodin Frank Jackson and Michael Smith OUP, 2007. The authors are: John Braithwaite (ANU); John Ferejohn (Stanford and NYU); Richard Holton (MIT); Susan Hurley (Bristol); Rae Langton (MIT); Nicola Lacey (LSE); Cynthia Macdonald (Belfast); Graham Macdonald (Canterbury); Peter Menzies (Macquarie); Alva Noe (Berkeley); Thomas Scanlon (Harvard); Jeremy Waldron (Columbia). Hans Lindahl, ed, Philip Pettit and the Incorporation of Responsibility, Special Issue, Rechtsfilosofie en Rechtstheorie,Vol 38, 2009 Jean-Fabien Spitz, Le republicanisme de Philip Pettit: Ontologie sociale et philosophie politique, Michalon, Paris, 2010; series ‘Le Bien Commun’. Antonio Gonzalez Carillo y Jose Luis Colomer Viadel Republicanismo cívico: socialismo de los ciudadanos, Ediciones del Laberinto de Madrid, 2010 Special Lectures John Curtin Memorial Lecturer, A.N.U., 1989. Annual Lecturer, Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, Nov 1991 Key Speaker, Nordic Graduate Program in Philosophy, Helsinki Oct 1996 Parcells Lecturer, University of Connecticut, Feb 1999 Discussant, Lionel Trilling Seminar, Columbia Uni., March 1999 James B. and Grace J. Nelson Philosopher-in-Residence, Dept of Philosophy, University of Michigan, April 2002 Donald R.Brown Memorial Lecturer, University of Vermont, Sept 02 Sawyer Seminar Presenter, Oxford University, Oct 02 Madden-Rooney Lecture, University of Notre Dame Irish Seminar 2004, Newman House, Dublin, June 2004 Public Lecture, with reply from Spanish Prime Minister, Circulo de Bellas Artes, Madrid, July 2004; sponsored by Universidad Autonoma de Madrid and Vodafone Espana. “La Caixa” Lectures, Catalonia (Terragona, Girona, Lerida), Oct 04 Pufendorf Lectures, Lund University, Sweden, May 2005 Tanner Lectures (M.Sahlins) commentator, Uni of Michigan, Nov 2005 Judge William H.Orrick, Jr. Lecturer, School of Law, Berkeley, March 2005 3 The Dialectica Lecture, German Association for Analytic Philosophy Conference, Berlin Sept 2006 Francis W.Gramlich Lecture in Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Oct 2006 Inaugural Edmund Burke Lecture, Trinity College, Dublin 2007 Sprague and Taylor Lecture in Philosophy, Brooklyn College, CUNY, 2007 Public Lecture, in review of the Zapatero Government, Complutense University, Madrid, June 2007 Ethics, Society and Politics Lecture, Rice University, 2008 Graduate Student Lecturer, 2007-08, Philosophy, Duke, 2008 Max Kampleman Lecturer On Human Rights, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2007-08 Bank of Finland, Tampere Club Lecture, Sept 2008 Blackwell Lectures, Philosophy, Brown University, April 2009 Albertus Magnus Professor, Philosophy, University of Cologne, June 2009 Distinguished Lecturer, University of Sydney Law School, July 2009 Routledge Lecture in Philosophy, Cambridge University, Oct 2009 Hourani Lecturer, Philosophy, SUNY at Buffalo, Nov 2009 Inaugural Lecture, Integrated Master in Analytical Philosophy Program, http://www.ub.edu/aphil/, Barcelona, March 2010 Seeley Lecturer, University of Cambridge, April 2010 The Oslo Lecture on Mind in Nature, August 2010 Daxia Forum Lecture, East China Normal University, Shanghai, Nov 2010 The Frankfurt Lectures, Frankfurt University, Feb 2012 Inaugural Quain Lecture in Jurisprudence, University College, London, March 2012 The Muenster Lectures in Philosophy, Muenster University, Oct 2012 Visiting positions Visiting Lecturer, University of Witwatersrand, September 1974. Guest Professor to Anthropology, Philosophy, and Sociology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, March-May,1979. Visiting Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, Oct-Nov 1982. Overseas Fellow, Churchill College, Cambridge, March-Sept 1986. Distinguished Visitor, Massey University, August 1988 Willam Evans Visiting Fellow, University of Otago, Aug-Sept 1988 Visiting Fellow, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, April-Sept 1989 Official Visitor, Nuffield College, Oxford, April-Sept 1989 Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics, April- July 1992 Professeur Invité, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, September, 1992 Invited Researcher, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, October, 1992 Adjunct Professor, Dept of Philosophy, Monash University1992-95 Visiting Professor, University of Cape Town, Oct 1993 1994 University of Auckland Foundation Visitor, Nov 1994 Visiting Professor, Universite de Neuchatel, March-June 1996 Professeur Invite, Institut Universitaire de France, March-May 1996 (affiliated to Universite de Caen). Visiting Fellow, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Jan-Sept 2003 Program Visitor, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, each Jan 2005- Senior Scholar in Ethics. Edmond J.Safra Foundation Center for Ethics; Visiting Scholar, Philosophy, Harvard University, 2006-07 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, 2010-11. Books, authored and co-authored (1) On the Idea of Phenomenology, Scepter Books, Dublin, Humanities Press, New York, 1969, pp.99. 4 (2) The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, and University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1975; pb edition (UC Press)1977, pp.118. (3) Judging Justice: An Introduction to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, pp.xii and 193. Hb and pb. (4) Semantics and Social Science, with Graham MacDonald, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, pp.vi and 194. Hb and pb. Chapter 1 reprinted in Peter Halfpenny, ed., Positivist Sociology and its Critics London: Edward Elgar 1993 (5) Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice, with John Braithwaite, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. viii and 228. Pb 1992. Selection (pp. 86-92, 101-06, 124-32) translated into Portugese in J-C Merle, Luiz Moreira and Eugênio Pacelli
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