DOCSLIB.ORG

Prospects for Palestinian Unity After the Arab Spring

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Prospects for Palestinian Unity After the Arab Spring Prospects for Palestinian Unity After the Arab Spring Prospects for Palestinian Unity After the Arab Spring YOUSEF MUNAYYER* ABSTRACT If the revolutions sweeping then Arab world are in fact its n May 4, 2011, the Palestinian fac- “spring” then the Hamas/Fateh tions Fateh and Hamas signed a reconciliationO agreement ending a four-year reconciliation deal may very well be the first buds this season division, which debilitated Palestinian domestic produced. Whether or not this politics and national strategy. The agreement, reconciliation deal will bear any signed with much fanfare in a post-Mubarak fruit for the Palestinian people, Cairo, raised hopes as well as questions. Could however, is yet to be seen. To best this really be the end of division between bit- understand the factors affecting the success of the deal, one must ter rivals and the start of a unified Palestinian have grasp of the history of the movement? How will such an agreement be relationship between Hamas and tested over time? How will Washington and Tel Fatah and the role of external Aviv respond to the agreement, and how does actors in that relationship as this all relate to the “Arab Spring?” well. In this commentary I lay out a history of tensions and These many questions are as interesting the role of the US and Israel as they are important. To attempt to provide in driving wedges between answers to them requires an understanding of the parties. Similar challenges the genesis of the division between these two will undoubtedly face this Palestinian factions, the history of their rela- reconciliation attempt and the greatest chances of success can be tionship prior to the recent period, and the dif- achieved when both parties put ferences in both interests and ideology. the interests of the Palestinian people ahead of the demands of their external patrons. * Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, [email protected] Insight Turkey Vol. 13 / No. 3 / 2011 pp. 21-31 21 YOUSEF MUNAYYER The reconciliation has potential The Origins of Tensions for ending a division that Fateh, like Hamas, derives its name debilitated Palestinian politics from an acronym; its complete title is and divided Palestinians for Haraket Tahrir al-Watani al-Falasteeni several years (The Palestinian National Liberation Movement). Fateh was founded in 1959, prior to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and before the initial implementation of the Oslo Accords the vast majority of Fateh’s leadership was based outside of historic Palestine. Hamas, whose complete title is Haraket al-Muqawamwh al-Islamiyeh (The Is- lamic Resistance Movement), is the largest of several Islamist movements in Pal- estine. Its origins are in the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, and while the Pal- estinian branch of the Brotherhood was established as early as 1946, the strength and coalescence of political Islam in Palestine really began to take root in the 1970s and 1980s.1 It was during this period that Fateh was making a transformation of its own. Fateh rose to prominence among all Palestinian factions in the Palestine Libera- tion Organization (PLO) by successfully carrying out many guerilla-style attacks on Israeli interests. In 1964, the Arab League recognized the PLO as the “sole, legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people. In 1967, the Arab League passed the “3 NOs” in Khartoum, but when the PLO obtained observer status at the United Nations in 1974, Fateh, whose leadership largely overlapped with the leadership of the PLO, began to moderate its positions and actions. The outbreak of the first intifada, or Palestinian uprising, in 1987 highlighted the contrast between Hamas, an organization inside Palestine, and the Fateh- dominated PLO which was based in Tunis at the time. Hamas was formally estab- lished in 1987 as an outgrowth of the Brotherhood and both fomented and ben- efitted from the activities of the first intifada resistance. The PLO quickly realized it had little leverage over the events on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza, which had grabbed the world’s attention. The Muslim Brotherhood increased in popularity among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, which was evidenced by results in student elections at Palestinian schools and universities – a common- ly-used barometer of Palestinian public opinion in the absence of other formal electoral institutions.2 The Fateh-dominated PLO hastily moved to make changes to its strategy. Within months, the PLO declared the independence of the state of Palestine with 22 Prospects for Palestinian Unity After the Arab Spring reference to UN resolutions relating to The Oslo accords are the occupation of the West Bank and largely recognized by many Gaza. This amounted to implicit recog- nition of the state of Israel, which would Palestinians to have been a later be formalized, and initiated a pro- strategic mistake resulting in cess, which would culminate in Oslo by American-led negotiations way of Madrid. and the further colonization of The Oslo accords are largely recog- Palestinian territory nized by many Palestinians to have been a strategic mistake resulting in American-led negotiations and the further colo- nization of Palestinian territory. At the time, however, the Oslo accords gave the Fateh-dominated PLO something they much desired – the chance to formally op- erate in Palestine for the first time in its history. But it also cost them a great deal of revolutionary legitimacy amongst Palestinians, which had been hard-earned over years of guerilla attacks and extensive sacrifices. Hamas stood clearly opposed to the Oslo accords and has continued to do so, often using the Fateh-led PLO’s con- cessions in the Oslo process to score political points. While Oslo brought these Palestinian leaders back into Palestine, it had sown seeds of division, which would grow in the years to come. The PLO returned to the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a different -or ganization than it was when it rose to prominence. Israeli decapitation attacks had eliminated much of the leadership, including Wadie Haddad (1978), Zuheir Mohsin (1979), Ali Hasan Salameh (1979), Mamoun Meraish (1983) and Khalil al-Wazir (1988). During this time, Yasser Arafat had also solidified his control over the PLO’s various decision-making bodies.3 When Arafat’s PLO returned in the form of the newly Oslo-created Palestin- ian National Authority (PA), many Palestinian activists from different ends of the political spectrum began to feel that a distant and disconnected leadership was returning from abroad to lead a national movement that had already organically developed through the intifada. The political environment was conducive to in- ternal divisions, particularly between Fateh, which had embraced a negotiations strategy, and the rising Hamas, which believed negotiations to be futile. Oslo and its implementation would frequently be used as a wedge to drive these factions apart. In 1991, Hamas formed the Izz-ed-Din al-Qassam brigades, which unchecked would pose a challenge to the Palestinian Authority’s ability to keep security com- mitments made through the Oslo Accords. Hamas’ use of violence, particularly 23 YOUSEF MUNAYYER suicide attacks, was relatively non-existent prior to 1993. It was after an Israeli set- tler, Baruch Goldstein, massacred nearly 30 Palestinian civilians when he opened fire on worshipers praying in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron that Hamas’ suicide bombings began to increase. 4 The Palestinian Authority (PA) was in the awkward position of having to ful- fill commitments of security for the Israelis against other Palestinians who the Israelis also occupied. Prior to the first PA elections in 1996, a major benchmark in the implementation of Oslo Accords, tensions between Hamas and the Fateh- dominated PA were on the rise as Hamas and Israel exchanged suicide attacks for assassinations. Many saw the elections as an extension of the Oslo Accords, which they believed to be against the Palestinian national interest, and the PA was well aware of the prospect of violence surrounding the election. Hamas and the PA entered talks to come to an agreement on security before the vote. They eventually came to an agreement in December of 1995 prior to the elections scheduled early the following year. The talks in Cairo were complicated by Hamas’ displaced po- litical leadership, which was in Amman at the time, but ultimately an agreement was reached in which Hamas pledged not to launch attacks against Israel from PA-controlled areas so as not to damage the PA’s credibility. The agreement seemed like it would be short-lived when on January 5, 1996, Israel assassinated a high-ranking engineer in the Qassam brigades, Yahya Ayash. Despite the deep anger and cries for retribution, violence immediately before and during the elections was limited. All this would change in the spring when a se- ries of bombings everyone expected were ultimately carried out to avenge Ayash. The PA came under tremendous pressure to clamp down on Hamas, which led to the most significant political repression of Hamas activists it had experienced to that point in its short history. The PA and Israel collaborated in massive waves of arrests of Hamas affiliates, and arms confiscation of Qassam brigades members ensued. 5 Within a few short weeks, elections in Israel yielded a new right-wing govern- ment led by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who made the case that the Oslo process was a sham better than Hamas ever could. The opening of an ancient tunnel underneath the Old City of Jerusalem infuriated masses of Pales- tinians, and the building of a new Israeli colony of Har Homa practically rendered the two-state solution dead. Har Homa is located on Jabal Abu Ghneim inside the Bethlehem governorate but within the unilaterally-declared, illegally-annexed Is- rael municipality of Jerusalem.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Palestine 100 Years of Struggle: the Most Important Events Yasser
    Palestine 100 Years of Struggle: The Most Important Events Yasser Arafat Foundation 1 Early 20th Century - The total population of Palestine is estimated at 600,000, including approximately 36,000 of the Jewish faith, most of whom immigrated to Palestine for purely religious reasons, the remainder Muslims and Christians, all living and praying side by side. 1901 - The Zionist Organization (later called the World Zionist Organization [WZO]) founded during the First Zionist Congress held in Basel Switzerland in 1897, establishes the “Jewish National Fund” for the purpose of purchasing land in Palestine. 1902 - Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II agrees to receives Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement and, despite Herzl’s offer to pay off the debt of the Empire, decisively rejects the idea of Zionist settlement in Palestine. - A majority of the delegates at The Fifth Zionist Congress view with favor the British offer to allocate part of the lands of Uganda for the settlement of Jews. However, the offer was rejected the following year. 2 1904 - A wave of Jewish immigrants, mainly from Russia and Poland, begins to arrive in Palestine, settling in agricultural areas. 1909 Jewish immigrants establish the city of “Tel Aviv” on the outskirts of Jaffa. 1914 - The First World War begins. - - The Jewish population in Palestine grows to 59,000, of a total population of 657,000. 1915- 1916 - In correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca, wherein Hussein demands the “independence of the Arab States”, specifying the boundaries of the territories within the Ottoman rule at the time, which clearly includes Palestine.
    [Show full text]
  • Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006 (Pp
    al-Yahya, ͑Abd al-Razzaq. Bayn al- ͑Askariya wa-l-Siyasa. Beirut: Institute for Palestine studies, 2006 (pp. 105-113). Translated by The Palestinian Revolution.1 I was engaged in the work of the Association alongside the steps of establishing the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) – yet these two processes were inherently linked. A third was also added to the mix, namely my following of the movement characterised by the establishment of disparate factions calling for armed struggle, and the conflicts and competitions that started to spring up between them. The community of Palestinian elites in that period operated much like a beehive, its activity non-stop day and night. During the preparations for the General Conference, Ahmad al-Shuqairi said yes to practically everyone who asked to be represented; this meant that it ended up being an amalgamation of various familial, provincial, regional, Palestinian nationalist, and Arab nationalist leanings. Our group, meanwhile, were keen for the Conference to be limited to those with political roles and ideas. Nimr al-Masri, who became al-Shuqairi’s right-hand man, was also of this opinion, but he did not clash with the president whose view was so different. Among the various sides that were spoken for at the conference (whether they deserved to be or not), our group of officers from the course [in Qatana] had a certain share of representation. Considering how many officers we had attending, this share was a decent one; in fact, the number of our officers surpassed the number of representatives of any participating armed faction or party.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Al-Khatib, Ahmad. Kuwait
    al-Khatib, Ahmad. Kuwait: Min Al-Imara Ila al-Dawla, Dhakariyat al- ʿAmal al-Watani wa-l-Qawmi. Beirut: The Arab Cultural Center, 2007 (pp. 72-83). Translated by The Palestinian Revolution, 2016 1 The Nakba, the Juncture, and the Birth of the Nationalist Youth There is no doubt that the United Nations decision to partition Palestine in 1947, the establishment of Israel in 1948, along with the Arab military defeat at the hands of the Zionists, created a total turnaround in our way of thinking. On a personal level, the impact of it was almost unutterably strong. Perhaps its bearing on me was so deep – and so personal – because I witnessed my Palestinian friends who were studying with me losing everything overnight, going every day to the Palestinian borders to search for their families amongst the displaced. I used to share all of that with them. I lived through the sad and painful reception of refugees, I went with them to the makeshift camps that had been set up for them, and saw how the families were squashed together in the tents, and the tiny units separated into individual dwellings with sheets. Every ‘dwelling’ housed one family, and open sewers ran through the middle of the units and between the tents. I sometimes saw two families living in one tent. Even though we hadn’t yet qualified as doctors, we had no choice but to provide medical treatment for the refugees. Owing to malnutrition – or at times lack of nutrition – and the lack of sanitation in people’s homes, tuberculosis began to spread through the camps.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethnicity, Rebel Diplomacy, and State Support for Insurgency
    University of Mississippi eGrove Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors Theses Honors College) 2016 Their Brothers' Keepers? Ethnicity, Rebel Diplomacy, and State Support for Insurgency Connor Somgynari University of Mississippi. Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Somgynari, Connor, "Their Brothers' Keepers? Ethnicity, Rebel Diplomacy, and State Support for Insurgency" (2016). Honors Theses. 224. https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/224 This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THEIR BROTHER’S KEEPERS? ETHNICITY, REBEL DIPLOMACY, AND STATE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY ©2016 By C. J. Somgynari A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies Croft Institute for International Studies Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College The University of Mississippi University, Mississsippi May, 2016 Approved Advisor: Dr. Yael Zeira Second Reader: Dr. Kees Gispen Third Reader: Dr. Benjamin Jones ii ©2016 C. J. Somgynari ALL RIGHTS RESERVED iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I cannot begin to thank the following individuals enough; without their help, support, and patience, this project would have not been possible. My thesis committee members, Yael Zeira, Kees Gispen, and Ben Jones, provided me with invaluable feedback that helped me develop my paper into the refined product it is today. I am in gratitude to each of them.
    [Show full text]
  • Mongrel Media
    Mongrel Media Presents CARLOS A Film by Olivier Assayas (330 min., France/German, 2010) Distribution Publicity Bonne Smith 1028 Queen Street West Star PR Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M6J 1H6 Tel: 416-488-4436 Tel: 416-516-9775 Fax: 416-516-0651 Fax: 416-488-8438 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] www.mongrelmedia.com High res stills may be downloaded from http://www.mongrelmedia.com/press.html BY OLIVIER ASSAYAS Accurately reconstructing the historical context was the Putting into production a screenplay such as this division between film and television: to approach the Introduction guiding principle behind the writing of the screenplays. required the tenacity and endurance of a producer, truth through fiction. Olivier Assayas, Dan Franck and Stephen Smith spent Daniel Leconte, and the determination, immense talent Ilich Ramírez Sánchez lives today in prison. months cross-referencing information gathered from and the sure touch of a director like Olivier Assayas. CARLOS is the most cinematographic of our dramas. The brand of revolutionary terrorism adhering to Marxist numerous books and press cuttings about Carlos and doctrine has disappeared with the collapse of the Communist terrorism in the 1970s-80s. Through this, they succeeded Financing a project of this scale is impossible in the I’d like to pay tribute to the exceptional work of Olivier bloc. Yet no one has forgotten Carlos, whose image captured in piecing together the main elements of his “career”, restrictive framework of traditional television drama. Assayas, who gives us a series which, I have no doubt, through a telephoto lens on the tarmac of Algiers airport, whilst accepting a degree of interpretation for the areas, That’s why the finance package put together by Daniel is one of his best films.
    [Show full text]
  • Review Dialogue, N. 21— September 2008 3 €, 3$,2 £
    Homage to Mahmud Darwich, Palestinian poet—Al- Awda, The Palestine Right to Return Coalition—A Refu- gee’s Open Letter to Mahmoud Abbas—The Shministim Letter 2008—Georges Habache 1926 – 2008—Ali Abuni- mah : One Country—There is hope in Gaza—Let Justice be the Salvation of Israelis and Palestinians. The Hope of a Victimized People—Readers’ column. Reactions about Waltz With Bashir, the film by Ari Folman. Review Dialogue, n. 21— September 2008 3 €, 3$,2 £ www.dialogue-review.com Contents p.3 Introduction p.4 Homage to Mahmud Darwich, Palestinian poet. By François Dominique. p.6 Al-Awda, The Palestine Right to Return Coalition – Press release. p.7 A Refugee’s Open Letter to Mahmoud Abbas. By Abdelfattah Abusrour. p.10 The Shministim Letter 2008. p.13 Georges Habache 1926 – 2008. By Rachid Akel. p.15 Ali Abunimah : One Country. By Sam Ayache. p.17 There is hope in Gaza. By Miko Peled. p. 19 Let Justice be the Salvation of Israelis and Palestinians The Hope of a Victimized People. By Georges Bisharat. p. 21 Readers’ column. Reactions about Waltz With Bashir, the film by Ari Folman. Hanthala, Palestinian child, by Naji Al Ali. Dialogue Review – number 21 – october 2008 page 1 Dialogue Review – number 21 – october 2008 page 2 Introduction The publication of this issue of Dialogue has been somewhat delayed and we apologise to our readers. ixty years after the partition of Palestine, which a few months later was to trigger Nakba, i.e. the mass expulsion of 800,000 Palestinians; after dozens of “peace plans”, which resulted in extorting S one-sided concessions from the Palestinians, we are still stuck in a dead end.
    [Show full text]
  • Arab Palestinian Resistance
    'T ARAB PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE Magazine 1973 PAIESTIIE LIBERATION ARMY - PEOPLE'S ^LIBERATION FORCES Arab Palestinian R E S I S T A CE Volume V No. 7 July 1973 CONTENTS • From the record 3 • Editorial 4-5 • Political scene By: M.T.Bujamuni 6-13 • Israel's Silent War (July 1972-May 1973) 14-25 By : S. Antonlus • The Social Structure of Israel 26-36 By : Prof. Lajpat Rai • The U.S. Israel and Ethiopia 37-41 a Ghassan Kanafani By: Anni Kanafani 42-61 • My Son By : Ghassan Kanafani 62-67 • OAU Threatens Israel With Economic 68-72 Sanctions • What Are They Celebrating ? 73-77 • A book review : The Fall of Jerusalem 78-85 • Documents : The Bologna Appeal and the 86-94 EURABIA Committee Letter FROM THE REGORD «... It is American support which enables the present leaders of Israel, in defiance of world opi- nion to annex and encircle Arab Jerusalem, to plant Israeli settlements on land seized from the Arabs, to prolong the misery of the refugees - and, by these acts, to make it certain that there will be further conflict in the Middle East. » Thirty European leaders in the EURABIA Committee letter to President Nixon-May 14, 1973 • Correspondence Price per copy Th 9 E d i t o r, Syrian p i a * t « r * 1 Resistance, P. §. B. 3577 $ O.S 0 D a m • • c ue , Syria Ed i ton Wl K'HDR The Security Council discussion of the Middle as a surprise to us. However, it did confirm a number East conflict has now come to an end-a highly of facts, including the following: frustrating end.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Marmion) to Deploy the Army in Order to Deter a Terrorist Attack at the Airport.1 Marmion Was Implemented on Three Further Occasions In
    King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.12154 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Hughes, G. (2014). Skyjackers, jackals and soldiers: British planning for international terrorist incidents during the 1970s . International Affairs (London), 90(5), 1013-1031. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12154 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel Flies Emirates
    AUSTRALIA/ISRAEL REVIEW VOLUME 45 No. 9 SEPTEMBER 2020 AUSTRALIA/ISRAEL & JEWISH AFFAIRS COUNCIL ISRAEL FLIES EMIRATES The dramatic implications for the whole Middle East of the UAE- Israel normalisation deal ISRAEL ENERGISED “ABJECT FILTH” SNAPBACK ATTACK ALMS FOR TERRORISTS? How gas production is providing the The battle to contain US move sees the Holocaust denial on UN Security Council Stopping charitable Jewish state with new diplomatic and social media ...PAGE 40 debating the zombie donations from serv- strategic opportunities ................. PAGE 20 nuclear agreement ing the aims of violent with Iran ........PAGE 24 extremists ...... PAGE 28 NAME OF SECTION 311 HEALESVILLE – YARRA GLEN ROAD, YARRA GLEN, VIC 3775 +61 3 5962 3311 WWW.TARRAWARRA.COM.AU With Compliments from P O BOX 400 SOUTH MELBOURNE, 3205, AUSTRALIA TELEPHONE: (03) 9695 8700 2 AIR – September 2020 AUSTRALIA/ISRAEL VOLUME 45 No. 9 REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2020 EDITOR’S NOTE NAME OF SECTION his AIR edition’s cover story looks at the implications of the dramatic and unexpected ON THE COVER Tannouncement on Aug. 13 of plans for the normalisation of diplomatic relations On Aug. 13, 2020, Tel Aviv City between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Hall was lit up with the flag of Amotz Asa-El looks at why the UAE normalisation deal is so widely seen as an im- the United Arab Emirates as portant breakthrough in Israel, strategic affairs reporter Yaakov Lappin explores its im- the UAE and Israel announced plications for the wider Middle East, while Israeli columnist Haviv Rettig Gur explains they would be establishing full why the Palestinian reaction to the deal has been so vehement and what the Palestinian diplomatic ties.
    [Show full text]
  • By Olivier Assayas
    BY OLIVIER ASSAYAS A myth in his own lifetime, Carlos is a central figure in the history of international terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, from pro-Palestinian activism to the Japanese Red Army. He was at once both a figure of the extreme left and an opportunistic mercenary in the pay of powerful Middle Eastern secret services. He formed his own organization, based it behind the Iron Curtain and was active during the final years of the Cold War. This film is the story of a revolutionary internationalist, both manipulator and manipulated, carried along by the currents A MAJOR THREE-PART TV DRAMA BY OLIVIER ASSAYAS of contemporary history and his own folly. We follow him to the end of his road, relegated to Sudan where the Islamic dictatorship, after having protected him, handed him over to French authorities. Produced by Daniel Leconte A contradictory character, as violent as the times he embodies, Carlos is also an enigma. That is what we set out to resolve, INTERNATIONAL PRESS Written by Olivier Assayas and Dan Franck at least partially. RICHARD LORMAND world cinema publicity Based on an original idea by Daniel Leconte www.filmpressplus.com Historical consultant Stephen Smith [email protected] In Cannes: With Edgar Ramírez in the role of Carlos PHONE +33 9 7044 9865 / +33-6 2424 1654 STUDIOCANAL INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CAROLINE SAFIR [email protected] CELL +33 6 12 68 59 54 The film CARLOS has been made based on historical and journalistic documentary research. That said, the life of Carlos includes significant CARLOS.CANALPLUS.FR uncharted periods, and thus is the subject of controversy.
    [Show full text]
  • A Palestinian Intellectual History, 1967-1974 Katlyn Maureen
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by The Australian National University Writing the Resistance: A Palestinian Intellectual History, 1967-1974 Katlyn Maureen Quenzer January, 2019 A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University © Copyright by Katlyn Maureen Quenzer 2019 All Rights Reserved Declaration I, Katlyn Maureen Quenzer, declare that this thesis is my own work. No material within it has been has been used for the award of any university degree or that of any higher learning institution. No material within it has been published previously or written by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment has been given. ii Acknowledgments I thank God for giving me the health and wherewithal to carry this project through. Just shy of a year after meeting with Sadik al-Azm, he passed away. His thoughts and generous giving of his time have been indispensable to this thesis, and I am so grateful that I had the opportunity to meet him. Others too have passed, such as Clovis Maksoud. Their work, regardless of one’s approach, continues to be a resource to scholars and anyone with an interest in the Arab—Israeli conflict. I would like to thank the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (CAIS), who made this work possible. I am grateful to Professor Amin Saikal and Dr. Kirill Nourzhanov, who supported my application. I would also like to acknowledge the generous support given to me by the ANU University Research Scholarship as well as the Vice Chancellor Travel Grant.
    [Show full text]
  • Between Vengeance and Retribution: a New View of the Mossad's Most Mysterious Operation
    BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND RETRIBUTION: A NEW VIEW OF THE MOSSAD'S MOST MYSTERIOUS OPERATION Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response (New York: Random House, 2006). Reviewed by Konstantin Eggert As the eight Black September gunmen climbed over the Olympic Village fence in Munich on September 5, 1972, they could hardly imagine the full consequences of their actions. All they wanted was to exchange the hostages for a couple hundred Palestinian inmates in Israeli pris ons. Their intention was to attract as much notice from the press as they could. However, they hardly expected that they would enter into history and would possibly even change its course. Twentyfour hours later most of the terrorists and all of the hostages were dead, while the so called Kitchen Cabinet of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir made a decision to launch a cam paign of retribution unprecedented in its duration and in resources spent, against the Black September organization and, essentially, against the Palestinian leadership as a whole, as well as its international representatives. Up until this point, the famous best seller Vengeance, written by the Canadian author George Jonas and published in 1984, has been considered the main, albeit rather frag mentary, source of information on the subject. Steven Spielberg based his film Munich on that very book. The American director portrays the Mossad agents not as “knights without fear, blemish, and doubt,” but as people who, in the end, begin to question whether their mission is worth all the sacrifice. Precisely this caused the mixed, if not angry, reaction of many in Israel.
    [Show full text]