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Fighting for Control: State-Sponsored Terrorism as Foreign Policy in Cuba and Libya, 1959-2010 by John David Payne OFT L B.A., Brigham Young University (1999) M.A., Brigham Young University (2000) ARCHIVES Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY September 2011 (c) 2011 John David Payne. All rights reserved. The author hereby grants to MIT ssion to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copi this the *sdocument in whole part in any medium now kno or hereafter cre . Signature of Author: U Department of Political Science / 7 September 12, 2011 Certified by: Stephen W. Van Evera Ford International Professor of Political Science Accepted by: Roger D. Petersen Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science Chairman, Graduate Program Committee 7 Fighting for Control: State-Sponsored Terrorism as Foreign Policy in Cuba and Libya, 1959-2010 by John David Payne Submitted to the Department of Political Science on August 30, 2011, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. Abstract In this dissertation, I ask four inter-related questions about state-sponsored terrorism. First, under what conditions do states choose to support foreign terrorist groups? Second, when do sponsor states stop supporting terrorism? Third, how can states which are the targets of terrorism best persuade sponsor states to cease their support? Fourth, how can sponsor states best avoid being held accountable for the actions of their terrorist agents? Building on Byman and Kreps' theoretical model of state-sponsored terrorism as a principal-agent relationship, I propose four hypotheses to answer these questions. First, states sponsor terrorism because they meet three necessary conditions: motivations for conflict, constraints against open conflict, and a perceived lack of accountability. Second, states cease supporting terrorism when any of these conditions changes. Third, states that are the targets of state-sponsored terrorism can best persuade state sponsors to change their behavior by holding them accountable for the actions of their terrorist agents. Fourth, states that sponsor terrorism will be more likely to avoid accountability if they sacrifice both control over their terrorist agents and credit for their agents' successes. These hypothesized answers are tested by examining two in-depth case studies of state- sponsored terrorism, Libya and Cuba during the Cold War. The evidence from these cases is generally congruent with the four hypotheses, with the first and second hypotheses demonstrating the best fit. The cases also yield five prescriptions for policy makers. First, economic sanctions may be more effective than military action at holding sponsor states accountable for the actions of their terrorist agents. Second, multilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions may be more effective than unilateral sanctions, although a single state may be capable of spearheading a successful international policy response. Third, the sponsor state's peers are crucially important in determining the success of target states' efforts. Fourth, better relations with sponsor states mean better leverage. Fifth, politicized application of the labels 'terrorist' and 'state sponsor' robs the terms of their condemnatory power and decreases their utility as rhetorical weapons. States that follow these prescriptions may be successful in persuading state sponsors to cease their sponsorship. Thesis supervisor: Stephen W. Van Evera Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science 4 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................... Chapter ONE THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM AND STATE SUPPORT .9 W hat is terrorism ? ......................... ... 10 Effects and causes of terrorism .................. 16 The impact of state sponsorship ................. 22 What is state-sponsored terrorism? ... .......... .. 28 Why do states support terrorism? ............. .. 33 C onclusion ................................. 39 TWO HYPOTHESES ON STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM .. Delegation and terrorism ....................... M otivations for conflict ....................... Constraints against direct conflict ................ Lack of accountability ........................ Three necessary conditions ..................... C onclusion ................................. THREE CUBA, REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM, AND THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET RESPONSE, 1959-2010 . ........... Modeling state-sponsored terrorism . ... ........... Cuban motivations for conflict ........ ........... Cuba - constrained against conflict ..... Cuba - unaccountable ............... Case study Cuba, 1959-1963 ............. 78 Cuba, 1964-1967 ............. 92 Cuba, 1967-1974 ............. 100 Cuba, 1975-1985 ............. 111 Cuba, 1986-1993 ............. 121 Cuba, 1994-2010 ............. 125 Case analysis and evaluation of the theory 126 Conclusion ....................... 129 FOUR LIBYA, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1969-2010 ............... 133 Terrorism, delegation, and accountability . .134 Libya: Motivated towards conflict ...... 136 Libya: Frustrating constraints ... .. .. .. ... .. ... .. ... .. 14 5 Libya: Perception of unaccountability ........................ 153 Case overview .......................................... 155 Libya and terrorism, 1969-1971 ....................... 156 Libya and terrorism, 1972-1978 ....................... 158 Libya and terrorism, 1979-1987 ....................... 167 Libya and terrorism, 1987-1993 ....................... 180 Libya and terrorism, 1994-2000 ....................... 182 Libya and terrorism, 2001-2010 ....................... 186 Case analysis and evaluation of the theory ..................... 190 Conclusion ............................................ 193 FIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS ................................ 197 Revisiting theoretical hypotheses ............................ 198 Evaluating from the evidence ............................... 201 Generalizing to other cases ................................. 209 Lessons for policym akers .................................. 213 Conclusions ............................................ 217 BIBLIO G RA PH Y .......................................................... 221 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my committee: Stephen W. Van Evera and Fotini Christia of the MIT Political Science Department, and Richard H. Ward, Dean of the Henry C. Lee College of Criminal Justice and Forensic Sciences at the University of New Haven, for their invaluable aid. Appreciation is also due to Roger Petersen of MIT, who helped advise me in the early stages of my research. I am indebted to each of these four scholars and mentors for their inestimable help. Without their patience, thoughtful feedback, and support, this dissertation could never have been completed. I will also be forever grateful for my fellow students from MIT. For the incalculable assistance they rendered to me over the years, I must single out Robert Reardon, Marc R. DeVore, Scott Radnitz, and Jessica Wattman. It is no overstatement to say that they made this dissertation possible through their encouragement, examples, insights, and friendship. They are friends and colleagues in the best senses of both words. I can never repay them. This work was also facilitated by a network of friends too numerous to count. Thank you all for believing in me. In particular, I should thank Xiaolu Hsi and Alison Craig, whose sage advice and kind words guided me through this project. Most of all, I am happy to thank my dear family for their unconditional love and support. Everything that I am, and everything that I have achieved, I owe to my mother and father, David and Grettle Payne. I learned the most important lessons of my life from them, and I can never thank them enough. I am also grateful for the love and friendship of my siblings- Sara, Samuel, Daniel, James, and David- and their spouses and children. Thank you all so much for inspiring me to strive upward. Finally, I would express my eternal gratitude to my wife, JaNae. She did not start this marathon with me, but her love got me over the finish line. Thank you, sweetheart. 8 Chapter One The Problem of Terrorism and State Support Introduction Terrorism is a persistent problem for the United States and many other countries. An important cause of terrorism is state sponsorship- the giving of support to foreign terrorist groups by states. State-sponsored terrorism is an important instrument of foreign policy for many states. State support for terrorist organizations and networks around the world (like state efforts to fight terrorism) also shapes the character of international terrorism. Better understanding why sponsor states support foreign terrorists, and why they cut off this support, will help states which are the targets of terrorism better respond to this problem. This dissertation accordingly asks four inter-related questions. First, why do states sponsor terrorism? Second, what causes sponsor states to cease their support? Third, how best can targets of state-sponsored terrorism persuade sponsor states to cease their support? Fourth, how best can sponsor states avoid accountability? In answer to these four questions, I offer four hypotheses. First, I argue that three conditions are necessary for state sponsorship: states must have a motivation for conflict, constraints