Princeton Diplomatic Invitational 2020

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Committee Chair: Person ‘year Director:

NATO PDI 2020

Contents

Contents ...... 2 Introduction to NATO ...... 3 Topic A: Russia Today ...... 5 Questions to Consider ...... 14 Bibliography A ...... 15 Topic B: Counter-terrorism ...... 15 Questions to Consider ...... 27 Bibliography B ...... 28

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Introduction to NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and political alliance made up of 28 member states throughout Europe and the Americas. First established on

April 4th, 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s creation at the beginning of the

Cold War was an attempt at balancing power between the East and West. More specifically, the rise of Soviet Union following WWII – and the widespread fear of the communism that came without it, especially in Europe – necessitated some form of intergovernmental action that would provide for the mutual protection of several allied nations in the North Atlantic.

As such, NATO’s primary purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through its most unique, enduring principle – the principle of collective defense.

In the North Atlantic Treaty, collective defense is established in Article 5, wherein it is stated that “an armed attack against one or more [members]… shall be considered an attack against them all.”1 However, Article 5 had never been formally invoked until the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. In so doing, the North Atlantic Council – the governing body of the organization – exhibited solidarity toward the US, as well as its power to engage in collective action against counterterrorism. Among other things, this action involved radar aircraft patrol, naval standing forces and efforts to “enhance intelligence- sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies.”

The cooperation and sharing of NATO’s military assets follows both a civilian and a military structure. Of the former, each member state has at its disposal a delegation of permanent representatives, all of which are overseen by the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

1 "The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed September 29, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

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Of the latter, NATO military operations oversee forces placed under the organization’s jurisdiction by individual member states, along with associated command and control structures. These forces are available for NATO operations once they meet a specific set of readiness criteria, as well as rules of deployment that vary from country to country.

In civilian and military matters alike, however, a consensus is taken by common consent.

Since 1949, this principle of consensus has existed at every committee level, meaning that any “NATO decision” passed is an expression of the collective will of the 28 sovereign states participating in the Alliance.2 This system is interesting politically – and rather idiosyncratic on the international stage – seeing as consensus decision-making means there is no voting within NATO. Consultations instead take place until a course of action that is acceptable to all is agreed upon. Surprisingly, this negotiation process happens rapidly since members consult each other on a regular basis. They often can anticipate each other's positions as a result.

2 Nato. "Consensus Decision-making at NATO." NATO. March 14, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm.

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Topic A: Russia and NATO

NATO was originally established to balance power between the Soviet Union and North

Atlantic nations. This meant the mission of NATO was clear and simple, reflected in the brevity of the original document.

The Founding Articles

NATO allies would come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack on a member state under Article 53. The assumption was, from 1949 through 1991 that NATO would most likely face off against the Warsaw Pact in an all-out combined arms land war in continental

Europe and the North Atlantic. During this period, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were directly comparable. The United States and the Soviet Union provided the brunt of the nuclear and conventional forces to their respective sides. Both possessed similar force sizes, though the exact strategic doctrine, quality of troops and preferred tactics varied. The Soviet

Union was expected to use large armored formations to cross the famous Fulda Gap in

Germany and Western Europe. The assumption for NATO and the reality for the Warsaw

Pact was simple. NATO’s ally troops and forward deployed American forces would attempt to hold off the Warsaw Pact for as long as possible before US reinforcements could arrive over the Atlantic route.

In Limbo: the 1990s

In 1991, this situation changed. The Warsaw Pact disintegrated, leaving NATO without its original mission. Since then, the threat has shifted to insurgencies in distant deserts. These threats have been largely intangible, decentralized and highly variable. NATO has also

3 NATO, “Countering Terrorism.”

5 NATO PDI 2020 expanded, adding many former Warsaw Pact states and even the former Baltic Soviet

Republics: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia4.

Russia Resurgent

This last point has not gone unnoticed by NATO’s eastern neighbor. Russia has since

2000 greatly modernized and expanded its military capability5. Russia in 2000 was suffering from a top heavy command structure with too many senior officers, while vital high end equipment atrophied and conscripts were unpaid. The situation has improved drastically.

Military reforms have increased the number of professional troops, new weapons projects, started in the 1990s have been brought to fruition and tactics developed6. Russia now possesses one of the most robust and competitive arms manufacturing industries, behind only the United States in arms exports. The Russian military is capable of carrying out highly coordinated operations close to home: as demonstrated in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in

2014. Capabilities for deployments abroad have also been greatly increased, as the Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War has proven decisive7. For all intents and purposes, Russia is a world power, with a formidable military capability.

Force imbalance

Russia, for all its military capability is still a single nation, operating without a major defensive alliance like NATO. Combined, NATO members possess a larger population, economy and military force. The United States alone outguns Russia in every military metric, at least on paper.

4 Joel R Hillison, “New NATO Members: Security Producers or Consumers.” 5 The Rand Corporatin, “What Will Russian Military Capabilities Look Like in the Future?” 6 The Rand Corporatin. 7 “Putin Announces Russian Troop Withdrawal from Syria during Visit.”

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This strategic situation is unique. An alliance of 29 members against a single large nation creates special risks and opportunities for both sides. NATO is an alliance with varying degrees of integration. Eastern members, closest to Russia possess limited military capabilities, some still are heavily reliant on Soviet era equipment, while spending insufficient sums on defense. Much of NATO’s present mission has been shifted to working on counter- terrorism, with counter-Russian capabilities deteriorating. NATO has stepped in to fill gaps, notably providing an international rotation of jet fighters to the three Baltic States (which do not possess any combat aircraft of their own)8.

Russia meanwhile has largely worked to modernize its military for the position it finds itself in. Russia is not the Soviet Union, neither in size, population or economy. It cannot fight NATO directly in a prolonged conflict. In response, Russia’s economy and scientific expertise has been leveraged to counter this NATO advantage.

On the military side: overlapping grids of anti-air and anti-ship missile coverage can prevent NATO mobilizations and movements of troops and aircraft to the front lines.

Russian missile technology has recently produced highly accurate, effective cruise missiles like the Kalibr family. Also in the news has been the S-400 air defense complex. This system is regarded as among the best in the world for air defense, effective against stealth fighters, enemy cruise missiles and even ballistic missiles9.

In the event of a war, NATO would need time to mobilize and bring its forces to bear from the US and Western Europe. During this time, Russian troops could dig in to forward positions and deploy their area denial systems. These would be more than a match for NATO troops if fully deployed and could give Russia negotiating room.

8 Joel R Hillison, “New NATO Members: Security Producers or Consumers.” 9 Majumdar, “The S-400 for Formidable Air Defense.”

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On the economic side, Russian gas pipelines provide much of Europe’s natural gas, with nations such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria 100% reliant on Russian gas imports.

Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Czechia and Austria are also highly dependent on Russia for their energy needs. Outside of NATO, Ukraine has been hard hit by Russian gas supply cuts10.

In conclusion, while Russia is outmatched in military force, its advantages in mineral resources can be leveraged in the event of a conflict as a force multiplier.

NATO overstep?

So far, this briefing has been from the NATO perspective. For many senior-level NATO policy makers, particularly American military planners, the Russian Federation is a default continuation of the Soviet Union. In other words, Russia picked up where the USSR left off.

The information above should be enough to provide credence that this is not entirely true. So what’ are the criticisms of NATO?

NATO is by nature a defensive alliance. Russian grand strategy has, for centuries, been about putting distance and buffer states between Moscow, Saint-Petersburg and the rest of the Russian heartland and any potential invader. Invasions of Russia tend to be bloody affairs and the suffering is borne by civilians, as was the case during the Mongol conquests,

Napoleonic Wars and Second World War. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the enlargement of NATO, the Soviet Union’s former buffer was eroded11. Russian strategists could quite reasonably could conclude that NATO is encircling Russia for an invasion. Even if unlikely, the possibility of NATO directly bordering Russia means that strategies to stop

10 Polyakova, “Russia Is a Great Power Once Again.” 11 “Russian Mentality.”

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NATO expansion must be decisive. For Russian war planners, a lapse in judgement about potential invasion is unacceptable.

This has been brought up as a likely explanation of the 2008 invasion of Georgia, when the nation was in talks with NATO to join. The reasoning for invasion is simple. To join

NATO, a nation must possess full territorial integrity. During the 2008 war with Russia, the

Georgian breakaway regions of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia were officially recognized by

Russia and have received significant support since. The same can be said for the Donetsk and

Luhansk regions in Ukraine in the ongoing Ukrainian Civil War. Because of this, neither

Georgia nor Ukraine could join NATO at present.

However, given that Russia has only acted in response to NATO, is it possible that the

Georgian and Ukrainian conflicts have been reactive and not assertions of Russian power?

Showing the Imperial Flag

The Soviet Union was known for frequently deploying military forces around the world, conducting visits in friendly socialist states with its navy and air force. The Soviet submarine force even completed a global circumnavigation with a pair of nuclear submarines in 196812. Also frequent, were incursion flights: where Soviet aircraft would fly close to national borders. Most famous were the flights of Soviet nuclear capable Tupelov Tu-95 bombers close to the US border. Modern Russia has seemingly brought back the ports of call, incursion flights and deployments of military hardware abroad for demonstrative purposes.

Russian bombers have visited Cape Town, Caracas and other locations, while the new

Admiral Gorshkov class frigate recently completed a long voyage across the world to various ports of call.

12 Military History Journal, “USSR Report.”

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An American F-22 intercepts a Russian Tu-95 nuclear capable bomber off the Alaskan coast

A Russian Su-27 fighter intercepts an American B-52 nuclear capable bomber over the Baltic Sea

It is absolutely critical to know that the United States and NATO perform these exact same actions. Conduct is almost always safe and professional, a test of capabilities for both sides. No fatal incidents have occurred despite hundreds of intercepts over the past decade.

American bombers and intelligence gathering aircraft regularly fly close to Russian airspace.

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American carrier groups and air squadrons are permanently deployed abroad. This has not gone unnoticed by Russian military officials, who point it out every time NATO accuses

Russia of aggressive behavior.

Cooperation

Despite their differences, NATO and Russia regularly cooperate. Both may send representatives to view the other’s military exercises, a major sign of trust. Both have denounced terrorism and are actively engaged in combatting it abroad. Russian and American troops have a direct hotline for resolving crises in Syria and coordinate to avoid interfering or hitting each other. The NATO-Russia Council exists to address mutual concerns like nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

NATO points of contention:

NATO has several major points of contention with Russian conduct. Chief among them is the 2014 Crimea crisis, in which a largely unrecognized referendum voted that the

Crimean peninsula be reincorporated into Russia. Unmarked Russian soldiers, known as little green men guaranteed that Crimea was held, easily expelling Ukrainian security forces.

The NATO response was fairly quick. France cancelled Russia’s contract for a pair of

Mistral class landing helicopter docks (warships sorely needed by the Russian Navy). The

European Union and United States enacted heavy economic sanctions13.

Also contentious has been the Russian military deployment to Syria, which has largely reversed the course of the war since 2015. This is particularly critical as NATO formerly operated with impunity in conflict zones during the collapse of Yugoslavia and in Iraq, without needing to consider other Great Powers being involved.

13 BBC, “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline - BBC News.”

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The other major issue for NATO is Russian influence on member policies. As mentioned, Russian gas supply directly affects NATO members and their stance on further sanctions. Germany in particular has been noted as being less willing to place sanctions on

Russia due to its high reliance on imported gas. Meanwhile the Russian government has been accused of conducting informational warfare and influencing the media narrative through doctored news articles and other methods.

Russian points of contention:

While Russia is not represented in this committee, the Russian point of view must be understood if relations are to improve.

The major issue for Russia has been the same since 1991. Russia has warned against

NATO expansion into the former Warsaw Pact and other Eastern European states. In 1990, the last Secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev was given the reassurance that after

Germany was unified, there would be “not one step east”. The Eastern bloc states would remain as the buffer Russian strategists considered essential to national security.

Even with this overstep, Putin himself is quoted as considering the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia as the starting point for souring relations. NATO stepping into the

Russian sphere of influence and ignoring Russian interests is a critical point of contention.

Also contentious is the Ukrainian security situation. Ukraine has historically been seen as the “little brother” of Russia, with their two destinies tied by politics. Ukraine in recent years has been less than favorable towards this view, moving towards EU integration and cooperation with NATO. The United States considers Ukraine to be an official ally.

Central to the Ukraine crisis is the Crimean peninsula, considered essential to Russian national security. Crimea is home to both a Russian ethnic majority and the Sevastopol naval base, home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This is a critical base for Russian interests in the

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Middle East and Mediterranean regions14. The Black Sea Fleet is considered as a critical vanguard covering Russia’s southern flank.

In summary, Russia wishes to be viewed as a Great Power and have its security interests respected rather than denounced. It is up to this committee what steps to take next.

Going forward:

Russia is not opposed to strategic cooperation. Above the Arctic Circle, in space and in the realm of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation, Russia is fully willing, able and has cooperated with the United States and other NATO members.

Any discussion will need to take into account the interests of Russia, NATO’s Eastern

European partners and the United States. Russia is part of the European community and despite sanctions still engages in trade, sends students and workers abroad. Whether or not rapprochement will be reached, NATO partners must consider opening discussion on key issues and engaging Russia where discussion can be productive. Rather than denouncing

Russia as a revisionist state, NATO members could consider discussion on nuclear and conventional arms deployment limitations as well as better linking the two entities’ counter- terrorism efforts. Both sides stand to gain from cooperation and effective de-escalation of tensions. Neither Russia nor any NATO member wishes to return to the Cold War state of constant fear.

14 “2018 Russia Military Strength.”

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Key Terms

 Area Denial

 Force Multipliers

 Article V/Collective Defence

 Cyber Warfare/Propaganda

 Great Powers

 The Status quo

 Russian gas exports

 Nuclear disarmnament

 Crimea

 The Black Sea Fleet

Questions to Consider

 How should propaganda and cyber warfare be thwarted on an international scale?

 What should be done with Crimea if it is unrealistic that Russia will ever give it up

peacefully?

 Should Ukraine ever be considered for NATO membership?

 Should the United States be involved in European affairs with Russia at all?

 What readiness action plans can be put into effect during ‘peacetime’ or proxy wars, if

at all?

 How should NATO utilize its standing forces/other military means in relation to the

Baltics and the Eastern flank in response to new Russian weapons systems?

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 Consider revisiting the North Atlantic Treaty once more. What changes could be made

to the existing institutional framework of the Alliance to better adapt it to the present

relationship with Russia?

Bibliography A

“2018 Russia Military Strength.” Accessed January 23, 2019. https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength- detail.asp?country_id=russia. BBC. “Ukraine Crisis: Timeline - BBC News,” November 13, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275. Joel R Hillison. “New NATO Members: Security Producers or Consumers.” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, January 4, 2009. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11539?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&sear chText=nato&searchText=free&searchText=riders&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBas icSearch%3FQuery%3Dnato%2Bfree%2Briders&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC- 4929%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3A5ecfb83253dee5354a8a23be07751d18&seq =9#metadata_info_tab_contents. Majumdar, Sayan. “The S-400 for Formidable Air Defense.” Vay Aerospace and Defence Review, no. 4 (August 2018): 41–43. Military History Journal. “USSR Report.” Springfield VA: US Department of Commerce, August 15, 1986. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a359706.pdf. NATO. “Countering Terrorism.” Multinational Organization. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 12, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm. Polyakova, Alina. “Russia Is a Great Power Once Again.” The Atlantic, February 26, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/russia-syria-putin- assad-trump-isis-ghouta/554270/. BBC. “Putin Announces Russian Troop Withdrawal from Syria during Visit,” December 11, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42307365. PravdaReport. “Russian Mentality: Uncertainty and Fatalism,” March 26, 2002. http://www.pravdareport.com/news/russia/26-03-2002/36195-0/. The Rand Corporatin. “What Will Russian Military Capabilities Look Like in the Future?” The Rand Corporation, June 18, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10038.html.

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Topic B: Counter-terrorism

Introduction

Countering terrorism is, and always has been, an enduring security priority for NATO and its constituent nations. From the 1972 hostage situation at the Olympic Games in

Munich, to the infamous Lockerbie attack that killed over 200, terrorism has remained embedded in the psyche of the western world.15 However, although the intimidating specter of terrorism has always remained a constant, such cannot be said for the the structure, tactics, and goals of the organizations that perpetrate terrorism. In the past two decades, the nature of terrorism has evolved dramatically. Modern terrorist organizations are decentralized, diffuse, and play by a different set a rules than those of the 20th and early 21st centuries. In order to combat these emergent threats, NATO will need to entirely rethink the way it approaches terrorism. The organization will need to develop a different set of principles and strategies to ensure that NATO remains a relevant and effective security coalition for years to come.

History of Terrorism

The word terrorism dates back to the mid-18th century, when Maxmilien Robespierre instigated a “Reign of Terror” immediately following the French revolution. Robespierre believed in the use of terrorism as a way to carry out dramatic societal reforms.16 This idea of using violence as a form of ideological control was novel at the time, and laid the basis for the modern conception of terrorism.

15 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Pan Am flight 103 disaster", accessed October 01, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/Pan-Am-flight-103-disaster. 16

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However, terrorism under Robespierre’s formulation is carried out by a state actor, whereas modern perpetrators of terrorism are overwhelmingly non-state actors. This transition from state to non-state actors did not occur until the mid 20th century, when ethnic nationalism, combined with the rejection of European colonialism and the rise of differing ideologies such as communism led to the increasing use of guerilla tactics and other forms of rebellious violence. For example, the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) employed terrorist tactics in Turkey in an attempt form an independent Kurdish State. The Irish

Republican Army (IRA) carried out bombing and assassinations in Ireland with the purpose of separating from Great Britain, and the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers used suicide bombings to wage an ethnic war against the incumbent Sri Lankan government.17 It was clear that terrorism had evolved beyond its roots in the 18th century. It had become an instrument for political usurpation; no longer a tool to be used by the state, but rather a tool to be used against it.

Terrorism took on another new dimension with the advent of mass-air travel in the mid-19th century. The 1960’s saw the rise of new forms of terrorism such as hijackings, airplane bombings, and attacks on foreign territory. Terrorist organizations were no longer relegated to the domestic affairs of any individual country: their attacks were often carried out overseas, and with motivations that transcended national boundaries. The infamous Munich

Massacre encapsulated this transformation perfectly. In the midst of the 1972 Munich

Olympic Games the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September infiltrated the

Olympic village, taking nine Israeli hostages.18 The terrorists demanded the release of a

17 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Irish Republican Army (IRA)", accessed October 01, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Irish-Republican-Army. 18 Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who-gsg-9-8476291

17 NATO PDI 2020 number of Palestinian political prisoners, and when their demands were not met, proceeded to massacre all of the Israeli hostages. Many contend that the German police, unprepared and ill-equipped to properly handle a terrorist situation, committed a number of tactical blunders that directly led to the tragic ending of the standoff.19

The tragedy of the 1972 Munich Olympics was a watershed moment for the international community. First, the massacre served as a reminder that terrorism had become a truly global phenomenon. Terrorists now had the capabilities to make dramatic and symbolic statements on the most prominent of global stages. It wasn’t until the Munich

Massacre that the world regarded terrorist attacks as theatrical or dramatic in nature, and this shift in perspective would set the precedent for future high-profile attacks such as the 1988

Lockerbie bombing and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. But the

19 Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm

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Munich Olympics didn’t just highlight the rapidly evolving capabilities of terrorist organizations, it also revealed how ill-prepared the international community was to check these new capabilities. The words “counter-terrorism” and “international terrorism” were never in the political lexicon of the United States until the Munich Massacre.20 Germany lacked an official counterterrorism unit at the time of the Munich Massacre, and its local police forces were woefully underprepared to face a terrorist threat. The massacre directly led to the creation of an official German counterterrorism agency: GSG-9, and other countries quickly followed suit.21 The late 20th century was when countries started taking the terrorist threat seriously- as not just isolated domestic guerillas, but as ideologically motivated and dangerously capable transnational organizations.

Throughout this dramatic evolution of terrorism, NATO had remained relatively stagnant. Even as the terrorism threat further evolved at the turn of the century to include religiously motivated groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, the organization was sluggish to respond. In 1999, NATO adopted a strategic concept that identified terrorism as a risk affecting its member nations. However, no formal measures to combat terrorism were agreed upon at the summit.

Counter-terrorism momentum picked up in the organization after the September 11 attacks on the United States. In the days following the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 –its mutual defense clause- for the first time in its history. Under Article 5, any attack on a NATO member is an attack on the entire alliance, compelling the entire coalition to come to the assistance of the United States through security operations such as Operation Eagle Assist and

20 Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm 21 Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who-gsg-9-8476291

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Operation Active Endeavor.22 In 2002, NATO adopted the “Prague Package”, aimed at “adapting

NATO to the challenge of international terrorism”. The package adopted four pillars that constituted NATO’s comprehensive response to the emerging threat of terrorism: anti- terrorism (reducing the vulnerability of civil and military elements to terrorist attacks), offensive counter-terrorism, consequence management, and military cooperation. Subsequent summits have served to reinforce these themes. For example, in 2004 NATO launched the

Defense Against Terrorism (DAT) initiative, which utilized technology in helping NATO develop countermeasures for asymmetric terrorist threats.

The evolution of terrorism did not stop at the conclusion of the 20th century. The terrorist threat continues to evolve today, and has taken on a number of unique characteristics that did not exist in the 9/11 era.

First and foremost, the balance of power between the major Islamist terrorist organizations has changed dramatically. Fourteen years ago, al Qaeda was the “undisputed heavyweight among jihadist groups”. Now however, the organization faces increasing competition from groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Hezbollah. In

2014, al Qaeda released a video lecture that railed against ISIS, claiming that they do not acknowledge ISIS’ Caliphate as the true Caliphate of Islam.23 This very fact that this video was made demonstrates the dynamic between the jihadist organizations has shifted: al Qaeda is being put on the defensive, while ISIS is becoming recognized as the primary jihadist organization.

22 Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01- The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf 23 Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10, 2015. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/

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Map of ISIS’ Territorial Holdings in 2016

Tangentially related to ISIS’ rise to prominence is the fact that in its heyday

(2014/2015), it organized itself into a de-facto state entity. Though the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda have historically controlled limited swaths of territory in the Middle East, none have controlled as much land, and administered it in the organized and institutionalized way that ISIS did at its peak. Within its territory, ISIS provided utilities, basic social services, courts, and enforces the rule of law.24 Though the international community largely refused to recognize ISIS as a state, for all intents and purposes, the group was indeed running one.

This behavior marked a substantial departure from the terrorist organizations of the 20th century, which were predominantly non-state actors, and provided ISIS several key

24 Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785/isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism

21 NATO PDI 2020 advantages. Nick Rasmussen of the United States National Counterterrorism Center contended that ISIS’ creation of a de-facto state provided it the necessary ingredients to develop substantial “external operations capability”. The creation of a state provided a “save- haven” for terrorists and provides them with valuable manpower and financial resources.

Fortunately for NATO, ISIS was beaten back from 2015 onwards, and it lost its capital of

Raqqa in 2017. In November 2017, ISIS’s last Syrian and Iraqi landholdings were captured by other forces. Still, the existence of de-facto terrorist states (albeit at a much smaller scale) in other unstable parts of the world (especially parts of Afghanistan and Yemen) means that terrorists continue to have deeply-entrenched bases for planning overseas attacks. Developing proper countermeasures to meet the enhanced capabilities of a state-based terrorist organization will be of crucial importance for NATO.

The basic structure of the terrorist organization has changed as well. Once highly centralized and hierarchical, the chain of command has become highly diffuse and decentralized.25 For example, from an operational standpoint, ISIS operates not as one coordinated body, but as a series of independent nodes. These nodes are self-financing, self- directed, and granted a large degree of autonomy by ISIS’ governing body.26 This allows individual operations to be conducted across the broad swath of ISIS territory at an alarmingly fast pace. It also makes ISIS particularly difficult to destabilize, as eliminating a high-level official in a “decapitation strike,” or degrading the capabilities of one node leaves the rest of the organization completely unaffected. This decentralized system of authority allows ISIS to be flexible, adaptable, and resilient to the sustained counterterrorism efforts of

25 McChrystal, Stanley. “Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World”, Print. May 12, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2016. 26 Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785/isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism

22 NATO PDI 2020 the international community. Other terrorist organizations, like Al-Qaeda, have also begun adopting these tactics as their leaders have become increasingly vulnerable to US drone strikes. Indeed, despite the 2011 assassination of Osama bin Laden and the 2019 killing of

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in addition to countless other strikes against top terrorists, groups like

ISIS and al-Qaeda remain stubbornly dangerous. NATO will need to evolve new strategies to help address the challenges of combatting these decentralized leadership structures.

Also worthy of note is the evolving nature of terrorist attacks against NATO member nations. The previously discussed attacks of the late 20th and early 21st centuries all involved a substantial amount of planning and coordination. Bombings and strikes against major targets like the Olympics required substantial funding, leadership, and advance preparation.

However, in response to the comprehensive counterterrorism security measures mandated by

NATO agreements, such as the “Prague Package,” terrorist organizations have been forced to evolve. In recent years, they have become less reliant on highly-coordinated attacks such as

Lockerbie and 9/11, and more dependent on so-called “inspired” or “lone-wolf attacks”.27

ISIS in particular makes extensive use of social media to encourage overseas converts to conduct their own homegrown attacks. The transition towards using these attacks has significant implications for the nature of terrorism: attacks are now far more frequent and less spectacular. ISIS is now able to leverage media channels to inspire self-radicalized people from all over the western world.28

Weapons have shifted from complex bombs and military weaponry towards simple everyday tools like rental trucks, knives, and commercially-available firearms. The targets of these attacks have changed as well. Instead of going after highly-guarded places like airplanes

27 Ibid 28 Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10, 2015. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/

23 NATO PDI 2020 and skyscrapers, these “inspired” radicals often target street fairs or even just crowded sidewalks. Admittedly, these new attacks do not net anywhere near the death toll of a bombing or hijacking, but they are frequent and extremely difficult for national intelligence services to anticipate. Nick Rasmussen believes that these evolving tactics provide law enforcement “far less time to disrupt or mitigate potential plots”, and this presents a great challenge for NATO’s future anti-terrorism efforts.29

NATO has also identified a number of emerging threats posed by terrorist organizations. In a report prepared by the Assistant Secretary-General, NATO identified several areas of global infrastructure and development that it believes will become key terrorist objectives in the future. For example, NATO believes that the rising demand of strategic resources such as energy will compel terrorist organizations to disrupt or seize control of such infrastructure.30 NATO also believes that shipping lanes, particularly narrow bottleneck straits such as The Strait of Malacca will also become high-value targets for terrorists.31

Beyond the social media capabilities of organizations such as ISIS, NATO also believes that terrorist organizations are looking into more advanced forms of technological warfare. Namely, NATO believes that cyber-terrorism and cyber-attacks could fit in extremely well with the “strategic-level objectives of terrorists”.32 Though it is currently estimated that terrorists do not have the capabilities to conduct large-scale cyberattacks as of

29 Gordon, Phillip H, “NATO’s Growing Role in the Middle East.” The Brookings Institution, March 1, 2006, accessed September 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/natos-growing-role-in-the-greater-middle- east/ 30 Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01- The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf 31 Ibid 32 Ibid

24 NATO PDI 2020 yet, this situation may quickly change in the future as terrorist organizations develop more advanced technological capabilities.

Though a comprehensive NATO framework for meeting these evolving threats has yet to be developed, nearly all agree that any course of action must involve the organization evolving beyond its original mission as a reactive security coalition. The NATO Assistant

Secretary-General noted that in order to afford its member states credible and effective protection, the organization must become “more of a team player”.33 This means that NATO must transform from a defense alliance into a “multi-faceted security organization”.34 It cannot sit idly waiting for one of its member nation to be attacked, it must take proactive steps to ensure that such an attack is never allowed to happen in the first place. This may include initiatives such as intelligence sharing, multilateral consultations, preventative social programs, and coordinating with other international partners or coalitions.

Country Policy

Economically Advanced Western Democracies (e.g. France, United States, U.K.)

With substantial economic and political clout, these countries are at the forefront of NATO, and as such are prime targets for potential terrorist attacks. From the Pulse shooting in

Orlando, to the truck massacre in Nice, France, the most high-profile attacks are often perpetrated against these countries. Hence, this bloc of highly developed countries would be more willing to commit significant financial resources in evolving NATO’s capabilities and developing it into a proactive security-based organization.

33 Ibid 34 Ibid

25 NATO PDI 2020

Eastern European and Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, etc.)

Most of these countries were former members of the Warsaw Pact, and many suffer from chronic economic and political instability. It is important to consider that though transitioning NATO into a more proactive organization would likely have security-related benefits, it would also be expensive, dramatically expand the organization, and mandate certain actions that might be seen as compromising national sovereignty, such as intelligence sharing. Because high-profile terrorist attacks seldom occur in these Eastern European countries, they may be less willing to transition the organization into an enhanced security partnership.

Key Terms

 Terrorism

 Decentralization

 “Lone-wolf” attacks

 Al-Qaeda

 Hezbollah

 ISIS

 Taliban

 Article 5

 Prague Package

 Defense Against Terrorism (DAT)

 Assymetric warfare

26 NATO PDI 2020

Questions to Consider

 In what ways has terrorism evolved since the 20th century?

 The United States has set a precedent for invoking Article 5 in the event of a terrorist

attack, even if it is perpetrated by a non-state actor. Should this precedent continue?

 What are some of the specific terrorism-related policy proposals that NATO adopted

after the September 11 attacks? How effective have they been?

 Can you anticipate other valuable strategic targets that terrorists may be inclined to

attack in the future?

 How will terrorism capabilities evolve in the future? Where will they be at five years

from now? Ten years? How can NATO best anticipate and meet these enhanced

capabilities?

 Should every country maintain a specialized counterterrorism police force?

 How can NATO best degrade the capabilities of decentralized and diffuse

organizations such as ISIS?

 Should NATO evolve into a proactive security-based coalition? What competing

factors are at play, and how do these factors align with the priorities of your country?

 Which non-NATO countries would be strategically valuable for NATO to work with?

27 NATO PDI 2020

Bibliography B

Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Irish Republican Army (IRA)", accessed October 01, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Irish-Republican-Army. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Pan Am flight 103 disaster", accessed October 01, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/Pan-Am-flight-103-disaster. Gordon, Phillip H, “NATO’s Growing Role in the Middle East.” The Brookings Institution, March 1, 2006, accessed September 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/natos-growing- role-in-the-greater-middle-east/. Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. Accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01-The_New_Strategic_ Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf. Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who- gsg-9-8476291 Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/ McChrystal, Stanley. “Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World”, Print. May 12, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2016. Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785 /isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism. Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/o d/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm.

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