Imperial Narratives and the United States Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924

“THE LAND OF BULLET HOLES”: IMPERIAL NARRATIVES AND THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1916-1924

A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by Patrice Nicole Laurent May 2019

Examining Committee Members:

Dr. Mónica Ricketts, Advisory Chair, Department of History Dr. Richard Immerman, Emeritus Faculty Department of History Dr. Alan McPherson, Department of History Dr. Harvey R. Neptune, Department of History Dr. Hiram Aldarondo, Department of Spanish and Portuguese

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines US media representations of Dominicans during the

American occupation of the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 1924. It argues that

American media images of the Dominican Republic changed to accommodate US government policy. For example, when there was interest in annexing the country in the mid-1800s, those who were in favor of annexation depicted Dominicans as white in order to demonstrate that they could be integrated into the United States. In the early 1900s, however, when the United States wanted to prevent foreign powers from intervening in the Dominican Republic, US media representations of Dominicans were overwhelmingly black to show the need for American oversight of financial matters. Whether depicted as black or white, this dissertation argues that the primary lens the US media employed to represent Dominicans was that of underdevelopment. Subsumed within this imperial narrative of underdevelopment were malleable depictions of race and, by 1916, a new element of humanitarianism that operated under the assumption that the Dominican

Republic was underdeveloped and thus in need of American guidance. Lastly, this dissertation examines the shift in the US media in 1920 as American sources began to critique the occupation.

To Yukiko, my ever-faithful companion.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Without the love and support of friends and family, this dissertation would not have been possible. I will forever owe a debt of gratitude to those who encouraged and inspired me: Dr. Joanne Lucena for her fierce love and eternal guidance, Dr. Giuseppina

Russo for her help in reorganizing this in the final hour, Dr. Jason Knirck for always being my advisor and mentor even when not my official advisor, Dr. Monica D’Antonio for her spirit and explanation of the intricacies of the English language over bottles of red wine on a street in Arzua, and all of my colleagues in the History department at

Montgomery County Community College who have been my cheering section over the last seven years. Thank you to the members of my committee for your advice and insight as well as the College of Liberal Arts for a travel grant to present this research. I would be remiss not to acknowledge my children who have provided me with emotional support throughout this process: Yuki, Abba, and my dearly departed Reef. Lastly, Dory

Chaefsky, the love of my life, thank you for getting me through the “ring of fire” during the final months of this this project, you will forever have my heart.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT ...... ii

DEDICATION ...... iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION: “THE LAND OF BULLET HOLES” ...... 1

2. FROM BLACK TO WHITE: TRANSFORMING DOMINICANS ...... 36

3. “UNCLE SAM’S PERIODICAL BAD MAN” ...... 70

4. A PRIMITIVE PEOPLE, AN UNDEVELOPED ISLAND ...... 100

5. HUMANITARIANISM, “THE MASTER NARRATIVE” ...... 130

6. SEEING BEYOND THE HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE ...... 163

7. INTERPRETING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM ...... 194

8. CONCLUSION: AN ENDURING LEGACY ...... 227

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 248

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: “THE LAND OF BULLET HOLES”

Advertised in the Marine Corps Gazette in August 1931 as a story about helping

“the little sister republic . . . on the way to an existence of peaceful pursuits without the aid of revolutions,” William Wendell Flewelling’s book Bad Hombre was a tale of love, banditry, and the necessity of American mediation in the Dominican Republic.1 As a former marine stationed on the island during the US occupation, Flewelling utilized his experiences as the basis for a work of fiction that mirrored the dominant American interpretation of the need for foreign intervention in places such as the Caribbean. Set after the American withdrawal in 1924, Flewelling’s account told of a Dominican

Republic not quite at the point of stability, but surely on its way with the help of a small contingent of Americans who were working with the Policía Nacional. In Flewelling’s novel a few bandits still ran free in the eastern Seibo province, most notably Ramón

Natera who was the “bad hombre” for which the book was entitled. In reality, Natera was a bandit leader during the occupation, but a rival shot him in 1920 before US forces were able to capture him.2 Able to outsmart the “Americanos” during the occupation,

Natera was public enemy number one for Captain Philip Kent, an American working with

1 “Bad Hombre,” Marine Corps Gazette 16, issue 2 (August 1931).

2 On Natera see Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), esp. 169-180. Alan McPherson added that Natera was one of the few bandits with a nationalist agenda. See Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Political Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 70-71.

the Dominican police. In Bad Hombre, Kent was the hero time and again, not only protecting Dominicans from the wrath of Natera but also ultimately saving the life of a young Spanish woman, Juanita Canelon.

Canelon’s love for Kent allegedly drew from a deeper font of admiration for the

United States. Canelon viewed the United States as a land of promise. At the beginning of the novel, she saw the Statue of Liberty when her ship sailed past New York on its way to the Dominican Republic. As the image overtook her, she pondered on the

“millions of progressive people” living there. Though Canelon admitted that she had never met an American before, her opinions about them were solidly grounded: “I have read so much about them – their work, their aims, and the good they have done in this world; especially for the smaller helpless nations.” Additionally, she stated that her cousin Rafael lived in New York and as a result had been notably altered: “I noticed particularly how splendidly changed he was – so resolute, so democratic, but best of all, so full of fun.”3 Here, Flewelling emphasized the transformative power of the United

States and its enlightened attitude. As Canelon made clear, the United States was ultimately a benevolent force, progressive in every way, with the ability to completely alter people and assist the “smaller helpless nations.”

Canelon’s song of praise echoed throughout the book as Flewelling described

Americans completely dedicated to their altruistic objectives. On approaching Santo

Domingo by sea, Canelon saw the wreckage of the USS Memphis, an image that saddened her greatly: “‘It seems so unfortunate,’ she remarked with casual concern, ‘so

3 William Wendell Flewelling, Bad Hombre (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1931), 11, 14.

unnecessary, that a few of the brave Americano sailors should lose their lives so close to land – and yet, how noble their death sacrificing themselves for others.’” The US Navy sent the Memphis to the Dominican Republic in July 1916 to protect American interests in the wake of revolution. On 29 August, a storm hit the island and numerous tsunami waves hit the Memphis, driving it to the bottom of the harbor and then into nearby cliffs.

Forty-three men lost their lives that day. By discussing the wreck of the Memphis,

Flewelling appealed to his readers’ sense of patriotism by emphasizing that these were the noble deaths of Americans who were innocently trying to better a foreign republic and paid the ultimate price. Like Christ, they were martyrs, as Flewelling described the wreckage, “the forward fighting top of the warship, looking not unlikes a great cross, securely in place; a fitting monument to its deceased warriors.”4

Novels like Bad Hombre succinctly demonstrated the imperial narrative that was a crucial component of the US occupation of the Dominican Republic. Canelon’s praise for the United States expressed the notion that America had the obligation to transform backwards nations. In fact, all of Flewelling’s descriptions of Dominicans in Bad

Hombre pointed to a barbarous people, more animal than human. This reinforced the notion of primitiveness and suggested not only that Dominicans needed the unsavory elements of their population (men like Natera) neutralized but also that the people in general needed paternalistic guidance. The way in which Canelon spoke about the

United States was almost entrancing as if American values like democracy and progress were able to penetrate one’s being and completely alter a person as they had her cousin

Rafael.

4 Flewelling, Bad Hombre, 13. 3

From the outset of the novel, Flewelling informed his readers that US actions in the Dominican Republic constituted a noble cause. Views such as this permeated

American opinions before, during, and after the intervention, demonstrating that this occupation was not one limited to battles on the ground between bandits and marines, but one that was vehemently waged in novels, travel literature, newspaper reports, and magazine articles as Americans justified their actions while simultaneously informing the public. Embedded within news reports, works of fiction, and glossy pictorials were a set of images about the Dominican Republic and its people as well as ideological values about America’s actions abroad.

Representations of the Dominican Republic in the American media are the central theme of this study with particular attention paid to the fictive world the American media created by privileging some narratives, especially underdevelopment, and manipulating others, such as race and culture. This world was the essential foundation upon which

America’s hold over the Dominican Republic sustained itself and garnered public support until challenges emerged in the American media against the United States’s own narrative of humanitarianism in 1920. This dissertation follows Michel Foucault’s idea that “each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true.” In the case of the Dominican

Republic, the “truth” about the conditions of the country or the characteristics of its inhabitants depended on economic and political factors, one of Foucault’s essential traits contributing to the creation of truth. Additionally, this dissertation privileges the novel, travel literature as well as articles in magazines and newspapers to understand how

“diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption” propagated representations of

the Dominican Republic that served America’s economic and political needs.5

Furthermore, the work of Edward Said on the collision between the media and empire informs this dissertation. In Orientalism, Said argues that binary representations of the

Orient reduced the Middle East to essentialized characteristics. Furthermore, they aided in the creation of both an Orient and an Occident – two diametric opposites.6 In his later work, Culture and Imperialism, Said maintains that imperialism and the novel shared a close relationship in which certain narratives emerged and others were silenced. The brilliance of this association was “the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging,” – what Said argues is one of the main connections between culture and imperialism.7 Additionally, Culture and Imperialism asserts the notion that

5 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 131. Mary Louise Pratt expounds on the connection between travel literature and the economic needs of imperial powers. See Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992). For more on the intersection between travel literature and empire see Steve Clark, ed., Travel Writing and Empire: Postcolonial Theory in Transit (New York: Zed Books, 1999). On the development of the genre of travel literature see Percy Adams, Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1983).

6 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). On Orientalism and American Empire see Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Sharon Delmendo, The Star-Entangled Banner: One Hundred Years of America in the Philippines (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004); Allan Punzalan Isaac, American Tropics: Articulating Filipino America (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

7 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), xiii. Shelley Streeby has demonstrated the confluence of literary works and US imperial ventures on mid-nineteenth century American culture. See Shelley Streeby, American Sensations: Class, Empire, and the Production of Popular Culture (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).

imperialism penetrates metropolitan culture, in almost imperceptible ways – from a

“shadowy presence” to an “outright concern.”8 This dissertation utilizes Said’s theories as basis for exploring the imagery about the Dominican Republic as sources emphasized

Hispanic heritage or African descent depending on the goals of the time. Furthermore, the American media’s creation of specific imagery centered around the concept of underdevelopment reveals not only what Americans thought about the Dominican

Republic, but in turn, what they thought about themselves and their role in the world.

Additionally, this dissertation employs the work of scholars of media studies who explore the various ways in which the media creates and reinforces both meaning and definitions. In his study of the press and violence in the United States, John Nerone shows the dual purpose of the media. On one hand, the press directs messages at a target audience with the intention of producing a desired result; for example, a story lauding the political promises of a presidential candidate with the expectation of attracting voters.

On the other hand, Nerone argues that this same story defines readers – in the case of the presidential candidate, it is labeling those reading the article as voters and citizens.9 In this way, the press not only communicates information to its audience but also defines that audience by categorizing them in various ways – as voters, citizens, consumers, etc.

Likewise, this dissertation posits that in the case of American intervention in the

8 Said, Culture and Imperialism, xvi-xvii. Working from Said’s premises, other scholars have demonstrated the intimate connection between empire and the metropole. See Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, eds., At Home With Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

9 John Nerone, Violence Against the Press: Policing the Public Sphere in US History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 14.

Dominican Republic, the media not only defined Dominicans in very specific ways

(immature, unstable, insolvent) but also in turn, fashioned those Americans reading these stories into humanitarians saving a backwards people through occupation forces.

Furthermore, as Michael Parenti demonstrates, the press has the power to set agendas and to define what the public believes, accepts, or rejects allowing them to reinforce certain ideological values.10 In his work on journalism, communication, and theory, James

Carey succinctly put it: “Journalism provides audiences with models for action and feeling, with ways to size up situations, and it shares these qualities with all literary acts.”11

Though the occupation of the Dominican Republic began in 1916, the United

States’s interest in the eastern portion of the island dated to the mid-nineteenth century, providing Americans with decades of depictions of the Dominican Republic to choose from to suit policy needs. Approaching the topic of the occupation by examining the

American media over a century before the occupation reveals the importance of representations of both Dominicans and Americans in this imperial project.12 This dissertation argues that the media’s shifting narrative about Dominicans, especially the

10 Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: Politics and the Mass Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), ix.

11 James Carey, “The Problem of Journalism History,” in James Carey: A Critical Reader, eds. Eve Stryker Munson and Catherine A. Warren (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 91.

12 In this dissertation, the term media is employed to refer to published works whether books, magazines, or newspapers – material that serves as a filter to inform and instruct readers as to how they should view events, people, and ideas. See Parenti, Inventing Reality, ix; Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of Mass Media (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 1-2.

mutability of their race and culture throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reflected changes in American foreign policy. The American media made

Dominicans white when they desired annexation and black when they did not, focusing on Hispanic origins to indicate potential and African ancestry to denote incapacity.

During the occupation, however, American sources did not alter their depictions of

Dominicans because there were no major shifts in policy. Rather than focus on race, one major narrative operated over the centuries in the American media: underdevelopment.

Underdevelopment drew from a long history of representing Dominicans as backward and uncivilized. As a part of this, humanitarianism came to serve as a way justifying

American objectives in the country and conquer underdevelopment. Humanitarianism reflected more what America thought about itself than Dominicans.13 By portraying

America’s efforts as a humanitarian mission of uplift, the media reinforced underdevelopment by creating a Dominican Republic in desperate need of outside assistance because of countless revolutions, political graft, and a general malaise that left the island a wasteland. The country was, as one author called it, “The Land of Bullet

Holes,” a place devoid of political stability without the paternalistic guidance of the

13 On humanitarianism see Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963); Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008); Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Julia Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Stephen R. Porter, Benevolent Empire: US Power, Humanitarianism, and World’s Dispossessed (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

United States.14 However, by elevating the humanitarian angle as the primary motivation of the United States, once media reports challenged this altruism in 1920, American officials quickly began creating an exit strategy. Questioning humanitarianism certainly was not the only cause for the end of the occupation. However, anxiety over America’s reputation in Latin American factored prominently in the discussion to draw up withdrawal plans. This anxiety along with the post-war depression and the mounting costs of maintaining a military government prompted the end of the occupation in the summer of 1924.

Colonialism, Independence, and the Dominican Republic

From the outset of interactions between the island of Hispaniola and outsiders,

Western observers viewed both the people and the landscape through a very distinct lens depending on their agenda and interests. In search of the lands of Asia and India,

Columbus and his crew arrived on the island he christened Española in December of

1492. He recorded his initial impressions:

For these people of this land are the most docile and timorous and of good disposition . . . All [their] acts are like those of children, except for the fact that they are men, and nature prevents them from being such. And any act they witness, they do as they see others do; because if someone steals or does wrong, it is just as happens with children. They are [mentally] subtle, for they then go and do what they have seen done.15

14 In his 1920 travelogue, Henry Franck entitled his chapter on the Dominican Republic, “The Land of Bullet Holes.” See Henry Franck, Roaming through the West Indies (New York: The Century Company, 1920).

15 Columbus, quoted in Nicolás Wey Gómez, The Tropics of Empire: Why Columbus Sailed South to the Indies (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008), 408-409.

Attributing child-like qualities to the native Taíno, Columbus was the first to document

European impressions of the indigenous people of the island. Columbus’s observations about these people, according to historian Nicolás Wey Gómez, were based on a long history of “assigning unique physiologies, characters, and mores (customs)” to groups based on their locations that imparted “unique positions in a hierarchy of polities” and specific “roles in a teleological history.”16 This environmental determinism, present since the initiation of European colonization in the Americas, had its roots in the writings of ancient authors like Hippocrates, Aristotle, Vitruvius, Pliny the Elder, Ptolemy, Albu

Masar, Avicenna, and Averroës.17

From the initial encounter between Columbus and the Taíno, a pattern emerged in which colonizers attempted to categorize the colonized, postulating on the nature, role, and capabilities of indigenous people. In the colonial period, this deliberation was most aptly represented in the debate between theologian and scholar Juan Gínes de Sepúlveda and friar Bartolomé de las Casas.18 In 1550 a royal commission gathered in the Spanish

16 Wey Gómez, The Tropics of Empire, 69.

17 On these ancient writers and ethnology see Denis E. Cosgrove, Apollo’s Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

18 On the debate see Lewis Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study of Race Prejudice in the Modern World (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1959); Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974). Both Anthony Pagden and Joyce Chaplin also discuss European ideas about the natives of the America. See Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Joyce Chaplin, Subject Matter: Technology, the Body, and Science on the Anglo-American Frontier, 1500-1676 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 10

city of Valladolid to discuss how the conquest of the Americas could be accomplished

“justly and in good conscience.”19 Rather than focus on the issue at hand, however, the conversation devolved into a heated contest between Sepúlveda and Las Casas about the characteristics of the natives of the New World. A former colonist turned Dominican friar, Las Casas upheld the belief that the conquest of the natives was both unjust and inhumane while Sepúlveda maintained that the indigenous people of the Americas were savages who committed horrible crimes against nature, including cannibalism and human sacrifice. In Sepúlveda’s opinion, the barbarous nature of the natives justified Spain’s war against them and their enslavement.20 Las Casas chronicled his main points in A

Brief Relation of the Destruction of the Indies, later published in 1552. The work was an attempt to reveal to Prince Philip II the appalling atrocities committed against the natives of the New World by his Spanish subjects. In addition, Las Casas portrayed the natives as good-natured, gracious, and submissive.

Though Las Casas’s intent was to create a change in New World policies, A Brief

Relation of the Destruction of the Indies served quite a different purpose in the hands of

Spain’s opponents. For those living in the Low Countries who found themselves under

Spanish control beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, the words of Las Casas about the

Spaniards’ behavior imparted the idea that characteristics like belligerence, intolerance, and cruelty were innately Spanish. By the late 1570s, translated editions of Las Casas’s

19 Rolena Adorno, The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 63.

20 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth Century Atlantic World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 173. 11

account appeared in French and Flemish with the following notice for their readers: “To serve as example and warning to the seventeen provinces of the Low Countries.”21 After these early editions, A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies appeared in Dutch,

French, English, German, Italian, and Latin by the end of the seventeenth century, forming the basis of the Black Legend or la leyenda negra.22 This propaganda was spread by Spain’s economic, political, and religious rivals who claimed that the manner in which Spain acquired its empire, its treatment of people during the Inquisition, and its interactions with the indigenous people of the Americas all revealed a deeply flawed, barbaric culture. This amounted to a “typological emblem of religious and political intolerance, tyranny, misrule, conspiracy, cruelty, barbarity, bloodthirstiness, backwardness, slothfulness, and degeneracy.”23 Some scholars challenge the notion that

Las Casas is to blame for the origin of the Black Legend. As Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra notes, there had been a long history of disdain for Spain dating to the Middle Ages, largely the result of other Europeans viewing Spain as a “threatening frontier” owing to its mixed population of Jews and Arabs. This depiction intensified during Spain’s wars

21 Adorno, The Polemics of Possession, 78.

22 Adorno, The Polemics of Possession, 79-80. On the Black Legend see Charles Gibson, The Black Legend: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New (New York: Knopf, 1971).

23 María DeGuzmán, Spain’s Long Shadow: The Black Legend, Off-Whiteness, and Anglo-American Empire (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 5. DeGuzmán also demonstrates how this identity attributed to Spain was used by Anglo- America to create a negative or reverse identity for themselves. This argument is similar to Linda Colley’s seminal work on British identity from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. See Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

with the Netherlands, especially “in the hands of Protestant printers.”24 Benjamin Keen also shows that the negative imagery associated with Spain can be found before Las

Casas among fourteenth-century Italians who based their observations on personal, economic, political, and cultural exchanges.25 According to Keen, crediting the development of the Black Legend solely to Las Casas is both an oversimplification and simply incorrect. Certainly, A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies aided in the diffusion of negative images of the Spanish, but, as Keen explains, it built upon a feeling that was already present, motivated by colonial rivals, religious differences in the age of

Reformation, and bourgeoning nationalism.26

The emergence of the Black Legend demonstrates how imagery and depictions are not only created but also disseminated and maintained. From early on, Western observers had dueling images of Hispaniola. Additionally, one can see the influence of this legend far past the colonial period. For example, J.H. Elliott argues that post- independence Latin Americans utilized the notion of a cruel and backwards Spain to

24 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, 132.

25 Benjamin Keen, “The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities,” Hispanic American Historical Review 49, no. 4 (November 1969), 703.

26 Keen, “The Black Legend Revisited,” 714. Keen also argues that not only did the Black Legend distort evaluations of Spanish colonial relations in the Americas, but the reactionary White Legend that emerged, touting Spanish altruism and cultural advances such as an end to human sacrifice and cannibalism, equally complicated assessments of Spain’s role in the Americas and its impact on indigenous communities. See also Paul J. Hauben, “White Legend against Black: Nationalism and Enlightenment in a Spanish Context,” The Americas 34, no. 1 (July 1977): 1-19.

explain setbacks and failures as they established their new nations.27 During the Spanish-

American War of 1898, the Black Legend appeared vividly and graphically in newspapers across the United States. The American media ran numerous stories representing Spain as a pirate or demon, and utilized symbols of “gothic horror” such as bloodied knives, skeletons, and skulls to communicate the depravity of the Spanish.

Here, Bonnie M. Miller argues, the American media employed the Black Legend to

“heighten a sense of impending threat against the imperiled female victim of Cuba.”28

Though by the time of the US occupation of the Dominican Republic, the specter of

Spain was largely neutralized. The longevity of the Black Legend demonstrates the power of imagery and narrative on perceptions and actions. Furthermore, characterizations of the natives of the Americas found in Columbus’s initial observations or the commentary provided by men like Las Casas and other colonial writers all set a precedent of privileging the viewpoint of those outside the culture they were writing about and elevating essentialized representations. Aßlong these lines, this dissertation argues that such depictions in the modern period are crucial to understanding the relationship between imagery and the creation of imperialistic policy as images of

Dominicans in the US media changed to accommodate the goals of the American government.

27 J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492- 1830 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 404.

28 Bonnie M. Miller, From Liberation to Conquest: The Visual and Popular Cultures of the Spanish-American War of 1898 (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011), 35.

For many Americans, the Dominican Republic was a land of perpetual ineptitude, insolvency, and backwardness. Struggling from centuries of Spanish control, the

Dominican Republic won its independence in 1821, only to have this triumph overshadowed by a Haitian takeover the following year. When independence came again in 1844, it was a bittersweet story for Dominicans. Trying to break free from a colonial past and build a modern, economically viable state with a stable political system was a daunting task for most, and the Dominican Republic was no exception. Into the void left by Dominican structural weaknesses came the United States. The search for new markets for export products as well as the prevention of competitors, such as Germany, fueled a desire to interfere in places like the Caribbean. With the end of the Spanish American

War in 1898, this desire grew exponentially with the acquisition of Cuba and Puerto

Rico. American interest in the region further intensified after the completion of the

Panama Canal in 1914.29 The Dominican Republic was not the only area subject to

American attention in this period. Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Haiti all experienced various levels of interference and intervention. In the Dominican Republic, as a direct result of economic downturn, the United States stepped in to prevent European

29 Most scholars credit the growing imperial power of the United States and its desire to protect its economic interests, as well as thwarting European interference in the Western Hemisphere, as major reasons for American interest in the Dominican Republic. Dana Munro argues that the threat of European invasion, particularly a German one, was a primary factor for intervention along with the promotion of stability through democracy. See Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964). See also Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publications, 1998), 321-340. Bruce Calder maintains that American involvement was not as much influenced by economic concerns since trade with the DR was less significant than other areas. See Calder, The Impact of Intervention, xii.

powers from invading the island and established the Dominican Customs Receivership in

1905, which put Americans in charge of servicing Dominican foreign debt. This fix, however, could not remedy the host of problems confronting the Dominican government and ultimately proved unsatisfactory in terms of American objectives in the Caribbean.

The US occupation government ruled the island from 1916-1924 under the control of the

US Navy and the US Marine Corps. American officials both in Washington and on the island deemed this occupation, much like America’s actions across Latin America, as a paternalistic, noble effort to impose order and progress on an immature, uncivilized people that desperately needed guidance.30

Many scholars note the endurance of stereotypes in the maintenance of empire.

In his 1971 work on Haiti, Hans Schmidt argues that the Haitian occupation, which began in 1914, was not the work of liberal internationalism or Wilsonian democracy, but rather, an extension of the earlier American wars against Native Americans in the West and general expansion in the Pacific and Caribbean. Just as the power of stereotypes dominated the American mindset in those cases, Schmidt contends that American troops and officials came to Haiti “equipped with racist concepts and stereotypes” that affected the course of the occupation.31 Furthermore, Schmidt maintains that the dominant theme in Haiti was materialistic rather than idealistic, as Americans relied on markers of

30 For example, Mary Renda argued that the US occupation of Haiti operated on these same premises of paternalistic rule. See Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), esp. 15-20.

31 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971/1995), 8.

materialistic achievement such as the building of infrastructure to uplift Haitians rather than the introduction of participatory democracy.32 Thus, Americans believed that

Haitians were so backwards that their transformation had to start with the basic building blocks of civilization. David Healy similarly argues that public support for American intervention in Haiti came from a combination of “racial prejudice, concern over hemispheric security, and disapproval of the turbulence and instability of Haitian politics.”33 Though Healy is most concerned with the relatively autonomous role of the

US Navy in determining policies on the ground, he does explore the intersection of public opinion and stereotypes about Haiti on government policy.34 Likewise, Mary Renda argues that cultural assumptions mediated the thoughts and actions of marines during the

American occupation of Haiti. Renda’s analysis relies heavily on the concept of paternalism, which operated as “a form of domination, a relation of power, masked as benevolent by its references to paternal care and guidance.”35 According to Renda, paternalism infused with racial and cultural assumptions justified American actions and policies in Haiti. In this vein, this dissertation builds upon the work of Schmidt, Healy, and Renda by examining the longevity of stereotypical representations of the Dominican

32 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 13. Schmidt adds that practically speaking, Americans could not allow elections because Haitians would vote for anti-American candidates and thus undermine the entire occupation effort, see esp.154-173.

33 David Healy, Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The US Navy in Haiti, 1915-1916 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 123.

34 See Healy, Gunboat Diplomacy, esp. 118-132.

35 Renda, Taking Haiti, 15.

Republic dating to the mid-1800s and their influence on occupation objectives, maintaining that the narrative of underdevelopment was the primary lens through which the United States viewed the Dominican Republic.

This dissertation utilizes the work of other authors that have examined the influence of racialized conceptualizations of Latin America in general. Analyzing political cartoons from the 1880s-1960s, John Johnson argues that these negative images endured in the American mind presenting the public with the sense that Latin America was politically and economically impoverished and culturally deprived. At times, cartoonists portrayed Latin Americans as monolithic, female, black, or childlike all in an effort to demonstrate their deficiencies. Johnson shows that the fact that these stereotypes survived over a century speaks to their “currency and conviction.”36 The value in these cartoons was not only that they were in the leading publications of the time, but that politicians, editors, and textbook authors also perpetuated and reinforced these ideas. Thus Johnson contends that even though these images did not reflect reality, the misrepresentation that they created was just as important because that became the reality for the American public.37 Similarly, this dissertation asserts that even if depictions of the Dominican Republic were inaccurate, the purpose was to justify and maintain the American presence on the island. Therefore, descriptions of economic ruin and political chaos served multiple functions and supported various foreign policy objectives.

36 John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 10.

37 Johnson, Latin America in Caricature, 22.

Also investigating American perceptions of Latin America, James Park argues that for over a century, Americans built and sustained enduring conceptualizations of

Latin America primarily based on the idea of underdevelopment. Both Johnson and Park indicate the durability of stereotypical depictions of Latin America as does this dissertation in the case of the Dominican Republic. It was precisely these conceptualizations that became the basis for intervention and validated American imperial actions. Park notes that the term underdevelopment became most popular after

World War II, but he indicates that the antecedents of this existed since the 1830s as the

United States always depicted Latin America as its opposite. While the United States was “forward, progressive, and advanced,” Latin American states were “backward or retarded.”38 Over time, this view crystalized as underdevelopment, a term used to indicate shortcomings like a lack of political stability and democratic framework as well as scant economic growth and an absence of social integration. This contrasted with the term undeveloped. According to Park, undeveloped was the base line at which every country started, whereas underdevelopment meant the “willful failure to meet potential.”39

Scholars working on American empire note that 1898 and the United States’s involvement in the Spanish American War denoted an important shift in the American

38 James William Park, Latin American Underdevelopment: A History of Perspectives in the United States, 1870-1965 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 2.

39 Park, Latin American Underdevelopment, 2.

mindset.40 In his study on American conceptualizations of Cuba, historian Louis A.

Pérez argues that America’s role in the Spanish American War shaped the way in which

Americans “constructed a sense of themselves and their place in the world.” While this was significant in the case of Cuba, as Pérez maintains, this dissertation posits that this strategy developed for Cuba continued to be actively employed by the media in the

Dominican Republic. According to Pérez, the United States utilized 1898 as “an undertaking for humanity [that] served to fix the moral calculus by which Americans thereafter imagined the purpose of their power and celebrated the virtue of their motives.”

In this way, Pérez maintains, the imperial project in Cuba afforded the United States an opportunity to craft their reputation both at home and abroad as well as create a carefully constructed view of Cuba. According to Pérez, Cuba “entered the American imagination as a metaphor,” albeit one that changed over time. Using a wide variety of sources including newspapers, theatrical works, poetry, diplomatic correspondence, novels,

40 Stephen Kinzer’s recent work on the Spanish American War notes the importance of this event in creating the American empire. He approaches the subject from both the imperialist and anti-imperialist camps to explore how this was a momentous shift in American attitudes. See Stephen Kinzer, The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, and the Birth of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007). On the impact of the war on the United States see: Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1974); James C. Bradford, Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993); Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Bonnie Goldenberg, “Imperial Culture and National Conscience: The Role of the Press in the United States during the Crisis of 1898,” Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 77 (2000): 169- 191; Daniel Cohen, Yellow Journalism: Scandal, Sensationalism, and Gossip in the Media (Brookfield, CT: Twenty-first Century Books, 2000).

government documents, and films, Pérez demonstrates the pervasiveness of these metaphors, which constituted an enduring narrative in which Cuba was at times portrayed as a land of opportunity, and at other times as a land inhabited by primitive, backward, unruly, and/or ungrateful Cubans. These metaphors constituted what Pérez refers to as a

“fictive world.”41 This dissertation similarly argues that a fictive world emerged out of the pages of print media in its coverage of the Dominican Republic. While the term metaphor is not used here, this dissertation analyzes a number of stereotypes and tropes that existed in an imperial narrative employed to inform Americans about the Dominican

Republic.

Likewise, in exploring the relationship between theory, language, and metaphor, historian Frank Costigliola demonstrates how these three facets work together within a cultural framework to influence foreign relations. Costigliola argues that “meaning is not intrinsic to an object or an event, but rather that people, acting within their respective culture and historical frameworks, assign meaning to that object or event.” Additionally, metaphors that “invoke race, gender, pathology, primitivism, and other hot-button issues can spark emotions and influence how policy makers and others perceive, discuss, and judge issues.” This study investigates representations of the Dominican Republic to understand how the meanings and metaphors assigned to the people and the country impacted foreign policy decisions. Additionally, this dissertation examines the binary opposites created in the media to depict the Dominican Republic in contrast to the United

States. Thus, as Costigliola shows, this dissertation agrees that meaning and the creation

41 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 110, 6, 2-3, 3.

of “emotion-evoking binaries” is often conceptualized “in terms of pairs that require one item to be not just dissimilar, but less valued than the other. In other words, we tend to organize, define, and evaluate things according to what they are not or to what they are opposed.”42

The ability of written works to assign meaning and create representations of foreign people speaks to the power of the media to shape the ways in which readers conceptualize imperial projects. Jeffrey William Sommers demonstrates that in the case of the occupation of Haiti, both the media and the US government presented “distorted cultural narratives” that allowed the United States to justify intervention and exploitation.

As Sommers demonstrates, both reports by the press and the government provided “the brick and mortar on which public and elite opinion were built for a consensus in support of Wilsonian intervention and US colonial uplift.”43 These narratives about Haiti emerged from a racialized framework that existed long before the American occupation of 1915 as Lindsay J. Twa argues in her work on representations of Haiti in US culture.

Twa asserts that media representations of Haiti, particularly in popular magazines such as

National Geographic, were the only way in which the average American “experienced

Haiti.” These pieces not only gave Americans their first glimpse of the island but also allowed them to “contemplate who they were not and how the US was triumphantly

42 Frank Costigliola, “Reading for Meaning: Theory, Language, and Metaphor,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 288, 297, 301.

43 Jeffrey William Sommers, Race, Reality, and Realpolitik: US-Haitian Relations in the Lead up to the 1915 Occupation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), ix, viii- ix.

improving people’s lives.”44 Andrew Griffiths shows that in the British Empire, newspapers and novels mediated empire by creating for their readers an “imperial experience” that instructed them how to understand, process, and experience empire.45

Similarly, Matthew Rubery demonstrates the interconnectedness of novels and newspapers that normalized empire for their readers.46 Works on American empire in the

Philippines, also note the various ways in which the media influenced public opinion such as David Brody’s work, which notes the value of visual sources for communicating subjective interpretations about empire, especially the tensions early on between pro- and anti- imperialists.47 This dissertation asserts that published material of all kinds were the main way in which the American public experienced empire, thus the media not only filtered what was written about the Dominican Republic but actively created a certain image of the Dominican Republic as well.

Various authors working on the press in Latin America note the power of published material to manipulate public opinion. In his work on journalism in Peronist

Argentina, James Cane demonstrates the crucial role the press plays as an “instrument for the creation of meaning and hierarchy,” which functioned as a “meaning-creating link

44 Lindsay J. Twa, Visualizing Haiti in US Culture, 1910-1950 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), xxiii.

45 Andrew Griffiths, The New Journalism, the New Imperialism and the Fiction of Empire, 1870-1900 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 4.

46 Matthew Rubery, The Novelty of Newspapers: Victorian Fiction After the Intervention of the News (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

47 David Brody, Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and Imperialism in the Philippines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

between the minutiae of everyday life, the shifting events of city, nation, and world, and the abstract, universalizing expressions of the dominant ideology.”48 Though Cane does not specifically deal with empire, his work is instructive in relating how the press creates consent and crafts a dominant ideology. In the same vein, Jerry W. Knudson argues in his work on Bolivia that the press closely operates within the political process as it not only reports and comments on events but is also active in “gathering, writing, editing, and displaying” information that is gradated by “its importance, setting the agenda for the audience.”49 Likewise, this dissertation focuses on the ways in which media reports on the Dominican Republic constructed meaning and consensus for the American imperial project.

The Historiography of the US Occupation of the Dominican Republic

Though scholars have studied the US occupation of the Dominican Republic from numerous angles, too little attention has been given to the significance of representations of the Dominican Republic in the US media during the intervention.50 One of the most

48 James Cane, The Fourth Enemy: Journalism and the Power in the Making of Peronist Argentina, 1930-1955 (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2012), 8.

49 Jerry W. Knudson, Bolivia, Press and Revolution, 1932-1964 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 1.

50 On the US occupation of the Dominican Republic see Melvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Domingo (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928); Charles Callan Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1938); Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1974); Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle: US Interventions in Central American and the Caribbean (Boston: South End, 1982); David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Lester D. Langley, The 24

complete treatments of the occupation is Bruce Calder’s The Impact of Intervention.

However, Calder’s study primarily focuses on the military struggles between bandits and

US troops along with a discussion of the four key areas of American reform efforts: education, public health, sanitation/public works, and the creation of the national constabulary. Calder notes that guerilla resistance and general Dominican opposition were “embarrassing” for the United States because they “tarnished” its image, complicating diplomatic efforts in Latin America and causing concern in Europe over the

American insistence on self-determination.51 Unlike Calder, this dissertation delves into the various ways in which the media used reforms in education, public health, public works, and the constabulary to support America’s reputation as a benevolent force in the

Dominican Republic. Furthermore, this dissertation demonstrates that it was precisely the challenge to this benevolent imagery that led to policy changes.

United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989); Brian Patrick Moran, “Prison Reform in the United States Navy and the Dominican Republic: The Military Occupation and Prisons, 1900-1930,” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2000); Rebecca Ann Lord, “An ‘Imperative Obligation’: Public Health and the United States Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924,” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2002); April Janice Mayes, “Sugar’s Metropolis: The Politics and Culture of Progress in San Pedro de Macorís,” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2003); Teresita Martínez Vergne, Nation and Citizen in the Dominican Republic, 1880-1916 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Melissa Madera, “’Zones of Scandal’: Gender, Public Health, and Social Hygiene in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1961,” (PhD diss., Binghamton University, 2011); Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Political Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Ellen D. Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).

51 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, xvii.

One of the most comprehensive works on the press and the occupation argues that

American journalists used popular perceptions of Haiti and the Dominican Republic to justify intervention. Historian John W. Blassingame’s article, “The Press and the

American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” notes that from 1904 until

1919, there was widespread support in the United States for intervention in the

Caribbean. Most of what Americans read was infused with racial stereotypes and references to Dominicans and Haitians as child-like and incapable of self-governance owing to long periods of devastating revolutions. In this way, “American journalists justified intervention on the basis of a paternalistic regard for a degraded people.”52

However, Blassingame maintains that not all periodicals supported intervention, most notably The Nation. By 1920, however, Blassingame posits that most newspapers and magazines changed their tone to be more critical of the occupation. However, he does not explain why. While this dissertation largely supports Blassingame’s findings for the

1904-1919 period, it approaches the topic from a different angle by analyzing the imagery produced by the media to explain how it supported American foreign policy goals. Furthermore, this dissertation argues that 1920 was a watershed year because many newspapers and magazines turned against the humanitarian narrative, challenging

America’s objectives and methods in the Dominican Republic.

Yet another source that explores the role of the media in the occupation of the

Dominican Republic is John R. Patton’s 2013 dissertation. Patton examines the occupation from a cultural perspective that incorporates the role of the media in a limited

52 John W. Blassingame, “The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1904-1920,” Caribbean Studies, 9 no. 2 (July 1969), 35.

fashion. Maintaining that the intervention occurred and persisted because of “culturally predisposed mind-sets,” Patton argues that political and intellectual leaders from the

Dominican Republic and Latin America exerted pressure causing the withdrawal in

1924.53 Patton focuses on the power of political opposition, noting that Dominican and other Spanish-speaking figures challenged the relationship between the United States and the Dominican Republic by “using the institutions and people of the US and other nations against their oppressor.”54 While much of Patton’s research relies upon government documents, he does contend that Dominican resistance led by the former president

Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal generated public interest in Spanish-language newspapers, periodicals like The Nation, and amongst anti-imperialist groups in the

United States. Ultimately, Patton argues that the leadership that Henríquez y Carvajal provided along with allies of the Dominican cause in the US government led to withdrawal.55 Two themes emerge from Patton’s work that warrants further examination: the influence of cultural predispositions and the importance of 1920. Much of Patton’s coverage of paternalistic attitudes is a cursory overview of the influence of Manifest

Destiny, Social Darwinism, and racism on American policy makers that does not probe

53 John R. Patton, “Intellectual and Political Resistance to the US Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924,” (PhD diss., University of Maine, 2013), 1-2.

54 Patton, “Intellectual and Political Resistance,” 2.

55 Patton maintains that this was this winning strategy for the Dominican Republic, especially when compared to Haiti or Nicaragua, both of which were also experiencing occupations at this time, but were unsuccessful at gaining back their sovereignty. This explanation is simplistic because it ignores prevalent racist attitudes (particularly toward Haiti) and also overlooks specific conditions in both cases. For a more comprehensive treatment of the occupations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua see McPherson, The Invaded.

into the intricate ways in which these concepts infiltrated the media particularly in cartoons and vivid written descriptions as this dissertation does. Lastly, he suggests that

1920 was a crucial year for the Dominican cause for freedom, but merely notes that this was due to its emergence in the American presidential campaign.56 While this was an important factor, this dissertation demonstrates that it was by no means the only one.

A more thorough treatment of the racialization of Dominicans comes from

Ginetta E. B. Candelario’s sociological work, Black Behind the Ears. In the first chapters of her book, Candelario traces outside views of Dominicans throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, primarily in travel literature, as a way of exploring Dominican national identity or dominicanidad. Candelario suggests, with little evidence, that

Dominicans internalized travel narratives to create for themselves an identity based on

“negrophobia, white supremacy, and anti-Haitianism.”57 Although this dissertation is not concerned with the creation of dominicanidad, Candelario’s observations are valuable if one uses them as a lens for investigating the ways in which American writers conceptualized Dominicans as they were largely the authors of this travel literature and the American public their consumers.

From scholars who explore basic stereotypes to ones who demonstrate how these conceptualizations became interwoven in the American mind, this dissertation utilizes these works to explore the fictive world of the Dominican Republic created by the

American media. Beginning with travel literature in the 1800s and continuing the

56 Patton, “Intellectual and Political Resistance,” 165-167.

57 Ginetta E. B. Candelario, Black Behind the Ears: Dominican Racial Identity from Museums to Beauty Shops (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 3.

analysis via magazine articles and press reports of the early twentieth century, this dissertation demonstrates how the narratives the media created and sustained played a crucial role in normalizing empire and reinforcing the supposedly altruistic mission of

American forces. In turn, this dissertation also posits that once the media began to question the benevolence of the United States in the Dominican Republic, calls for withdrawal and an end to the occupation became more publicized.

Organization

The chapters that follow examine the role of the media in shaping a dynamic imperial narrative about the Dominican Republic. Since the 1800s, the Dominican

Republic appeared in the American media as a beautiful yet troubled island. This depiction continued into the twentieth century as political infighting and economic ruin finally prompted the arrival of the US Marines in the summer of 1916 and the establishment of the occupation government in November of that year. This dissertation is divided into three parts in order to understand the foundation of narratives of the occupation.

Part I examines how the American media conceptualized Dominicans beginning in the late eighteenth century until the establishment of the occupation in 1916 because it is essential to understand the foundation of these narratives. Chapter two begins with an analysis of non-American sources and then proceeds to explore American travel writing as well as American press reports throughout the nineteenth century to demonstrate the shifting narrative about Dominicans in the American media. Chapter three focuses on the early twentieth century to demonstrate the crucial link between American foreign policy

objectives and representations of Dominicans in the American media. These sources reflected and reinforced imperialistic goals by characterizing the Dominicans and their government as desperately in need of outside assistance. In turn, the more involved the

United States became in Dominican affairs, the more insistent the media was on the necessity of an American presence on the island. The common themes found in these works became the basis for a narrative about empire based on the concept of underdevelopment that would later serve as justification for the occupation established in

1916. Furthermore, this chapter links policy goals with the media’s constant manipulation of Dominicans’ race and culture.

Part II further explores underdevelopment and demonstrates how this narrative worked with the concept of humanitarianism to justify and sustain the American occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. During this time, the themes reported in the US media not only justified American involvement in the Dominican

Republic but also served as a blueprint around which to discuss the objectives of the occupation. At every point the Dominican Republic and the United States were diametric opposites. Chapter four investigates the themes of political instability, economic turmoil, and backwardness embodied in the concept of underdevelopment that became essential terms in an imperial lexicon Americans used to discuss the Dominican Republic during the first four years of the occupation. Chapter five analyzes the media’s addition of humanitarianism to this traditional account. The narrative of humanitarianism relied less on describing Dominicans, revealing much more about what how the United States viewed its intentions and actions on the island.

Part III investigates the change in American media coverage of the Dominican

Republic as articles appeared questioning the very humanitarianism the United States claimed its dealings with the Dominican Republic were based upon. By 1920 there was a definite shift in the American media that included a more critical discussion of the occupation. Chapter six explores the media’s general resistance to criticize the occupation, noting important critiques of Wilsonian idealism through the early months of

1920. Though the conclusion of the Great War provided an opportunity to finally debate and then contest American actions in the Dominican Republic as wartime censorship diminished, the majority of American media sources continued to support the occupation.

The process of publicizing criticism of the military occupation of the Dominican

Republic increased throughout 1920 particularly with indictments made during the US presidential election of 1920 as shown in chapter seven. Crucial to understanding this change in coverage were stories that called into question America’s reputation as a benevolent force in the Caribbean. As journalists began reporting on the loss of individual liberties, accusations of abuse and false imprisonment, and most importantly the very ideologies that American foreign policy was based on, the experience of empire for Americans was no longer a noble project, but rather one careening toward disaster.

In the conclusion to the dissertation brief mention is made of the withdrawal process, the various plans devised to end the occupation, and the media coverage of these events. More significantly, though, this section discusses media depictions and evaluations of the Dominican Republic after the termination of the occupation. The end of the occupation served as an opportunity to justify American imperialism and define it exclusively by its noble intent, once again relying on the trope of underdevelopment.

Lastly, this chapter explores the legacy of the American occupation. While the goal of the United States was to transform what officials saw as a primitive, underdeveloped country into a prosperous and stable neighbor, the lasting legacy of the occupation was not necessarily what those hoping to instill democracy had hoped for as aptly demonstrated by the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo.

PART I

SHIFITING IMPERIAL NARRATIVES, 1796-1916

Part I of this dissertation explores the various ways in which the American media conceptualized Dominicans between the late eighteenth century and 1916. In order to understand representations of Dominicans that justified and sustained the American occupation of the Dominican Republic, it is essential to understand the foundation of these narratives. Initial reports in the 1790s and 1830s about the island came from non-

American sources as the Dominican Republic had little appeal in the United States.

However, once the US government became interested in potentially annexing the country by the mid-1800s, the American media reported on the vast economic opportunities available there. Unbounded potential, the capability of Dominicans to be transformed, and overcoming political failures all played a prominent role in accounts of the

Dominican Republic that promoted annexation. When American policy shifted away from this after the failure to annex the country in 1870, a new narrative emerged stressing the deterioration of the island and the complete inadequacies of Dominicans. Most notably, American writers and politicians in this period manipulated race to fit their agendas. These sources made Dominicans white when they desired annexation and black when they did not, focusing on Hispanic origins to indicate potential or African ancestry to denote incapacity. The two chapters that follow argue that the American media’s shifting narrative about Dominican race and culture, spanning approximately a century, reflected shifts in American foreign policy. Furthermore, common themes such as financial insolvency, political disorder, and economic potential found in the media prior

to 1916 would became the basis for an imperial narrative that would later serve as justification for the American occupation.

Additionally, an analysis of pre-occupation sources reveals common themes essential to the maintenance of US control over the Dominican Republic. Early accounts show the desire to identify the source of Dominican backwardness, noting either the legacy of Spanish colonialism and a Hispanic culture that promoted indolence, or proximity to an uncivilized and barbarous Haiti as the basis for degeneration. Therefore, from the beginning of outside accounts about the island a consistent theme emerged that maintained that Dominicans were highly susceptible to outside influence, molded by those around them rather than agents of their own making. American interest in the

Dominican Republic began in the 1850s and continued for two decades with plans to secure Samaná Bay as an American naval base and a push for outright annexation in

1869. The American media picked up on this surge of attention promoting closer ties to the island through works that emphasized the lucrative potential of the island if Anglo-

Saxon industriousness were to be applied. The American press encouraged foreign investment, reporting that the Dominican Republic was a land of political stability, tranquility, and vast economic potential. Newspapers popularized the idea that

Dominicans had let their land go to waste and the solution was American productiveness.

Similarly, travel writers praised the Dominican Republic’s economic value and encouraged annexation. American sources promoting annexation argued that

Dominicans were anything but black in order to demonstrate the potential of a people who could be transformed. However, some remained incredulous about the abilities of

Dominicans contending that they were indeed more black than white and thus wholly

unlike and unfit to join the United States. The debate about the Dominican Republic throughout the course of the nineteenth century allowed the United States to manipulate their representations of Dominican race and culture to justify their actions. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the media portrayed Dominicans as white or black in order to suit foreign policy needs. Though the depiction of

Dominicans’ race changed over time, as evidenced in the American media, certain aspects of this discourse remained constant particularly accounts that emphasized the need for paternalistic guidance.

CHAPTER 2:

FROM BLACK TO WHITE: TRANSFORMING DOMINICANS

In order to validate their expansionist schemes, many American travel writers in the nineteenth century emphasized the lucrative prospects of the Dominican Republic.

As an advocate for extending American economic interest in the Dominican Republic in both books and newspapers, in 1860, Wilshire S. Courtney expressed a common

American viewpoint that privileged Anglo-Saxon productivity and claimed that the

Dominican Republic could be transformed under its guidance.

To the Anglo-Saxon race more perhaps than any other, we must ascribe the grand results in civilization, in the industrial economies, in commerce and finance, in machinery and inventions, in knowledge and free institutions and in the arts and sciences, of the nineteenth century. Through its agency more than that of any other race this tide of progress has so covered Christendom and arisen to its present hight [sic]. The day and the hour forbid that its herculean energies and its inherent genius and skill, should any longer exclude the wastes of Dominica from its theatres of enterprize [sic]. In the dimly discerned grand Moral and Divine order of the Universe, by which the Almighty weighs the actions of men, balances the destinies of nations and over-rules their iniquities, Spanish St. Domingo has already done a long and cruel penance for its cities founded in cupidity and bloodshed, its immolations of the innocent on altars of avarice and its plains drenched with fratricidal carnage. The equities of Heaven’s Chancery have been meeted [sic] out to it in sore afflictions for generations. That this gem of the Western Seas will sooner or later, through the enterprize of the Anglo-American be rescued from desolation, its valleys and plains transformed into elysian gardens and blooming fields, its mountains made to yield their golden stores and its now solitary rivers and pensive bays thronged with commerce, is inevitable.1

Recalling the age-old Black Legend, Courtney claimed Spanish greed and violence was the root of Dominican backwardness. However, after centuries of penance, he believed that the United States would inevitably rescue and transform the country turning it into a

1 Wilshire S. Courtney, The Goldfields of Santo Domingo (New York: A.P. Norton, 1860), 142-144. 36

divine paradise that could finally take advantage of its rich resources and superior location. Courtney’s opinions did not stand alone as he represented a shared perspective many in the American media promoted throughout the mid-nineteenth century. From this viewpoint many similarly emphasized the lucrative potential of the island if Anglo-Saxon industriousness were to be applied.2

This chapter explores how the American media depicted Dominicans throughout the nineteenth century, arguing that fluctuations in representations of Dominican race and culture mirrored major shifts in American foreign policy. Furthermore, reports that claimed that Dominicans themselves could be transformed with proper guidance represented a crucial component of the long-term American narrative about Dominicans.

The first section of this chapter reviews two early works on the Dominican Republic to illustrate the important precedents set by non-American authors in explaining Dominican heritage. The next part examines American sources of the mid-1800s that aimed to depict the island as a land of unlimited potential in order to attract American investment.

As plans to annex the Dominican Republic unfolded in the 1860s, the American media focused their attention on both the economic viability of the country and the race of its

2 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Deborah L. Madsen, American Exceptionalism (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press, 1998); Amy S. Greenberg, ed., Manifest Destiny and American Territorial Expansion: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012); Fabian Hilfrich, Debating American Exceptionalism: Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Victor Kiernan, America: From White Settlement to World Hegemony (New York: Zed Books, 2015). 37

people. This portion of the chapter argues that the American media utilized race and heritage to either support or counter annexationist claims.

Setting Precedents: Moreau de Saint-Méry and Mackenzie

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, Americans had little interest in the Dominican

Republic and thus information about it came from outside sources. Martinique-born lawyer, politician, and author Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry penned A

Topographical and Political Description of the Spanish Part of Saint-Domingo in 1796.

Moreau de Saint-Méry relocated to Saint-Domingue after studying law in Paris. On the island he worked tirelessly collecting information about history, legal traditions, the environment, people, and the economy.3 This information was especially useful to

French administrators who had signed a peace treaty with Spain the year before granting them control over the eastern two-thirds of Hispaniola, which they would retain until

1809. One of the first travel books on the Spanish part of the island, Moreau de Saint-

Méry’s work laid the foundation for American perceptions with its 1798 English language edition published by Philadelphia’s Philosophical Society. The book had over

100 subscribers including such illustrious men as Vice President John Adams, Benjamin

Franklin, and famous Philadelphian Matthew Carey along with numerous booksellers requesting multiple copies.4

3 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2004), 9-10.

4 The first few pages of Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry’s book listed subscribers and booksellers in the United States that requested copies of the text. 38

Later cited by many American authors, Moreau de Saint-Méry’s book became an authoritative text on the colony of Santo Domingo and underscored the potential of the island. However, he viewed Hispanic culture as a barrier to developing the assets present there. Moreau de Saint-Méry maintained that Santo Domingo was a rich area filled with many natural resources, but unfortunately lacking in development because the Spanish creoles were negligent, idle, and uneducated. Commenting on the Spanish custom of siesta, Moreau de Saint-Méry was not surprised this was a common practice “among a people always indolent.” This inactivity made for a backward colony in a constant “state of mediocrity and decay.” According to his research, the people of Santo Domingo were almost all illiterate because there were no schools save for a few in the capital city.

Moreau de Saint-Méry blamed this deficiency on what he observed about the Spanish character. In his opinion, the Spanish creole had “few wants,” was “easily satisfied,” and generally “pass[ed] their lives without wishing to better their lot.” As further proof of

Dominicans’ disdain for progress, Moreau de Saint-Méry remarked on the pitiable condition of health on the island, a result of the scarcity of physicians and surgeons and the fact that they did not inoculate for smallpox.5 Though he did note that whites, freed people, and slaves constituted the island’s population, the majority of Moreau de Saint-

Méry’s comments focused on Hispanic heritage as the source of degeneration. For a man devoted to science and the Enlightenment, this disregard for education and progress was

5 Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry, A Topographical and Political Description of the Spanish Part of Saint-Domingo, Containing, General Observations on the Climate, Population and Productions; on the Character and Manners of the Inhabitants; with an Account of the Several Branches of Government, trans. William Cobbett, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, 1798), 51, 77, 60, 50, 48, 52.

at the root of Santo Domingo’s backwardness along with a distinct Spanish character, which, he argued, naturally lent itself to idleness.

Published in 1830, just eight years into the Haitian occupation of the Dominican

Republic, Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic blamed Haitians for the country’s backwardness. Rather than blame Santo Domingo’s deficiencies on an innate Spanish character as Moreau de Saint-Méry had done, Charles Mackenzie linked underdevelopment to Haitian control. Mackenzie was the British Consul-General in Haiti from 1826-1827 and spent fourteen months traveling throughout Hispaniola during this time. Coming a little over three decades after the Haitian Revolution, much of

Mackenzie’s writing focused on explaining the current state of affairs in the new nation.6

His work represents the only English-language account of the era of Haitian unification,

1822-1844.7

Much like Moreau de Saint-Méry, Mackenzie remarked on the lack of education.

Instead of Spanish inadequacies, however, Mackenzie criticized the Haitians who forced

Dominicans into military service and stymied educational aspirations:

6 “Review Article: Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic,” The Monthly Review – May to August 1830, vol. 14 (London: Henderson, 1830), 160-177.

7 Ginetta E. B. Candelario, Black Behind the Ears: Dominican Racial Identity from Museums to Beauty Shops (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 42.

[T]heir university no longer exists; the public schools are destroyed; and they insist that it is a mockery to talk of national schools, the teachers of which are utterly incompetent; but the greatest grievance (and it is a terrible one) is that, at the very age when their sons require the utmost care of a parent, they are bound by the existing law to become soldiers, and to be initiated into all the profligacy of a guard-house, as privates; from which sense of degradation no merit can raise them, while the son of the most worthless chief in the west is at once raised to the rank of an officer.8

According to Mackenzie, Haitians cared more about war than education. Furthermore, his comment that Dominican sons served under the “worthless” chiefs of the west indicated what he saw as a grave error – the uncivilized Haitian had not only taken over the eastern side of the island, but was now lording his position of authority over his helpless neighbor. Additionally, Mackenzie noted that the Spanish side of the island lacked in both commerce and consumption. Dominicans produced only what was needed to survive, failing to capitalize on their extensive resources. 9 Mackenzie viewed this as a further testament to Haitian mismanagement.

Both Moreau de Saint-Méry and Mackenzie demonstrated the fluctuation of race and culture in written accounts about the Dominican Republic. Though both authors wrote of a lush land ripe with economic possibilities, they each noted the lack of development on the island, crediting different cultural factors. Moreau de Saint-Méry emphasized

Spanish heritage as the source of indolence, which caused economic stagnancy. Though he did not propose a remedy for this, his discussion of the lack of schools, traversable roads, and healthcare suggest that under a different cultural influence, Dominicans might have been able to improve. Mackenzie maintained that backwardness and

8 Charles Mackenzie, Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic, vol. 1 (London: Colburn and Bentley, 1830), 291.

9 Mackenzie, Notes on Haiti, 293. 41

underdevelopment stemmed from Haitian control, implying that removing this influence would dramatically alter the eastern portion of the island. In both accounts, what made the Dominican Republic so unique was its susceptibility to outside influence. This would be an important characteristic that Americans would also attribute to Dominicans to justify US objectives. This ability to shape the very nature of Dominicans was possible because other than investors, travel writers, and political officials, most Americans never traveled to the country so it remained an area that was relatively unknown outside of the pages of these sources. Therefore, mostly people with economic and political motives molded the image of the Dominican Republic that appeared in newspapers, travel literature, and official policies. Regardless of the source, in most cases, Dominicans appeared as passive subjects easily manipulated to fit the needs of the author.

Island of Untapped Resources

The American government’s interest in the Dominican Republic initially began in the 1850s. In 1854, American President Franklin Pierce sent a group of US Army engineers to survey Samaná Bay as a potential naval base.10 Though treaty negotiations ultimately failed, the attention the island received drew in American businessmen who continued to push for closer ties between the two countries. One such entrepreneur was

Texas pioneer William Cazneau, who served as a special agent to the Dominican

Republic twice in the 1850s. Cazneau purchased land near Samaná Bay and spent the next two decades concocting moneymaking schemes to enhance his own investments and

10 Eric T. Love, Race Over Empire: Racism and US Imperialism, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 35.

attract American financiers.11 Beyond individuals like Cazneau, many southerners in the

United States expressed interest in acquiring Caribbean locales. As historian Robert E.

May demonstrated in his work The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, southerners were active in pursuing foreign policies that would grant the United States control over new slave territories in places like Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America. The purpose of this was to counter free states being admitted to the union so that those who supported slavery could protect the institution itself and maintain a balance of power in

Congress.12 Similar to May, historian Matthew Karp noted the huge influence southerners had in the United States prior to the American Civil War. These southern slaveholders were at the forefront of American foreign policy, many of them members of the executive branch of government, actively promoting their interests in defending slavery.13 As Karp showed, southerners desired places like the Caribbean and Latin

America because they wanted to maintain systems of slavery in areas where it already

11 Love, Race Over Empire, 35. For more on the Cazneau’s and their role in American political and economic expansion in the mid-1800s see Robert E. May, “‘Plenipotentiary in Petticoats’: Jane M. Cazneau and American Foreign Policy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in Women in American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders, ed. Edward L. Crapol (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Robert E. May, “Lobbyists for Commercial Empire: Jane Cazneau, William Cazneau, and US Caribbean Policy, 1846-1878,” Pacific Historical Review 48 (January 1979): 383-412. Jane Cazneau wrote two books about her time in the Dominican Republic. See Jane Cazneau, Life in Santo Domingo: By a Settler (New York: G. W. Carleton & Company, Publishers, 1873). Under her pen name Cora Montgomery, Cazneau self-published another travel narrative about the Dominican Republic in 1878. See Cora Montgomery, Our Winter Eden: Pen Pictures of the Tropics (New York, 1878).

12 Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1973), 10 -11.

13 Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 3-5.

existed and implement it in locations where they believed it would generate the most economic potential. Given this context, the Dominican Republic was one of the key areas southerners wanted to acquire.

As American writers became more interested in the Dominican Republic, works followed that emphasized the lucrative prospects of the island. In Imperial Eyes: Travel

Writing and Transculturation, Mary Louise Pratt argues that travel writers constituted the

“capitalist vanguard” because their writing focused on the economic potential of certain areas while simultaneously lamenting their backwardness as a way to authenticate and consecrate expansionist schemes.14 Pratt contends that the capitalist vanguard emerged after the wars for independence in Latin America as Europeans attempted to justify their imperial aspirations. However, this same language appeared in American works on the

Dominican Republic beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century. Just as

Europeans had “reinvent[ed] America as backward and neglected, to encode its non- capitalist landscapes and societies as manifestly in need of the rationalized exploitation the Europeans bring,” so too would American travel writers of the mid-1800s present the

Dominican Republic as a land of untapped potential in need of American involvement.15

Wilshire S. Courtney’s 1860 work on the Dominican Republic aimed to convince readers that all that was missing there was the efficiency and ingenuity of the Anglo-

Saxon race. Commissioned by the editor of the New York Herald, a newspaper known for its explicit promotion of Dominican annexation, Courtney’s The Gold Fields of Santo

14 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992), 148, 152.

15 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 152.

Domingo informed Americans of the unlimited possibilities of their Caribbean neighbor.16 According to Courtney, Americans excelled because “they apply themselves to exploring new fields of industry, trade, commerce, manufactures, art and skill.” In

Courtney’s book, Santo Domingo was a land of “vast mineral, agricultural, manufacturing and commercial resources.” All that was needed on the island was “the

Anglo-Saxon race” who in just a “few years [would] transform that gem of the Western seas into an earthly Paradise [because] the elements of material wealth and prosperity are there in unlimited and inexhaustible abundance.” Writing in the mid-1800s, Courtney remarked that the American talent for hard work had been spent on places like Kansas,

Texas, and California as their “surplus of mental and physical energy” sought out “a proper market, outlet, or theatre of activity.” Now, however, was the perfect moment for

Americans to direct that momentum of westward expansion toward the Dominican

Republic. Courtney hoped his book would be a source of knowledge and enlightenment for the American public – a group whom he claimed had only a vague notion of the location of the Dominican Republic.17

Additionally, Courtney’s work aimed to dispel popular impressions about the

Dominican Republic, which he thought would be a barrier to American interest and investment. He wrote that most Americans believed that the island was full of poisonous snakes, adverse weather, and disease. Certainly this prevailing attitude had to be countered if Americans were even to consider traveling there. Courtney claimed that this

16 Candelario, Black Behind the Ears, 51.

17 Courtney, Goldfields, 8, 9, 35, 8.

popular depiction could not have been farther from the truth and that in reality the

Dominican Republic was “uniformly healthy and salubrious” as well as “conducive to longevity.” He acknowledged that there were cases of yellow fever now and again, but this was no more of a threat than what already existed in the “swampy areas” of the southern United States. As for the chaos that seemed to dominate the political scene,

Courtney assured his readers that “[t]hese insurrections and revolutions are almost exclusively confined to the few politicians, government officials and hired soldiers, and scarcely ever involve the masses of the people.” To further emphasize this point,

Courtney contended that, from the time the Dominican Republic became independent from Haiti in 1844, uprisings were not “destructive to the life or property” of foreigners and that Dominicans respected their rights.18 Other than comments such as these,

Courtney largely avoided discussions about Haiti. This deliberate omission spoke to

Courtney’s objective of attracting American investment and the possibility of annexation as all of his topics pointed to the potential of the Dominican Republic and its safe environment both in the sense of human health and financial investment.

Aiming to attract investors, Courtney portrayed Dominican culture as definitively

Spanish. He estimated the population of the eastern two-thirds of the island at 120,000, which consisted of – “Spaniards, Spanish Creoles, and some Africans and people of color.” The word “some” implied that the majority of the population was of Spanish descent. In fact, Courtney insisted that Dominicans retained “all the civilities and social amenities of their refined and urbane Spanish ancestors.” Though Dominicans were

18 Courtney, Gold Fields, 9-10, 83-84, 83, 84, 12.

steadfastly Roman Catholic, Courtney assured readers that “their religious and patriotic zeal however, is not by any means of an indurated, bigoted or evangelizing character.

They are tolerant and liberal.”19 Commentary about religious toleration and a refined

Hispanic character served as further proof of Dominican malleability. According to

Courtney, Dominicans were a civilized people with European sensitivities and thus a secure place of investment.

“If this country is so rich, why don’t people take advantage of it?” The answer, according to Courtney, lay within the characteristics and shortcomings of Dominicans themselves. Courtney described a population almost entirely lacking in education save for the cities and towns where wealth and intelligence abounded. Other than these areas, the country people “although habitually honest, hospitable and sincere, are poor, uneducated and inoffensive.” In Courtney’s eyes, the deficiency of the general population spanned many areas:

The mass of the population wholly lack that thrift and industry necessary to their own material well-being and the redemption of their country from the desolation into which it has fallen. They are not progressive, but from year to year live on precisely as the generation before them lived, adopting no improvements in their mode of life – in new systems of industrial, domestic or social economy.20

This general lack of industriousness came from Dominicans’ Spanish heritage, as

Courtney maintained that the Spaniards had lived in “opulence and ease” and were

“averse to manual labor.” Courtney’s Dominicans were much the same as those of

Moreau de Saint-Méry sixty years before – idle and content to live off the natural bounty

19 Courtney, Gold Fields, 132, 133, 136.

20 Courtney, Gold Fields, 132-133.

of the land. “No allurements of wealth will arouse them from their indolence and lethargy. They will sit by, smoke their pipes or cigarettes, and look on without covetousness and with supine indifference while the man of industry and application mines the gold or cultivates the soil.”21

The only hope the country had was in the firm guidance of Anglo-Saxons. Some writers attempted to demonstrate how truly profitable the Dominican Republic could be with the application of American productivity. While Courtney attempted to appeal to the American spirit of expansionism, a friend and business partner of Cazneau and former

US consul actually took on the challenge. Joseph Warren Fabens’s Into the Tropics: By a

Settler in Santo Domingo, published in 1863, told the story of one man’s escape from the harsh winter climate of New York and his year-long foray in the warm island sun of the

Dominican Republic. The book constituted a diary of sorts, with each month of his stay detailed in terms of accomplishments (mostly in farming) and also general observations about the land and people. In the book, the fact that Fabens had a flourishing garden within mere months of his arrival astounded Dominicans. Equally impressive was

Fabens’s ability to turn the bitter oranges that were so prevalent on the island into sweet ones. Throughout Into the Tropics, Fabens emphasized his industriousness and knowledge, particularly his use of pruning and grafting. Fabens the gardener, settler, and

American stood in stark contrast to Dominicans, people who Fabens claimed worked with minimal effort and without technology, know-how, or even an awareness of laborsaving devices. In the end, Fabens claimed that the Dominican Republic would only

21 Courtney, Gold Fields, 137, 132, 132, 138.

be improved by an influx of “intelligent laborers,” “men who know how to make wood and iron perform the severest part [of labor], to the sparing of human sinews; men who can work steam in harness, these are what is wanted here.”22 With Courtney, who maintained that Anglo-Saxon productivity would transform the land, Fabens seemed to agree: “Under the warm sun of the tropics, intelligent working men and machinery will yet open the grandest field of civilization ever realized.”23

Fabens’s comments in Into the Tropics made little mention of race. This made sense given that his work was aimed to encourage American investment, not promote annexation. By the time Fabens arrived in the Dominican Republic, Spain had reannexed the country. In a paper given to the American Geographical and Statistical Society of

New York in that same year, Fabens commented that owing to their “isolated position” and “inherent weakness,” Dominicans had difficulty maintaining their government. The lack of roads and postal facilities and the fact that Dominicans were “totally ignorant of the various mechanical inventions which assist labor and add to capital” further hampered governmental success.24 Though Dominicans appealed to Europe and the United States for help, the only “sympathetic response” they received came from Spain. Fabens praised Spain for making the Dominican Republic even more appealing to foreign investment. In an attempt to attract Americans, he claimed that Spain was in the process

22 Joseph Warren Fabens, Into the Tropics: By a Settler in Santo Domingo (New York: Carlton, 1863), 144.

23 His emphasis, Fabens, Into the Tropics, 145.

24 Joseph Warren Fabens, Resources of Santo Domingo: A Paper Read Before the American Geographical and Statistical Society of New York (New York: Carelton, 1863), 29.

of cleaning up the cities and rebuilding infrastructure, on top of already abolishing slavery and establishing “perfect political equality of the races.”25 As further enticement to investment, Spain would be reducing duties on imports, repealing duties on exports, and, most importantly, throwing “open her doors” to invite “colonization from all quarters.”26

The absence in Fabens’s commentary of both Dominicans’ race and of Haiti suggested that only when the United States was interested in direct control did these factors matter. With Spanish reaanexation between 1861 and 1865, Fabens simply wanted to attract American investment in his discussions of an Edenic paradise in need of

Anglo-Saxon initiative. Furthermore, with the American Civil War raging during this same period, the Dominican Republic remained far from most Americans’ minds.

American Annexation and the Manipulation of Race

After the conclusion of the Civil War in the United States and the Dominican victory over Spain during the War of Restoration, both in 1865, American attention once again turned toward the Dominican Republic. In January 1866, President Andrew

Johnson sent Secretary of State William Seward to meet with Dominican President

Buenaventura Báez about once again securing Samaná Bay in the northeast of the country as a US naval base to prevent European intervention in the Caribbean. Báez agreed to sell, even mentioning his desire for the potential annexation of the whole

25 Fabens, Resources of Santo Domingo, 30.

26 Fabens, Resources of Santo Domingo, 30.

country despite protests by Dominican nationalists.27 In the United States, Johnson broached the subject in his fourth annual message to Congress in December 1868.

Johnson stated that “the long-indulged habits of colonial supineness and dependence upon European monarchical powers” on the island had stymied attempts in both countries to establish stable republics. Though the United States did not want to see the reestablishment of European power in the Western Hemisphere, Johnson lamented that,

“too little has been done by us . . . to attach the communities by which we are surrounded to our own country, or to lend even moral support” to their efforts in creating “republican institutions.” Citing the political and social difficulties in both Haiti and the Dominican

Republic, the president noted that it would not be long before the United States would have to “lend some effective aid.”28

American intervention in the Dominican Republic benefitted many individuals.

As the United States acquired land around the region over the course of the nineteenth century with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the procurement of Spanish Florida in

1819, and the massive territorial gains as result of the Mexican-American War in 1848,

American interest in the region had grown considerably.29 As Americans settled in these regions and established trade and transportation networks, both Central America

27 Silvio Torres-Saillant and Ramona Hernández, The Dominican Americans (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 20.

28 Andrew Johnson, “Fourth Annual Message to Congress” (speech, Washington, DC, 9 December 1868), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

29 Eric Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1998), 10.

(particularly Panama and Nicaragua) and the Caribbean became strategic economic areas for the United States. For his part, President Báez had many political enemies who wanted him out of office at any cost. Just days after being sworn in as president for his fourth non-consecutive term, Báez notified American officials that he was willing to sell them Samaná Bay for the cost of $1 million in gold and $100,000 worth of munitions.

While negotiations were underway, Báez also wanted three battleships to help preserve his precarious position against his rivals who had allied themselves with Haitian rebels to overthrow him.30 For American businessmen such as William Cazneau and Joseph

Warren Fabens, closer ties between the United States and the Dominican Republic would secure their investments. Cazneau owned a plantation near the bay and Fabens owned hundreds of acres of land (his reward for a geologic and cartographic survey of the island in 1868). Eventually these two men owned about one-tenth of the land in the Dominican

Republic, prompting them to promote the treaty to politicians in Washington.31

The American press also seemed to encourage foreign investment in the

Dominican Republic. Articles from late 1869 and early 1870 noted the political calm and economic opportunities there. Reporting in February, the New York Times cited President

Johnson’s message and added that Dominicans greeted his words with “the liveliest satisfaction.”32 The article indicated the presence of French and British capitalists on the

30 Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2010), 237. Love, Race Over Empire, 37.

31 Love, Race Over Empire, 35, 36.

32 “St. Domingo: Visit of English and French Capitalists,” New York Times, 2 February 1869, 5.

island, perhaps as a further inducement for Americans to claim what they referred to as

“another California.” To allay concerns, the Times concluded: “Except some occasional guerilla raids on the border, the country is in perfect calm. Trade is reviving; crops, particularly tobacco, are unusually fine this year.”33 Washington’s Daily National

Intelligencer stressed that the Dominican Republic’s reputation as a “theatre of many political vicissitudes” lay in the past. Armed with a “commanding political position in the Caribbean, magnificent harbors, valuable forests, rich mines, and fertile territory,” the country remained of value.34 The New York Herald claimed the Dominican Republic had

“marvelous sources of vegetables and mineral wealth.”35

Reviving antebellum images of indolence, newspapers also focused on

Dominicans’ lack of productivity. The New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette concurred that the Dominican Republic could be a lucrative acquisition for the United

States, but blamed the natives’ slothfulness and passion for political instability as the root of backwardness. According to the paper, Dominicans were “ignorant, indolent and stupid, and as long as they can get plantains to eat, and swing in their hammocks, they are satisfied, but they love the excitement of a revolution.”36 These depictions stressed the idea that the only energy Dominicans’ possessed was for rebellion. The press popularized the idea that Dominicans had let their land go to waste and it would only be

33 “St. Domingo,” 5.

34 “The Annexation of Santo Domingo,” Daily National Intelligencer, 6 February 1869, 2.

35 “Santo Domingo,” New York Herald, 14 January 1870, 6.

36 “San Domingo,” New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette, 11 May 1870, 2.

under American industriousness that the riches of Santo Domingo could be cultivated. In

January of 1871, the New York Herald echoed these themes:

There is probably no country in the world possessed of greater natural resources than St. Domingo. Her climate is healthier than that of any other West India Islands, being mild and salubrious. The soil is remarkably fertile, producing everything grown in the tropics. . . . Gold and silver abound in the country, but the same indolence which has left the soil virgin of the plough has left these precious metals undisturbed in the bowels of earth.37

While these articles avoided a blatant discussion of race, they implied that laziness, political instability, and backwardness were simply innate attributes of Dominicans. In this way, reports such as these created a Dominican identity for their readers perpetuating a narrative that could only be altered by American intervention.

Travel writers also continued to praise the economic value of the Dominican

Republic and to push for annexation utilizing similar themes. In his 1870 book, San

Domingo: Pen Pictures and Leaves of Travel, Romance and History, De Bennevile

Randolph Keim noted the need for another book on Santo Domingo because of the lack of information about the island. As a result, he traveled there in the summer of 1869 as a special correspondent for the New York Herald. Dedicating his book to President Ulysses

Grant, Keim lauded the fecundity of the environment by describing teeming rivers, abundant forests, mountains filled with precious metals, and rich soil. Keim portrayed

Santo Domingo, the capital, as civilized. “In every respect,” it was a “Spanish city,” which “bore the traces of antiquity” since it was “the oldest living European city in the

Western Hemisphere.” Though Keim underscored the connection to Europe and its

37 “Sketch of the Resources and History of St. Domingo,” New York Herald, 11 January 1871, 3.

Hispanic heritage, he also lamented that the city, which had once been the staging ground for the great conquistadors, was now a land of “poverty and decay.” To encourage annexation, Keim’s book deemphasized race and ignored Haiti. According to Keim, the source of deterioration was constant uprisings that had bankrupted the government.38

To underscore the need for American guidance, Keim related his interview with

Dominican President Báez. The president mourned the state of affairs in his country, the result of “a handful of fugitives from justice, and desperadoes” who did not represent the popular sentiment of the people and had caused the country to go “backward instead of forward.” Asked if there was any hope for a better future, President Báez apparently replied, “We look to your government. If we had your strong arm to lift us up, you would see how soon we would be able to return all of your assistance.” Keim summarized his findings and the thoughts of the president for his reader: “With a strong

Government, and a few examples, for the edification of the turbulent spirits, I feel assured that there is enough virtue left in the Dominican people to make a peaceable, industrious and enterprising race. All they need, is example.”39

Many in the United States, the president included, had more than just example in mind as plans for the annexation of the Dominican Republic surfaced in 1869. Under the tenure of President Ulysses S. Grant, the idea of gaining hegemony in the Caribbean and increasing commercial wealth through closer ties with island nations resurfaced.

38 De Benneville Randolph Keim, San Domingo: Pen Pictures and Leaves of Travel, Romance and History (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 1870), vi, 37, 38, 40, 60, 67.

39 Keim, San Domingo, 68, 70, 71, 319.

This objective prompted his attempt to annex the Dominican Republic with the possibility of later making it a state.40 In 1869, US officials brokered an annexation treaty with President Báez, who saw this as a favorable way to protect his country from

European encroachment and provide his government with much needed funds to take decisive actions against his political enemies.41 In the treaty signed on 29 November

1869, the United States agreed to pay Báez $100,000 in cash and $50,000 in arms in return for the annexation of the country. Put to a vote, the treaty passed in the Dominican

Republic.42 Approving the treaty in the United States, however, turned into a long process. Submitted to the US Senate in early January 1870, the senators debated on the topic for over five months, finally putting the treaty to a vote on 30 June 1870. The result was a tie of 28-28, which failed to attain the necessary two-thirds for ratification.43

Disappointed by the outcome, President Grant continued to push for annexation in the coming months.

40 Dennis Hidalgo, “Charles Sumner and the Annexation of the Dominican Republic,” Itinerario 21, no. 2 (July 1997): 51-65. On the long history of diplomatic relations and the desire for annexation see William Javier Nelson, Almost a Territory: America’s Attempt to Annex the Dominican Republic (Newark, DE: University of Delaware, 1990). For more information on early diplomatic connections see Charles Callan Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873, A Chapter in Caribbean Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1938).

41 Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 229-230.

42 Frank Moya Pons noted that these votes were largely obtained through intimidation and came mostly from poor, illiterate Dominicans. See Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 229.

43 Harold T. Pinkett, “Efforts to Annex Santo Domingo to the United States,” The Journal of Negro History 26, no. 1 (January 1941), 37. Love, Race Over Empire, 64.

In his second inaugural address in December 1870, President Grant attempted to sway public opinion and pressure his political opponents. In his speech, he warned that if the United States abandoned the Dominican project, European powers would quickly seize the commercial opportunity. President Grant provided listeners with a long list of positives: geographic control over the Caribbean, mining and agricultural opportunities, stabilization of the balance of trade, a market for American products, national protection, control over isthmian commerce, and even the potential to destabilize slavery in Cuba,

Puerto Rico, and Brazil. Obviously influenced by the extensive discourse about the island, Grant insisted that though the Dominican Republic was a “weak power, numbering less than 120,000 souls,” it had “one of the richest territories under the sun, capable of supporting a population of ten million people in luxury.” He continued: “The people of San Domingo are not capable of maintaining themselves in their present condition, and must look for outside support;” what they needed was, “a stable government, under which her immense resources can be developed.”44 Mirroring the existing narrative of the Dominican Republic presented in travel narratives and the press,

Grant saw annexation as the best option for both the Dominican Republic and the United

States.

The following month, still insistent on annexation, President Grant sent an investigative committee to the island to report on conditions with the hope of persuading

Congress to revisit the issue. The commission arrived in the Dominican Republic in

44 Ulysses S. Grant, “Second Annual Message to the Senate and House of Representatives” (speech, Washington, DC, 5 December 1870), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29511.

January 1871 led by Republican senators Benjamin D. Wade (Ohio) and Andrew D.

White (New York), along with Dr. Samuel G. Howe and Frederick Douglass, the former abolitionist-turned-diplomat who now served as the commission’s assistant secretary.

Grant wanted to prove that Dominicans wanted annexation and perhaps his selection of four abolitionists to lead the commission was an attempt to prove the altruistic intentions of the United States.45 Accompanying them was a host of specialists including geologists, mineralogists, botanists, and zoologists as well as members of the press and men representing American commercial firms.46 Their reconnaissance produced a report that highlighted the improved political situation and economic possibilities of the island, as well as the potential of its inhabitants.

Though the majority of the commission’s findings included reports on resources, the commissioners made sure to dispel potential investors’ qualms about the political situation in the republic. Acknowledging the political turbulence of previous years, the commission maintained that, under Báez, the government was “organized and in complete operation of all of its departments, exercising every function of a legitimate government.” Addressing recent disturbances led by José María Cabral and Gregorio

Luperón, the report dismissed both as selfish profiteers who cost the government money

45 Senator Wade was a prominent Radical Republican who also supported women’s suffrage and African American equality. Senator White was an historian and educator as well as the co-founder of Cornell University. Dr. Howe had served in the Greek Revolution as a surgeon, founded the Perkins School for the Blind and was married to Julia Ward Howe writer of the “Battle Hymn of the Republic.” Frank Moya Pons claimed that the favorable report produced by the commission was the result of bribes by President Grant and his supporters. See Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 230.

46 Torres-Saillant and Hernández, The Dominican Americans, 22.

with their “annoying guerilla warfare.” Rejecting Cabral’s claim to power, the report noted that in referring to himself as the “Chief of the Revolution,” he clearly had no real authority or respect for the constitution. As for Luperón, Dominicans testified that he was “simply a bandit stained with crime,” financed through robbery and “piratical actions on the coast.” To further indicate their illegitimacy, the commission noted that both reportedly received funding from Haiti. The report failed to mention that part of Báez’s desire for annexation was precisely to gain financial support and the political backing of the United States against these adversaries, instead labeling these individuals as greedy bandits. Lastly, the report mentioned the issue of “provincial jealousy” and “petty military chiefs” (caudillos) who were relatively autonomous and thwarted central control.

The commissioners believed that a “union with a strong government” would give

Dominicans the authority needed to bring these caudillos in line.47 Like many American sources on the Dominican Republic, the commission’s report failed to analyze the political intricacies of the country and made broad distorted by their goal of obtaining support for annexation. Furthermore, the issues the report so easily dismissed such as guerilla warfare, caudillismo, and Haitian incursions had not been solved and, in fact, would continue to plague Dominican and then American administrators for decades to come.

As further testament to the peaceable conditions in the republic, the commissioners noted that, throughout their trip, they never worried about their own

47 US Senate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry to Santo Domingo (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1871), 6, 7, 8. The press also printed portions of this report. See “Report of the St. Domingo Commissioners,” Sun, 1 March 1871, 1.

safety. In Santo Domingo they slept with doors “slightly secured” or sometimes completely unlocked and their windows wide open. During their stay, they did not employ guards nor did they carry weapons. Local judges assured the commission that

“high crimes” such as burglary, arson, and murder were unknown on the island. The report stated that they “never encountered any shadow of hostile demonstration; nothing but kindness met them in all quarters and among all classes.” When the topic of annexation came up in multiple conversations with Dominicans, the commissioners claimed they witnessed absolutely no antagonism. Even in the remotest villages, they maintained people had intelligently discussed the issue “and everywhere there was a general agreement in the declaration that their only hope of permanent peace and prosperity is in annexation to and becoming part of the people of the United States.”48

Precisely because Báez had a vested interest in annexation, and his political opponents had supporters in the country (as evidenced by the high numbers of political prisoners), it was likely he carefully selected who the commissioners would meet and what those people would say when asked about their support for US annexation.

The investigation also aimed to counter previous depictions of Dominicans as indolent. Though the commissioners reported that the people did not cultivate as much as they could given the fertility of the land, this was not due to laziness but rather to the simple fact that they did not know if they would reap the benefits of their work. Whereas previous authors blamed Spanish culture as the source of idleness, the commission countered this stating that those with “Spanish blood” were especially capable of physical

48 US Senate, Report of the Commission, 12, 11.

exertion. The emphasis on Dominicans’ Hispanic roots was likely employed to differentiate them from Haitians and also African Americans – two groups many

Americans viewed as lazy because of their African heritage. Furthermore, they claimed that the “evidence taken shows that the Dominican people are not averse to work when certain of reasonable reward, but are good and faithful laborers.”49 Because the commission wanted to stress the industriousness of Dominicans, it was important to explain the cause of underdevelopment. To this end, the commission emphasized that constant warfare, not Spanish culture, was to blame as the war with Haiti had imparted a sense of uncertainty about the future and thus discouraged farmers from producing more than they needed.

Given that the job of the commissioners was to report on the potential of the

Dominican Republic and the benefits of annexation, the commissioners made sure to comment extensively on culture and race. As with President Grant’s previous discussion of granting the Dominican Republic statehood, it was important to depict them as anything but black. Though Dominicans were not “pure white,” as the report indicated, they were not “pure black” either, but instead of “mixed blood.” The “majority,” it stated, “were much nearer white than black.” The best way to explain race in the

Dominican Republic was in comparison to Haiti, noting the intrinsic differences between the two halves of the island. In a discussion of the border, the report noted that this boundary line not only divided the island politically but also marked “the separation of different languages, different national trades, characteristics, different modes of holding

49 US Senate, Report of the Commission, 14.

and surveying the soil, different peoples.” In fact, according to the report, Haitians

“differ[ed] widely” from Dominicans because “[n]egro blood preponderates very largely in Hayti; but the pure negro of African type is not common even there. White blood preponderates largely in Dominica, but pure whites, in the popular sense of the word are not numerous.” The commissioners assured their audience that only in Haiti was the

“black race” in “complete ascendancy.” In the Dominican Republic, meanwhile, a more civilized people inhabited the land – a people courteous, hospitable, respectful, and polite. In fact, the commissioners declared their surprise in finding the “physical, mental, and moral condition of the inhabitants . . . much more advanced than had been anticipated.”50

The American media publicized the commission’s findings to the general public.

While newspaper reports tended to be more substantive on the subject, magazines articles dedicated more space to the topic and provided pictures. One of America’s most popular journals, Harper’s Weekly, depicted sketches of the commissioners and a scene from the

Dominican Republic on the cover of their 11 March 1871 edition. Though the piece focused almost exclusively on biographies of the three commissioners, the caption for the sketch and the image itself instructed readers how to view the country. Dominating the bottom third of the cover was a scene of a primitive tropical village with the caption,

“View in San Domingo City – Altar Erected by Columbus.”51 The image was of an unpaved street filled with barefoot, dark-skinned figures and huts with thatched roofs and distant palm trees; in the street children played and a man rode a donkey. At the center of

50 US Senate, Report of the Commission, 13, 15, 28, 3, 15, 13.

51 Harper’s Weekly 15, no. 741, 11 March 1871. 62

the image was a stone structure, a stark contrast to the shacks around it. In front of it, a

Dominican woman bowed down to an altar while her child stood solemnly at her side.

The article maintained that Columbus built the house as a residence for himself and the altar served as a temporary place of worship. Though Columbus constructed the house from “stone and mortar,” the article explained that at present it had crumbling walls and lacked a roof. The reader obtained a sense of history from the sketch and a strong connection with the European past via Columbus – a past that some Dominicans still venerated as evidenced by the woman and her child. However, the commentary that the building itself was in a state of disrepair led the reader to the conclusion that this place,

San Domingo City, had fallen from its previous glory. Further evidence of the deterioration of the city emerged in the crude tropical huts and the shoeless figures that littered the dirt road. Though the article itself did not comment on the race of

Dominicans, the image led the reader to the conclusion that, though they had a Hispanic connection to the past, at present, they possessed darker skin and lived in squalor.

Harper’s Weekly thus presented a narrative that highlighted the historic European roots of the Dominican Republic but questioned its present condition. As the image in Harper’s

Weekly demonstrated, despite the glowing report of the commission extolling the industrious and civilized people in the Dominican Republic, some still doubted the potential of the country and the people, as they could not see them as anything but primitive.

Despite the detailed report of the commission, some senators still doubted their findings. Much like the cartoonist from Harper’s Weekly, there were senators that remained incredulous about the potential of Dominicans. Leading the charge against

Dominican annexation were Senators Charles Sumner from Massachusetts and Justin

Morrill from Vermont. From the beginning of discussions about the Dominican

Republic, Sumner believed annexation jeopardized Haitian independence and was the byproduct of shady commercial and diplomatic dealings.52 Furthermore, as historian

Dennis Hidalgo shows, Sumner adhered to the concept that certain races should remain in geographically determined areas, thus, Dominicans belonged in the tropics rather than the

United States.53 Morrill, however, believed that Dominicans were “unaccustomed to a free Government.”54 He lambasted Dominicans as a worthless people “wholly without education, led in factions by unprincipled and desperate chiefs, destitute of all ambition which a high civilization inspires, reeking in filth and laziness” and never having

“invented anything nor comprehended the use of inventions of others.”55 It was a “vain idea,” he added, to think the United States could “fire the languid brains and torpid muscles of the Dominicans to make sugar, grow coffee, and hack down mahogany

52 Much of this is outlined in Sumner’s December 1870 speech to the US Senate. See Charles Sumner, “Naboth’s Vineyard” (1870) in Naboth’s Vineyard (Washington, DC: F. and J. Rives and George A. Bailey, 1870). Many of the same points Sumner made in his “Naboth’s Vineyard” speech appeared in later speeches published by the press, for example see “San Domingo: Armed Negotiation in Favor of Usurper,” Chicago Tribune, 28 March 28 1871. Dennis Hidalgo also outlined these concepts in his article. See Dennis Hidalgo, “Charles Sumner and the Annexation of the Dominican Republic.”

53 Hidalgo, “Charles Sumner and the Annexation of the Dominican Republic.”

54 Justin Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo” (1871) in Annexation of Santo Domingo (Washington, DC: F. and J. Rives and George A. Baily, 1871), 8.

55 Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo,” 8.

trees.”56 Morrill’s fiery statements challenged the commission’s image of Dominicans as potentially hardworking if given American direction.

In the end, the most vehement arguments from the senators revolved around race.

Like other anti-imperialists of the time, both Sumner and Morrill effectively used racist rhetoric to counter annexationist claims. Relying on theories of scientific racism popular at the time, these anti-imperialists claimed that those who were racially different from whites could never be fully assimilated.57 Ignoring the commission’s claims that

Dominicans were mostly white, unlike their Haitian neighbors, Sumner referred to the entire Caribbean as homogeneous “colored communities” where the “black race was predominant.”58 Morrill concurred, stating that the population was comprised of “mainly descendants of Indians and forty different Africans races.” According to Morrill,

Dominicans were:

A foreign, incompatible race, and never can be homogenous, in manners or customs, language or religion, with our people; because, having a diverse and incoherent origin, and a climate always tending toward effeminacy, they have also for ages been intermixed with a stock which neither learns virtues nor forgets vices, and which clings with the sublimest faith to revolutions and the Catholic priesthood of Santo Domingo.59

56 Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo,” 7.

57 Love, Race Over Empire, 31-32, 55-56. Sumner and Morrill were not the only contributors to this debate as Senator Charles Schurz also relied on the idea that the tropical environment of the Dominican Republic imparted a racial identity on Dominicans that made them incompatible with white Americans. See Fidel Tavárez, “‘The Moral Miasma of the Tropics’: American Imperialism and the Failed Annexation of the Dominican Republic, 1869-1871,” Nuevo Mundo, Mundos Nuevos (2011). Available from: https://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/61771?lang=en.

58 Charles Sumner quoted in Hidalgo, “Charles Sumner and the Annexation of the Dominican Republic,” 59.

59 Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo,” 8. 65

This statement indicated that the United States and the Dominican Republic were diametric opposites and that Dominicans’ Hispanic heritage was partly to blame. In

Morrill’s opinion, rebellions and a blind devotion to Catholicism separated Dominicans from Americans, making the two incompatible. Furthermore, Morrill argued that it made more sense for America to focus its efforts north, incorporating the people of Alaska, for example, because they were of a “kindred stock and tongue” and thus possessed more potential to assimilate. By contrast, Dominicans belonged with Haitians, as Santo

Domingo was “a portion of an island greatly coveted by Hayti, from which it was violently wrenched in 1844 and to which it geographically belongs.”60 Facing a rising chorus against annexation and much to Grant’s chagrin, the topic did not lead to a reconsideration of the 1869 treaty.

With the final defeat of annexation, the Dominican Republic receded as a topic of interest in the American media. Though he had personally traveled with the commissioners in 1871, Samuel Hazard’s book, Santo Domingo: Past and Present, with a Glance at Hayti, was not published until 1873. Much of his book included long passages extracted from the commission’s report extolling the potential of the Dominican

Republic. However, Hazard’s conclusion demonstrated the turn away from the island.

Maintaining that major changes were needed, Hazard conceded that these did not have to come from the United States and, instead, could be carried out by some other

60 Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo,” 18, 9, 10-11.

“progressive Government,” noting the already strong German presence there.61 Previous authors mentioned foreign involvement as further inducement to American intervention; here was just the opposite as Hazard stated that the Germans could easily fulfill the task.

Robert T. Hill’s 1899 work, Cuba and Porto Rico, with the Other Islands of the West

Indies, devoted two chapters to the Dominican Republic, explaining its constant political revolutions and general turmoil as it was “perhaps the most impoverished and backward of the Great Antilles.” Hill’s chapters repeatedly focused on the deterioration of the island, which he claimed began as early as 1540. He stated that the “population is neither savage nor vicious, although its vitality has been greatly sapped by the unfortunate political events.”62 Most notably missing from Hill’s book were statements encouraging

American intervention. This absence was also notable in travel literature. Francis C.

Nicholas’s Around the Caribbean and Across Panama, published in 1903, did not even mention the Dominican Republic.63

Though for a brief period the Dominican Republic retreated from view, its century-old images reemerged in travel literature, the press, and official reports when the subject did. Prominent in early twentieth century depictions of the Dominican Republic were reports of unbounded economic potential, the ability of Dominicans to be transformed, and the overcoming of political failures. Most notable, however, was the

61 Samuel Hazard, Santo Domingo: Past and Present, with a Glance at Hayti (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1873), 469.

62 Robert T. Hill, Cuba and Porto Rico, with the Other Islands of the West Indies (New York: Century, 1899), 236, 253, 258.

63 Francis C. Nicholas, Around the Caribbean and Across Panama (Boston: HM Caldwell Company, 1903). 67

mutability of Dominican culture and race. As American writers and politicians manipulated the race of Dominicans to fit their agendas – making them white when annexation was desired or black when it was not, focusing on Hispanic origins to indicate potential or African ancestry to denote incapacity – the media of the twentieth century followed suit, continuing to mold Dominicans according to their motives.

Conclusion

An analysis of pre-occupation sources reveals common themes essential to the maintenance of US control over the Dominican Republic. Early accounts showed the desire to locate the source of Dominican backwardness, identifying either the legacy of

Spanish colonialism and a Hispanic culture that promoted indolence, or proximity to an uncivilized and barbarous Haiti as the basis for degeneration. Therefore, from the beginning of outside accounts about the island a consistent theme emerged that maintained that Dominicans were highly susceptible to outside influence, molded by those around them rather than agents of their own making. US newspapers and travel literature in the nineteenth century demonstrated the malleability of representations of

Dominican race and culture as they created and reinforced imperial views and stereotypes based on American foreign policy desires. President Grant’s desire to annex the

Dominican Republic initially prompted investigations into the country that highlighted vast economic opportunities and the whiteness of Dominicans who, with American guidance, could realize their full potential. The pushback against the annexationist scheme utilized language to demonstrate the differences between Dominicans, who they claimed were more black than white. The constant shifting in this imperialist narrative

allowed the United States to manipulate their representations of Dominican race and culture to justify their actions. Though the depiction of Dominicans’ race changed over time, as evidenced in the American media, certain aspects of this discourse remained constant. No matter what the objective, US observers continued to view Dominicans as children in need of paternalistic guidance and tutelage. Additionally, the treatment of the

Dominican Republic as a land of untapped economic potential persisted as a prime motivator for American occupation forces.

CHAPTER 3:

“UNCLE SAM’S PERIODICAL BAD MAN”

Commentary in the American media on the economic woes and political instability of the Dominican Republic in the early twentieth century highlighted the utter incapability of Dominicans to effectively administer their country. Writing in 1914,

William D. Boyce recounted the political vicissitudes in the Dominican presidency starting with the dictatorship of Ulises Heureaux in the late 1800s:

Many are the stories they tell of his [Heureaux’s] depravity and cruelty, how he slaughtered those who opposed his wishes and turned over concessions, monopolies, even the customhouse, on receipt of “cash payments.” This reign of terror was brought to a close by a well-placed bullet from the pistol of Caceres, whose father he had murdered. Later on, Caceres himself became President, to meet the same fate at the hand of an assassin.1

In order to emphasize the chaotic state of governance in the country, Boyce characterized the Dominican financial situation as utterly hopeless without the intervention of the

United States.

The Dominicans do hold all records for the scandalous handling of public funds. Soon after they broke away from Spain they started on this mad career, borrowing right and left, until they had piled up a mountain of debt, over $30,000,000 and nothing to show for it! This forty years’ spree was filled, “acrobatically speaking,” with all sorts of daring exhibitions of financial tumbling. From the “hard up” state they slipped down into the “dead broke” class. Then the foreign creditors demanded their money. Their sheriffs were warships. Then the Dominicans appealed to the United States for aid and protection and Uncle Sam threw out a life preserver. This was back in 1905.2

1 William D. Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, Illustrated (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1914), 567.

2 Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, 577.

Like many American writers of the early twentieth century, Boyce related a story of utter incompetence combined with political pandemonium. Stories such as these served as justification for increasing American intervention in the Dominican Republic.

This chapter explores the various ways in which the American media conceptualized Dominicans in the early twentieth century, further emphasizing the crucial link between American foreign policy objectives and representations of

Dominicans in the American media. A major turn appeared in American sources as the desire of US politicians moved away from the annexation plans of the nineteenth century and instead focused on establishing a stable and financially prosperous neighbor. In order to accomplish this, the United States created the Dominican Customs Receivership in 1905, which collected customs duties in an effort to ensure the repayment of foreign loans. During this period the common depiction of Dominicans was one that emphasized their similarities with neighboring Haiti and increasingly showed them as black. When the customs receivership failed to create political stability, American sources shifted their attention from the topic of race to that of corrupt government complete with graft, nepotism, and a penchant for revolutions because, according to these accounts, American intervention could solve these problems. The manipulation of representations of

Dominicans corresponds to Michel Foucault’s idea of a “régime of truth” as these depictions became the “true” image of Dominicans that influenced policies. Moreover, the ease with which they transformed depending on the needs and desires of the United

States demonstrates how and why Americans created this “Other.”3

3 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 131. The

A New Era in American Diplomacy

The Spanish American War of 1898 brought areas of the Caribbean and Pacific under America’s control, generating a greater interest in guarding its newly acquired assets. This desire to protect its latest possessions intensified with the signing of the Hay-

Pauncefote Treaty in 1901, which allowed the United States to build and manage its own canal; the US Senate voted in favor of completing this project in Panama the following year. With places like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Panama in its sightlines, the Caribbean gained in strategic value for the United States, one it was not willing to compromise because of unpaid debt to European creditors. Though the Monroe Doctrine warned

Europeans to stay out of the Western Hemisphere, over the course of the 1800s this had not led to significant US interventions to enforce it. By the turn of the century, however, the United States was finally in a position to act. In December 1902, Venezuelan

President Cipriano Castro failed to pay his country’s foreign loans, leading Italy,

Germany, and Great Britain to enact a naval blockade, which, in turn, prompted the

United States to take action. When a similar situation threatened the Dominican

Republic, the United States, backed by the press, was ready to act.

From 1882 until 1899, Ulises Heureaux ran the Dominican Republic and drove the country deeper into debt. Holding the presidency at various points during his almost two-decade rule, Heureaux’s dictatorial tenure involved attempts at developing infrastructure, expanding military forces, and supporting his lavish lifestyle – much of this financed by foreign creditors. Many of these loans ended up in the hands of the San

Dominican “Other” functioned many times like the Orientalized “Other” as defined by Edward Said. See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

Domingo Improvement Company, an American firm founded in 1893.4 Nonetheless, the government still owed money to creditors in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, the

Netherlands, and France, and the assassination of Heureaux in 1899 revealed the acuteness of the financial situation. With over $30 million in debt, the Dominican government faced a crisis.

The American press reported on the Dominican Republic’s financial woes, highlighting the country’s downfall rather than its economic potential with stories that spoke of a state rife with rebellion and plagued by instability. Most articles that appeared in the New York Times were at most two to three sentences in length, but effectively communicated the dire conditions of the island with headlines such as:

“Revolt in Santo Domingo,” “Another Dominican Revolt,” “Fall of the Dominican

Government Expected,” and “Crisis in Santo Domingo.”5 With the deterioration of governmental strength and the subsequent failure to address foreign debt, European creditors began not only pressuring the Dominican Republic to pay its loans but also threatening it with the possibility of military action. In September 1903 the New York

4 Ellen D. Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 24-25. Alan McPherson also mentioned this company see Alan McPherson, A Short History of US Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 48. See also Cyrus Veeser, A World Safe for Capitalism: Dollar Diplomacy and America’s Rise to Global Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

5 “Revolt in Santo Domingo: Insurgents Capture a Coast Town, but Are Afterward Driven Out – Martial Law Throughout the Country,” New York Times, 1 April 1902; “Another Dominican Revolt: Vice President Vasquez Said to be Leading It – It Is Believed that It Will Be Suppressed,” New York Times, 29 April, 1902; “Fall of the Dominican Government Expected: The Rebels Hold the Whole of the Country Except the Capital and the City of Puerto Plata,” New York Times, 3 May 1902; “Crisis in Santo Domingo: New Government Cannot Last – President Vasquez Mentally Affected,” New York Times, 29 June 1902.

Times ran an article stating the significance of the Monroe Doctrine by arguing that the countries to the south of the United States would quickly learn that it “imposes upon them duties as well as confers upon them rights.”6 No longer would Latin America be a refuge for debtors and it was now time to “lay down the law” in places like the

Dominican Republic. The author of the article feared that Europe would take advantage of the weakened state of affairs there and “make it profitable for themselves.” In response, the author maintained: “We will not allow the exclusive possession or any occupancy of any part of the territory of the republic by any European Power in time of peace, and still less in time of war.”7

From experiences such as those in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, a new policy formed in the United States that would change the way America viewed itself and its role in Latin America. In his State of the Union Address in December 1904, President

Theodore Roosevelt formulated what would later be referred to as the Roosevelt

Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt’s speech emphasized that the United States did not “feel any land hunger” but instead cared about the welfare of other countries in the Western Hemisphere. He assured listeners that those countries that could “act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters,” “keep order,” and most importantly fulfill their financial obligations would win the friendship and support of the

United States. However, in cases of “chronic wrongdoing,” the United States would be forced to intervene in order to protect hemispheric interests and keep European creditors at bay. Roosevelt stated: “All that this country desires to see is the neighboring countries

6 “Laying Down the Law,” New York Times, 21 September 1903, 6.

7 “Laying Down the Law,” 6.

stable, orderly, and prosperous.”8 These words turned the Monroe Doctrine into a belligerent policy in which the United States intervened in Latin America when peace was threatened. Instead of the promotion of annexation to create stability, the Roosevelt

Corollary justified sending in US marines to ensure the payment of debt in countries like the Dominican Republic, signaling the beginning of dollar diplomacy to keep Europe out.9

In an effort to prevent European intervention in the Dominican Republic, in 1904 the United States pushed for an agreement in which US agents would collect customs and handle the repayment of debt. These negotiations produced the Dominican Customs

Receivership in April 1905.10 The American president appointed the head of the receivership, which collected all customs in the country. In order to facilitate the repayment of foreign loans, the receivership reserved fifty-five percent of customs taxes to pay off debts and remitted forty-five percent to the national government.11 This agreement became a formal treaty in 1907 between the Dominican Republic and the

United States with the added stipulations that its entire administration be placed under the

8 Theodore Roosevelt, “Fourth Annual Message to Congress” (speech, Washington, DC, 6 December 1904), TeachingAmericanHistory.Org, http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/roosevelt-corollary-to- monroe-doctrine/.

9 McPherson, A Short History, 61.

10 McPherson, A Short History, 48; Fred J. Rippy, “The Initiation of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic,” Hispanic American Historical Review 17, no. 4 (November 1937), 420.

11 Bruce Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 4.

Bureau of Insular Affairs and that the Dominican government accept a loan of $15 million from a New York bank to pay off all outstanding foreign debt.12

The American desire to restrain European creditors not only influenced major policy decisions like the Roosevelt Corollary and the establishment of the receivership but also elicited language that painted Dominicans as children incapable of self- government and in need of parental care. On 25 December 1904, the New York Times prepared its readers for the possibility of more direct American intervention. Referring to the country as the “little ‘republic,’” placing the word republic in quotation marks, the article emphasized the opinion that governmental functions on the island were a farce.13

The diminutive reference to the Dominican Republic further underscored its immaturity and child-like nature. Though the Times assured their readers that financial issues would not dredge up President Grant’s old plans of annexation, it did note that the United States would take on a more active role in the Dominican Republic to help establish a “decent

Government.” In another article, the Times accentuated the need for American guidance, stating that the receivership was a necessary step because the United States had to “guard these countries in the south against the ultimate consequences of their own misbehavior.”

Echoing President Roosevelt’s speech, the article contended that the holding of a “big stick” via the Monroe Doctrine allowed the United States to “constrain our neighbors to

12 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 4.

13 “May Seize Santo Domingo: Occupation for Debt Believed in Washington to be Near,” New York Times, 25 December 1904, 1.

the performance of their international duties.”14 According to the author, “Santo

Domingo seems to stand in need of good advice.”15

The Dominican Customs Receivership marked a new beginning in the relationship between the United States and the Dominican Republic, one increasingly depicted as paternalistic. In effort to bring financial solvency to the island, the United

States was like a parent patiently guiding its wayward child – and not a child of just any race. In December 1904, the New York Tribune referred to the Dominican Republic as a

“mulatto baby just about sixty years old, but exceedingly small for its age.”16 Before

American intervention, debts went unpaid because, since its birth, the Dominican

Republic “suffered from internal disorders that have wasted its strength and stunted its growth.”17 Similarly, in January 1905, the Spokane Press reported that the Dominican

Republic had been historically “torn by revolution, misgoverned and despoiled” and was now to “feel the chastening influence of the ‘big stick.’”18 With its new authority, the

United States would order the Dominican Republic “to pay its debts and be good.”19

Taking the metaphor of the unruly child even farther, the St. Paul Globe referred to the

Dominican Republic as “Uncle Sam’s New Ward,” a country with so much trouble that

14 “Dominica's Adviser,” New York Times, 21 January 1905, 8.

15 “Dominica's Adviser,” 8.

16 “The Mulatto Republic,” New York Tribune, 11 December 1904, 4.

17 “The Mulatto Republic,” 4.

18 Jacob Waldeck, “A US Receivership for Santo Domingo,” Spokane Press, 10 January 1905, 3.

19 Waldeck, “A US Receivership for Santo Domingo,” 3.

the United States had been compelled to “Put [it] Over Our Knee and Spank [it] in Order to Make it Good.”20 In an article for New England Magazine, reprinted in the

Washington newspaper the National Tribune, American author Winthrop Packard referred to Dominicans as a “semi-barbarous but simple and child-like people.”21

Packard stated that Dominicans should be “regarded as children; good children in the main, and perhaps capable of growing up, but needing for the present, and possibly for a good while to come, a strong guiding hand.”22

The depiction of the Dominican Republic as a child in this period was joined with a shift in the portrayal of race. Whereas the pro-annexationist literature of late 1800s highlighted the whiteness and Hispanic roots of the country, the rhetoric of the receivership period harkened back to anti-annexationist portrayals of the Dominican

Republic that focused on blackness and a lack of civilization. The St. Paul Globe maintained that Dominicans were “rotting away” and that their constant revolutions reduced the population to “acute misery” resulting in a people that had “practically reverted to African savagery” as “most of the evidence of Spanish civilization had been swept away.”23 Other articles noted the scarcity of whites on the eastern half of the island or emphasized the degeneration of the people by underscoring the peculiar racial

20 “Uncle Sam’s New Ward, Turbulent Little Santo Domingo,” St. Paul Globe, 19 February 1905, 31.

21 Winthrop Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” National Tribune, 15 March 1906, 8. This article was a reprint of Packard’s piece with the same title in New England Magazine. See Winthrop Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” New England Magazine 34, no. 1 (March 1906), 3-16.

22 Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” 8.

23 “Uncle Sam’s New Ward,” 31.

mixture of the population.24 In his piece in the New England Magazine, Packard argued that miscegenation had not led to “a race, but a mongrel” lacking virility and the physical stamina to be productive.25 Packard claimed that the majority of the population was

“semi-savage” and lived in “feudal times.”26

In contrast to the literature of the annexation period, which stressed the differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, newspaper reports in the early

1900s conflated the two. The American press attributed voodoo ceremonies, human sacrifice, and cannibalism to the Dominican Republic in an effort to emphasize its savagery and African roots. The Washington Post quoted extensively from Professor

Jesse Walter Fawkes from the Bureau of Ethnology in a 1903 article. Fawkes stated that, although everyone in the Dominican Republic claimed to be Catholic, this was merely a façade because “beneath this surface, lies the paganism of old Africa, with its human sacrifices, cannibalism, obscene rites and ceremonies, every bit as strong, if not stronger, than it is or ever was in the depths of the African forest.”27 In another piece published in

The World To-Day, a monthly magazine offering original content and color imagery in its coverage of world events, author Sigmund Krausz questioned the extent of voodooism in the Dominican Republic, arguing that, although Dominicans likely did not participate in human sacrifice or cannibalism, “there is truth in the horrible stories of the survival of

24 “Waving Big Stick Over San Domingo,” Times Dispatch, 29 January 1905, 1. “The Mulatto Republic,” 4.

25 Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” 8.

26 Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” 8.

27 “Santo Domingo Voodooism,” Washington Post, 17 May 1903, 11.

fetish worship in the remoter districts of Santo Domingo.”28 Addressing the long history of differentiating between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the New York Times claimed that, even though Dominicans maintained that they were different from their neighbors, “it is the reverse of creditable for a white republic to have conducted its affairs in about the same way as those of the black republic.”29

Cartoon representations of Dominicans in the early 1900s allowed the American public to identify swiftly the blackness and backwardness of the island through a series of racially loaded images.30 Most cartoons depicted their Dominican subject as both child- like and black, the pickaninny figure, an image used to illustrate Cubans, Puerto Ricans,

28 Sigmund Krausz, “Santo Domingo, the Home of Revolution,” The World To- Day 8 (July 1, 1904-January 1, 1905), 1029.

29 “Topics of the Times: An Island with Possibilities,” New York Times, 24 January 1905, 8.

30 On the value of cartoons as an historical source see Thomas Mitton Kemnitz, “The Cartoon as a Historical Source,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 4, no.1 (Summer 1973): 81-93. For a specific analysis of cartoons about Latin America see John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980). Cartoons played a key role in shaping Americans views of Cubans during the Spanish American War as well. On American media at that time see Bonnie M. Miller, From Liberation to Conquest: The Visual and Popular Cultures of the Spanish-American War of 1898 (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011). On the various imagery Americans associated with Cuba see Louis A. Pérez Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). For pictorial representations in the Philippines (including cartoons and photographs) see Servando D. Halili, Iconography of the New Empire: Race and Gender Images and the American Colonization of the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2006); Kent Worcester, “Introduction: Symposium on Editorial Cartoons,” Political Science & Politics 40, no. 2 (2007): 223-227; Roland Sintos Coloma, “‘Destiny Has Thrown the Negro and the Filipino under the Tutelage of America’: Race and Curriculum in the Age of Empire,” Curriculum Inquiry 39, no. 4 (September 2009): 459-519; Nerissa S. Balce, Body Parts of Empire: Visual Abjection, Filipino Images, and the American Archive (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016).

Haitians, Chamorros, and Hawaiians in this same period.31 The pickaninny figure possessed stereotypical features including engorged lips, kinky hair, and ink black skin.

These physical qualities along with a child-like stature pointed to a subject that was immature and possessed animal-like features that hinted at a wild and savage disposition.

As sociologist Kelvin Santiago-Valles articulated in his analysis of cartoon images of

American empire, the pickaninny body presented both a child-like copy of an adult and a parody of a civilized white body, a representation that communicated the need for tutelage and instruction.32 Furthermore, the use of the pickanniny to represent multiple, diverse groups in the Caribbean, Pacific, and the American South relayed the notion that

“no specialized or socio-culturally specific expertise is required to instruct and administer” these people.33 Thus, American viewers could readily contextualize

Dominicans through cartoons that made them little different than the more familiar images of Cubans, Puerto Ricans, or even African Americans from the southern United

States.

The St. Paul Pioneer Press published two cartoons by illustrator George W.

Rehse in 1904 and 1906 that reinforced the conceptualization of the Dominican Republic as a black, uncontrollable child in need of American supervision. A 1904 cartoon showed Uncle Sam leaning out the window of house with the letters “U.S.” over the door.

Outside, a shoeless black child with a ratty straw hat emboldened with the words “San

31 See Kelvin Santiago-Valles, “’Still Longing for de Old Plantation’: The Visual Parodies and Racial National Imagery of US Overseas Expansion, 1898-1903,” American Studies International 37, no. 3 (October 1999): 18-43.

32 Santiago-Valles, “’Still Longing for de Old Plantation,’” 31.

33 Santiago-Valles, “’Still Longing for de Old Plantation,’” 33.

Domingo” threw a temper tantrum in the street. One of the child’s hands was clenched in a fist and the other held a straight razor with the word “revolution” on its blade. The caption read, “Uncle Sam: ‘Maybe I’ll have to bring the boy into the house to keep him quiet.’”34 Rehse drew the “boy” or San Domingo as a typical pickaninny figure. Clearly needing the discipline of the mature and stable Uncle Sam, the cartoon conveyed the idea that the unruly Dominican might have to be brought under American supervision to keep him calm and orderly. A similar depiction appeared in a 1906 cartoon entitled: “Uncle

Sam’s Periodical Bad Man.” Here, Rehse’s Dominican once again wielded a straight razor while his other hand clutched a bottle of “Revolution Gin” which clearly made him drunk as he stumbled off-kilter down the street in an attempt to avoid a truncheon- brandishing Uncle Sam dressed in a policeman’s uniform.35 Again, represented as the pickaninny, the Dominican figure wore a sombrero with the words “Santo Domingo” on its brim, complete with ragged clothes held together with a safety pin and bare feet that appeared to be dirty because they left footprints on the pavement. Drunk on revolution,

Santo Domingo needed the discipline a mature, sober Uncle Sam could provide.

Other cartoonists utilized the pickaninny image to depict the Dominican Republic as disobedient and plagued by revolution. Robert Satterfield’s 1904 image showed “San

Domingo” raising a sword and pistol over his head as he stormed forward in a cloud forming the word “Revolution” around him. Uncle Sam gazed down on him, four-times

34 George W. Rehse, “Uncle Sam: ‘Maybe I’ll have to bring the boy into the house to keep him quiet,’” in Cartoon in John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 183.

35 George W. Rehse, “Uncle Sam’s Periodical Bad Man,” in John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 189.

as large and dressed in a police uniform with a billy club near his hand and a harsh look on his face. The cartoon’s caption read, “Revolution number sixty-seven is now in progress in San Domingo, and Uncle Sam is, as usual keeping an eye on ‘American interests.’”36 Charles G. Bush’s 1904 cartoon, “The Strenuous One Will Catch You, If

You Don’t Watch Out!” conveyed a similar message. In this cartoon, two faceless

“revolutionists” sat atop a giant watermelon with the word “San Domingo” on it as they carved up the fruit with their machetes. Their wide-brimmed hats and completely blackened faces obscured all facial features. A giant Theodore Roosevelt smiled above them with what appeared to be a bucket ready to scoop them up.37 The image of the watermelon, a common feature of cartoons depicting African Americans, reminded readers that Dominicans were black. Yet again, the larger American figure, in this case,

President Roosevelt, was ready to rescue Dominicans from their own infighting.

With these powerful images, cartoonists instantaneously conveyed a representation of the Dominican Republic that the American press pushed since 1903.

This depiction presented Dominicans as financially insolvent, incapable of self- governance, prone to revolutions, child-like, and unruly. The easiest way to convey this narrative to the American public was to make Dominicans black. The American media accomplished this racial transformation in articles that spoke of voodoo practices and

African primitiveness and in cartoons that portrayed Dominicans as pickaninnies that

36 Bob Satterfield, “Revolution number sixty-seven is now in progress in San Domingo, and Uncle Sam is, as usual keeping an eye on ‘American interests,’” in Tacoma Times, 17 February 1904, 4.

37 Charles G. Bush, “The Strenuous One Will Catch You, If You Don’t Watch Out!” in John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 185.

were disobedient, drunk, violent, and in need of parental control. This shift in the rendering of Dominicans demonstrated the plasticity of race as the American media changed Dominicans depending on national and individual objectives. The media stressed Hispanic heritage and whiteness when annexation was the goal – these

Dominicans had the potential to be industrious because deep down, they were European.

However, when the desire to take over the island was no longer the objective, and the

United States instead wanted a stable neighbor that paid its debts and allowed the US to control its customs, the Dominican people became black. As with US images of Cuba,

Hawaii, or Puerto Rico, blackness conveyed the idea that white Americans had to oversee these groups because they were immature, unstable, and ultimately incapable of managing their own affairs, a characterization that perfectly fit with already existing paternalistic assumptions in the United States.

The Island of Misrule

With the customs receivership in place in 1905, rosy reports appeared in

American newspapers justifying US actions with accounts of growing income, debt repayment, and political calm, all fortifying the paternalistic narrative that Dominicans needed American guidance. The New York Times informed readers that Dominicans were “supremely happy” and that political stability dominated the island as “revolutions that were threatened three months ago never materialized, and there are peace and quiet in the whole country.”38 Another article praised the receivership because of the rapid increase in customs duties and the ability to pay off hundreds of thousands of dollars in

38 “Santo Domingo Happy with Our Collectors,” New York Times, 3 June 1905, 8.

foreign debt.39 An even more positive assessment appeared in the San Francisco Sunday

Call in November 1911 claiming that the receivership produced a magical transformation in the Dominican Republic. “In Santo Domingo, Uncle Sam has waved the wand that produces national transformation, and lo! a republic has appeared where government is of the people, peace assured, prosperity perennial.”40 The New York newspaper the Sun commented on the ability of the Dominican Republic to finally meet its financial obligations thanks to American oversight. This had, in turn, led to internal improvements in the country such as the construction of “good roads” and “clean streets, properly lighted” with “harbor improvements” on the way.41 These assessments of the merits of the receivership highlighted the ability of the United States to ensure financial security, internal development, and a stable government – components that had remained elusive without American involvement.

Missing from most American press reports, however, were details about the actual political situation in the country. Though the press attributed the onset of stability and order in the Dominican Republic to the receivership, it failed to credit Dominican

President Ramón de Cáceres for much of the calm in the country. Elected in 1906, de

Cáceres proved to be not only a popular leader in the Dominican Republic but also a long-tenured one when compared to the chaotic political situation following the

39 “Domingan Income Growing,” New York Times, 16 September 1905, 6.

40 “How Uncle Sam May Stop the Scrapping and Pull the Central American Republics Out of the Hole,” San Francisco Sunday Call, 11 November 1911.

41 “Santo Domingo in Uncle Sam’s Care,” Sun, 14 April 1912.

assassination of President Heureaux in 1899.42 De Cáceres’s own assassination in

November 1911 brought an end to peace and, once again, revolution returned to the

Dominican Republic, bringing with it at least eight separate administrations over the course of the next five years.43

Though de Cáceres was out, the receivership remained, and now the American press had to explain the return of political turbulence. The solution to this dilemma came in the form of returning to the old trope of bad government. For example, American author Frederic J. Haskin maintained in his 1912 article for the Washington paper the

Evening Star that, although US officials had hoped that the customs agreement would put an end to revolutions, this was not possible as Dominican politicians cared more about greed, nepotism, and power than peace.44 Reporters like Haskin and travel writers from this period continued to ignore the political intricacies of the Dominican Republic, and more importantly how US demands undermined the authority of Dominican politicians.

At various points between 1911 and 1916, the United States sent in marines, threatened to cut off customs funds, forced the resignation of constitutionally elected leaders, and attempted to impose reforms that placed more power in the hands of American officials who could operate above Dominican supervision.45 In the end, this side of the story did not end up in the American media; instead, the focus returned to the supposed quality of

Dominican political incompetence.

42 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 4, 5.

43 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 5.

44 Frederic J. Haskin, “Caribbean Politics,” Evening Star, 14 May 1912, 10.

45 On these complexities see Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 5-7.

Throughout 1914 the American media shifted from commentary on race and economic potential to an almost exclusive focus on the instability of the Dominican government. In part, this rhetorical adjustment reflected the chaotic political situation following de Cáceres’s assassination, though very few if any sources actually noted this fact. However, by creating a narrative in which revolution and political volatility almost seemed to be part of the Dominican national character, American sources validated the need for further action beyond just controlling customs. For example, the magazine New

Outlook praised the receivership for its success in doubling Dominican revenue but also noted that financial turmoil was a product of “revolutions and incompetent and dishonest administration” that had continually plagued the country.46 The Chicago publication The

Day Book characterized both Haiti and the Dominican Republic as troublesome areas due to the “reign of rapine and anarchy.”47 In a discussion of sending US marines to the island, the Sun stated the necessity of this action since Haiti and the Dominican Republic had suffered from at least a century of “barbaric internal warfare” and were both “filled with corruption.”48 A piece that appeared both in the West Virginia newspaper the Daily

Telegram and in Vermont’s Burlington Weekly Free Press referred to the Dominican

Republic as “the island of revolutions” and even claimed that it was “the official program of Santo Domingo.” The two papers agreed that it was “quite difficult to keep an

46 “Our Work in Santo Domingo,” New Outlook, 3 January 1914, 618.

47 “US to Step Into Hayti and Santo Domingo,” The Day Book, 14 July 1914.

48 “US Control of Caribbean Sea Now Menaced,” Sun, 19 July 1914, 1.

accurate account of the number of revolutions that have taken place in the pugnacious little Republic.”49

Further underscoring the persistent narrative of the Dominican Republic as a land of revolution, the magazine Literary Digest ran a piece in August 1914 maintaining the similarities of the country with Haiti. Noting the need to protect the Panama Canal and keep the Germans at bay, possibly because of the outbreak of World War I, the author worried that the two Caribbean nations were “going to pieces” owing to “endless

‘barbaric internal warfare.’” Despite constant diplomatic attempts, the need for armed intervention to “enforce order and safeguard life” was imminent.50 To further relay the dire situation, two cartoons appeared alongside the article. In one, Uncle Sam had a small pickaninny child labeled Haiti in his lap. Throwing a fit at being spoon-fed medicine, Uncle Sam laments in the caption, “Gosh! I’m getting’ tired of stoppin’ these internal disturbances.” In the other cartoon, President Woodrow Wilson appeared as a teacher at the front of a classroom labeled “School for Young Republics.” In the background, racialized pupils read a book entitled “New Freedom,” while Wilson chastised Santo Domingo. Dressed in a soldier’s uniform, the small pickaninny figure of

Santo Domingo fussily rubbed his face with one hand while the other clutched a sword.

To emphasize the role of Wilson as disciplinarian, in one hand he held a switch and in the other he gripped a figure representing Mexico by the collar. The cartoon communicated the essential idea that the United States, here depicted as President Wilson, was a

49 “Something About Santo Domingo,” Daily Telegram, 15 August 1914. This exact same article appeared in September in the Burlington Weekly Free Press, see “Something About Santo Domingo,” Burlington Weekly Free Press, 17 September 1914.

50 “Quieting Haiti and Santo Domingo,” Literary Digest 49, part I (1 August 1914), 179.

disciplinary force in Latin America, tutoring “young republics” and teaching them how to behave. Unlike purely written sources that avoided race, the cartoons accompanying the article continued to rely on a stereotypical depiction of the Dominican Republic.

The tendency to concentrate on the shortcomings of the Dominican government continued in travel literature and reinforced the justification for American involvement.

Famous for his role as the founder of the Boy Scouts of America, William D. Boyce was also an avid traveler, publishing his views on America’s role in the world in 1914’s

United States Colonies and Dependencies, Illustrated. For Boyce, the Dominican

Republic or the “foster-child of Uncle Sam” was a land dominated by revolutions and greed. Upon rowing up the Ozama River from the bay, he joked that the price the boatman attempted to exact was outrageous because, after all, they were not called

“DOUGHminicans” for nothing. Boyce recalled the accumulation of debt under

President Heureaux noting that after winning their independence from Spain, Dominican officials continuously borrowed from foreign creditors amassing “a mountain of debt over $30,000,000.” As creditors demanded payments Dominicans could not make, the government turned to the United States for aid and protection. Boyce noted that since the establishment of the receivership in 1905, swift and vast improvements abounded. The capital now possessed telephones, electricity, and paved streets for their new automobiles.51 The emphasis here was that this had all been possible because of

American intervention.

For Boyce and other travelers he spoke with while in the Dominican Republic, the real issue was the corrupt politicians who had caused their country to become so

51 Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, 566-567, 567, 572.

backward. These politicians “jail people on trumped up charges” and, in the rural areas, jefes or “petty rulers” embezzled directly from the people. Interviewing an American who had been working on a sugar plantation there for the last eight years, he asked him what was wrong with the Dominican Republic. The man replied that it was a rich, fertile land that could support millions rather than just thousands. However, the real issue was politics. According to the sugar man, “Trouble is, they all want to be President, even if they get shot for it. They certainly did need us Americans down here to count the cash.”

Boyce’s interviewee feared that, if the United States terminated its current position of controlling customs in the Dominican Republic, then “the politicians will get their grip on the treasury [and] there will be a revival of the dear old business of killing each other.”

According to Boyce, what the Dominicans needed was more American supervision rather than less. Here was a people used to “small rations and the smell of gunpowder,” and without American mediation, the situation would never improve.52

Boyce’s opinion toward all countries explored in the book, not just the Dominican

Republic, was one that focused on the necessity of American intervention. From the outset, Boyce set the tone by reminding his readers that “every square foot of the soil that now constitutes our country and its colonies once was owned or claimed by some foreign power. That it finally became the home of self-governing people has been the largest and most hope-inspiring of all facts.” Boyce waxed paternalistic as he claimed that, “in our colonies” the role of the United States “is to protect and hold and train them to become self-governing units.” In this context, American involvement in the Dominican Republic appeared not as an opportunistic power move on the part of the United States, but instead,

52 Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, 577, 593, 594.

as a benevolent mission in which to improve the country and make it like the United

States. The biggest obstacle to this was bad government. Though Boyce briefly mentioned race, calling the country the “Black and Tan Republic,” and noted its racial diversity, the focus remained on governmental failures, a problem Boyce believed the

United States could fix.53

This conceptualization of the Dominican Republic as a land plagued by political turmoil continued in A. Hyatt Verrill’s Porto Rico Past and Present and San Domingo of

To-Day, published in 1914. Verrill was a well-traveled author, illustrator, and explorer with a passion for zoology and writing science fiction. His journeys took him all over the

Western Hemisphere, with considerable time spent in the Caribbean, particularly in

Puerto Rico, where he lived for some time. Verrill claimed that the Dominican “fondness for revolutions” was both their national pastime and one of their few native customs.

Though, like Boyce, Verrill largely avoided the topic of race, he seemed to argue that a sort of bloodthirstiness and disposition toward violence were part of the Spanish colonial heritage: “Here was shed the first blood of Europeans in conflict with the Indians.” If the

Dominican Republic were to rise to greatness, according to Verrill, it would have to transcend a past in which it had been “baptised in blood, civilised by ruthless slaughter of countless thousands of human beings, and for centuries … torn with massacres, revolutions, and warfare.” Verrill claimed that these early atrocities were further exacerbated by the wars for independence, first against Spain and then Haiti, which predisposed Dominicans to belligerency. According to Verrill, these struggles “infected

[Dominicans] with the ‘insurrecto’ germ, they cannot overcome their tendency to revolt

53 Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, xi, 566, 572.

on any and every occasion … their effect upon the progress and welfare of the country is incalculable.” This of course led to financial problems, as peasants became soldiers, leaving behind farms and hindering the economic development of the country. The frequency of revolutions and fighting had also led to a lack of foreign loans because investors believed this to be a highly unstable area.54

Like those before him, Verrill compared the Dominican Republic with Haiti, explaining the vast differences between the two countries in terms of “habits, manners, people, and language.”55 However, despite this distinction, Verrill maintained that one feature applied to both countries: “They are torn by frequent revolutions and have not yet learned that peace spells prosperity.”56 Other sources argued that Haiti and the

Dominican Republic were more alike than different in terms of their political instability.

In 1915, the Sun reported that, since independence, both countries had been “in a state of constant upheaval and bloodshed as the result of a practically unbroken succession of revolutions.”57 There was no way this could go without action any longer and no one can deny that they needed “nothing short of absolute control by the United States under some sort of protectorate or regency.”58

54 A. Hyatt Verrill, Porto Rico Past and Present and San Domingo of To-Day (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1914), 235, xx, xxi, 235, 235-236.

55 Verrill, Porto Rico Past and Present, 227.

56 Verrill, Porto Rico Past and Present, 228.

57 “Hard Problems for US in Hayti and Santo Domingo,” Sun, 1 August 1915, 1.

58 “Hard Problems,” 1.

By December 1914, the political chaos in the Dominican Republic appeared to be dwindling with the election of President Juan Isidro Jimenes, but continued pressure by

American officials eventually toppled Jimenes’s government. For years, the United

States had been trying to get the Dominican government to agree to expand American control. In addition to the receivership, the United States wanted to place two American officials within the Dominican government. Both appointed by the US president, one would serve as the director of public works and the other would be a financial adviser who would establish a national budget and authorize all public expenditures. Moreover, the United States wanted to enlarge the authority of the customs receivership by having it collect and control internal revenue.59 American demands further intensified as US officials wanted to expand the powers of the financial advisor and disband the Dominican armed forces in favor of a constabulary controlled by a person selected by the US president.60 Though Jimenes accepted these terms, the Dominican Congress did not, and, instead of pulling back, the United States stood firm, willing to send in military forces to ensure their requests. The situation continued to devolve, and by 1916 Jimenes had few moves left. Though the US was willing to back him militarily, Jimenes did not want the

US to send in troops. With little support in his own government, in the spring of 1916, the Dominican Congress passed a resolution to impeach Jimenes, leading to the landing of US marines in May 1916.61

59 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 6.

60 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 7.

61 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 8. The continued pressure of American officials and their increasing demands in the early twentieth century fits well with the transition from informal to formal imperialism as defined by John Gallagher and Ronald

Limited coverage on the Jimenes administration appeared in the American press; instead, US sources continued to express generalizations about bad government. For example, the New York Times published very short articles on events in the Dominican

Republic throughout the first half of 1916, relating basic details about political events and noting the impending impeachment of Jimenes and the likelihood of sending in US marines to protect the American legation.62 Notably absent from the articles in the Times was any mention of the demands placed on Jimenes by US officials. In its place, articles persisted in publicizing the narrative of misrule. Noting the similarities between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the Clarksburg Daily Telegram referred to the two countries as “Siamese Twins.” Maintaining that revolutions in the two republics went on

“seemingly forever,” the Telegram quoted from a National Geographic report that claimed that Haiti and the Dominican Republic “have followed each other like birds of passage, flight, assassination and forcible removal from office being the rule rather than the exception.”63

By May 1916 the United States had occupied Haiti for almost a year, and articles suggested that a similar fate would soon benefit its troubled neighbor. The Washington

Robinson, see Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review 6, no.1 (1953): 1-15.

62 See New York Times, 3 May 1916, 5; “General Jimines [sic] Impeached,” New York Times, 3 May 1916, 10; “Warns Santo Domingo Our Marines May Land,” New York Times, 5 May 1916, 1; New York Times, 7 May 1916, 7; “Dominican President Quits Under Pressure,” New York Times, 8 May 1916; 11. “More Marines Landed,” New York Times, 9 May 1916, 8. Other American newspapers besides the Times had little if anything to say about the Dominican Republic.

63 “’Siamese Twins’ in the Family of Nations,” Clarksburg Daily Telegram, 18 May 1916, 8.

newspaper the Sunday Star supported this proposition in an article by American author

Charles M. Pepper. Pepper claimed that the Dominican Republic was the sight of constant marine landings simply because of the “persistence of revolutionary factions” in the country.64 Arguing that the Dominican Republic was just like other Latin American states, Pepper contended that politicians there only wanted “to control revenue and ignore the welfare of the masses.”65 As further testament for the need for American intervention, Pepper described the benefits of the US protectorate in Haiti, maintaining that it was “not an invasion of Haitian sovereignty, because it is accepted by the bulk of the Haitian population.”66 The New York Times concurred that Haiti was a shining example of American success in the Caribbean. In an article in September 1916, the

Times reminded readers that the United States was not interested in taking over territory in foreign countries, but instead embarked upon projects like that in Haiti at a huge personal cost. Affirming the humanitarian objective, the article claimed: “Our purpose has been to aid these neighbors, not to take any of their possessions, to exercise a controlling influence in their elections, or in any way to subject them to the domination of the United States.”67 As the American presence in the Dominican Republic grew, eventually leading to the proclamation of the US occupation in November 1916, the narrative in the American media continued to stress the beneficent nature of US

64 Charles M. Pepper, “Santo Domingo and Intervention by the United States,” Sunday Star, 28 May 1916.

65 Pepper, “Santo Domingo and Intervention.”

66 Pepper, “Santo Domingo and Intervention.”

67 “Help for Our Neighbors,” New York Times, 1 September 1916, 6.

intervention, that, as the Times noted, had been conducted in a “fatherly way, to help a country tormented by chronic revolution.”68

Conclusion

US newspapers and travel literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrated the plasticity of images about Dominican race and culture as they created and reinforced imperial views and stereotypes. When annexationist schemes failed and

American foreign policy shifted to dollar diplomacy, the American media claimed that

Dominicans were more like their Haitian neighbors in their tendency toward revolution and their African ancestry. In this way, American sources contended that the United

States had to take on the role of a father figure in assisting the child-like republic on the path to financial solvency and political tranquility. As the political situation devolved, particularly after the assassination of President de Cáceres in 1911, the narrative once again adapted with a sharpened focus on the so-called intrinsic revolutionary tendencies of Dominicans. With this depiction firmly in place, the United States continued their intervention in Dominican political affairs, landing marines in May 1916 and eventually establishing the occupation government in November of that year.

The constant shifting in this imperialist narrative allowed the United States to manipulate their representations of Dominican race and culture to justify their actions.

Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the media portrayed

Dominicans as white or black in order to suit foreign policy needs. Though the depiction of Dominicans’ race changed over time, as evidenced in the American media, certain

68 “Help for Our Neighbors,” 6.

aspects of this discourse remained constant. No matter what the objective, the United

States continued to view Dominicans as children in need of paternalistic guidance and tutelage. Additionally, the treatment of the Dominican Republic as a land of untapped economic potential persisted as a prime motivator for American occupation forces.

Throughout the years of American military rule these narratives established throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to thrive in the American media as variations on Dominicans’ race and culture shifted according to the political exigencies of the time.

PART II

NARRATIVES OF THE OCCUPATION –

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIANISM, 1916-1924

Part II of this dissertation examines two crucial ideas that helped justify and sustain the American occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. The narrative of underdevelopment relied on the classical conceptualization of the Dominican

Republic as a land of political chaos, constant revolution, and indebtedness. Though this theme was not new, as it had been present from the outset of travel literature about the eastern half of the island written by both foreign and American sources, its longevity and endurance demonstrate that it was the primary filter through which the United States viewed the Dominican Republic. This was especially significant given that previous discussions about race that had dominated the pre-occupation period were largely absent during the initial years of military rule. Added to this traditional account was a new humanitarian component that revealed more about what the United States thought about itself than how it viewed Dominicans. Although the American media had employed language noting the altruism and benevolent sacrifice of the United States in areas like

Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines since 1898, this rhetoric did not enter the discussion about the Dominican Republic until 1916. The paucity of this discourse prior to 1916 suggests that in this period, only in cases of direct occupation did the United

States employ this rationale. The two narratives of underdevelopment and humanitarianism worked in tandem to create a problem and a solution; underdevelopment identified the cause of the Dominican Republic’s problems and American

humanitarianism solved key issues as the United States could point to specific projects as evidence of its success.

CHAPTER 4:

A PRIMITIVE PEOPLE, AN UNDERDEVELOPED ISLAND

Though published a year before the American occupation of the Dominican

Republic, Roger Ward Babson’s The Future of South America conveyed the common conceptualization that the country was a political, social, and economic backwater.

The people are uneducated; the cities are dirty; communication is practically nil, and the entire island looks like a deserted, but once beautiful garden. Of course the government is wretched; there are no conveniences or modern improvements, and it is the last place where one would want to bring up a family. Paradoxical as it may seem, the capital of Santo Domingo, or Santo Domingo City, is both the oldest and the most backward city of the Western Hemisphere . . . It is interesting to realize that the first land discovered in this hemisphere will probably be the last to be developed. At any rate, it is to-day the most backward place in this section of the world.1

Babson’s description was not meant to deter American interest in the Dominican

Republic but rather to encourage it. His vivid account hinged on the idea that though this was a backward and underdeveloped country, it was ripe for the adventurous man looking for investment opportunities. Other American sources dating to this period similarly emphasized the primitive state of the Dominican Republic – a land desperately in need of outside control and guidance.

This chapter argues that American media sources portrayed the Dominican

Republic as primitive and backward to justify and sustain the occupation. The narrative of underdevelopment relied on the classical conceptualization of the Dominican Republic as a land of political chaos, constant revolution, and indebtedness. Though this theme was not new, as it had been present from the outset of travel literature about the eastern

1 Roger Ward Babson, The Future of South America (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915), 47-48, 48.

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half of the island, its longevity and endurance demonstrate that it was the primary filter through which the United States viewed the Dominican Republic. This was especially significant given that previous discussions about race that had dominated the pre- occupation period were largely absent during the initial years of military rule. This chapter examines the establishment of the occupation and its portrayal in the American media and investigates underdevelopment as American sources continued to focus on misrule, revolution, and debt as an explanation for the backwardness and primitiveness of the Dominican Republic’s land and people. By focusing on these particular areas, once the occupation was underway, American officials had a clear blueprint for projects that centered on combatting problems such as political discord, public health, and the lack of infrastructure as the United States claimed that it was battling against underdevelopment in the Dominican Republic.

Establishing the American Occupation

As 1916 unfolded, the political situation in the Dominican Republic rapidly devolved, leading to the landing of US troops in May. Though the United States was willing to bring in forces “to suppress insurrection and maintain order” if requested,

Dominican President Juan Isidro Jimenes did not want American forces sent in.2

However, the president had little support in his own government as Congress passed a resolution to impeach him on 1 May. Four days later, American ships landed, and

Jimenes resigned just two days later on 7 May. As armed revolutionaries amassed under

2 “Secretary of State (Lansing) to Minister Russell,” January 24, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 220-221.

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the control of Minister of War Desiderio Arias, the United States claimed to be sending in marines to protect the American legation and consulate in Santo Domingo as well as

American citizens there who might be in danger.3 In reality, a major fear was of a

Dominican Republic headed by Arias, a man both the American government and media considered anti-American.4 US forces gave Arias an ultimatum: Surrender by 15 May or face American occupation and war.5 To avoid confrontation, Arias and his supporters evacuated the city and US troops moved in. Rather than support elections to fill the vacant presidency, American officials worried that such an action would only give more power to Arias, who was likely to garner a majority of the votes. Furthermore, if Arias were to win, officials believed this would contradict the American policy of not tolerating revolutions in the region.6 For many American officials, allowing Arias to control the

Dominican Republic amounted to supporting the exact political culture that Americans had always equated with the Dominican Republic.

Following the end of President Jimenes’s tenure, instability ensued as Dominican politicians struggled amongst themselves. Additionally, American officials refused to support any presidential candidate who would not acquiesce to their demands of allowing the United States to control internal revenue, the national budget, and the Dominican

3 “Minister Russell to American Legation,” May 3, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 223.

4 “Military Rule Proclaimed in Santo Domingo,” Aberdeen Daily American, 1 December 1916, 4. “Put Santo Domingo Under Martial Law,” New York Times, 1 December 1916, 1.

5 “Admiral Caperton to Secretary of Navy,” May 13, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 226.

6 “Minister Russell to Secretary of State (Lansing),” May 15, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 227.

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military.7 To fill the vacant executive, Congress agreed on a compromise candidate,

Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, the Supreme Court’s chief justice. However, the United

States would not support Henríquez y Carvajal because he had made it clear that he would not accept American demands. When it was revealed that his political opponents colluded with Americans to arrest his own supporters, Henríquez y Carvajal withdrew his candidacy. Without Henríquez y Carvajal as a compromise candidate, Congress was at an impasse. Political factions agreed to elect Federico’s brother, Francisco Henríquez y

Carvajal who became the provisional president on 31 July 1916.

President Henríquez y Carvajal struggled from the outset. Continued political infighting and the United States’s refusal to disburse funds from the customs receivership hampered the success of his administration. An article from August 1916 in the New

York Times outlined the issues for readers, noting that American President Woodrow

Wilson would not recognize the newly elected Henríquez y Carvajal until he accepted

“virtually the same sort of fiscal protectorate” that existed in Haiti.8 Stating that the customs receivership greatly benefitted the Dominican Republic, the Times explained that the internal revenue of the country, still collected by Dominican officials, only resulted in paltry sums because of “maladministration by native officers.” Thus, until Dominicans accepted a “financial protectorate” and “a complete reorganization of military forces through the creation of a native constabulary officered by American navy and marine

7 Bruce Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 4.

8 “Washington to Run Dominican Finance,” New York Times, 22 August 1916, 20.

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officers,” the United States would continue to withhold receivership funds and official recognition of Henríquez y Carvajal’s government.9

From July until November, tension in the Dominican Republic remained high.

American forces were not only present in Santo Domingo but had also moved in to the northern areas of the republic. At this point, the customs receivership not only controlled external but also internal revenue, crippling both Henríquez y Carvajal’s government and the Dominican economy at large when the United States cut off the disbursement of funds until all its demands were met.10 Furthermore, the same act that had made

Henríquez y Carvajal provisional president required Congress to create a constitutional assembly and write reforms by December 1916. Once again, US officials feared that elections would favor Arias by either granting him the presidency or a majority of his supporters seats in Congress.11 US Secretary of State Robert Lansing described the situation to Wilson as “approaching a crisis” in which “revolution and economic disaster are imminent.”12 The chief of the Latin-American division of the State Department concurred, stating that the only solution was to “declare martial law and place Santo

Domingo under military occupation.”13 Officials justified this decision by claiming that the Dominican government had violated their 1907 treaty with the United States and

9 “Washington to Run Dominican Finance,” 20.

10 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 11-12.

11 “The Chief of the Latin-American Division to the Secretary of State,” November 21, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 241.

12 “Secretary of State to the President,” November 22, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 240.

13 “The Chief of the Latin-American Division to the Secretary of State,” 241.

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because of the “present unsettled conditions in the Republic.”14 US Navy Captain Harry

S. Knapp moved before a constitution could be written or elections held delivering the proclamation of American occupation on 29 November 1916.

The proclamation drew heavily on the narrative of debt, demonstrating that when policy needs arose, American officials relied on classic tropes to justify their actions.

Making it clear that American actions were enacted on behalf of Dominicans who were unable to achieve peace on their own, the proclamation quoted from the 1907 treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Article III stated: “Until the

Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States.” Citing the increase in public debt “on more than one occasion” as a breach of the treaty, the proclamation noted that though “the Government of Santo

Domingo has from time to time explained such violation by the necessity of incurring expenses of incident to the repression of revolution,” this constant instability was a primary reason for American intervention. Claiming that the end of revolutions was not in sight, the proclamation maintained that “domestic tranquility has been disturbed and is not now established, nor is the future observance of the treaty by the Government of

Santo Domingo assured.” As a result, the United States “is determined that the time has come to take measures to insure the observance of the provisions of the aforesaid treaty . .

. and to maintain the domestic tranquility” of the Dominican Republic.15

14 “The Chief of the Latin-American Division to the Secretary of State,” 241.

15 “Proclamation of Occupation and Military Government,” November 29, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 246, 247.

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Additionally, the proclamation portrayed the United States as a benevolent force whose only interest was peace and stability for the Dominican Republic. The proclamation assured Dominicans that

This military occupation is undertaken with no immediate or ulterior object of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic of Santo Domingo, but, on the contrary, is designed to give aid to that country in returning to a condition of internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of the treaty aforesaid, and the obligations resting upon it as one of the family of nations.16

As a further guarantee of sovereignty, the proclamation stated that Dominican laws would remain in effect as long as they did not conflict with the objectives of the occupation. Government administration would continue by Dominican officials though they would be “under the oversight and control of the United States Forces.” Although

“contempt or defiance of the authority of the Military Government” would be “tried by tribunals set up by the Military Government,” the proclamation stated that civil and criminal cases would continue to be overseen by the Dominican judicial system.

Occupation forces would act with “respect for the personal and property rights” of

Dominicans, upholding Dominican laws “in so far as they do not conflict with the purposes for which the Occupation is undertaken.” Lastly, the occupation government would control both internal and external revenue. All of these measures were aimed to restore “domestic order and tranquility” and bring about “the prosperity that can only be attained under such conditions.”17

Most US newspapers informed their readers of the establishment of the military occupation, but the articles remained rather short, stating a few basic facts that avoided

16 “Proclamation of Occupation and Military Government,” 247.

17 “Proclamation of Occupation and Military Government,” 247.

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any critical analysis of the event. Reports instead relied on the common themes of debt and revolution to explain American actions in the Dominican Republic. From Georgia to

South Dakota, Washington State to California, newspapers at first included only a few sentences on the proclamation of military rule the day after the event.18 Articles that appeared in the days following included more information, much of it mirroring the sentiment, if not quoting direct passages, from the official proclamation. Furthermore, the language and imagery employed reinforced already existing narratives about the constant revolutions in the Dominican Republic and built upon an emerging notion of

American benevolence and humanitarianism.

Running under different headlines, multiple versions of the same article appeared in newspapers across the United States in the first days of December 1916, presenting the

American public with a common understanding of military actions in the Dominican

Republic.19 South Dakota’s Aberdeen Daily American informed its readers that the establishment of military rule in the Dominican Republic was a necessary step “to suppress existing political chaos in the little republic and [to] pave the way for guaranteeing a future quiet by establishing there such a financial and police protectorate.”

18 “Named Military Governor,” Columbus Ledger, 30 November 1916, 1. “US Takes Charge of Santo Domingo,” Aberdeen Daily News, 30 November 1916, 1. “Naval Captain Takes Charge of Dominican Affairs,” Bellingham Herald, 30 November 1916, 1. “Martial Law Proclaimed,” Evening News, 30 November 1916, 5.

19 “US Navy Forces Rule in Santo Domingo,” Boston Journal, 1 December 1916, 1. “Uncle Sam Takes Things Under Wing,” Daily Alaska Dispatch, 1 December 1916, 1. “Independence Santo Domingo Be Maintained,” Aberdeen American, 1 December 1916, 1. “American Military Rule in Dominican Republic,” Anaconda Standard, 2 December 1916, 4. “US Object is to Aid Santo Domingo,” Colorado Springs Gazette, 2 December 1916, 4. “Santo Domingo Under Martial Law,” Presbyterian of the South, 6 December 1916, 21.

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Utilizing the idea of political chaos, the article explained that if the Dominican Republic were to have a prosperous future it would come only with American oversight. The term

“little republic,” a common epithet, further underscored its immaturity and need for paternal supervision. Emphasizing the temporality of the occupation, the article stated that the 1,800 marines stationed there would “maintain order, at least until elections in

January.” Additionally, these troops were to “supervise the conduct of government” and

“disburse the customs revenues,” implying that Dominicans were not capable of managing these tasks on their own.20 The Aberdeen Daily American admitted that this was a “drastic step” but one that had been considered for several months since the overthrow of President Jimenes. This same article appeared in the New York Times under the headline, “Put Santo Domingo Under Martial Law,” with the added subheading:

“MARINES TO KEEP ORDER: Plan is to Check Revolutions and Arrange for Prompt

Payment of Foreign Liabilities.” Maintaining the necessity of martial law “in order to enable the Dominican Government to pay the interest on its foreign debt in accordance with the treaty of 1907 between this country and Santo Domingo,” the Times article pointed to revolution and defaulted loan payments as the reason for American intervention. Moreover, the Times hoped American supervision would end revolutions that had “rendered the island a source of menace to the international relations of the

United States because of the foreign capital invested there.”21 In its publication of the same article, the Washington Post added that military rule would not “destroy the

20 “Military Rule Proclaimed in Santo Domingo,” Aberdeen Daily American, 1 December 1916, 1.

21 “Put Santo Domingo Under Military Law,” New York Times, 1 December 1916, 1.

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independence of the republic” and that American supervision was part of a larger “desire to assist the country to establish internal order and to enable it to comply with the provisions of its conventions and to fulfill its obligations as a member of the family of nations.”22 From the outset of the occupation, the language used to discuss the

Dominican Republic, whether from the American government or the media, relied on a discourse that had existed for decades depicting the Dominican Republic as a land of revolution, misrule, and ultimately, underdevelopment. Additionally, this rhetoric implied that the American conceptualization of underdevelopment in and its assistance in combatting that was not motivated by imperialistic aims or self-interest.

The Theory of Underdevelopment

One of the imperial narratives concerning the Dominican Republic with the most longevity was that of an underdeveloped land, people, and government. This was not a unique American perspective as writers like the French Médéric Elie Moreau de Saint-

Méry and the British Charles Mackenzie postulated on the roots of backwardness in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, arguing that Spanish heritage or Haitian influence, respectively, caused the damage.23 As American interest grew in the

22 “Domingo Rule Secure: No Infringement of Sovereignty,” Washington Post, 2 December 1916, 2.

23 Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry, A Topographical and Political Description of the Spanish Part of Saint-Domingo, Containing, General Observations on the Climate, Population and Productions; on the Character and Manners of the Inhabitants; with an Account of the Several Branches of Government, trans. William Cobbett, Vol. I (Philadelphia: Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, 1798). Charles Mackenzie, Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic, Vol. 1 (London: Colburn and Bentley, 1830).

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Dominican Republic, writers in the mid-1800s located the origin of underdevelopment in the lack of Anglo-Saxon industriousness and the constant wars with Haiti. In his examination of US perceptions of Latin America, historian James William Park argued that, for over a century, Americans built and sustained enduring conceptualizations of

Latin America based on the idea of underdevelopment. Though Park noted that the term

“underdevelopment” became most popular after World War II, antecedents of this notion existed since the 1830s. The United States portrayed itself as “forward, progressive, and advanced” while it viewed Latin American states as “backward or retarded.”24 Over time, this view crystalized as underdevelopment, a term used to indicate shortcomings like the absence of political stability or a democratic framework as well as scant economic growth and a lack of social integration. This contrasted with the term undeveloped. According to Park, undeveloped was the base line at which every country started, whereas underdevelopment meant the “willful failure to meet potential.”25

Locating the Source of Backwardness: Spanish Colonialism

In identifying the basis for the backwardness of Dominicans, American sources postulated on a number of causes. For some, like Samuel Guy Inman, it was the product of Spanish colonialism. As executive secretary of the Committee on Co-operation in

Latin America, Inman traveled to Hispaniola in January 1919 to “make a survey of religious, social, and educational conditions.” The findings of Inman’s trip were

24 James William Park, Latin American Underdevelopment: A History of Perspectives in the United States, 1870-1965 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 2.

25 Park, Latin American Underdevelopment, 2.

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published in 1919 in his book, Through Santo Domingo and Haiti: A Cruise with the

Marines. Inman also emphasized the stagnancy of the Dominican Republic characterizing it as “The Island Where Time Has Stood Still, for, with all its beauties and the richness of its natural resources, much of it is as primitive and crude as in the days of the first Spanish settlement 400 years ago.” Inman attributed this “neglected and arrested development” to “Spain’s abuse of the oldest of her American colonies.” Maintaining that “little progress” had been made since “the glory days” of the Spanish conquest,

Inman was not surprised to find that the capital, Santo Domingo, lacked automobiles, paved roads, and sewers as well as water and telephone lines. Illiteracy rates hovered between ninety and ninety-five percent, as “many of the country people are unable to count above four or five.” Additionally, he related that, “disease is widespread with practically no medical attention for the poor, and, in general, the blessings of Christian civilization are lacking.”26 As a Christian missionary devoted to improving the country,

Inman saw the solution to the Dominican Republic’s backwardness in Christian humanitarianism that would increase infrastructure and combat illiteracy and disease.

Though avoiding any outright statements blaming the Spanish colonial legacy as the source of backwardness, journalist Frederic J. Haskin who wrote a series of articles on American actions in the Caribbean that appeared in newspapers from New York to the

Midwest highlighted the lack of civilization. In a 1917 article published in the Omaha

Bee, Haskin characterized the interior of the country as “half wilderness and without roads, [it] is in somewhat the condition of Europe in the middle ages.” Though citizens

26 Samuel Guy Inman, Through Santo Domingo and Haiti: A Cruise with the Marines (New York, Committee on Co-Operation in Latin America, 1919), 4, 15, 4, 14.

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technically constituted the government, in reality, “feudal barons, acknowledging no law or government,” ran everything.27 In another article appearing in the Great Falls Daily

Tribune in June 1919, Haskin explained the situation on the eastern part of the island:

You must know that Santo Domingo is a mass of mountains and along the coast is a sort of civilization, but the interior mountains are wilderness without roads, bridges or even good trails, in parts still unexplored. The people of this wilderness live in a state of barbarism. They have leaders, who are much like the robber barons of early medieval Europe. They pray on travelers and raid sugar plantations and if there is a revolution they sell their services to the highest bidder.28

One can surmise from his writing, that this stagnancy he illustrated was one present since the beginning of Spanish rule.

Even after the establishment of the occupation, American sources continued to utilize the narrative of underdevelopment. In a large spread published in October 1920 in the New York Times, reporter Sara MacDougall sketched an illuminating picture of the republic for readers:

In the heart of some of the scenic valleys . . . there are luxurious hillsides of coffee and cacao and tobacco, where the most delicious mangoes and alligator pears and pineapples in the world are grown, people have been living for centuries in such dense ignorance that there are many men who have no sense of numbers above five. As we passed along country roads naked children would come running out of thatched huts similar to those occupied by Indians at the time of the conquest.29

27 Frederic J. Haskin, “The Trail of Horse Marines,” Omaha Bee, 31 March 1917, 16.

28 Frederic J. Haskin, “The Bandit-Hawks,” Great Falls Daily Tribune, 2 June 1919, 6.

29 Sara MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” New York Times, 10 October 1920 12.

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MacDougall credited this underdevelopment to years of misrule and mismanagement, starting with centuries of “backwards” Spanish rule and subsequent years of revolutions and political “instability” that had left the country in a state of despair. She wrote that

Dominican appeals to the United States for annexation in the nineteenth century were an indicator that “from the early days of the Republic its most progressive men believed that the prosperity and happiness of the land depended on securing the protection of a stronger power capable of maintaining order.”30

Underdevelopment and Revolution: A Game of Child’s Play

By the occupation period, most American sources claimed that constant revolution was the source of underdevelopment in the Dominican Republic. In the journal The South American, a New York publication solely devoted to current Latin

American topics, Yale professor Fred Roger Fairchild explained the numerous defects of the Dominican Republic. Fairchild repeatedly used the word primitive to describe the

Dominican economy, its business organizations, and its schools.31 Other pieces stressed the political and social failings of the Dominican Republic. Appearing in the pages of the

Sun, one of New York’s most popular dailies among the working class of the city, one article emphasized the backward state of the country. Referring to the Dominican

Republic as “the republic of revolutions,” the article maintained that underdevelopment

30 MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” 12.

31 Fred Rogers Fairchild, “The Problem of the Dominican Republic,” The South American, 9 no. 1 (November 1920), 16.

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there was the “byproduct of a lack of free and stable Government capable of maintaining law and order.”32

A well-traveled author, A. Hyatt Verrill published books on multiple locales including one on Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic in 1914 that took on the topic of revolution and misrule as its main theme. Three years later, his work, The Book of the

West Indies, referred to the Dominican Republic as “The Isle of Misrule,” “The Land of

Revolutions,” and, in Verrill’s opinion, the most apt moniker, “The Island where Time has Stood Still.” Verrill mourned that the beauty and resources of the island were overshadowed “by revolutions, drenched with blood,” maintaining that, “much of Santo

Domingo is as primitive, as backward, [and] as crude, as four centuries ago.” Constant revolution resulted in a chaotic political environment. Verrill described Dominicans as

“walking arsenals” carrying two machetes, “a heavy revolver, a wicked, dagger-like knife, and, for good measure, a rifle or shotgun.” Though he maintained that these armed men caused the revolutions that led to so many political setbacks, he likened these altercations to mere child’s play. According to Verrill, most of the “blood-letting is confined to sporadic revolutions, and even these seem more in the nature of games, for relieving the tedium of uneventful lives, than serious conflicts.” During these brawls, men often “pause to have cigarettes and chat” and then “resume their pot-shooting as nonchalantly as possible.” He even claimed he had seen them stop, mid-fight, for photo opportunities. Given this immaturity and the treatment of war as some sort of game,

Verrill argued that advancement would occur only when

32 “Our Protectorate in the West Indies,” Sun, 7 July 1918, 2.

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The inhabitants of the island discard their guns and take up the hoe, when they learn how to handle the machete as an agricultural implement with the same dexterity as they now wield it as a sword, then, and not until then, will dawn an era of prosperity and progress which will lift Santo Domingo to the place it merits.33

The Book of the West Indies emphasized Dominicans’ own shortcomings and relied heavily on the narrative of underdevelopment. According to Verrill, these were people who actively chose revolution over progress.

The idea of continuous revolution as the source of underdevelopment appeared time and again in the works of American authors. A prolific author and professor of political science, H. H. Powers published America Among the Nations in 1918. The book explored a wide array of topics associated with the expansion of US control over the continental United States and in areas like the Pacific and Caribbean. Throughout the book, Powers referenced the Dominican Republic’s perpetual state of revolution, which he characterized as “perilous” and demoralizing. Powers regrettably related to readers that the United States had rejected President Grant’s request to annex the Dominican

Republic in the mid-nineteenth century resulting in a country that had devolved into a position that was “hopelessly bankrupt, while petty revolutions continually robbed the industry of its fruits.” To demonstrate this sorry state of affairs, Powers included an explanation given by one of his acquaintances who had lived in the Dominican Republic for quite some time:

33 A. Hyatt Verrill, The Book of the West Indies (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1917), 174, 176, 194, 195, 195-196.

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I have lived through five of these revolutions and have never heard a shot fired. I knew the leader of one of them. He confided in me that he had gotten three thousand dollars and was going to start a revolution. Later he and his army made me a call. There were thirty-one of them, five of them being generals. I treated them all to coffee, and after that, when they robbed the mails, they always sent me letters.34

Powers referred to this account as “burlesque,” a caricature of a potentially serious military event that was nothing more than a comical mimicry with Dominicans seemingly acting like children playing a game of war. “In a country whose military defenses were on much the same scale, and where the soldiers of the realm were likely to join the revolution if it promised excitement, such disturbances were a fatal obstacle to industrial and political development.” Noting that the establishment of the receivership ended most of the infighting, Powers blamed the resurgence of civil war in 1912 on Dominicans themselves because, with “the elimination of revolutions and plunder, life seemed to have lost its zest for Dominicans of a certain type.”35 According to Powers, Dominicans were a people that could not resist their natural inclination toward revolution.

Hailed as one of the most comprehensive books on the Dominican Republic, Otto

Schoenrich’s Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future focused on portraying an underdeveloped country with much potential. Schoenrich’s observations were based on his time in the Dominican Republic as secretary of a commission to investigate

Dominican finances as well as his position as secretary and advisor to the Dominican government’s finance minister.36 Since Schoenrich argued that the occupation had finally

34 H. H. Powers, America Among the Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1918), 126.

35 Powers, America Among the Nations, 127.

36 “Otto Schoenrich, 100, Dies at His Home in Baltimore,” New York Times, 9 February 1977, 20.

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ended revolutions, balanced the budget, and put the country on the path of development, his observations in this 1918 publication likely stemmed from observations made shortly after the establishment of the occupation in late 1916 or 1917. In Schoenrich’s opinion, the Dominican Republic’s impoverishment stemmed from “periodic revolutions” which had “prevented proper development.” As a result, cities lacked essential services, the towns were “badly neglected,” and sanitation was practically non-existent. Schoenrich blamed the depressing state of the country on constant revolutions that had caused “the paralyzation [sic] of agriculture, arrest of development and loss of credit” as well as the diversion of public funds to fight unrest. To underscore this point, Schoenrich noted that in 1903, the country’s military expenditures accounted for over seventy percent of the national budget. This had all led to a backward state of affairs:

At such times the government was reduced to a desperate struggle for existence; the loss of the customs houses in power of the insurgents made its position still more precarious; it contracted loans on ruinous terms; it neglected its foreign obligations and paid its employees in promissory notes and even in postage stamps, which they would then peddle about the streets. Under such conditions it is natural that nothing was left for public improvements.37

Schoenrich maintained that the only way out of such desperate times was through the help of the United States.

Harry A. Franck’s travel experiences came out both as a book and a series of articles in The Century Magazine that also emphasized the prominent themes of instability and underdevelopment.38 An accomplished travel writer, Franck trekked

37 Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), 242, 334, 335.

38 Franck’s trip to Hispaniola was paid for by The Century Company, a publishing house that was interested in capitalizing on the growing demand for travel narratives about tropical locales. For more on this topic see Steven Driever, “Beyond the Narrative:

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across the globe from Patagonia to China and Hawaii to the Caribbean. Based on an eight-month trip that took him to many islands, Roaming Through the West Indies came out in 1920 and Franck fittingly titled his chapter on the Dominican Republic “The Land of Bullet-Holes.” As Franck traveled from town to town, he made sure to mention the pock-marked buildings he saw everywhere claiming that “bullet-holes are as universal in

Santo Domingo as fighting cocks” and that these products of the many revolutions were one of the “chief setbacks” to political progress. Franck claimed that banditry appealed more to the average Dominican than hard work. This further hampered development and led to constant revolutions because “many of its men preferred taking to the hills at 50 cents a day with rations and the possibility of loot to doing honest work at a dollar a day.”

According to Franck, this hostility toward work led not only to political instability, but also a lack of civilization. In the town of Santiago, Franck observed that the average person,

reaches the dignity of clothes somewhat late in life. Naked black or brown babies adorn every block, the sight of a plump boy of five taking his constitutional dressed in a pair of sandals, a bright red hat, and a magnificent expression of unconcern attracts the attention of no one except strangers.39

Here were a people missing one of the key visible markers of civilization, clothing.

Furthermore, Franck noted that children in the Dominican Republic began smoking cigarettes long before they began to wear clothes. Adults were not much better. Though clothed, they tended to be lazy: “A large percentage of the males are too proud or too

An Intertextual Reading of Harry Franck’s Travel Writing on Haiti, 1919-1938,” Literary Georgraphies 2, no. 2 (2016): 164-181.

39 Harry A. Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies. Ebook (New York: Century Company, 1920), loc. 4117.

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habitually fatigued to indulge in manual labor, which is the most crying need of the country.”

Writing for the monthly magazine, The World’s Work, journalist George Marvin, provided a detailed description of the revolutionary chaos present before the American occupation. Marvin relayed the story of bandit leader, “Cha-Cha” who could, with the

“blow on a policeman’s whistle” summon about 200 armed men in under ten minutes.

Once his call went out, within two hours Cha-Cha “could muster about 750 warriors, all armed and nearly all of them, technically, bad.” Equipped with a variety of rifles including Mausers, Krags, Winchesters, long-barreled revolvers, and shotguns, Cha-Cha and his men had, for several years, “helped to keep the peace thoroughly disturbed and to kick up revolution.” Marvin described Cha-Cha as “a little man physically, big otherwise,” who could “jerk his thumb, nod his head, outstretch his hand and command peons.” Seeing himself as the leader of his province, Cha-Cha became the “little man with the big whistle [who] prospered and became Augustan, entertain[ing] gubernatorial and presidential ambitions.” For Marvin, this local leader was precisely what was wrong with the Dominican Republic, “if you can see Cha-Cha you can see Santo Domingo and get a preliminary glimpse of why the country is now under military law.”40 Marvin’s description literally belittled the bandit leader, continuously referring to him as small.

Furthermore, according to Marvin, Cha-Cha and his armed lackeys were all “bad” for disturbing the peace. The actual person Marvin was referring to in the article was

40 George Marvin, “Watchful Acting in Santo Domingo,” The World’s Work, Vol. 34 (May-October 1917), 205, 206, 208, 209, 213.

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Salustiano “Chachá” Goicochea, who eventually surrendered to US forces in January

1917.41

A Land of Disease

The topic of health was also an essential area targeted for improvement because of the equation of poor sanitation and disease with primitiveness and a lack of development. The emphasis on public health, like the narrative of bankruptcy or anarchy, provided a perfect topic with which to discuss the deplorable conditions of the island.

Additionally, narrowing in on health allowed the United States to have an objective with clear parameters that could be measured, treated, and ultimately cured offering yet another example of success and uplift.

In their reports about the state of health on the island, American sources contended that Dominicans suffered from poor sanitation, curable diseases, and a dearth of medical knowledge. Writer Harry Franck witnessed many cases in which sickly

Dominicans appealed to American forces for medical attention. According to Franck, most Dominicans would rather become “revolutionists” than study to become doctors.

The result was a primitive understanding of disease in which the majority of remedies consisted of “sticking … a green leaf on the temples” or smearing the body with “holy dirt in the ardent hope of improvement.”42

Interested in assessing the conditions of health in the Caribbean, Dr. John Swan traveled to the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and the Virgin Islands in the winter of 1919-

41 Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations, 48.

42 Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies, loc., 253.

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1920 on behalf of the American Red Cross to conduct health surveys. The purpose of

Swan’s trip was to collect information and make recommendations on how to improve conditions on the islands. During his two-month tour of the Dominican Republic, Swan not only visited all of the provinces of the country but also met with Commander

Reynolds Hayden, Secretary of State for the Department of Sanitation and Beneficence

(an arm of the occupation government established to regulate health and sanitation on the island), and then military governor Admiral Thomas Snowden.

Swan found the standards of medical education at the University of Santo

Domingo subpar. He argued that even among those who claimed to practice medicine, skills were “extremely rudimentary.”43 Swan cited the fact that the university possessed neither a dissecting room nor a laboratory as clear evidence that all of the medical instruction was theoretical. Students had little if any clinical instruction, lacking even something as basic as a decent medical library. In his assessment, Swan thought the university, “from the medical point of view, is little better than a quiz class.” As an example of the lack of medical knowledge in practice, Swan visited the city prison in the northern town of Moca and met a man with an alveolar abscess that had ruptured in his mouth. This simple condition characterized by an accumulation of pus around the root of the tooth and localized swelling could have been easily cured with antibiotics and a procedure to drain the abscess. However, as Swan appallingly noted, “the patient has been absolutely uncared for and the municipal physician apparently did not know he was sick.” Swan stated that many people with illnesses received no medical attention other

43 Dr. John Swan, “Report of the Field Representative to the American Red Cross Appointed to Take a Medical Survey of the Dominican Republic, the Virgin Islands, and Haiti,” Record Group 52, Box 445, Folder 126039 (62), Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives and Records Administration.

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than that “given by neighbors as ignorant as themselves.” The Dominican Republic suffered from not only a shortage of doctors in general, but according to Swan, those possessing medical degrees were not in fact knowledgeable in the slightest.

In his assessment of sanitation, Swan found the republic woefully lacking in all areas, which was evident through his observation of living conditions. During his visit to

Santo Domingo, Swan commented in his entry for 10 December 1919, “the conditions under which these people live are quite unsanitary. Many persons, men, women, and children, [live] in small rooms with dirt or cement floors and very little furniture.” Swan noted that the houses were unkempt and dirty, animals “polluted” the yards, and

“cobwebs and dirt” covered the interior of many homes. Remarking upon the other towns he visited, Swan stated that there was garbage everywhere and little if any sanitation as some of the villages were the dirtiest he had ever seen.44 In all, Swan’s report for the Red Cross depicted Dominicans as possessing rudimentary medical training and as completely uncivilized in every aspect of their living conditions. His final recommendation was that if the country were ever to be modernized and sanitary, then it would only come with the help of outside organizations, like the Red Cross or the US military. Though Swan’s report was not published in the mainstream American media, his observations demonstrated that even those with specialized knowledge subscribed to the dominant imperial narratives already employed about the Dominican Republic.

US military personnel deployed to the Dominican Republic had a similar understanding of the primitive state of health and sanitation there. In a three-part series for the Marine Corps magazine, Leatherneck, Wes Ley recalled his impressions of the

44 Swan, “Report of the Field Representative of the American Red Cross.”

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abject state of health on the island noting that he saw Dominicans “with deformed feet and legs – the worst cases I ever saw and then some. Swollen to a sickening degree; I did not think humans existed in such a condition.”45 Searching for material to help him start his writing career, Arthur J. Brooks joined the Marine Corps and served for two years in the Dominican Republic during the occupation. Part of Brooks’s duties included a survey of the island during which he and his men encountered many hardships and setbacks in terms of health. “All of us were rotten with malaria, dengue and occasional touches of dysentery. Our faces were scratched from brambles and our bodies covered in welts from the stings and bites of insects.” Attempting to map the wild landscape, Brooks’s men suffered from “fiery red” rashes and eye inflammation traveling along jungle trails,

“sleep[ing] in leprosy-rotten shacks, eat[ing] native food filled with ants.”46 Based on

Brooks’s account, it was clear that the insalubrious conditions in the Dominican Republic were not only a danger to Dominicans, but American troops serving there as well.

Beyond managing minor conditions like edema and other common ailments, the focus of many health campaigns zeroed in on preventing the spread of communicable diseases, particularly sexually transmitted ones that stood out as yet another example of the underdeveloped healthcare system. The threat of venereal disease prompted commanding officers and medical personnel to train marines prior to their deployment, encouraging abstinence or at the very least, full disclosure to health professionals if a

45 Wes Ley, “A Recruit” Leatherneck, (August 1927), 7.

46 Arthur J. Brooks, The Land of Checkerboard Families (New York: Coward- McCann, Inc, 1932), 98, 99, 104.

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soldier engaged in sexual relations.47 On the ground, education efforts continued as well.

For example, field hospitals showed films produced by the USMC to instruct the men on the dangers of sexual diseases. Military medical personnel believed that men serving in the Dominican Republic were “exposed to the dangers of venereal disease to a far greater degree than are men of the military forces serving in other states.”48 William Arthur

Worton recalled a clear example of the dangers of venereal disease in the Dominican

Republic. Worton joined the USMC Reserves in 1917, served in France in 1918, and after recuperating from a near-deadly gas attack, shipped out to the Dominican Republic shortly after his recovery. Once he arrived in Santo Domingo, Worton reported to

Colonel Cyrus Thorpe, a man he described as quite unusual and always dressed in a crisp white uniform with matching gloves. At their meeting, Worton and Thorpe shook hands, and Thorpe explained: “I wear these gloves. There’s so much syphilis in this part of the world.”49 Worton understood Thorpe’s meaning. Thorpe was “insinuating that I might have had syphilis,” apparently acquired in the few days since Worton had landed.50

Instances such as this exchange between Worton and Thorpe indicated the common

47 Memo to Medical Officer, Norfolk Navy Yard, April 6, 1918. Memo from Surgeon General USN to Dr. Rossiter, USN, Training Station San Francisco, February 8, 1918. “Syllabus Accredited for Use in Official Lectures on SEX HYGIENE and VENEREAL DISEASES,” April 1917. Record Group 52, Box 419, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives and Records Administration.

48 Memo, Field Hospital 4th Regiment USMC, Santiago, Dominican Republic, November 3, 1921. Record Group 52, Box 413A, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives Records Administration.

49 William Arthur Worton (USMC), interviewed by Benis M. Frank, La Jolla, CA, 1967, Marine Corps Project, Columbia University Archives, 71.

50 Worton, 71.

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understanding among those deployed that this was a land of both sexual and physical danger.

Primitivism: An Endless Source of Entertainment

By some accounts, Dominican underdevelopment extended to a complete unawareness of the modern world and provided American writers with an opportunity to poke fun at a people whose primitiveness could be entertaining for white audiences. In a

1917 article, Haskin relayed the story of one feudal baron who was “one of the most formidable native leaders” in the country, “Olivario or Hombre de Dios,” as the locals knew him.51 American forces, led by a Swiss soldier of fortune, Lieutenant Fuerlein, were able to easily disarm the bandit and obtain his surrender by awing him with a compass, which they told him was a “magical instrument” that “had pointed out the stronghold of Hombre de Dios with its little iron hand.”52 In an article from August 1919 entitled, “‘Evil Birds’ Kill Bandits,” the Washington Post recounted a report to USMC headquarters by Captain Walter E. McCaughtry. McCaughtry oversaw six airplanes in the aviation force and claimed that these machines completely confused Dominicans. He reported: “The natives, though, are thoroughly alarmed by the birdmen. They refuse to

51 Haskin referred to him as Olivario though his actual name was Dios Olivorio Mateo. Considered a bandit leader by occupation forces, Mateo led a messianic movement until his death by the marines in 1922. On Mateo see Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 125-126. For an in-depth look into the topic including the influence of Olivorismo during the Trujillo regime see Mats Lundahl and Jan Lundius, Peasants and Religion: A Socioeconomic Study of Dios Olivorio and the Palma Sola Region in the Dominican Republic (New York: Routledge, 1999).

52 Haskin, “The Trail of Horse Marines,” 16.

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go near the machines, and as a result they do not believe men fly them. They call the planes ‘evil birds’ and the bombs which they drop are ‘eggs.’”53 McCaughtry claimed

Dominicans were fearful of these “evil birds,” and that superstition overcame them when

“gazing in fear at a passing airplane” and they had no other recourse but to run to “the nearest cemetery,” dig “up the bones of their ancestors,” and boil them into a “broth as a charm against the ‘evil birds.’”54 In most accounts, superstitious behavior such as this was typically credited to Haitians with stories of voodoo ceremonies, cannibalism, and magical transformations; however, applying this trope to Dominicans served as an example of both their backwardness and their ignorance.55

Writing in 1923 about training Dominicans in the Guardia Nacional, Edward A.

Fellowes explained that teaching his recruits modern hygiene practices provided an endless source of jokes for American officers at the training camp.56 Familiarizing recruits with the basic elements of cleanliness initially proved to be a major challenge,

53 “‘Evil Birds’ Kill Bandit,” Washington Post, 26 August 1919, 6.

54 “‘Evil Birds,’” 6.

55 See Brooks, Land of Checkerboard. On the differences claimed to exist between Haitians and Dominicans see Pedro L. San Miguel Ramírez, The Imagined Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 38-45. Men deployed to Haiti often relayed stories of voodoo rituals and cannibals. For example, Julian Constable Smith recalled stories of bubbling human flesh in cauldrons and claims that one man could turn into a cat as large as a lion. See Interview of Julian Constable Smith, 1968. Marine Corps Project, Columbia University Archives, 34-36.

56 Teaching natives to adopt American standards of hygiene was not unique to the Dominican Republic and constituted a key area of concern in other US possessions. For the Philippines see Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). For Guam see Anne Pérez Hattori, Colonial Dis-Ease: US Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941 (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).

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“Our greatest troubles arose at first from the natural aversion for soap and razor.” To ensure that recruits began to adopt American standards of hygiene, Fellowes and his men conducted numerous “inspections and musters for the purpose of getting the men out of the habits of laxity in regard to personal cleanliness and neatness.” According to

Fellowes, Dominican resistance stemmed from the scarcity of water in the country and the “backward” belief that bathing led to disease. However, Dominican attitudes quickly changed once they were supplied with American “toilet waters and scented soaps and face powders.” Fellowes stated that the Dominican fondness for American bath products provided unending entertainment for officers:

It was amusing to see how these natives, who are dandies at heart, went after these commodities, and at our first inspection after pay-day, every bunk included among its equipment laid out for inspection a bottle of Eau de Passion, or some other equally pungent concoction.57

To further emphasize this point, some sources likened Dominicans to Gallic barbarians. Commenting on the division of the island into two countries, an article in the

Sun likened this partition to the three areas of Gaul “in the time of Julius Caesar,” a comment intended to imply the barbarity of the entire island.58 In a piece published for

American schoolteachers in 1917, the journal School and Home Education quoted extensively from the annual report of the US Secretary of the Navy. The author noted that the information was reminiscent “of the style Caesar used in his Commentaries on

57 Edward A. Fellowes, “Training Native Troops in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette 8, issue 4 (December 1923), 222, 230, 226-227, 230.

58 “Our Protectorate in the West Indies,” 2.

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the Gallic War.”59 In this comparison, just as Caesar had brought Roman civilization to the barbaric Gauls in his war of conquest, so too was the United States fighting on the front lines to deliver civilization to backward Dominicans. Additionally, this association with the Romans cast American actions in the Dominican Republic as a humanitarian endeavor. After years of misrule, revolution, and backwardness, the sources agreed that

Dominicans, much like Caesar’s Gauls, could only become civilized (by American standards) if they were taught to be. This narrative provided justification for the occupation and provided the United States with measurable goals in terms of balancing the budget, building roads, improving education, and training a new military force. At the same time that articles appeared in magazines and newspapers across America describing underdevelopment, those same pieces sought to convey that the solution to problems on the island were the improvements occupation forces made. This was not only an indication of progress being made in the Dominican Republic but also a sign of the benevolent intentions of the United States.

Conclusion

The narrative of underdevelopment was a crucial component of American intervention in the Dominican Republic. Though it had been a common theme since the

1800s, it took on new meaning during the occupation, becoming the primary justification for the intervention. While underdevelopment provided the reason for America’s presence in the Dominican Republic, humanitarian projects, framed as such in the

59 W.C. Bagley, ed., “Marines: Their Record in Haiti and Santo Domingo,” School and Home Education, Volume XXXV (September 1915 – June 1916), 173.

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American media, including the building of infrastructure, the development of public health, and the erection of new schools not only assisted the country on the road to progress but also made the United States seem like a purely altruistic authority on the eastern portion of the island that could combat centuries of backwardness.

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CHAPTER 5:

HUMANITARIANISM, “THE MASTER NARRATIVE”

Reviewing Otto Schoenrich’s Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future, the New

York Sun recalled the many advances made in the country as a result of American intervention. Lamenting the fact that the United States had not annexed the Dominican

Republic during President Grant’s tenure, the anonymous author of the article quoted from Schoenrich’s book:

The power of the United States would have maintained peace; salutary laws would have educated the people in self-government; liberal tariff concessions would have stimulated agriculture and industry . . . honest administration would have provided roads and schools; and soon the country would have attained a high degree of development and prosperity.1

However, without American guidance, the republic floundered for decades and, as the author noted, it was not until recently that major changes initiated by the United States had resulted in a transformation. Though the Dominican Republic was formerly referred to as the “republic of revolutions,” The Sun claimed this label was becoming “less appropriate” as American oversight through the customs receivership initiated an era of financial solvency and the ability to repay foreign debt. According to the article,

American interference in the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean locales represented a new era in the United States:

1 Otto Schoenrich quoted in the Sun.

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By its treatment of Spain after the war of 1898 the United States had shown that a great nation was capable of acting unselfishly and in accordance with altruistic ideals. . . . The relations established by such a fiscal treaty as ours with Santo Domingo are so delicate as to require very careful handling. The purpose of the United States is, or should be, to serve the Dominicans without dominating their Government or wounding their susceptibilities. The revolutionary tendencies of the people render this an exceedingly difficult task.2

This interpretation of US actions abroad represented a new perspective in American foreign policy for the Dominican Republic, one that viewed intervention and occupation as examples of an altruistic desire to make the world a better a place.

This chapter examines the narrative of humanitarianism, which validated the

American occupation of the Dominican Republic. Added to the traditional account of the country as a land of perpetual political ineptitude and insolvency was a new humanitarian component that revealed more about what the United States thought about itself than how it viewed Dominicans. Although the American media had employed language noting the altruism and benevolent sacrifice of the United States in areas like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines since 1898, this rhetoric did not enter the discussion about the

Dominican Republic until 1916. The paucity of this discourse prior to 1916 suggests that in this period, only in cases of direct occupation did the United States employ this rationale. The concept of underdevelopment (explored in chapter 4) and humanitarianism worked together to create a problem and a solution; underdevelopment provided the cause of the Dominican Republic’s problems and American humanitarianism solved key issues as the United States could point to specific projects as evidence of its success.

This chapter explores the ideology of humanitarianism in which a strong belief in the power of the occupation to transform the island under the guise of selfless sacrifice and in

2 “Our Protectorate in the West Indies,” The Sun, 7 July 1918, 2.

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the name of civilization eclipsed previous conversations about race. By focusing on projects like ending discord, public health, infrastructural development, education, and the creation of the national constabulary, the United States claimed that it had conquered underdevelopment in the Dominican Republic. The occupation period was unique for two key reasons. First, images of the Dominican Republic in the US media remained stagnant precisely because American sources had already identified underdevelopment, and its associated consequences, as the main setback in the country. Thus, there was no need to change the imagery. Second, and related to the first, these two narratives of underdevelopment and humanitarianism facilitated occupation policy at the same time providing a problem and a solution. This chapter argues that American sources did not shift their representations of Dominicans because they did not alter their goals during the occupation. This further demonstrates the intimate connection between policy and imagery – without a major shift in policy, a shift in imagery was not necessary.

Furthermore, this supports the converse argument presented in part I: only when the goals of the United States changed was there a corresponding shift in the representation of

Dominicans in American sources.

Humanitarianism: The “Master Narrative”

The narrative of misrule employed by the United States exposed the various ways in which the American media conceptualized the Dominican Republic and its people.

The narrative of humanitarianism, however, revealed much more about the ways in which the United States viewed its place in the world. Curiously, though this viewpoint emerged about the Caribbean in 1898, Americans did not employ this language in their

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discussions of the Dominican Republic until 1916, suggesting that this rhetoric was only utilized when the United States desired or achieved direct occupation. As discussed in chapter two, the majority of discussions about the Dominican Republic prior to 1916 centered on financial problems, race, and revolution rather than benevolent uplift. Once marines arrived and the occupation began, the American media deployed the narrative of humanitarianism.3

As many scholars have noted, the Spanish American War fundamentally altered

United States policy, transforming Americans’ beliefs about their international role as the upholders of liberty and the altruistic purveyors of material progress.4 In Cuba and the

American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos, historian Louis A. Pérez explored the various ways in which the war in Cuba transformed American conceptualizations of Cubans as well as themselves. Pérez contended that the war changed the American consciousness, charging it “with salvation of the world,” creating a “master narrative” in which Americans were “given to selfless service to mankind,

3 On humanitarianism see Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963); Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008); Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

4 On the importance of the Spanish-American War in altering US perceptions see Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1974); James C. Bradford, Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993); Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Stephen Kinzer, The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, and the Birth of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

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without ulterior motive, without selfish intent.”5 This selfless viewpoint colored

American media interpretations of the United States’ global role, captured in articles praising the arrival of infrastructure, upgraded sanitation, disease eradication, and improved government in places like Cuba and the Philippines.6 This “master narrative” would be employed time and again in possessions gained after the Spanish American

War.7

Sources dating to 1898 and after outlined the new humanitarianism American observers believed was at the core of the country’s actions around the globe. American politician John J. Ingalls, in his 1898 work, America’s War for Humanity, claimed that

American actions in Cuba were motivated by a “lofty moral impulse, which has inspired the heroes of every history, and the martyrs of every religion.”8 Writing about the

5 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 7.

6 On the Philippines see “The Conquest of Bubonic Plague in the Philippines,” National Geographic, Vol. XIV no. 5 (May 1903), 185-195; “Improvements in the City of Manila,” National Geographic, Vol. XIV no. 5 (May 1903), 195-197; “American Development in the Philippines,” National Geographic, Vol. XIV no. 5 (May 1903), 197- 203; “Ten Years in the Philippines,” National Geographic, Vol. XIX no. 2 (February 1908), 141-148. On Cuba see Estel R. Carr, “Great Improvement,” The News-Herald, 26 July 1900, 5; “A Brilliant Success,” The Hawaiian Star, 30 December 1903, 4; “Stamping Out of Yellow Fever,” San Antonio Express, 16 November 1903, 10.

7 Studies have examined US aims in other imperial projects of the time. On Veracruz, Mexico see Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986), 34-68; Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1967). For Haiti see Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995).

8 John J. Ingalls, America’s War for Humanity (New York: N.D. Thompson Publishing Company, 1898), 177.

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American victory over Spain, Ingalls contended: “Our victory will be the triumph of the

Nineteenth Century over the Middle Ages; of democracy over absolutism; of self- government over tyranny; of faith over bigotry; of civilization over barbarism.”9

Rudyard Kipling’s infamous 1899 poem, “The White Man’s Burden,” brilliantly captured these sentiments by explaining the taxing nature of imperialism in which “the best ye breed” would be sent “to serve your captives’ need.” Kipling drew a clear dichotomy between the primitive, “new-caught, sullen peoples, Half-Devil and half-child” and the developed colonizers who were to take up the “savage wars of peace” and “fill full the mouth of Famine / And bid the sickness cease.”10 Almost a decade later, a similar attitude pervaded Secretary of War William Howard Taft’s words in National

Geographic. Taft noted that there had never been “a greater exhibition of pure altruism” than American actions in the Caribbean and the Philippines during and after the Spanish

American War. Much like what would be discussed in another decade about the

Dominican Republic, Taft lauded American efforts in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the

Philippines. He praised the establishment of schools, the building of roads, and efforts to combat epidemic diseases. Taft outlined US goals as,

to stimulate business, to elevate and educate the people, to maintain and preserve order, to introduce internal improvements of all sorts into the islands, to build roads and bridges and harbors, and gradually to enlarge as far as possible the control which the natives shall have over their own local governments.11

9 Ingalls, America’s War for Humanity, 177-178.

10 Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” Internet History Sourcebook, http://www.sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/Kipling.asp.

11 William Howard Taft, “Some Recent Instances of National Altruism,” National Geographic, Vol. 18 no. 7 (July 1907), 434-435.

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According to Taft, though there had been some cases of abuse on the part of civil and military personnel, the overall account was that of an “unblemished record of generous, earnest effort to uplift these people, to help them on the way to self-government, and to teach them a higher and a better civilization.”12

The argument that the occupation of the Dominican Republic was a humanitarian undertaking, unique in its selflessness, emerged in 1916 and sustained itself throughout the occupation. National Geographic ran a piece in August 1916 discussing American intervention in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. The magazine assured its readers that American actions were different than those of other colonial or imperial nations:

Wherever the United States has gone the welfare of the people has been her first concern; and while all colonial history shows that the tares of evil are absent from the wheat of good, our nation’s record of help given where most needed is one that well may challenge our admiration, and quicken our patriotism.13

In September 1916, the New York Times echoed these sentiments, reminding its readers that the United States did not covet land but instead only offered assistance. “Our purpose has been to aid these neighbors, not to take any of their possessions, to exercise a controlling influence in their elections, or in any way to subject them to the domination of the United States.”14 In June 1919, the New York Times interviewed Reverend Arthur R.

Gray for a piece entitled, “The Missionary Marines.” As secretary for the Latin

12 William Howard Taft, “Some Recent Instances of National Altruism,” National Geographic, Vol. 18 no. 7 (July 1907), 432, 432-433, 438.

13 “Wards of the United States: Notes on What Our Country is Doing for Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, and Haiti,” National Geographic (August 1916), 151.

14 “Help for Our Neighbors,” New York Times, 1 September 1916, 6.

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American division of the Board of Missions of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Gray believed that the marines were a beneficent force on the island, “teaching the people how to manage their finances, how to build roads, how to establish schools, how to fight disease – as well as how to preserve law and order so that the national habit of revolution may be overcome.”15 Gray had expressed similar sentiments in an article published earlier that year. Despite all the positive effects American forces had in Haiti and the

Dominican Republic, Gray warned his readers that “some people, whose narrowness has made them skeptical as to the possibility of a nation’s being unselfish” believed that the

United States was “playing a deep game and seeking under a cloak of altruism to increase its material possessions.”16 According to Gray, this could not be farther from the truth because the United States would only stay in these countries until they could “paddle their own ship of state.”17 The only feeling Americans should have about these actions, according to Gray was, “to be proud” of the “missionary job” of the US government.18

American sources were careful to qualify the United States’s actions in the

Dominican Republic as completely altruistic. Relaying the timeworn narrative of revolution and financial problems, National Geographic added that American actions came with great effort, expense, and the “actual sacrifice of blood and life” in an attempt to “play the role of Good Samaritan to the peoples of Santo Domingo, Haiti, and

15 “The Missionary Marines,” New York Times, 8 June 1919, 38.

16 Arthur R. Gray, “Haiti in Transition,” The Spirit of Missions 34, no. 1 (January 1919), 432.

17 Gray, “Haiti in Transition,” 432.

18 Gray, “Haiti in Transition,” 434.

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Nicaragua.”19 Otto Schoenrich noted that some Dominicans might “feel sad at passing under the government of a foreign power” but that over time they would recognize the immense benefits American control imparted:

But those with a clearer vision recognize that there is no alternative, that real freedom is only now beginning to dawn, and that American assistance will give the greatest impetus to prosperity. . . . These relations between the two countries impose at least a moral duty upon the United States. They make it incumbent upon the United States, as far as is in its power, to foster the development of Santo Domingo and promote the happiness of the Dominican people.20

Many articles that followed in the American media similarly focused on benevolence and sacrifice. In December 1916, the New York Times explained American military actions in the Dominican Republic in an article entitled “Unselfish Intervention.”

The piece explained for Times readers that the United States had been active in the West

Indies since 1906, motivated “almost exclusively by a desire to give the benefits of peace to people tormented by repeated revolutions.” Utilizing the proclamation of occupation as the basis for its claims, the article further explained that the institution of military rule was necessary according to the 1907 treaty. Furthermore, the establishment of the military government was purely for the “restoration of order and [to] insure fair voting at the approaching election.” Additionally, American forces had not intervened in the local courts or civil matters and after the elections the United States would be providing economic oversight and a constabulary like in Haiti. Though “the United States could easily conquer and annex” the Dominican Republic, this would not occur because “our

Government does not seek to acquire territory, nor does it ask for preferential

19 “Wards of the United States,” 147.

20 Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future, 392, 393.

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advantaged, commercial or otherwise. The people of the island should realize that it is their best friend.”21 An article published in February 1917 in the Oregonian reiterated that the work of the marines in the Dominican Republic had been undertaken “to the best interests of humanity.”22 In another report, “They Make Peace,” extensive quotes from

Reverend Charles Blayney Colmore, Bishop of Puerto Rico and Haiti, commended the work of the US military. Colmore highlighted the difficult task marines had on the island: “I want the American people to realize what big work is being done. It isn’t a pleasant task to teach a people how to ‘govern straight,’ and the marine officers and men realize this and yet go at it with stout hearts and high courage. They laugh at the hardships of life.”23

Travel narratives also confirmed the humanitarian angle. For example, Franck characterized the Dominican Republic as an unruly child that the United States would have to guide on the path to progress:

Like a wayward boy who was never taught to govern himself, but was merely exploited by a heartless stepfather, from who he finally ran away, Santo Domingo has no real conception of how to conduct itself in political matters, and up to the present occupation no one has ever attempted to teach it what it never learned from Spain or experience. Santo Domingo has always run more or less wild; she needs a complete new standard of honor and morals. Among other things this will require at least 25 years of good elementary schooling … the text-books adopted should contain much pertinent queries as: “What are the chief faults of Dominicans (of Latin-Americans in general) which it is necessary to correct before they can take their proper place in the modern world?”24

21 “Unselfish Intervention,” New York Times, 5 December 1916, 10.

22 “Order in Santo Domingo,” Oregonian, 19 February 1917, 10.

23 Quartermaster Sergeant C.B. Proctor, “They Make Peace,” Charlevoix County Herald, 29 June 1917, 6. This article also appeared in the Washington Bee on 16 June 1917. 7.

24 Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies, loc. 5090.

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Franck firmly believed in the redeeming power of the intervention, insisting that, in just four years, the island had already improved under American guidance. For Franck this demonstrated that “Santo Domingo could be a success so long as some overwhelming power holds it steady by appointing the better class of officials and keeping an exacting eye constantly upon them.” The best course of action on the island, he stated, was for occupation forces to remain there for at least fifty years or until the present generation, with all of their faults, had passed on, a claim reiterated by Americans time and again.25

If underdevelopment was the core problem in the Dominican Republic, then the key to combating it was a humanitarian project that centered on tangible goals. From the outset, occupation forces identified four areas of improvement: public health and sanitation, public works, education, and the creation of a constabulary.26 These projects remained the focus of the occupation government for the next seven years – highlighted in official reports and publicized by the American media. These particular endeavors were undertakings that the occupation forces could point to as examples of selfless service in their attempt to improve the Dominican Republic. Additionally, they were all projects with measurable outcomes – numbers of vaccinations, miles of roads, literacy rates, and more. Largely ignoring public health initiatives in the Dominican Republic, the American media concentrated their attention on reporting about financial improvement and end to revolution as well as progress in building infrastructure,

25 Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies, loc. 4178, 5090.

26 For a deeper discussion of these goals and their outcomes see Calder, The Impact of Intervention.

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education, and the constabulary as a way of communicating success in the Dominican

Republic.

An End to Revolution and the Makings of Prosperity

After the arrival of troops, reports flooded the American press praising the profitable effect tranquility was having on the island. In September 1916 the Washington

Post claimed that, with US forces in control and an end to political chaos in sight, representatives from American companies were sailing to the Dominican Republic to explore investment opportunities. According to the Post, this initial outburst likely

“represents only a beginning of commerce with Santo Domingo and investment of

American capital in the natural resources of the island.”27 In another article from

November of that year, the Post discussed the previous revolts that had raged throughout the country stating that, since the arrival of the marines, the process of pacification had begun.28 In a special report for the Post in March 1917, the reporter detailed the visit of

General George Barnett to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Barnett claimed that the

Dominican Republic now “had the appearance of prosperity.”29 Official reports mirrored this sentiment as military governor, Harry S. Knapp, affirmed in 1918, “the country is

27 “‘Holland’ Writes of Opportunities for US Capital in San Domingo,” Washington Post, 16 September 1916, 7.

28 “Fear Revolt in Domingo,” Washington Post, 21 November 1916, 2.

29 “What Uncle Sam’s Marines Have Done for Haiti: Gen. Barnett Tells of Vast American Influence on the Island,” Washington Post, 4 March 1917, SM7.

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now in a period of constructive work after pacification.”30 For both the press and the military government, peace in the Dominican Republic was the key to economic prosperity.

The US intervention had brought an end to revolution and American sources declared that this had produced a profound effect on the island and its people. Just days before the official proclamation of occupation, the Washington Post claimed that

American supervision had already transformed Dominicans: “Many already are changed into useful citizens and are clearing lands for cultivation. The farmers are working enthusiastically to increase their crops, now that their property is protected.”31 Five months later, Frederic J. Haskin wrote for readers of his syndicated columns on the

Caribbean that US intervention allowed occupation forces to move forward with improvements. Management of all funding allowed occupation forces to “provide

Dominicans with those fundamentals of a civilized state, such as roads, schools and an orderly system of land tenure, which at present they lack. Santo Domingo is a land with a future of splendid possibilities, and this future is now largely within our control.”32

Haskin, and many Americans, believed this would transform the people and the country:

But give these people roads so that they may travel and trade, give them schools so that they may learn to read, give them a system of land tenure so that they may own property securely and acquire conservatism and self-respect, and you have abolished the material of which revolutions are made.33

30 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Knapp) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), July 1, 1918, FRUS 1918, 364.

31 “Fear Revolt,” Washington Post, 2.

32 Frederic J. Haskin, “Uncle Sam in the Caribbean: How We Rule Santo Domingo,” Omaha Sunday Bee, 8 April 1917, 6.

33 Haskin, “Uncle Sam in the Caribbean,” 6.

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Stories that emphasized the beneficial effect of peace on the Dominican Republic continued throughout the occupation as a testament to American success. Otto

Schoenrich’s 1918 Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future claimed that the situation in the country had radically changed owing to the presence of the United States. Schoenrich stated, “Revolutions have become a matter of history. Ballots will hereafter take the place of bullets, and politics will be conducted in the same manner as in other orderly countries. Evolution, not revolution, will be the characteristic of the future.”34 Running on the same day in August 1920, both the New York Times and the Washington Post confirmed this viewpoint. The Times insisted that Dominican financial woes had ultimately been solved and political advances had multiple positive effects. “The alleged graft, dishonesty and inefficiency with which the old Santo Domingo Treasury was said to be honeycombed have been eliminated.”35 Quoting from a report by military governor of the Dominican Republic, Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden, the Post described improvements in the republic. “The military government has set the country an unassailable example of good government, free from graft, giving a square deal to all, an administration absolutely above reproach.”36 The report stated that internal revenue collection was up from $700,000 annually to an astounding $3.5 million, taxes that had

34 Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future, 335.

35 “Dominica Thrives Under Our Control: Daniels Makes Public Admiral Snowden’s Report Forecasting $4,500,000 Revenue This Year Near Sevenfold Increase Republic’s Customs Loan to be Paid Thirty-three Years Before Due – 110,000 Children in Schools,” New York Times, 16 August 1920, 22.

36 “Santo Domingo is Prosperous,” Washington Post, 16 August 1920, 6. For the original report see The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), June 30, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 126-131.

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fallen too heavily on the poor had been eliminated, loans were being paid quicker than ever before, graft and inefficiency had been eliminated, and the focus had now turned to improving the state of affairs on the island with projects in health, sanitation, and education.37

Public Health Efforts

Though the topic of public health initiatives in the Dominican Republic did not generate much interest in the American media as noted by the absence of newspaper and magazine articles on the subject, this area was an important component of the occupation’s reforms. Whether for their own purposes of protecting American lives or as a way to demonstrate the superiority of their medical knowledge, building a modern public health system and imposing sanitary restrictions on the Dominican Republic was a crucial project of the intervention. Historian Rebecca Ann Lord contended that the focus on health and sanitation reflected American goals to control the environment and the spread of vector-born diseases in an effort to “transform the nation into a stable client state.” According to Lord, for “American military officials, the Dominican Republic was a ‘sick’ nation, with high rates of chronic and epidemic diseases. This sickness could only be cured with American scientific and organizational expertise.” Whereas the

United States viewed their public health efforts as an example of their altruism and self- sacrifice, Lord argued that the focus on epidemic diseases like smallpox, typhus, yellow fever, and malaria revealed that occupation forces were self-serving because these were the illnesses that most threatened “American soldiers and commercial and political

37 “Santo Domingo is Prosperous,” 6.

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interests” rather than average Dominicans.38 Other scholars, such as José G. Amador argued that in the Cuban case, public health campaigns were not only a way for the

United States to assert its superiority and authority in terms of science and politics but also as a way to justify their occupation. According to Amador, “promoting sanitation signaled the beginning of a new war, a battle against a disease that provided a means to justify and implement US imperialism.”39 Elements of both of these interpretations explain the objectives of the military government in the Dominican Republic.

Tackling public health afforded the military government an issue with a measurable outcome that was also a matter of grave interest for the United States. A

1917 report by the Department of Sanitation and Beneficence outlined the justification for the intervention and the benefits it provided Dominicans. Confirming the benevolent and philanthropic spirit US forces claimed to be acting under, the report stated that the

American interest in public health was aimed at benefitting the Dominican people and improving their quality of life by protecting them from preventable diseases. This, in turn, would lead to greater benefits in their “industrial, social, and commercial life.”

Beyond this “altruistic attitude,” the report stated that the United States had a “broader and more imperative obligation” to Americans at home and the wider Latin American community to make sure that disease did not spread. Because the Dominican Republic had a “central position in the West Indies,” it could not “harbor infectious diseases” that

38 Rebecca Ann Lord, “An ‘Imperative Obligation’: Public Health and the United States Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924,” (PhD diss., College Park University of Maryland, 2002), 3, 4, 8, 3, 12.

39 José G. Amador, “‘Redeeming the Tropics’: Public Health and National Identity in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Brazil, 1890-1940,” (PhD Diss, University of Michigan, 2008), 72.

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would make it a “menace” to “its many neighbors.” The United States took this responsibility seriously and stated in the report that maintaining public health,

“constitute[d] an international obligation surely comparable to those of financial integrity and internal order.” Taking on this necessary burden as yet another piece of molding the

Dominican Republic into a modern nation, American officials saw it as their duty to intervene in the name of public health. Like debt and political instability, the only way to redeem the Dominican Republic from the danger of disease was “direct, immediate and very complete control of the Dominican public health service.”40

Because of the threat of epidemic disease, the United States embarked upon vaccination campaigns like the one veteran Omar Titus Pfeiffer recalled in a small town south of Higüey when and he and his men were ordered to vaccinate everyone after an outbreak of smallpox.41 Smallpox vaccination campaigns were popular throughout the period of the occupation, as the military government believed that the “greatest danger” in the republic “was the possibility of a virulent epidemic” that could not be contained.

In fact, from the beginning, the military government initiated a smallpox vaccination program, but according to reports in 1918, this had only led to the vaccination of a large number of schoolchildren while the vast majority of the population remained highly susceptible to contracting and spreading the disease. According to the military government, “[t]his fact, taken together with the constant occurrence of small outbreaks

40 “A Study of the Problems of Dominican Public Health and Sanitation from the Viewpoint of the United States Government in its Relation to Santo Domingo,” 1, Record Group 52, Box 559, Folder 129626, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives and Records Administration.

41 Omar Titus Pfeiffer (USMC), interviewed by L.E. Tatem, San Jacinto, CA, 1968, Marine Corps Project, Columbia University Archives, 36.

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of smallpox in Puerto Rico, only a few hours distant, made anti-smallpox vaccination perhaps the most urgent single public health need in Santo Domingo.”42 By 1921, the military government was still trying to combat smallpox through a “vicious propaganda” campaign, which enlisted the help of local newspapers as well as prominent citizens to spread the word of the necessity of vaccination. However, despite these efforts, the military government reported that there were strong anti-vaccination sentiments, especially in the Cibao region and that the “anti-vaccination propaganda has been and is largely political and virtually amounts to anti-American propaganda.” The only remedy to this situation was to blame Dominicans if smallpox were ever to reach epidemic proportions. Thus, the Department of Sanitation and Beneficence issued a statement declaring that if there were an epidemic, “the fault would be with the Dominican leaders of the people, not with the Military Government, this department, or the people as a whole.”43

The difficulties surrounding the success of the smallpox eradication campaign were not singular as managing venereal disease and the prostitutes that were thought to be the source of it proved a difficult task for the occupation government as well. In her work on prostitution, Melissa Madera contended that the focus on efforts to abolish prostitution in the Dominican Republic became imperative for US officials because many

42“Statement of the Dominican Public Health Situation: June 1918,” June 15, 1918, From Surgeon P.E. Garrison USN Chief Sanitary Officer To Head of Military Government, Record Group 52, Box 559, Folder 129626, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives and Records Administration.

43 Department of Sanitation and Beneficence, Quarterly Report, First Quarter, 1921, Legajo 106, Exp. 38, Ano 9999, Archivo Nacional General, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

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believed that “prostitution spread venereal disease, contaminated honorable citizens, and weakened the national body.”44 In the case of Cuba, Tiffany Sippial argued that the control of prostitution was based on the American idea that moral negligence hindered modernity and progress.45 Efforts by the occupation government to control venereal disease in the Dominican Republic ranged from creating red-light districts and enforcing the mandatory medical inspection of prostitutes to attempts at abolishing prostitution outright.46 Military officials arrested women suspected of prostitution and incarcerated them in special facilities documenting not only their names but also the diseases they harbored. Officials listed many of the women as having multiple diseases at the same time, typically gonorrhea and syphilis, though some were jailed with the note “no disease.”47 These women were presumably held based on the idea that their tests had given false negatives or that their behavior was enough to warrant their detainment.

Frustrated by prostitutes who evaded capture because they were “trained to conceal themselves, thus making it more difficult to find them,” the military government

44 Melissa Madera, “‘Zones of Scandal’: Gender, Public Health, and Social Hygiene in the Dominican Republic,1916-1961,” (PhD diss., Binghamton University, 2001), 13.

45 Tiffany Sippial, Prostitution, Modernity, and the Making of the Cuban Republic, 1840-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 113.

46 See Madera, “‘Zones of Scandal.’”

47 Memo from Medical Officer Carcel Publica to Secretary of State of Sanitation and Beneficence, Sick Bay, M.B. Barracks Fort Ozama, Santo Domingo, June 3, 1924, Record Group 38, Box 71, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, National Archives and Records Administration.

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attempted time and again to root out what they believed to be an immoral practice, but continually failed.48

Both the campaigns against smallpox and prostitution constituted complications for the occupation government. Although these were projects with measurable goals, those goals were not met. Additionally, they demonstrated two clear instances of resistance to American reforms. The lack of reporting any significant details about these two endeavors in magazines and newspapers likely was a conscious decision to ignore a narrative that could not easily be explained. Answering questions as to why Dominicans would resist smallpox vaccinations or continue to practice prostitution called into question the ability of the occupation government to transform the people and the physical health of the island.49

48 Memo, Sick Bay 44th Company Marine Barracks San Pedro de Macorís, January 15, 1924, From Post Medical Officer to Regimental Commander, 1st Regiment USMC, Santo Domingo, Record Group 38, Box 71, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, National Archives and Records Administration.

49 The literature on resistance to smallpox inoculation and vaccination covers various areas around the globe. For more on this topic see Claudia Huerkamp, “The History of Smallpox Vaccination in Germany: A First Step in the Medicalization of the General Public,” Journal of Contemporary History 20 (October 1985): 617-635; José G. Rigau-Pérez, “The Introduction of Smallpox Vaccine in 1803 and the Adoption of Immunization as a Government Function in Puerto Rico,” Hispanic American Historical Review 69 (August 1989): 393-423; Angela T. Thompson, “To Save the Children: Smallpox, Vaccination, and Public Health in Guanajuato, Mexico, 1797-1840,” The Americas 49 (April 1993): 439-440; Nadia Durbach, Bodily Matters: The Anti- Vaccination Movement in England, 1853-1907 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Stanley Williamson, The Vaccination Controversy: The Rise, Reign, and Fall of Compulsory Vaccination for Smallpox (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007); Niklas Thode Jensen, “Safeguarding Slaves: Smallpox, Vaccination, and Government Health Policies Among the Enslaved Population in the Danish West Indies, 1803-1848,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 83 (Spring 2009): 95-124.

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Roads to Progress

American sources focused on the accomplishments of the occupation that presented measurable material progress, in particular roads. For generations, travel writers had commented on the deplorable state of transportation in the Dominican

Republic, noting that this was a barrier to economic development. The construction of roadways, particularly a highway to connect the north and the south, was an essential component of the military government’s plan. This was praised as the key to increasing commerce and trade within the country as well as opening up new rural areas for agricultural development.50 Additionally, occupation forces viewed the building of roads as a crucial means of preventing revolution in the country because they would provide military forces with easy access to problematic areas.51 In late 1920, the journal The

South American reported that over 141 kilometers of macadam roads had been built to date.52 In a lengthy piece on the advancements made by occupation forces for the New

York Times, journalist Sara MacDougall recalled that roadways before the arrival of the

US marines had been so horrendous that travel between the northern and southern parts of the country took longer than the passage between New York and London.53 However, following the improvements made by the United States, this trip now only took three

50 Quarterly Report of the Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden), July 1, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 123.

51 Robert C. Kilmartin, “Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” Leatherneck, (December 1922), 382.

52 “Santo Domingo Under American Rule,” The South American IX, no. 2 (December 1920), 25.

53 MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” 12.

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days, and with the completion of the national highway set for 1921, the journey would take just one. An article for the Evening Star in 1922 reported that these new roads were also of interest to tourists who would now be able to travel around the country with ease, allowing them to see many more interesting sites than before when they had to rely on

“irregular steamships.”54 On the completion of the highway that connected the north with the south, the South Carolina newspaper the Keowee Courier maintained that this was the first time since Columbus that a new road had been opened. The paper credited this accomplishment to the marines who had built something that “holds rich promise for the future development of the island.”55 Praising the accomplishments of American intervention, Robert C. Kilmartin agreed that roads had unified the Dominican people and would “stand as a monument to the American occupation.”56

Americans fond of statistical and visual proof of progress could look to George

Marvin’s article in October 1917 for the monthly magazine World’s Work. The piece included a series of photographs that impressed upon readers the positive effect of the

American presence. The top of the page showed a road seemingly carved out of the surrounding jungle. Though wide, the road was muddy and difficult to navigate given the many ruts that marred its surface. A man was riding a loaded down horse and the caption read, “Under the Old Régime: A ‘road’ in the interior before the advent of the United

States Marine Corps.” Beneath was another picture with the caption, “Under the New

54 Roger Batchelder, “Santo Domingo Invites Tourists to Inspect Its New Auto Roads,” Evening Star, 24 March 1922, 16.

55 “Great Highway Improvement,” Keowee Courier, 22 November 1922, 3.

56 Kilmartin, “Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” 382.

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Régime: A modern macadam road built and maintained by the Marine Corps in their work of setting the Republic’s house in order.” This picture revealed a more orderly landscape, with a flat, smooth paved road. In comparing the two photographs, Marvin’s readers would be able to see that the occupation brought with it order, modernity, and future economic prosperity. To further emphasize this point, Marvin included yet another photograph with the title, “Two Kinds of Transportation.” The photograph displayed women wading across a river with baskets on their heads and their skirts hiked up to their waists. Marvin described the scene: “The tireless women of Santo Domingo have been the burden bearers, but now are giving way to the railroads and other civilized means of carriage under the stable rule of the Americans.” These pictures depicted the Dominican

Republic in desperate need of development in order to succeed as a modern, financially stable nation. This infrastructure could only be possible with the help of the United

States, which generously provided assistance. According to Marvin, America’s attitude in the Dominican Republic was, “Millions for development, if you will, but not one cent for exploitation!”57

Educational Advancements

In American sources, combatting illiteracy and building schools was also a sign of the United States’s humanitarian intentions. Throughout the occupation, quarterly reports by the military government highlighted educational accomplishments. Stating that in

1917 alone, 250 rural schools had been erected, by July 1918 the military governor

57 George Marvin, “Watchful Acting in Santo Domingo,” World’s Work, Vol. 34 (May-October 1917), 211. 212, 218.

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reported that school attendance was up by 120%. Moreover, American forces had begun standardizing curriculum, establishing a system of school inspection and discipline, and constructing new buildings complete with an order for $50,000 in school furniture.58 In a report from 1920, the military governor stated that the construction of eighteen modern school buildings was underway at a cost of about $800,000. Additionally, he recalled that in 1917 only 12,000 students were enrolled in school, but by the year of the report that number had increased to 110,000.59

In a large piece for the New York Times, journalist Sara MacDougall related the advances made in the Dominican education system as a result of American occupation.

Reporting on the paternalistic role of the United States in the Dominican Republic,

MacDougall characterized it as “taking a backward little country by the hand and helping it across a chasm of centuries.” MacDougall informed her readers that, before the occupation, illiteracy rates in the country hovered around ninety percent and, out of

200,000 children, only 12,000 went to school on a regular basis. Because this same figure appeared in the military governor’s report earlier that year, this was likely

MacDougall’s source of information. As evidence of the transformative power of the

United States, MacDougall cited two interviews, one with the superintendent of schools and the other with the military governor. The occupation government appointed Julio C.

Ortegas Frier as superintendent of public education and MacDougall toured a number of

58 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Knapp) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), July 1, 1918, FRUS 1918, 360.

59 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), June 30, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 130.

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urban and rural schools with him during her visit. Educated in the United States at the

Ohio State University, Ortegas spoke of the need for American guidance:

Some of my people accuse me of partiality toward the Americans. … But they do not understand. They are short-sighted. I love my own people so much that I am glad the American occupation is compelling us to do the things we ought to have done long ago. I wish we were strong enough to get along without the Military Government. But when we get restless we should read our own history.60

Including Ortegas’s opinion here certainly was a strategic attempt to show that

Dominicans consented to the presence of American forces. MacDougall’s other interviewee, the military governor, Admiral Thomas Snowden, concurred with Ortegas’s evaluation of the necessity of American assistance and the positive effect it had had on the republic. Snowden claimed that “the country had gone to sleep and we are waking it up.” With improvements in education, public health, and infrastructure, Snowden noted that though this was a heavy burden for the United States, Dominicans desperately needed this in order to make progress as a nation:

We are doing our stunt here in as idealistic and humane way as we know how. It isn’t any particular fun for us, aside from the satisfaction we get from seeing a big and constructive job being pushed through for a people that needed a helping hand. No other country in the world would do what the United States is doing for Santo Domingo.61

Snowden’s choice of words made it clear that America’s undertaking in the Dominican

Republic came at a great expense, but that such a sacrifice was a worthy cause for a country that saw its role in the world as a force of selfless humanitarianism.

For American forces, increasing school attendance was not just a benevolent undertaking but also a means of creating responsible citizens. Commenting about the

60 MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” 12

61 MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” 21.

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possibility of withdrawal in June 1920, Snowden related to the charge d’ affaires that the

United States would need to stay in the country “for some years” because the people are

“not yet educated to the value of the vote.” He continued, stating that most Dominicans were used to the old “personalismo” system of voting “for a certain man no matter what were his principles.” This, he claimed, was “a relic of the old feudal system,” and could only be remedied with American-guided education that would teach “the people the value and power of the vote and to separate the principle from the man.”62 In a report to the

Secretary of the Navy later that month, Snowden elaborated on this idea: “It is most vital to the future good government of the country that the people should be taught to understand their civil duties and the value and power of the vote, to fulfill these duties in a patriotic manner.” Stating that a large proportion of the population was still illiterate,

Snowden argued that education was the key to transforming Dominicans and indoctrinating them on the intricacies of democracy.63

Policing the People

In the opinion of occupation forces, another crucial element to building a stable, democratic society was the creation of a police force that would function above political influence. Established by Executive Order No. 47 in April 1917, the Guardia Nacional

Dominicana replaced all previous branches of the Dominican military and was expressly

62 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden) to the Chargé de Affaires in the Dominican Republic (Brewer), June 20, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 116.

63 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), June 30 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 130.

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trained by Marine Corps officers.64 Historian Ellen D. Tillman argued that the creation of the constabulary was an “experiment” intended to create a military force that would maintain peace and protect American interests.65 Deployed to the Dominican Republic in

1917, Charles Noxon served as a company commander for the marines. In a piece for the

New York Times published in late 1919, Noxon explained to readers that the American presence on the island was “to stabilize, to establish law and order, to teach a weaker nation what to do and then later on to expect them to take their place with other nations as an example of American training and of the application of the Monroe Doctrine.”

Working toward those goals, the Guardia would teach Dominicans to “manage their own affairs” by learning “the American method of policing one’s own country so as to make it safe for all.”66 Writing for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1923 about his role in establishing and maintaining a training school at Haina, Lieutenant Edward A. Fellowes explained that American officials saw the Guardia as a force that would be the “lawful guardian of law and order on the island.” After completing their training, these men would be deployed throughout the country to validate the American presence, and, hopefully pique the interest of other Dominicans to enlist. According to Fellowes,

Dominicans trained at Haina would serve as a model of order, discipline, and modernity – the very embodiment of occupation objectives. Apart from military training, recruits

64 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 55. Ellen D. Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 80-84.

65 Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy, 78-79.

66 Charles H. Noxon, “Santo Domingo – Ward of the Marines,” New York Times, 30 November 1919, SM11.

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were also instructed in “agriculture, hygiene, and sanitation” with the understanding that

“it was to be used by them in the betterment of conditions in the provinces in which their posts were located.”67

The task of training Dominicans in the Guardia to be the upholders of law and order, however, was a constant struggle according to Fellowes. One of the major obstacles he encountered was a high illiteracy rate, upwards of ninety percent by

Fellowes’s own account, owing to the fact that most of his recruits came from the lower class of peons and very few from the “‘gente decente.’”68 Indeed, many of the first recruits were from the lower class as the temptation of free room and board as well as medical care and a stipend of fifteen dollars per month attracted them to the Guardia.69

Fellowes recalled: “Our first enlisted men were the most ignorant and crude specimens possible, as far as intelligence was concerned.” While marine officers struggled at the beginning with their Dominican charges who Fellowes referred to as the “scum of the island,” over time the quality of people increased as it became more popular to join.

Though Fellowes believed that Dominicans could be a “dignified people,” he carefully qualified this statement: “Their dignified bearing is that it appears to be the dignity of a child playing grown-up, and is soon discarded for some childish squabble, or youthful frivolity.” The apparent immaturity of his recruits sometimes made Fellowes feel as if he were losing a hold on his men, but with the assistance of Major Joseph M. Feeley,

Fellowes was able to instill discipline. Fellowes described Feeley as an assertive man

67 Fellowes, “Training Native Troops,” 216, 222.

68 Fellowes, “Training Native Troops,” 229.

69 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 56. A prime example of this was Rafael Leonidas Trujillo who enlisted in 1919.

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with the ability to “still a native in one of his frequent ‘tantrums’ with a few well turned syllables, and [he] knew secrets about handling sensitive and high-strung Dominicans.”70

Representing Dominicans as unruly children was certainly not unique as demonstrated in chapter two. However, this depiction during the occupation was limited to military personnel. Deployed to the Dominican Republic in January 1917, Henry C. Davis believed the employment of assertiveness was the only way Dominicans would learn to change. As he explained in an issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, the only thing a

Dominican had respect for was “FORCE” and to gain his respect one “must have and exert the strong hand in dealing with him.” Davis insisted that since the Dominican “had a master his entire life; he recognizes the necessity of a master, and he wants a master.”71

Fellowes’s direct and intimate contact with Dominicans as well as his own frustration and preconceptions led him to comment on the subject of race at a time when many American sources avoided commentary on this topic.72 Among his recruits,

Fellowes equated light skin with intelligence. Those with dark skin were, according to

Fellowes, difficult to train. “As a general rule, the degree of intelligence increased with the decreased ebony tinge. The blacker recruits were generally simple-minded giants

70 Fellowes, “Training Native Troops,” 230, 231, 220.

71 Henry C. Davis, “Indoctrination of Latin American Service,” Marine Corps Gazette 5, issue 2 (June 1920), 154.

72 Tillman noted that one of the major obstacles to successfully building the Guardia was the mindset of marine officers and their racial and paternalistic prejudices. See Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy, 80. Mary Renda discusses this in detail for Haiti as she argued that many of the Americans deployed to Haiti were from the American South and thus brought with them their ideas of racial superiority. See Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

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who did what they were told simply from the habits of discipline, and lacked a sense of responsibility and initiative.” Conversely, “those with a clearer complexion usually were more intelligent, and could be trusted with responsible jobs.” Fellowes contended that those with a larger proportion of Spanish blood rather than “negro blood in their veins,” tended to be the best men in the force. All of them, however, required constant supervision because “when ‘out on their own’ [they] are inclined to slack, and loaf away the time.”73 Although American forces believed that they were able to make Dominicans into civilized people, like no other project, the case of the Guardia revealed the paternalistic attitude employed to achieve this. Furthermore, Fellowes’ anecdotes demonstrated that, even seven years into the occupation, the United States still had a lot of work to do in terms of transforming Dominicans into who they wanted them to be – a point not lost on military officials on the island who would resist withdrawal plans claiming that their work was far from complete.

Conclusion

Both underdevelopment and humanitarianism were crucial components of

American intervention in the Dominican Republic. While the narrative of underdevelopment had been a common theme since the 1800s, it took on new meaning during the occupation, as it became a primary justification for the intervention. Working in tandem with the theme of underdevelopment was the narrative of humanitarianism.

While underdevelopment provided the reason for America’s presence in the Dominican

Republic, humanitarian projects such as the building of infrastructure, the development of

73 Fellowes, “Training Native Troops,” 231, 232.

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public health, and the erection of new schools not only assisted the country on the road to progress but also made the United States seem like a purely altruistic authority on the eastern portion of the island with its goals centered around objects such as roads, hospitals, and schools. Concentrating their efforts on these measurable goals allowed the

United States to largely forgo conversations about the race of Dominicans and its role in their underdevelopment with a new focus on tangible advances. Additionally, the media’s focus on such selfless endeavors allowed the United States to shape its image in the Dominican Republic and the larger global community. However, once a critical discussion of this so-called benevolent mission emerged, American sources began to question the very objectives and the means of obtaining these that the United States had employed.

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PART III

QUESTIONING THE HUMANITARIAN ANGLE, 1916-1921

Part III of this dissertation traces the change in American media coverage of the

Dominican Republic, as articles appeared that began to question the United States’s humanitarian efforts during the occupation. Though from the outset Dominican intellectuals, politicians, and writers along with sympathetic parties throughout Latin

America and the United States confronted the imperialist impulse head on, it was not until the end of World War I that a critical look into the occupation appeared in the

American media. The process of publicizing criticism of the military occupation in the

United States began slowly, increasing in intensity as the year 1920 unfolded. As journalists began reporting on the loss of individual liberties, accusations of abuse and false imprisonment, and most importantly the hypocrisy behind the very ideologies that

American foreign policy was based on, the occupation of the island finally received the attention that those championing the Dominican cause had long hoped to achieve. While some sources argued that America’s actions were suspect in the wake of allegations of mismanagement and cruelty, others upheld the long-standing narrative that America only acted in the Dominican Republic out of selfless altruism. This section argues that the crucial element in explaining the change in American media coverage and the subsequent alteration of US foreign policy in the Dominican Republic were stories that called into question America’s reputation as a humanitarian force. As chapter three demonstrated, fluctuations in US objectives generated a change in images in the American media about the Dominican Republic; this chapter builds upon that claim by exploring the ways in

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which the United States altered its own image in the wake of charges that disputed the altruistic spirit of American actions in the Dominican Republic.

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CHAPTER 6

SEEING BEYOND THE HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE

In his 1918 piece for Metropolitan Magazine, journalist William Hard critiqued

President Wilson’s foreign policy decisions in places such as the Dominican Republic.

Picking up on a topic uncommon in most American media sources, Hard provided a scathing examination of Wilson’s actions via a fictional conversation between the president, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Greek Prime Minister Elefterios Venizelos, and the deceased Dominican bandit Vicente Evangelista. In the article, entitled “Is America

Honest?” the bandit “Evangelista” quoted a speech Wilson gave on 22 January 1917 in which the president claimed he was an internationalist dedicated to the freedom of other nations who should be able to determine their own polities “unhindered, unthreatened, and unafraid.” “Evangelista” countered this claim, providing contrary examples, noting

US intervention in places such as Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Greek Prime

Minister “Venizelos” supported “Evangelista’s” claims, arguing that Wilson’s

“professions” and “practices” contradicted one another: “You profess a pure anti-

Imperialism, but you have an Empire.” To further demonstrate this fact, “Wilhelm” produced a report from “data” collected by his ministers to indicate the compromised sovereignty of the Dominican Republic. His report read as follows:

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Santo Domingo. Governed by American Navy Department. No other government. First inkling we Germans had of it was when we tried to communicate with the sovereign and independent state of Santo Domingo. Found the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs was a man named Rufus H. Lane. Strange name for Dominican. Found he was Colonel Rufus H. Lane of the United States Marines. No Dominican President. No Dominican Congress. President exiled. Congress disbanded. Colonel Lane appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by Admiral Knapp. International status of Santo Domingo? Difficult to define. Perhaps as independent as Bureau of Navigation in Navy Department. A sub- vassal state of the 2nd order.1

Hard’s commentary on the Dominican situation revealed that in the months prior to the end of World War I, criticism of the occupation was finally emerging in the American press. Though most of the mainstream media did not question America’s intent or actions in the Dominican Republic, this article from March 1918 foreshadowed a deeper conversation that emerged in the press after the end of the war that approached the occupation from a critical angle seeing beyond the humanitarian narrative to argue that

American actions were imperialist and that they subverted native political institutions.

This chapter traces the change in American media coverage of the Dominican

Republic, as articles appeared that began to question the United States’s humanitarian efforts during the occupation. Though from the outset Dominican intellectuals, politicians, and writers along with sympathetic parties throughout Latin America and the

United States confronted the imperialist impulse head on, it was not until the end of

World War I that a critical look into the occupation appeared in the American media.

The process of publicizing criticism of the military occupation in the United States began slowly, increasing in fervor as the year 1920 unfolded. As journalists began reporting on the loss of personal freedoms, the abuse of native people, and most importantly a

1 William Hard, “Is America Honest?” Metropolitan Magazine 47, no. 4 (March 1918), 69, 67.

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perceived duplicity underlying the very ideologies of American foreign policy, the occupation of the island finally received the attention that those championing the

Dominican cause had long hoped to achieve. While some sources argued that America’s actions were suspect in the wake of allegations of mismanagement and cruelty, others upheld the long-standing narrative that America only acted in the Dominican Republic out of altruism. This chapter argues that the ideology of the American media was, in fact, very difficult to change. Though more stories began to call into question America’s reputation as a humanitarian force, most media sources refused to deviate from the benevolent idea behind American actions demonstrating how entrenched this concept was in the United States at this time. As part II demonstrated, fluctuations in US objectives generated a change in images in the American media about the Dominican Republic; this chapter builds upon that claim by exploring the ways in which the United States media refuted charges that disputed the altruistic spirit of American actions in the Dominican

Republic.

The first segment of this chapter reviews contention in the American media between 1916 and the end of World War I, noting early criticism made in publications such as The Nation and the few pieces that appeared in major newspapers such as the

New York Times. In particular, this section demonstrates that critical discussions about

America’s actions abroad emerged prior to the end of the war ignited by President

Woodrow Wilson’s speeches about respecting the sovereignty of all nations. Many questioned America’s intervention in the Dominican Republic because it seemed to be in direct opposition to Wilson’s concept of self-determination. The next part of the chapter examines two events in 1920 that caught the attention of the press because they called

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into question America’s intent in the Dominican Republic. The first was a conference on

Mexico and the Caribbean held at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, which garnered the attention of the press, who reprinted lengthy quotations from one of the presenters who vociferously denounced America’s actions in Haiti and the Dominican

Republic. The second event was the arrest and trial of Dominican poet Fabio Fiallo. As press associations across Latin America pressured the Wilson administration to dismiss the charges, many began to question the legitimacy and fairness of the occupation government abroad though American newspapers failed to weigh in on the debate. In both cases, America’s benevolent reputation was called into question, but it would take much more than academic conferences and one jailed poet to overturn the narrative behind American foreign intervention.

Contention in the Media, 1916-1920

Though the articles that appeared in the The Nation in 1916 were not as cutting as ones that would appear in later years, the key points they brought up would ultimately prove contentious in the American media as discussions about censorship, legitimacy, and intent became more frequent. The majority of media coverage in the United States throughout 1916 and 1917 remained focused on the success of the occupation government, but The Nation was one of the few American publications that consistently questioned military rule in the Dominican Republic.2 Just days after Captain Harry S.

2 The Nation also consistently criticized US actions in Haiti. For a brief overview of the work of James Weldon Johnson on the topic of the US occupation of Haiti see Rayford W. Logan, “James Weldon Johnson and Haiti,” Phylon 32, no. 4 (1971): 396- 402.

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Knapp gave the proclamation of the occupation, The Nation referred to it as a “military dictatorship” set up by “un-American” procedure. The magazine contended that, if the temporary governing of the island was necessary, then it must be done without the strict censorship regulations enforced by the navy so that “the whole world, and particularly the

Pan-American world, may judge of the benevolence of our acts and intentions.” The

Nation warned that, without full public disclosure, the situation in the Dominican

Republic could potentially lead to abuses like had happened in the Philippines.

Additionally, The Nation had reservations about Knapp’s decision to only preserve

Dominican laws that did not conflict with the objectives of the occupation. The article asked readers to consider the question of who would determine if the laws were fit given that severe censorship barred both Congress and the American public from obtaining comprehensive information.3

In the next issue of the magazine, The Nation commended the end of censorship in the Dominican Republic but questioned why the United States was there in the first place. Noting President Wilson’s refusal to intervene in the Mexican Revolution, the piece inquired as to why this was the opposite approach in the case of the Dominican

Republic. The article added, “The islanders may even have a prima facie case in asserting that the downfall of their Government has been due to our refusal to let them conduct their affairs in their own way.”4 Calling for a congressional investigation of both

Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the magazine doubted whether the United States had a right to occupy either country. Although Dominicans objected to the occupation, many

3 “The Week,” The Nation, 7 December 1916, 528

4 “The Week,” The Nation, 14 December 1916, 551.

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based on the same reasons noted in The Nation, little news of this reached most American readers.

In the early months of the occupation, short articles indicated discontent over the

Dominican situation, but coverage was never comprehensive enough to provide a meaningful understanding of the Dominican point of view for American readers. The

New York Times reported on the actions of Dominican minister Armando Pérez Perdomo in late December 1916. Addressing other members of the “diplomatic corps,” Perdomo opposed the occupation and the Times stated that, “according to precedent,” this was

“sufficient cause” for his removal.5 Interestingly, when the topic appeared again in mid-

January of the following year, the Times did not remind its readers of Perdomo’s protest activities. Keeping the article short, the piece stated that Perdomo’s removal was the result of cost-cutting measures.6 The Washington Post also reported that according to the

American military government, Perdomo’s removal was due to the need to reduce expenses. However, the article suspected that Perdomo might have been dismissed for other reasons. The Post speculated that Perdomo could have “proved an embarrassment, because he is said to have circulated among Latin-American diplomats a protest against the action of the American government in assuming charge in the island republic.”7 Both the Times and the Post relayed the sacking of another Dominican official, Manuel

Morillo, the Dominican chargé d’affaires in Cuba. Dismissed from his post by Captain

Chandler of the US marines for his refusal to recognize the authority of the military

5 “Dominicans Made Protest,” New York Times, 23 December 1916, 6.

6 “Ousts Dominican Envoy,” New York Times, 19 January 1917, 18.

7 “Ousts Dominican Envoy,” Washington Post, 19 January 1917, 2.

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government, both pieces noted that Morillo was the representative of the Dominican press association in Havana. In this capacity, Morillo would “carry on a program of publicity against the actions of the American government in Santo Domingo.”8 The articles also mentioned that, on 16 December of the previous year, Morillo presided over a meeting of “prominent Dominicans” in Havana “at which resolutions condemning the

American government, and accusing the American forces in Santo Domingo of assassination, arson and other illegal acts, were adopted.”9 Rather than explaining for readers why men like Morillo or Perdomo protested the occupation of their country, these articles focused on the damage their actions could potentially cause in questioning

America’s altruistic actions.10

In the first years of the occupation, reports on Dominican sentiments about the military government in the New York Times remained sparse. The Times printed the words of former Dominican president Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal on 23 January

1917. In keeping with America’s humanitarian narrative, the Times indicated that

Henríquez y Carvajal spoke optimistically about the occupation believing that it would result in similar strides as had occurred in Cuba.11 Henríquez y Carvajal did not expect the occupation to last long because Latin American countries would not acquiesce to this

8 “Removes Dominican Envoy,” Washington Post, 18 January 1917, 1. “Ousts Dominican Agent,” New York Times, 18 January 1917, 7.

9 “Removes Dominican Envoy,” 1. “Ousts Dominican Agent,” 7.

10 Alan McPherson notes the early protest of the occupation by men like Perdomo and Morillo served as an early transnational resistance to American intervention. See Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 47-48.

11 “Santo Domingo Has Faith,” New York Times, 23 January 1917, 5.

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nor would the American public stand behind “injustices which would dishonor any nation and which would arouse rancor among the sister peoples of Spanish America, [and] asphyxiate the aspirations of brotherhood and commerce, which is stated so emphatically by the United States as being desired.”12 Here, Henríquez y Carvajal implied that wrongdoing would never taint America’s humanitarian efforts. Though another article by the Times noted that there was criticism of the occupation by prominent Dominicans who wanted an investigation into fair treatment, the pieced stated that officials in Washington determined that these claims were “without real foundation or justification.”13

Furthermore, the Times insisted that American actions were:

wholly defensible and the natural result of chaotic conditions of government, finance, and social order that inevitably forced this Government to land marines, set up a temporary military government, protect foreign interests, and administer Dominican affairs until the deadlock between local factions has been broken, and a stable government and financial conditions re-established.14

In all, articles that appeared in the Times tended to uphold the belief in America’s goodwill, dismissing any claims counter to it.

Unlike the New York Times, the Washington Post tended to print more critical reports. However, at this early date, even the Post resisted questioning American policy decisions in the Dominican Republic. Reporting on the closing session of the American

Academy of Political and Social Sciences, the Post printed a few quotes from Oswald

Garrison Villard, co-founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People (NAACP), founder of the American Anti-Imperialist League, and eventual editor

12 “Santo Domingo Has Faith,” 5.

13 “Marines to Stay in Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 26 January 1917, 15.

14 “Marines to Stay in Santo Domingo,” 15.

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of The Nation. Garrison directly condemned American actions in Central America and referred to intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic as a “polite conquest” in which freedom of speech and the press had been abolished. The majority of the article, however, focused on the words of Theodore Marburg, former US minister to Belgium.

Marburg claimed that policies pursued in Latin America were the same ones that had

“rendered unquestionable service in the Philippine Islands and given the people there better government than if they had been allowed to drift away from us, or to have become the wards of other nations.” The Post continued to quote Marburg’s remarks: “The spread of British dominion of the brown men has made for justice, liberty, freedom and their betterment and so does the United States policy along the same lines make for a larger measure of popular liberty and better government for those who are our subjects.”15 Upholding the sentiment that like Britain, America’s actions abroad stemmed from a benevolent desire to improve the lot of “brown men,” at this early stage of the occupation the Post avoided any critical assessment of the Dominican situation.

Furthermore, Marburg’s commentary rested on the idea that the role of the United States was to promote development and improvement in areas it viewed as underdeveloped.

This goal was not only worthy but also in Marburg’s estimation, necessary. The rest of

1917 and 1918 remained relatively quiet on the issue of American actions in the

Caribbean as most newspapers, the Post included, focused on the war in Europe.

As many scholars have noted, the end of World War I opened a space for a critical discussion of America’s role and actions abroad. However, the initial spark for these critical dialogues occurred before the war’s conclusion, ignited by President

15 “Clash on US Policy,” Washington Post, 22 April 1917, 2.

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Wilson’s own remarks.16 On 8 January 1918, Wilson delivered his famous “Fourteen

Points” in an effort to establish an outline for peace. Points six and thirteen guaranteed sovereignty for Russia and Poland, respectively, while other points included broader statements about the fate of nation-states in general. The fourteenth point proposed the establishment of a “general association of nations” that would guarantee “political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”17 Many interpreted this to mean that even smaller states had a right to their own sovereignty and would be guaranteed it. 18 In an address to congress the next month, Wilson confirmed this idea and added the notion of self-determination: “National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. ‘Self- determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of actions which

16 On Wilson’s strategy and policy see Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). Robert David Johnson, The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002). Ross Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America’s Strategy of Peace and Security (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2009).

17 Woodrow Wilson, “Fourteen Points,” (speech, Washington, DC, January 8, 1918). World War I Document Archive, https:// wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points.

18 On the contention over self-determination, anti-colonialism, and Wilson’s ideology see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); John Milton Cooper, Jr., ed., Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Susan Pederson, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

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statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”19 The concept of self-determination caused some to question American actions in the Caribbean where the United States appeared to be violating the very ideals Wilson proposed. However, as noted by scholar

Richard Seymour in American Insurgents, Wilson’s conceptualization of self- determination was never applicable to all equally – those that Wilson deemed “politically undeveloped” that had never learned “the rudiments of order and self-control” were not eligible for determining their own futures.20 This discussion over which people were entitled to guide their own countries was at the heart of the debate on the matter.

Early discussions on self-determination in the American media differed on their interpretation of the policy, a debate that continued after the war. On the one hand, some argued that self-determination did not apply to all equally. One resident of Highland

Park, a community north of Dallas, Texas, wrote in to the Dallas Morning News in

February 1918 expressing his belief that not all were fit for self-rule. The author claimed that the truth behind this doctrine was that “people who are temperamentally or habitually or prenatally indisposed to lead industrious, orderly, constructive lives are unfit to determine for themselves what sort of political State they shall erect.”21 In his opinion, this caveat not only applied to Haiti and the Dominican Republic but would also be applied to post-war Europe when officials would “have to take these facts rather than

19 Woodrow Wilson, “Address to Congress,” (speech, Washington, DC, February 11, 1918), World War I Document Archive, https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Address_to_Congress,_Analy zing_German_and_Austrian_Peace_Utterances.

20 Richard Seymour, American Insurgents: A Brief History of American Anti- Imperialism (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 62.

21 “Self-Determination,” Dallas Morning News, 9 February 1918, 10.

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doctrinaire fancies into the forefront of their consideration.”22 Six months later, former president Theodore Roosevelt echoed similar sentiments in his editorial “Sound

Nationalism and Sound Internationalism,” originally printed in the Kansas City Star and reprinted in newspapers across the nation. In this piece, Roosevelt questioned Wilson’s proposal on a League of Nations and his concept of self-determination. Roosevelt debated if the United States could even make claims about self-determination given its actions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which he referred to as “hypocritical.” He explained that it was hard to judge these two cases since much had occurred with little publicity or transparency. However, “the fact remains that we have with armed force invaded, made war upon, and conquered the two small republics, have upset their governments, have denied them the right of self-determination, and have made democracy within their limits not merely unsafe but non-existent.” If anything, according to Roosevelt, these two examples showed that “we are committed to the principle that some nations are not fit for self-determination, that democracy within their limits is a sham, and that their offenses against justice and right are such as to render interference by their more powerful and more civilized neighbors imperative.”23 Both Roosevelt and the anonymous resident of Highland Park agreed that Wilson’s policy could not possibly apply to all nations equally. Furthermore, these two pieces demonstrated that adjustments would have to be made to Wilson’s ideas in order to address the discrepancies between his anti-imperialism and the reality of America’s imperial actions.

22 “Self-Determination,” 10.

23 “Roosevelt Flouts League of Nations,” Washington Post, 4 August 1918, 3.

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A critical look into the inconsistencies of President Wilson’s foreign policy appeared in the previously mentioned New York publication Metropolitan Magazine in

March 1918. A monthly periodical that mostly focused on politics and literature,

Metropolitan Magazine often ran pieces expressing disapproval of Wilson’s decisions.

The article “Is America Honest?” by William Hard critiqued Wilson’s foreign policy through a fictional conversation between the president, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Greek Prime

Minister Elefterios Venizelos, and the deceased Dominican bandit Vicente Evangelista.

In the piece, Hard’s characters utilized quotes from Wilson’s own speeches to discuss discrepancies between his ideals and actions. Quoting from a speech Wilson gave in

January 1915 on the topic of the Mexican Revolution, “Evangelista” noted that “Wilson” opposed intervention, claiming that infighting should be left to the Mexicans to sort out on their own. However, as “Evangelista” pointed out, this was the exact opposite policy pursued in the Dominican Republic. In his defense, “Wilson” argued that Mexico was a distinctive case because it was a revolution based on “principles,” not on the whims of greedy politicians. He continued: “The Haitians and the Dominicans were different.

Their revolutions, on the facts, were not really for principles. And they were not working them out.”24

The most caustic accusations in the article likened the president to the Kaiser, who continually praised Wilson’s policies. “Wilhelm” congratulated “Wilson” on stating that governments derived their power from the consent of the governed. “Wilhelm” contended that this was “wise” to express in public though the reality of the situation was that “Wilson” had no intention of letting some areas govern themselves. The irony was

24 Hard, “Is America Honest?” 69.

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not lost on “Wilhelm,” who recognized the incongruity between policy and practice:

“You hold Porto Rico by war, by conquest, by blessing of the God of the Battles, by supreme biological survival and justice; and you intend to continue to hold it.”

“Wilhelm” maintained that he could overlook such “romantic idealisms,” conveyed in speeches because, after all, “I am a statesman too.” At one point, “Wilhelm” stated, “I begin to admire these Americans, really.” “Wilhelm” even went so far in his acclaim for

“Wilson’s” diplomatic skills to add, “I am going to have to have an American for

Chancellor.”25 “Kaiser Wilhelm’s” repeated expressions of respect and admiration for

“Wilson” indicated Hard’s opinion that there was not much difference between the two leaders – a dangerous charge during wartime which no doubt contributed to the US government’s decision to ban this issue of the magazine from the mail.26

Two articles responding to Hard’s critiques demonstrated the denial to see

American actions in the Caribbean as anything but positive. Republished from the

Chicago Tribune, the Colorado Springs Gazette argued that Hard’s article was audacious and would “outrage enthusiasts in whose opinion the administration is sacrosanct, and will give pain to many Americans whose conceptions of patriotism do not admit criticism.” Though the piece acknowledged that there had been inconsistencies in

Wilson’s policies, the paper maintained that “the administration has acted quietly, but wisely” behaving like an “absolute dictator, benevolent yes, but absolute.” Though these discrepancies could make America seem “hypocritical,” the article upheld the idea that in

25 Hard, “Is America Honest?” 15, 16, 68.

26 “Ill-Disguised German Propaganda,” Oregonian, 9 March 1918, 10.

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end, “America is honest. It must be known as honest.”27 In another response published in the Oregonian, there was less willingness to accept any ill intentions on the part of the

United States. The paper referred to Hard’s piece as “ill-disguised German propaganda,” stating that it “could not have lied more outrageously about the United States, or have better served the purpose of the Kaiser, if it had been written by the chief of the German propaganda in Berlin.” Though Hard had attempted to establish a parallel between

German actions and the events in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the Oregonian argued that there was no comparison because the Germans had destroyed Belgium, massacring and enslaving its men while ravaging its women. Conversely, in the case of

Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the United States intervened because they “were in a state of chronic civil war, their people were murdering each other wholesale, and were also murdering Americans.” Furthermore, according to the article, the United States was simply following its long-standing policy of aiding other countries like it had in the

Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, places where the “justification of American intrusion is to be found in the liberty, peace and prosperity which reign wherever American troops have gone.” The Oregonian emphatically stated that Germany did not have a Cuba and that the difference was one of motive: “Germany sends out armies to make men slaves,

American marines go forth to make men free. German occupation makes a prostrate, starving, impoverished Belgium; American occupation made a free, prosperous, happy

Cuba.”28 Unlike Hard’s allegations, the Oregonian upheld that the United States was nothing like Germany because its intentions were always selfless. The inability to accept

27 “America is Honest,” Colorado Springs Gazette, 9 March 1918, 4, 5.

28 “Ill-Disguised German Propaganda,” 10.

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criticism of US actions in both of these articles represented the intransigency on the part of American media sources at this time. Precisely because areas like Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Dominican Republic were supposedly unable to be industrious, stable, or orderly, on other words, their underdevelopment justified American intervention.

Sustained critiques of American policies toward the Dominican Republic did not appear in the US media immediately after the end of the war. Instead, most major and minor newspapers in the United States avoided the topic completely, filling their pages with updates on the Paris Peace Conference that left out the complicated status of places such as the Dominican Republic. On 31 January 1919, the New York Times briefly mentioned Haiti and the Dominican Republic, questioning whether entry into the League of Nations would change the way the United States administered affairs in the two countries and what this could mean for the Monroe Doctrine.29 Though former

Dominican President Henríquez y Carvajal traveled to Paris in the hopes of meeting with

President Wilson to discuss the occupation of the Dominican Republic, the American press failed to report on this topic. In a letter written to Jordan H. Stabler, Chief of the

Latin American Division of the State Department, dated 19 April 1919, Henríquez y

Carvajal extolled the position of the Dominican Republic in light of Wilson’s claims and the goals of the Peace Conference stating that no country was “in a better position than the Dominican Republic to claim the restitution of her sovereignty as a state and nation, which she has lost neither by war nor by any international agreement, voluntary or

29 Richard V. Oulahan, “Council Has Long Debate,” New York Times, 31 January 1919, 1.

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otherwise.”30 Henríquez y Carvajal noted the irony of the peace talks that had managed to resurrect “nations which appeared dead” while the Dominican Republic remained

“with her sovereignty sequestered and crippled.”31 As passionate as his argument was,

Henríquez y Carvajal’s words went unheeded by the State Department and more importantly unheard by conference delegates. Dominican poet Fabio Fiallo likened this to a deep betrayal as Dominicans were “deceived” by “the word of a just man,” clearly referring to President Wilson.32

Another article on the Dominican occupation would not appear in the Times until

September, noting that Henríquez y Carvajal had gone to Paris. The article did not discuss what the deposed president did or did not accomplish but instead published portions of a statement he had issued on behalf of the Junta Nacionalista Dominicana or

Dominican Nationalist Commission founded in July 1919. Henríquez y Carvajal testified that the military government had greatly reduced individual liberties, amounting to a complete loss of the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly with no possibility to modify the situation since the national government had ceased in 1916.33

As stated in the proclamation of military rule, the occupation was meant to be temporary

30 Enclosure, Doctor Henriquez y Carvajal to the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs of the Department of State (Stabler), April 19, 1919, FRUS, 1919, Vol. II, 107-108.

31 Enclosure, Doctor Henriquez y Carvajal to the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs of the Department of State (Stabler), April 19, 1919, FRUS, 1919, Vol. II, 107-108.

32 Fabio Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson in Santo Domingo (Havana: Arellano y Cia Impresores, 1940), 29.

33 “Santo Domingo Pleads for Self-Government,” New York Times 12 September 1919, 7.

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and Henríquez y Carvajal insisted that the Dominican people wanted a return of their native government.34 The Times made no commentary on the president’s claims, simply reprinting the statement of the Commission, yet another example of the media’s unwillingness to question American imperialism at this time.

The silence of the American press was noteworthy. It demonstrated that discussion of the post-war world, particularly in terms of self-determination and the rights of weaker nations was limited to Europe, a point clearly made during the Paris

Conference by American officials, who told Henríquez y Carvajal that talk of the

Dominican Republic could be addressed later in Washington.35 Neither Haiti nor the

Dominican Republic, both under US occupation, factored into the debate. It would take much more sensational and controversial stories, particularly ones that criticized the

United States’s actions and policies, to get the cause of Dominican independence more regularly in the press with any conviction.

Questioning America’s Intent

As 1920 wore on, the American press frequently published articles that questioned the actions of the military government in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In May

1920, the American media focused on a conference about Mexico and the Caribbean held at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. Whether newspaper editors ran the story to sell more papers or with a general interest in revealing the contradictions in the

34 “Santo Domingo Pleads for Self-Government,” 7.

35 The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (J. C. Grew) to the Acting Secretary of State, April 25, 1919, FRUS 1919, Vol. II, 106.

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Caribbean is unknown. Flashy headlines such as “Yanks Tyrants Toward Haiti

Schoenrich Says,” “Assails Our Record in Ruling Latins,” “Serious Charges,” and “Rule in Haiti Called Tyranny,” certainly captured readers’ attention and presented more critical pieces about American actions abroad. Though the goal of the conference was to foster critical discussion on foreign policy issues and develop an appreciation and understanding of the circumstances under which these events had unfolded, the focus of the media revealed deeper questions about America’s standing as a benevolent, humanitarian force looking beyond accomplishments like road building and education to question the removal of political institutions and civil liberties.

Although several speakers presented their point of view on America’s actions in the

Caribbean, the majority of articles reprinted the remarks of Otto Schoenrich. A lawyer by training, Schoenrich had worked with a commission to revise and compile laws in

Puerto Rico, later serving as a district judge there. Additionally, he had been secretary of a commission to investigate Dominican finances as well as secretary and advisor to the

Dominican government’s finance minister. Schoenrich had also worked for the

American government in Cuba and Nicaragua.36 Two years prior, newspapers lauded

Schoenrich’s 1918 publication, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future. Schoenrich was viewed as an expert on the country because of his extensive trips and intimate knowledge of the people and their government; papers hailed the book as a comprehensive study on the politics, finances, and business of the Dominican Republic.37

36 “Otto Schoenrich, 100, Dies at His Home in Baltimore,” New York Times, 9 February 1977, 20.

37 “Our Protectorate in the West Indies,” Sun, 7 July 1918, 2. “Reviews of New Books,” Sunday Star, 16 June 1918, 14.

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Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future praised the American occupation maintaining that the United States’s work on infrastructure, sanitation, and political stability had all produced “a rapid advance of the people and development of the country.”38 Two years, later, Schoenrich focused on a very different aspect of the occupation in his speech at the conference.

In Worcester, Schoenrich maintained that actions in the Dominican Republic did not measure up to the positive effects of American intervention in Cuba and Puerto Rico. He provided a long list of American accomplishments on the island: public works projects, elimination of debt, establishment of the national guard, and improvements in education.

However, these undertakings were all enacted by a regime that had generated distrust and hostility among Dominicans, he claimed. According to Schoenrich, these endeavors had

“been accompanied by the complete suppression of popular liberty under a drastic censorship and the oppressive action of arbitrary military courts.” Schoenrich claimed that the three main defects in the Dominican Republic were the character of the military government, the provost courts, and the strict censorship laws. In his discussion of military personnel, Schoenrich pointed out that many of these men were “apt to be autocratic, arbitrary, intolerant and inefficient” and some had even taken this a step further by employing methods of torture including the “water cure,” the “application of red-hot machetes,” and allowing prisoners to escape only to shoot them in the back as they attempted to get away. Schoenrich spoke of an administration that enacted rigid censorship laws from its inception, allowing neither criticism of the military government

38 Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), 394.

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nor of its officials, even going so far as to outlaw words such as national, revolution, freedom of thought, and freedom of speech. To conclude his talk, Schoenrich gave his final assessment: “When we consider the splendid achievements in Cuba and Porto Rico, the record made in Santo Domingo must bring us deep disappointment, while the mess in

Haiti must awaken feelings of resentment and shame.” The blame, according to

Schoenrich, lay with Washington because it allowed this situation to develop and

“displayed a disregard of the rights of the inhabitants.”39 Schoenrich’s emphasis in this speech was not on American imperialism or the ideology behind it but rather its record in the Dominican Republic. Despite some infrastructural advancements, what worried

Schoenrich were political institutions and individual freedoms that the occupation had removed from the Dominican Republic.

The majority of articles did not comment more on the topic beyond liberally quoting

Schoenrich, though his scathing words certainly made some uncomfortable. One attempt to counteract Schoenrich’s claims appeared in the Chicago Daily Tribune, which printed one statement from another presenter at the conference, Colonel George C. Thorpe of the

United States Marine Corps. Though Thorpe’s address at the conference blatantly attacked Schoenrich’s accusations, all the Chicago Daily Tribune printed was Thorpe’s claim that “everywhere in the island of Santo Domingo American troops make friends with the people.”40

39 Otto Schoenrich, “The Present American Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti,” in Mexico and the Caribbean: Clark University Addresses, ed. George Blakeslee (New York: GE Stechert and Company, 1920), 210, 211, 212.

40 George C. Thorpe quoted in “Yanks Tyrants Toward Haiti Schoenrich Says,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 21 May 1920, 10.

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Schoenrich’s ultimate point, not lost on some journalists, was concern over America’s reputation abroad. The Boston Daily Globe noted: “For the sake of our standing with the people of South and Central America, as well as for our own honor, it is imperative that the present charges should either be proved false or that any officer or man who has disgraced our flag by Prussianism should be punished.”41 Similar to Hard’s article in

1918, the equation of the United States with the aggression of World War I Germany was an affront to American goodwill and beneficence. In the coming months discussion of the Dominican situation intensified, as the damage being done to America’s reputation became a major cause for concern in the press. Rather than printing stories about

Dominican politicians and intellectuals trying to regain their independence, the American media honed in on the topic of America’s reputation abroad. Behind that concern lay the fear that the United States had not acted as the humanitarian it thought itself to be as accusations of abuse and mismanagement garnered attention.

Though not publicized in the American press, demands for ending the American occupation of the Dominican Republic increased in both frequency and intensity during

1919, prompting changes in occupation policy. In an attempt to foster goodwill between

US forces and the Dominican population, the military government revised Executive

Order No. 385, which had established strict censorship. In a telegram dated 25 December

1919, the US minister in the Dominican Republic informed the secretary of state that changes had been made “practically abolishing censorship but forbidding publication of slanderous or false statements against [the] Military and United States Governments and

41 “Serious Charges,” Boston Daily Globe, 22 May 1920, 4.

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articles tending to disturb order by calling on [the] people to revolt.”42 The revision of

Executive Order No. 385 officially stated the abolishment of censorship but also included a long list of exceptions to the rule including any publications or speeches, which taught the doctrine of Bolshevism or anarchy, promoted ideas contrary to public morality, or fostered hostility toward the United States or military government (including its policies or personnel). The modification also forbade publications or speeches that “hold up to scorn, obloquy or ridicule, the conduct of the United States Government, of the Military

Government, or of their officers” and those “which describe present conditions in Santo

Domingo as manifestly unfair or [in an] untruthful manner.”43 Thus, though changes were made, the revisions made censorship more specific.44

Despite the risks, many Dominicans, including poet, writer, and politician Fabio

Fiallo, criticized the military government. Fiallo likened this relaxation in the censorship laws to an opening of the floodgates as a “resolute phalanx of orators and journalists, filled with war-like ardor” began to openly critique the occupation.45 In response,

American military forces imprisoned over twenty poets, journalists, editors, and

42 The Minister in the Dominican Republic (Russell) to the Secretary of State. December 25, 1919, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II. 161.

43 The Chargé d’Affaires in the Dominican Republic (Brewer) to the Secretary of State, January 22, 1920, Enclosure, Executive Order No. 385, January 15, 1920, of the Military Government of Santo Domingo, Relaxing Censorship, FRUS, 1920, Volume II., 163.

44 “Patriot Poet Accused,” New York Times, 10 August 1920, 14. “El Consejo de Guerra Contra Fabio Fiallo y Otros,” Diario de la Marina, 10 August 1920, 1. Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 9.

45 Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 40.

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intellectuals.46 The chargé in the Dominican Republic telegrammed Secretary of State

Bainbridge Colby on 3 August 1920, indicating that articles published by Fiallo and writer Américo Lugo were “considered a violation of the regulations put into effect at the time of [the] abolishment of censorship,” and had thus resulted in their arrest.

Additionally, Manuel Cabrera, a Venezuelan writer and publisher living in Santo

Domingo, awaited trial for printing the two men’s articles.47 Furthermore, the chargé indicated that these arrests and others had taken place during Patriotic Week, “a farce” celebrated with the express intention of “raising funds for propaganda [and the] restoration of the national government.”48 The New York Times claimed that Fiallo and

Lugo had “attacked military officials” with the intent to circulate their message across

Latin America.49 After being detained by American occupation forces on 15 July 1920, a military court sentenced Fiallo to five years hard labor and a fine of 5,000 pesos.50 Part of the outrage in the international community that “caused much astonishment and general indignation” surrounded the prospect that Fiallo might lose his life for his crime since “one of the powers of the Military Commission” included “the right to impose the

46 Bruce Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 197.

47 The Chargé d’ Affaires in the Dominican Republic (Brewer) to the Secretary of State, August 3, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 164.

48 The Chargé d’Affaires in the Dominican Republic (Brewer) to the Secretary of State, August 3, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol, II, 165, 164.

49 “Patriot Poet Accused,” New York Times, 10 August 1920, 14.

50 Editor’s Note. Fabio Fiallo, “The Evacuation of Santo Domingo,” Current History XIV (April-September 1921), 294. “Suspenden la Asentencia de Fiallo,” El Mundo, 15 September 1920.

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death sentence.”51 With the imminent possibility of Fiallo’s death, press organizations across Latin America not only picked up the story but also began pressuring Washington to intervene in the situation.

Though both Lugo and Cabrera were mentioned in many of the press releases, the focus of the Latin America media remained on Fiallo, the “patriot poet.” The campaign for Fiallo’s release began in August in Havana and reverberated across the Western

Hemisphere as the Cuban Press Association planned to ask President Wilson to intervene in the case and implore the press association in Washington and all of the press clubs in

South America to champion their cause.52 Numerous Latin American newspapers published articles protesting Fiallo’s imprisonment throughout the late summer and early autumn of 1920. The Associated Press of Havana prompted most of the media response by issuing telegrams urging their fellow journalists to take up the cause of the patriot poet. Though they did not have much luck with Washington, the efforts of Havana journalists did prompt movement in South American press clubs as the associations in

Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico all appealed to Wilson on behalf of Fiallo.53

Although US newspapers picked up the Fiallo story, they neither passed judgment nor appealed to Wilson to intercede demonstrating the difficulty in changing the perceptions of American intervention in the US media. Throughout the month of August, both the

51 Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 41.

52 “El caso de Fabio Fiallo,” El Mundo, 10 August 1920, 1. “En favor de Fiallo,” Diario de la Marina, 11 August 1920, 1.

53 “Cuba intercede por la vida de Fabio Fiallo,” El Mundo, 8 August 1920, 1. “En favor de Fiallo,” Diario de la Marina, 11 August 1920, 1. “La solidaridad intelectual,” El Mercurio, 15 August 1920, 26. “Brasil y Mexico apoyan a Fiallo,” El Mundo, 15 August 1920.

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Washington Post and the New York Times published information on the Fiallo situation relaying the actions of Latin American press clubs.54 On 8 August, the New York Times reported on the subject of Fiallo, noting that the cable the State Department had received from the Havana Press Club “was the first information the department had that such a trial was in progress.”55 Given the circumstances, the Times stated that the State

Department was requesting a full report on the matter directly from the Dominican

Republic. Despite the demands of Cuban journalists, neither the Times nor the Post published any items requesting Wilson’s assistance or condemning the military government’s actions demonstrating that there was still a desire to stand behind the military government, and by extension, the occupation. Though the Times did include a few quotes from the cablegrams including Havana’s plea that Wilson resolve the issue

“in accordance with the highest sentiments of justice and humanity” and Montevideo’s entreaty for the president to rectify the matter “in accordance with his high democratic spirit,” most pieces ignored these statements.56 In fact, most articles were short and ended with the fact that Fiallo had violated the censorship laws.57

54 “Patriot Poet Accused,” New York Times, 10 August 1920, 14. “Wilson Asked to Save Poet Facing Death in San Domingo,” New York Times, 11 August 1920, 1. “Plead for Santo Domingo Poet,” Washington Post, 8 August 1920, 26. “Appeal on Behalf of Poet,” Washington Post, 17 August 1920, 6.

55 “Appeal for San Domingan,” New York Times, 8 August 1920, 19.

56 “Wilson Asked to Save Poet Facing Death in San Domingo,” 1. “Appeal for San Domingan,” 19.

57 “Uruguay Asks Wilson to Aid San Domingo Poet,” Idaho Daily Statesman, 8 August 1920, 12. “Wilson Asked to Intervene in Trial,” Gulfport Daily Herald, 9 August 1920, 1. “Friends Plead for Poet,” Oregonian, 10 August 1920, 18.

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The fiasco provoked anxiety in the State Department as the Latin American press questioned America’s benevolent reputation. According to a telegram from Secretary of

State Colby, the arrests of Lugo, Cabrera, and Fiallo “caused deep concern throughout

Latin America.” Receiving multiple notifications from “numerous Latin American press associations protesting against the arrest of these men,” the State Department worried about the “unfortunate impression” these events had created. Acknowledging that the reputation of the United States was on the line in the wake of “continued agitation,”

Secretary Colby instructed the minister in the Dominican Republic to relay to the military governor the following:

[T]he Department hopes that it may be possible to conclude the trials at an early date and to express to him the opinion of the Department that unless the penalty imposed be light, in the event that these men are convicted, Lugo and his companions will become martyrs in the estimation of the Dominican public generally and the action of the Military Government will have an unfortunate effect in Latin American countries.58

In response to this request, the military governor reduced Fiallo’s sentence to one-year imprisonment and a fine of $2,500. This was not pleasing in the least to Secretary Colby, who questioned the governor’s actions in a telegram to Secretary of the Navy Josephus

Daniels:

I am taking the liberty to bring this to your attention since it was my understanding that you intended to have the Military Governor take steps to deport Flores Cabrera . . . and to have the two Dominicans themselves released after a warning had been given them by proper authorities. It may be, of course, that the Military Governor feels obliged to have this severe sentence imposed upon Fiallo, for the moral effect which it may have throughout the Republic, and later pardon him.59

58 The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Dominican Republic (Russell), August 13, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 165.

59 The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), September 2, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 166.

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However, Colby warned Daniels that this was not an acceptable form of action as “I fear the report of this case will be made considerable use of in propaganda directed against the

Military Occupation of Santo Domingo in other Latin American countries.”60 As a result,

Daniels ordered Military Governor Snowden to immediately suspend all proceedings against Lugo and Fiallo.61 Content with this action, Colby telegrammed Daniels his opinion on the situation: “I feel that the action which was taken most fully meets the situation, and I am sure that its effect will prove most helpful to our interests throughout

Latin America.”62 Fiallo’s sentence was suspended, commuted, and then finally dismissed on 15 October 1920.63

Though the US government intervened in the situation, the concern on the part of the State Department was never really over Fiallo’s fate but instead over America’s standing throughout Latin America. The Latin American press’s denunciations of

Fiallo’s imprisonment prompted a reaction by US officials, a clear indication that the press could elicit change when America’s reputation was on the line. The Cuban newspaper El Mundo credited Washington’s change in attitude to the efforts of the associated press of Latin America, in particular the hard work and dedication of the

60 The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Dominican Republic (Russell), FRUS. 1920, Volume II. 166.

61 The Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to the Secretary of State, September 3, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 166.

62 The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), September 10, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 167.

63 Editor’s Note, “The Evacuation of Santo Domingo,” Current History, 294.

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Havana Press Club.64 After his release, Fiallo cabled the Havana Press Club on 21

October stating, “Provisional release, I will never forget how much I owe [it to] the associated press.”65 Not only had this united effort ultimately closed the cases against journalists, but also, according to Fiallo, this was a decisive moment in the struggle for

Dominican freedom as now “the dike [had] broken, [and] the national conscience spread in a series of manifestations which carried the echoes of our decided opposition and irreconcilable claims throughout the world.”66

In a biting article published in February 1921, the Philadelphia Inquirer not only went the opposite direction of the Latin America press but also took a firm stance on the issue unlike the previous articles on the topic in the Washington Post or the New York

Times. Claiming that Fiallo’s recent photo in which the poet appeared in a prisoner’s garb was a complete publicity stunt aimed at tugging at the heartstrings of viewers who were supposed to reflect on “Fiallo suffering the terrors of prison life,” the Inquirer implied Fiallo was a would-be martyr for an unworthy cause. In fact, the article argued,

Fiallo “never wore a convict’s suit in his life, unless it was under the old regime of

Dominican dictatorships,” and instead, American forces had allowed Fiallo access to a car for excursions and provided him with Columbus’s own suite in Fort Ozama. In stating that “Fiallo violated a law of the American Military Government in Santo

Domingo against inciting [the public] to insurrection,” the Inquirer implied that not only was the poet guilty but also that he had been found culpable by a legitimate authority that

64 “Suspenden la asentencia de Fiallo,” El Mundo, 15 September 1920, 3.

65 “La libertad de Fabio Fiallo,” Diario de la Marina, 22 October 1920, 1.

66 Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 42.

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could have sentenced him to death. Instead, US officials chose to give him just “a few months in jail,” later reducing and then eliminating the charge altogether. The article alluded that this stood in stark contrast to the sadistic fate Fiallo might have suffered in the hands of a native Dominican government: “In the days of Santo Domingo’s Concho

Primo the penalty might also have carried with it the painless details of quartering and boiling in oil.”67 Throughout this piece, the Inquirer unashamedly created a distinct dichotomy between the rational rule of the United States and the uncivilized and barbaric customs of native Dominican administration. Furthermore, the Inquirer vehemently maintained that the public exposure Fiallo garnered from his arrest only served to enrich him as “his poetry jumped in popularity, and he had to get out a fresh edition which sold as high as $100 a copy.”68 While most American newspapers did not go to the same lengths to discredit Fiallo as the Inquirer had, the commonality between these media sources lay within the fact that the greatest concern was about the reputation of the

United States. In a way, the Inquirer piece hinted at this simply through the claim that

Fiallo had orchestrated the whole stunt. According to the Inquirer, this was not a case of injustice, but rather that of a swindler looking to sully the good name of the United States in order to sell more of his own poetry.

67 Concho Primo refers to an Uncle Sam-type character created in 1919. For more on the origins of Concho Primo see Sydney Hutchinson, Tigers of a Different Stripe: Performing Gender in Dominican Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), 30-33.

68 “Santo Domingo Job Called Half-Baked,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 February 1921, 9.

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Conclusion

As articles emerged in the American media denouncing the military occupation of the

Dominican Republic whether they were taken at face value or challenged like the case of

Fiallo in the Philadelphia Inquirer, most media sources in the United States were reluctant to condemn American actions in the Dominican Republic. However, as more stories appeared in the press claiming that the US occupation was an example of abuse and poor administration that all came at the expense of a loss of personal freedoms for

Dominicans, the question of what exactly were American objectives in the Caribbean and whether or not they were worth it became more publicized in the media. Though these claims were ones that Dominicans had made since the start of the occupation, it was not until these articles called into question the benevolent intent of the American intervention by noting the loss of native government and individual liberties that the subject of the occupation garnered any critical attention in the American media. These early discussions on American foreign policy and the role of the United States abroad continued to intensify during the US presidential campaign of 1920, eventually contributing to a change in the occupation.

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CHAPTER 7

INTERPRETING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM

As shown in the previous chapter, early concerns over America’s imperial actions often times centered on a discussion of its reputation abroad. In 1918, prolific author and professor of political science H. H. Powers wrote America Among the Nations. The book explored the growth of US territory from the time of continental expansion and then turned to an overview of American actions in places such as the Pacific and Caribbean.

While Powers did not provide an indictment of American imperialism, he instead urged his readers to understand that the lack of consistent policy had led outsiders to see the

United States as aggressive and hypocritical particularly because of the dictate that every country had the right to self-government. The irony between statement and action was not lost on Powers:

But important as it is to see ourselves as we are, it is even more important to see ourselves as others see us. It is a peculiarity of this unintentional imperialism that we are largely unconscious of our own attitude. As we are never aggressive until circumstances suddenly coerce us, we live in constant mood of fancied deference which overshadows all else in our experience. Outsiders are quite uninfluenced by our consciousness of innocence of which they have no experience. They see only our acts which have been consistently aggressive, and from which they not unnaturally infer a consistent purpose of aggression. Their attitude seems to us one of unworthy suspicion, and ours to them one designing hypocrisy. The relation is natural and is not to be conjured away. It must be with consciousness of our character and our reputation that we confront the proposed policy.1

Though written in 1918, Powers’ concerns were similar to those appearing in the

American by the 1920s about the US occupation of the Dominican Republic.

1 H. H. Powers, America Among the Nations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), 162-163.

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This chapter continues to examine how the American media changed in its coverage of the occupation of the Dominican Republic. Since the end of World War I a more critical discussion of US policies and objectives had appeared in the press. This debate about America’s role in the Dominican Republic and Latin America as a whole intensified during the presidential election of 1920 and continued to garner attention in the following years.

The first part of this chapter analyzes media responses to presidential candidate

Warren G. Harding’s accusations of mistreatment and maladministration in the Caribbean to explain how the topic of the occupation was thrust to the forefront of the press. Next, the chapter turns to an examination of two tours of South America. The first, undertaken by the Dominican Nationalist Commission, aimed to publicize their campaign for independence. The second, completed by the US secretary of state, represented an effort to rekindle positive foreign relations with countries to the south of the United States and control the damage done by the commission’s efforts to expose the deficiencies of the US occupation. The chapter closes with an analysis of two articles that appeared in The

Atlantic Monthly in 1924. One piece, written by Protestant missionary and secretary of the Committee on Cooperation in Latin America Samuel Guy Inman, argued that

America’s actions abroad constituted a clear case of imperialism, while the other, authored by Sumner Welles, chief of the Latin American division of the US State

Department, argued the opposite. Throughout this back and forth criticism that at times defended the occupation and at others denounced it, the American media’s representation of both the Dominican Republic and the United States continually fluctuated to meet

American needs.

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The 1920 Presidential Election

Like nothing before, the remarks of Republican presidential hopeful Warren G.

Harding pushed the topic of the American occupation of the Dominican Republic to the forefront of the press, sometimes even on the front pages of newspapers. Though certainly not the focus of his campaign, Harding’s criticisms of American foreign policy under Wilson ignited the subject of intervention in the media. Since more critical pieces appeared condemning the occupation in the context of the presidential race, the rapid turnaround in the American press, owed in part, to partisan politics. “Nothing would have been heard about Haiti and Santo Domingo at this time if there had not been a presidential campaign in the United States,” wrote the Washington Post’s Albert W.

Fox.2 Scholars of the American occupation of the Dominican Republic agree that

Harding’s speech brought the Caribbean interventions to the attention of the press, leading to criticisms of US foreign policy.3

On 28 August 1920 Harding gave a speech to constituents in Marion, Ohio, disparaging the current administration for its dealings with other countries stating that

“no power on earth” could compel him to act in a similar manner. According to Harding,

Wilson and the Democrats had allowed an assistant secretary of the United States Navy

2 Albert W. Fox, “Island Issue Looms Large,” Washington Post, 6 October 1920, 1.

3 John W. Blassingame noted that some publications changed their appraisal of the occupation, condemning it only after 1920. See John W. Blassingame, “The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1904-1920,” Caribbean Studies 6, no. 2 (July 1969): 27-43. For more on the press and resistance to the occupation see John R. Patton, “Intellectual and Political Resistance to the U.S. Occupation of the Dominican Republic – 1916-1924” (PhD diss, University of Maine, 2013), esp. 137-140.

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to “draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the point of bayonets borne by the United States Marines.”4 Harding continued, maintaining that these actions had not been made public, but instead were “cover[ed] with a veil of secrecy.” The misuse of the Oval Office had led to “repeated acts of unwarranted interferences in domestic affairs of the little republics of the western hemisphere.”5 No doubt the “helpless neighbors in the West Indies” referred to Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the constitution “jam[med] down their throats” acknowledged statements made earlier by Franklin Roosevelt, former assistant secretary of the Navy and current Democratic vice presidential candidate, who claimed to have authored Haiti’s constitution. Here, Harding’s comments were not against the occupation exactly but rather focused on the loss of individual freedom and native government.

Harding’s remarks derived from a 1920 speech to constituents in Butte, Montana, in which Roosevelt claimed: “You know, I have had something to do with running a couple of little republics. The facts are that I wrote Haiti’s Constitution myself and, if I do say it, I think it’s a pretty good Constitution.”6 Although Roosevelt attempted to diffuse the situation by claiming that he was misquoted, citizens of Butte responded that they had

4 Warren G. Harding, “A Speech by Senator Warren G. Harding to Delegation of Indiana Citizens, Marion Ohio, August 28, 1920” (speech, Marion, OH, August 28, 1920), Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/stream/speechesofwarren00harding/speechesofwarren00hard_djv u.txt.

5 Harding, “A Speech by Senator Warren G. Harding to Delegation of Indiana Citizens.”

6 Franklin Roosevelt, “Campaign Speech” (speech, Butte, Montana, August 18, 1920), FRANKLIN, http:// http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/msf/msf00145.

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heard the politician clearly when his “cynical remark” basically “dismissed the butchery of some three thousand Haitians by US troops of the United States and the enslavement of Haiti’s population by the sugar-trust.”7 The Butte Daily Bulletin explained the self- aggrandizing agenda of Roosevelt and the Wilson administration, arguing that they had

“done in Haiti and Santo Domingo exactly what Great Britain is doing in Ireland, Egypt and India; what France is doing in Arabia, and what the imperialists of all lands since the great war for ‘democracy’” had been doing.8 Reporting on Harding’s speech, the New

York paper the Evening World quoted liberally from Harding relaying for readers that

“1000s of native Haitians have been killed by American marines.”9 African American newspapers from Seattle to Chicago also conveyed these same accusations to their readers, focusing on Harding’s claim that thousands of Haitians had lost their lives.10 For example, the Cleveland Gazette demonstrated the illegality of American forces in Haiti and the Dominican Republic maintaining that a state of war existed “with the little helpless republics of our own hemisphere. The wars upon our neighbors to the south were made and are still being waged though never declared, through the usurpation by, the executive powers.”11

7 “Roosevelt’s Unconvincing Deal,” Butte Daily Bulletin, 4 September 1920, 4.

8 “Roosevelt’s Unconvincing Deal,” 4.

9 “US Making War on Helpless Haiti, Harding Charge,” Evening World, 17 September 1920, 19.

10 “The War in Hayti,” Cayton’s Weekly, 9 October 1920, 2. “The War in Hayti,” Dallas Express, 9 October 1920, 4. “’The Rape of Haiti!’ The Most Shocking Assertion Ever Made by a Responsible Government Official,” Cleveland Gazette, 25 September 1920, 1.

11 “’The Rape of Haiti!’” 1.

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Others seized upon Harding’s comments to further disparage America’s foreign policy. Journalist W. E. Pulliam wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Tribune questioning Wilson’s bullying tactics under the headline “Picking on Small Nations.”

Pulliam noted the discrepancies between Wilson’s words and actions, quoting a 1913 address in which Wilson stated that “one of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and

South America.” To demonstrate Wilson’s hypocrisy, Pulliam followed this with quotes from John Barrett, former head of the Pan-American Union. Barrett claimed that almost all newspapers in Latin America criticized the policies of the United States in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and that this had provided “ammunition for anti-United States agitators and critics.” Much like earlier admonishments, Pulliam likened the United

States to Germany. Although the Navy Department continually discussed the improvements made in the two countries, Pulliam asked: “But wasn’t that the boast of the

Germans in Belgium?” He also implored his readers to contemplate whether America’s actions “square with the promise of ‘self-determination’ for small nations” maintaining that the “occupation of Santo Domingo is without semblance of moral right, international law or treaty obligation.” To drive home his point, Pulliam asked, “Why pick upon small, defenseless nations, in which natives who oppose the invaders are characterized as bandits, where free speech is abridged and writers who criticize conditions are imprisoned and threatened with execution?”12 Appearing in the Washington Post,

Pulliam’s editorial revealed that the topic had finally garnered the attention of major

12 W. E. Pulliam, “Picking on Small Nations,” New York Tribune, 24 October 1920, 1.

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newspapers that went beyond focusing on the material benefits of imperialism to examine the methods with which those improvements were achieved.

Many articles that appeared in the Post supported Harding’s interpretation. Although not reaching nearly the amount of readers as papers like the New York Times, the Post was a valuable source of Republican sentiment given that its owner at this time was a friend of Harding and a supporter of the Republican Party.13 In part, the turn in American opinion against the Dominican occupation, particularly in newspapers like the republican

Post represented an example of political partisanship rather than a genuine interest in the fate of the Dominican Republic. The Post stated that Roosevelt neither had the right to pen Haiti’s constitution nor the authority to depose a free government in favor of “an

American dictator backed by naval guns.”14 In an article published in October 1920, the

Post condemned American policy under the Democrats, arguing that “the free and independent nation known as the Dominican Republic has ceased to exist” as the

“government of that republic has been extinguished by the military forces of the United

States.” The article continued its bold critique:

There is no president of Santo Domingo and no congress. The public ministers have been dismissed and the people have been prohibited from holding elections. There is a rigid censorship and a military rule, exercised by an American naval officer, who makes the law hourly or daily, according to orders which he receives from the Secretary of the Navy.15

13 Aurora Wallace, Newspapers and the Making of Modern America: A History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 165. Wallace estimated the pre-WWI circulation of the New York Times at 250,000 and after at approximately 360,000. By the late 1910s the Washington Post’s circulation was 75,000 making it the second largest paper in the DC area.

14 “Misuse of the Monroe Doctrine,” Washington Post, 26 December 1920.

15 “The United States and Santo Domingo,” Washington Post, 5 October 1920, 6.

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Though the Post recalled the familiar narrative of the inability to pay off foreign debt as the explanation for US involvement, by 1920 the details of the story had changed. Rather than citing a violation of the 1907 treaty, the Post noted: “There is no provision in the treaty which justifies the abolition of native government.” Furthermore, since American forces removed the Dominican government, the article maintained that “the United

States, and not Santo Domingo, is the chief violator of that treaty,” creating a regime that

“is fully as severe as the military government of Ireland, and there is not now visible in the Dominican Republic any government of, by or for the people.”16

The next day, the Post ran Albert Fox’s article that declared that the United States had robbed Dominicans of their rightful government. Under the current administration, Fox maintained, foreign policy in the Dominican Republic contradicted basic American doctrine. He asserted that the US government along with the Navy had “wiped out the government completely, dismissed all ministers, forbade the holding of elections, proclaimed a sort of military dictatorship over people and has virtually kept them in a state of subjugation in rigid military rule enforced in the name of liberty.” Fox strengthened his argument by contending that Harding was not impressed by the progress that had been made in the Dominican Republic but instead believed that “the end does not justify the means if the means have been of such a tyrannical nature as to make a mockery of the Monroe Doctrine, to arouse hatred and suspicion of America on the part of neighborly nations and to praise liberty with fine words [and] sword at the same

16 “The United States and Santo Domingo,” 6.

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time.”17 Although Fox was clearly troubled by US actions, his concern was also over

America’s reputation, one tarnished by Harding’s commentary and certainly not justified just for the sake of infrastructural improvement.

Though many utilized Harding’s speech to critique the current administration and its foreign policy, other newspapers expressed disgust at the senator’s words seeing them as an attack on the United States. The Dearborn Independent, the paper of the Ford Motor

Company, stated that the word “marine” was being “bandied about unpleasantly in the heat of campaign” and that it was “disgraceful that politics should permit the breeding of maliciousness such as that which has characterized some of the accusations against the

United States Marines.”18 The paper did agree that an investigation into the claims was wise, but quoted Secretary Daniels, who argued, “a wanton attack upon their (the

Marines’) record is a wanton attack upon American civilization.”19 The District of

Columbia Evening Star reported on Roosevelt’s claim that Harding had misquoted him and maintained Roosevelt’s assertion that Harding, as a member of Congress, was fully aware of US actions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Thus, according to Roosevelt,

Harding’s accusations were nothing more than “dribble” and a “deliberate attempt to deceive” the American public. The Evening Star also related that Roosevelt believed

Harding’s “win at any cost” strategy of besmirching the marines and American actions would “neither disturb our sister republics nor deceive intelligent Americans.”20 The

17 “Island Issue Looms Large,” 1.

18 “The Facts About It,” Dearborn Independent, 23 October 1920, 4.

19 “The Facts About It,” 4.

20 “Roosevelt Denies Harding Charges,” Evening Star, 18 September 1920, 8.

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New York Times relayed the State Department’s opinion on Harding’s speech characterizing it as “cheap” and in “wanton disregard of facts.” The paper included the response of Daniels, who was surprised that Harding would “give currency to so unjust a reflection upon brave and patriotic members of the Marine Corps on duty in Haiti.” He continued, “They have rendered a real service to the people of that country and with very few exceptions have shown that they are worthy comrades of those Marines who won imperishable glory in France.”21 The Colorado Springs Gazette countered Harding with the response of Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, who said that the relations of the

United States should not be “misrepresented even under the temptations that a political campaign presents to irresponsible utterances and conscious inveracity.”22

Other papers characterized Harding’s comments as “gross exaggerations” given that the marines were “preserving order” and “protecting [the] lives and property of foreign citizens.”23 Furthermore, Harding had no right to accuse the marines of indiscriminately killing people for sport because this was against their very nature. Originally published in the Iowa newspaper the Sioux City Journal, the Chicago Daily Tribune reprinted an editorial that argued that Haiti and Santo Domingo were among the few places where the present administration was “acting with intelligence and purpose” in its use of

“benevolent control.” In a statement that harkened back to the racialization of the

21 “Daniels Defends Marines in Haiti,” New York Times, 19 September 1920, 18.

22 “United States Soon to Leave Haiti; Work Nearing Completion,” Colorado Springs Gazette, 21 September 1920, 1.

23 “Former Consul Lauds Marines,” Los Angeles Times, 30 October 1920, 14. This article also appeared in the New York paper the Sun, see “Praises Marines’ Work in Dominican Republic,” Sun, 30 October 1920, 3.

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Dominican Republic prominent at the turn of the century, the piece indicated the necessity of such actions since both countries were “nations of Negroes.”24

Newspapers that supported the occupation praised the work of the military government to counter Harding’s allegations. The New York Times, for example, ran articles lauding the public health, sanitation, and educational advances of occupation forces.25 In a story discussing the Washington visit of three new ministers from Latin

America, the Times included extensive coverage of statements made by Emilio Joubert, former chargé d’affaires in the Dominican Republic. Responding to the topic of the current difficulties in the country, Joubert stated:

The altruistic and humanitarian spirit that has characterized your Excellency’s Administration, the noble record of the people of the United States as a chivalrous champion of justice and right, are constant proof that in the relations of our Government with the people of the Dominican Republic there could be no other sentiments than those of sympathy for the young Republic in her misfortunes, nor any other purposes than these inspired by lofty and generous intentions without a doubt, as those inspiring the best and most disinterested of our citizens.26

The Fort-Worth Star Telegram echoed similar sentiments extoling the occupation government’s building of roads, ports, and bridges.27 Both the Tennessee Crossville

24 “Harding’s Mistake,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 5 October 1920, 8. The same article appeared in the Chicago Defender, see “This is Rich,” Chicago Defender, 9 October 1920, 12.

25 “Tells Our Reforms in Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 4 October 1920, 9. “Helping Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 5 October 1920, 7. Sara MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” New York Times, 10 October 1920, 12. “Our Aid to Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 10 October 1920, 23.

26 “President Receives Three New Ministers,” New York Times, 30 November 1920, 21.

27 “Santo Domingo is Rehabilitated by U.S. Military Rule,” Fort Worth Star- Telegram, 10 October 1920, 7.

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Chronicle and Nebraska’s North Platte Semi-Weekly Tribune also highlighted the improvements being made in the Dominican Republic by American forces in the article

“Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order.”28

Accompanying the “Uncle Sam” article was a small cartoon illustrating Uncle him and the Dominican Republic, which relied on older stereotypical tropes. In the cartoon, Uncle Sam sat at a desk with a paper in his hand, perhaps a treaty or set of laws.

Older and distinguished, Uncle Sam watched “S.D.,” a small, child-like figure with ink black skin, bare feet, and engorged lips. Portrayed in the classic pickanniny caricature,

SD puffed on a cigar with his hands on his hips, seemingly without a care in the world.

In the cartoon, SD wore a military uniform, a nod to the occupation government’s training of a native civil guard, yet another highly praised objective of US forces. Rare for this period, the cartoon aptly captured the perspective of the article, which implied that that the need for intervention was partly to blame on Dominicans blackness. This racial depiction implied the underdevelopment of the country and thus the need for

American intervention. Adhering to a paternalistic theme, the article stated that Uncle

Sam had done a good job of “house cleaning” in the Dominican Republic, putting “the republic on its feet,” with “restored order, rehabilitated finances, established public sanitation and compulsory education.”29 This cartoon functioned much like its predecessors popular between 1904-1907 because it provided an easily identifiable black

28 “Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order,” Crossville Chronicle, 17 November 1920, 6. “Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order,” North Platte Semi- Weekly Tribune, 5 November 1920, 11.

29 “Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order,” Crossville Chronicle, 17 November 1920, 6. “Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order,” North Platte Semi- Weekly Tribune, 5 November 1920, 11.

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figure readers could readily contextualize in terms of southern African Americans or the darkened depictions of others under American rule who lacked development.

Given the stories being run in American newspapers, it was clear that, by the fall of 1920, the topic of occupation of the Dominican Republic had finally become controversial in the media with the reputation of the United States as a benevolent force on the line. Unlike previous articles that garnered little attention on allegations of impropriety in the Dominican Republic, the presidential election called attention to major discrepancies in US policy. Pieces written on the Dominican Republic prior to the end of

World War I singularly praised American efforts. Conversely, press coverage dramatically changed over the course of 1920 as criticism of the occupation became more publicized. And yet, as the cartoon in the two papers demonstrated, there was still a desire to defend the United States by relying on earlier narratives that justified intervention based on racist imagery and the narrative of underdevelopment.

The Reputation of the United States

Two tours of Latin America in late 1920 sparked further critical discussions in the

US media as one sought to expose injustices committed against the Dominican people and the other attempted to justify American actions. Utilizing the same arguments that appeared in the media during the US presidential campaign, one side focused on the benefits of the American occupation maintaining that political stability and economic prosperity were worthy goals enacted by a benevolent force, while the other contended that these so-called advancements were not worth the cost of eliminating personal

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freedoms and a sovereign, native government. Setting sail for South America on 29

December 1920, Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, Max Henríquez Ureña, and Tulio

Cestero represented the Junta Nacionalista Dominicana or the Dominican Nationalist

Commission founded the previous year. The Commission worked to restore Dominican sovereignty by meeting with officials in Washington and publicizing their cause in the

US and Latin American press.30 The trio toured the southern continent until their return in late May 1921, emphasizing themes of Hispanic American solidarity and fraternal bonds forged through a common race, culture, language, and history while at the same time protesting against the US occupation of their country.31 The Commission’s activities overlapped with US Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby’s own journey to

South America, which also commenced in December 1920. The goodwill tour that Colby undertook had been in the making for quite some time. Official visits by the presidents of Uruguay and Brazil to Washington had occurred during the war, but it was not until

1920 that an American trip was possible.32

The Commission’s itinerary placed them in Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and

Buenos Aires right before Colby. This strategic schedule aimed to garner support for the

Dominican cause among Latin Americans prior to Colby’s appearance. The New York

Times reported that the arrival of the Commission in Montevideo just prior to Colby was

30 Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 46-47. Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Political Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 162, 164.

31 McPherson, The Invaded, 164.

32 Daniel M. Smith, “Bainbridge Colby and the Good Neighbor Policy, 1920- 1921,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 50, no. 1 (June 1963), 71.

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a calculated move to “initiate a campaign against [the] American occupation of Santo

Domingo.”33 The Chicago Tribune concurred, claiming that the Commission planned to call attention to “atrocities in Haiti and Santo Domingo” perpetrated by the occupations in an attempt to “persuade the South American republics to champion the islanders against the United States.”34

Rather than portraying the work of the Commission as a legitimate effort to publicize the cause for Dominican independence, most of the American media described it as the work of troublemakers aimed at tarnishing the goodwill Colby hoped to build.

The New York Times characterized the work of the Commission as “propaganda,” maintaining that Henríquez y Carvajal stirred up Latin American hostility toward the

United States.35 While Henríquez y Carvajal insisted that the Dominican occupation was

“brought about without the consent of the American people and against their democratic sentiments,” the New York Tribune referred to these words as an “attack.”36 According to the Tribune, the damage that the Commission attempted to exact was lethal because it generated Latin American “hostility toward the United States.” Furthermore, these claims of “oppression” at the hands of Americans were meant to serve as a warning to

“South Americans against the ‘imperialism’ of the United States.”37 Even months after

33 “Brazilian Lauds Monroe Doctrine,” New York Times, 24 December 1920, 10.

34 “Working Against Colby,” Chicago Tribune, 28 December 1920, 27.

35 “Working Against Colby,” New York Times, 28 December 1920, 27.

36 “Dominicans Attack US in South America,” New York Herald, 26 December 1920, 10.

37 “Working Against Colby,” Chicago Tribune, 27.

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Colby’s return to the United States, the press continued to report on the damage the

Commission had done. J. W. White wrote in late January 1921 that the Commission claimed the United States had “robbed a tiny island of its sovereignty and defenseless people of their liberty.” White referred to the words of Ureña and Henríquez y Carvajal who called the Dominican Republic the “cradle of America . . . crushed under the feet of an invading military horde” as nothing more than “a flowery historical recital.”38

Additionally, White referred to allegations of torture and abuse as “absurd.” The Los

Angeles Times reported that the Commission had sowed “distrust for the United States” during Colby’s visit and continued its work after his departure by “spreading anti-Yankee propaganda throughout Peru and Chile.” In particular, the Los Angeles Times charged

Cestero with giving interviews accusing the United States of “all sort of cruelties,” a common allegation tossed about during the entirety of the Commission’s time in South

America, that, in their opinion, was untrue.39

Colby’s voyage represented an important moment for US diplomatic relations in

Latin America, especially following the Commission’s tour. Looking to rekindle its ties to South American states, Colby’s visit also aimed to assure Latin Americans that the

United States was not only being benevolent but also respected their rights. In his official statement about the tour, President Wilson maintained that visits such as these were important because they were “instruments of cementing the sincere attachment and deepening the genuine intimacy between the self-governing democracies of the western

38 J.W. White, “United States is Denounced as Military Power,” Omaha Daily Bee, 30 January 1921, 2.

39 “Sowing Seed of Distrust for America,” Los Angeles Times, 15 April 1921, 11.

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hemisphere.”40 In telegrams from Colby to the ambassadors in Brazil and Uruguay, the official visit was hoped to bring the two countries “closer” and expand on the

“exceptional relations of friendship” between them.41 Before even setting sail, the New

York Times described the importance of Colby’s trip emphasizing themes of friendship and respect.42

Media coverage of Colby’s trip highlighted a softer imperialist rhetoric that sought to emphasize a benevolent paternalism that, at its core, respected Latin American states. Furthermore, including the remarks of Latin American statesmen that praised the

United States demonstrated for readers that despite the claims of the Commission, other

Latin Americans understood that America only had the best intentions in mind. For example, the New York Times reported the comments of Brazilian Senator Alfredo Ellis on the Monroe Doctrine. Senator Ellis likened the United States to an older brother who guarded the safety and liberty of the rest of the family. He also argued that American actions were not driven by an imperialist agenda: “No one can suppose that your powerful nation, the most fronded tree of the republican forest, would need for its enormous growth and development the sap of sister trees growing confidently under its beneficial and friendly shade.” Benito de Miranda made similar statements in the

Chamber of Deputies maintaining that the two culminating moments of US policy were

40 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan), November 10, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. I, 231.

41 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan), October 21, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. I, 228. The Secretary of State to the Minister of Uruguay (Jeffrey), October 23, FRUS, 1920, Volume I, 229.

42 “Secretary Colby’s Mission,” New York Times, 6 December 1920, 14.

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the Monroe Doctrine and Wilson’s Fourteen Points.43 Reports on Colby’s stay in

Uruguay portrayed much of the same. The Boston Daily Globe reprinted highlights from a speech given by Uruguayan President Baltasar Brum, who believed that the United

States had entered World War I neither for personal or direct offenses nor with a desire to gain more territory but rather based on the high morals of establishing international justice and pursuing Wilson’s goals of world peace and freedom.44 Dr. Javier Mendivil, former minister of the interior and chairman of the foreign relations committee of the

Uruguayan Senate, expressed even more accolades. Dr. Mendivil told Colby that

Uruguay had a “thorough comprehension of the Monroe doctrine and understood that it did not imply nor involve any right on the part of the United States to compromise or dominate the independent sovereignty of any American state.”45

The New York Times included extensive coverage on Colby’s time in Brazil to further drive home the point that Latin Americans understood the altruism behind

American foreign policy. Claiming that Brazilians believed Colby’s tour represented

“milestones in the highway leading to a real, vital Pan-Americanism,” the Times ensured that their readers knew Brazilians understood the intentions behind American actions abroad. Relating the story of Colby and his party pausing at the Monroe Palace, the headquarters of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the Times indicated that this stop

43 “Brazilian Lauds Monroe Doctrine,” New York Times, 24 December 1920, 10.

44 “Assures Colby Friendship to US,” Boston Daily Globe, 30 December 1920, 13. This same speech was also reported in the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio see “Los Festejos en Honor de Mr. Colby,” El Mercurio, 30 December 1920, 20.

45 “Yankee Might Upholds Right, Uruguayan Says,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 30 December 1920, 2.

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gave Colby the opportunity to pay tribute to Brazil “because it had made such a prominent public building a lasting monument to the Monroe Doctrine.” Colby proclaimed that the palace was a “tribute of civilization to democracy.” So moved by the

Monroe Palace, Colby continued:

Coming from the United States, which first promulgated the doctrine of the great American President, Monroe, every citizen of the United States must be thrilled to look at this palace and see in it a vindication of the policy which has made for the advancement and protection of the republics linked together by it. It is the hope of the people of my country that the bond thus created by this doctrine shall never fail to command respect, secure the right to independence and liberty and never prove irksome or be unjustly used to impair its unity or universal value.46

For Colby and those Brazilian officials present at this moment, the thrust of this speech was the beneficial spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, which not only protected, but also connected, all of the Western Hemisphere together in an everlasting bond solidified by respect and justice.

The inclusion of two journalists in Colby’s entourage allowed for a calculated portrayal of events for the American public, particularly in the New York Times, which underscored Washington’s goals by highlighting the deep and meaningful relationship between the United States and Latin America. The official membership of the group included several government officials as well as two American journalists from leading

Democratic papers, William H. Crawford from the New York Times and Louis Seibold from the New York World.47 As an official member of Colby’s entourage, Crawford published several articles on the topic. He emphasized the American need to maintain

46 “Liken Colby Visit to That by Root,” New York Times, 25 December 1920, 3.

47 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan), December 3, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. I, 233.

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favorable relations with South America because it was a “natural outlet for our surplus material and manufactures” as well as “our best, most natural and most favorable market,” going so far as to argue that this was the ultimate objective of Colby’s tour.

Sent to South America to counteract the “insidious influences that are working to discredit the United States in Latin America,” Crawford acknowledged that many were critical of American policy in places such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Costa

Rica, yet they failed to recall the success of intervention in Cuba. Admittedly, much damage had been done to America’s reputation in South America, where many believed that “the United States is set on aggrandizement and filled with the European idea of the control of minor peoples under the thin guise of spheres of influence.” However,

Crawford attributed attitudes such as these mostly to Argentinians whom he referred to as a “proud race” that resented the protectorates established by the Monroe Doctrine and thus harbored “a genuine dislike for America and things American.” Crawford alleged that these sentiments likewise persisted in the United States, particularly in Republican newspapers like the Post that suggested, “America’s aims were not based upon a high altruistic plane.”

Throughout his articles, Crawford assured his readers that Colby’s tour had

“allayed Latin suspicions” by impressing on South Americans that the Monroe Doctrine was not about force but was rather “a protecting arm for all of America” and that cases of intervention only occurred “for the preservation of order and life.”48 In the end,

Crawford believed Colby’s trip was a success because it reminded Latin Americans that

48 William H. Crawford, “Colby Tour Allayed Latin Suspicions,” New York Times, 28 January 1921, 5.

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“there is no tincture of military intervention in the case of either Haiti or Santo Domingo, that the landing of American forces for the preservation of order and life has the sanction of express provisions contained in treaties freely and openly arrived at with both republics.” Furthermore, Crawford trusted that Latin Americans “understand the appalling conditions in the island of Santo Domingo which compelled the United States to reluctantly and rather tardily take up the work of restoring order.”49 Relying on the age-old rhetoric of underdevelopment provided Crawford with an argument for American intervention that readers were familiar with.

Surely the speeches emerging from the tour and the pieces published in papers such as the Times outraged members of the Dominican Commission. The employment of phrases that stressed America’s altruism and beneficence while at the same time denying any desire for territorial gain was an insult to many people living under American occupation. Colby’s own words that assured listeners of the United States’s devotion to independence, liberty, and the sovereignty of other nations directly contradicted what was occurring in the Dominican Republic. Of particular importance was the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine on both sides. While Colby contended that the Monroe Doctrine ensured not only peace in the Americas but also independence and liberty, Dominicans and their supporters claimed just the opposite.

Beyond reporting on Latin Americans who believed in America’s humanitarian intent, the American media continued to publish pieces that counteracted any negative imagery about the occupation dredging up the narrative of underdevelopment to remind readers of the need for American intervention. The New York Times claimed that

49 William H. Crawford, “Colby Has Dual Mission in South American Trip,” Omaha Daily Bee, 30 January 1921, 1.

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American rule had transformed the Dominican Republic, making it “solvent” and providing an education for the “people in the principles of self-government.” Rather than a case of imperialism, as the Commission argued, the occupation represented an example of America’s humanitarianism. Lauding the work of US forces, the Times maintained that, on his tour, Colby could point to the island as clear “proof that Wilson kept the faith.” Recalling the words of former Secretary of State Elihu Root, Colby too could reiterate the fact that “the United States does not covet a foot of ground in Spanish-

American countries, and is concerned only about their welfare and to maintain amicable relations with them.”50 The Times touted a familiar trope when discussing the benefits of the intervention in June 1921: “In the last four years its people have had lessons in government that should not be lost upon them. They are an intelligent people, but their politicians have preyed upon them and must now realize that the old rule of the country by cabals will no longer be tolerated.” Recalling over a century of paternalist discourse, the Times continued: “Santo Domingo is a country of underdeveloped resources. Under good government it should flourish, provided the United States stands ready to lend a helping hand in the event of reversion to government by insurrection.”51

While the Commission was not entirely a success, the publication of their efforts, combined with the attention the Dominican cause had been gaining throughout the course of 1920, led to a critical discussion of American actions in the Dominican Republic, eventually resulting in a change of policy. As the Washington Post noted, Latin America was “deeply wounded, and the United States government will have to do much in the

50 “Dominican Self-Government,” New York Times, 27 December 1920, 11.

51 “Santo Domingo’s Welfare,” New York Times, 7 June 1921, 13.

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right direction before they will repose confidence in it again.”52 Numerous papers reported on the results of Colby’s tour, noting that South America resented the Monroe

Doctrine and defined it as “a mantle of protection or expression of power by North

Americans.”53 Though many still relied on the old narratives of humanitarianism and benevolence, with critical stories being published in the press, the Dominican case could no longer be ignored. Just a month prior to his tour, Colby messaged Daniels questioning if now was the time for withdrawal:

The increasing agitation among the Dominicans during the last two years for the right of self-government, and the anxiety expressed by the governments of other American republics as to our intentions in Santo Domingo, have caused the Department of State to give very thoughtful consideration to the question of whether the United States might not now take the first steps in returning to the Dominicans the Government of their Republic.54

Colby did not cite the press in his argument directly, but instead insisted that the

Dominican Republic had finally achieved a measure of peace and thus Dominicans “may now be entrusted with at least partial control of their Government.”55 However, Colby’s commentary that the announcement of withdrawal would “have a most beneficial effect upon our relations with all the Latin American Republics” because it would “dispel the misunderstanding and suspicions” generated by four years of occupation betrayed the

52 “Misuse of the Monroe Doctrine,” 22.

53 “South America Turning From US – Colby,” Grand Forks Daily Herald, 20 February 1921, 17. “Colby Tells of South America,” Columbus Ledger, 20 February 1921. “Colby Tells of South America,” Charlotte Observer, 20 February 1921.

54 “The Secretary of State (Colby) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels),” November 27, 1920, FRUS, 191, Vol. II, 136.

55 “The Secretary of State (Colby) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels),” November 27, 1920, FRUS, 191, Vol. II, 136.

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power of the press.56 Misunderstanding and suspicion had come to a head in 1920 as scandalous and controversial stories emerged on the pages of newspapers – stories that were not present in prior years.

By 1920, the anxiety over the perception of the United States’s actions in both

Haiti and the Dominican Republic prompted an official Senate Commission of Inquiry originally called in October of that year.57 Senator Medill McCormick, a Republican from Illinois, chaired the committee, assisted by four other senators. Hearings were initially held in Washington in August 1921 followed by a trip to Hispaniola in

November to listen to testimonies and gather information in Haiti and the Dominican

Republic. Cutting their trip short by five days, the senators left the Dominican Republic on 15 December, returning to Washington where they resumed hearings from February until June 1922.58 The official report of the committee included over a thousand pages of witness testimony in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Washington, DC along with accounts by outside observers, Dominican officials, and American military personnel.

Included in the printed record were tables and charts indicating the success of the respective occupation governments detailing increased revenues and infrastructural development among other statistics demonstrating the commitment to the narrative of

56 “The Secretary of State (Colby) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels),” November 27, 1920, FRUS, 191, Vol. II, 138.

57 Alan McPherson notes the various events that contributed to the official inquiry including the activism of occupied people in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and their supporters in the United States. Additionally, reports of marine abuse in Haiti were made public earlier in October in a letter from USMC Major General Commandant George Barnett. McPherson examines investigations into abuse in the Dominican Republic as early as 1917. See McPherson, The Invaded, 174-175.

58 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 215-216, McPherson, The Invaded, 176.

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underdevelopment. Of particular interest was the claim many Dominicans made that the

United States had no right to intervene in Dominican affairs let alone occupy the country.

Many testified that the 1907 treaty had not been violated and some Dominicans even argued against the long-standing American belief that the Dominican Republic was unstable in 1916 due to revolution.59 These of course were charges that neither the senators nor the American administration could accept. After hearing the testimony of

Jose Manuel Jimenes, son of former President Juan Isidro Jimenes, who stated that the occupation brought with it “killing, burning,” the destruction of property, and torture,

Senator Pomerene responded in utter disbelief. 60 Maintaining that such atrocities could never happen, the senator countered Jimenes’s accusation, stating that army and navy personnel along with American civilians “do not believe in torturing and cruelties of any kind, and they do not permit it when they have proof of it.”61 Dismissing most witnesses’ statements, the senators argued that additional evidence was necessary to prove such outrageous accusations.

The inquiry made for sensational news stories with eye-catching headlines from both supporters and opponents of the occupation. Reporting on the commencement of the hearings, Ben McKelway of the Sunday Star reported that Americans knew very little about either Haiti or the Dominican Republic, but that both countries had received

59 See Senate Inquiry, “Statement of Dr. Francisco J. Peynada [sic], Lawyer, Santo Domingo City,” 946-956. “Statement of Mr. Pedro A. Perez,” 960-963. “Statement of Mr. Arturo Lagrono,” 968-970. “Statement of Mr. Moses Garcia Mella,” 1054-1069. “Statement of Dr. Enriquez Henriquez [sic], Santo Domingo City,” 1081- 1083.

60 “Statement of Mr. Jose Manuel Jiminez, of Santo Domingo City,” 1096.

61 “Statement of Mr. Jose Manuel Jiminez,” 1096.

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“considerable publicity lately, due to sensational charges of misconduct and cruelty on the part of American occupational forces.” Much like the pronouncements made by the

American media during the Commission’s tour of South America, McKelway did not put much faith in the accusations made by Dominicans stating that the charges were “inspired partly by native politicians anxious for withdrawal of the Americans,” and that most had

“proved groundless” after a previous naval investigation.62 Similarly, in a letter to the editor of the New York Times dated 28 August 1921, A. Pereira who described himself as a “Latin American” who, knew “Dominicans well,” stated that the critiques appearing in newspapers about the Dominican occupation were from those who did not know much about the topic since the marines stationed there were “guided by a spirit of justice.”63

Other articles vehemently attacked American actions in the Caribbean with vivid descriptions and catchy headlines. Oswald Villard Garrison spoke on behalf of the Union

Patriotique of Haiti, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Santo Domingo Independence Society, critiquing the American occupation in

Haiti and the Dominican Republic in multiple newspapers in early August 1921.64

Garrison referred to the interventions as the “blackest chapter in American history in the

Caribbean,” calling for a special Senate investigation into numerous allegations of abuse

62 Ben McKelway, “Laying Down Basis of Definite Policy,” Sunday Star, 31 July 1921, 3.

63 A. Pereira, “Americans in Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 28 August 1921, 26.

64 “Assails Troops in Haiti,” New York Times, 4 August 1921, 14. “No Trouble in Haiti Until We Went There, Is Claim,” Sun, 4 August 1921, 3. “Attacks Island Occupation,” Washington Post, 4 August 1921, 6. “Denounces American Record in Caribbean,” Evening Star, 4 August 1921, 27.

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and mismanagement. In the end, despite debates in the media and at the hearings, the inquiry put pressure on the US government to give in to negotiations with Dominicans about ending the occupation. In the case of the Dominican Republic, this was likely due to the fact that by 1921 plans for ending the occupation had already been underway for some time.65

“Is America Imperialistic?”

The back and forth arguments advanced from both sides of the issue illustrated the tension in the American press to either condemn or commend the United States for its actions in the Dominican Republic. On one side, overcoming underdevelopment through humanitarianism remained the main justification for any misdeeds in the Dominican

Republic. On the other, however, was the argument that development could not be coerced and that doing so without the consent of Dominicans through policies that abolished native government and upended civil liberties were not only unacceptable, but reprehensible making the United States no different than any other imperialist country.

Though published in 1924, the year the occupation officially ended, two articles from The

Atlantic Monthly aptly illustrated the controversy over America’s role as an imperialistic power. The Atlantic Monthly, founded in 1857 advertised itself as a magazine about literature, art, science, and politics. It regularly published political pieces by men such as

Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Booker T. Washington. In July 1924, the same month that the occupation officially ended with the inauguration of Dominican

65 McPherson explains the differences between the reception of Dominican and Haitian testimony as well as the outcomes. See, The Invaded, 176-179.

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President Horacio Vásquez, Samuel Guy Inman’s piece, “Imperialistic America,” appeared. Inman was the executive secretary of the Committee on Cooperation in Latin

America, a Protestant missionary, and author of the 1919 work Through Santo Domingo and Haiti: A Cruise with the Marines. His article in The Atlantic Monthly indicted US officials for generating worldwide hostility toward the United States because of imperialistic policies. In response, in December of that year, Sumner Welles argued against Inman’s stance in an article entitled “Is America Imperialistic?” Welles, as chief of the Latin American division of the US State Department, wholly disagreed with

Inman, stating that his observations were not only short-sighted but also the result of misinformation and propaganda.

In “Imperialistic America,” Inman placed blame for America’s poor reputation on inconsistent policy decisions that were motivated more by greed than benevolence.

According to Inman, US imperialism “bodes more evil” than any other development in

American history as the countries to the south were dominated not by righteous men of morality, but by “oil kings,” soldiers, and bankers that turned formerly independent countries into “our Irelands, our Egypts, and our Indias.” In his estimation, America was no different than those imperialistic countries that had come before it. The “final test” for

American Christian civilization would ultimately rest on how it treated “our next-door neighbours.” For Inman, the assessment was anything but positive:

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We are piling up hatreds, suspicions, records for exploitation and destruction of sovereignty in Latin America, such as have never failed in all of history to react in war, suffering, and defeat of high moral and spiritual ideals. How can the United States expect to be the one exception to the rule? Run your eyes rapidly down the map and note the countries where the United States is now in practical control. And remember that this control always brings resentment and enmity among the people, though their officials may approve it.66

Inman’s repeated use of the pronouns “we” and “our” throughout the article indicated the responsibility for these actions that had generated so much animosity and distrust were for all Americans to bear.

Though Inman’s piece did not solely focus on the Dominican Republic, instead providing an overview of Latin American countries from Mexico to Peru and Cuba to

Bolivia, he maintained that the Dominican Republic represented one of the most unique cases.

For the first time in the history of republics, one republic, without declaring war on another, landed an army, dismissed the president and congress, and for seven years ruled entirely, without even a semblance of national government, by military decrees enforced by a foreign military governor, backed by 2500 marines. Recent promises to retire the military governor are conditioned on the Dominicans’ ratification of all the acts of the military government and agreement to allow the United States to continue to collect the customs and administer the finances of the country.67

According to Inman, these conditions forced upon Dominicans were a further testament to America’s selfishness. Furthermore, Inman complained that the United States cared more about military and economic control than creating programs and policies to actively advance the state of affairs in Latin America. Though many media sources lauded the work of America in the Dominican Republic as an example of altruism to build

66 Samuel Guy Inman, “Imperialistic America,” The Atlantic Monthly (July 1924), 107.

67 Inman, “Imperialistic America,” 108.

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infrastructure, education, and generally bring “development” to the country, Inman did not agree. He complained: “Will not someone kindly explain why, when we are arranging to direct the financial and military affairs of these nations, we should not with equal propriety arrange to direct their educational systems?” According to Inman it was precisely the focus on economic exploitation and political control that caused the elimination of friendships and the “fostering of suspicions” throughout Latin America. In the end, Inman viewed American imperialism as “a departure from the ideals of our fathers.” He maintained that any American visitor to the Caribbean “sensitive to those ideals, often blushes with shame and suffers the deepest humiliation on beholding sights enacted in the name of our fair America – acts which his fellow citizens at home would deem impossible,” actions Inman characterizes as wholly “un-American.” Inman admitted that American intervention in Latin America had led to positive outcomes such as the construction of roads, establishment of health and sanitary codes, and an end to revolution, but he did not believe that these improvements were worth the sacrifice of

“American principles.” Even if developments such as these helped Latin American states by some measure, according to Inman this was not enough: “The people of the United

States cannot go on destroying with impunity the sovereignty of other peoples, however weak, cutting across the principles for which our fathers fought, without the reaction being shown throughout our whole body politic.”68

In an article that directly responded to Inman’s claims, Welles argued just the opposite – that America was not imperialistic in the least. To start, Welles discounted

Inman’s observations and attacks stating that his opinions were those of the minority in

68 Inman, “Imperialistic America,” 112, 113, 114, 116.

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the United States. Though Welles admitted that a majority of people in Latin America disagreed with America’s policies of intervention and economic control, their viewpoint derived not from facts, but from propagandists. Conversely, Welles argued his own reflections on Latin America were more valid based on the fact that he had years of expertise and hands-on experience in the region. Explaining why opinions like Inman’s gained credence, Welles argued that propaganda with its sensational stories always had a ready audience in those looking to blame the United States for every problem in Latin

America. Welles admitted, “mistakes undoubtedly have been committed,” but, in general, America’s record

has been one with which an American citizen may be well content. It has revealed a consistent effort on our part to strengthen the foundations of constitutional and stable government, to develop legitimate commercial relations, and, by demonstration and friendly advice, to further the settlement by peaceful methods of international disputes.69

According to Welles, when a country like the United States intervened “to protect the lives and property of its citizens” in times of danger, its “friendly mediation” or in more extreme cases its “friendly intervention” might be misunderstood especially by those “not familiar with the perplexing problems” in Latin America, a group Welles clearly considered Inman to be a part of. In the end, Welles considered the advancements made worth the cost:

69 Sumner Welles, “Is America Imperialistic?” The Atlantic Monthly (December 1924), 413.

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A careful analysis of the history of our relations with Latin America during the past twelve years will, it is believed, demonstrate conclusively, that, for every error of judgment, additional progress has been made in instilling in the hearts of our neighbors belief in the sincerity and unselfishness of our purpose. South of the Rio Grande faith is increasing, notwithstanding the occasional difficulty of the Latin to comprehend the Anglo-Saxon mentality, that our Government is responsive solely to the desire to promote good understanding and to remove discord, using its powerful influence at all times on the side of right and justice.70

Specifically addressing the Dominican situation, Welles continued to maintain that like the rest of Latin America, the United States had done well in its handling of the situation. Recalling the old narrative of underdevelopment, he described the history of the Dominican Republic as a “tragic one” that alternated between periods of revolution and dictatorship, ultimately necessitating American intervention in the name of peace.

As for the long, drawn out process of withdrawing from the country, Welles blamed the

Dominicans themselves who rejected the initial proposal made during the last months of

President Wilson’s tenure in December 1920. As for the subsequent withdrawal plan drafted during the Harding administration, Welles stated that the excuse Dominicans gave for rejecting the plan – that it provided a conditional withdrawal based “the ratification by the Dominican people of all the acts of the Military Government” and the acceptance of

American financial oversight, was “entirely inaccurate.” In the end, those that were quick to point out the errors of the occupation, in Welles’ opinion, failed to see that the occupation was ultimately successful as evidenced by the free elections that brought to power a constitutionally elected government proving the sincerity of the United States’s promise to leave the country once peace and stability had been established.71

70 Welles, “Is America Imperialistic?” 412, 413, 422-423.

71 Welles, “Is America Imperialistic?” 415, 416.

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Conclusion

The pieces by Inman and Welles articulated the debate on how to view the US occupation of the Dominican Republic. Some articles denounced the military occupation as abusive, poorly administered, and at the expense of a loss of personal freedoms, journalists began to assail American objectives in the Caribbean while others maintained that the ultimate objective of peace and stability was worth any minor errors. Those that criticized American actions made similar claims to ones that Dominicans had maintained since the start of the occupation. However, it was not until these articles called into question the benevolent intent of the American intervention that the subject of the occupation garnered any critical attention in the American media. Whether spurred by intellectual discussions, the arrest of Dominican intellectuals, the US presidential election, or the work of the Commission, American foreign policy in the Dominican

Republic began to change by the end of 1920 as plans for withdrawal finally emerged in the State Department. Added to these factors was the costliness of the occupation in a time of economic depression. Worldwide sugar prices plummeted in 1921 ruining many

Dominican merchants and causing a general economic crisis that extended to a military government counting on sugar revenues to help foot the bill for their expansive reforms.72

Although it would take until 1924 for the withdrawal process to be complete, serious questioning of the humanitarian narrative in the United States represented one element of the complex reasons for a change in approach when it came to the occupation of the

Dominican Republic.

72 Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2010), 331-332. This further supports the claim by Robinson and Gallagher that once formal empires become too costly, imperial powers tend to focus more on informal control.

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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION: AN ENDURING LEGACY

After four years of military rule and mounting critiques in the American media that questioned the nature of the occupation, officials in the United States finally began the long process of leaving the Dominican Republic. Plans for a graduated withdrawal emerged from the State Department on 23 December 1920. Drafted by Sumner Welles,

Chief of the Latin American Division, the Wilson Plan offered Dominicans an end to the occupation with certain stipulations. A key component of the plan was the formation of a junta consultiva or advisory board of Dominicans who would revise the laws and create constitutional amendments to satisfy American preconditions for withdrawal.1 Because the announcement of withdrawal came just days before Christmas, the American media depicted the Wilson Plan as a great gift given to the Dominican people.2 Quoting directly from the proclamation of withdrawal, newspapers claimed the success of the occupation in the “restoration of public order and protection of life and property.”3 Furthermore, the press listed the accomplishments of four years of military occupation: general tranquility, public works, sanitation projects, improved public health, and expanded education along with increased revenues. Though hailed in the American press as an example of the

1 Rebecca Ann Lord, “An ‘Imperative Obligation’: Public Health and the United States Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924,” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2000), 276; Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 204.

2 “Dominican People Get Christmas Gift,” The State, 25 December 1920, 1; “Santo Domingo Liberated by Rear Admiral Snowden, Issues Proclamation as Christmas Gift,” Salt Lake Telegram, 24 December 1920, 1.

3 “Wilson Takes Step to Give Up Control in Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 25 December 1920, 1.

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United States making good on its desire to withdraw “when conditions improved,” the

Wilson Plan almost immediately drew ire from Dominicans. First of all, it was hard to find Dominicans to serve on the advisory board because many viewed cooperation as tantamount to betraying their sovereignty. Second, many held out hope that the new

Harding administration, which would take office the following year, would present more favorable terms.

The rejection of the Wilson Plan led to a discussion between US officials and

Dominicans from March until June 1921. Announced on 14 June 1921, the Harding Plan presented clearer terms than the Wilson Plan, but with demands many Dominicans were still unwilling to accept. The new proposal included the ratification of all acts by the military government, the acceptance of a $2.5 million loan to complete the occupation’s public works projects, the continuation of the customs receivership, and the maintenance of American marine officers over the Guardia Nacional.4 Additionally, the plan called for elections under American supervision and the withdrawal of troops within eight months.

In the American media, the press relayed the Dominican protest of the Harding

Plan, some sympathizing with Dominican claims and others denouncing them. At first, the New York Times admitted that they were not even sure what grievances Dominicans had that would prompt their complaints, a statement that revealed the unwillingness to follow or even recognize Dominican calls for a return of their sovereignty.5 For many

4 Lord, “’An Imperative Obligation,’” 277. Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 209.

5 “Dominicans Protest Withdrawal Plan,” New York Times, 19 June 1921, 12.

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Dominicans, including key politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals, the desire was for unconditional withdrawal, making any plan that came with provisions unacceptable.6

Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes blamed these objections on the “selfishness of political malcontents” and the overall “ignorance of the real intentions of the United

States.”7 Challenging Hughes’s interpretation, the editor of The Nation, Ernest H.

Gruening, interviewed Dominican Archbishop Adolfo Nouel, describing the clergyman as an “agitator for the spirit of ’76 in America, for liberty, for justice, for the divine right of all peoples to control their own destinies.”8 The title of the article, “Santo Domingo’s

Cardinal Mercier,” further emphasized that Nouel was a beacon of light and hope standing against the American occupation much like Belgium’s own Cardinal Mercier had done against the Germans during World War I. Others similarly denounced the withdrawal plan. Anti-imperialist journalist Oswald Villard Garrison wrote for the

Cleveland Gazette that asking Dominicans to approve of all military acts seemed to be

“part of the price for their freedom to make the record of the American occupation appear as the driven snow.” Furthermore, it was an example of “writing history at the point of a pistol.” According to Garrison, the Harding Plan was nothing more than the United

States’s attempt to “save face” and “perpetuate myths” rather than own up to their own

6 “Asks Complete Withdrawal,” New York Times, 21 June 1921, 3; “Santo Domingo Wants America to Get Out Now,” Chicago Defender, 2 July 1921, 15.

7 “Hughes Reassures Santo Dominicans,” New York Times, 29 June 1921, 10.

8 Ernest H. Gruening, “Santo Domingo’s Cardinal Mercier,” The Nation, 11 January 1922, 42.

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actions and misbehavior.9 Others, like the liberal magazine the New Republic, agreed with Garrison’s interpretation arguing that the plan discounted Dominican consent and basically constituted the United States saying, “sign on the dotted line, or be damned.”10

Much like its predecessor, the Harding Plan did not result in acceptance, leading to further discussions between Dominicans and American officials that finally produced the Hughes-Peynado Plan in July 1922. Though the announcement drew aversion from both Dominicans and members of the occupation government, the Hughes-Peynado Plan, named after Secretary of State Hughes and prominent Dominican lawyer and former cabinet official Francisco Peynado, finally brought an end to the occupation.11 The plan called for the election of a provisional government that would oversee the American withdrawal, which was to take place in stages, as American troops would be pulled out of major bases around the island with the final evacuation of Santo Domingo set for 1924.

The Dominican government was to pass into law certain executive orders of the military government and see to the completion of various public works projects.12 The announcement of withdrawal appeared in American newspapers across the country as a simple statement of fact without reflection or criticism, a point revealing that Americans

9 Oswald Villard Garrison, “That ‘Withdrawal’! What it Really Means to the Little Mulatto Republic,” Cleveland Gazette, 9 July 1921, 4.

10 “How We Make Enemies,” New Republic, 13 July 1921, 184.

11 Eric Roorda details the discontent of occupation government personnel including Military Governor Samuel Robison who believed a the United States needed to permanently maintain troops in the country to ensure peace, see Eric Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 19.

12 Lord, “’An Imperative Obligation,’” 277-278.

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were no longer interested in the Dominican Republic as it seemed the saga was now over.13

The American press interpreted the election of a provisional government as the end of the occupation with headlines claiming as much even though American military forces were still present on the island.14 On 21 October 1922, Juan Bautista Vicini

Burgos was elected provisional president. Over the next two years, President Burgos’s administration focused on the completion of public works projects like the national highway and the training of the Guardia Nacional to act as a guarantor of peace and stability.15 In one article, the American media praised the work of President Vicini, citing it as an example of the occupation’s success running under the headline, “Santo

Domingo is Graduate in US Discipline.”16 After two years, elections were held to appoint a constitutional government and Horacio Vásquez won the presidency in March

1924. Four months later on 12 July 1924, President Vásquez was sworn into office marking the official end of the occupation, although the last American troops did not leave until September of that year.17

13 “Plan to Leave Santo Domingo,” Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1922, 11; “Plan to Terminate Our Dominican Rule,” New York Times, 12 July 1922, 10; “US Approves Plan to Quit Santo Domingo,” Sun, 12 July 1922, 1; “Plans Evacuation of Santo Domingo,” Washington Post, 12 July 1922, 5.

14 “American Rule Ends in Santo Domingo,” Boston Daily Globe, 22 October 1922, 3; “US Control Ends in Santo Domingo,” Sun, 22 October 1922, 20.

15 Lord, “‘An Imperative Obligation,’” 278.

16 Arthur Sears Henning, “Santo Domingo is Graduate in US Discipline,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 20 April 1923, 3.

17 Lord, “‘An Imperative Obligation,’” 281.

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The American media portrayed the election of President Vásquez as a testament to the success of the occupation. For example, the New York Times explained in an article published in June 1924 that the occupation had brought political order and that the election “was a test of the Dominican education in self-government.” The Times stated that “this was not only the first free election in Santo Domingo, but the first held without bloodshed” marking a “new and important step” that demonstrated that Dominicans could now govern themselves.18 Writer Frederic J. Haskin expressed similar sentiments in an article that appeared in newspapers across America. Haskin described the election as “one of the most peaceful in Caribbean history,” another example of American triumph.19 The Chicago Daily Tribune noted that the United States was leaving the

Dominican Republic since they had “stabilized the country and furnished it with a modern system of administration and public institutions.”20

The end of the occupation allowed the American media to once again call on the old tropes of revolution and debt to remind its readers why the United States was involved in the country in the first place. In June 1924, the Washington Post recalled that the “intolerable” Dominican government had “plunged into foreign debt” and neglected its treaty obligations, resulting in “domestic conditions [that] were bordering upon anarchy,” prompting American action.21 Along with political problems, the New York

18 “Ending the Santo Domingo Occupation,” New York Times, 28 June 1924, 12.

19 Frederic J. Haskin, “Republic’s Flag Again Unfurled,” Los Angeles Times, 13 July 1924, B35. This article also appeared in the DC newspaper the Evening Star under the headline, “The Marines Leave Santo Domingo.”

20 Henning, “Santo Domingo is Graduate in US Discipline,” 3.

21 “America’s Faithful Friendship,” Washington Post, 16 June 1924, 6.

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Times described a land with many presidents, chaotic finances, “primitive transportation,” and a woefully neglected public education system.22 Writing for the

Marine Corps Gazette, veteran Charles J. Miller described the deplorable state of the country prior to the arrival of American troops. Miller claimed Dominicans were

“ignorant of the first rules of sanitation: cities and towns were without sewage systems; the streets and patios were the habitats of the domestic animals; the garbage was dumped indiscriminately or taken to the edge of town to accumulate as a fetid decaying mass.”23

These descriptions of the underdeveloped and backward state of the country communicated to readers why the United States was involved in the Dominican Republic and represented the continuance of themes that had been used to define the country since the 1800s.

Interestingly, the announcement of withdrawal plans also brought with it a return of the discussion of race, primarily owing to the fact that occupation forces remained in neighboring Haiti. To address this discrepancy in policy, the American media once again stressed the racial differences between the two parts of the island. In an article published in the Dearborn Independent in May 1921, the author speculated that withdrawal was possible in the Dominican Republic because the people there were “civilized” unlike the

Haitians.24 Observing the Senate hearings on abuses in Haiti and the Dominican

Republic in 1922, New Republic reporter Katherine Sergeant Angell wrote that there was

22 “Ending the Santo Domingo Occupation,” New York Times, 28 June 1924, 12.

23 Charles J. Miller, “Diplomatic Spurs,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1935, 43- 44.

24 Wilber Forrest, “Latin-America is Watching Our Handling of Hayti,” Dearborn Independent, 7 May 1921, 7.

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a “huge” difference between the two countries. Angell claimed that Dominicans were

“less simple, less naïve, more independent and canny and self-sufficient on the whole than Haitians,” and, in general, Dominicans were akin to Americans in their “manners.”

Angell speculated that, “the mixture of Spanish, Indian and Negro blood seems to make a less tropical, rather hardier and more hard-headed race than the French and Negro.”25

Therefore, in her opinion, Dominicans had learned the lesson of self-government and proper management under American tutelage granting them their freedom while the

Haitians still had not. Others seemed to agree with this pronouncement. In an article written for the Chicago Daily Tribune in April 1923, journalist Arthur Sears Henning noted, “Dominicans contend that they are able to govern themselves and there appears to be no valid reason for denying them.” In part, Henning’s assessment was based on race.

He argued that Dominicans represented a “much higher type of intelligence than

Haitians,” claiming that Dominicans were eighty percent white while Haitians were ninety-five percent black.26 These examples demonstrated that civilization and whiteness were intimately linked with one another, but more importantly revealed the ways in which the race of Dominicans was still being manipulated to fit American objectives. In this case, Dominicans became white as a concrete way of explaining the end to their occupation and the continuance of Haiti’s.

Lastly, the end of the US occupation of the Dominican Republic served as an opportunity to justify American imperialism and define it exclusively by its noble intent,

25 Katherine Sergeant Angell, “On Trial in Santo Domingo,” New Republic, 5 July 1922, 157.

26 Henning, “Santo Domingo is Graduate in US Discipline,” 3.

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despite its critics. Likely because the first plans for withdrawal emerged in late 1920, even before the official end of the occupation, the American media began to reflect on the significance of the occupation. Papers like the Washington Post reminded readers that earlier protests against the American presence existed primarily because Dominicans did not truly understand the intentions of the United States. “Dense ignorance of American sentiment furnished the seedbed for the propagation of all sorts of freak ideas concerning the true purpose of this government.” According to the Post, the United States had always acted in “firmness and patience” in order to demonstrate their “unselfishness and friendliness,” and the end of the occupation confirmed that the United States “is a friend whose good offices will never be perverted into schemes of aggression.”27 The American children’s magazine, The Youth’s Companion, taught young readers that most of the complaints about the Dominican occupation were the work of “noisy politicians” and

“would-be revolutionists.” These selfish men had tried to “incite the ignorant masses,” but American ideals had triumphed, teaching Dominicans “the value of a regulated, civilized life.”28

The topic of American imperialism on Hispaniola was featured on the cover of the May 1927 issue of the Leatherneck. As a magazine published primarily for members of the Marine Corps, the positive interpretation of American actions on the island was no surprise. The cover image featured a large, antique map of the island in the background, complete with pirate ships, sea monsters, and Latin terminology. In the foreground, two

27 “America’s Faithful Friendship,” Washington Post, 16 June 1924, 6.

28 Lothrap Stoddard, “The American Empire: II, Santo Domingo: The Isle of Unrest,” The Youth’s Companion, 30 March 1922, 182.

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marines rested amongst cactus plants. One marine stood, taking a deep drink of water from a canteen, presumably after a hard day’s work, while the other was seated, hands in his lap as he thoughtfully gazed ahead perhaps reflecting on the arduous tasks he had just completed. In addition to the cover, the magazine ran an article explaining the image.

Readers were told that, “the marines crossed the same waters as Columbus to protect lives and property.”29 The mention of Columbus along with the old map was meant to convey the relationship between the past and present – between the founder of western civilization in the Americas and its protectors, the USMC. The article stated that the marines were a key tie in the chain of history, a “golden link” of “self-sacrifice, of patience, of self-defensive fighting, of pure Americanism,” with “no tarnish, no taint – a gallant chain of duties loyally performed for humanity and the flag.”30 The careful selection of words in this description aptly characterized how many Americans viewed their imperial endeavors. Actions were undertaken in self-defense and with much patience and sacrifice in an attempt to make the world a better place. The altruism of these tasks was conveyed by the fact that the United States never officially took over, as explained in the article: “The story of the island over which has flown the Flags of Spain;

France; of Great Britain, but never of the United States of America, except as a symbol of our interest in humanity, which includes Dominicans and Haitians.”31 Thus, one of the critical markers of American imperialism was its selflessness especially when compared to the actions of European powers.

29 Edwin North McClellan, “The Story of the Cover,” Leatherneck, May 1927, 59.

30 McClellan, “The Story of the Cover,” 59.

31 McClellan, “The Story of the Cover,” 59.

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Published in 1929, five years after the end of the occupation, Harry L.

Foster’s Combing the Caribbees aimed to provide a travel guide for those wishing to explore the West Indies. Foster served in Europe during World War I after which he spent almost a decade traveling the globe and writing of his experiences from Fiji to

Latin America.32 His chapters on Haiti and the Dominican Republic reveal not only the adherence to the old narrative of debt and revolution but also the insistence that the US occupation had produced tangible results. Foster recalled that only a decade before, the overland journey between Haiti and the Dominican Republic had been unbearable as one was forced to “wallow over a jungle-path . . . cross a wide lagoon on a raft” and struggle along primitive routes. However, owing to the introduction of modern highways and air travel, the process was much less cumbersome. According to Foster, the improvements introduced by the occupation were many spanning the infrastructural success he mentioned above to “fashionable” suburbs complete with “villas whose counterpart might easily be found in any residential suburb from Forest Hills (New York) to Beverly Hills

(California).” These “palatial” homes included modern features such as “garages and bath-tubs and radio sets.” These advances had all been made owing to US intervention that, in Foster’s opinion, had finally settled a country traditionally riddled with revolution. Foster did not give much credence to these rebels whose fighting he described as the “comic opera variety, wherein both parties battled furiously until the ammunition gave out and then adjourned more or less amicably to the nearest grog-

32 “Harry L. Foster, Writer, Dies at 37,” New York Times, 16 March 1932, 21.

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shop.” However, the United States had managed to transform this revolutionary mentality imparting to Dominicans a “passion for modernity.”33

Much like his counterparts in the American press, Foster also had to take into account the differences between Haitians and Dominicans, in part to explain to his readers why the occupation had ended in one country and not the other. Here, race once again entered the discussion. According to Foster, the two countries had very little in common. Dominicans, though they could have “complexions” that “were occasionally dark, the majority of those one met were predominantly Castilian,” and their language was Spanish as opposed to French. Additionally, Foster claimed that unlike the Haitians, the Dominicans had “learned their lesson” continuing projects the Americans had begun such as sanitation and road building. Here, Foster implied that the Haitians had not yet passed their test of tutelage thus their country remained occupied.34

In 1944, National Geographic produced an article entitled “The Land Columbus

Loved,” that still relied on the same themes that highlighted transformation via the US occupation. By that year, dictator Rafael Trujillo had been in power for over a decade during which time he had brutalized his own people and massacred thousands of

Haitians. However, Oliver P. Newman, author of the piece, chose to focus on Trujillo’s continuance of American projects. Explaining the origin of the occupation, Newman reminded readers that US marines arrived in the Dominican Republic to “maintain law and order” and that through American intervention the Dominican people had gained

33 Harry L. Foster, Combing through the Caribbees (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1929), 270, 278, 287, 273, 286.

34 Foster, Combing the Caribbees, 277, 275.

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“certain material benefits.” According to Newman, “during the occupation they

[Dominicans] learned the meaning of a good water supply, a better postal service, adequate sewer systems, public education, sanitation, roads, bridges, harbors, paving, clean streets, agricultural development, public health.” Trujillo, who Newman described as a man who learned quickly and rose through the ranks of the army, “has applied and extended the policies initiated by the Marines between 1916 and 1925. Both he and his country benefitted from close contact with American ideas.”35 The article included a smiling picture of Trujillo, busy at work, thumbing through a stack of papers on his desk.

The caption read: “President Trujillo, the Dominican Republic’s Strong Man.” Below was the following description:

Three times Chief Executive, he modernizes his country – paving roads, rebuilding cities, establishing schools, digging harbors, and improving agriculture – the while he cuts public debt. Under Trujillo, wasting civil war have ceased. In his honor, old Santo Domingo is now called Ciudad Trujillo. Friendly to the United States, his country was one of the first in Latin America to declare war on the Axis.36

Newman conveyed that the United States had improved life in the Dominican Republic through infrastructure, education, and economic stability. Additionally, it had fostered the rise of man like Trujillo who would not only continue the good work of the United

States, but was also a loyal ally as noted in the comment that the Dominican Republic was one of the first Latin American countries to side against the Axis powers during

World War II.

35 Oliver P. Newman, “The Land that Columbus Loved,” National Geographic (February 1944), 218.

36 Newman, “The Land that Columbus Loved,” 207.

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The Legacy of the American Occupation

In many ways, the aim of the US occupation was to transform the Dominican

Republic from what American policy makers viewed as a primitive, underdeveloped country into a prosperous and stable neighbor. As travel writer Harry A. Franck observed in his 1920 book: “Santo Domingo has always run more or less wild; she needs a complete new standard of honor and morals.”37 However, the lasting legacy of the occupation was not necessarily what those hoping to instill democracy had anticipated.

True, the days of revolution and political chaos had been left behind, but in its place was the iron grip of a dictator who rose through the ranks of the Guardia Nacional and ran the country for thirty-one years. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina joined the Guardia

Nacional in 1918, became a commissioned officer in 1921, and was appointed commander of the Policía Nacional Dominicana (the institution the Guardia became) by

President Vásquez shortly after the end of the occupation.38 A small rebellion called the

Civic Movement challenged President Vásquez in 1930, however, in order to achieve success, this movement, led by the young lawyer Rafael Estrella Ureña, needed the support of the military. A secret alliance formed between Estrella and Trujillo and though Estrella was the leader of the revolt, Trujillo forced him into a subservient position in the coming election by taking the title of president for himself and relegating

Estrella to the ineffective post of vice president.39 From this position of power, Trujillo

37 Harry A. Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies. Ebook (New York: Century Company, 1920), loc. 5090.

38 Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 22.

39 Richard Lee Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 2.

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consolidated his hold over the Dominican Republic, maintaining his status through the use of intimidation and assassination over the course of three decades to become one of the world’s longest-reigning dictators.

Much of the existing literature on the trujillato seeks to explain the myriad ways in which Trujillo retained power. Many scholars have placed emphasis on coercion and terror as the keys to the longevity of the dictatorship arguing that Trujillo had virtually no social base or policies that gained a popular following.40 Furthermore, social scientist

Juan J. Linz based his concept of the “sultanistic” regime off of Trujillo, noting that this type of rule thrives without “consent, legitimation, authority, desirable policies, or credible ideology.”41 While the trujillato certainly was rife with examples of rape, torture, and murder, scholars have also examined the ways in which Trujillo used symbols, celebrations, and populism to achieve widespread support. For example,

Richard Lee Turits demonstrated in his investigation of the Dominican peasantry how

Trujillo successfully utilized popular agrarian policies and a personal, paternalistic approach to gain rural support.42 Historian Lauren Derby explored the ways in which the regime infiltrated Dominican culture and society through public rituals and

40 Catherine LeGrand, “Informal Resistance on a Dominican Sugar Plantation during the Trujillo Dictatorship,” Hispanic American Historical Review 75, no. 4 (1995): 555-596; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Alain Rouquié, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).

41 Juan J. Linz, “Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

42 Turits, Foundations of Despotism.

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celebrations.43 While others, like Eric Roorda argued that nationalizing rituals such as massive rallies, state-sanctioned holidays, and even renaming the landscape transformed

Trujillo into a “demigod” through “hyperbolic rituals, tribute, civic ritual, geographical reorientation, and public works.”44 Through these various methods, Trujillo built a dictatorship spanning three decades in which the nation and the man seemed to be one in the same entity. During his tenure, the Dominican economy rapidly grew due to post- depression recovery and policies promoting import substitution industrialization and the opening of thousands of acres of farmland. In addition, investment in and completion of many public works projects increased the infrastructural development of the island.

However, these advances came with a steep price in the form of multiple human rights abuses (most notably the 1937 massacre of thousands of Haitians on the border), a strict sedition law making all forms of disapproval virtually illegal, and the enrichment of

Trujillo himself, who, already by 1934, was the richest man in the country thanks to strategic monopolies and economic controls.45

Though historians have focused on various aspects of Trujillo’s regime, most agree that it represented the most enduring legacy of the American occupation. One of the greatest accomplishments of the occupation, according to American officials, was the creation of the national constabulary or Guardia Nacional (later called the Polícia

Nacional Dominicana and then renamed the Ejército Nacional Dominicano). The

43 Lauren Derby, The Dictator’s Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era of Trujillo (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).

44 Eric Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 98.

45 Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), 359-369.

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Guardia was supposed to remain an apolitical organization that would act as a stabilizing force in the country preventing the rise of rebellions. The irony, of course, was that this was the very institution that led to Trujillo’s rise to power.46 Roorda argued that the

American occupation laid the groundwork for dictatorship by creating the constabulary, which under Trujillo enforced his one-party rule in a regime “sustained by violence.”47

Derby has also maintained the intimate connection between the American occupation and

Trujillo’s dictatorship. Derby argued that the occupation fragmented political space, stymied the growth of a liberal bourgeoisie, and ultimately set a precedent in Dominican politics of seeing the state (at first the occupation government and then Trujillo) as the ultimate arbiter of political issues, not the people.48 Furthermore, Derby contended that almost a century of foreign intervention followed by the US occupation left a desire amongst Dominicans to build up a strong sense of nationalism leading them to support a caudillo style of leadership that would prevent the United States from politically intervening in the country again and allow Dominicans to take control of their economy.49 In the case of Cuba, Jorge I. Domínguez demonstrated the ways in which US intervention obstructed political growth by preventing the development of a strong, stable central government. Domínguez showed that factions in opposition to the government

46 Most historians writing on the Dominican Republic note the importance of the Guardia Nacional in Trujillo’s rise to power, see Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 239 and Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 80.

47 Eric Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 2-3.

48 Lauren Derby, The Dictator’s Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era of Trujillo (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 20.

49 Derby, The Dictator’s Seduction, 27, 64-65.

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often precipitated crises in order to garner US support for their cause, ultimately pluralizing the political system and undermining a viable party system.50 Though beyond the scope of this dissertation, the legacy of the United States occupation of the

Dominican Republic and elsewhere not only calls into question the accomplishments of

American rule but also warrants further investigation and comparison into how occupations hinder the growth of democratic institutions.51

“The Land of Bullet Holes”

This dissertation explored representations of the Dominican Republic and

Dominicans in the American media between the nineteenth century and the end of the US occupation in 1924. Part I revealed the American media’s shifting narrative about

Dominicans, especially the mutability of their race and culture from the nineteenth century until 1916. Unbound potential, the capability of Dominicans to be transformed, and overcoming political failures all played a prominent role in accounts of the

Dominican Republic that promoted annexation. When American policy shifted away from this, a new narrative emerged stressing the deterioration of the island and the complete inadequacies of Dominicans. Most notably, American writers and politicians in this period manipulated race to fit their agendas. These sources reflected and reinforced imperialistic goals by making Dominicans white when they desired annexation and black

50 Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1978), 13-18.

51 On the topic of the occupation of Haiti, The New Yorker published an interesting retrospective on the one hundredth anniversary of the US occupation, see Edwidge Danticat, “The Long Legacy of Occupation in Haiti,” The New Yorker, 28 July 2015. On the US in Iraq see Eric Herrin and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

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when they did not. Furthermore, common themes such as financial insolvency, political disorder, and economic potential found in the media prior to 1916 would became the basis for an ideology of empire that would later serve as justification for the American occupation.

Part II examined the use of underdevelopment and humanitarianism in the

American media during the occupation. While the narrative of underdevelopment had been a common theme since the 1800s, this dissertation demonstrated that it took on new meaning during the occupation, as it became a primary justification for the intervention.

Working in tandem with this theme was the narrative of humanitarianism. While underdevelopment provided the reason for America’s presence in the Dominican

Republic, humanitarian projects such as the building of infrastructure, the development of public health, and the erection of new schools not only assisted the country on the road to progress but also made the United States seem like a purely altruistic authority on the eastern portion of the island. Concentrating their efforts on measurable goals allowed the

United States to forgo conversations about the race of Dominicans and emphasize tangible advances. The media’s focus on such selfless endeavors allowed the United

States to shape its image in the Dominican Republic and the larger global community while avoiding deeper conversations about Dominican protest or marine abuses.

Part III argued that the crucial element in explaining the change in American media coverage and the subsequent alteration of US foreign policy in the Dominican

Republic were reports that called into question America’s reputation as a humanitarian force. As this dissertation showed, the process of publicizing criticism of the military occupation in the United States began slowly, increasing in intensity as the year 1920

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unfolded with journalists reporting on the loss of individual liberties, accusing the military government of abuse and false imprisonment, and most importantly noting the hypocrisy behind the very ideologies that American foreign policy was based on. These critiques tarnished the reputation of the United States, especially in Latin America. As a result, by the end of 1920, the United States finally announced its plans to withdraw from the Dominican Republic.

As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the most persistent narratives about the

Dominican Republic portrayed the country as rife with political chaos and prone to indebtedness. These themes of instability and insolvency proved to be the ones with the most longevity precisely because they could reinforce any American objective whether that was annexation, non-intervention, financial oversight, or outright occupation. This depiction of the Dominican Republic continued even after the withdrawal to remind

Americans of why the United States intervened in the country in the first place. As shown throughout this dissertation, the subject of race was the most malleable characterization of Dominicans as the people themselves could literally go from black to white depending on American goals – a common theme that emerged even during discussions of withdrawal as the media needed a way to explain why the occupation in the Dominican Republic was coming to a close while the one in Haiti would continue.

During the early occupation period from 1916 until 1920, American print culture focused primarily on two aspects: American humanitarianism and Dominican underdevelopment

– two narratives that reinforced one another. Portraying the occupation as a humanitarian endeavor not only justified the American presence on the island but also provided the

United States with measurable outcomes they could cite as evidence of their triumph over

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Dominican backwardness. This overwhelming focus on humanitarianism, however, ended up prompting a change in policy once America’s altruism was called into question by articles throughout 1920 that exposed mismanagement and abuse. In all, this dissertation has examined the role of the American media in shaping narratives about the

Dominican Republic arguing that perceptions and imagery changed as American interests shifted. In each instance, no matter what narrative was created, Dominicans always remained passive agents as the United States dictated their representation. In this way, the American media created a fictive world essential for justifying intervention and then occupation as well as maintaining American power in the Dominican Republic.

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