Social Classes and the Origin of the Modern State: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1930 Author(s): Emelio Betances Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 3, The Dominican Republic: Social Change and Political Stagnation (Summer, 1995), pp. 20-40 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2634138 . Accessed: 17/02/2011 20:56

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http://www.jstor.org Social Classes and theOrigin of the Modern State The DominicanRepublic, 1844-1930 by EmelioBetances

Social and politicalstructures established in theCaribbean and Central Americain theearly 20th century continue to have an impacton thecurrent developmentof the region. Yet historical case studiesof the formation of the region'smodern state have been rare. Most studies have assessed economic structuresand generalpolitical development. This studycomplements that traditionby providingan in-depthhistorico-sociological analysis of the formativeyears of theDominican capitalist state. It surveysthe socioeco- nomicstructure of theDominican dominant blocs in themid- 19th century and examinesthe formation of thebourgeoisie and the state in relationto a combinationof worldevents, including the Spanishreoccupation of the country(1861-1865), the Ten Years' Warin Cuba (1868-1878),and U.S. expansioninto the Caribbean basin. It suggeststhat the structural weakness ofthe local dominant blocs created the historical circumstances for continued foreignintrusion and the emergence of the Trujillo dictatorship in 1930. Standardhistoriography has overemphasizedthe role of externalfactors inthe development of Caribbean nation-states. It treats the Caribbean people as "peoplewithout history" and ignores the role of local class strugglein the unfoldinghistorical process. This interpretationobscures rather than en- hances our understandingof the dialecticbetween external and internal influenceson theformation of Caribbeannation-states. This studyoffers a perspectivethat recognizes the importance of the interplay between external and internalfactors. In contrastto thestandard historiography, the research of Ortiz(1975), Muto (1976), Calder (1984), Sang (1989), and othersprovides excellent descriptionsof theinternal political processes in theDominican Republic between1844 and 1930,but it fails to describe the social forces that brought

EmelioBetances, a Dominican,is anassociate professor of sociology and Latin American studies atGettysburg College. He haspublished articles on state formation and contemporary Caribbean politicsin Latin American Perspectives, Caribe Contemporaneo, and Politica: Teoria y Accion. His Stateand Societyin theDominican Republic (1995) is beingpublished by Westview Press as partof the Latin American Perspectives Series.

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue86, Vol.22 No. 3, Summer1995 20-40 ? 1995Latin American Perspectives 20 Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 21

aboutsocial changeand theconsolidation of politicalpower. It discusses politicalpower but ignoresits class nature.This articlefocuses on the transformationofclass forcesin relationto theorigins of the modern state. Two schoolsof thoughthave attemptedto explainthe Dominican class structure.Juan Bosch representsa school thatclaims thatthere was no bourgeoisiein the 19th and early 20th century. He arguesthat the U.S. military governmentof 1916-1924"laid theabsolutely necessary and indispensable materialbasis to developa bourgeoisclass in the DominicanRepublic" (Bosch, 1982:214-226). Although, he argues,no suchclass formed,it was uponthis foundation that Rafael Trujillo was able to consolidatepolitical powerand become a substitutefor the bourgeoisie.Interestingly, Bosch maintainsthat there was only one class, the petty bourgeoisie, subdivided into fivestrata: high, medium, low, lower poor, and lowervery poor. The sugar plantationsof thelatter third of the 19thcentury were "sugar islands" or enclaves;the labor force was importedfrom Haiti and theLesser Antilles. The politicalstruggles of the countryoccurred as strugglesbetween the differentstrata of thesame class or withthe vestiges of a landedoligarchy. Thisapproach has beenrightly attacked for its functionalism and itsfailure to recognizethe bourgeoisie that in factexisted (Jimenes Grullon, 1980; Cassa',1986). The otherschool is representedby historiansand sociologistswho con- siderthe merchantsa structurallyheterogeneous bourgeoisie in thatthey receivedtheir profits in surplusgenerated by capitalistand precapitalist relationsof production. Lozano (1976), Gomez (1977), B aez Evertsz(1978), Vilas (1979), Oviedo and Catrain(1981), Cassa (1982), Brea (1983), and othershave argued that within this heterogeneous and complex grouping the capitalisttendency was themost important determinant. Where this group perceivesa strongtendency toward capitalism, Boin and SerulleRamia (1979) and JimenesGrullon (1980) see a full-blowncapitalist economy. Thesesocial scientists,however, do notsystematically analyze the relation- shipbetween class andpolitical power. This investigationperceives a clear distinctionbetween the political regimeand thestate. A politicalregime is definedas the"formal rules that linkthe main political institutions (legislature to theexecutive, executive to thejudiciary,and party system to them all), as wellas theissues of the political natureof theties between citizens and rulers." In highlyabstract terms, the "notionof staterefers to thebasic alliance,the basic 'pactof domination,' andthe norms which guarantee their dominance over the subordinate strata" (Cardoso,1979: 38). In thewords of Oscar Oszlak, "thestate is a social relationship,a political medium through which a systemof social domination 22 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES is articulated"(1981: 5). Focusingon thehistorical origins of thestate and noton the political regime, this study examines the relationship between state andclass-the shapingof class forces in relation to the origins of the modern Dominicanstate. In contrastto the Europeandebate on the capitaliststate, which has consideredthe relationshipbetween class and statewithin the imperial centers,this study attempts to integratethe international dimension of class relationsinto local socialstructures and to showhow they help to shapethe formand functionsof the statein the periphery.State formation in the peripheryoccurs in the historicalframework of an expandingcapitalist system,which needs a local nation-stateto organizean exporteconomy. Foreigncapital and credit become components of local class structuresand exercisedirect political pressure on statepower. However, when local politi- cal structuresare notresponsive to theneeds of capitalaccumulation on a worldscale, imperialist powers force the necessary political restructuring of states.This is thecase inthe Caribbean basin, where the capitalist states often developedon structureslargely imposed from outside through capital invest- ment,financial control, and finally military intervention. This studyemploys the notion of an embryonicbourgeoisie, a notion based on the assumptionthat the conceptof class struggleprecedes the developmentof a full-blownbourgeois class. It is possibleto arguethat the bourgeoisieexisted but only in embryo.Its structural weakness inhibited its abilityto organizea modernstate that could respond to theimperatives of internationaland local capitalaccumulation. This weaknessprompted the U.S. occupationin 1916and the establishment ofa militarygovernment that organizedand centralized local politicalpower.

STATE AND CLASS FORMATION

Stateformation in theDominican Republic was largelydetermined by a regionalizedprecapitalist economy and weak socioeconomic structures. Al- thoughthe DominicanRepublic is a rathersmall country, historically its agrarianstructure has variedfrom region to region. By themid-19th century cattleraising and subsistencefarming on communallands were the main activitiesin theeastern portion of thecountry. During the colonial period, hateros(ranchers), closely tied to thecolonial bureaucracy, had developed intocaudillos who constituted an economicand social elite. In theCibao (the northernregion), tobacco and, to a lesserextent, cacao andcoffee became the principalproducts. Closely linked to Europeanmarkets, the Cibao gaverise to an embryoniccommercial and agrarianbourgeoisie which by the late Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 23

1850swas seriouslychallenging the power of theranchers. In thesouthern partof thecountry, mahogany exports supported the economy. A groupof timbermerchants had emerged prior to independence and at times allied itself politicallywith the rangers. Thus regionalism was an importantelement of Dominicanpolitical struggles. WhenDominican independence was proclaimedin 1844,the local bour- geoisiewas stillembryonic and thusunable to organizea liberalbourgeois state.In themid- 19th century timber merchants saw theirbusiness decline as theforests became exhausted and replanting was ignored.Ranchers had been in economicdecline since the time of theHaitian Revolution (1791-1804), whichcut off a marketfor Dominican meat. The increasingeconomic pros- perityof theCibao-based farmers and merchantsthreatened these groups. Thisprosperity strengthened the emerging Sociedad La Trinitaria(Trinitarian Society),which helped to developa senseof nationalismand declaredthe independenceof the Dominican Republic. The haterosand timber exporters wereannexationist. They collaborated with the nationalist Trinitarios to get Dominicanindependence from Haiti only so thatthey could annex the countryto Spain,believing that their economic interests would be better protectedunder a foreignpower. In theirstruggles with each other, however, both annexationistsand nationalistsdeveloped alliances with local and foreignresident merchants, revealing the underlying class characterof their politicalstruggles. Duringthe periodbetween 1844 and 1880 the Dominicansocial and economicstructures remained largely undeveloped. The Trinitariosand the emergingagrarian and merchant bourgeoisie of theCibao hopedto createa liberal democracy.However, Pedro Santana and BuenaventuraBaez, caudillosfrom the East and theSouth respectively, dominated Dominican politics.These twomen led differentpolitical forces with a commongoal: annexingthe country to a foreignpower, whether Spain, France, the United States,or England.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND STATE FORMATION

Earlyon in itsdevelopment, the military was thestrongest branch of the evolvingDominican state. The military leadership of the caudillos obstructed thedevelopment of theliberal state and lefta legacyof authoritarianism whoseeffects persist. The waragainst Haiti (1844-1856) also contributedto thedevelopment of militaristictendencies within civil society and theDo- minicanstate. Historically, the Dominican army had consistedof a small numberof regulartroops supplemented by volunteersin timesof crisis. 24 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Santana,the leading caudillo during the First Republic (1844-1861), orga- nized these troopsinto an armythat under his commandacquired the characteristicsofa nationalorganization dominated from above. "The regular armyconsisted of eight to ten thousand men.... In a momentof unexpected invasion,the Government ... couldimmediately send one ortwo regiments to reinforcethe borders of theSouth without leaving the capital unarmed" (Hoetink,1982: 95). The caudillos,of course,strictly controlled this army, whichshould not be thoughtof as a modernregular army. Althoughthe army had officersand privates,it was a politico-military organizationthat basically responded to one chief,Santana. When the Haitiansinvaded in 1849,President Manuel Jimenes called upon Santana to use his prestigeand authorityto preventthe Haitiansfrom crossing the borders.Again in 1858,when the Cibao merchantswere fighting President B'aez, theyrequested Santana's military assistance. Everyone knew that hundredsand even thousands of peons and peasants would follow Santana's orders.In sum,a modernregular army did not exist, but various groups would followa militaryleader when there was a threatof foreign invasion. For the periodof theFirst Republic, however, these groups seemed to respondto a "national"military leadership. At Santana'srequest, Spain annexedthe DominicanRepublic in 1861,but Spanish rule proved short-lived. Economic conditionsdid not improve; on the contrary, the Spanish authorities subjected Dominicansto manynew regulationsand levied new taxes on boththe foreignand thelocal population.Dominicans serving in theSpanish army werediscriminated against. These factors combined to engendera rebellion bythe majority of Dominicans against Spanish rule, bringing it to an endin 1865 (Bosch,1984: 279-280). The prospectsfor the development of the Republic's political institutions did notchange with Spain's withdrawal.Now, however, the leaders had a differentsocial background.Whereas in theFirst Republic the dominant politicalfigures had beeneither landowners or merchants,after the War of Restorationleaders from the lower strata of thesociety moved upward in societythrough military service. A largenumber of military officers came to live offthe state's income; in 1865 therewere at least 100 generals(Cassa', 1982: 22). Thisdevelopment strengthened existing tendencies toward mili- tarismwith the difference that the army was no longera hierarchical"orga- nization"responsible to one man.Hoetink suggests that a de factorestruc- turingof the army took place after the War of Restoration. The army acquired the characteristicsof a marketplace,breaking up into small groupsthat competedto offertheir services in thepolitical arena (Hoetink, 1982: 96). Severalpolitical forces struggled for state power in orderto establishan economicbase forthemselves. Those in powerused thestate's income to Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 25

increasetheir own wealth (a featurestill apparent today). In 1859 and 1865, Cibao-basednationalist political elites attempted to introducemajor reforms toexpand the political regime, but these efforts failed because the nationalists lackedthe power base thattheir constitutional projects required. Only under UlisesHeureaux (1886-1899) did a viablebureaucracy and relative "national unity"emerge. From Independence to Heureaux'sdictatorship, no govern- mentproved capable of undertaking any significant public works or expand- ingthe state apparatus.

CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND CLASS FORMATION

Small-scalesugar production had existed in the Dominican Republic since the16th century. Large-scale production began only in themid-1870s. Two distinctiveagrarian systems developed: sizable capitalist sugar plantations in the Southand agriculturalpetty-commodity production for export in the northernCibao Valley.The lack of connectionbetween these two systems promotedthe uneven development of Dominican society and conditioned the organizationof politicalpower. The Cibao, whichhad brieflybecome the strongesteconomic and political region, gave way once moreto theSouth, wherepolitical power had traditionallyrested. The Cibao's smalltobacco, coffee,and cacao farmswere no matchfor the South's growing capitalist enterprises. A combinationof worldevents facilitated the early development of a bourgeoisie.These events included the Ten Years' War in Cuba (1868-1878), whichdisrupted sugar production on thatisland, the Franco-Prussian War (1870),which reduced sugar beet production in France and Germany, and the U.S. CivilWar (1861-1865), which destroyed the sugar plantations of Lou- isiana. Duringthe Ten Years' War, more than 100,000 Cubans left the island, and nearly3,000 of themwent to theDominican Republic. Since many of these immigrantswere political dissidents, a number of them later returned to Cuba or leftthe countryfor the UnitedStates. However, a significantnumber stayed,and they had both technical know-how and capital to investin sugar productionand commerce.In fact,these capitalists, along withItalians, Germans,Puerto Ricans, and North Americans, constituted the nucleus of the Dominicansugar industry. Two importantperiods can be observedin thedevelopment of thesugar industry.The first, from 1874 to 1916,is theperiod of takeoff in the transition to capitalismwith the emergence of large-scalecapitalist plantations that brokewith preexisting agricultural structures in thesoutheast (Cassa', 1974; 26 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Lozano, 1976; Gomez,1977; BaiezEvertsz, 1978; Hoetink,1982). In these yearsan indigenousbusiness class slowly emerged. The secondperiod, from 1907 to 1925,saw largeconglomerates assume control of sugarproduction and commerce,thus incorporating part of theDominican economy into the internationalcapitalist system controlled by NorthAmerican corporations. Sugarplantations brought a significant expansion of the forces of production (railroads,industry, communications, new towns).The firstmodern mills developedafter 1874, and by 1882 therewere 34 cane plantations.Sugar exportssteadily increased from 6,361 metric tons in 1880to 17,613in 1885 and22,138 in 1890(Baiez Evertsz, 1986: 212). Althoughsugar exports from the Dominican Republic rose steadily, two crises,largely determined by foreign factors, affected the industry in thelate 19thcentury. Acollapse of prices in 1881was theresultof therapid expansion of sugarproduction during several years of favorableprices and theabun- danceof cheaperEuropean beet sugar. Worldwide cane sugaroutput grew, forexample, from 2,140,000 tons in 1876 to 3,538,000tons just twoyears later.Moreover, in thelatter year, production of all typesof sugarreached 5,123,000tons. During the period from 1881 to 1889,thirteen of themost importantearly mills, most of them in Azua, Samana, Puerto Plata, and Santo Domingo,closed down. Mills valued in the hundreds of thousands of dollars sold for a pittance(Ortiz, 1975: 348-352). The second crisishit in the mid-1890s.Various factors, including the formation of trustsin theUnited States,combined to holdprices down. A recordcrop of European beet sugar in 1894produced some 6.6 milliontons in comparison with only 3.4 million tonsthe previous year, causing a newglut in themarket and a consequent declinein prices (Ortiz, 1975: 356). Theworld crisis, however, did not cause a recessionin thenew industry.In spiteof a downturn,which occasioned bankruptciesand closures, on thewhole the industry experienced an expan- sion (Lozano, 1976: 106). Insufficienttechnology and capital,the main featuresof the initialyears of the industry,gave way to moremodern technologyand centralized organization. Despitethe negative effects of world market fluctuations on theDomini- can sugarindustry, the agrariantransformations of the late 19thcentury broughtthe emergence of a newelite of sugarplanters that, along with the merchants,constituted an emergingDominican bourgeoisie. Many of the pioneersof theDominican sugar industry stayed in thecountry and were rapidlyassimilated into the creole social structure.Some marriedinto the prominentlocal familiesand reinvestedtheir profits in thelocal economy. JuanBautista Vicini, an Italian,for example, started his sugarbusiness in 1882 and becameone of themost successful capitalists in thecountry. One Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 27 ofthe government's main creditors, he marriedinto a Dominicanfamily, and fromthis union emerged a line of prominentcitizens. One of themwas BautistaVicini Burgos, president from 1922 to 1924. Sugar plantersdeveloped an alliancewith the Heureauxdictatorship. Heureauxgave concessions to both sugar planters and merchants in exchange forcredit and politicalsupport. William L. Bass, a NorthAmerican sugar producer,represented a group of plantersthat pressured Heureaux to give themduty-free exports. He also advisedthe government on howto promote thedevelopment of thesugar industry in thecountry (Sang, 1989: 53-55). Bass's groupreceived concessions from the government to establishsugar mills,import machinery duty-free, build infrastructure, and providepublic services.It helpedsustain Heureaux's dictatorship because it earnedhigh intereston thecredit it extendedto thegovernment. Thus, the relationship betweenHeureaux and the sugar planters gave the emerging Dominican state a class character. DespiteHeureaux's continued support, the pioneers of theDominican sugarindustry did notsurvive the expansion of U.S. sugargiants into the Caribbeanand the Dominican Republic at the turn of the century (Del Castillo andCordero, 1982: 96-99). The effectof foreign capital hegemony was that thesugar planters never formed a national bourgeoisie; instead, the U.S. sugar corporationselbowed them out of the market.While some engagedin import-exportactivities, others joined traditionalpolitical elites in their searchfor political power. It is worthnoting, however, that as the elites becamemarginalized the state became their main source of revenue and thus theterrain of struggle that their various fractions sought to control.

NONSUGAR EXPORT AGRICULTURE

At theturn of the 20th century, nonsugar export agriculture was basedon petty-commodityproduction. Traditional producers of tobacco,cacao, and coffeeremained an agrarianpetty bourgeoisie, that is to say, a class of small-scalefarmers unable to accumulateenough capital to investin large- scale production. Petty-commodityproduction was characteristicof Dominicancommer- cial exportagriculture (outside of sugar)throughout the 19thand theearly 20thcentury. For example,until the 1870s tobaccohad been thefastest- growingsector of the Dominican economy, but various factors combined to slow downits expansion.First, farms grew tobacco in a ratherunsophisti- catedway that produced a low-qualityleaf. Second, the decentralized struc- 28 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES tureof tobacco cultivation made it impossible for producers to establish direct relationswith merchants. Middlemen or corredoresexercised substantial controlover the producers because they provided credit. Third, in the1870s Dominicantobacco had to competewith an oversupplyof Brazilianand DutchEast Indian tobacco in the world market. Michiel Baud notesthat "the price of Dominicantobacco per quintal(forty-six kilograms) fell from betweenfourteen and twenty Dominican pesos in 1849to nine pesos in 1872 and to fourpesos in the1880s" (Baud, 1987: 136-138).The crisisfaced by Dominicantobacco affectedmerchants as well. Accordingto Baud, the numberof commercial houses in Santiagodecreased from 25 in 1879to 6 in 1884. Thecrisis in the tobacco trade led many producers to shift to cacao. Cacao productionincreased in the1880s and 1890s. Cacao producersbenefited fromgood prices in theinternational market, improving transportation facili- ties,and, in contrast to sugar, duty-free entry into the United States. Not only did cacao exportsincrease progressively and significantlybut they com- paredfavorably with sugar in termsof value.In 1906 thecountry received US$2,262,912for cacao exportsand US$2,392,406for sugar. Though this happenedonly once, it is worthnoting that in 1908cacao surpassedsugar in value,reaching US$4,269,047 compared with US$3,092,429 for sugar. After 1913,however, sugar became the main crop by any criterion. Despitea sustainedincrease in cacao exportsafter 1910, internal structural impedimentsand international competition prevented a transition from petty- commodityproduction to large-scale capitalist production. Dominican farm- ers could nottake advantage of good pricesin theinternational market to improveproduction, and after1910 theyhad to competewith cheaper producefrom Brazil and the Gold Coast.Paul Mutoattributes this behavior to the factthat those with money to investdid not growcacao: "Cacao growingremained the province of Dominicanfarmers who did nothave access to largeamounts of capitaland otherDominicans failed to investin thecrop. For the most part, cacao sufferedno greatdecline; it simply ceased toexpand.... In thepostwar period, expansion was negligible"(Muto, 1976: 51). In addition,transportation was stilla majorlimitation. Away from rail lines,roads consisted of mud trails, which made hauling costly. "To transport a quintalof cacao fromthe town of Yamasa down to SantoDomingo (about 100 kilometers)cost one dollar.The samequintal could then be sentfrom anyport in theDominican Republic to New Yorkfor 24 cents"(Bray, 1983: 65-66). Thus,the bottleneck represented by poorcommunication, monthly Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 29

interestrates of 2-6 percent,and internationalmarket competition partly explainwhy local cacao farmersnever became an agrarianbourgeoisie. A similarsituation existed with coffee. Like thatof cacao, coffee cultiva- tionwas basedon petty-commodityproduction (Del Castilloand Cordero, 1982: 100). The relativelysmall producers of coffeelacked the technology and meansof transportationto export their produce. Moreover, difficulties withcredit and financing as wellas transportationprecluded expansion even whenworld prices were high. These structural impediments prevented their transitionfrom petty-commodity production to large-scale capitalist agricul- tureand, once again, inhibited the formation of an agrarianbourgeoisie that couldhave fostered the development of a moderncapitalist state. Investigationof the developmentof the sugarindustry and the main traditionalagricultural export sectors at theturn of the20th century reveals thatthe incorporationof the Dominicaneconomy into the international capitalistmarket system not only promoted a continued regionalization of the socialstructure but also obstructedthe development of a nationalbourgeoisie basedon sugarplanting. These new developments introduced capitalism into thecountry but blocked the consolidation of a nationalgovernment.

LOCAL AND FOREIGN RESIDENT MERCHANTS

Merchantscomprised another fundamental component of the Dominican socialand economic structure. In thesecond half of the 19th century a local andforeign resident merchant fraction evolved in association with the politi- cal elitesand thestate. The incorporationof Dominicanfinances into the internationalbanking system, however, inhibited the developmentof an indigenousclass of merchants. At best they could stake out a subordinaterole in theimport-export trade guaranteed them by the operation of tariff mecha- nisms.Merchants' marginal role in the main economicactivities of the countryhampered their ability to influencenational politics in theface of growingU.S. controlof Dominican finances and customshouses. The wareffort against Haiti (1844-1856) and political stability before and afterthe War of Restoration (1863-1865) gave rise to a constantincrease in thepublic debt. Customshouses represented the government's main source of revenue.Government expenditures usually ran ahead of receipts,and thereforeleaders had to borrow from merchants to buy weapons and finance jobs fortheir political supporters. Merchants reaped profits from the increas- inggovernment debt. 30 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Governmentsoperated with money borrowed from European merchants establishedin thenorthern port of PuertoPlata and in the capital,Santo Domingo.For example, Rothschild and Cohen established an officein Santo Domingoin the 1830s,and after1944 theytook care of thegovernment's customsand finances during Baez's administrations.The merchants financed thegovernment both indirectly, by paying the customs duties for the imports and exportsthat formed the mostimportant source of stateincome, and directly,by advancing credit to thegovernment. The governmentrepaid the loansin theform of exemptionsfrom import-export duties (Hoetink, 1982: 69). In 1865 thegovernment created a systemof juntas or compafii(asde credito(credit associations) made up oflocal andforeign resident merchants who lentmoney to the governmentwhen it was in financialneed. The governmentrepaid these loans by allowingthe merchants to collectinterest andamortization at thecustomshouses. Dominicanpolitical leaders sought to formalize the financial connections betweenmerchants and the state. Gregorio Luperon, a militaryleader during theWar of Restoration,promoted the growth of creditassociations, further strengtheningthis relationship. The considerablesums thatleading mer- chantslent to theHeureaux dictatorship further illustrate the relationship betweenthem and thestate. In 1884 thegovernment granted Cosme Batlle 50 percentof dutieson theproducts he imported.In 1893 thegovernment owedsignificant sums to Batlle and Juan Bautista Vicini (Sang, 1989: 39-75). A sizable groupof foreignand local merchantstook partin the credit associationsand became very closely associated with the government. This grouphad economic reasons to opposelarge loans from European creditors. Speakingon theirbehalf, the prominent intellectual Federico Henriquez y Carvajalargued in favor of internal as opposedto foreign debt. When a loan fromthe WestendorpCompany of Holland was beingpursued in 1888, "GeneralLuperon and more than two hundred distinguished citizens signed a letterof protestto Congressdenouncing the Westendorpnegotiations" (Baez Evertsz,1978: 31). Since Independence,local and foreignresident merchants had benefited by charginghigh interest on governmentloans. Since 1882 Heureauxhad been tryingto negotiatea settlementwith the holders of a 420-poundloan fromEdward Hartmont and Companyof London extendedto the Baez administrationin 1869. The nintharticle of thecontract stipulated that "all theresources of thestate of SantoDomingo, its customshouses, rents, and dominiums,are given as guaranteefor regular payments and amortization" (Herrera,1953: 241-245). Hartmont and Company had made a firstpayment to the Dominicangovernment of 38,095 poundsbut thendiscontinued Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 31 paymentsand insteadauthorized Peter, Lawson and Son of London on May 1, 1869,to issuea loanfor the amount of 757,700 nominal pounds. It failedto communicatethese changes to theDominican government, which waiteduntil July 30, 1870,to cancel the"unfortunate contract" (Herrera, 1953:247). Baez wasnegotiating the annexation of the country by the United Statesat the timeand may have been unawareof the consequencesof Hartmont'sactions. No Dominicangovernment managed to arrangeany Europeanloan until the Hartmont affair was resolved. The Westendorploan, amountingto 770,000 nominalpounds, was in- tendedto pay off not only the Hartmont loan but all domesticdebts. Accord- ingto thecontract, the Dominican government was to pay a yearlysum of 55,646pounds according to an agreed-uponscheme of amortization. Westen- dorpand Companywould administerthe customshouses,and in case of conflictthere would be bindingmediation by the Dutch government (Herrera, 1953:293-305). The contract with Westendorp reduced the influence of local and foreignresident merchants and sugarplanters over government loans. Althoughthey continued to be importantplayers in thepolitical process, merchantsbecame increasinglymarginalized as NorthAmerican con- cernscame to exercisecontrol over Dominican customshouses and finances in the 1890s. In 1893 theWestendorp Company transferred its rightsand obligationsto theNew Jersey-basedSan DomingoImprovement Company. Heureauxand the San DomingoImprovement Company developed a unique relationshipfrom which they obtained mutual benefits and one thatresulted in an unprecedentedincrease in the country's foreign debt. In March8, 1900, the Gaceta Oficialde Santo Domingoreported that the foreign debt was $21,111,528.93in U.S. gold. It also stipulatedthat the internaldebt was US$2,845,550.44in gold and US$10,126,628.00 in silver. Together, external and internaldebts amounted to US$29,020,393.73.These are astronomi- cal figuresif we recallthat in 1888 theinternal and externaldebts were US$5,500,000and US$4,122,750.40, respectively (Dominguez, 1992). Thesehuge debts threw Heureaux's regime into a deepcrisis. His longtime associatessought to distancethemselves from him, while the forces repre- sentingthe embryonic bourgeoisie from the once-powerful Cibao regionand thealienated political elites from Santo Domingo plotted to bringthe gov- ernmentdown. In 1898 JuanI. Jimenes,a powerfulmerchant from the northerncity of Monte Cristi,became a nationalhero by attemptingto overthrowHeureaux. A yearlater Horacio Vasquez and RamonCaceres of theCibao succeededin assassinatinghim. Political instability and the near- collapseof the government followed. 32 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

THE MODERN STATE AND THE U.S. SEMIPROTECTORATE

The Heureauxdictatorship expressed national political plans to develop a strongnation-state. This initialattempt failed partly because of thecontra- dictoryintegration of theDominican state into the international capitalist systemand thesocioeconomic weakness of thebourgeoisie that supported Heureaux.Heureaux's failures led to increasedU.S. intrusionin Dominican politicaland economic affairs. The Dominican state began to intervenein the economy during Heureaux'sdictatorship, articulating the interests of a newlyemerging na- tionalbourgeoisie based on sugarplanters and merchants.Heureaux, well awareof this political alliance, sought European and North American credit in orderto maintainrelative political autonomy from the planters and the merchants.Initially, foreign credit afforded Heureaux a degreeof autonomy fromlocal power groups, but it subordinated the state to foreign creditors by increasingthe foreigndebt. Nonetheless, Heureaux expanded the armed forcesand used thenew meansof transportand communicationsto move troopsaround the island. The governmentbureaucracy experienced a degree of development,and theDominican state began to intervenein societyto bringabout economic growth and createa favorableclimate for capitalist development.In thissense, Heureaux's dictatorship represented a first step towarddeveloping a modernnational capitalist state. The new mode of integrationof theDominican state into the international capitalist system, whichdemanded a statethat was notjust responsive to oneman but account- able to its local and foreigncreditors, delayed this start.The political incapacityof Heureaux'sregime to live up to thesenew expectations,the strugglesof theresidual national bourgeoisie, and Heureaux'sinflationary policiesled thedictatorship into a crisisthat ended with Heureaux's assassi- nationin July 1899. Not until 1906 was a fractionled by Ramon Caceres able to consolidatepower. By thistime the sugar planters and merchants had been vastly weakened, andthe United States had full control of Dominican customshouses. Caceres continuedto organizeand concentratepolitical power, but thispower no longerresponded to national interests. U.S. sugarcorporations and banks had replacedforeign resident sugar planters and merchants. The local bourgeoisie was alienatedfrom the economic and political mainstream. The U.S. govern- mentbacked Caceres when he undertookprojects that favored paying the foreigndebt or created infrastructure that underwrote the prosperity of U.S. sugarconcerns. Increases in Dominicantraditional exports, reduction and consolidationof internal and external debts, and the implementation ofstrict Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 33 methodsfor collecting customs duties allowed Caceres to providepolitical stability.He expandedmilitary control across the nation's territory, organized a professionalconstabulary separate from the traditional caudillos, passed laws to developmodern capitalist property relations, and implementeda publicworks system. Debtsdealt the final and decisivemortal blow to themerchants in 1907, withthe signing of theDominican-American Convention to consolidateall debts.Historically, Dollar Diplomacyis associatedwith President William HowardTaft, but it was PresidentTheodore Roosevelt who initiatedthe policythat promoted North American banking interests in theCaribbean. In 1905,Roosevelt sent Professor Jacob Hollander as hisspecial representative to theDominican Republic. Hollander prepared the confidential report, The Debt ofSanto Domingo, that Roosevelt used in designinghis policy toward theDominican Republic. Speaking to a U.S. SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations(1907: 1 and 17),Hollander stated: I do notthink any of them are valid debts, in the sense that public debts in the UnitedStates are, but such as theyare, something must be donewith them.... Thereis littlethat is crediblein thefinancial past of SantoDomingo. But grantingthis, we are now confronted byrecognized claims, and we can not go backto thebeginning of things. These debts have been created, have been acknowledgedby the Republic, and have been in largepart secured by an assignmentofcustomhouses toforeign government. Hollanderproposed an adjustmentplan to deal withDominican external and internaldebts. He suggesteda consolidationof debts,reducing them from US$32,000,000to US$17,000,000. In addition,he proposedthat the govern- menttake a US$20,000,000loan fromKuhn, Loeb and Companyof New Yorkguaranteed by the U.S. government(Hollander, 1907: 291-292). In 1907the U.S. andDominican governments signed a conventionwhereby the formerwould underwritethe loan thatHollander had proposed.In addition,the president of the United States would appoint a generalreceiver ofDominican customs and give him and his assistants "such protection as it mayfind to be requisitefor the performance of theirduties." Clearly, the DominicanRepublic had becomea semiprotectorateof the United States, because"protection" could easilybe interpretedas militaryintervention to protectU.S. interests.Furthermore, Article 3 statedthat "until the Dominican Republichas paid thewhole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shallnot be increasedexcept by previous agreement between the Dominican Governmentand the United States" (U.S. DepartmentofState, 1910: 307-310). Unlikeprevious foreign debt arrangements, the convention established a specialrelationship whereby the United States would control the Republic's 34 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES finances.These new arrangementsended the role that merchants had been playing.They now had to limittheir activities to theimport-export trade, an area tightlycontrolled by U.S., German,British, and Spanishsuppliers. Again,like the pioneers of the sugar industry, the merchants had suffereda setbackthat had immenseimplications for the development of a national bourgeoisie.A nationalbourgeois class based on plantersand merchants movedback toward an embryonicstage. The state became a semiprotectorate of theUnited States and no longergave themfree access to government largesse.Clearly, Caceres reorganizedand centralizedthe state,but he underminedthe class that was necessary for it to be national.Obviously, these circumstancesgenerated considerable political resentment both within and outsideof Caceres's own group. As a matterof fact, his assassination in 1911 was theresult of the exclusionof local politicalelites from government patronagejobs andpayoffs. AfterCaceres's assassination,the implementationof the Dominican- AmericanConvention became problematic. In themidst of greatpolitical instability,the UnitedStates imposedirresistible demands on the local politicalelites. It repeatedlyrequested the appointmentof Americansto overseeDominican finances and militarymatters. The administrationof PresidentWoodrow Wilson (1913-1919) became convincedthat it was impossibleto consolidatea stronggovernment favorable to U.S. interests withany of thelocal politicalfactions and in 1916 establisheda military governmentto completethe tasks initiated by Caceres. Themilitary government ruled the country from 1916 to 1924,and during itstenure it soughtto developa publicworks program, which established a "national"road network;organize a "national"constabulary, which had a monopolyof organizedpower over the whole society; erect a tariff,which restructuredthe nation's dependency and weakenedthe economic base of local elites;legalize the land titles held by sugar and timber companies; and legitimizethe executive orders of the military government as a conditionfor withdrawal(Calder, 1984; Hoepelmanand Senior,1973; Welles, 1928; Lozano, 1976). The politicaleconomy of the U.S. militarygovernment did nothave the sameimpact on eachof the different social classes. The military government legalizedquestionable land titles held by U.S. sugarconcerns and helped to surveythe lands held by U.S. corporationsbut found no moneyto help small Dominicanfarmers who opposed the surveys. It destroyedlocal industryby erectingtariffs that restructured the nation'sdependency but helped to developan import-exportmerchant class that became the nucleus of a weak Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 35

Dominicanbourgeoisie. Clearly, although the U.S. militarygovernment claimedto rule "in thename of theDominican people," its politicaland economicpolicy had a class character.Like Caceres'sregime, the new state thatemerged out of the military occupation responded only to a limitedextent tonational political and economic interests. The new state was integratedinto theU.S. sphereof influenceand, as such,had to respondto U.S. political, economic,and military interests in theCaribbean basin. The nationalpolitical response to the military government was a complex one. At first,local politicalelites with ties to theimport-export merchants wereexcluded from the political process, but in spiteof this they gave their supportto the military government. Nationalist groups expressed opposition butwere unable to exert significant political pressure on thenew government becauseof the military repression. The nationalistswere urban-based petty- bourgeoisand middle-classelements that under Caceres had beenexcluded fromgovernment largesse. In theEast, peasants had been fighting evictions by sugarcompanies since the 1890s,and theseevictions were stepped up duringthe occupation. The popularurban and thepeasant resistance never establishedany political links with each other, partly because of government repression.The nationalists looked on the peasants as banditsand would have nothingto do withthem. The nationalists never opened a politicalspace until 1919,when World War I was overand theguerrilla insurgency in theEast hadheated up. Then the State Department began to observe Dominican affairs moreclosely. The eventualU.S. withdrawalresulted from strong domestic opposition to Wilson's foreignpolicy and Dominicanresistance bolstered by Latin Americansolidarity. In hisfamous Fourteen Points, presented in 1919 atthe VersaillesConference in Paris,Wilson had proclaimedthe rightto self- determinationof the small Europeanstates, and yet he had orderedthe militaryoccupation of theDominican Republic-a factgleefully noted by his Republicanopponent, Warren G. Harding.This new politicalclimate made it possiblefor Dominican nationalists to presstheir demands for the withdrawalof the military government. In fact,the State Department, which had paid onlyscant attention to Dominicanaffairs because of the war in Europe,began to becomemore involved in directingU.S. policytoward the DominicanRepublic, which had previouslybeen handledby the Navy Department. Whilethe nationalist groups organized as theUnion Nacional Dominicana (DominicanNational Union) were demanding the total withdrawal of the militarygovernment, the traditional political elites with ties to theimport- 36 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES exportmerchants were ready to collaborate with the military government by acceptingappointments to consultingcommittees. Under the leadership of AmericoLugo and Fabio Fiallo,the nationalists rejected the various U.S. plansto validatethe actions of themilitary government. The conservative factionof the traditionalpolitical elite seized the opportunityto offera negotiatedsolution to the impasseby recommendingthe creationof a provisionalcivilian government. The UnitedStates accepted this proposal andappointed Sumner Welles as specialcommissioner to lead thetransition fromforeign military to local civilianrule. During the two-year period the provisionalgovernment organized elections, which General Horacio Vdsquezwon in 1924.Shortly thereafter, Vdsquez convened a newlyelected NationalCongress to legalizeall theactions of the military government and recognizeU.S. controlof Dominican customs and finance (Knight, 1928). The politicaleconomy of themilitary government further weakened the economicbasis of theagro-industrial fraction of thelocal elitethrough a tariffthat made it impossiblefor local industryto competewith imported NorthAmerican manufactured products. In addition, the military government strengthenedthe coercive apparatus of thestate, turning it intoa sphereof powerwithout precedent in Dominican history. The newly created constabu- laryhad effectivemilitary control of the national territory. Conflictsbetween the politicaland militaryelites soon emerged.An opportunityfor the participationof the militaryin nationalpolitics was providedby Vdsquez'scampaign for reelection in 1930.The presidenthad alreadylost popularity by extending the presidential term for two years, and a new and effectiveopposition soon developed.The militaryelite already seemedto have a nationalleader, Rafael L. Trujillo.Trujillo had been admittedto the constabularyin 1919 as a secondlieutenant and rapidly ascendedto the upper ranks. He becameVdsquez's protege and by 1930was theunquestioned chief of the constabulary, which had been transformed from a police-typeorganization into an army.What is noteworthy,however, is that he was a nationalmilitary caudillo with sufficient power to preventthe reemergenceof regional caudillismo. Priorto thewithdrawal of theU.S. militarygovernment, local military officershad nothad theopportunity touse thestate as a vehiclefor accumu- latingwealth. Vasquez had offered them a tasteof economic opportunity, but theywanted real economicpower. As thegovernment lost its support,the military,led byTrujillo, seized power in 1930.Its rapid ascendancy must be examinedin terms of both the internal political struggle and the army's direct relationshipto theUnited States. There is no doubtthat the world capitalist crisisof 1930conditioned the internal crisis that had been taking place in the Betances/ CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 37

countryand thatit favoredTrujillo's ascent to power.Although documents indicatethat the United States officially manifested disfavor of Trujillo,in practiceit protected the dictator through a moratoriumon thegovernment's foreigndebt, without which he couldhave never stabilized his regime. Once inpower, Trujillo made it his first task to eliminate all opposition.His regime lastedfrom 1930 to 1961 and succeededin subordinatingall social classes andgroups to hispolitical and economic power.

CONCLUSION

Themodern Dominican state was notsimply a productof the U.S. military occupationof 1916-1924but a logicalresult of socioeconomicand political processesdating to themid-19th century. The relationshipbetween national politicalstruggles and ongoing foreign interventions in Dominican political andeconomic life is thekey to an understandingofthe early stages of state formation. The actionsof Ulises Heureaux (1886-1899) and Ramon Caceres (1906- 1911) had profoundimplications for the formationof the modernstate. Initially,the dictatorship of Heureaux articulated the political and economic interestsof an emergingnational bourgeoisie based in sugarproduction and commerce.This politicalalliance allowed Heureaux to startdeveloping a strongnation-state that could provide a favorableclimate for capital accumu- lation.Subsequent monopolization of thesugar industry by U.S. capitalists and continuedreliance on foreigncredit precipitated the collapse of the dictatorship. By thetime Ramon Caceres took power, the embryonic national bourgeoi- sie nurturedby Heureauxhad beenvirtually excluded from the mainstream of theeconomy. The U.S. governmentcontrolled Dominican finances and customshouses.Caceres continued to organize and centralize state power, but he hardlyrepresented national interests. His regimehelped to turnthe Dominicanstate into a U.S. semiprotectorate,establishing neocolonial ties thatpersist today. In fact,the U.S. militarygovernment was simplya continuationof this state-building process. Whereasstandard historiography tends to presentRafael Trujillo as a productof U.S. imperialism,this study suggests that his regimewas the productof a socioeconomicprocess with 19th-century origins. Dominican societywas regionallydivided, and the dominant regional elites were weak and fragmented.Under the U.S. militarygovernment, import-export mer- chantsimproved their economic condition but remained too weak to exercise 38 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES meaningfulpolitical influence on thestate. Sugar, the most dynamic sector of theeconomy, was controlledby U.S. corporations,and the traditional exportsectors had beenunable to overcomethe structural impediments of inadequatecredit, insufficient means of communication, and lack of capital. The structuralweakness of civil society contributed to theemergence of an authoritarianregime. The U.S. militaryoccupation strengthened the existing authoritariantendencies within civil society and the state. Finally,the findings of this study support the validity of a classperspective in explainingstate formation in termsof thedialectic between internal and externalfactors. They demonstrate that a class analysissheds light on the state-buildingprocess by focusing on the relationships between economy and politics.Adoption of thehistorico-sociological approach employed in this studyand in studiesof otherCaribbean and Central American cases would enhanceour understanding ofthe process of state formation in theregion.

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