Downloads/Bryce Smallsats 2019.Pdf Bugaenko, A

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Downloads/Bryce Smallsats 2019.Pdf Bugaenko, A Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative and 17 + 1 Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, from the Perspective of Central and Eastern European Countries Coordinators: Flavius CABA-MARIA Alexandru GEORGESCU Liviu MUREȘAN Radu-Cristian MUȘETESCU © Editura EIKON București, Calea Giulești 333, sector 6 cod poștal 060269, România Difuzare / distribuție carte: tel/fax: 021 348 14 74 mobil: 0733 131 145, 0728 084 802 e-mail: [email protected] Redacția: tel: 021 348 14 74 mobil: 0728 084 802, 0733 131 145 e-mail: [email protected] web: www.edituraeikon.ro Descrierea CIP este disponibilă la Biblioteca Națională a României Promoting the belt and road initiative and 17 + 1 cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, from the perspective of Central and Eastern European countries / coord: Flavius Caba-Maria, Alexandru Georgescu,Liviu Mureșan, Radu-Cristian Mușetescu. – București: Eikon, 2020ISBN: 978-606-49-0389-1 I. Caba-Maria, Flavius II. Georgescu, Alexandru (coord.) III. Mureșan, Liviu (coord.) IV. Mușetescu, Radu-Cristian (coord.) 656 32 Editor: Valentin Ajder Promoting THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE and 17 + 1 Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, from the Perspective of Central and Eastern European Countries Coordinators: Flavius CABA-MARIA Alexandru GEORGESCU Liviu MUREȘAN Radu-Cristian MUȘETESCU Center for China Studies Bucharest, 2020 5 CONTENTS Executive Summary.................................................................................................................. 11 PART I: THE STATUS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND 17+1 COOPERATION Chapter 1. The Current Strategic Initiatives ......................................................17 1.1. The Belt and Road Initiative as a “Project of the Century”? ............17 1.2. An Overview of China’s Strategic Initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe ...............................................................................................................33 1.2.1. China and Public Diplomacy in the Central and Eastern European Region ........................................................................................39 1.2.2. Perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative and 17+1 Format among the Central Eastern European Countries ............................42 1.3. The 17+1 Format and Energy Cooperation – a Case Study ...........51 1.4. The Main Achievements of the Initiatives ...........................................66 1.5. A Critical Assessment of the Initiatives and their Implementation ..................................................................................71 PART II: THE CUrrENT CONTEXT’S INFLUENCE ON THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND 17+1 COOPERATION Chapter 2. Evolution of the Wider Security and Economic Environment ....................................................................87 2.1. The Current Systemic View ........................................................................87 2.2. Strategic Trends .............................................................................................93 2.2.1. Technological Trends ..................................................................................93 2.2.2. Economic Trends .........................................................................................96 2.2.3. Political Trends............................................................................................101 2.3. The Impact of the SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic on China’s Initiatives .....105 Chapter 3. The Challenges of Going Global – the Belt and Road Initiative Perspective ............................................................116 3.1. China in the World .......................................................................................116 3.2. China and the United States ...................................................................122 6 3.3. China and Europe........................................................................................137 3.3.1. The European Union, China, and Environmentalism ....................149 3.4. China and Russia ..........................................................................................151 3.5. The Perceptions of Central Eastern European Countries on the 17+1 Format, in the New International Context ...............................157 3.5.1. The US-China Rivalry and the US as a Security Provider ............158 3.5.2. The 5G Dilemma ........................................................................................159 3.5.3. SARS-CoV-2 ..................................................................................................160 3.5.4. Twitter Diplomacy .....................................................................................161 3.5.5. Conclusions ..................................................................................................162 3.6. Challenges to Cooperation between China and its Central and Eastern European Partners ....................................... 164 3.7. China and the Black Sea – Eastern Mediterranean Sea Perspective .............................................................170 3.8. The Middle East – a Linchpin between the Belt and Road Initiative and 17+1 Format ........................................................................172 3.8.1. Opportunities .............................................................................................. 174 3.8.2. Challenges ..................................................................................................176 3.8.3. Prospects ......................................................................................................178 3.8.4. Conclusions ..................................................................................................181 PART III: TOWARDS A BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 2.0 (BRI 2.0) Chapter 4. Potential Projects with Expanding Dimensions.......................193 4.1. The Opportunities for Sub-Regional Cooperation .........................193 4.2. Critical Infrastructure Protection – the Key for Cooperation .......199 4.3. Security Oriented Development .......................................................... 207 4.4. Partnerships for Crisis and Emergency Situations .......................... 209 4.5. Space Cooperation as a New Dimension for Belt and Road Initiative ..........................................................................................................211 Chapter 5. Proposals on Economic Cooperation ...........................................218 5.1. The Synergy between 17+1 Format and the Middle East under the Grand Plan of Belt and Road Initiative ............................218 5.2. Pursuing Synergies with Other Regional Initiatives ....................... 222 5.2.1. Synergies with the Danube Macroregional Strategy ....................224 5.2.2. Synergies with the Three Seas Initiative ...........................................225 7 5.2.3. The South-East European Connector for the Belt and Road Initiative ........................................................................................................226 5.3. Leveraging China’s Internal Economic Reform and the Impact on the Belt and Road Initiative ....................................... 228 5.4. New Models for “Going Global” ............................................................ 229 5.4.1. The Danube-Black Sea Canal as an Industrial and Logistics Hub ..............................................................................................233 5.5. Towards an Organization of Energy Transit Countries .................. 237 5.6. Further Developing the 17+1 Format ................................................... 240 5.7. New Dimensions of Digital Cooperation .......................................... 250 5.7.1. The Belt and Road Initiative and Blockchain ....................................253 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 259 List of Contributors (in alphabetical order) ..................................................................265 8 FIGURES Figure 1: The Belt and Road Initiative and its main branches, in one interpretation .............................18 Figure 2: The Belt and Road Initiative projects by May 2019, arranged and counted by sectors of activity ...........................................................................24 Figure 3: The infrastructure investment needs by region and sector .....................................................25 Figure 4: The infrastructure financing gap ............................................................................................25 Figure 5: Map of the Central Eastern European region with the 17+1 members highlighted ................36 Figure 6: Map of the EU Member States and their views of China ..........................................................43 Figure 7: Map of the EU Member States and their positions on Chinese investment .............................43 Figure 8: Number of masks sent abroad by China as part of “coronavirus diplomacy” ........................106 Figure 9: Number of medical personnel sent abroad by China as part of “coronavirus diplomacy” .......... 106 Figure 10: A map of countries receiving debt relief and emergency financing from the International Monetary Fund .............................................. 112 Figure 11: The results of distressed loan negotiations in the researched sample .................................120 Figure 12: The three Arctic sea routes ....................................................................................................129
Recommended publications
  • Turning the Tide on Dirty Money Why the World’S Democracies Need a Global Kleptocracy Initiative
    GETTY IMAGES Turning the Tide on Dirty Money Why the World’s Democracies Need a Global Kleptocracy Initiative By Trevor Sutton and Ben Judah February 2021 WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG Contents 1 Preface 3 Introduction and summary 6 How dirty money went global and why efforts to stop it have failed 10 Why illicit finance and kleptocracy are a threat to global democracy and should be a foreign policy priority 13 The case for optimism: Why democracies have a structural advantage against kleptocracy 18 How to harden democratic defenses against kleptocracy: Key principles and areas for improvement 21 Recommendations 28 Conclusion 29 Corruption and kleptocracy: Key definitions and concepts 31 About the authors and acknowledgments 32 Endnotes Preface Transparency and honest government are the lifeblood of democracy. Trust in democratic institutions depends on the integrity of public servants, who are expected to put the common good before their own interests and faithfully observe the law. When officials violate that duty, democracy is at risk. No country is immune to corruption. As representatives of three important democratic societies—the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom—we recognize that corruption is an affront to our shared values, one that threatens the resiliency and cohesion of democratic governments around the globe and undermines the relationship between the state and its citizens. For that reason, we welcome the central recommendation of this report that the world’s democracies should work together to increase transparency in the global economy and limit the pernicious influence of corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance on democratic institutions.
    [Show full text]
  • EJTS European Journal of Transformation Studies 2020, Vol.8, Supplement 1
    EJTS European Journal of Transformation Studies 2020, Vol.8, Supplement 1 1 EJTS European Journal of Transformation Studies 2020, Vol.8, Supplement 1 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF TRANSFORMATION STUDIES 2020 Vol. 8 Supplement 1 © by Europe Our House, Tbilisi e-ISSN 2298-0997 2 EJTS European Journal of Transformation Studies 2020, Vol.8, Supplement 1 Arkadiusz Modrzejewski University of Gdansk, Poland [email protected] Editors Tamar Gamkrelidze Europe Our House, Tbilisi, Georgia Tatiana Tökölyová Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Trnava, Slovakia Rafał Raczyński Research Institute for European Policy, Poland Paweł Nieczuja–Ostrowski – executive editor Pomeranian University in Slupsk, Poland Jaroslav Mihálik – deputy editor Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Trnava, Slovakia Edita Poórová – copy editor Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Trnava, Slovakia Andrii Kutsyk– assistant editor Lesya Ukrainka Eastern European National University, Lutsk, Ukraine Editorial Advisory Board Prof. Jakub Potulski,University of Gdansk, Poland – chairperson Prof. Tadeusz Dmochowski,University of Gdansk, Poland Prof. Slavomír Gálik, University of Ss.Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Slovakia Prof. Wojciech Forysinski, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famangusta, Northern Cyprus Prof. Danuta Plecka, Zielona Gora University, Poland Prof. Anatoliy Kruglashov, Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine Prof. Malkhaz Matsaberidze, Ivane Javakashvili Tbilisi State University Prof. Ruizan Mekvabidze, Gori State Teaching University, Georgia Prof. Lucia Mokrá, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia Prof. Andras Bozoki, Central European University in Budapest, Hungary Prof. Tereza - Brînduşa Palade, National University of Political and Public Administra- tion in Bucharest, Romania Prof. Elif Çolakoğlu, Atatürk University in Erzurum, Turkey Prof. Valeriu Mosneaga, Moldova State University in Chişinău, Republic of Moldova Prof. Andrei Taranu, National University of Political Science and Public Administration in Bucharest, Romania Prof.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Sharp Power Are Political and Economic Elites (“Elite Capture”); Media and Public Opinion; and Civil Society, Grassroots, and Academia
    A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication THE HARD EDGE OF SHARP POWER Understanding China’s Influence Operations Abroad J. Michael Cole October 2018 Board of Directors CHAIR Richard Fadden Pierre Casgrain Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, Director and Corporate Secretary, Ottawa Casgrain & Company Limited, Montreal Brian Flemming VICE-CHAIR International lawyer, writer, and policy advisor, Halifax Laura Jones Robert Fulford Executive Vice-President of the Canadian Federation Former Editor of Saturday Night magazine, of Independent Business, Vancouver columnist with the National Post, Ottawa MANAGING DIRECTOR Wayne Gudbranson Brian Lee Crowley, Ottawa CEO, Branham Group Inc., Ottawa SECRETARY Calvin Helin Vaughn MacLellan Aboriginal author and entrepreneur, Vancouver DLA Piper (Canada) LLP, Toronto Peter John Nicholson TREASURER Inaugural President, Council of Canadian Academies, Martin MacKinnon Annapolis Royal CFO, Black Bull Resources Inc., Halifax Hon. Jim Peterson DIRECTORS Former federal cabinet minister, Blaine Favel Counsel at Fasken Martineau, Toronto Executive Chairman, One Earth Oil and Gas, Calgary Barry Sookman Jayson Myers Senior Partner, McCarthy Tétrault, Toronto Chief Executive Officer, Jayson Myers Public Affairs Inc., Aberfoyle Jacquelyn Thayer Scott Past President and Professor, Cape Breton University, Dan Nowlan Sydney Vice Chair, Investment Banking, National Bank Financial, Toronto Vijay Sappani Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer, Research Advisory Board TerrAscend, Mississauga Veso Sobot
    [Show full text]
  • Mocenské Zájmy a Vliv ČLR V ČR
    CEVRO INSTITUT Bakalářská práce POLITOLOGIE A MEZINÁRODNÍ VZTAHY Mocenské zájmy a vliv ČLR v ČR Autor: Milan Trieu Vedoucí bakalářské práce: PhDr. Pavel Pšeja, Ph.D. Praha 2021 Čestné prohlášení Prohlasuji, ze jsem bakalářskou práci zpracoval samostatne a vyznacil v ni veskere pouzite zdroje informaci. V Praze, 27. dubna 2021 ……………………………… age Podpis 2 Poděkování Na tomto miste bych rád vyjádřila vřele podekováni svemu vedoucimu PhDr. Pavlu Psejovi za cenne rady a připominky. 3 1. Obsah 1. Obsah ................................................................................................................. 4 2. Úvod ................................................................................................................... 6 3. Metodologie ..................................................................................................... 10 4. Čínské společnosti v ČR ...................................................................................13 4.1. CITIC (CITIC GROUP) ................................................................................................ 17 4.1.1. Žung I-zen ............................................................................................................................................18 4.1.2. CITIC Group v ČR ..............................................................................................................................19 4.2. CEFC ......................................................................................................................... 20 4.2.1. CEFC
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Policy Toward Eurasia and the Role of the U.S. Congress
    U.S. POLICY TOWARD EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS May 27 – June 2, 2019 | Prague, Czech Republic U.S. POLICY TOWARD EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS The Aspen Institute Congressional Program May 27 – June 2, 2019 Prague, Czech Republic TABLE OF CONTENTS Rapporteur’s Summary Matthew Rojansky .............................................................................................................. 3 U.S. Policy Toward Eurasia and the Role of the U.S. Congress Thomas Graham ...............................................................................................................17 Getting America Off the Backfoot in Eurasia Evan A. Feigenbaum .........................................................................................................23 Does BRI Really Exist? Robert Daly ......................................................................................................................29 China’s Rise as a Geo-Economic Influencer in Eurasia Philippe Le Corre ...............................................................................................................39 It’s Time to Rethink Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy Dimitri Trenin ...................................................................................................................47 Is Russia a U.S. 'Adversary' or Just a 'Competitor'? Developing a Sustainable, Realistic U.S. Policy Towards Russia Nikolas K. Gvosdev ............................................................................................................59 The
    [Show full text]
  • Andrzej Duda and Rafal Trzaskowski Will Face Each Other in the Second
    PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN POLAND 12th July 2020 Outgoing President Andrzej Duda European and the Mayor of Warsaw Rafal Elections monitor Trzaskowski will face each other Corinne Deloy during the second round of the Polish presidential election on July 12 Results Outgoing President Andrzej Duda (Law and Justice, PiS) who was running as a freelancer, took third place with came out ahead in the first round of the presidential 13.85% of the votes. He failed to embody an alternative election in Poland on June 28. He won 43.67% of the force capable of dethroning the country's two main vote and Rafal Trzaskowski, Mayor of Warsaw and parties, which have fought a fierce battle in every former Minister of Administration and Digital Affairs election for the past fifteen years. Krzysztof Bosak (2013-2014), candidate of the Civic Platform (PO) led (National Movement, RN) won 6.75% of the votes. The by Grzegorz Schetyna, who obtained 30.34% of the other seven candidates each received less than 3%. votes. The two men will face on July 12 for a second round of voting. More than six in ten Poles voted (62.90%), 13.64 points more than in the first round of the previous presidential Szymon Holownia, a journalist and presenter of the election on May 10 2015. television programme Poland has incredible talent Results of the first round of the presidential election on June 28 2020 in Poland Turn out: 62.90% Number of votes won % of votes won Candidates (first round) (first round) Andrzej Duda (Law and justice, PiS) 8 412 188 43.67 Rafal Trzaskowski (Civic Platform,
    [Show full text]
  • VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 9 • MAY 9, 2019 On
    VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 9 • MAY 9, 2019 SPECIAL ISSUE: CHINA’S UNITED FRONT OPERATIONS AROUND THE WORLD IN THIS ISSUE: On the Correct Use of Terms for Understanding “United Front Work” By Anne-Marie Brady Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Religious Affairs Work By Alex Joske The United Front Work Department Goes Global: The Worldwide Expansion of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China By John Dotson ​ United Front Work by Other Means: China’s “Economic Diplomacy” in Central and Eastern Europe By Martin Hála How Beijing is Shaping Politics in Western Australia By Wai Ling Yeung and Clive Hamilton Editor’s note: This is a special theme issue of China Brief, focused on China’s “united front” (tongyi zhanxian, 统一战线) ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ influence operations throughout the world. Many of the Chinese government’s united front activities are entrusted to a specific organization: the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), which handles a broad range of policy portfolios ranging from ethnic and religious affairs within China, to seeking influence over ethnic Chinese ​ communities and governments in foreign countries. However, in a much broader sense, the “united front” also represents a series of political strategies and tactics, employed by a variety of Chinese state-affiliated organizations, to pursue the interests of the Chinese Communist Party throughout the world. In our first article, Anne-Marie Brady helps to frame the issue by examining the nature of “united front work,” and the language employed in reference to these activities.
    [Show full text]
  • UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Southern District of New York *SUBJECT to GENERAL and SPECIFIC NOTES to THESE SCHEDULES* SUMMARY
    UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Southern District of New York Refco Capital Markets, LTD Case Number: 05-60018 *SUBJECT TO GENERAL AND SPECIFIC NOTES TO THESE SCHEDULES* SUMMARY OF AMENDED SCHEDULES An asterisk (*) found in schedules herein indicates a change from the Debtor's original Schedules of Assets and Liabilities filed December 30, 2005. Any such change will also be indicated in the "Amended" column of the summary schedules with an "X". Indicate as to each schedule whether that schedule is attached and state the number of pages in each. Report the totals from Schedules A, B, C, D, E, F, I, and J in the boxes provided. Add the amounts from Schedules A and B to determine the total amount of the debtor's assets. Add the amounts from Schedules D, E, and F to determine the total amount of the debtor's liabilities. AMOUNTS SCHEDULED NAME OF SCHEDULE ATTACHED NO. OF SHEETS ASSETS LIABILITIES OTHER YES / NO A - REAL PROPERTY NO 0 $0 B - PERSONAL PROPERTY YES 30 $6,002,376,477 C - PROPERTY CLAIMED AS EXEMPT NO 0 D - CREDITORS HOLDING SECURED CLAIMS YES 2 $79,537,542 E - CREDITORS HOLDING UNSECURED YES 2 $0 PRIORITY CLAIMS F - CREDITORS HOLDING UNSECURED NON- YES 356 $5,366,962,476 PRIORITY CLAIMS G - EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND UNEXPIRED YES 2 LEASES H - CODEBTORS YES 1 I - CURRENT INCOME OF INDIVIDUAL NO 0 N/A DEBTOR(S) J - CURRENT EXPENDITURES OF INDIVIDUAL NO 0 N/A DEBTOR(S) Total number of sheets of all Schedules 393 Total Assets > $6,002,376,477 $5,446,500,018 Total Liabilities > UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Southern District of New York Refco Capital Markets, LTD Case Number: 05-60018 GENERAL NOTES PERTAINING TO SCHEDULES AND STATEMENTS FOR ALL DEBTORS On October 17, 2005 (the “Petition Date”), Refco Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • Submission to the Inquiry on Foreign Interference, New Zealand Parliament, Justice Select Committee, 2019
    Submission to the Inquiry on Foreign Interference, New Zealand Parliament, Justice Select Committee, 2019 Professor Anne-Marie Brady My qualifications to speak on this topic: I am a specialist in the politics of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, China) and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Party-State system; as well as polar issues, Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. I have published ten books and close to fifty scholarly papers on these topics. I was educated in Auckland, Shanghai, and Canberra. I am a fluent Mandarin Chinese speaker with dual degrees up to PhD level in Chinese Studies and Political Science and International Relations. I am a Professor in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Canterbury, as well as a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, and a member of the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (New Zealand). I have taught graduate and undergraduate courses at East China Normal University, Tsinghua University, Wuhan University, Beijing University, and Renmin University. My comments in this submission are based on conclusions in my research published over the last thirty years. In researching these papers and books I referred to many thousands of Chinese language CCP materials and the comments I make here are based on those sources, as well as secondary sources on the CCP’s united front work. My submission: My submission to the Justice Select Committee Inquiry into Foreign Interference is in two parts: 1.
    [Show full text]
  • FCPA Update 1 January 2019 Volume 10 Number 6 FCPA Update a Global Anti‑Corruption Newsletter
    FCPA Update 1 January 2019 Volume 10 Number 6 FCPA Update A Global Anti‑Corruption Newsletter In this issue: The Year 2018 in Review: 2 United States 30 United Kingdom Continued Globalization of Anti-Corruption 44 France Enforcement 52 Germany During 2018, anti-corruption enforcement remained vigorous. The United States 57 Asia continued enforcing aggressively the FCPA. And a growing number of other 65 Latin America countries enacted their own anti-corruption laws, pursued high-profile investigations Click here for an index of and enforcement actions, and partnered with other authorities in multi-jurisdictional all FCPA Update articles inquiries. In this issue, we survey the past year’s most significant anti-corruption If there are additional developments in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Asia, and individuals within Latin America. your organization who would like to receive FCPA Update, please email [email protected], [email protected], or [email protected] Continued on page 2 www.debevoise.com FCPA Update 2 January 2019 Volume 10 Number 6 United States A. Overview Overall, there were eighteen corporate enforcement actions – the third most corporate actions in FCPA history – which included four declinations under DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement Policy. In relation to these 18 matters: • The United States collected over $1 billion in penalties, or more than $1.9 billion including the disgorgement that the SEC credited from Petrobras’s class action settlement. • When adding settlement payments to other countries that the U.S. authorities credited, total penalties exceeded $2.9 billion, representing the third largest sanction amount in the FCPA’s 40-year history.
    [Show full text]
  • The Roman Catholic Church in Poland After the Fall of Communism
    Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe Volume 40 Issue 7 Article 2 9-2020 The Roman Catholic Church in Poland after the Fall of Communism Krystyna Górniak-Kocikowska Southern Connecticut State University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons Recommended Citation Górniak-Kocikowska, Krystyna (2020) "The Roman Catholic Church in Poland after the Fall of Communism," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 40 : Iss. 7 , Article 2. Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol40/iss7/2 This Thirty-Year Anniversary since the Fall of Communism is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN POLAND AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM Tempora Mutantur1 By Krystyna Górniak-Kocikowska Dr. Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska is a Professor Emerita and Adjunct Faculty in the Philosophy Department at Southern Connecticut State University. She is a native of Poland and received the Ph.D. degree in philosophy from Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and a Masters in religious studies from Temple University in Philadelphia. She is an Academic Council Member of Charter Oak State College and a Fellow of the Albert Schweitzer Institute. Krystyna has previously published articles in OPREE; she is a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of OPREE. Disclaimer There are 18 major churches and denominations registered officially on the basis of individual legal acts in Poland as of 2019 (Ćmiel, 2019).
    [Show full text]
  • Capital, Political Vulnerability, and the State in China's Outward Investment
    Going Out or Opting Out? Capital, Political Vulnerability, and the State in China’s Outward Investment Meg Rithmire Working Paper 20-009 Going Out or Opting Out? Capital, Political Vulnerability, and the State in China’s Outward Investment Meg Rithmire Harvard Business School Working Paper 20-009 Copyright © 2019, 2021 by Meg Rithmire Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Funding for this research was provided in part by Harvard Business School. Domestic Capital in China’s Internationalization Going Out or Opting Out? Capital, Political Vulnerability, and the State in China’s Outward Investment Meg Rithmire F. Warren McFarlan Associate Professor Business, Government, and International Economy Harvard Business School Abstract: How do state-business relations interact with outward investment in authoritarian regimes? This paper examines this question in the context of China’s rapid transformation into major capital exporter. While most political economy scholarship focuses on firms’ economic profiles to discern preferences toward international openness, this paper shows the importance of domestic political status and specifically business’s vulnerability to the state in explaining the behavior of firms as they invest abroad and the state’s reaction. I present three types of domestic capital that differ in economic and political logic as they go abroad: tactical capital pursues political power and prestige, competitive capital pursues commercial goals, and crony capital seeks refuge from the state and asset expatriation. The Chinese regime’s approach to outward investment, which I characterize as mobilization campaigns adjusted over time and combined with targeted domestic regulation, endeavors to treat these different kinds of capital differently, deploying and disciplining tactical capital, enabling competitive capital, and constraining crony capital.
    [Show full text]