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Transitional Justice Received Very the Process Increased Number 4, August 31, 2009 A publication of Afghanistan watch Forth Note past two weeks. The mass media Justice Is Permanent strongly pushed for a transparent The fourth issue of Haqiqat/The Truth election. However as we were getting Not Transitional contains a lot of news and reports on closer to the election, concerns election transparency and during this regarding transparency and integrity of period transitional justice received very the process increased. In this regard little attention. Efforts have been made some cases of fraud and election I am afraid of another to pick up news and analysis related to problems are reflected in the media. four key issues of transitional justice, Injustice for the Sake of reconciliation and negotiation with anti‐ Corruption: Justice government groups, elections The media had little focus on corruption transparency and corruption. during past two weeks. In many cases corruption is said to be the only cause Transitional Justice: of failure in the government of The issue of transitional justice received Afghanistan after the collapse of very little attention in the media during Taliban. Media and political the period of fourth issue of Haqiqat. commentators highlighted that the The only point in this regard is the success of next government can be return of General Dostum from Turkey measured against its success in fighting to Afghanistan. The Afghan media has corruption in the state offices. covered issues that were believed to be most important during the past two Interviews: weeks. An interview with two presidential candidates, Dr. Ramazan Bashardost Negotiation and Reconciliation with and General Shahnwaz Tanai is also Taliban: included in this issue. The questions The issue of negotiation and during the interviews focused on the reconciliation with Taliban also received four constant topics of Haqiqat little attention in the media. The issue Newsletter i.e. transitional justice, of negotiation and reconciliation was reconciliation and negotiation with anti‐ almost forgotten as the elections and government forces, election its related violence dominated transparency and state corruption. The reporting and analysis in the Afghan candidates offer two different media. This lack of interest can perspectives on issue of transitional probably explained by the fact that justice and accountability for past offers of negotiation has so far been crimes. Dr. Ramazan Bashardost made unilaterally by the Afghan believes the process of transitional government and some foreign countries justice is very important to be which has so far faced rejection or implemented as it is the right of those indifference by the insurgents. who were oppressed during war in the past. On the other hand General Election Transparency: Shahnwaz Tanai presents a pessimistic Concerns and issues regarding view and says it is impossible to transparency in the elections were implement transitional justice in the widely reflected in the media during the current situation of Afghanistan. The Truth is a bi‐weekly publication of the Afghanistan Watch supported by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). It is intended to provide a snapshot of how the Afghan media and candidates for Presidential and Provincial Councils Elections debate and approach these key issues facing the country: transitional justice, corruption, elections transparency and negotiationsPURL: with the https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1b0bf0/ armed insurgents. If you wish to subscribe please send an email to [email protected] or visit our website: www.watchafghanistan.org Inside This Issue Transitional Justice We Will Cut the Fingers of Voters 9 Transitional Justice and Ethnic Emotions 3 US Ambassador emphasized on transparency in… 9 America and Karzai Face to Face with the Arrival… 3 United Nations: 95% of people participate in… 9 Negotiation with armed position Groups Elections was Fair 9 The Votes from Western Provinces Misused… 4 Fraud and Vilations of August 20 Elections 9 Negotiation with Anti‐Government Forces… 4 Election was not transparent 9 Cease Fire ends with Reconciliation 4 A Fraud in Herat: total population 5000 and… 10 Britain and US Preparing to Talk to Taliban 4 The Election Process Was Positive 10 Negotiation with Taliban Fruitless 5 No Election Result Unless the Complaints Are… 10 Karzai’s Five Year Strategy Struggle for a Vicious… 5 Lack of Legitimacy in the New Government of… 10 Hushdar Editorial 8 5 Electoral Complaints That Could Falsify… 10 Preconditions That Makes Impossible… 5 Corruption Please Negotiate with Taliban 6 Cabinet Chief Executive: Solution or Problem? 11 A Western Writer Revealed:America Will Pull Out… 6 Razaq Mamoon: Coming Election and the End… 11 Elections Transparency US Officials In Search Of a New Post for… 11 The Hands behind Insecurity in the North 7 Two Committees Established To Monitor Foreign… 11 Taliban: We will disrupt the Elections 7 Some High Authorities in Interior Ministry Collect 11 Will the Rivals accept the Elections Result Easily? 7 Corruption Reduced in the Ministry Of Transport 12 Special Measures to Prevent Fraud in the Elections 7 Why Cases are not pursued? $17.5 Million… 12 Will Fraud Be Prevented In The Election? 7 Campaign Spending Higher Than First Elections 12 We Are Unable To Prevent Fraud 8 How to Eradicate Corruption? 12 Phillipe:Candidates should accept official result… 8 Security, Political, Psychological and… 12 Elections a Period of Business for the Media 8 USA to Make a Complete Assessment of Afghan… 12 Obama’s Special Envoy Arrives in Kabul to… 8 Democracy is Not about Elections Only 13 The Probability of Second Round Elections… 8 What Will The Second Republic Do? 13 Violence increased on the eve of Afghan Election 8 Exclusive Topics Justice Is Permanent Not Transitional 14 I am afraid of another Injustice for the Sake of Justice? 16 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1b0bf0/ No 4, August 31, 2009 Transitional Justice Transitional Justice and Ethnic Emotions 8am Daily, No 646, Page 4, Sunday, August 2, 2009 In my view after the failure of the government and international community to support transitional justice for reasons of stability and peace, negotiations with the Taliban is the next most damaging blow to the process. Now we can rarely hear any word regarding transitional justice by government or international community. At a time the West and the government are trying to open doors for talks with a terrorist group, talk of transitional justice is becoming difficult and meaningless. Apparently, Mr. Karzai is trying to remove the names of Taliban leaders from the black list of United Nations. When Mullah Omar is not questioned for his crimes and terrorist activities then the process of transitional justice is in vain. Those who have power and arm might not be held accountable for long years because government whose higher officials are comprised of law breakers and war criminals can not point to crimes committed by others? ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ America and Karzai Face to Face with the Arrival of Dostum in Afghanistan Nukhost Daily, No 135, Page 6, Aug 18, 2009 Ahmad Behzad, a Member of Parliament from Herat province calls concerns of US Embassy unfair regarding the case of General Dostum. He says: “it is very outrageous if other bloody incidents and human rights violations are neglected and only the case of General Dostum is pursued.” Mr. Behzad added that if we are to pursue the human rights violations and war crime cases in Afghanistan, then all those who were involved in the massacre of Afshar and other internal conflicts between rival parties should be brought into justice and tried. According to him many of them are now part of Karzai’s government and present in the parliament. 3 |Page http://www.watchafghanistan.org PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1b0bf0/ No 4, August 31, 2009 Negotiation with armed Opposition Groups The Votes from Western Provinces Misused The Badghis Insurgents Took the Money and Broke the Ceasefire Mandegar Daily, No 98, Page 1, July 30, 2009 The Mandegar Daily in its editorial say the recent agreement between Taliban and the government of Afghanistan is a game and levy by insurgents. Following the report the Daily Telegraph an English Newspaper revealed that government of Afghanistan paid a sum of 20 thousand pounds to Taliban for the ceasefire agreement in Badghis province. The Newspaper quotes a senior western diplomat that the current plan is part of a strategy to misappropriate the north‐ western votes. In the meanwhile the government of Afghanistan says the agreement in Bala Murghab district of cordially and logically accept the negotiation process, if they Badghis province was the result of efforts and struggles by tribal understand that Taliban admit to negotiate with government elders in this province. However Mullah Malang, a member of and there is no more force, explosions, suicide bombings and House of Representatives says the agreement was based on helicopters flying above their head. money and after the money was received it was broken. Hamid Karzai has been pursuing the process of negotiation with Daily Telegraph in the end adds that Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, a Taliban for along time and now the negotiation in Bala Murghab presidential candidate called the plan of agreement by Kabul district of Badghis province and Ghurmach district of Faryab government as a joke. province will bring reasonable results. In these provinces Taliban have promised to supervise the building process
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