Protecting Sensitive Information: the Virtue of Self-Restraint Dallas Boyd

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Protecting Sensitive Information: the Virtue of Self-Restraint Dallas Boyd Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-Restraint Dallas Boyd ABSTRACT have telegraphed that the United States was bracing for nuclear war, precipitating a Soviet An abundance of information that could be first-strike. Far from an act of irresponsible useful to terrorists is available in the open journalism, Gup cited the story as a case literature. This information, unclassified but study in the value of an inquisitive press nonetheless sensitive, includes risk corps.3 assessments that identify infrastructure Though lawmakers quickly acknowledged vulnerabilities, analyses that hypothesize the Greenbrier’s obsolescence, the revelation creative attacks, and otherwise dangerous remains controversial.4 Despite a plea for knowledge that is released under the rubric discretion, a small number of journalists had of scientific openness or the public’s “right to substituted their own judgment on national know.” Attempts to manage this information security for that of the U.S. defense more responsibly have been resisted in part establishment. The tension that the story due to the misconception that such efforts illuminated – between the value gained by would require formal, draconian restrictions revealing sensitive information and the on speech. However, greater discipline in the potential harm invited by doing so – has only dissemination of sensitive information can grown more pronounced since terrorism be introduced without compromising the emerged as the dominant security threat. nation’s values. In particularly sensitive This tension usually concerns information areas, scientists, journalists, and members of that, like the bunker location, has been the general public should embrace voluntary formally designated as secret. Most recently, self-restraint as a civic duty. Further, both WikiLeaks’ release of more than a half- government entities and journalists should million classified documents has revived avoid calling attention to sensitive debate over the legitimacy of leaking as a information in ways that compound rather form of civil disobedience. 5 However, a more than reduce the potential harm it represents. complex question concerns the advisability of making public, or drawing attention to, a variety of mostly unclassified information INTRODUCTION that is nonetheless useful to terrorists.6 Examples of this information include media Less than a year after the Cold War ended, descriptions of target vulnerabilities, one of its best-kept secrets came to light hypothetical attack scenarios, and sensitive when the hidden purpose of West Virginia’s counterterrorism measures. The central Greenbrier Hotel was revealed in the question explored in this article is whether Washington Post.1 Beneath the hotel was a the availability of this unclassified knowledge massive bunker built to house the U.S. benefits our adversaries more than it Congress after a nuclear war, part of the advantages society. nation’s “continuity of government” program. The motives behind disclosures of Though congressional leaders had urged the sensitive information vary, but a common newspaper not to expose the secret, the Post’s refrain is that they spur remedial action that executive editor justified the publication as a would otherwise be avoided. Critics argue, “historically significant and interesting story however, that these revelations recklessly that posed no grave danger to national endanger the public. Whatever their effect, a security or human life.” 2 Ted Gup, the soft consensus seems to have formed that journalist who uncovered the Greenbrier’s airing this information does not subtract macabre function, went further, arguing that from national security to such an extent as to the facility had been potentially destabilizing justify the extraordinary powers that would even when its existence was a secret. be required to suppress it. This attitude Evacuating Congress during a crisis might HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, (MAY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG BOYD, PROTECTING SENSITIVE INFORMATION 2 represents a stark departure from previous the case of classified information, the public’s wartime policy, when speech was frequently “right to know.” The purpose of the analysis restricted on security grounds.7 During World is to challenge the assumption that these War II, censorship succeeded largely because revelations are largely innocuous. A further communications technology had not yet aim is to dispute the notion that curtailing made the practice impractical. Since then, the them requires measures that are information revolution has greatly expanded incompatible with our national values. This the number of people with access to sensitive misconception encourages the belief that any information as well as the means to effort to discourage discussion of sensitive disseminate it. Attempts to manage this information compromises civil liberties. information have been less than vigorous, An alternative to draconian restrictions on and in many cases the government itself has speech entails fostering a culture of voluntary made questionable revelations in the name of restraint, in which citizens refrain from greater transparency. inappropriate revelations out of a sense of The existence of sensitive information in civic duty. Its enforcement would depend not the public domain is a security concern only on government coercion but on individuals insofar as there are adversaries poised to and institutions supplying disapproval of exploit it. Yet on this score there can be little irresponsible discussion. Admittedly, any doubt. Gathering information from open effort to discourage discussion of unclassified sources is an established intelligence knowledge, no matter how sensitive, faces an methodology that both states and non-state obvious hurdle: persuading the public to actors utilize. For example, Chinese accept new categories of protected physicists relied heavily on Western scientific information just as the government struggles literature in their development of strategic to keep secret the materials it has already weapons.8 Modern-day terrorists appear to classified. But the challenge of safeguarding behave similarly. A captured al-Qaeda the two types of information is different. One training manual released by the Justice requires more diligent enforcement of Department after 9/11 advises that by using existing security protocols. The other is a public sources “openly and without resorting societal responsibility that presents no to illegal means, it is possible to gather at additional burden to the government beyond least 80% of information about the enemy.” promoting its merits. While the debate over Among the sources it recommends are the discussion of unclassified information is “newspapers, magazines, books, periodicals, not likely to resume until another attack official publications, and enemy broadcasts.” 9 occurs, policymakers should revisit the The diversity of malevolent actors who might matter before that inevitable event. In its exploit this information has also grown aftermath, impulsive calls to curtail American dramatically over the previous decades. In rights may obscure the more measured the age of terrorism, the incoherence of the option that is available today. nation’s response to this phenomenon represents a significant failure. ADVERTISING VULNERABILITIES This article examines three common forms The emergence of terrorism has occasioned of “sensitive information,” defined for the the reevaluation of what had been a steady purpose of this analysis as knowledge that increase in transparency across many sectors might be useful to terrorists and would be of society. The shift in attitude concerning considerably more difficult – if not knowledge of natural gas line locations is impossible – for them to assemble instructive. For decades errant digging had independently. This information includes: occasionally punctured pipes containing media reports and risk assessments, both explosive gas, with lethal results. Industry private and government-sponsored, that and government responded by advertising identify critical vulnerabilities to terrorism; their location as widely as possible. After open-source analyses that hypothesize 9/11, however, a series of reports highlighting creative terrorist attacks; and publications the possibility of natural gas attacks led some that reveal potentially dangerous knowledge to question the wisdom of this effort. A 2004 under the rubric of scientific openness or, in HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, (MAY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG BOYD, PROTECTING SENSITIVE INFORMATION 3 New York Times headline captures the identification. While the names on the pass dilemma: “Mapping Natural Gas Lines: and ID must match, the Transportation Advise the Public, Tip Off the Terrorists.” In Security Administration (TSA) does not scan response to these concerns, pipeline maps the barcode or compare the name against the began to be removed from many gas No-Fly List. Only at the gate is the boarding company web sites.10 Similar fears have pass scanned, but no matching identification arisen in other countries. In 2008, flood risk is required. Bowers suggests that terrorists experts in Britain’s Environment Agency could travel with two boarding passes – one incurred the wrath of security officials when legitimate, purchased with a stolen credit they published maps depicting regions under card, and the other a counterfeit created severe threat in the event of dam failures.11 As using widely available software. At the first in the
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