Deliberative Power-Sharing: the Government in Opposition Approach

CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters ofArts in The Government in Opposition Approach Deliberative Power-Sharing Deliberative Comparative Constitutional Law Constitutional Comparative Department ofLegal Studies Central European University European Central Supervisor: HurstHannum Supervisor: Budapest, Hungary Simon Cooke Submitted to Submitted 2011 By CEU eTD Collection democracy. theories of deliberative advancedwithin procedural standards to accordingopposition rules in for utilizing a government illustrate basic framework to as acasestudy Bosnia-Herzegovina presents Theauthor models. consociational and boththecentripetal of weaknesses many the of is argument The deliberativepresented that power-sharingbased on rules’. governmentin opposition wouldrules resolve in opposition ‘government called, mechanisms institutional of genre new deliberative new standards evaluatingevaluate for power-sharinginstitutions and of then a uses those standards to emergence the examines thesis This models. centripetal and in the consociational presented those beyond mechanisms institutional of exploration little very been has criteria of there democracy, theories within deliberative have evolved institutional designs normative for evaluating new while However, societies. in divided design constitutional to democracy of in deliberative theories the interest applying has beenaheightened years there In recent ABSTRACT Page ii Page CEU eTD Collection CONTENTS ilorpy...... 38 Bibliography CONCLUSION...... 35 V. DELIBERATIVE-FRIENDLY ...... 28 POWER-SHARING IV. GOVERNMENT IN OPPOSITION RULES...... 23 III. PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL FORMS OF POWER-SHARING...... 16 II. DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND DELIBERATIVE ...... 8 NORMS I. SITUATING THE DEBATE...... 3 INTRODUCTION...... 1 D. DELIBERATIVE NORMS D. DELIBERATIVE C. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ELECTORAL B. ETHNIC PROTECTION MEASURES A. THECORE: MULTIPLE LAYERS OF WINNING POWERS OF IN OPPOSITION RULES A.GOVERNMENT TYPES B. CENTRIPETAL POWER-SHARING A. POWER-SHARING CONSOCIATIONAL SOCIETIES D. MANAGINGPOWER DIVIDED IN COERCIVE SOCIETIES INDIVIDED DELIBERATION C. INSTITUTIONALIZING B. DELIBERATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN ANDEQUALITY AUTONOMY A. PERSONAL INTRINSIC 2. The requirement of publicity...... 12 1. The requirement of reciprocity...... 11 Page iii CEU eTD Collection CEU eTD Collection overview of contextof the deliberative power-sharing among other the theories of in democracy in conflict. groups as ethnic than rather citizens asfellow another one with politically engage standards inhopesof divided societies providing with institutionsa setof enable to citizens to deliberative to according be used might rules these how examine is to thesis in this objective my newentirely howlosing powerscanbe study between of parties. divided winningand Therefore, institutional measures overtheenumeration pastfewof these years has an led gradually to in rules. The as ‘government opposition’ to arereferred rules institutional sharing. These power- to approaches theexisting within offered treatments counter-majoritarian kinds of the to complements, least very the at or replacements, better as serve may that rules institutional of anewgenre offering hasemerged design constitutional few yearsto anewapproach proposals. There is, however, hope for rectifying this gap between theory and practice. In the last in need and are concrete of practitioners hasyetmodel not been Policy-makers achieved. powers-sharing fully deliberative goal the operational but a establishing of deliberative norms, years haveoperationalize in madeworthy been to Someefforts recent note strategies. resolution conflictidentity through civic acommon for achieving standards set of procedural recognize a resolving conflict between ethnic groups. Deliberative theories of democracy,on the other hand, within models liberal of and republican providedemocracy to for sufficientprocedural standards democracy to the context of divided societies. These interests are owed, in part, to shortcomings INTRODUCTION The outline of this thesis will be as follows. In the first chapter Iwill first chapter ageneral provide In The beasfollows. thesis the this will of outline of theories in deliberative applying interests yearshasa revival of been there In recent Page 1 CEU eTD Collection considerations thatinstitutional indesigners societiesdivided can build in upon future studies. intofocus by aworkablesuggesting incorporates model both normativethat andanalytical mechanisms institutional and norms deliberative of discussion the bring will I chapter final and mechanisms that conform institutional sharing Iwill overviewof an chapter In provide thirdthe sharing toinstitutions. procedural requirements deliberativestructure power- to which upon foundation theoretical the provide will norms that of deliberative divided I presentan Inchapter societies. two of democraticthe overview valuesanddeliberative democracy. In the fourth Page 2 CEU eTD Collection 1 basic individual protections rights suchasabill andof rights, constitutional review. measuresitgobeyond find advocate thatnecessary accommodationists to counter-majoritarian resultinto dominant andfor supremacy partisan the group, one this of reason, categories. notfall neatly either two of these does into and democracy is asdeliberative paper known inthis with deal howeverthatIwill The approach academic literature. frequently within discussed and known are well democracy representative categories of broad two these within and between Debates and‘integration.' ‘accommodation’ of rubric broad the under to referred sometimes are advanced frequently most been I. SITUATING THEDEBATE argue in favorargue power-sharing of such segmental veto, oriented amutual group arrangements, as Lijphart Arend like consociationalism, of Advocates pluralism. territorial or multiculturalism, centripetalism, consociationalism, strategies: following the of more or one endorse they whether political andsocial of ethnicroots conflict. held by accommodationists are predominately an outgrowth of practical concerns regarding the W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa ( 1965). Accommodationistsview in areunited majority the that inruleis dividedsocieties likely have that Thetwo societies. in democratic divided design to approaches many There are The democratic mechanisms advocated by accommodationists vary depending on Page 3 1 Theviews CEU eTD Collection The Politics of Ethnic Conflict regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflict ( 1993). 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 debate in conflict regulation, 41-88(2008). pp 41 - 88 2 coalitions through vote pooling mechanisms. pooling vote through coalitions onthe in Horowitz, inter-group handargue favorof other promoting for electoral treatments autonomy, proportional representation, or territorial autonomy. argue for cultural argue rightsautonomy, orproportional group representation. state, but with significant autonomy in sub-regions of the state. the of sub-regions in autonomy significant with but state, same the within exist to identities national multiple allow who Canada like countries those are with state’. with the is coterminous nation ofthat asingle needs than the rather such communities of all preferences linguistic,national categories; or religious, group and onaddressing the emphasis the needsand ethnic, is recognition ‘publicandadvocates the substate mostof of accommodation private isby shared viewthat the however, Ultimately, approaches. these of apply andcombinations do to even more extreme forms to evenmoreof extreme forms ethno-nationalism. lead can and identities of ethnic politicization the exacerbate approaches accommodationist that ideals. social liberal, or republican, are basedon a common general will. of formation the to aresecondary preferences group where identity national asingle emphasizes instead amore for politics, advocating modern type of which democracy participatory John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Introduction: the Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict, in Conflict, of Ethnic Regulation Macro-Political the Introduction: O’Leary, &Brendan McGarry John id. Supra note 2 at 45 - 51 Supra note 2 at 69 Supra note 2 at 63 Supra note 2 at 56 Sujit Choudhry, Bridging comparative politics and comparative constitutional law, (2008).pp. 15-26 enduring The accommodation? or Integration Simeon, Richard & O’Leary Brendan McGarry, John See: Integrationists on the other hand tend to occupy the opposite spectrum of democratic 6 7 Integrationists tend to advance normative theories of democracy, that democracy, of theories normative advance to tend Integrationists Page 4 3 Multiculturalists, like Will Kymlicka, will often will Kymlicka, Will like Multiculturalists, 8 9 It is also common for integrationist to argue 5 Of course many countries can many Of countries course 2 Centripetalists, like Donald like Centripetalists, 4 Territorial pluralism Territorial CEU eTD Collection debate debate in conflict regulation, 41-88 (2008). 85 13 in Democracy and Power (1979). 12 11 10 institutions ought tobebased. such onthe standardsonwhich most agree but can achievethis, that institutional the devises interests of all citizens.own Deliberative personal theories from their todistance themselves require representatives elected that measures of power-sharing differ or amongstgroup themselves interestsequal for common the regards good. on the exacthave who individuals between naturearguments well-reasoned through consensus to lead andofwhich making adopt laws,systems, deliberative theoristspolicies argue that what animates democracy are the processes electoral through interests of aggregation the on of models center democratic decisionother most Whereas and integrationists. or institutionsaccommodationists either than reasoning normative of paradigm different that promote the on andon demographic historical contexts. inferior its alternatives. or to superior empirical yield reasoning will alone is afirm whether theory one of necessarily conclusion or democracy normative neither that view who scholars with aligned cautiously more am I particular outcomes. lead to will actions certain policy that weexpect because arise will claims empirical values, and democratic between choose competing to an inclination of out will arise claim of consistency with democratic values? In response to this questions, normative claims John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary & Richard Simeon, Integration or accommodation? The enduring The accommodation? or Integration Simeon, Richard & O’Leary Brendan McGarry, John Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (1991). p. 156. See also, Brian Barry, Is Democracy Special?, See generally: Frank Cunningham, Theories ofDemocracy: A Critical Introduction (2002) Amy Gutman &Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? ( 2004). p 3 Deliberative theories of democracy, which I will deal with in this paper, operate withinin with a thispaper,operate Deliberative Iwilldeal of democracy, theories which All rival conceptions of democracy have some empirical and normative merit depending meritnormative and have some empirical of democracy All conceptions rival makeastronger theorists ordeliberative accommodationist, integrationist, Can either 11 12 10 In the context of divided societies this translates into translates this societies divided of context the In 13 Thisis because high-level democracy will theories of Page 5 CEU eTD Collection better functioningbetter institutions.Arend Lijphart both and Ever since Donaldproposed Horowitz keep in good mindto argumentsdesign can is help empirical that normativeand when to aim the argument. empirical or normative a single to adherence strict than rather process, analytical well-designed demonstrates how creative solutions tailored to a unique set of problems can be found through a 17 16 15 14 approach). lines (anintegrative group across alliances formation political of promote the measures to with approach) (anaccommodationist group ethnic traditional Fiji’s for parliament in representation of level minimum a guarantee to measures combined constitution that adopted for arecently recommendations of a set and produced period year integrationist devices. integrationist accommodationistbuildingboth and thatendedupadopting to reforms approach constitutional analytical an took designers institutional that find we example, an as Fiji multiethnic take we irreconcilable, institutional designs can incorporate aspects of multiple theories of democracy. If as historical and regional contexts allowfor some exceptions to occur. long feel not as guilty, need another theory over normative toone give who preference designers level. operating atthe convergeparticulars eventually on having accurate representation of preferences within government. voter representation of having accurate or bylegislators representation self-interested as values,such rejecting on certain democratic from uniting prevent theories need not representation democratic of theory of merits a particular Id. Timothy Sisk, PowerSharing, Beyond Intractability (2003) Id. Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small ( 2007). 13 Conversely, while moderation is an important principle for institutional design, it is also it design, institutional for principle important isan moderation while Conversely, So, whereas much of the literature treats competing theories of democracy as democracy of theories competing treats literature the of whereas much So, 16 In 1997, a group of of In examined analysts1997, agroup system Fiji’s political over afour Page 6 14 Moreover, skepticismthe Moreover, about 15 Therefor, institutional Therefor, 17 This example This CEU eTD Collection sharing institutions. long standingdebates withinliterature regarding power-sharing the effectiveness power- of based. My main aim here is todiscuss these new advancements in hope of clarifying some of the wereoriginally power-sharing arrangements upon those which basicassumptions the regarding a revitalization doubts of haveledto constitutionalism. developments These to approaches comparative as well as democracy deliberative of theories normative the both to advancements many havethere twenty years ago, been models over their power-sharing ground-breaking Page 7 CEU eTD Collection interests in interests public sphere.the and private own their advance to citizens allow should institutions political basis that on and interests, andjudge arethebestindividuals of good holds own their that autonomy, equation.the Personal basis. (or an autocratic regime) to impose their own view of what is good for others and govern an equalsayin on it mightbe theprocess Inother words, of governing. individual possiblefor an that treat all citizens as intrinsically equal, this does not necessarily mean that all citizens would have right. own her or based thenotion humanon beingindependent each that moral has valuablestanding andisin his rather they must operate side-by-side throughout the political process. political the throughout side-by-side operate must they rather however, he says, is sufficient by itself to ensure the promise of democratic governance, but 22 21 20 19 18 on two fundamental values, namely: ANDEQUALITY AUTONOMY A. PERSONAL INTRINSIC II. NORMS VALUESAND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATIVE Id. Supra note 19 at 45 Supra note 19 at 43 Ian O’Flynn, Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies ( 2006). 45 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics ( 1989). 21 Therefore, personal autonomy, as a second fundamental value is necessary to complete Robert Dahl has argued that any adequate defense of democracy will inevitably fall back inevitably defensewill of democracy Dahl has arguedadequate any Robert that 20 Yet, while intrinsic equality supports the view that governmentmust aspire to 22 intrinsicequality Page 8 and personal autonomy 19 Intrinsic equality is equality Intrinsic . 18 Neither, CEU eTD Collection Law and Democracy Technology ( William Rehg tran., 2 ed. 1996). 25 24 23 the needto samethe recognizes time at but majorities, hyper-active citizensprotect from to their subgroup identities or autonomy. withgroups having acommonrelinquishvalues can arrive divergent at civic identity, to without wherebydevelop aprocess theory to deliberation.of Habermasdiscourse usesaspects through of toaproceduralsociety recourse framework for buildingconsensus amongst themselves sectors highly divergent would give that expound of democracy alternative theories on to others accommodation. group and/or common some and rights,civic endingcivilstrife identity without degree autonomy,group of a in establishing trust build to is difficult it cases, such In communities. between conflict democracy lessare in thereis societies appealing violence,where repression, or historical liberal Forthis group-rights. approach than of do reason,both theories and republican they individual based rights higher emphasis an on place both of Moreover, approaches these republicanism, based places emphasis on political nationalsolidarity identity. on a singular concern forindividual liberty and equal pursueindividualability to interests, whereas of democracy. competing conceptions number of ways, indeterminate canbe inan this becore it realized saidthat can also of democracy, ‘moral core’ and as such, different interpretations of these values have lead to many See generally Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Theory Discourse a to Contributions Norms: and Facts Between Habermas, Jurgen generally See Supra note 19 at 54 Supra note 19 at 48 However, while valuesintrinsic the of equality personal and may autonomy the constitute Ian O’Flynn has argued that, like liberalism, deliberative democracy recognizes the need like democracy recognizes deliberative has arguedthat, Ian liberalism, O’Flynn These difficult realities in divided societies have led scholars, like Jurgen Habermas and 25 23 Liberal theories of democracy, for example, give greater give for example, democracy, of Liberal theories Page 9 24 CEU eTD Collection Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics ( 1997). 67 - 91 30 29 28 27 26 time’. over institutions, from those away or towards institutions, instance,choice in guide of later, of and, first institutions the power-sharing the progress those deeply standards to applied societies, can‘inform of divided democracy,deliberative when the two these is that argument His publicity’. of ‘requirement is the second the and reciprocity’ for balancingintrinsic equality and personal autonomy. decisionsbe. ought to of like content look the ought what to and ofthestate character whatthecivic decide on clarify procedural conditions underthose which citizens in and divided societies deliberate can ‘middle ground’. agreeable a mutually at negotiating andarriving for procedural process a emphasizes deliberative democracy character vision of that asubstantive than providing of rather civicsociety, the but about importance deliberation of character the recognizes public interests. competing group accommodate manage and resolve ethnic conflict. The lack of clearly defined institutional measures that institutional The lackofclearly defined conflict. manage ethnic resolve and expound a need for to comparative future on studies mechanisms to numberthe of deliberative emphasis he also power-sharing, centripetal and power-sharing consociational both of reforms on often happen under asubstantive conception civicof identity. ascan of state, from functions the inhibitcommunity subsuming that a dominant are adopted the transgress values equality intrinsic of and personal as longautonomy as standards procedural solidarity need isand accommodation logic not approach behinda subgroup that deliberative Supra note 19 at 4; Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Deliberative Supra note 19 at 77 Supra note 19 at 72 Id. Supra note 19 at 55 O’Flynn, argues that a deliberative theory of democracy presents two principlemethods two presents democracy of theory a deliberative that O’Flynn, argues 26 Page 10 Andlike democracy republicanism, deliberative 29 The first is the ‘requirement of 30 28 However, whilehe elaborates However, Therefore, it is necessary to 27 The CEU eTD Collection 33 32 31 overgroups individualsothers. or certain arbitrarily privilege individualsto proposals may find or not mutually all that groups because they agreeable do reciprocity 1. The requirement of FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN B. DELIBERATIVEREQUIREMENTS to deliberativeapproach in democracy societies. divided advancingmajora comprehensive deliberativeto a conform obstacle therefore, is,to principles mechanisms that, to the extent possible, discourage tit-for-tat threats between powerful players powerful between threats tit-for-tat discourage possible, extent the to that, mechanisms of process alsoforinstitutions reasoningandof public discussion. establishment calls the It and through strength the Thisof allargument. implies that majora political undergo disagreements sanctions wherebutrather onopposingsides,resolve all sides attempt to disagreements political impose by to not threatening achieve ends to attempt wherein decision-makers are those identity andaid andthat in creating goods. shareable national sense forcommon of astronger basis principles the provide andvaluesthat order makers to deliberateunderlying values, often willentail this a decision making thatallows process for decision their way past their perspectives. political competing first order interests,are capable of narrowing conflictresolution mustitthat strategies gapbetween the encourage towards more amenable second Supra note 19 at 85 Id. Supra note 19 at 79 In the most basic sense, reciprocity is a characteristic of measures or institutions that lead that institutions or measures of is acharacteristic sense,reciprocity most basic In the 32 Because interests can be grounded in very can be different invery Because interests grounded Page 11 33 In another sense, reciprocal institutions reciprocal sense, another In 31 For a measurequalify a For to as such, CEU eTD Collection 36 35 34 of reasoning and isdiscussion subjectnot tofull public knowledge then itmightreasonably be process. thepolitical within representatives fairforfor toseethat all reachedby all decisions is legislation citizens or reasoning applied by deliberative democracy. Measures that fulfill the requirement of publicity are those that allow afforded afairhearing. been have and opinions interests their toseethat people ordinary enable that under conditions is valuefor aneedeffect occur reciprocal tothe to of still deliberation there personal autonomy, give to Inorder is political how arejustified. concerned only with proposals because reciprocity publicity 2. The requirement of identity isthat based onmutual understanding. moral independent standing. They helpalso advance astronger sense national of common in togive the basicexisthave individuals democratic order thatall to idea expression who wish to shape public debate in their own interests. In summary, reciprocity requirements in order for it to be forin itmust consideredto or just, order right of passthe test scrutiny.public This is inline with Kant’s ‘transcendental formula of public law’ which provides any that policy, all. of interests general the with coincide officials of self-interest the that insuring of means a as gridlock between mayelites. More warring point,to the we think requirementthe of of publicity intrust democratic institutions to thatarestruggling transition from foreign anddependence in building alsoaids It tocorruption. barrier asapreventative itacts because than politicians Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in Kant: Political Writings. 126 Id.; See also Robert Goodin, Motivating Political Morality ( 1992). 131 Supranote 100 19 at The requirement of reciprocity, however, only partially completes the equation. This is 34 This then leads intoa discussion of the publicity requirement advanced 35 Page 12 Publicity works to the advantage of rather citizens of advantage the to works Publicity 36 If the process CEU eTD Collection reforms in divided societies. Without political and social buy-in it is not likely that elites, parties, elites, that likely not is it buy-in social and political Without societies. in divided reforms bemight institutionalized. deliberation as a standard of ‘good practice’, it is an entirely different question to ask how they or may not be fully realized when implemented. when be may realized fully not or policybesoundness will not and outcomes deliberative of self-evident makers propriety to either deliberative idealscanbe words, achieved.In sufficient withoutother procedural safeguards, the which be inhibits to factstandards extent ininstitutional This the can applied greatly terms. reciprocity areinstructive, much tobeclarified and thereisstill publicity howthese about Citizenship in Diverse Societies ( Will Kymlicka &W. Norman eds., 2000). 138 39 38 37 making policy. public operationalized when drafting devising constitutions, in conciliatory mechanisms,political and SOCIETIES INDIVIDED DELIBERATION C. INSTITUTIONALIZING deficientmanner. outcomes of political processes are subjected to the suspicion that they may have come about in a that so standard, operative bethe should legitimacy procedural Therefore, negotiation. insulated is still necessary that publicly justifiable reasons be givenfor those decision which may require intereststhe of population.the Notall willreal-world contexts benefitfrom public it scrutiny, but of subset insufficient but an rather good collective expressthe doesnot policy the assumed that Melissa Williams, The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy, in Supra note 19 at 22 Supra note 19 at106 Understandably, there are many doubts regarding the willingness to adopt deliberative adopt regardingthe willingness to many doubts are Understandably, there The two principles of reciprocity and publicity, provide a set of criteria that can be of that criteria provide aset principlesand publicity, of reciprocity The two 37 38 However, it may also be mentioned that while the two principles of principles two the while that mentioned be also may it However, Page 13 39 So, while it is possible to recommend to is possible it while So, CEU eTD Collection taming the unacceptable uses of uses of coercion. unacceptable taming the following the for insight provide will distinctions namely roleof‘coercion’the and ‘deliberation’ within making. democratic decision These of power-sharing, aspect theoretical critical another and towards my argumentfocus of shift the SOCIETIES D. MANAGING DIVIDED POWER IN COERCIVE many of problemsthe with associated consociational power-sharing. avoid models that design power-sharing may theorists helpdeliberative that constitutional design to approach a different at look I section following the In occur. can reforms substantial before first reach a consensus institutional on kindsthe of deliberativepromote designs that outcomes, deliberative reforms may be instituted, rather, my argumentis institutional that mustdesigners maybe reforms anon-starter. of national as well level,deliberative atthe civil society as level the at Therefore, level. elite the beyond competition political significant allow to designed part, for themost not however,are Consociational governments, within process. political the are generally predicated on softening or eliminating an emphasis efforts on These ethno-centricsociety. within behaviornorms deliberative for momentum building in role substantial more institutions,but persay,rather anappeal for civil society and/or outside influences play a to will voters or behindan But thisisagainst deliberative agenda.rally adeliberative not argument Having dealtwith some of principles basic the behind deliberative democracy, to Iwish how through whatprocess or to adequately ananswer provide Icannot In this paper Page 14 chapter which for insightprovides additional CEU eTD Collection 43 42 41 40 fashion”. ina induceson preferences non-coercive reflection that “communication is free from that coercion’. communication through arrived convictions form common who those can among only power arise put anend civil apeaceagreement. for conflictandendorse their to support grantwarring isitfor coercive groups to that provides incentive to necessary powers parties, to imbalances in the ethnic status quo. Another, reason advocates of consociationalism see it as ameansgroups of negotiating them with providing political redress tools thatenableto them ethnic to powers coercive provide power-sharing of consociational Advocates coercion. state of powers imbalance entrenched redress that through have to beenthat systematically oppressed procedural ideal which of equal political groups make powerbetween then it forpossible those aremutually that tolerable. levels to it reducing only rather, but coercion, eradicating entirely of way reasonable no is there protection of their interests. equal secure the to coercion form of tosome need resort generally actors severe conflict, arein of in members in their which the interests are a situation whenever democracies view that itself.” outcome andthe setof actors or actor an of interests the between relation causal potential or actual “the definition following the Iuse “coercion” “power” and By groups. sectarian and/or political elites coercion) (or to power John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations ( 2000). Samantha p. 76. Besson & Jose Luis Marti, Deliberative Democracy and its discontents ( 2006). p. 118 Supra note 40 at 57. Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting Power,1 Constellations 53-73(1994). 55. Power-sharing governments, are characterized by institutions which grant significant grant by institutions which arecharacterized governments, Power-sharing Deliberative theories of democracy, however, promote the “idealist” view that ‘legitimate that view “idealist” the promote however, democracy, of theories Deliberative In consociational institutionssuperimpose democracies,power-sharing aredesigned a to 41 Hence, while many forms of democratic coercion intolerable, are coercion Hence, manyforms of while democratic 40 This is partially justified by the “realist” (or empirical) (or “realist” the by justified partially is This 42 Page Deliberation might sense be definedinabroad as Deliberation 15 43 However, CEU eTD Collection 45 44 laden society. in is of possible conceptions aconflict what narrow should not attempt to institutional designers derivethrough legitimate power democratic deliberation, isit desirable to implement a procedural ifalways achievable and even not were,theoutcomes would certainly beideal.Hence, while the theory of deliberation, are mixed,it interests conflicting can be always thatdeliberative is argued democracy not that leads to post-conflictwill likely have partially influence.only and societies for Thus, where common implausibly websites, etc.) within every society, thus, state policies to promote deliberation (e.g.churches, social networking clubs,numbercan spaces‘ associations, cafes, of ‘deliberative be costly and infinite an arevirtually fact there tothe that inowed is part This define inpractice. to difficult deliberativethe situation by described Jurgen Habermas, representsapolitical thathasideal been Lebanon, India, Belgium, Switzerland, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe Ethiopia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, Switzerland, Belgium, India, Lebanon, formsVarious of model consociational the havebeen in likeused countries Bosnia-Herzegovina, incentives model) whichas the majoritarian- to referred (sometimes model the centripetal ashas many countries, is commonlyin used widely been has Lijphart, Arend of works the with associated associated commonly most model, with Donald Horowitzexamination mostwithout models. commonly used power-sharing consociational The two the of and Benjamin Reilly. TRADITIONAL OF III. WITH FORMS POWER-SHARING PROBLEMS situations. ideal than less with these precautions a deliberative theory of democracy can at least serve as a guidepost for dealing Id. Supra note 42 at 86 Any serious attempt to analyze power-sharing in divided societies would not be complete 45 Page 16 44 Nevertheless, in spite of CEU eTD Collection variety of different institutional forms, that can include supplemental institutional rules and procedures. and rules institutional supplemental include can that forms, institutional of different variety 46 proportional for within segmental representation groups parliament. asharedis power, veto that safeguarded through political bargaining and processes executive, level are meantconstituent to begroups weighed in thethen former serve peace againstas a meansagreement. of National replenishingelections thestate. within for aformula shared-power negotiate society, fragmented Lawthe making wishes elitesdecisions at the taken sharingnationalof ateach the levelnational segmentalwho areestablishes partial At its consociational core, between power- ethnic elites. involving bargaining circumstances to one of communitythe a for dividedcartel societies. Lijphart views the consociationalthrough model as the best-fit for post-conflictof elites a who, after agreeingA. POWER-SHARING CONSOCIATIONAL to lay down arms and stabilizesocieties. a most salient criticisms comprehensivethat are relevant analysis to the discussion This is choice ethnic meansfor section of management and byno the of a conflict. resolution of the two models, of deliberative but rather amore appropriate whetherof over constitutes twomodels these debate theongoing concerning democracyis an attempt in divided to summarize havebeen literature ofproduced amounts Enormous academic New Guinea,others. Estonia, and some of the and have Themodel Fiji, like in many centripetal Australia, been Papua others. used countries deal deal grandcoalition mutual the regarding concerns with and the veto. The four-pronged consociational framework has evolved over time and in practice there are a wide Consociational power-sharing represents the dominant model of democratic government democratic model of thedominant represents Consociational power-sharing Page 17 46 In this thesis I will only CEU eTD Collection alternative avenuesof expression whichpolitical intereststhrough cross-cutting and experiences of kinds for the space is insufficient still there groups, segmental of interests expressed the due to First, bemay whileforaccountability some tworeasons. degreeof there reciprocity and publicity of requirements the satisfy not do largely arrangements these that are democracy for negative engagement asmuch as itis for providing protection for ethnic groups. canbe atool much therefore as prolonged It institutional leadparalysis. because to itoften can significantgroups. elites prevents the possibilityautonomy. The mutual veto is also avery powerful tool that when put in the hands of contentious that major reducetheir toeliminate or anyattempts toblock which groups veto’, enables ‘minority decisions will be taken without full agreementhappen tocoincide with such groups. of all ifmultiple or they parties distinctive broad groups ethnic inclusion the butof rather formula a strict to adherence necessarily isnot coalition grand of consociational feature the meaningful 49 48 47 where appropriate. For the sake of presenting a basic overview I will deal primarily with the main features and add context top officeholders. “grand andother coalition”) (sequential alternating presidencies or comprisedmulti-ethnic of informal groups the form may an committee of advisory take also broadly butmultiparty isrepresentative, coalition cabinet, limitedsuch not arrangements. It to positions. hold in society segment) (or in majorexecutive) ethnic orfrom group power-sharingelites which each (or cabinet coalition’ Supra note 47 at 49 Id. Arend Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy ( 2008).45 In regards toconsociational main the power-sharing, advancedconcerns by deliberative The second distinguishing feature of a consociational democracy is the‘mutual’ or The first and most significant institutional feature of consociationalism is the ‘grand the is consociationalism of feature institutional significant most and first The 49 Subsequently, it has been the source of much contention andstalemate contention much of source ithas been the Subsequently, 48 A consociational grand coalition can take the form of a Page 18 47 The CEU eTD Collection B. CENTRIPETAL POWER-SHARING B. CENTRIPETAL conflict. ethnic exacerbating thereby ways, cross-cutting than ways rather inself-interested power use that to way most appropriate especially managing of ethnic conflict, when ethnic likely more elites are is the elites ethnic around power centering why explain to fail generally claims empirical these agreement, of outset a peace atthe table bargaining the are sitting at who for elites option ethnic more attractive area consociational governments fact that apart from the But accountable. other each hold to power that use to attempt will they power of share equal relatively a have elites because claim They that also succeeded. have coalitions grand where Switzerland countrieslike referencein instances other also “cross-cutting”. Consociationlists neutral or be claiming and because theirfavor any of theyareskeptical group groups, alsoto segmental notpredominately does that formation of a adoptgovernment to unlikely elites are basisthat the identity. national a common of can form basis the that shareable goods of kinds onthe compromise 51 50 accept. insociety can everyone reasonably that in terms justified are decisions that assurance of lack is a there in government, those of check behavior the to parties for opposition little space exists factthat of the byvirtue Secondly, actors. state of responsibility thecollective inhibits generally and this can beexpressed, Id. Supra note 19 at156 - 161 In their defense, consociationalist may object to these kinds of normative concerns, on Page 51 In both cases, there is little potential to reach 19 50 CEU eTD Collection 53 (2004). p. 11 52 extremes’. than the rather centre moderate the at competition Reilly definesmaximize federal cooperation. inter-group aim arrangements that for incentive to Benjamin the centripetal approach as ‘a political system or strategy designed to focus have an incentive to come together to bargain and negotiate in the search for cross-partisan and cross-partisan for search the in negotiate and bargain to together come to incentive an have bargaining. Reilly defines theseas arenas from ‘under which political actors groups different policies. compromising adopt preferencesfor to ethnic then lower-order parties areavaluable tool mean group, that this will ethnic own their within members extreme to votes losing of chances the outweighs transfers vote Morespecifically,if on candidatesseats of increasedchance from groups. winning opposingthe moderate preferences to lower-order to transfer voters encourage will such rankings is that assumption underlying in The of ballot their on the preferences. order to rank candidates voters allow (AV), becausethey vote thealternative (STV) or vote transferable single like the systems voting preferential of favor in argue therefore Centripetalists own. their than other groups adoption system campaigning requires attractan fromvotes of electoral that politicians toethnic cooperation. the main cross-ethnic aretherefor of institutions engineering sources andrepresentative Parties, elections of groups. interests rival the accommodate to constituents focusthat on depoliticizing institutional ethnicity through incentives for politicians and their managedevices through conflict seekto Centripetal proposals multi-ethnic parties. andpolitical multi-ethnic 3)centrist for aggregative, incentives,bargaining, and 2) areas electoral doing so:1) Id. at 11 Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management The centripetal approach to power-sharing centers on a collectivity of electoral and electoral of a collectivity on centers power-sharing to approach The centripetal The second feature of centripetalism involves the creation of voluntary of arenas voluntary of creation the involves of feature centripetalism The second The first and most heavily emphasized component of the centripetal model is the model centripetal the of component emphasized heavily most and first The 53 Page 20 52 He cites three main devices for CEU eTD Collection 54 reveals several key flaws with this approach. First, itis unlikely that AV would ever be agreed to to develop moderate platforms aimway good Its reciprocity. incentivesof encourage partiesencouraging is useelectoral to to by appealing to a wider audience. consensusHowever, on state policy. a deeper analysis majoritarian and cooperation tomulti-ethnic leads formation diverse their because arrangement that such coalitions should be the essential component of any successful power-sharing for a greater range of moderate policy options for voters to choose from. Horowitz has argued intra-party of ‘middle moderate’ exchange andparties into candidates political alliances provides negotiating lower-order vote transfers, preference exchanges, and policy platforms. In theory, the by pre-electoral level atthe multi-ethnic areorganized AsReilly coalitions features. explains, two first the of implementation successful on the model. They are predicated centripetal the It also entails a risk of zero-sum outcomes if groups refuse to compromise. bargainingadvocating dividedsocieties many barriers stemsfrom within communication. the to of weaknesses the that concedehowever Centrepetalists negotiation. inter-party of practice normalize rather areintended a self-enforced but to conflicts collective ongoing resolving allocation. Suchforums ofbargaining, sois or it argued,arenotintended much so ameansas of as thenumber and tobepresentedonballots issueslike of preferences negotiable resource such matters electoral basis technical over on a voluntary occurs bargaining generally of process The conditions. social aswell as favorable rules electoral preferential engineered successfully existencethe of both predicated on arenasaretherefore Bargaining issues’. substantial cross-ethnicvote-pooling deals, negotiations which may then lead on discussionto of other more See: Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict ( 1985). Atinspection, first the centripetal model’s incentives-based mayapproach seem like a isfeature of the third platforms, inter-ethnic political aggregated consisting of Coalitions 54 Page 21 CEU eTD Collection 57 56 (2004). p. 30 55 conflict, is simply a means of advancing strategic interests rather than common civil interests. inter-ethnicthe bargaining whichisintended tobe necessary momentum the end to ethnic advance of group. ethnic rather to interests own their but the good, common toadvancethe not is the aim generally groups, ethnic from another candidates moderate willethnic almost always group win. some particular represent to seeking in acandidate end and the single-member constituency, ina operating AVbased This amajority is threshold isbecause on shareof vote. largest the the undermineto their electoral support’. by hardline ethnic parties entering a constitutional settlement if they believed it would belikely Id. Supra note 19 at155 Engagements Consociational Conflict: Ireland Northern The O’Leary, &Brendon McGarry John 55 56 Second, in a divided society, ethnic parties still likely win likely still parties ethnic society, in adivided Second, Lastly, even if lower-order preferences are transferred to preferences aretransferred if lower-order Lastly, even Page 22 57 Therefore, in final analysis, in final Therefore, CEU eTD Collection 59 58 enough forestall, produce, to influence or an law.of enactment significant are they when particularly powers, winners’ of elements contain also might powers losers’ namely that practical avery dimension, important overlook theseassumptions However, coerce. to legislate and to power the are powers winners’ while forestall, block and that those tobe influence. arecommonly Inasimilarvain, losers’ thought possess powers only procedural winning party coalition or controls all substantial andof losingpowers government where parties this form balancetobestruck thereby of adeliberative-friendly power-sharing. creating for allows requirements, deliberative in with accordance and if successfully section, engineered in this I describe Themechanisms minorities. legislative of disfavored repression sanctioned officially from permitting theirlaws enforcement or enacted democratically preventing hand,other model centripetal mechanisms the anylacks for substantial counter-majoritarian the On interests. competing their to hostage process political the hold to able are who players veto many too are there because efficiently function cannot government model, consociational dominate power-sharing models fail resolve thisto in an tension adequate way. In the two The minorities. and majorities between power coercive of distribution tolerable mutually a finding of issue an largely is dilemma this Solving constraints. constitutional majoritarian IV. GOVERNMENTINOPPOSITIONRULES winners’ powers, and likewise losing coalitions are not always losers’ not solely powers. are coalitions andlikewiselosing granted winners’ powers, point, is that in many democratic regimes, winning coalitions are not necessarily always given all Id. David GovernmentFontana, in Opposition, 119The Yale Law Journal 548-623(2009). 557 It is common to think of majority rule as a ‘winner-takes-all’ endeavor, where a singular a where endeavor, ‘winner-takes-all’ a as rule majority of think to is common It will counter- and legislative majoritarian the between is tension There a well-known Page 23 59 More importantly, and to the to and importantly, More 58 CEU eTD Collection Journal of Political Philosophy 74-98 (2005). 63 62 61 60 more is winning that through elections. ever assumepower should they experienced and responsible opposition an be will result the policy, national of execution and development (minimumlosingexcessive) asubstantialnot opposition winning) parties inthe (but role as a majority are what David Fontana has referred to as ‘government in opposition’ rules. winning losing and coalitions. stable fragileand alike,will likely entail a continuum of affordedboth winning powers to itdemocraticmostto say wouldaccurate more be regimes, that speaking,Structurally therefore, far more extensive in number and less drastic in scope than the ones presented in the presented ones the than in scope drastic less and in number extensive more far are rules governance minority that out point to critical is it veto, minority the and coalition grand true Lijphart’sthat model basedis ona grouping ofminority particular likegovernance rules, the within by approach hisundertaken Lijphart is whileit model However, of consociationalism. control to thedetriment groups. other of much from that control and using politicaltoo successful gainingvery movement ethnic oriented most in societies,how canconstitutional problematic namely, divided questions design prevent a participate more to minorities enable that powers of effectively thesorts understand usto allow they because societies in a democracy. In turn, they also degree of andpublic discourse raising legitimacy making. therefore majoritarian the decision of allow us to resolvethe byincreasing force accountability government upon to minorities have power means thatthe one of the Seegenerally Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 The Supra note 58 at556 Supra note 58 at548 Supra note 58 at556 Government in opposition rules are based primarily on the assumption that by awarding by that assumption the on primarily based are rules in opposition Government At first glance, one may see a resemblance between government in the and opposition government between may see aresemblance glance,firstAt one in todeliberative Government opposition individed are important power-sharing rules 60 The study of these kinds of powers that enableminority a actto Page 24 62 61 It also 63 CEU eTD Collection party with more than 20 seats would be entitled to representation cabinet. the within representation would beentitled to more20seats party than with then guaranteed to have a member of the party appointed as Executive Deputy President, and any constitution, if a political party received at least eighty seats in the National Assembly, they were interim the In apartheid. of out transition the smooth to rules in opposition government used which Africa South of constitution interim former the is case illustrative Another agency. executive any of information compel to Operations Government on Committee House sevenmembersempowers in of the usedtheUnitedStates Rule” so-called “SevenMember the p 5 in Divided Societies, the Government in Opposition Approach, (2010)unpublished course onpaper, file. 66 65 Law Review 2311 - 2385(2006). 64 body. fashion by nonpartisan a drawninanonpartisan districts as well electoral parties; opposition its branch preventor whose captureautonomy byeitherwould government governmentof chaircommittee positions; as settingwell as upanindependentbureaucratic administrative or allowing periods,in a setting, minorities daysrole agenda andquestion opposition and standing compromisinginstitutionalincludewithout governmentefficiency.They suggest that designs governance principles can be applied so as toprevent the excessive concentration of power governmentin opposition rules can also benon-constructive if applied in arbitrary ways. means of eliminating thanas legislativeaccountable, andholdingmeans will of a rather restraining the government consociational majority model.rule It allis better together. to think of governmentHowever, in oppositionit should rules not as a bemoderate forgotten that South African Interim Constitution. 1993,Section 84.; See also: Simon Cooke, “Constitutional design Supra note 58 at569 See generally: David J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harvard 64 Government in opposition rules have been used in a number of countries. For example, For countries. of number a in used been have rules in opposition Government DavidLevinson and RichardPildes anumber have presented of minority ways that Page 25 66 Both of 65 CEU eTD Collection Deciding,1745 Standford Law review (2005). Powers, 119Harvard Law Review 2311 -2385(2006). See also: HeatherGerken, Dissenting by Institutional Design Democracy: of Writ Small Mechanisms ( 2007). See Vermeule, also: David Adrian J. Levinson also: See & Richard(2005).; H. Pildes, 74-98 Separation Philosophy of Parties,Political Not 67 minority rules: of variouskinds governance the achieve the aimsethnic of conciliation and power-sharing. Thefollowing illustrates some list of to adopt might societies fragmented that mechanisms institutional of kinds the of examples divided societies. several scholarly andworks allareworth considering as potential fordevices power-sharingin OF IN OPPOSITION RULES A.GOVERNMENT TYPES benefits. empirical and normative when speakingisminority of itgovernance important rules, torecognize theirstand alone Therefore, groupings. informal than other ‘effective’ more necessarily not are rules of opposition government rule making. Moreover, it should also be pointed out that consociational groupings sharingbeneed not onlymeansthe of minoritiesgiving an ability enforce to or influence power- centripetal or consociational be that reasoned to stands It therefore affect. significant with often and ways, of number wide inordinately an in used be can that rules, opposition South Africa, the opposition might even be able to exercise some discretionary ‘winner’ powers. mentionedin of andin it case those exercises, that the forpowers thediscretionary accountable typesforholdthese ofminority rules minority allow to executive parties governance the See: Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 The Journal of Journal The 13 Majorities, upon Accountability Forcing Rules: Submajority Vermeule, Adrian See: There are a wide variety of minority governance rules that have been elaborated on by on elaborated been have that rules governance minority of variety wide a are There minority of variety infactawide are there that demonstrate These fewexamples, 67 If meaningful distinctions are to be made, it is necessary to provide a few Page 26 CEU eTD Collection challenges to federal statutes legislation. or statutes federal to challenges initiate statutes; of constitutionality challenge to standing automatic proceedings; obtain court operations of courts at the national or subnational levels; compel certain information control staff); and judicial key resources other or in Judges as (such judiciary the to appointments legislation. inof part take implementation ability to administrative or discretionary powers; the ability to decide or appointministerial positions, or in mutli-party coalitions;executives positions within advisory councils with special voting requirements. voting days for questioningdefeat the executive; motions; or overrule ormake use supermajority of control all or some of the subcommittees; discussions or within legislativeor operations debates, forcehearings, parliament hearings; ofsubcommittee force parliament committees; temporary or standing chair subcommittees; or parliament or subcommittees; make use to: force disclosure information of on executive agencies;make use of special privileges within of designated In reference to the Concerning the Within the Within Legislature executive judiciary , government in, government rulesopposition mightgive minorities the power , government in opposition rules might include: representation include: might rules in opposition government , , submajorities may have an ability to: Make or nominate, Page 27 CEU eTD Collection 68 identity. civic common achieve a to lacks butlargely consensus ofpeace some andhasestablished elections degree reconciliation. of process inacollaborative engage governance and policy-making inBiHhasdrifted into situation astalemate governmentfrom operating effectively. Asaresult of having found little common ground, coercive like tactics ‘political blackmail’inhibiting endup that and public trust, preventing the platformsmoderate encourages model current little toadopt butrather elites for incentive gives the In short, of Peoples. House and Presidency the to for election identities, ethnic three of the one to belong not do who individuals against discriminate laws election BiH’s that fact the also overbearing partial grand largelyinsulates coalition that politicians from is accountability. There process. making decision the derail to ability an elites two main objections have have that in tothemutual raised been regard veto which allows ethnic rules. opposition forblueprint highlighting the potentialstrengths and weaknesses using governmentin of useful asa willserve sketches these model.Nevertheless, power-sharing basis of a deliberative form afew might the rules inwhichminority governance ways of the only demonstrate partially from and are far Ipresentcomprehensive, The proposals (BiH). of context Bosnia-Herzegovina V. DELIBERATIVE-FRIENDLYPOWER-SHARING Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: An Exploration ( 1980). p. 24 Within BiH there is wide spread discontent with the current consociational model. The model. consociational current the with discontent spread is wide there BiH Within This presents a chapter number of ways for utilizing minority governance rules in the The failure to enact policy, due to prolonged disputes, has also led hasprolonged also to enactdue to disputes, policy,The failure to Page 28 The country goes through the motion of 68 The other problem has been an where parties fail to CEU eTD Collection major party or coalition within the legislature.each to these of wouldpowers and tiers lowest), distribute then influence beingthe procedural These bundles of powers mightwould for allow powers to be dividedtiers into (with law-makingbebeing the highest tier and thought of as governmentin opposition rules. of the seats in the legislature. The remaining or secondary blocs would consistmostly of significant portion of power would be given partiesto who are ablewin to majoritya or plurality a wherein blocs into level national the at powers governmental of number finite relatively A. THECORE: MULTIPLE LAYERS OF WINNING POWERS of reciprocity and publicity. more minority deliberate-friendly mechanismsbased protection governance requirements the on governmental layers and branches, and transforms existing the ethnic mechanismsprotection into level in wouldfor a waythat clearer between allow mechanisms decision-making of national atthe competencies for restructuring alternative onepotential represents below I present preventbottom-up for reforms citizen and in participation accountability Themodel government. in entities turn which segmentsor ethnic the three molded around are institutions governing in the factthat is rooted isbecause BiH’s model.disfunctionality This consociational current decide resorttoold to hostilities. ifa defunctand lead may peace agreement to parties publiceventually considerable discontent This distribution wouldof powers bein keeping with principlethe ofmajority rule, but dividing Ihaveinmindinvolves the that aspect power-sharing The core of deliberative the with problems underlying the solve not likely will reforms institutional scale Small Page 29 CEU eTD Collection 69 institutions. state of layers multiple in policy employment in representation alllegislation; over 4) proportional veto holds a peoples) House/council of (the chamber lower wherethe legislature in 3) Abicameral judiciary; the andrepresentation equal called cantons; 2) a tripartite presidency (partial grand coalition), entity voting within parliament, measures areensured following:the through 1)theterritorialization (entities)of ethnic groups ishowever,an not adequate solution problem.the to In system, currentthe ethnic protectionist agreement, peace Dayton the through facilitated been had that way in the sphere, political into the ethnicity arenecessary. Enshrining andsafety each group insurance of for ensuring the Safeguards fear the groups. nationalistother vulnerable of to madeparticularly its’ population B. ETHNIC PROTECTION MEASURES measuresprotection would be nextsection). established (see ethnic rather party based. However other but basednotbe blocs ethnic rules. Thesewould constitutional or statute by fixed alternatively, or election, the to prior coalitions and parties winning themultiple between be pre-negotiated bloc could either each within rules governance of minoritykinds different of mostly be composed would layers subsequent the and governments, incumbent governance by most possessed generally powers the bloc highest electoral would contain system. The rules (as well in gains electoral whichwouldthe on besome sphere, based kind proportional of representation as some substantiallayers of political influence, and would be relative to the share of support that a party or coalition powers). The kinds of minority See Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Annex V of Dayton Peace Agreement Peace Dayton V of Annex ofBosnia-Herzegovina, Constitution See BiH’s three and a half year war between the three major segments of its population has population its of segments major three the between war year a half and three BiH’s Page 30 69 CEU eTD Collection leaders, and international or regional experts who would present information on the matters information whothe on would present regional experts or andinternational leaders, anddelegates from community, party representatives each segmental society civil organizations, frame. within time a specified forCoP whereaninformal vote amendmentor re-submissionbe would taken sent backand wouldthe legislature) to besent (subjectof approval the the group to of each ethnic interests tothevital berelated indirectly may or directly that Alllaws groups. ethnic of all interests engage designed the to of legislationpublic inthediscussion to thevital national relevant Serbs,Croats, and intoan independentbe Others/National Minorities, would converted body instituted. For example, the current House/Council of Peoples (CoP) consisting of Bosniaks, nationalism and promoting a common sense of civic identity. ideological thereby basis of would the levelchallenge ethno- the that reasoning raising public of political processes ingovernment through opposition rules allowthat forpublic discussion, As wouldaccountability embededin mentioned previously,government. deliberation of be the protected through variousthe blocs who ensurehave of government ability public an to instability. political and social term institutions by partieskeeping and political tied ethnicplatforms to fears, thus promotinglong- state in discrimination reinforces also It biases. ethnic to according society civil and politics national groups. The resulthas been highly problematic and enables the distortion of democratic the current political system thereby enabling the resurrection of conflict amongst the three ethno- The problem with this is schemeitcurrent locks in that antagonisticnarratives ethnic into The CoP might also call for public deliberative forums with base of forumsa broad with alsocall might deliberative for public The CoP mechanisms are In terms there measures, beethnic couldother of direct which protection wouldmodel interests ethnic In I propose, beindirectly deliberativethe power-sharing Page 31 CEU eTD Collection exercising those powers. And one way to avoid a situation where there might be an inordinately be an might there where a situation avoid to way one And powers. those exercising foraccount thechangein blocsnumberparties those of political tothe within governance rules emerge in the coalitions that or upon dependent numberof the parties blocs power of numberwinning of outcome the make be to might parties, smaller of expense the at powers, of number large ofinordinately an an election. This wouldcase basis. also involve betweenand majorities of winningpowers andminoritiesredistribution acase-by- orderly on redistributinginvolvewould atactful scenarios,that such areways of avoiding there However, ethnic groups. between leadhostilities arelapse of old to might of society sectors of certain where exclusion the minoritysocieties, divided of context in the justifiable are fears These ways? immoderate or illiberal powers? whatIf so, would such preventfrom a party using itsin multiplied in advantages power substantial portion of the electoral vote. Would they be able to obtain multiple blocs of winning than amore coalition wins or aparty where letus imagineasituation Now, eachbranch. within by law ofinfluentialnegotiation,predefined or powers gradients each winning with descending Hypotheticallylet speaking, ussupposethat multiple blocs of havewinning powers been outcomes. electoral of varying aresult as change time over might rules governance C. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ELECTORAL legislation. of constitutionality the to review Court being discussed.Thedeliberations of CoP wouldthe alsobereviewedbytheConstitutional Fore example, one approach in avoiding a situation where one party or coalition obtains minority of distribution the how is attention needs that consideration, additional An Page 32 CEU eTD Collection tolerable way without sacrificingtolerable conflictefficiency;it waywithout government 2) would encourage following the 1)coercive of reasons: state powers wouldin be divided mutually a and agreeable vote. electoral the share of so thatopposition always of groups some have reasonable influence degree proportional to their sharing should operate on the assumption thatit is better to have a continuum of winning powers will should governmentinor same degreeInother havethe words, powers. of opposition power- notmean itall but does parties that considered, causes arereasonably ensure those that ability to win beis for their affordedshould ableto electedparty an they support causes, democratically NORMS D. DELIBERATIVE amend. winning blocsby predefined special wouldthat statutes, to votes require asupermajority of within powers of distribution the determine which laws the have to sense make might it addition, In legislature. within morethe powers) bloc winning seats (thereby number of agreater gaining merely prevent for sakelawsparties the from voters censure of enforced through deceiving to and pre-declared be formally need to necessity, of out also, would parties between Coalitions blocs would nothave simply the degreeof winning powers thethat main wouldhave.parties are there than parties of number any greater alternatively, or legislature, in the parties political (preferablylimits somenumber form of proportional places that of on representation) the large or small number of parties or coalitions, would be to institute an electoral system This way of This way of power-sharing would bein keeping with requirementthe of reciprocity for The basic assumptionbehind model is this ifof Ihave power-sharing a that proposed Page 33 CEU eTD Collection reciprocity reciprocity and publicity. of principles the to according power of optimization the on is placed concern greater way in this by and making.interests haveimpacton policy concerns a constitution designing Moreover, an between a majority’s abilitymultiple apportioning will there them parties, winning always besometo degreeof consistency to govern and the ability main of advantage is approach this by that creating multiple layersbundleswinning of and of opposition parties to ensure that their voting; force roll call and/or prolong discussion toforceor powers interestgeneral of all; law of 3) overall scrutiny public makingwouldfrom resultopposition would act as a barrier to corruption and insure that the self-interests of officials coincide with the information and provide made; for reasons each 2)governmentdecision in opposition rules opposition parties by minority governance rules thatforce the governing bloc to disclose sharing would provide thefollowing: 1)fairhearings for discussion of would be by provided players who wish to maintain face with the electorate. power-full between threats tit-for-tat reduce This also would executive action. or legislative each information disclosure would ensure that public reasoning and discussion would be requiredfor minority 5) it; vetoing than rather governance discussion prolong that rules governance minority the by be reduced rules that give number of 4) theabilityshareable goods; opposition of to sanctionany single group would opposing groups partiesnegotiated be to the increasing thereby thedivision powers of preferences of asaconsequence second-order have to would an parties of abilitypreferences order first 3) tominorities; the call and majority the for hearings or forceresolution by narrowing (but noteliminating) theinequality gap between possessedpowers by There are clearly gray areas in distributing powers of government in this way, but the In terms fulfillingof the requirementof in publicity, government opposition power- Page 34 CEU eTD Collection designed properly,violate principlethe ofmajority rule. toinfluencehave if wouldpowers substantial governmentrulenot, making,these powers would of population the segment significant Whileeach processes. a political to deliberation observations are highly innovative and haveconsiderable potential for bringing greater power-sharingto based on governmentin opposition Theserules. new normative and analytical favorusinganapproach may that democracy bydeliberative advanced arguments of normative kinds the of little exploration hasbeen there models, centripetal power-sharing or consociational CONCLUSION failthat towithstand test the mutual of forpublic reasonability and intrinsicrespect equality. enactpolicies and as illiberal to acts a buffer theirdemocrats powers ability between governing by regional party makeup,ethnic or policies. Regardless divided the distribution the of of the satisfaction of knowing they too will posses some governing powers if they win voters over obtain more popular supportwith moderate policies, butin meanthe time still ethnic groups have winning andhaving compete powers, for groups multiethnicthem, parties might be able to layers of between differentiating By communities. ethno-national between force as a moderating competition democratic thepossibility using is without of superimposed between ethnicgroups consociational status quo inBiHisthatundermodel a consociational a coequal approach The difference between the government in opposition approach and the current the and approach in opposition government the between difference The While much of the debate on post-conflict constitutional design has centered on either on centered has design constitutional post-conflict on debate the of much While Page 35 CEU eTD Collection merger of the aims of the consociational and the centripetal power-sharing models. Like models. power-sharing centripetal the and consociational the of aims the of merger design. poor of indicator issufficient a favor its in arguments normative strong lacks that system a democratic essence, In of well. as terms benefits in also normative but stability their of terms in just not assessed be should systems democratic inconsociational model somewhat hasproven However, successful endingprolonged conflicts. equality and personal autonomy. This may seem like harsha review given thefact that the alsobut intrinsic namely onlynot democracy, of democratic values, of standards deliberative the governmentis opposition, thedegree towhich consociational institutions areoutof sync with, societies. show promising potential for institutionalization the of standardsdeliberative in divided in publicity. but for rulesterritory areGovernment deliberative opposition uncharted theorists would beinstitutional that the requirements of and morereciprocity receptive to procedures, those identifying ofdemocracy towards theories deliberative needed within isattention Andliterature. establishinmind,with that goal focus to Ihavetried and thecasethat greater the within previously been discussed had not that ofdemocracy theories and deliberative inmy main establish wasmerely between a to opposition objective, connection rules government reasoning is necessary to give weight to the arguments I have presented in this thesis. However,opposition rules would seem to satisfy this requirement. More rigorous normative and empirical functionalities Atfirst state. of the power-sharingin glance, based arrangements on government meansis and ofpowers coercive is and what needed a moredistributing publicity,sophisticated So, it is quite reasonable to argue that in order to satisfy the requirements of of reciprocity therequirements satisfy in to order argue that to is reasonable itquite So, In many respects the government in opposition approach to power-sharing represents a represents power-sharing to approach in opposition government the respects many In The pertinentfindingisother that revealedbystudying deliberative norms and Page 36 CEU eTD Collection reasoned political deliberation on arebased. democracies political reasoned which on deliberative deliberation new ways economizingof and winning powers, in reach process, the middlethe fair of ground indesigners. If government opposition areusedjudiciously,rules theoristsmaydeliberative find why governmentin rules opposition should notbeinstitutional more taken amongst seriously few are in reasons there Therefore, closing, power. to come parties if immoderate overlooked may whofearinterests assuranceethnic their be groups that to greater gives parties, but way. Andlike centripetalism,in government favors multiethnic opposition parties over ethnic limited in a albeit maintained, is still rule majority of principle the consociationalism, unlike consociationalism, governmentin opposition divides powers so as to constrain majority rule, but Page 37 CEU eTD Collection (1994), Review 2311-2385 (2006). Jürgen Habermas, Jürgen Herzegovina (2009). (1998), Ronald Dworkin, John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations ( 2000). Analgesia Dryzek, John S. Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics ( 1989). 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