Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology 2016, Vol

Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology 2016, Vol. 42 (Special edition), 16–24 Article

Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China: e Role of the Estimated Attitude of Others and Pluralistic Ignorance

Kengo NAWATA*, LiHua HUANG*, and Hiroyuki YAMAGUCHI*

is study investigated whether Chinese anti-Japanese public attitudes involve conformity to perceived anti- Japanese social norms from the perspective of pluralistic ignorance. We surveyed attitudes toward Japan/China among Chinese/Japanese university students. e results revealed that Chinese participants perceived the attitudes of other Chinese toward Japan as more negative than their own private attitudes. In addition, publicly expressed Chinese attitudes are inuenced both by perceptions of others’ attitudes and private attitudes. In contrast, among Japanese participants, public attitudes were inuenced less by others’ estimated attitudes even though pluralistic ig- norance was seen in Japan as a self-other discrepancy eect. ese ndings suggest that the Chinese conform to anti-Japanese social norms based on exaggerated perceptions and thus do not express positive public attitudes about Japan in front of other Chinese.

key words: pluralistic ignorance, social norm, anti-Japanese sentiments, anti-Chinese sentiments, Japan–China relations

Japan and China are geographically close, and due Prentice, 1994) and conformity to an anti-Japanese to recent, profound cultural and economic exchang- social norm. es in the two countries, there is a need for mutual Psychological studies related to international rela- cooperation between them. However, Japanese atti- tions have demonstrated that individuals’ personali- tudes toward China, as well as Chinese attitudes to- ties or attitudes aect their behavior toward foreign ward Japan, have been negative (Genron NPO, 2015; countries or foreigners. Most psychological studies Nippon Research Center, 2007; Cabinet Oce of of Japan–China relations (Huang et al., 2015; Nawa- Japan, 2015). During World War II, Japan was a ta & Yamaguchi, 2012; Takemura et al., 2013) inves- perpetrator and China a victim, and this historical tigated relations among individuals’ variables. For distinction has caused strong tensions between these example, Nawata & Yamaguchi (2012) showed that countries. In addition, the recent territorial dispute nationalism facilitated support for intergroup ag- over the islands known in Japan as Senkaku and in gression in Japanese students through collective vic- China as Diaoyu has frayed the countries’ relation- timhood and intergroup anger. Although these stud- ships with each other. ies on internal processes are very important, studies erefore, it is necessary to understand the psy- on social inuence suggest that the attitudes of oth- chological processes by which these negative atti- ers signicantly impact and alter individual behav- tudes are formed and perpetuated. However, with a ior, even when individuals have no wish to behave in few exceptions (e.g., Huang, Nawata, Miyajima, & a particular manner. A similar situation arises in the Yamaguchi, 2015; Nawata & Yamaguchi, 2012; Take- expression of attitudes toward international relation- mura, Hamamura, & Suzuki, 2013; Yokota & Li, ships. at is, among Chinese or Japanese, personal 2012), few studies have investigated attitudes about interactions may promote the expression of unin- Japan–China relations from a psychological per- tended public attitudes. Based on this perspective, spective. To improve the relationship between Japan the study examined whether anti-Japanese public at- and China, this study investigated the expression of titudes among the Chinese involve pluralistic igno- anti-Japanese attitudes by the Chinese in terms of rance. pluralistic ignorance (Katz & Allport, 1931; Miller &

* Institute of Decision Science for a Sustainable Society, Kyushu University, 744 Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka 819–0395, Japan N   et al.: Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China （ 17 ）

process in this relationship, which mainly includes Pluralistic ignorance two phases. In the rst phase, members of a social Social inuence impacts behavior through peo- group have a cognitive bias toward the erroneous ple’s perceptions of group norms or of others’ opin- belief that others’ attitudes dier from their own. ions. In other words, group norms can aect indi- is self-other discrepancy is oen narrowly dened vidual behavior only aer they have been perceived as pluralistic ignorance (Miller & Prentice, 1994). In as group norms. us, erroneous perceptions of a the second phase, by assuming and acting upon an group norm can cause one to conform to a nonexis- erroneous perception of others’ attitudes, members tent“ majority.” When most group members misper- of entire groups engage in behavior that they do not ceive the group norm, all group members behave personally support. is conformity is not due to in- dierently from the group members’ average inten- formational but rather normative social inuence tions. is phenomenon is called pluralistic igno- (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). is estimation of others’ rance (Katz & Allport, 1931; Miller & Prentice, attitudes is recognized as a social norm that is a 1994). Pluralistic ignorance is dened as“ a psycho- compelling force for group members. is cyclical logical state characterized by the belief that one’s process maintains the social norm without the sup- private attitudes and judgments are dierent from port of individuals. In the current study, we dene those of others, even though one’s public behavior is “pluralistic ignorance” as cognitive bias in the self- identical” (Prentice & Miller, 1993, p. 244). For ex- other discrepancy, and“ conformity to perceived so- ample, a group may have planned a trip, but if it cial norm” as conformity to erroneous perceptions rains heavily on the scheduled day, every individual of others’ attitudes. will want to cancel the trip because of the rain. Pluralistic ignorance occurs in small groups and However, all the group members may believe that at a broader social level. Vandello & Cohen (2004) the others want to continue with the trip. us, de- indicated that pluralistic ignorance can explain Cau- spite each member’s individual wish, the trip con- casian males’ violent behavior in the Southern Unit- tinues as planned because the members conform to ed States, which is called a“ culture of honor.” Simi- an erroneous perception of the majority attitude. Er- lar to males in the North, males in the South do not roneous perceptions of other members’ attitudes favor male aggression. Yet, only Southern males lead to group behavior not desired by any individual overestimated others’ approval of male aggression. member. Past studies have demonstrated that plural- Similarly, Hashimoto (2011) showed that Japan’s in- istic ignorance can emerge in many situations, such terdependent culture has persisted not because of as helping behavior in an emergency (Latané & Dar- individual preferences but because of people’s over- ley, 1968), drinking on campus (Prentice & Miller, estimation of the general Japanese attitude toward 1993), and establishing romantic relationships interdependent behavior and adaptation to the so- (Vorauer & Ratner, 1996). cial niche. e violent culture of Caucasian males in the Southern United States and the interdependent Process of maintenance of a social norm unsup- culture of Japan are maintained by social or cultural ported by individuals and pluralistic ignorance norms, although these norms are not supported by Previous studies pointed that social norm was de- individual members of society. ned as two sides: externalized expectation or stan- When people perceive the behavior of others as dard and internalized believes (i.e., Kitaori, 2000). complying with a social norm, they regard it as nor- From the perspective of the former denition of ex- mal and conform to the norm. Moreover, the norm ternalized expectation or standard that others have, may not become internalized as an individual pref- this study dened social norm as“ the collective be- erence. Conformity to the majority thus maintains lief and knowledge of what others should do or the status quo in a group or society. Pluralistic igno- should not do.” If a person deviates from the social rance perpetuates social norms that individuals do norm, others may punish or exclude him/her. Plu- not support personally. ralistic ignorance can lead to maintenance of a social norm; moreover, maintenance of a social norm can lead to pluralistic ignorance. us, there is a cyclical （ 18 ） Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 42

others to be stronger than their own personal anti- Anti-Japanese attitudes in China Japanese feelings. In contrast, in Japan, the self-other as pluralistic ignorance discrepancy was not observed aer controlling for Pluralistic ignorance can manifest itself as preju- participants’ attitudes toward a third nation in con- dice in intergroup relations. O’Gorman (1975, 1979) sidering a self-serving bias eect. ese results sug- and O’Gorman & Garry (1976) studied attitudes to- gest that Chinese expressions of anti-Japanese feel- ward racial segregation and demonstrated that Cau- ings include an element of pluralistic ignorance. casians overestimated other Caucasians’ support for Yokota & Li’s (2012) study provided suggestive it. at is, even people who personally opposed ra- evidence for pluralistic ignorance in Japan–China cial segregation perceived that most others agreed relations. Not only in that study but also in most with the policy. is suggests that conformity to an previous studies on pluralistic ignorance, individual overestimated discriminatory majority may promote attitudes were compared with beliefs about the atti- the expressions of racial discrimination that most tudes of others (Taylor, 1982). Of course, it is impor- individuals do not actually support. tant to clarify the self-other discrepancy. However, Similarly, the expression of negative attitudes to understand the processes by which social norms among the Chinese may also emerge as a result of are maintained, it is necessary to investigate not only pluralistic ignorance. One reason why an anti- pluralistic ignorance narrowly dened as the self- Japanese social norm emerged in China may be that, other discrepancy but also conformity to erroneous from the Chinese perspective, Japan was the perpe- beliefs about others’ attitudes. us, by measuring trator of World War II, and Japanese brutality and public attitude as conformity to others, we examined violence have been emphasized in Chinese history the eect of perceived anti-Japanese attitudes of education (Seo, 2009). is could lead to the forma- others on the public expression of attitudes by the tion of a social norm in which the expression of an- Chinese, and corroborated Yokota & Li’s (2012) ti-Japanese attitudes is acceptable. ndings on social norms and conformity. Once an anti-Japanese norm is shared in Chinese Overview and hypotheses society, it may perpetuate itself, and it may be more negative than the average private attitude among the is study comprised two surveys in China and Chinese. Some individuals in China may actually Japan and tested three hypotheses, H.1–H.3. In the have positive attitudes toward Japan. However, due rst survey, we examined Chinese attitudes toward to the anti-Japanese norm, it is dicult for many Japan. e item of this survey included two types of Chinese to express positive views toward Japan, at “others”: close friends and national society, which is least on the surface, because of perceived pressure to dierent in social distance and scale from the partic- conform to the social norm. erefore, they may see ipants. the majority of others conforming to the anti- People conform to strong social norms. Deviants Japanese norm, and thus their belief that others be- are rejected by other group members under strong sides themselves dislike Japan is reinforced. Confor- social norms. To avoid rejection, people would show mity to the anti-Japanese norm is thus self- conformity to the perceived attitudes of others. We perpetuating. From this perspective, expressions of applied the same socio-psychological processes to anti-Japanese public attitudes among the Chinese Japan–China relations and hypothesized H.1–H.3. may be interpreted as pluralistic ignorance and con- Many literature have noted that the anti-Japanese formity to an erroneously assumed anti-Japanese attitudes is strong in China. us, Chinese people norm in Chinese society. perceives strong anti-Japanese social norm in China. Yokota & Li (2012) conducted pioneering work On the contrary, anti-Chinese social norm in Japan on pluralistic ignorance in Japan–China relations. was less widespread than anti-Japanese social norm Adopting the methodology of previous pluralistic in China. We tested this phenomenon quantitatively. ignorance studies, they compared Chinese anti- H.1. e perceived anti-Japanese social norm in Japanese emotions with Chinese beliefs about oth- China is greater than the perceived anti-China so- ers’ anti-Japanese feelings. e results indicated that cial norm in Japan. the Chinese believed the anti-Japanese emotions of Next, we investigated Chinese attitudes toward N   et al.: Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China （ 19 ）

Japan. If there is a strong anti-Japanese norm in author, who is Chinese, sent a recruitment e-mail to China, Chinese people may express negative atti- her Chinese acquaintances at universities and re- tudes about Japan in front of other Chinese to con- quested them to forward it to students. Participants form to other Chinese. We predicted that percep- responded in November and December 2011. Aer tions of others’ attitudes toward Japan would be excluding the surveys containing incomplete re- more negative than the participants’ own attitudes. sponses, 153 surveys were used in the analysis (66 is is the same prediction made by Yokota & Li female, 83 male, 4 unspecied). e average age of (2012). Furthermore, we postulated that people the participants was 21.26 years (SD＝1.94). e lo- would deliberately express more negative attitudes cations of the participants’ universities were distrib- toward Japan to conform to their erroneous percep- uted as follows: 44 in northeastern China, 21 in east- tions of others’ attitudes toward Japan. Furukawa ern China, 20 in northern China, 10 in central (2013) noted that some Chinese do not buy Japanese China, 4 in southwestern China, 3 in northwestern products because of pressure to conform to the sub- China, and 32 unspecied. e information about jective social norm. is is a typical example of pro- participants’ majors was not collected, but we did Japan actions being constrained by conformity to not recruit only participants who majored in others’ perceived negative attitudes. In China, we Japanese language or Japanese culture. predicted that others’ perceived attitudes would cor- Japanese sample. In Japan, Japanese university stu- relate positively with public expression of attitudes dents participated in the survey using SurveyMon- toward Japan. key (www.surveymonkey.com), as we did in China. H.2a. In China, estimates of others’ attitudes to- To recruit participants, the rst author, who is ward Japan are predicted to be more negative than Japanese, sent a recruitment e-mail to his Japanese participants’ own attitudes. acquaintances at universities and requested them to H.2b. In China, the public expression of attitudes forward it to students. Participants responded in in front of others is predicted to be aected not only November and December 2011. Aer excluding the by private attitudes but also by the perceived atti- surveys containing incomplete responses, 98 ques- tudes of others. tionnaires were used in the analysis (59 female, 38 In the second survey, we investigated Japanese at- male, 1 unspecied). e average age of the partici- titudes toward China. No studies have found a clear pants was 21.08 years (SD＝1.64). e locations of anti-Chinese norm in Japan. Under the weak anti- the participants’ universities were distributed as fol- China norm, public discrimination is undesirable, lows: 91 in Kyushu, 2 in Chugoku, 1 in Hokkaido, 1 and hate speech is treated negatively in Japan, at in Kanto, 1 in Kansai, 1 in Shikoku, and 1 unspeci- least in public. We hypothesized that the self-other ed. discrepancy would not be observed in Japan, and For ethical reasons, participants were informed Japanese people conform only slightly to the per- on the rst page of the questionnaire that their par- ceived negative attitudes of others. ticipation was voluntary, and that they could quit H.3a. In Japan, participants’ estimates of others’ the survey at any time. All participants in our analy- attitudes toward China are predicted not to dier ses agreed to participate in this survey. In addition, from participants’ own attitudes. participants were notied on the nal page of the H.3b. In Japan, publicly expressed attitudes are questionnaire that the survey did not intend to pro- predicted to be inuenced largely by private atti- mote anti-Japanese prejudice, but rather aimed to tudes, but slightly inuenced by the perceived atti- understand the psychological mechanism underpin- tudes of others. ning prejudice and provide a strategy for future in- ternational cooperation. Methods Measures Participants e following items is in the survey toward the Chinese sample. In China, Chinese university stu- Chinese participants. In the survey for Japanese par- dents participated in the survey using a web-based ticipants, the terms referring to China and Japan survey tool provider, SurveyMonkey (www.survey were reversed. In consideration of social desirability monkey.com). To recruit participants, the second bias, we used items for positive attitude toward Japan. （ 20 ） Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 42

1. Private attitude toward Japan. Private atti- To measure the perception of an anti-Japanese norm tude toward Japan was measured by the item“ I like on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 Japan.” (strongly), participants rated their agreement with 2. Perception of others’ attitudes toward Japan. the following three items:“ If someone likes Japan, (2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward Japan was he/she must not say this aloud in China”;“ People measured by the item“ My friends like Japan,” and who say‘ I like Japan’ are disliked by other Chinese”; (2b) Perceived attitude of Chinese society toward “ e average Chinese person thinks it is appropriate Japan was measured by the item“ Chinese society to say‘ I dislike Japan’.” e average score of the approves of Japan.” three items (α＝.84) was used for the analysis. 3. Public expression of attitudes toward Japan. ese items were initially written in Japanese. e (3a) Public expression of attitudes toward Japan to second author and a collaborator, who are native friends was measured by the item:“ In front of my Chinese speakers, translated the items into Chinese, close friends, I would say‘ I like Japan’,” and (3b) paying careful attention to conveying the same Public expression of attitudes toward Japan in front of meaning in both languages and checking it by back- Chinese society was measured by the item“ I would translation. For Japanese participants, we reversed say‘ I like Japan’ if I were to give a media interview the placement of the references to China and Japan. for Chinese society.” Results We measured the ve items above, which were rated on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (strongly). Table 1 (Chinese samples) and Table 2 (Japanese 4. e perceived anti-Japanese norm. is samples) show descriptive statistics and correlations study dened“ social norm” as the collective belief among the variables. and knowledge of what others should do or not do.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables in China (N＝153)

M (SD) 1 2a 2b 3a 3b 1 Private attitude toward Japan 3.61 (1.71) 1.00 2 Perception of others’ attitudes toward Japan (2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward Japan 3.07 (1.52) .50** 1.00 (2b) Perceived attitudee of Chinese society toward Japan 2.83 (1.63) .16* .53** 1.00 3 Public expression of attitudes toward Japan (3a) Public expression of attitudes toward Japan to friends 3.18 (1.73) .63** .55** .49** 1.00 (3b) Public expression of attitudes toward Japan in front 2.95 (1.68) .53** .53** .59** .72** 1.00 of Chinese society 4 Perceived anti-Japanese norm 3.04 (1.00) －.04 －.15† －.13 －.08 －.16*

**p＜.01, *p＜.05, †p＜.10

Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables in Japanese (N＝98)

M (SD) 1 2a 2b 3a 3b 1 Private attitude toward China 3.92 (1.65) 1.00 2 Perception of others’ attitudes toward China (2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward China 3.81 (1.52) .56** 1.00 (2b) Perceived attitudee of Japanese society toward China 2.69 (1.21) .34** .47** 1.00 3 Public expression of attitudes toward China (3a) Public expression of attitudes toward China to 3.64 (1.84) .78** .57** .37** 1.00 friends (3b) Public expression of attitudes toward China in front 3.60 (1.81) .68** .62** .37** .71** 1.00 of Japanese society 4 Perceived anti-Chinese norm 1.99 (0.87) －.37** －.39** －.41** －.28** －.27**

**p＜.01, *p＜.05, †p＜.10 N   et al.: Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China （ 21 ）

Differences in perceived Anti-Japanese/Anti- items measuring attitudes toward China, (1), (2a), Chinese norms between China and Japan (H.1) and (2b). e analysis revealed a statistically signi- e perceived anti-Japanese norm in China (M＝ cant main eect among the three items, F(2, 194)＝ 3.04, SD＝1.00) was signicantly higher than the 37.95, p＜.001. Shaer’s multiple comparison tests perceived anti-Chinese norm in Japan (M＝1.99, were then conducted and showed that (2b) Perceived SD＝0.87), t＝8.52, df＝249, p＜.001, Cohen’s d＝ attitude of Japanese society toward China (M＝2.69, 1.12. e result supported H.1. SD＝1.21) was signicantly more negative than (1) e self-other discrepancy in Anti-Japanese atti- Private attitudes toward China (M＝3.92, SD＝1.65, tudes in China (H.2a) t＝7.23, df＝97, adjusted p＜.001), and (2a) Per- We conducted a one-way ANOVA (analysis of ceived attitudes of friends toward China (M＝3.81, variance) on the three items measuring attitudes to- SD＝1.52, t＝7.23, df＝97, adjusted p＜.001). ward Japan, (1), (2a), and (2b). e analysis revealed In Japan, friends’ attitudes toward China were not a statistically signicant main eect among the three perceived as negative, but the attitudes of Japanese items, F(2, 304)＝9.41, p＜.001. Shaer’s multiple society in general toward China were perceived as comparison tests were then conducted and showed more negative than participants’ private attitudes. that (2a) Perceived attitudes of friends toward Japan is reected pluralistic ignorance as a self-other (M＝3.07, SD＝1.52, t＝3.75, df＝304, adjusted (social level) discrepancy in Japan. e result par- p＜.001) and (2b) Perceived attitude of Chinese soci- tially disproves H.3a. ety toward Japan (M＝2.83, SD＝1.62, t＝5.42, df＝ e eect of perceived attitudes of others on pub- 304, adjusted p＜.001) were signicantly more nega- lic expressions of attitudes (H.2b, H.3b) tive than (1) Private attitude toward Japan (M＝ Finally, we examined the eect of the perceived 3.61, SD＝1.70). attitudes of others on the public expression of atti- us, Chinese participants estimated that other tudes. Private attitudes and the perceived attitudes Chinese held attitudes more negative than their of others were regressed on public expressions of at- own. In other words, pluralistic ignorance as a self- titude among Japanese and Chinese participants other discrepancy occurred both among friends and (Figure 1). e results showed that for the Chinese, among members of Chinese society in general. e their own private attitudes inuenced their public result supported H.2a. expressions of attitude (friends, β＝.47, p＜.001; e self-other discrepancy in Anti-Chinese atti- Chinese society, β＝.44, p＜.001). In addition, the tudes in Japan (H.3a) perceived attitudes of others had an eect on the We conducted a one-way ANOVA on the three public expression of attitudes (friends, β＝.32,

Figure 1 Antecedents of public attitudes expressed to other Chinese/Japanese Note: **p＜.01, *p＜.05, †p＜.10 （ 22 ） Japanese Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 42

p＜.001; Chinese society, β＝.52, p＜.001). Tests on refrain from publicly expressing positive attitudes the dierence of regression coecients showed a toward Japan. non-signicant dierence between the eect of per- e perceived anti-Chinese social norm among ceived attitudes of others and private attitudes the Japanese was much lower than the perceived an- (friends, Z＝0.673, p＝.50; Chinese society, Z＝ ti-Japan social norm among the Chinese. erefore, 0.128, p＝.90). e impact of perceived attitudes of there is no strong anti-China norm in Japan. Al- Chinese others was as large as that of their own pri- though pluralistic ignorance as a self-other, particu- vate attitudes. larly self-society, discrepancy was found in Japan, However, among the Japanese, private attitudes regression analysis showed that the perceived atti- had quite a strong eect on public expressions of at- tudes of others had a relatively small eect on public titudes (friends, β＝.66, p＜.001; Japanese society, expressions of attitudes. ese ndings indicated β＝.63, p＜.001). e perceived attitudes of others that while the Japanese perceive others’ attitudes to- had a relatively small eect on public expressions of ward China to be more negative than their own, attitudes in front of others (friends, β＝.17, p＝.031; they do not conform to the perceived attitudes of Japanese society, β＝.15, p＝.051). Tests on the dif- others. ference of regression coecients showed that the ef- Conformity to the perceived attitudes of others in fect of the perceived attitudes of others was signi- China cantly smaller than that of their personal attitudes ese results suggest that the public expression of (friends, Z＝3.91, p＝.002; Japanese society, Z＝ anti-Japanese attitudes in China does not always re- 3.11, p＝.01). ect actual Chinese attitudes toward Japan. ese ese results suggested that the intention to pub- results also imply that even individuals who do not licly say“ I like Japan” is as greatly inuenced by per- have anti-Japanese attitudes may express them to ceptions of others’ attitudes toward Japan as their conform to the perceived anti-Japanese social norm own personal attitudes among Chinese. Conversely, in China. Under this anti-Japanese social norm, the impact of the perceived attitudes of others on in- people who approve of Japan cannot freely express tentions to publicly declare“ I like China” was low in their views. erefore, statements by those who hold Japan. ese ndings conrmed H.2b and H.3b. anti-Japanese attitudes may account for a large pro- portion of the publicly expressed sentiments about Discussion Japan in Chinese society. A spiral of silence (Noelle- We tested the hypotheses that the Chinese expres- Neumann, 1993) thus seems to surround anti- sion of anti-Japanese attitudes involves conformity Japanese attitudes, and expression of these attitudes to a perceived anti-Japanese norm. is perpetuated and reinforced as a self-fullling First, we compared anti-Japanese and anti- prophecy in Chinese society. In addition, the result Chinese norms. e perceived anti-Japanese norm of the self-other discrepancy found in the study sug- among the Chinese was greater than the perceived gested that the perceived negative attitudes of others anti-Chinese norm among the Japanese. erefore, reects pluralistic ignorance. the perceived social norm to exclude those who ex- e underlying cause of the anti-Japanese norm is press positive sentiments about the other country not important for it to be perpetuated; this is the re- was stronger in China than in Japan. sult of society’s conformity to a perceived norm. Re- Next, Chinese attitudes toward Japan were exam- gardless of the reason, once anti-Japanese attitudes ined. Chinese participants perceived their friends became a social norm, their expression is perpetuat- and Chinese society in general to have more nega- ed. is is considered similar to the“ culture of hon- tive attitudes toward Japan than their own personal or” in Southern United States, which emerged in the attitudes. Moreover, among the Chinese, public ex- era of cattle breeders but is still maintained today pressions of attitude were inuenced not only by (Vandello & Cohen, 2004). their private attitudes but also by the estimated atti- To create a harmonious relationship between tudes of other Chinese. ese results indicated that Japan and China, anti-Japanese public attitudes that because the Chinese perceive others’ attitudes to- emerge from social norms must be reduced. is ward Japan to be more negative than their own, they raises the question of exactly how to reduce confor- N   et al.: Anti-Japanese Public Attitudes as Conformity to Social Norms in China （ 23 ） mity to the perceived attitudes of others. Previous Limitations studies on pluralistic ignorance have shown that e present research has some limitations that when individuals recognize that a perceived norm should be addressed in future studies. First, there reects pluralistic ignorance, pluralistic ignorance are some possibility of self-serving bias that people decreases (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). is sug- think their negative attitude is more moderate or gests that making the Chinese aware that not many lower than the others. In Yokota & Li’s (2012) study, Chinese sincerely harbor negative attitudes toward attitudes toward a third country served to control Japan may reduce the anti-Japanese norm. However, any eects of self-serving bias. However, in the cur- the eectiveness of this strategy is limited only to re- rent study, attitudes toward a third country were not ducing pluralistic ignorance. A dierent strategy measured, so there was no such control. Future re- would be needed to correct genuinely internalized search should measure and control this. anti-Japanese attitudes. at is, psychological studies Next, the results showed perceived attitude of must understand both types of anti-Japanese atti- others had a relatively small impact on expression of tudes among the Chinese: genuinely internalized an- public attitudes among the Japanese. We interpreted ti-Japanese attitudes and public attitudes conform- these results as the dominance of an anti-discrimi- ing to the perceived attitudes of others. Few studies nation norm rather than an anti-Chinese norm. have examined the latter, and future research is re- However, because we did not measure perceived an- quired to develop a more concrete strategy for re- ti-discrimination sentiments, it is not well under- solving pluralistic ignorance in intergroup conicts. stood at this time whether or not an anti-discrimi- Less conformity to the perceived attitudes of others nation norm was actually more dominant than an in Japan anti-Chinese norm. erefore, further research is In contrast to Chinese attitudes toward Japan, necessary to measure the anti-discrimination norm conformity to an anti-Chinese norm was not found in Japan and conrm the validity of the interpreta- in Japan. is may be due to the absence of a clear tion. anti-Chinese norm in Japan. e results showed that ird, answers about private attitudes may con- the perceived anti-Chinese norm was very low; the tain the inuence of the norm. It is dicult to elimi- average score was 1.99 on a 1–7 point scale. ere nate this eect only by improving the methodology are many various social norms; anti-discrimination for self-reported answers. us, for understanding might be a dominant norm in Japan. at is, be- the eect of purely private attitudes, controlling for cause the anti-Chinese norm is not a dominant force the eect of the perceived norms or attitudes of oth- in Japan, participants might not feel pressured to ers is also necessary. conform to the perceived anti-Chinese attitude of References others. Although the score of (2b) Perceived attitude of Chinese society toward Japan among the Chinese Cabinet Oce of Japan 2015 Gaikou ni kansuru yoron chousa was similar to the score of (2b) perceived attitudes of [Opinion Poll on Foreign Policies]. 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