Three Essays on Collective Action and Communal Rangeland Management in Botswana

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THREE ESSAYS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMNIUNAL RAN GELAND MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA

presented by

PATRICIA MASEGO MAKEPE

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment of the requirements for the

PHD degree in RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

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2003

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6/01 c:/CIRC/DateDue.p65—p.15 THREE ESSAYS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMUNAL RANGELAND MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA

Patricia Masego Makepe

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to Michigan State University In partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Resource Development

2003 ABSTRACT

THREE ESSAYS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMUNAL RANGELAND MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA

Patricia Masego Makepe

This dissertation is composed of three distinct chapters, all of which explore the mechanism of collective action and communal rangeland management in

Botswana. A sample of borehole syndicates in Botswana’s Kgatleng district is used for empirical analysis. Chapter one is a literature review and traces the tradition and evolution of the institutions and rules governing communal grazing lands in

Botswana. Chapter two explores the nature, extent and determinants of collective action over water and grazing management in Botswana’s Kgatleng district. Using factor analysis, two indices of collective action are developed from the survey data.

Multivariate econometric methods are used to examine the underlying factors which determine collective action in Kgatleng district. The analysis provides evidence that syndicate members actively take steps to work together over borehole water provision and management. Chapter three explores the impact of collective action over borehole water provision on investments made to improve the water source and reduce grazing pressure on the surrounding grazing land. Multivariate econometric methods are used to examine these relationships. The analysis shows that collective action over borehole water provision matters for investments made to improve the water source but not necessarily for rangeland conservation. Cepyn'ght by Patricia Masego Makepe 2003 To my parents

iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I ﬁrst and foremost express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my major professor John Kerr for his unwavering support, guidance and encouragement. I am also indebted to the following members of my committee, Professors Jeffrey Riedinger,

George Rowan and Thomas Reardon. I beneﬁted ﬁ'om their constructive comments and suggestions.

I owe special thanks to Professor Felix Nweke, whose advice helped me navigate the rough waters of graduate school as well as the dissertation process. I beneﬁted enormously from his wisdom. His help and comments were invaluable to me.

This work would not have been possible without the ﬁnancial support I received from the University of Botswana, for this I am grateful. I would also like to thank the following individuals in the Ministry of Agriculture whose assistance proved to be valuable during the data collection process: Bonnake Tsimako, Raymond Kwerepe, Loeto

Makubate and Michael Manowe.

Lastly, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my parents for giving me the motivation to go this far with my studies. I thank my parents for their love and encouragement throughout my learning journey. TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...... viii

LIST OF FIGURES ...... ix

CHAPTER 1 ...... 1 THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND RULES GOVERNING COMMUNAL GRAZING LANDS 1N BOTSWANA ...... 1 1 . 1. Introduction ...... l 1.2. The Rural Economy ...... 6 1.3. Livelihood Systems: A History of Mixed Economic Strategies ...... 8 1.4. Pre-colonial Institutions for Land Tenure and Management in Botswana ...... 9 1.5. The Erosion of Pre-Colonial Institutions of Land Management ...... 14 1.6. Efforts at Improving Institutions of Land Management ...... 17 1.6.1. The Tribal Land Act 1968 ...... 19 1.6.2. The Tribal Lands Grazing Policy of 1975 ...... 20 1.6.3. The Fencing Component of the 1991 National Agricultural Development Policy ...... 23 1.7. Differences in the Implementation and Outcomes of Privatization ...... 24 1.8. Conclusion ...... 27

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 30

CHAPTER 2 ...... 35 THE NATURE, EXTENT AND DETERMINANTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION OVER WATER AND GRAZING MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA’S KGATLENG DISTRICT ...... 35 2.1 . Introduction ...... 3 5 2.2. The Study Area ...... 39 2.3. Data ...... 39 2.4. Collective Action over Water and Grazing Resources in Kgatleng district ...... 42 2.5. Measuring Collective Action at the Borehole Syndicate Level ...... 44 2.6. General Models ...... 5 1 2.7. Explanatory Variables and Hypothesized Relationships ...... 51 2.8. Econometric Results ...... 56 2.9. Conclusion ...... 6O

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 69

vi CHAPTER 3 ...... 72 THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ON WATER AND GRAZING MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA’S KGATLENG DISTRICT ...... 72 3.1 . Introduction ...... 72 3.2. The Study Area ...... 75 3.3. Data ...... 76 3.4. The Management of Water and Grazing Resources in Kgatleng District ...... 78 3.5. General Models ...... 82 3.6. Explanatory Variables and Hypothesized Relationships ...... 84 3.7. Econometric Results ...... 90 3.8. Conclusion and Policy Implications ...... 95

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 105

APPENDIX A The Range Condition Score Card ...... 108

APPENDIX B The relationship between population density, size of operation, and collective action for monitoring and investment ...... 109

APPENDIX C The Questionaire ...... 116

vii LIST OF FIGURES

Table 1.1: Differences in the Implementation and Outcome of the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy and 1991 Fencing Component of the National Agricultural Development Policy in Botswana ...... 29

Table 2.1: Reasons for the Extent of Conﬂicts and Conﬂict Resolution over Water and Grazing in Botswana’s Kgatleng District ...... 62

Table 2.2: Factor Analysis Results on Five Indicators of Collective Action ...... 63

Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis ...... 64

Table 2.4: Determinants of Collective Action over Borehole Water Management in Botswana’s Kgatleng District (With Indices of Collective Action) ...... 65

Table 2.5: Determinants of Collective Action over Borehole Water Management in Botswana’s Kgatleng District (With Indicators of Collective Action)...... 66

Table 3.1: Extent and Severity of the Conditions of Access to Water and Grazing Botswana’s Kgatleng District ...... 97

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis ...... 98

Table 3.3: The Impact of Collective Action for Borehole Water Management on Improvements Made to the Water Source Botswana’s Kgatleng District ...... 99

Table 3.4: Impact of Collective Action for Borehole Water Management on_Stocking Density in Botswana’s Kgatleng District ...... 101

Table B - 1: Relationship between average herd size per member, total distance from cattle market and investments to improve the water source and level of collective action ...... 114

viii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. Land Use in Kgatleng District, Botswana ...... 67

Figure 2.2: Scree Plot of Eigenvalues from Preliminary Principal Components Analysis is on the Indicators of Collective Action ...... 68

Figure 3.1: Land Use in Kgatleng District, Botswana ...... 103

Figure 3.2: Kgatleng District Boreholes ...... 104

Figure B-l Scatter plot of borehole syndicates according to size of operation and distance to market ...... 1 15

ix Chapter 1

THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND RULES GOVERNING COMMUNAL GRAZING LANDS IN BOTSWANA

1.1. Introduction

Since Hardin (1968) provided the theoretical linkage between resource degradation and communal land ownership, the tragedy of the commons has dominated and inﬂuenced the way in which the problem of resource overexploitation has been addressed. According to the tragedy of the commons, in situations where access to the range resource is free and unrestricted, individuals acting in their own self interest will eventually overexploit it. In the pastoral context, such overexploitation comes in the form of overstocking, which if left unchecked, can lead to problems of overgrazingl and land degradation.

Implicit in the tragedy of the commons thesis is the assumption that individuals cannot collectively devise and successﬁrlly apply rules to prevent the communally owned range resource from being overexploited. Instead, it is assumed that only individuals with a unique and absolute authority over the range resource are likely to conserve it

(Demstez, 1967; Cheung, 1970; Posner, 1977, Allen, 1985) and so the privatization of the commons is inevitable.

In recent years, both empirical and theoretical evidence has converged to show that the privatization of the commons is not always the best antidote for resource

' Overgrazing is deﬁned as a reduction in forage production below the biological optimum when considered in terms of some unit of time. Degradation results when forage productivity is reduced more or less permanently because of long lasting damage to the productivity of the resource base (Behnke and Scoones, 1993). overexploitation (Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Lane and Moorehead, 1995; Baland and

Platteau, 1996, Larson and Bromley, 1999). This is particularly true within non- equilibrium environmentsz, where livestock mobility is an essential part of a risk management strategy herders use to maximize on variations in range productivity

(Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Swallow, 1993; Niamir-Fuller, 2000).

Proponents of privatization as a prescription for overgrazing adhere to the notion that there is a ﬁxed carrying capacity for any particular range, a notion which holds in stable environments. As a range management strategy, the carrying capacity concept rests on the ability to determine and maintain an equilibrium number of animals at which the rate of forage consumption equals the rate of forage production on a particular range.

Once the number of animals exceeds this threshold overgrazing occurs. Consequently, the problem of overgrazing can be easily averted by determining and maintaining this equilibrium through the enforcement of stocking restrictions with the help of a government or external agency (Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Lane and Moorehead, 1995).

Central to this argument is that environmental conditions where the range is located are fairly stable; that herders are willing to reduce cattle numbers when they are required to do so and that livestock production is sedentary. Herders’ reluctance to adhere to stocking restrictions in drought prone regions is well known. Amongst other things, large herd sizes are preferred as a risk management strategy (Swallow, 1993; Niamir-

Fuller, 2000). When herders enter a drought with large herds, chances of the entire source of their livelihood being decimated are reduced (Abel, 1993). Hence, it follows that in non-equilibrium environments such as those found in Botswana; the conventional notion

2 Non equilibrium environments are those where there is no stable equilibrium between plant and animal populations because of the effect of highly variable rainfall and temperature ﬂuctuations over time and space. of carrying capacity is no longer applicable (Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Niamir-Fuller,

2000)

Another feature of non-equilibrium enviromnents is that owing to rainfall variability, at any point in time, certain parts of the range may be highly productive while other parts are not as productive. This makes livestock mobility a vital part of the way in which herders have traditionally allowed their animals to utilize the communal range resource (Sanford, 1983); an aspect which is constrained by the enclosure of the range under privatization.

Nevertheless, the privatization of the commons and enforcement of carrying capacity is still perceived to be the superior solution to the overexploitation of the commons. This perception continues to be the catalyst for the privatization of the commons throughout Aﬁica, often with adverse consequences (Tsimako, 1991; White,

1992; Galaty, 1993; Segosebe, 1997; Niamir-Fuller, 2000). In fact, most development interventions in rangeland areas in Africa have failed to generate promised higher levels of productivity, improvements in the welfare of local communities, and protect rangelands from degradation (Sanford, 1983; Behnke and Scoones, 1993). Yet, several governments and pastoral development program initiatives continue to operate under this paradigm (Lane and Moorehead, 1995; Kirk, 2000).

Other scholars have looked at the problem of resource overexploitation from an institutional perspective. Here the commons are viewed more accurately as communal areas where access is controlled. Individuals do not act with greed. Instead, owing to increasing resource scarcity and the signiﬁcant contribution the resource makes to people’s livelihoods, it is argued that, communities may have found it necessary to collectively devise and establish rules, which ensure that actions regarding resource use are coordinated in ways that avoid resource overexploitation (Runge, 1981; 1984; 1986;

Bromley and Cemea, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Hanna and J entoft,

1996)

In support of this approach, evidence is presented from communities around the world that have successfully managed resources held in common as if they were club assets’. Using this evidence, these scholars argue that resource overexploitation where it is observed, occurs mainly because the rights, duties and privileges of individuals within communities, towards their natural resources have been undermined. Largely as a result of the dismantling and delegitimization of traditional resource management institutions, which occurred during the colonial period, and were later reinforced by newly independent governments; increased market activity and high population pressure.

Consequently, communities are no longer able to effectively coordinate their actions regarding the use of resources critical for their survival.

In support of this view, the institutionalists assert that given adequate institutions, communal resource management can be the most efﬁcient and equitable property rights structure which can substantially mitigate the overexploitation of the commons (Ostrom,

1990; Runge, 1981, 1992; Bromley and Fceny, 1992). Hence, the restoration of the corrnnons through the proper devolution of the rights over resources back to communities to manage their own resources is advocated as a possible solution to the problem of resource overexploitation (Kirk, 2000; Ngaido and Kirk, 2001).

3 In this case a club asset is the resource held in common whose beneﬁts are received by members of the community who adhere to certain duties, rights, and privileges that come with membership. Failure to adhere to the rules excludes an individual from enjoying the beneﬁts from that resource. This chapter is an institutional analysis of Botswana’s pastoral commons. It traces

the tradition and evolution of institutions and rules that govern the use of communal

grazing lands in Botswana. The effects of this change on the status of the communal

lands are also discussed.

Differences in the actual implementation and outcomes of the privatization policy

in Botswana indicate that a blanket approach is not the only option for addressing the

overgrazing problem. Despite several efforts at privatization, parts of the country still

remain under communal tenure.

Theories of induced innovation (Hayami and Ruttan, 1970) and intensiﬁcation

(Boserup, 1981) explain how institutions and land use patterns emerge over time in

response to existing factor scarcities and prices. The privatization of communal land is

expected to emerge as the efﬁcient way to manage communal land in scenarios where the

costs of managing it communally have become prohibitive. Where communities are able

to successﬁrlly manage their land, common property may be the most efﬁcient property

rights structure and less privatization ought to be observed (McCarthy, et. a1., 2001).

Therefore, the privatization and external control of the use of communal range lands is

not the only way to prevent them from being overexploited.

However, for it to be effective communal resource management depends on the

quality of local level institutions of resource management and the organizations to

enforce them (Rarnussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland and Platteau, 1996). This paper makes a contribution to the search for a more appropriate communal resource

management strategy by shifting the emphasis away from privatization toward collective

action. 1.2. The Rural Economy

Livestock rearing is the mainstay of Botswana’s rural economy. Over 80 percent of the national herd is grazed on communal land, which is inhabited by 70 percent of the population. A large percentage of the population draws its livelihood from livestock.

Hence, the government has traditionally pursued policies that strongly support the growth of livestock production in the form of high prices for meat and livestock input subsidies.

Unfortunately, this strong support has led to over expansion of the livestock sector at the expense of other more productive sectors (Amtzen and F idzani, 1997).

Within the rural economy cattle4 are kept primarily because they are seen as a store of wealth and as a means of intergenerational transfer of wealth (Doran, et. al.,

197 9). Herders treasure having large herd sizes, a feat that is made easier by the free access to communal range land prevalent in the parts of Botswana where they are found.

But large herd sizes have led to overstocking which in turn has led to problems of overgrazing and land degradation (Merafe, 1992; Government of Botswana, 2000).

For many decades, concern has been expressed over the apparent degradation of communal range lands as a result of overstocking (Campbell, et. al., 1971; Van Vegten,

1981; Amtzen, 1990; Allen, 1996; Ringrose, 1996). J eltsch and others (1996) have demonstrated that the rate of outward expansion of degraded zones is positively correlated with the number of grazing animals per unit of land. Degradation has become especially severe around watering holes, villages and cattle posts; and has continued to expand concentrically with a real threat that large expanses of the country’s land will be lost (Allen, 1996; Ringrose, 1996).

’ In this study, the term cattle and livestock are used interchangeably as if they mean one and the same thing although cattle are really a subset of livestock. Livestock includes other animals such as goats and sheep. The main policy instrument used by government to improve the deteriorating condition of communal range lands has been to privatize communal grazing lands. This was implemented ﬁrst with the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP) of 1975 and later, through the fencing component of the 1991 Agricultural Development Policy. Both policies were based on the premise that granting individuals or groups, private property rights over the commons accompanied by the enforcement of a destocking policy would reduce overgrazings. Stock limits were established for the allocated ranches but these were never enforced. Hence, the problem of overgrazing continued to persist (Amtzen,

1990; Tsimako, 1991, Segosebe, 1997).

At present, there is no appropriate institutional mechanism in place to assure herders that if they keep the recommended6 herd size others will follow suit. Hence, each herder has the incentive “to get while the going is good” (Runge, 1981). For this reason, overstocking on Botswana's communal rangelands can be associated with the failure of existing institutions and rules to coordinate herders' actions in ways that can substantially reduce the uncertainty each herder has over the actions of other herders (Rappoport, 1985; Runge, 1984; l986)7.

Owing to this uncertainty, herders keep larger herds than they would otherwise keep if they believed that every member of the community would adhere to the recommended herd size. In order for each herder to keep the recommended herd size, a coordinated collective effort at the community level is necessary. This chapter is the ﬁrst

5 The imposition of compulsory livestock regulations in the form of maximum livestock quotas for individuals or groups has proven to be unpopular to both large and small livestock owners. 6 The number of animals recommended for a particular grazing area which falls within a certain range that ensures the optimal distribution of animals on grazing land according to the season and range quality. For exarrrple, the number would be higher during the wet season and lower during the dry season as suggested by Behnke and Scoones, (1993). 7 Cited in (3. Lane and R. Moorehead (1995). of three in this study. It provides the backdrop against which existing resource management structure could be restructured to ensure that herders keep the recommended herd size. The focus is on the parts of the country which remain under communal tenure despite efforts at privatization.

1.3. Livelihood Systems: A History of Mixed Economic Strategies

Historically the people of Botswana have practiced a variety of economic strategies. Analogous to the way in which a modern investor diversiﬁes his or her portfolio in volatile markets to minimize risk, the people of Botswana reacted to unpredictable environmental conditions, by spreading risk across a wide range of income generating activities. Not only did people engage in livestock rearing, they also ventured into other economic activities such as arable agriculture, migrant labor, hunting as well as the gathering of veld8 products (Poteete, 1999).

The type, mix and degree of concentration of economic activity which emerged in various parts of the country, was dictated by the environment and the rules determining access to resources at the time. For example, in the less arid parts of the country arable agriculture prevailed, while livestock rearing became more prevalent in the arid parts of the country.

The country’s rangelands and their resources formed an essential part of this complex production system. Hence, the traditional system of resource management emerged as a both as a political and cultural institution, speciﬁcally crafted to manage the access and use of the range and its resources (Hanna and J entoft, 1996).

3 The word veld is another name for range and it is commonly used in Southern Africa. In this paper, veld products refer to products from the range such as wild fruit, herbs and medicines. 1.4. Pre-colonial Institutions for Land Tenure and Management in Botswana

This section demonstrates the existence and purpose of the traditional system of resource management. The organization and function of the traditional system of resource management is discussed; as are its strengths and shortcomings, and their implications for resource management today. Baland and Platteau, (1996) have questioned whether people were traditionally conservationists. Using different examples from around the world they show that traditional systems of resource management were not necessarily designed for resource conservation. Instead, they argue that while there may have been some concern over the possible overexploitation of communal resources by community members.

Traditional resource management systems were designed primarily to exclude outsiders from using resources that were valuable to the community because ﬁghting degradation was not an issue at that time.

Prior to independence, traditional leaders or chiefs controlled land administration in the tribal territories. Land belonged to the tribe as a whole and could not be alienated by anyone for his own purposes. The chief allocated blocks of land designated for residences, arable agriculture or grazing to a village headman. The village headrnan then allocated land for residences and arable agriculture to married men for the use of their families (Schapera, 1955; Hitchcock, 1980). In general, the size of these areas was large enough to take into account population growth.

Different land uses were arranged in adjoining concentric circles. Residential land formed the village center, with plots for arable agriculture encircling it, some distance away. The third most outer ring of land was used for grazing, and separated the village from the wilderness. Headmen divided the grazing lands into districts that were used and managed by overseers.

The chief initially appointed the overseers, but eventually the position became hereditary. The overseers controlled access to their blocks of grazing land. Since they used the land for grazing their own herds, they had a strong incentive to limit access to control overgrazing. If the livestock holdings of an individual with existing grazing rights endangered the livestock holdings of others, the overseer could request that the individual limit the size of his herd or ask that he relocate. Similarly, if an individual ignored his neighbor’s complaints about cutting down too many trees, he would be asked to relocate. In this way, citizens were sanctioned if they acted contrary to the group’s expectations.

Although, pre-colonial institutions focused on management of grazing, citizens also relied on the rangelands for many other resources, such as grass for thatching, wild fruit and game. Overseers did not interfere with hunting and gathering activities, because they generally did not compete with grazing. Each citizen had a right of access to land and surface water based on membership to the tribe or community. Therefore, an unregulated common property regime existed for individuals within the group (Baland and Platteau, 1996). Outsiders were excluded.

Outsiders could only gain access to the grazing pastures if they had permission from the chief, who would only grant access to them if there was room. Any trespassers were evicted. Nevertheless, those driving cattle though an area were entitled to use any surface water and grazing, even though they were not allowed to settle permanently

(Schapera, 1955).

10 Citizens could establish private rights to water through the exertion of labor in developing a water point9 (White, 1992). The distance between water points was controlled to ensure sufﬁcient grazing and was based on the quality of the land. Wells and dams were considered individual or family property while all citizens had a right to water that collected in natural pans and rivers falling within their tribal territory (Poteete,

1999). As we shall see later, this ambiguity which existed between rights to land and right to water became a problematic for managing range lands in situations where access to range became solely determined by access to water (Peters, 1994).

The success of the traditional system in managing the communal range could be attributed to several factors. First, the structure of the political system gave the chief, as custodian of the tribal territory, the ultimate authority and legitimacy needed to enforce the rules governing access to and use of the range. The delegation of speciﬁc management responsibilities to headmen and overseers served to decentralize the system; allowing those with a more intimate knowledge of the range and its users, more powers over deciding how it was used. Headmen and overseers were able to monitor and enforce rules pertaining to the use of the grazing area. During this time people belonging to the same clan tended to live together (Hitchcock, 1980). Thus, headmen knew all citizens who grazed their animals on land lying within their jurisdiction. Any outsiders could be easily identiﬁed and punished for breaking rules of access.

Neighbors monitored each other’s actions and if anyone deviated from the expectations of the group, he was reported to the overseer who would inform the chief. In

9 During this period, the technology for drilling boreholes had not yet been developed. Other community members would provide labor for developing these water points. In return the owners would allow them limited access to the water point. This changed with improvements in drilling technology when owners now used their own capital to drill boreholes and either excluded outsiders from using their water or charged them a fee for doing so.

11 return, the economic reward and status the headmen and overseers received from their positions as range managers reinforced their allegiance to the chief in his role as the custodian of the range.

All matters and disputes pertaining to land allocation were settled by the chief at the kgotla, the traditional meeting place and court. Anyone who was denied access to land by the overseer could appeal to the chief. The chief would either overrule the overseer’s decision based on the merit of the case or ﬁnd land elsewhere for the applicant.

This arrangement cultivated a mutual trust in authority and also built a sense of community and readiness to protect collective welfare. It also enhanced community cohesiveness and vigilance in guarding resource use. Citizens were loyal to the chief, and shared the same values and beliefs regarding range preservation because it was critical for sustaining the tribe.

The traditional system was novel in that the need to protect individual and group expectation was engendered in the very rules that the tribe had craﬁed over time.

Multiple claims to resources were laid down by what Demstez and others (1967) have referred to as a “bundle of rights”. Speciﬁcally, this bundle consisted of usufruct rights of members; rights of the chief to graze his cattle anywhere he wanted within the tribal territory, the rights of the chief or community to sanction violators; the right of the community to prevent land alienation; and the right of members not to be unduly denied access to resources were they lived, if they were in need (Segosebe, 1997).

All of the tribal territories were known to the chief, village headmen and overseers. Tribal boundaries were not ﬁxed. The tribal territory expanded or constricted

12 according to ﬂuctuations in the strength of the tribe, and its need for more resources.

When the tribe grew in size and strength and the demand for land increased, more land would be taken from neighboring territories. In some cases, adjacent land was already occupied and so expansion usually involved the conquering of weaker groups.

The traditional deﬁnition of community excluded a variety of people. This group included outsiders who had been conquered, assimilated or enslaved by the tribe in its quest for more land. Since traditional authorities held a monopoly over allocation of land and other resources, those who met with discrimination did not have impartial options for appeal. The chief usually settled appeals of decisions made by overseers in their favor.

Given their high stakes in the traditional deﬁnition of community membership, chiefs could not always be expected to advance the rights of marginalized groups.

The traditional system also had shortcomings regarding the management of communal rangelands. Citizenship automatically granted individuals access to the range.

Unfortunately, the system did not place any restrictions on the number of citizens who could graze their animals on a particular range, neither did it place any stock limits its citizens. Others have argued that during this period abundant land, harsh ecological conditions and the poor availability of water which limited herd growth may have made it unnecessary to institute formal stock limits (Baland and Platteau, 1996). Nevertheless, this lack of authority to enforce stock limits became a problem with the development of permanent water sources. This has remained a severe weakness in the traditional management system.

Despite the shortcomings stated above, the traditional system succeeded in effectively preventing the overexploitation of the natural resource base during the pre-

13 colonial era. The system of land tenure with its exclusion of outsiders; the low population; and harsh ecological conditions all served to limit herd growth, and ensured that pressure on the range remained minimal during this era.

1.5. The Erosion of Pre-Colonial Institutions of Land Management

In this section, the factors that led to the erosion of the traditional system of resource management are laid out and discussed. The aim is to illustrate how the combined effects of colonial rule; the policies of the newly independent government; increased market activity and population growth led to the gradual disintegration of the traditional resource management system. Communities lost their ability to coordinate their actions regarding resource use and overexploitation occurred. On communal rangelands, resource overexploitation manifested itself as overgrazing; a problem which has continued to this day because of the inadequacy of the existing institutions to address it.

In the 1855, Botswana was formally declared a protectorate under British rule.

This ushered in a new era on rights over land and related controls. First, the traditional system with its embodiment of the communal system was seen as being inefﬁcient with regard to resource allocation and lacking in its management capacities. Secondly, the

British were mainly interested in preventing the expansion of the Germans from the west and the Boers from the southeast. The best way to achieve this was to maintain law and order in the protectorate. This was done by strengthening the authority and legitimacy of the chiefs; and ﬁxing and enforcing tribal territorial boundaries (Poteete, 1999).

14 Previously, the traditional resource management system and its system of land tenure had adhered to the social and hierarchical structure of the tribe. This it achieved by incorporating a holistic view of the rangeland resource and its users, in its bundle of rights. Contrary to this, new thought which now guided tenure change, led to the classiﬁcation of resource users in the tribal territories into clearly separable social units.

These social units were exclusive of each other and were classified according to ethnicities, villages, farmers and herders. This fragmentation was also applied to the institutions and organizations that were formed to manage natural resources. Institutions and organizations were classified in such a way that they could easily be delineated for enforcement mechanisms. The new system led to the omission of critical features of the traditional system; its flexibility and ability to cater for all members’ needs through its bundle of rights. For example, administrative boundaries were created which eventually endangered the mobility of herders. This limited their capacity for efficient opportunistic management and for reacting flexibly to different risks (N iamir-Fuller, 2000; Kirk, 2000).

The ﬁxing and enforcement of tribal boundaries under colonial rule meant that tribes lost their ability to expand, constrict or split as they had been able to do in the past.

Consequently, their capacity to adjust to ﬂuctuations in regional power relations, population growth, and the environment were limited.

Colonization also coincided with changes in demographics, market pressures, and technology. As prices for meat increased, so did the opportunities for marketing livestock. Botswana had previously only exported beef to South Africa; the country now had access to the European market. This market guaranteed a market for her beef exports at prices that were 40 percent higher than world market prices (Fidzani, et. al., 1997).

15 These rents were passed onto herders. Furthermore, government strongly supported the

livestock sector; making it highly attractive. In response, the number and size of cattle

herds grew.

The introduction of mechanically drilled deep boreholes in the 19505 and 19605

furthered the expansion of livestock and placed increasing pressure on the range. The size

of the national cattle herd in Botswana increased over several decades. From a population

of about half a million in the 1920s, the national herd increased to one million in the early

19505. By 1970, the cattle population had doubled again to two million. A record of

approximately three million head was reached at the onset of the 1982-7 drought period

(Harvey, et. al., 1990). By 1993 the cattle population stood at 1.8 million and increased

further to 2.25 million by 1996 (Government of Botswana, Statistics Bulletin, 2000).

Despite the decline in cattle numbers, acute overgrazing and land degradation continued

to erode the productivity of this sector (Government of Botswana, Environment Statistics,

2000)

Boreholes allowed year round grazing in areas previously reserved for the rainy

season or were entirely inaccessible because of the absence of surface water. Besides

increasing pressure on the range, the introduction of permanent water sources impacted on property rights to land and water. Only those individuals who had the ﬁnancial means to drill deep wells did so. Since borehole ownership guaranteed them access to a permanent water source at the exclusion of others; cattle ownership gradually became skewed in favor of the wealthier members of the community (White, 1992).

Higher market opportunities led to the detachment of people from their traditional community settings through the enhancement of economic, social and geographical

l6 mobility (Baland and Platteau, 1996). For example, a signiﬁcant segment of the young male population became migrant laborers in South Aﬁican mines. Gradually, this led to a

change in the values and beliefs systems regarding resource preservation. The kgotla lost

its signiﬁcance as the traditional system was dismantled and delegitimized.

Since tribes could no longer respond to population pressures through expansion

and relocation, demands on natural resources increased locally. The traditional system

had relied on the ability to limit entry, natural demographic checks, and the ability to

expand territorially. As these conditions gradually disappeared, so did the effectiveness of the system (Poteete, 1999).

1.6. Efforts at Improving Institutions of Land Management

The purpose of this section is to illustrate govemment’s efforts at improving land management institutions. The discussion begins by highlighting the importance of

livestock production to the economy. The policies which led to the over expansion of

livestock production and placed an added strain on the range and existing tenure system

are discussed. Various policies that were implemented to remedy the problem are also discussed.

At independence in 1966, agriculture was the engine of economic growth contributing 45 percent to GDP. Livestock production contributed 70 percent to

agriculture’s share of GDP”). In addition, it was the main source of foreign exchange

(F idzani, et. al., 1997). Hence, government implemented policies that strongly favored

livestock production. These policies came in the form of high prices; input subsides; a

'° The actual ﬁgure may be higher since GDP ﬁgures do not capture non cash exchanges.

17 very lenient tax system and the provision of heavy livestock speciﬁc infrastructure; all of which, made the livestock sector extremely attractive for individuals to invest in.

As livestock numbers grew, so did concerns about livestock productivity and range degradation. Livestock productivity indicators such as calving percentage, mortality rates and commercial off-taken levels were low. Range degradation was seen to be a result of overstocking. All these problems were blamed on the traditional system of land tenure which was under tremendous strain.

Policymakers and administrators saw the traditional system of land tenure as being inadequate for promoting higher levels of commercial off-take; limiting stock numbers to the carrying capacity, and preventing land from being overused (Lane and

Moorehead, 1995). The apparent mismanagement of communal range lands led the government to privatize them.

Privatization was regarded as the instrument for promoting optimal resource allocation, management, cost efﬁciency and the protection of resources. Granting herders private property rights would give them incentive to adopt a more commercially oriented approach to livestock production. It would also provide them with the security of tenure needed to encourage long term investments in measures that would improve range productivity.

The ﬁrst piece of legislation that led to the replacement of the traditional system and its institutions for land management was the Tribal Land Act of 1968. The next change came in the form of privatization under the Tribal Land Grazing Policy of 1975, followed by the fencing component of the 1991 National Agricultural Development

" Off—take refers to the number of cattle slaughtered from the national herd expressed as a percentage. Cattle are primarily sold to the Botswana Meat Commission the ofﬁcial beef export marketing agency.

18 Policy. These policies and their effects are discussed consecutively in the sections that follow.

1.6.1. The Tribal Land Act 1968

The Tribal Land Act of 1968 was a pivotal piece of legislation regarding land administration. The Act took custody and control of communal land from the chiefs and vested it in the control of newly instituted land boards. Land Boards consisted of members elected by the communities and members appointed by the Minister of Local

Government, Lands and Housing.

The structure of the land boards was intended to integrate local participation in land planning and administration (Baland and Platteau, 1996). However, the powers and controls established under the Act ensured that the management system remained largely centralized because board members were ultimately answerable to the minister. With no decision making powers over how land was to be used, the land boards were eventually reduced to advisory boards for the minister who had the last say over how land was to be allocated.

Under the traditional system, no written records of land allocations had been kept.

Headmen were now required to certify that new allocations did not conﬂict with existing rights. However, headmen were not paid to act in compliance with the agents of the land board. This was a major oversight on the part of government. Under the traditional system, headmen had received economics reward and beneﬁts from prestige associated with their position as land managers. The new system made this a lost entitlement. As a result, headmen failed to cooperate with the agents of the land board.

19 The agents rarely checked for existing rights to areas under consideration and this created opportunities to exploit the system. Although the communal system of land tenure continued, the authority of the overseers to regulate access to grazing land had collapsed (Poteete, 1999). The new system of Land Boards, meanwhile, lacked the capacity to regulate the use of communal grazing land.

With time, the Land boards accumulated written records and developed systems for tracking allocations. Both the numbers and qualifications of Land Board staff have improved as have the qualifications of Board members. While legitimacy, authority and institutional capacity of the Land Boards increased significantly since their introduction in 1970, barriers to effective administration of land remained. The Land Board’s limited capacity for the sort of on the ground monitoring needed to enforce decisions and prevent unapproved uses of land posed perhaps the most important challenge. The government of

Botswana introduced the Tribal Land Grazing Policy (TGLP) in 197 5. While promoted as a means to alleviate overgrazing on communal lands and encourage commercial development, the new policy also gave Land Boards a new tool for managing the range

(Poteete, 1999).

I. 6.2. The Tribal Lands Grazing Policy 0f1975

The TGLP established three zoning categories for the tribal lands: communal, commercial leasehold and reserve. Individuals with large cattle holdings were required to move their herds from the communal lands to commercial leasehold land, drill boreholes and develop ranches. Each individual was given a 50 year lease which gave him exclusive usuﬁ'uct rights to the ranch. The policy suited the capacity of Land Boards in that it created clear rights to speciﬁed blocks of land and required little on the ground

20 monitoring of land use. Also with private rights land farmers now had an incentive to report any infringements on their property to the land board. Theoretically, it was the generally believed that privatization also provided incentive for improving range productivity (Demstez, 1967; Cheung, 1970; Posner, 1977, Allen, 1985; Larson and

Bromley, 1999).

TGLP led to a change in land tenure and a reduction in the size of communal grazing lands. Since the remaining communal land had shrunk, pressure on this land increased, aggravating the overgrazing problem rather than alleviating it (Carl Bro

International, 1982; Tsimako, 1991; Segosebe, 1997).

The main problem with TGLP had to do with the poor manner in which it was conceptualized and implemented (Tsimako, 1991; White 1992; Poteete, 1999). The proposed zoning of land was based on the false premise that vast tracks of empty land existed, which could be divided into ranches. As it turned out, most of the land which was habitable was already occupied or provided valuable resources to populations within its vicinity. Any land that was bare often did not have any water and hence, could not sustain life.

The lease agreements themselves had several loopholes. While leasees were supposed to develop their ranches, no minimrnn requirement was set for ranch development. Rents were set at sub-economic levels and leasees were not required to pay immediately (Picard, 1980; Amtzen, 1990; Peters, 1994). As a result, leasees had no incentive to improve management on the ranches and many ranches continued to be managed as cattleposts (Tsimako, 1991, Segosebe, 1997).

21 There were ﬂaws in the criteria used to grant ranches to individuals. Instead of granting individuals ranches according to whether they possessed the ﬁnancial means and managerial skills necessary to embark on such a venture, let alone if they had a remote interest in ranching; the criteria was based solely on the size of one’s cattle holdings.

Consequently, ranches were allocated to individuals who in many cases had neither the

incentive nor the capacity to run successful ranches.

Many times ranches were allocated without prior knowledge of the likelihood of

ﬁnding water on the ranch. Individuals would be allocated ranches, only to spend huge amounts of money searching and drilling for underground water. More often than not, individuals used huge amounts of money they had been given as loans from the government for ranch development, solely on water exploration (White, 1992). As a result, there was little or no money left over from these efforts for other development purposes.

The actual size of the ranches was ﬁxed (Poteete, 1999). This aspect did not consider the difﬁcult ecological conditions in the areas where the ranches were located.

Fixed ranches plus the fencing requirement eliminated the ﬂexibility herders needed to their boundaries and possibly meant the end of seasonal migration. The grass and water available on the ranches could not support the large herds that were moved there. Herders were also reluctant to sell part of their herd (Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Swallow, 1993;

Niamir-Fuller, 2000). Rather than sell part of their herd, they would divert them back on to the communal range where they placed added pressure on the remaining communal land (Tsimako, 1991). This practice was made possible by the legal system which

22 allowed dual grazing rights, the right to retain rights to the commons after gaining exclusive usufruct rights to ranches.

By 1990, the land that had been designated for ranch development had either been allocated or designated for communal use, but the problem of reforming institutions of land tenure to encourage long term investment remained. Although TGLP had failed, high ranking policymakers continued to state that improving agricultural productivity required the individualization of property rights and the adoption of capital intensive ranching. From their perspective TGLP had failed because it did not go far enough. If its shortcomings were ﬁxed, all boded well for the twin objectives of increasing agricultural productivity while reducing range degradation. Thus in 1991, the government introduced a follow up policy for ﬁrrther tenure changes as a component of the National Agricultural

Development Policy.

1. 6.3. The Fencing Component of the 1991 National Agricultural Development Policy

The fencing component of the 1991 National Agricultural Development Policy12 gives individuals or groups exclusive rights to graze cattle on land they were currently using, for which they must fence. Under this policy, the commons are restricted to areas that are not currently in use because of the poor quality of water and grazing there. A more limited form of commons is to be created in areas where each community will gain the exclusive right to exclude members of other communities (Government of Botswana,

1991). Perhaps, this change in the wording of the policy reﬂects a growing awareness and need to embrace more community based approaches to resource management.

Nevertheless, the main goal of the policy is to privatize all grazing land that is currently being used. Before it was approved, several policy makers argued that lessons

'2 Even though this policy was implemented in 1991, it still remains government policy in 2003

23 learnt from the failed TGLP could be applied to the new policy to avoid undesirable outcomes. Several things had to be in place before implementation. First, fencing teams had to ensure that there was enough land and water prior to fencing. Second, land board agents had to evaluate the management skills of potential leasees. Third, all the necessary extension and infrastructure support was to be provided where necessary. Fourth, land use conﬂicts were to be avoided and/or resolved before allocation. Unfortunately, dual grazing rights were maintained. To this day, no single ranch has been allocated under the

1991 policy. Poteete, (1999) argues that this was because of the diverging views between policymakers in the ministries and ofﬁcers at the local level.

1.7. Differences in the Implementation and Outcomes of Privatization

The purpose of this section is to illustrate the differences in the implementation and outcomes of the privatization policies. What emerges from the discussion indicates that even though privatization was regarded as the solution to the apparent mismanagement of communal land it was not always accepted and adopted by the communities it was intended to beneﬁt. The reason why this is the case are also examined in this section.

The TGLP and the 1991 fencing policy occurred in succession. Regarding implementation, TGLP was met with little opposition. The privatization of grazing land held in common was the accepted dogma by many within the development community

(Sanford, 1983; Lane and Moorehead, 1995; Larson and Bromley, 1999). Policymakers in Botswana were no exception. Many of them were politically elite and wealthy cattle barons. As such, they were not opposed to the idea of acquiring exclusive usufruct rights

24 to grazing land. Therefore, they promoted privatization under the guise that it would promote social justice by putting an end to overgrazing and range degradation. Thus, reserving land for ﬁxture generations. Any opposition to privatization was crushed, and it was approved as government policy. As it turned out, hundreds of ranches were allocated under the TGLP. More than 500 ranches were demarcated and by 1991, 65 percent of them had been allocated (Tsimako, 1991). In contrast, not a single ranch has been

allocated under the 1991 policy. This was mainly because of the diverging views between policymakers on one hand and district ofﬁcials and people at the local level.

The stark difference in the actual implementation and outcomes of the two policies stemmed from growing concern and evidence from the experience with TGLP.

People were beginning to question whether the fencing of grazing lands was really more

efﬁcient than the traditional system (Abel, 1992; Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Lane and

Moorehead, 1995). To begin with, fencing restricted multiple uses of the range resources.

It also limited seasonal migration, preventing herders from moving their animals in their

efforts to maximize range productivity. Wildlife movements were also affected, and this was having a negative impact on the tourism industry. F urtherrnore, fencing made less

land available to accommodate an ever increasing population. This increased

overcrowding in the remaining communal land. As a result, there was a lot of opposition

to the fencing policy at the district and local level which could not be ignored.

For policies pertaining to land management and administration in Botswana to be

enacted, they have to be approved by policymakers at cabinet and parliamentary levels.

However, for these same policies to be implemented it takes commitment and action at

the district level from land board members and agents for them to be actually carried out.

25 Cabinet members and parliament did meet and approve the 1991 fencing policy.

Nevertheless, they could not force district ofﬁcials and land board agents to implement a policy that was being rejected by the very people it was going to affect. In some cases, strong opposition at the grassroots level led to the outright rejection of both TGLP and the fencing policy of 1991. For example, in Kgatleng district, the TGLP and fencing policy proposals were thrown out completely (Peters, 1994). This was partly because in this district there was not enough land to demarcate ranches for each cattle owner.

Therefore, in Kgatleng district no ranches were allocated at all. Hence, grazing lands in this district have always remained under communal tenure.

Table 1 shows the districts of Botswana, their ecological condition and population density and the extent to which TGLP and the 1991 policies were implemented. From the table it is clear that the allocation of ranches under TGLP was only possible in those districts with low population densities and relatively poor ecological conditions. Still in these same districts, fencing under the 1991 policy is listed as ongoing. In Kgatleng district which has a high population density and relatively small land both policies were not implemented at all although the planned change was to privatize land.

These outcomes support theories of induced innovation and intensiﬁcation

(Hayami and Ruttan, 1970; Boserup 1981). The View that population pressure, changes in market conditions and technology may induce changes at the local level as a result of changing factor scarcities and prices. Further, the discussion shows the involvement of people at the grassroots level as illustrated by their opposition and outright rejection of privatization of their communal lands in some cases.

26 1.8. Conclusion

The debate on the management on communal resource management has come full circle. From promotion of the individualization of property rights (Demstez, 1967;

Cheung, 1970; Posner, 1977, Allen, 1985), to promotion the devolution of rights back to communities to enable them to manage their resources as they once did (Runge, 1981;

1984; 1986; Bromley and Cemea, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996;

Hanna and J entoﬁ, 1996).

It is now widely accepted that privatization is not the only efﬁcient development pathway (McCarthy, et. al., 2001). Furthermore, simply devolving rights over resources from governments back to the communities or user groups is not enough (Rasmussen and

Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Meinzen-Dick, et. al., 2001). As it relates to the management of communal grazing, a coordinated collective action effort is needed to ensure that herders keep herd sizes on a particular range over time so that the grazing pressure on the range is properly managed.

Where communities can successfully manage their resources, it has become necessary to explore whether collective action could be fostered to enable communities to manage resources like they once did in the past. Botswana’s Kgatleng district presents an opportunity to examine whether this is a viable option. In Kgatleng district, cattle owners have organized themselves into borehole syndicates. Membership to a borehole syndicate entitles one to access to water all year round. The organization and hierarchical structure of the borehole syndicates bears a striking resemblance to the traditional deﬁnition of community.

27 Makepe (2003) examines the borehole syndicate as an institution through which collective action over the management of grazing resource can possibly be engendered.

Considerable research has been devoted to determining the conditions necessary for successful collective action (Wade, 1987; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1999).

Drawing from these lessons the paper looks at how the existing system can be restructured to improve range land management at the borehole syndicate level.

28 Table 1.1: Differences in the Implementation and Outcome of the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy and 1991 Fencing Component of the National Agricultural Development Policy in Botswana

District Ecological Population TGLP Planned 1991 policy Condition density Done Change Implemented Central Arid/mild 2.79 Yes Privatization Ongoing med-low

Ghanzi Very arid 0.20 Yes Privatization Ongoing low

Kgalagadi Very arid 0.28 Yes Privatization Ongoing low

Kgatleng Mild 7.60 No Privatization No high

Kweneng Arid/Mild 4.47 Yes Privatization Ongoing med

Ngamiland Riverine/Arid 0.87 Yes Privatization Ongoing low

Southern Very arid/mild 5.48 Yes Privatization No med

North East Mild 8.29 No Communal No high Farms

South East Mild 29.21 No Communal No high Farms

Source: Government Statistical Bulletin (2000).

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34 Chapter 2

THE NATURE, EXTENT AND DETERMINANTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION OVER WATER AND GRAZING MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA’S KGATLENG DISTRICT

2.1. Introduction

Common property resource (CPR) regimes have been under scrutiny for over three decades (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). A CPR is one over which no single individual has control, making it susceptible to unrestricted access, overuse and degradation. For example, livestock grazing in Africa is widely practiced under arrangements where the ownership of livestock is private, but the land on which they are grazed is utilized in common. Left unchecked, overstocking causes overgrazing which can lead to land degradation. Other examples of these tragedies of the commons are overﬁshing and deforestation.

Several instruments such as taxes, quotas, licenses, the assignment of private property rights and the imposition and enforcement of the rules of use and access by an external agency have been suggested as measures to address the CPR overuse problem

(Wade, 1986; Tietenberg, 1992). In Botswana, privatization was implemented in 1975, and later in 1991, to address the problem of overgrazing. Privatization failed to address the overgrazing problem because of high transaction costs and the high incentives herders in Botswana have to overstock13 . Consequently, the problem of overgrazing persists.

Recently, policymakers and scholars have acknowledged that as a resource management tool, privatization is not always superior to community resource

'3 A detailed discussion of the factors which led to the failure of privatization as a policy to address the problem of overgrazing is given in Makepe (2003).

35 management (Runge, 1992; Baland and Plateau, 1996) although privatization may be optimal in cases where community resource management is so poor it becomes welfare increasing to privatize land (McCarthy, et al., 2001). Various factors such as poverty, dependence on the natural resource, and environmental risks may make common property a more rational solution to problems of resource management (Runge, 1992).

Botswana’s rangelands lie in a non-equilibrium environment. Non equilibrium environments are ones in which no stable equilibrium between animal and plant populations exists because of highly ﬂuctuating rainfall and temperature both in time and space (Ellis and Swift, 1988). As such, the application of the carrying capacity concept as it is used on fenced ranches in stable environments is not realistic (Behnke and Scoones,

1993). In non-equilibrium environments, there is no ﬁxed number of animals for a particular range over time and space, so livestock mobility plays an important role in enabling herders to allow their animals to maximize on variations in range productivity

(N iarnir-Fuller, 2001). This practice allows livestock to utilize greener pastures while other pastures are given time to regenerate, something which is not possible with enclosure. Therefore, in non-equilibrium environments like those in Botswana, it may be welfare increasing for rangelands to be managed as common property.

Over the last decade, scholars have advocated for the restoration of indigenous common property rights structures to enable communities to manage their own resources

(Ostrom, 1990; Runge, 1992; Baland and Platteau, 1996). As a result, community based resource management approaches relying on collective action, have received greater attention as plausible ways to deal with the CPR overuse problem. But the devolution of

36 resource rights back to communities alone is not enough to ensure that resources will be used in sustainable ways.

The success with which communities collectively manage their resources also depends on the quality of local level institutions of resource management; the organizations to enforce them and the ability of these institutions to govern resource use

(Baland and Platteau, 1996; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Swallow and Bromley,

1995). In the pre-colonial era harsh ecological conditions were sufﬁcient to limit herd sizes keeping pressure on the range minimal (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Poteete, 1999).

Since then population pressure, mechanical technology, market and government failures and the lack of use regulations for communal rangelands have led to their overexploitation”.

Communal grazing lands in Kgatleng District of Botswana are under severe grazing pressure. Factors which can enhance the way cattle owners in the district can collectively manage the communal grazing resource system need to be identiﬁed. Cattle owners have organized themselves into syndicates for purposes of drilling underground water critical for livestock production. Membership in a syndicate allows cattle owners to control access to water and the surrounding grazing lands. Traditionally, the land board made sure that boreholes were drilled 16 km apart but in some places boreholes are closer together. Grazing lands are under the jurisdiction of the Land Board which has failed to address the problem of overgrazing. It has become necessary to explore whether grazing rights ought to be devolved to the syndicates, so that this user group can take over the management of the grazing resource (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; 1992).

Before this happens, it is vital to understand the factors underlying collective action at the

'4 A detailed discussion of these effects is given in Makepe (2003). 37 syndicate level over water provision in Kgatleng district as it currently stands. In this study, collective action is deﬁned as any action taken actively and jointly by syndicate members (or a committee of elected syndicate members) to achieve a common objective, whose outcome depends on the interdependence and reciprocity of syndicate members.

Collective action occurs whenever members take steps actively to work together in managing water and grazing resources.

What are the determinants of collective action over the management of water and grazing resources in Kgatleng district? After presenting some descriptive statistics of some indicators of collective action, I develop an index of collective action at the syndicate level. Next, I use econometric methods to examine the determinants of collective action over borehole water and grazing management by the syndicates. The main concern is to establish whether cattle owners in Kgatleng District actively and jointly take steps together to manage their water15 and grazing resources.

Recently, policy makers and researchers have acknowledged that a critical dimension to environmental sustainability is the success with which local communities husband collectively-managed natural resources (Baland and Platteau, 1996). By looking at collective action as a possible alternative to privatization, the study contributes to the search for appropriate communal resource management strategies.

'5 In this study it, was not possible based on the available survey data to distinguish between people’s willingness and capacity to act collectively. Inaction on the part of a member simply indicates a lack of collective action.

38 2.2. The Study Area

Kgatleng district, located in southeastern Botswana, covers a total area of 7,960 kmz. It was selected for the study for the following reasons. First, all the grazing land in this district is under communal tenure and it is dominated by pastoralism. Second, small and large cattle owners in this district have formed themselves into syndicates and drill boreholes to tap underground water which provides permanent water for livestock production. Finally, the area is considered to be under a lot of grazing pressure (Van

Vegten, 1981; Moleele, 1994; Amtzen, 1990; Allen, 1996; Jeltsch, 1996; Ringrose, 1996,

Government of Botswana, 2000).

Land use in the district is broadly divided as shown in the map (see Fig. 2.1).

Villages are found along the Madikwe River, the railway line and the main road. The predominantly mixed farming areas are found in the southern part of the district where crop production is the dominant activity. The predominantly grazing area is found in the north eastern part of the district.

Kgatleng district has a mean annual precipitation of 450 — 550 mm. Precipitation is erratic both in space and time with a seasonal rainfall variability of between 30 to 40 percent. Mean annual temperature is 18 - 20 degrees Celsius. Soils are poor in organic matter and nutrient quality (Moleele, 1994).

2.3. Data

This study is based on a survey of 73 borehole syndicates conducted from

February to September 2002, in Kgatleng District. A list of all the boreholes that were drilled in Kgatleng district was obtained from the Department of Water Affairs in

39 Gaborone, Botswana. From this list, all the boreholes that were owned by syndicates in the district were selected. Of the 80 syndicates, ﬁve declined to participate in the survey and so a total of 75 syndicates were interviewed. Of these syndicates, two were outliers” and were dropped from the analysis. As a result, data from the 73 remaining syndicates was used in the analysis.

The borehole syndicate was selected as the unit of analysis because it is the relevant institution responsible for borehole water provision and management. Therefore, it became expedient to look beyond the household as the unit of analysis. Boreholes are spread all over the northeastern part of the district, a predominantly grazing area covering more than 60 percent of the district’s total land area. The average number of cattle watered in one season per borehole is 1110. This ﬁgure consists mainly of members’ cattle and a small number of in-migrating cattle which make it to the borehole because the grazing area is not fenced.

Membership in a syndicate allows members to share ownership and control over the use of the borehole, and grazing resources within the vicinity of the borehole. The average number of members in a syndicate is 18. All members share joint responsibility for the borehole’s operational and maintenance costs. These include the costs of fuel, oil, services and repairs. Tasks such as maintaining the troughs and fences surrounding the holding pens are done by members with assistance from herd boys (people hired to look after cattle). If a member’s access to borehole water is terminated, it is done by other members as a sanction for his failure to pay his share of the borehole’s operational and

‘6 In one syndicate there were only two members because all others had been evicted. Of the remaining members, one complained that the other member was not contributing to the running of the borehole at all. In fact, he was in the process of getting him evicted from the syndicate. The second syndicate had 100 members which was unusually high. 40 maintenance costs. This step is taken after several attempts at persuading the member concerned to pay his share of the operating and maintenance fees.

Each syndicate has a tiered structure which extends access to the borehole beyond its members to include dependents and hirers. A member’s dependents are the people who come behind him and gain access to the borehole through his membership to the syndicate. Dependents include the children or relatives of the member of the syndicate.

For example, a son or a relative whose cattle are being held by the member qualiﬁes as a dependent. On average, syndicate members allow four dependents access to the borehole.

Dependents have no independent rights to the borehole except through the member and they do not pay fees. Nevertheless, non-monetary exchanges do occur between adult dependents and members, particularly if the dependent is not a child of the member. A dependent may offer his services as a herd boy to a member in return for access to borehole water and grazing. Therefore, while there may be no monetary exchange there is some reciprocal exchange taking place between members and dependents over time.

The next category of cattle owners who have access to the syndicate borehole are the hirers. Hirers are people who pay members a fee for the privilege of enjoying use rights to the borehole water and grazing. Each hirer pays an amount proportional his herd size. 34 percent of syndicates have no hirers, while another 63 percent have an average of two hirers but do not intend to accept any additional hirers because of resource scarcity.l7

Neither dependents nor hirers have any say in the running of the borehole.

A structured questionnaire was administered to groups of three individuals representing the members of each syndicate. The survey collected information about the

‘7 Increasing resource scarcity is evident in two ways: ﬁrst, in the way syndicates turned down applications from cattle owners who wanted to be merrrbers of existing borehole syndicates, and second, in the practice of limiting the number of dependents the syndicate could have.

41 structure and function of the syndicate; the use and maintenance of water and range resources, range degradation and improvements; causes and the extent of disputes over resource use; and market accessibility. In addition, informal interviews were carried out with key informants in the Ministry of Agriculture at the district level and community elders to provide supplemental information.

2.4. Collective Action over Water and Grazing Resources in Kgatleng district

In Kgatleng district, access to communal grazing land is solely determined by access to borehole water which is owned and managed collectively by a syndicate.

Communal tenure entitles community members to graze their cattle on land designated for grazing. But the spacing rule used by the land board to allocate land to syndicates for drilling boreholes prohibits others from drilling a borehole near the existing borehole.

Hence, syndicates have defacto control over the grazing surrounding the borehole. The ambiguity which exists between rights to grazing and rights to water makes managing grazing difﬁcult (Peters, 1994). While syndicates have established rules regarding the use of borehole water the same cannot be said for grazing”. But because access to grazing is determined by access to water, collective action for managing water is inextricably linked to grazing management.

Collective action for managing water occurs within and between syndicates. Each syndicate acts as a unit within itself, and also as a unit in relation to other syndicates.

Within the syndicate, collective action amongst members occurs in the form of shared responsibility, joint action and reciprocity toward water provision for themselves.

Between syndicates, collective action occurs in the form of reciprocal behavior toward

'8 This issue is introduced here and dealt with in greater detail in the next paper.

42 water provision for members of other syndicates experiencing a disruption in their water supply. Assistance is sought from the nearest syndicate with a reliable water supply.

Once permission is granted, grantees supply oil and fuel for running the borehole while their cattle are at the borehole. This form of collective action is a standard practice amounting to an unwritten rule which does not require econometric analysis. Therefore, this paper focuses on collective action within the syndicate. 59 syndicates reported giving and seeking assistance from others when there is a water shortage, while the remaining

14 reported only giving assistance to others but not seeking it.

To establish how well members work together, respondents were asked about the causes and extent of disputes over resource use. 40 percent of the syndicates had a dispute in the last year. Disputes arise mainly over problems related to fee collection. 79 percent of the syndicates had problems with the payment of fees. In the spirit of working together said to be the cornerstone of syndicate organization (Peters, 1983) if there is a dispute members ﬁrst talk it over before resorting to punishment.

To establish whether members worked together better now than in the past, respondents were asked to determine whether the incidence of disputes had reduced (or increased) and whether their resolution was easier (or more difﬁcult) now than in the past ten years. 58 percent of the syndicates reported that there were fewer disputes.

Conversely, 42 percent of the syndicates reported that there were more disputes.

However, 70 percent of the syndicates stated that it was easier to resolve disputes. The remaining 30 percent had difﬁculties in resolving disputes.

Table 2.1 indicates the various reasons given for the above observations. Having members who are relatives enhances their ability to work together, an important factor in

43 reducing the incidence of disputes. When accompanied by the application of strict punishment rules it became easier for syndicates to resolve disputes. In contrast, having too many boreholes in the area, high cattle numbers and opportunistic behavior on the part of members with small herd sizes contributed to the increase in disputes”. These factors and the disregard for syndicate rules plus the inability for members to work together made it more difﬁcult for some syndicates to resolve their disputes now than in the past.

Despite the incidence of disputes, syndicate membership is fairly stable. 63 percent of the syndicates had no members join or leave the syndicate in the last ﬁve years. Based on the 61 percent level of attendance at meetings, members do actively contribute their labor and time to activities related to water provision most of the time.

Meetings are held six times a year on average to discuss matters pertaining borehole management. Although nearly half the syndicates stated that the incidence of disputes had risen, more than half reported that it was easier to resolve them. The above assessment shows that syndicates in the district do work together in water provision.

2.5. Measuring Collective Action at the Borehole Syndicate Level

The process of measuring collective action at the syndicate level was done in three stages. First, ﬁve indicators of collective action were selected from the survey data.

Second, these indicators were used to develop two indices related to collective action using factor analysis. Finally, these indices were used to analyze the underlying

‘9 Syndicate members with large herds have a higher stake in ensuring that borehole water is available on a permanent basis and accused those with smaller herds of free riding on their contributions. This contributes to the incidence of disputes among syndicate members.

44 determinants of collective action within syndicates over the management of water and grazing in the district.

I used a series of ﬁve variables because there is no single ideal indicator of collective action. The ﬁve variables were chosen based on observable syndicate features representing several aspects of collective action, namely: how well members get along; members’ provision of labor, time and capital, and the use of underlying institutions to punish violators of syndicate rules for water provision. Using this criterion, the following

ﬁve indicators of collective action were chosen: (1) whether disputes had occurred in the last year (2) the number of meetings held in the last year, (3) the percentage attendance at meetings, (4) the presence of defaulters, and (5) the severity of punishment for defaulters.

Similar approaches have been used in empirical studies on collective action

(Gebremedhin, et a1, 2000; McCarthy, et al., 2001) in Ethiopia, (Meinzen-Dick, et al.,

2000) in India and (Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2001) in Mexico and South India. The selection of these indicators of collective action was constrained by data availability. The syndicate level interviews made it difﬁcult to collect data on sensitive and private information, such as data on the main sources of income of members. In what follows, I explain and justify the selection of the indicators of collective action based on my knowledge of study area, the syndicates and insights gleaned from the survey.

Whether there were any disputes in the last year indicates the extent of violations regarding water use, allocation and borehole maintenance and how well members get along. Disputes often arise amongst members because of the allocation of costs amongst the group. If a member uses his own vehicle to transport fuel to the borehole a dispute may arise over the proper allocation of the cost amongst members. On the other hand, if

45 hired transport was used it is easier to divide the transportation cost equally among

members. Using the absence of disputes in the last year as an indicator of collective

action has been used before (Gebremedhin, et al., 2000; McCarthy, et al., 2001; Dayton-

Johnson and Bardhan, 2001).

The number of meetings held in the last year and the percentage attendance at

meetings were both chosen as indicators of collective action because they represent

individuals’ active and joint supply of labor and time in the provision of the water.

Members regularly hold meetings throughout the year to discuss and take action on

matters pertaining to the rules of use, operation and maintenance of the borehole. On

average syndicates met six times during the year, with an average attendance rate of 61

percent.

Meetings proceed when enough members are present to constitute a quorum. The

types of decisions reached at these meetings include decisions related to the management

and maintenance of the borehole, planned improvements for the borehole, payments and

rules of use, and penalties to be meted out on defaulters. Decisions and actions are taken jointly and made democratically after a consensus has been reached by members; no

single member dominates the meeting. Even though syndicates appointed a chairman, his

main purpose was to chair the meetings and keep a record of the syndicate’s affairs. He

did not make unilateral decisions. Others have used the actual amount of labor time spent

in the construction, development and maintenance of a water source by members of a

user group as a dependent variable (Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2001 ). Unfortunately,

this data was not available. To address this issue, I used percentage attendance at

46 meetings as an indicator of collective action. McCarthy et al., (2001) also used this variable as an indicator of collective action.

I used the presence of defaulters as an indicator of collective action because this variable represents the provision of individuals’ capital in providing water. If there were defaulters this indicated a lack of collective action. Defaulting on fees could indicate a lack of funds and not a lack of collective action. To address this issue, respondents were asked why they thought other members had not paid fees. Only 20 percent of the syndicates indicated a lack of funds to be the main reason for not paying fees. 44 percent of the syndicates reported that some members could pay fees but they would not pay because they knew that other syndicate members would meet the borehole’s operational and maintenance costs; evidence that some members free ride on the contribution of others.

Members share jointly the responsibility for the borehole’s operational and maintenance costs. 88 percent of the syndicates used a ﬂat rate system, with each member contributing an equal amount towards maintaining the borehole. 11 percent of the syndicates had members pay proportionately according to herd size. Only one syndicate used money from hirers for borehole maintenance”. In rare cases where the problem had to be ﬁxed urgently, some members paid more than their share of the monetary cost and collected the money from other members later. Patterns of reciprocity come into play when it comes to those who cannot pay at some point in time. If a member cannot pay today, he may do something in return for another member who may pay his share.

2° In this particular case the hirer had negotiated access to the borehole with the full members of the syndicate who had given him perrrrission to use the borehole water over a ﬁve year period provided that be invested money towards the development of the water source.

47 I used what happens to members who do not pay maintenance fees as an indicator of collective action because this variable reﬂects the way in which members deal with those who fail to cooperate. Traditionally, members have developed a graduated penalty system of dealing with defaulters. Initially, a defaulter is persuaded to pay. Then he is taken to the customary court. When this fails he is taken to the high court. If the problem persists he is evicted. Eviction is taken as a ﬁnal resort by members frustrated by those who continuously violate syndicate rules. As observed by Peters (1983):

This penalty is rarely imposed, since it indicates a failure of the syndicate’s major internal sanctions — verbal reminders and recriminations—and a rupture in the valued solidarity of the organization. Members are reluctant to have recourse to such a ﬁnal sanction, since it constitutes public acknowledgement that the mutual understanding or kutlwano said to underlie syndicate organization has broken down. (pp156).

Nevertheless, nine syndicates indicated that they had evicted some defaulters. Using the establishment of a penalty system and graduated sanctions to deal with defaulters as an indicator of collective action has been used before (Gebremedhin, et. al., 2000;

McCarthy, et. al., 2001).

Given the context and manner in which syndicates provide and manage water provision, the approach I used to measure collective action made it possible to capture sufﬁciently the most suitable and appropriate indicators of collective action for the following reasons. The syndicate level interviews made it possible to obtain accurate data on the indicators that were subsequently selected to represent collective action because respondents were able to recall together, facts about their syndicate. Members know each other very well from many years of interaction. Therefore, they were able to state with conﬁdence whether or not members of their syndicate were cooperating, based on the

48 indicators selected above. The interviews included follow up questions to verify and clarify certain points and this served to enrich the data collected. Nevertheless, the syndicate level approach made it difﬁcult to obtain accurate data on sensitive individual level information. Respondents were reluctant to reveal the main sources of income of other members. Such questions were regarded as sensitive and private information.

Further, there were no resources available to conduct a household level survey to get such sensitive and disaggregated data. Despite these shortcomings, group level surveys are the most commonly used approach to study collective action.

Developing the index of collective action

Using STATA 7 software, I performed a principal components factor analysis on all ﬁve indicators of collective action. This yielded a list of eigenvalues for each variable.

The results of the factor analysis are in Table 2.2. The eigenvalues for the ﬁrst and second principal components were 1.84 and 1.14 respectively. Together they accounted for 60 percent of the variation. Only these two factors had eigenvalues values greater than one. Therefore, using Kaiser’s Rule21 these two factors were retained for further analysis.

I then performed the scree plot test22 to ascertain this ﬁnding, and it supported this conclusion. The results of the scree plot test are on Fig. 2.2. A sharp bend occurred after the second component indicating a noticeable drop in the variance explained by each

2' According to Kaiser’s rule only those principal components with eigenvalues greater than one can be retained for further analysis. This rule is based on the rational that any principal component, which is a measure of common variance should account for more variance than any single variable in the standardized score space (Green, 1978) 22 The scree plot test is used to determine how many components can be retained. The method involves plotting the variance accounted for by each component in the order of extraction and then looking for an elbow in the curve.

49 factor additional to the second. The factor loadings23 from the two retained factors were then subjected to a varimax rotation, forcing the principal components to be orthogonal.

These orthogonal component loadings were then used to construct the principal component scores for each observation in the survey data set. These principal component scores were then normalized to facilitate interpretation.

The ﬁrst factor is highly and positively correlated for variables associated with disputes, nonpayment and punishment. Speciﬁcally, the incidence of a dispute in the last year, the presence of defaulters and the severity of punishment all weighed heavily onto component one and weakly onto component two. I take this index to represent the combination of these indicators. However, its meaning is ambiguous because while nonpayment suggests a lack of collective action, taking strong steps to punish defaulters suggests collective action. This anomaly arises from the possibility that a higher incidence of disputes represents a situation of reporting disputes quickly so that they can be resolved.

The second factor is highly and positively correlated with variables associated with members actively participating in matters related to the management of the borehole. Speciﬁcally, the number of meetings held in the last year and the percentage attendance at these meetings all weighed heavily onto the second component and weakly onto component one. I take this as an index of members taking active steps together in matters related to the operation and management of the borehole.

2’ The factor loadings are the correlations between the original variables and the new principal components.

50 2.6. General Models

Multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the determinants of collective action using as dependent variables the index indicating members not following rules and the index indicating greater activity in meetings, and also the ﬁve individual indicators (disputes, nonpayment, punishment, number of meetings, and percentage attendance at meetings). I do the analysis both ways to ascertain and enrich the analysis because the indices are not without some difﬁculty in interpretation.

Ordinary least squares models were used to explain the two indices related to collective action. A tobit model was used to explain the percentage attendance at meetings because this variable is bounded between zero and one. Binary probit models were used to explain the presence of members who do not pay fees and whether there were any disputes in the last year. An ordered probit model was used to explain what happens to those who do not pay fees because responses took on a graduated order from one to ﬁve, with one being the least severe penalty (doing nothing) and ﬁve indicating the most severe penalty for violation (eviction from the syndicate). Multiple regression analysis was done on the number of meetings held in the last year. In selecting the explanatory variables for the models it was not possible based on the available survey data to distinguish between people’s willingness and capacity to cooperate.

2.7. Explanatory Variables and Hypothesized Relationships

In this section, I list the explanatory variables I use in this paper and explain the hypothesized relationships based on existing literature on collective action. The variables

I use to explain collective action within syndicates include the number of households who

51 are members of a syndicate, heterogeneity in cattle ownership, the average herd size per member, total distance to the major market where cattle are sold, membership in other village organizations, age of the syndicate, years of schooling of the chairman, the presence of hirers, percentage of women members, the major source of water in the wet season, the presence of a water shortage during the dry season and the turnover ratio in membership. All these variables are common to all the models. Table 2.3 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. In what follows, I describe the hypothesized relationships based on extant literature on collective action.

People work better in smaller groups (Olsen, 1965; Wade, 1986; Baland and

Plateau, 1996). In small groups the common knowledge assumption of models of strategic decisions is more valid. Norms and beliefs are shared, and patterns of reciprocity are common, especially if the group is socially and culturally homogenous as is the case here (Peters, 1983; Poteete, 1997). In small groups, it is also easier to reach a consensus in decision making and in enforcing social sanctions through reputation mechanisms and existing relationships (Bardhan, 1993; Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997).

Group size also represents a balance between increasing transaction costs and economies of scale. In a small syndicate, the demand for collective action over water provision may be low while the transaction costs of achieving it are high because of high

ﬁxed costs. But a larger syndicate may be able to pool its resources and meet its costs. As syndicate size grows and resources become scarce, it raises the stakes for members to remain actively engaged in collective action. Therefore, there are some positive economies of scale to be gained by larger syndicates when it comes to the pooling of resources. But if the syndicate gets too large, it can be detrimental for collective action

52 because the gains from collective action ultimately exceed incentive problems associated with it. Rising scarcity raises the beneﬁts from free riding on the contributions of others and so collective action may work better in groups of intermediate size (Pender, 1999). I hypothesize that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between intermediate syndicate size and collective action.

The effect of heterogeneity on collective action is ambiguous. Communities may be heterogeneous according to socio-cultural background, interest and endowment

(Baland and Platteau; 1996; 1999). These aspects may affect collective action differently.

The population in the district is ethnically and culturally homogeneous Peters (1983) and

Poteete (1999). Therefore, I do not have a variable for cultural heterogeneity. I consider wealth heterogeneity in terms of cattle ownership amongst members. Gebremedhin et al.,

(2000) measured the effect of heterogeneity on collective action by the coefﬁcient of variation of the distribution of the proportion of households with no oxen, one ox, two oxen, and more than two oxen. Using this approach, I measure heterogeneity by the coefﬁcient of variation of the distribution of the proportion of households with a certain number of cattle based on the following categories: less than 20 cattle, 20 to 40 cattle, 40 to 60 cattle, 60 to 100 cattle, 100 to 200, 200 to 300 and more than 400 cattle.

In Botswana, government policy strongly supports cattle producers through high prices and input subsidies for cattle. As the average herd size per member increases, so does the incentive for collective action over the provision of water critical for cattle keeping. I expect collective action to be enhanced by the average herd size per member because it increases the proﬁtability of providing and managing water (McCarthy, et. al.,

53 2000). Therefore, I hypothesize that average herd size per member has a positive impact on collective action.

Total distance to market represents members’ accessibility to cattle markets. It

also represents members’ accessibility to markets for their labor. Hence, the effect of market access on collective action is ambiguous. In the study area market access varies

within the sample. Roads get poorer as syndicates get further away from major towns.

But generally the district has relatively good access to markets compared to other places.

Once cattle reach a major town, the marketing inﬁ'astructure is in good condition. Better access to markets increases the value of resources and the value of managing resources well. Both factors favor collective action Gebremedhin et al., (2000). Fujita, Hayami and

Kikuchi (1999) have shown that in rural communities with poor access to markets, members have incentives to cooperate because they expect to continue their interaction indeﬁnitely. Better access to markets may undermine an individual’s incentive to engage in collective action by increasing the opportunity cost of labor or by providing more exit options, making it more difﬁcult to punish those who fail to cooperate (Baland and

Plateau, 1996; McCarthy, et al., 2001).

I hypothesize that membership in other village organizations has a positive impact on collective action. Possible learning effects and experience acquired from being in other organizations reduces the costs and increases members’ ability to enforce agreements (Wade, 1986; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland and Plateau,

1996). Different village organizations such as farmer organizations, revolving funds and burial societies, exist in the study area. Experience gained from membership in these organizations has a positive spillover effect on the running of the syndicate.

54 I hypothesize that the age of the syndicate has a positive impact on collective action. Syndicates with members who have been around longer and have more experience working together are likely to cooperate more than in syndicates that are fairly new. The average age of syndicates in the study is 36 years and membership is fairly stable.

Years schooling of the chairman was selected as a proxy for the management ability Kajisa (1999) of the syndicate chairman. I hypothesize that years of schooling of the syndicate chairman has a positive effect on collective action. Schooling is likely to provide the chairman with better management skill and leadership in matters pertaining to running the syndicate.

Syndicates located near rivers or seasonal pans (low-lying areas which become submerged with water for part of the year) shut down the borehole in the wet season and use these alternative water sources. This reduces the borehole’s operational and maintenance costs. The main source of water in the wet season is a dummy variable which is zero if the syndicate used its borehole during the wet season, or one if a river or seasonal pan was used. I hypothesize that reliance on alternative water sources in the wet season impacts negatively on collective action because it lowers members’ stakes to work together to secure water on a permanent basis.

Whether the syndicate experienced a water shortage during the dry season is used as an explanatory variable to explain collective action. During the dry season all syndicates rely mainly on borehole water. Therefore, I hypothesize that the presence of water shortages during the dry season has a positive impact on collective action because

55 reliance on the borehole during this period raises the stakes for members to act collectively to ensure that water is available on a permanent basis.

I hypothesize the presence of hirers in the syndicate to impact negatively on collective action. The presence of hirers raises the difﬁculty of collecting fees and enforcing rules.

Similarly, I hypothesize that the percentage of women members in the syndicate has a negative impact on collective action. Cattle-keeping is a male dominated enterprise.

Women members are represented by a male relative in decision making at the syndicate level. Therefore, they have no direct say in how the syndicate is run. This contributes to disagreements amongst members when decisions are made which they are not party to.

Finally, I selected turnover ratio as an explanatory variable. The turnover ratio is the number of people joining the syndicate plus the number of people leaving the syndicate divided by the syndicate size. Turnover ratio affects borehole management because people are not in the syndicate long enough to develop an ability to work together. I hypothesize that the turnover ratio has a negative impact on collective action within the syndicate.

2.8. Econometric Results

Robust results of the econometric analysis first with the indices of collective action and second with the indicators of collective action as dependent variables are shown in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 respectively. There are few significant variables, making it difficult to establish and identify measurable relationships that determine collective action. This is consistent with other findings in the empirical literature which

56 also point to this difﬁculty. Nevertheless, the regressions do yield some signiﬁcant relationships which deserve mention.

Looking at each explanatory variable, I ﬁnd evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between syndicate size and collective action. For percentage attendance at meetings, both the number of households and its squared term are signiﬁcant at the one and ten percent levels respectively (Table 2.5). This supports my hypothesis that collective action works better in syndicates of intermediate size, consistent with the extant literature on collective action (Olson, 1965; Wade, 1986; Bardhan, 1993; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Meinzen-Dick, et. al., 1997; Pender, 1999; McCarthy, et. al., 2001).

Syndicate size represents a balance between increasing transaction costs and economies of scale. Intermediate syndicate size raises the likelihood that members attend meetings, have few defaulters and use more severe penalties by enabling members to organize themselves more effectively in providing labor, time and capital for water provision.

Average herd size per member impacts positively on collective action. It has a negative effect on the index for members not following rules at the one percent level of signiﬁcance. This supports my hypothesis that factors which increase the proﬁtability of water provision enhance collective action. McCarthy et al., (2000) report a similar

finding. The result is supported by the negative and significant effect average herd size per member has on the following indicators of collective action: presence of defaulters and severity of punishment. In both models, average herd size per member is negative and significant at the one and five percent levels respectively.

For the index capturing members not following rules, I ﬁnd that membership in other village organizations has a positive and signiﬁcant effect. The ambiguity of this

57 index made it necessary to examine the coefficient on membership in other village organizations in the regressions on the following indicators of collective action: disputes in the last year and severity of punishment. I find that membership in other village organizations also increases the likelihood that disputes occurred in the last year and severity of punishment at the five and one percent levels of significance respectively. As mentioned earlier, higher incidence of disputes may capture higher reporting of disputes, possibly indicating that experience in other organizations increases the awareness of the benefits of addressing disputes quickly in order to resolve them. The positive relationship with the severity of punishment is consistent with the extant literature on collective action which states that when individuals participate in other organizations, learning takes place and social capital is created. Both these aspects serve to reduce the costs and increase the ability of members to enforce agreements (Wade, 1986;

Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland and Plateau, 1996).

The age of the syndicate has a positive impact on collective action based on the number of meetings at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. This supports my conjecture that syndicate members with more experience working together get along better.

The presence of hirers in the syndicate reduces the likelihood the penalty system is used at the ten percent level of signiﬁcance. Increasing resource scarcity means that hirers face a real and credible threat of exclusion if they default. Therefore, they must abide by syndicate rules. That there is increasing resource scarcity in the area is supported by the limits placed on the number of hirers accepted and the refusal by other syndicates to accept hirers at all.

58 The percentage of women members in the syndicate has a positive and signiﬁcant

impact on the index of members not following rules at the ten percent level of

signiﬁcance. The same variable also has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the index for

number of meetings and percentage attendance at meetings and on the number of

meetings at the one percent level of signiﬁcance. This supports my conjecture about the

problem of direct representation faced by women members. Cattle production is a male

dominated enterprise and women become members when the husband passes away.

However, in matters related to decision making at the syndicate level they are represented

by a male relative. This lack of direct representation increases the incidence of disputes.

Women are more likely to attend meetings to have these disputes resolved.

Whether there was a water shortage in the dry season has a positive and

signiﬁcant effect on the index of members not following rules as well as the index of

greater activity in meetings at the ten percent level. The same variable was positive and

signiﬁcant for the number of meetings that were held in the last year at the ten percent

level. The ﬁnding supports my hypothesis that the presence of a water shortage in the dry

season raises the stakes for members to be actively involved in collective action over

water provision because a permanent water supply is critical for cattle production.

The remaining explanatory variables — heterogeneity in cattle ownership, total

distance to market, years schooling of the chairman and source of water during the wet

season and turnover ratio — are not signiﬁcant although they have the expected signs.

Putting the results ﬁom the analyses together, I found signiﬁcant relationships between some indicators of collective action within syndicates and the following

explanatory variables: syndicate size, average herd size per member, hirers, percentage

59 women members and water shortage during the dry season; social capital as represented by membership in other organizations and age of the syndicate. These results are borne out in the literature on cooperation and collective action (Olson, 1965; Wade, 1986;

Bardhan, 1993; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997, McCarthy, et al.,

2001). I found that collective action in Kgatleng district is enhanced by factors which reduce the costs of water provision and increase its proﬁtability. I also found that collective action is hindered by factors which increase the costs of water provision and factors which reduce its proﬁtability.

Multicollinearity could be responsible for making some explanatory variables used in the models statistically weak. I tested for multicollinearity in the model of the index representing members not following rules and the model representing greater activity in meetings. There were minor but manageable problems between number of households and its squared term.“ These variables were kept as they were needed to test the inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of the syndicate and collective action.

2.9. Conclusion

Using factor analysis, two indices related to collective action were developed and used to examine the underlying factors which determine collective action within syndicates in Kgatleng district of Botswana. To strengthen the analysis, multivariate econometric analysis was also done directly on all ﬁve indicators thought to represent

2" Using STATA I calculated the Variable Inﬂation Factor (VIF), which helps ﬂag multicollinearity. The VIF values for number of households and its squared term are 23 and 21, respectively, which are below the rule of thumb cut-off value of 30.

6O collective action. The analysis clariﬁed whether and how syndicate-speciﬁc characteristics affect collective action in the district.

The results show that the following syndicate level characteristics had signiﬁcant effects on collective action: physical factors (syndicate size, average herd size per member, percentage women members and whether there was a shortage of water during the dry season). Two factors which representing members’ experience in working in groups (membership in other village organization and age of the syndicate) also have a signiﬁcant effect on collective action.

Collective action is considered necessary to manage common property resources, and this study takes the preliminary step of investigating the extent to which collective action is found in Kgatleng district. While it is difficult to quantify exact relationships and ﬁndings are not entirely conclusive, this study provides some evidence that collective action is likely to occur in syndicates with intermediate size which are located in areas where members have experience working in groups. The study also provides evidence that members actively take steps to work together over managing water. Nevertheless, the management of water and grazing is inextricably linked because access to grazing is solely determined by access to water in Kgatleng.

Finally, collective action to manage communal grazing is probably a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for conservation. The next chapter investigates whether collective action results in conservation.

61 Table 2.1: Reasons for the Extent of Conﬂicts and Conﬂict Resolution over Water and Grazing in Botswana’s Kgatleng District

Reasons why there are more conﬂicts now than in the past ten Frequency Percentage years

Too many boreholes and cattle congestion 11 36.7 Arable land encroachment l 3.3 Generation gap between young and old members 2 6.7 Member’s relaxed attitude toward paying fees and low 4 13.3 punishment Members with small herd sizes taking advantage of those with 12 40.0 larger herds Total 30 100

Reason there are less conﬂicts now than in the past ten years Frequency Percentage Members are related to each other and work together well 19 48.7 Good leadership accompanied by strict punishment rules 5 12.8 Better educated members 1 2.6 Syndicate is still new 2 5.1 Few members 5 12.8 Few boreholes in the area 2 5.1 Herd boys look after cattle 1 2.6 Drift fence separates arable land from grazing 4 10.3 Total 39 100

Reason it is easier to resolve conﬂicts now than in the past Frequency Percentage ten years Most of the members are related to each other 2 4.0 Members work together well and sort out problems 29 58.0 Few in number 2 4.0 Strict punishment rules and using the penalty system 15 3.0 Herd boys take good care of cattle l 2.0 Syndicate is still new 1 2.0 Total 50 100

Reason it is more diﬁ'icult to resolve conﬂicts now than in the Frequency Percentage past ten years High demand for grazing l 5.9 Members do not work together well 11 64.6 Financial constraints 2 l 1.8 Some members do not abide by the rules of the syndicate 2 11.8 We have no control over members 1 5.9

Total 17 100

Source: Survey data, Makepe (2002)

62 Table 2.2: Factor Analysis Results on Five Indicators of Collective Action

Eigenvalue decomposition of the indicators of collective action

Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 1 1.843 0.6973 0.3686 0.3686 2 1.146 0.1931 0.2292 0.5978 3 0.953 0.2763 0.1906 0.7884 4 0.677 0.2954 0.1353 0.9237 5 0.381 0.0763 1.0000

Principal component factor loadings for indicators of collective action Variable Component 1 Component 2 Uniqueness Disputes 0.6653 -0.2665 0.4864 # Meetings -0.0588 0.7621 0.4157 % Attendance -0.1221 0.6468 0.5667 Nonpayment 0.8463 0.1 148 0.2705 Punishment 0.8160 0.2499 0.2717

Principal component loadings for the orthogonal solution Variable Component 1 Corrrponent 2 Uniqueness Disputes 0.6164 -0.3656 0.4864 # Meetings 0.0590 0.7621 0.4157 % Attendance -0.0212 0.6579 0.5667 Nonpayment 0.8540 -0.0017 0.2705 Punishment 0.8445 0.1215 0.2717

Principal component score coeflicients based on rotated factors Variable Scoring coefficient 1 Scoring coefficient 2 Disputes 0.3209 -0.2858 # Meetings 0.0707 0.6621 % Attendance 0.0213 0.5680 Nonpayment 0.4691 0.0284 Punishment 0.3210 0.1474 Source: Survey data, Makepe (2002)

63 Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max

Disputes in the last year 73 0.40 0.49 0 1

Number of meetings held last year 73 6.31 8.28 l 52

Percentage attendance at meetings 73 0.61 0.26 0.14 1

Presence of defaulters 73 0.79 0.40 0 l

Severity of punishment 73 2.55 1.19 l 5

Index of members not following rules 73 0.52 0.28 0.08 0.97

Index of activity in meetings 73 0.60 0.09 0.48 0.99

Age of the syndicate 73 35.60 19.6 4 77

Number of households 73 17.97 10.55 3 49

Years schooling of chairman 73 7.45 4.01 0 17

Membership other village organizations 73 0.52 0.50 0 1

Total number of cattle watered at the 73 1110.51 1103.62 200 6000 borehole Average herd size per member 73 63.70 69.70 4 440

Main source of water during the wet season 73 0.75 0.43 0 1

Total distance to major market 73 173.52 54.74 35 283

Heterogeneity in cattle ownership 73 0.21 0.10 0 0.67

Number of hirers 73 1.93 3.57 0 15

Percentage women members 73 0.12 0.13 0 0.82

Water shortage during the dry season 73 0.37 0.49 0 1

Turnover ratio 73 0.23 0.51 O 3

Source: Survey data, Makepe (2002).

64 Table 2.4: Determinants of Collective Action over Borehole Water Management in Botswana’s Kgatleng District (With Indices of Collective Action)

Members not following rules Greater activity in meetings index Index Number of 0.0065 -0.0068 households (0.48) (1.64)

Households -0.0002 0.0001 Squared (0.65) (0.74)

Wealth -0.0730 -0.03 87 heterogeneity (0.2 1) (0.37)

Average herd size per -.0014 -.00002 member (2.52)*** (0.09)

Distance to cattle 0.0012 -0.0002 market (1.77)* (1.14)

Membership in other 0.1660 -0.0147 village organizations (2.45)" (0.72)

Age syndicate -0.0012 0.0007 (0.70) (1.44)

Years schooling 0.0058 0.0003 chairman (0.0.67) (0.13)

Hirers -0.0345 -0.01 l 1 (0.50) (0.53)

Percentage of 0.4012 0.1940 women hholds (1.67)* (2.71)"*

Water source wet -0.0312 0.0003 season (0.29) (0.001)

Water shortage dry 0.1223 0.0343 season (1.79)‘ (1.68)*

Turnover ratio 0.0923 -0.0599 (1.32) (0.29)

Constant 0.2319 0.6918 (0.93) (9.32)"*

Observations 73 73 R2 0.32 0.43 F test 2.14 3.45 0.02 0.00

Source: Survey data Makepe, (2002) Numbers in parenthesis are absolute value of t statistics. *significant at 10% level ** significant at 5% level ***significant at 1% level

65 Table 2.5: Determinants of Collective Action over Borehole Water Management in Botswana’s Kgatleng District (With Indicators of Collective Action)

Number of Percentage Disputes Presence of Severity of Meetings attending last year Defaulters punishment last year meetings Number of -0.1 178 -0.03799 0.0236 0.0104 0.0578 households (0.28) (3.1 1)"* [0.31] [0.13] [0.97] Household -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0012 Squared (0.07) (2.22)" [0.26] [0.44] [1.01]

Wealth -1 .4713 -0. 1668 -0.4391 -0.8446 0.1081 heterogeneity (0. 14) (0.57) [0.24] [0.34] [0.07]

Average herd -0.0063 0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0089 -0.0059 size per member (0.37) (1.11) [0.62] [2.63]*" [221]"

Distance to -0.0059 -0.0006 0.0056 0.0053 0.0037 cattle market (0.29) (1.16) [1.65] [1.25] [1.33]

Membership -1.6682 0.0078 0.7522 0.4129 0.8548 village orgs. (0.80) (0.14) [202]” [0.91] [2.84]*“

Age syndicate 0.1235 -0.0016 -0.0149 0.0021 -0.0065 (2.30)“ (1.09) [1.52] [0. 18] [0.87]

Years schooling -0.1542 0.0109 0.0324 -0.0447 0.0469 chairman (0.58) (1.53) [0.68] [0.72] [1.23]

Hirers -1.0169 0.0441 0.3832 0.1545 -0.5458 (0.47) (0.78) [0.99] [0.32] [l.78]"'

% women 20.6881 0.3198 1.7693 1.5253 1.5562 hholds (2.80)” (1.62) [1.43] [0.74] [1 .52] Water source -1 . 1724 -0.0110 -0.6357 0.1641 -0.8332 wet season (0.47) (0. 17) [1.45] [0.34] [0.24] Water shortage 3.8814 0.0223 0.2866 0.9107 0.4441 dry season (1.84)* (0.40) [0.78] [1.55] [1.50] Turnover ratio -0.9312 0.0559 0.2423 0.3998 0.41 12 (0.43) (0.75) [0.64] [0.82] [1.37] Constant 5.8382 1.0750 -1.5838 0.2583 (0.76) (5.28) [1.22] [0.18] Observations 73 73 73 73 73 R2 0.27 F test 1.72 0.08 Wald 16.62 19.43 25.49 LR 55.22 x’statistic 0.00 0.22 0.1 1 0.02 Pseudo R2 1.02 0.17 0.26 0.13 Log likelih'd 0.62 -40.73 -27.36 -86.99

Source: Survey data, Makepe (2002). Numbers in parenthesis are absolute value oft statistics. Numbers in brackets are 2 statistics. l"significant at 10% level " significant at 5% level ”"significant at 1% level

66 Figure 2.1. Land Use in Kgatleng District, Botswana

_ 9° ' Botswana 2“ 00 'Kgatleng District.

......

Predominantly . grazing Predominantly mixed farming Village area O . / ' 1 - Mal l ‘ VIII-ac ‘ *5... Railway tin. ﬁdi {AV/,- Ramgn‘me 0d . ' Mathubudukwane‘ . Road M°dipm° = ‘- Sikwane 0 J0

Source: Allen, (1996)

Figure 2.2: Scree Plot of Eigenvalues from Preliminary Principal Components Analysis is on the Indicators of Collective Action

2.4

1.5“ E E > S .9 1.1.1 1__

.5“ l l l l l 1 2 3 4 5

68 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Amtzen, J. W. (1990). Economic Policies and Rangeland Degradation in Botswana. Journal of International Development. 2: 4, 471-499.

Baland, J. P. and J. P. Platteau (1996). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Communities? Oxford University Press.

Baland J. P. and J. P. Platteau (1999). The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management. World Development. 27 (5): 773 — 788.

Bardhan, P. (1993). Analytics of the Institutions of Informal Cooperation in Rural Development. World Development. 21 (4): 633- 639.

Behnke, R; Scoones, I and C. Kerven (1993). Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models of Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas. ODI. London.

Dayton-Johnson, J. and P. Bardhan (2001). Inequality and the Governance of Water Resources in Mexico and South India. Workshop Paper: Economic Inequality, Collective Action and Environmental Sustainability. Santa Fe Institute. Sept. 2001.

Fujita, M., Y. Hayami and M. Kikuchi, (1999). The Conditions of Collective Action for Local Commons Management: The Case of the Philippines. Paper presented at World Bank Seminar, Washington DC: September 1.

Greene, W. H. (1978). Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science. Vol. 162. 1243 - 1248.

J eltsch, F. Milton, S. J; Dean W. R. J. Rooyen-van, N. Harcombe, P. and M. Palmer (1997). Simulated Pattern Formation around Artiﬁcial Waterholes in the Semi- Arid Khalahari. Journal of Vegetation Science 8: 2, 177-188.

Kajisa, K. (1999). Contract Theory and its Application to Groundwater Markets in India. PhD Dissertation. Michigan State University.

69 Makepe, Patricia. 2003. The Evolution of Institutions and Rules Governing Communal Grazing Lands in Botswana. Paper One. PhD dissertation, Dept. of Resource Development, Michigan State University.

Meinzen-Dick, R. S. and A. Knox. 1997. Collective Action, Property Rights and Devolution of Natural Resource Management: A conceptual framework. Paper presented at Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights and Devolution of Natural Resource, Puerto Azul, Philippines June 21-24.

Moleele, N. (1994). Ecological Change and Piospheres: Can the Classical Range Succession Model and its Modiﬁcations Explain Changes in Vegetation and Soil Around Boreholes in Eastern Botswana. MSc. Thesis. University of Canberra.

Niamir-Fuller, M. (2001).Managing Mobility in Aﬁican Range Lands. In N. McCarthy, B. Swallow, M. Kirk and P. Hazel (eds). Property Rights, Risk and Livestock Development in Aﬁica. IFPRI. Washington, DC.

Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ostrom, O. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E. (1999). Crafting the Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems. Institute for Contemporary Studies. San-Francisco California.

Pender, J. (1999). Rural Population Growth, Agricultural Change and Natural Resource Management in Developing Countries: A review of hypotheses and some evidence from Honduras. EPTD Discussion Paper 48. IFPRI. Washington DC., USA.

Peters, P (1983). Cattlemen, Borehole Syndicate and Privatization in Kgatleng District of Botswana: An Anthropological History of the Transformation of a Commons. PhD Dissertation. University of Boston.

70 Peters, P. (1994). Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana. Charlottesville and London: University Press to Virginia.

Poteete, A. R. (1999). Disaggregating State and Society: Accounting for Patterns of Tenure Change in Botswana 1975-1996. PhD Dissertation. Duke University.

Rasmussen, L. N. and R. Meinzen-Dick. (1995). Local Organizations for Natural Resource Management: Lessons from Theoretical and Empirical Literature. Environment and Production Technology Division Discussion Paper No. 11. Washington DC. IFPRI.

Ringrose, S. 1996: The Use of Integrated Remotely Sensed and GIS Data to Determine Causes of Vegetation Cover Change in Southern Botswana. Applied Geography. Sevenoaks. l6. 3, 225- 242.

Runge, C. F. (1992). Common property and Collective Action in Economic Development. In Bromley (ed). Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy: 41 -62. International Center for Self Governance: San Francisco.

Swallow, B. W. and D. Bromley, (1995). Institutions, governance and incentives in Common property regimes for African Rangelands. Environment and Resource Economics. Vol. 6 99 — 118.

Van Vegten, (1981). Man-made Vegetation Changes: An Example from Botswana’s Savanna. Gaborone, University of Botswana.

Wade, R. (1986). The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 11, 95 - 106

White, R. (1992). Livestock Development and Pastoral Production on Communal Rangeland in Botswana. Food Production and Rural Development Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

71 Chapter 3

THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ON WATER AND GRAZING MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA’S KGATLENG DISTRICT

3.1. Introduction

Policymakers and researchers worldwide acknowledge that the most critical dimension to solving problems of natural resource overexploitation is the local one. This view has prompted several empirical studies (Ostrom, 1990; 1992; Bardhan, 1993;

Baland and Platteau, 1996) that have looked at the underlying factors determining the success with which communities husband collectively managed natural resource systems.

Evidence from these studies has reinforced the widely accepted view that greater participation by resource users in managing resources critical to their livelihoods is essential to halting resource overexploitation (Meinzen-Dick, et al., 2000).

As a result, the implementation of community based natural resource management programs involving the transfer of rights over the responsibility and control of natural resources from government agencies to user groups is now a popular policy trend

(Meinzen-Dick, et al., 2001). Such programs range from increasing user involvement in resource management to the full and absolute transfer of the responsibility and control of resources to users themselves. These programs are fueled by the realization that government agencies have a limited capacity to manage resources at the local level

(Baland and Platteau, 1996).

72 The problem of overgrazing observed in Botswana is largely a result of development policies designed to improve rural livelihoods and alleviate poverty

(Amtzen, 1990). High price supports for cattle, input subsidies and huge investments in marketing inﬁastructure have made cattle production lucrative. This has encouraged both young and old aspiring cattle barons to enter into cattle production with the major aim being to build herd size. Improvements in technology have enabled underground water to be tapped so that cattle can be kept in areas previously reserved for the rainy season or that were inaccessible because they lack surface water (Peters, 1994; Poteete, 1999).

Cattle numbers have grown in response. Without use regulations, overstocking placed high grazing pressure on communal grazing lands that are now overgrazcdzs. Overgrazing is severe in districts with small land and high population density such as Kgatleng district

(Government of Botswana, 2000).

In Kgatleng district, access to grazing is currently determined by access to borehole or underground water that is owned and collectively managed by syndicates

(Poteete, 1994). Membership in a syndicate allows members to control access to water and the surrounding grazing lands. Traditionally, the Land Board made sure that boreholes were drilled 16 km apart but in some places boreholes are closer together.

Grazing lands are under the jurisdiction of the Land Board, which has failed to address the problem of overgrazing.

Perhaps as the grazing resource has become scarce, syndicates have devised rules and conservation strategies for grazing, over which they have defacto control, as they

2’ Overgrazing is deﬁned as the reduction in forage production below the biological optimum when considered in terms of some unit of time. Degradation results when forage productivity is reduced more or less permanently because of long lasting damage to the productivity of the resource base (Behnke and Scoones, 1993).

73 have done for water. Before fully devolving grazing rights to syndicates as has been suggested in the literature, it is necessary to understand whether collective action over water provision by the syndicates results in better resource management and conservation for both water and grazing. This chapter investigates whether collective action over water provision has a positive spillover on investments made to improve the water source, and reduce grazing pressure on land surrounding it. In this chapter, collective action is deﬁned as any action taken actively and jointly by syndicate members (or a committee of elected syndicate members) to achieve a common objective, whose outcome depends on the interdependence and reciprocity of the members of the syndicate. Collective action occurs whenever members take steps actively to work together in managing water and grazing resources. For borehole water, it may be possible for a dominant syndicate member to make investments unilaterally. In situations of great wealth heterogeneity, one individual may undertake large investments on his own because he has a greater stake in ensuring the water is reliable all year round (Bardhan, 1993; Agrawal, 2001). Others with smaller herds then free ride on his contribution. However, to successfully reduce overstocking a coordinated collective effort at the syndicate level is necessary so that members have the assurance that when they reduce their herd size others will also follow suit.

In Kgatleng district, collective action over water provision within borehole syndicates mainly occurs in the way members actively and jointly take steps together to develop rules on how the borehole is used, operated and maintained and how violators are punished (Makepe 2003). Rules and actions focus on borehole water management.

Hence, the emphasis in this chapter is on collective action as it relates to borehole water

74 management. But water and grazing are inextricably linked because access to grazing is determined by access to water. This chapter builds on (Makepe, 2003) by examining the impact collective of action over borehole water management at the syndicate level on investments made to improve the water source and the surrounding grazing area.

This study is important because it establishes the success with which syndicate members collectively manage scarce water and grazing resources. In this chapter, success in managing water and grazing land takes place when well-deﬁned access rules and conservation are observed. The study makes it possible for policy makers to determine the extent and role the syndicates can play in resource management. In this way, the study contributes to the search for appropriate communal resource management strategies.

I begin by looking at the current water and grazing situation in Kgatleng district and determine whether it has deteriorated or improved over the last ten years. Next, I use the indices related to collective action developed earlier using factor analysis on a series of indicators of collective action to determine its effect on investments to improve water and reduce grazing pressure.

3.2. The Study Area

Kgatleng District, located in southeastern Botswana, covers a total area of 7 ,960 kmz. It was selected for the study for the following reasons. First, all grazing lands in this district are under communal tenure and are dominated by pastoralism. Second, small and large cattle owners in this district have formed themselves into syndicates or groups and drill boreholes to tap underground water which provides permanent water for livestock

75 production. Finally, the area is considered to be under a lot of grazing pressure (Van

Vegten, 1981; Moleele, 1994; Amtzen, 1990; Allen, 1996; Jeltsch, 1996; Ringrose, 1996,

Government of Botswana, 2000).

Land use in Kgatleng district is broadly divided as shown in the map (see Figure

3.1). Villages are found along the Madikwe River, the railway line and the main road.

The predominantly mixed farming areas are found in the southern part of the district where crop production is the dominant activity. The predominantly grazing area is found in the northeastern part of the district.

Kgatleng district has a mean annual precipitation of 450-550 mm. Precipitation is erratic both in space and time with an annual rainfall variability of between 30 to 40 percent. Mean annual temperature is 18-20 degrees Celsius. Agronomic conditions in the district are fairly homogeneous with soils characterized by poor organic and nutrient quality (Moleele, 1994).

3.3. Data

This study is based on a survey of borehole syndicates conducted from February to September 2002, in Kgatleng District. A list of all the boreholes drilled in the district was obtained from the Department of Water Affairs, Gaborone, Botswana. From this list, all the boreholes that were owned by syndicates in the district were selected. Of the 80 borehole syndicates in the district, ﬁve declined to participate in the survey and so a total of 75 syndicates were interviewed. Of these syndicates, two were outliers26 and were

2" In one syndicate there were only two members because all others had been evicted. Of the remaining members, one complained that the other member was not contributing to the running of the borehole at all. In fact, he was in the process of getting him evicted from the syndicate. The second syndicate had 100 members which was unusually high. Dropping these two outliers improved the analysis.

76 dropped from the analysis. As a result, data from the 73 remaining syndicates was used in the analysis.

The borehole syndicate was selected as the unit of analysis because it is the relevant institution responsible for borehole water provision and management”.

Therefore, it became expedient to look beyond the household as the unit of analysis.

Boreholes are spread throughout the northeastern part of the district, a predominantly grazing area that covers more than 60 percent of the district’s total land area.

Membership in a syndicate allows members to share ownership and control over the use of the borehole, and gazing resources within the vicinity of the borehole. On average, 1110 cattle are watered at each borehole. The average number of members per syndicate is 18. All members share the joint responsibility for the borehole’s operational and maintenance costs.

A structured questionnaire was administered to goups of three individuals representing the members of each syndicate. The survey collected information about the structure and function of the syndicate, the use and maintenance of water and range resources, range degadation and improvements, causes and the extent of disputes over resource use, and market accessibility. In addition, informal interviews were carried out with key informants in the Ministry of Agiculture at the district level and community elders to provide supplemental information.

Current range condition data was also collected. A visual assessment of the range within the vicinity of each borehole was done with the help of a range specialist from the

Ministry of Agriculture. From this visual assessment, range condition data was collected

27 A detailed discussion on the structure and function of the borehole syndicate is contained in Makepe (2003)

77 for 63 boreholes in Kgatleng district using a range condition score card developed by

Field (1977) see Appendix A. The range within the vicinity of each borehole was assessed and rated based on the following categories: lower level cover, botanical composition, plant vigor, litter, trees and shrubs and soil erosion. A score was given for each category. Finally, these scores were summed and the total score for each borehole was compared with the following range condition classes: very poor for a total score ranging from zero to 29; poor for a total score ranging from 30 to 39; fair for a total score ranging from 40 to 59; good for a total score ranging from 60 to 79; and excellent for a total score ranging from 80 to 100 percent.

3.4. The Management of Water and Grazing Resources in Kgatleng District

In situations of resource scarcity, high population gowth and proﬁt maximization we expect to observe well deﬁned and strict access rules and conservation (Baland and

Platteau, 1996). Whether or not we observe conservation depends on what the affected community perceives the cause of the scarcity to be. If they believe that the scarcity is being caused by outsiders coming in, then we may see stricter access rules and no conservation. If the community sees itself as part of the problem, then we are more likely to see well-deﬁned access rules evolve as well as some conservation rules. But even if the latter situation prevails, we still may not observe well-deﬁned conservation rules because high transaction costs and institutional bottlenecks make the collective action problems associated with devising and crafting these management rules insurmountable.

The two primary concerns of cattle owners in the district are whether cattle have enough water and enough fodder. Low and erratic rainfall and poor surface water

78 availability mean that water and gazing are inextricably linked. If there is gazing in the absence of water one cannot raise cattle. But if gazing coexists with water, cattle can be raised. Therefore the gazing areas are deﬁned by the water source.

Two types of water sources exist, natural and manmade ones. Natural water sources include rivers and seasonal pans (low-lying depressions) which become submerged with water during the wet season. Manmade water sources are the boreholes

(deep wells) drilled to tap undergound water. Boreholes are the main source of water in the dry season.

Natural water sources, like the gazing resource, are under communal tenure and can be used by anybody”. In the wet season when there is some water in seasonal pans and rivers, cattle owners take advantage of these alternative water sources. While doing so, they may shut down the borehole to cut costs. 75 percent of the syndicates had used alternative water sources in the wet season. This practice is done within the vicinity of the borehole. Syndicates located in areas with insufﬁcient surface water have to keep boreholes running in the wet season because they have problems accessing surface water.

25 percent of the syndicates faced this predicament and kept their borehole running in both seasons.

In contrast, borehole water is owned and collectively managed by syndicates and is subject to strict, well-deﬁned access rules. The spacing rule that the Land Board uses in allocating land for the borehole gives syndicates defacto control over gazing within the

28 Previously, harsh ecological were sufﬁcient to limit herd sizes and kept grazing pressure low. Individuals were able to move cattle freely on communal gazing lands and use surface water as they wanted. However, the introduction of boreholes has enabled more cattle to be kept on the land. At the same time, individuals have gouped themselves into borehole syndicates and now control the movement of cattle on the land surrounding their boreholes because higher grazing pressure has made fodder less available for their cattle. As a result, cattle are not able to move about freely as they once did.

79 vicinity of the borehole. Syndicate control over gazing area is fully and effectively exercised in the dry season when access to borehole water is particularly binding. In the wet season when some cattle owners opt to use surface water sources they must get permission ﬁ'om syndicates located near surface water before doing 50. Therefore, syndicate control does not disappear in the wet season. Nevertheless, the use of surface water is limited by location, low and erratic rainfall, few rivers and seasonal pans which cannot retain water for long periods, and high cattle numbers which make accessing surface water difﬁcult. The extent and severity of the conditions of access to water and gazing in Kgatleng district are shown on Table 3.1.

In the wet season, those who decide to use surface water are often involved in gazing disputes with syndicates located near rivers or seasonal pans. The problem arises because while cattle are at the river or pan they utilize the gass there as well. At the onset of the dry season, when cattle return to their own borehole they have reduced the gazing available for cattle which stay behind. 52 percent of the syndicates used their borehole water all year round, even if not as the primary source, because of this type of problem. The problem of accessing water in seasonal pans has become more severe than it was ten year ago as stated by 63 percent of the syndicates.

To secure a reliable water supply, 42 percent of the syndicates improved their water source. Such improvements included drilling additional boreholes and purchasing engines and water pumps. In addition, syndicates regularly maintained the boreholes.

Each syndicate had rules for borehole use and management for members. Rules ranged from the amounts to be paid by members and hirers, to rules of access and severity of punishment for violators.

8O Regarding the gazing situation, 58 percent of the respondents stated no concern for gazing availability within the vicinity of the borehole”. Among the remaining 42 percent, concerns were raised about cattle congestion due to having more boreholes in some areas, stray cattle and bush encroachment (see Table 3.1). Bush encroachment is the gadual spread of unpalatable gass species as a result of increased gazing pressure. 55 percent of the syndicates stated that the amount of fodder that was available had gone down in the last ten years. The reasons for this reduction were high cattle numbers, poor rains, and stray cattle. There was some concern that the Land Board was part of the problem since in some cases other syndicates were allowed to drill boreholes close to existing ones.

However, members acted together to contest the drilling of boreholes nearby their own because doing nothing meant reduced gazing for their cattle. Similarly, if others came to use water in rivers and seasonal pans close to their boreholes they complained because it reduced gazing for their cattle at the onset of the dry season. There were some practices that members undertook to control cattle movements. For example, drift fences have been constructed to separate arable lands from gazing lands to prevent cattle from damaging crops in nearby ﬁelds. Some syndicates watered their cattle in holding pens to reduce cattle congestion and consequent degadation near the borehole.

There were times in the year when there was a shortage of gazing. 62 percent of the syndicates experienced a shortage of gazing. This usually occurred after the winter months (May-August) and during droughts. Supplementary feed was used to prevent

29 Syndicate level interviews elicited responses ﬁ'om 3 full members of each syndicate. Therefore, this may not entirely represent the views of all members of the syndicates. Nevertheless, the lack of concern over gazing availability may be because members counteract the effects of overgazing through the use of supplementary feed. Prominent use of supplementary feed is evident in the district since 77 percent of syndicates report using supplementary feed.

81 cattle from starving. 77 percent of the syndicates had members who used supplementary feed on a regular basis. Feed was obtained from the livestock advisory centers located in the main village and capital city. In some cases, members traveled to South Africa to purchase supplementary feed and other supplies. The main complaint was that large cattle owners placed big orders for supplementary feed and veterinary supplies. When the stock arrived they would deplete the stocks ﬁrst because they had the means to get to the livestock advisory center earlier than smaller cattle owners with less ﬁnancial resources.

40 percent of the syndicates used supplementary feed all the time. 7 percent used supplementary feed when gass became scarce, after rains had been poor. 4 percent only used supplementary feed when a drought was declared. The rest did nothing and just waited for better rains.

3.5. General Models

In this section, I present the framework I use to determine the impact collective action over borehole water provision at the syndicate level has on investments made to improve the water source and reduce gazing pressure on the gazing land surrounding it.

Collective action within borehole syndicates over water provision focuses on rules and actions for borehole water. Hence, the emphasis is on collective action within the syndicate as it relates to borehole water management.

For both water and gazing, I look at whether certain factors commonly taken as indicators of collective action over borehole water management actually make any difference when it comes to explaining improvements made to the water source and reductions in stocking density. In other words, if some goups are acting collectively and

82 it results improvements to the water source and reductions in stocking density then it suggests that they are engaging in conservation behavior. I test the hypothesis that syndicate members act collectively to the improve water source but not stocking density, indicating an interest in productivity but not conservation.

The stocking decision is observed as stocking density at the syndicate borehole. I calculate stocking density as the number of cattle watered at the borehole in the last season divided by the area surrounding the borehole. The area surrounding each borehole is determined using the coordinates for each borehole in such a way that there was no overlap in the area surrounding each one30 (Figure 3.2).

I use a binary probit model to examine the determinants of improvements made to the water source, because this dependent variable is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if an improvement is made and zero otherwise. I use ordinary least squares analysis to analyze the determinants of stocking density because this is a continuous dependent variable. A log—linear speciﬁcation of the stocking density model was used in the analysis.

To capture collective action within the syndicates, I use two indices developed in

(Makepe 2003) using principal components factor analysis based on the following variables representing collective action over borehole water management: disputes in the last year, presence of defaulters, the severity of punishment, number of meetings held in the last year and percentage attendance at these meetings. The results of the principal components factor analysis yielded two indices related to collective action. The ﬁrst index weighed heavily on disputes, nonpayment and punishment and was chosen to

3° The area around each borehole was estimated from the coordinates of each borehole using the Thiessen command of arcinfo in GIS.

83 represent members not following rules. The second index weighed heavily on number of

meetings and percentage attendance at meetings and was chosen to represent member’

active participation. Both indices were normalized to lie between zero and one to

facilitate the interpretation of results. For a detailed discussion on how the two indices

were developed see Makepe (2003).

For both water and gazing, I ﬁrst I do the analysis with the indices related to

collective action and then with the actual indicators of collective action. I do this to

ascertain and enrich the analysis because the indices are not very strong and have some

difﬁculty in interpretation. While the interpretation of the disputes, nonpayment and punishment index represents a combination of these indicators its meaning is ambiguous because while nonpayment suggests a lack of collective action, the punishment of

violators indicates collective action. Doing the analysis with the actual indicators of collective action addresses this issue.

3.6. Explanatory Variables and Hypothesized Relationships

In this section, I list the explanatory variables I use in this chapter and explain the hypothesized relationships based on existing literature. Table 3.2 lists the explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis along with their descriptive statistics, and they are explained in the text below.

The number of households and its squared term was initially included to test the hypothesis that improvements made to the water source are easier to achieve in intermediate sized syndicates. If the syndicate is small, high ﬁxed costs may make it difﬁcult to make investments in improving the water source. Larger syndicates may

84 beneﬁt from pooling resources but high variables costs of organizing and monitoring make it difﬁcult to collectively undertake resource improvements (Olson, 1965; Ostrom,

1990; de J anvry., 1998)3 l. The squared term was dropped from the analysis because of multicollinearity. Instead, I test the hypothesis that as syndicate size increases so does the difﬁculty of making improvements to the water source due to higher variables costs of organizing and monitoring the goup. In the stocking density model I test the hypothesis that as syndicate size increases so do the number of cattle watered at the syndicate borehole.

The effect of wealth heterogeneity on improvements made to the water source and stocking density is ambiguous (Baland and Platteau, 1996; 1999). Wealth heterogeneity can make finding mutually beneficial ageements difficult. Those with larger herds have a larger stake in improving the resource management make improvements while those with smaller herds may free ride on their contribution (Olson, 1965; Baland and Platteau,

1996). Since, the syndicates are ethnically and culturally homogenous (Peters, 1983;

Poteete, 1999) this aspect of heterogeneity is not introduced in the model. Instead, I use a wealth heterogeneity variable in both models. Using an approach similar to Gebremedhin et al., (2000), wealth heterogeneity is measured by the coefﬁcient of variation of the distribution of the proportion of households with a certain number of cattle based on the following categories: less than 20 cattle; 20 to 40 cattle, 40 to 60, 60 to 100 cattle, 100 to

200, 200 to 300 and those with more than 400 cattle.

Average herd size per syndicate member is hypothesized to have a positive impact on improvements made to the water source because it raises the proﬁtability of water provision. Cattle are a valued resource receiving high price and input subsidies from the

3' Cited in McCarthy, et al., (2002).

85 government. Therefore, as the average herd size increases so does the proﬁtability of reliable water sources (McCarthy, et al., 2000).

The effect of total distance to where cattle are sold on improvements made to the water source and stocking density is ambiguous. On one hand, remote areas have fewer exit options and high opportunity cost for not making improvements to the water source and reducing stocking density because members may rely more on natural resources

(Fujita et al., 1999). On the other hand, proximity to markets raises exit options for members while lowering opportunities costs for inaction because it provides alternative labor markets (Baland and Platteau, 1996; McCarthy et al., 2001).

Membership in other organizations enables better management through the learning effects and experiences members acquire from working in other goups (Wade,

1986; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Therefore, I expect membership in other village organizations to have a positive impact on whether improvements are made to the water source and reductions in stocking density.

Experience from being a member of other village organizations such as farmer organizations, revolving funds and burial societies improves members’ ability to work together and run the syndicate better.

I use years of schooling of the chairman as a proxy for management ability. I hypothesize that years of schooling has a positive impact on improvements made to the water source and a negative impact on stocking density. Education increases an individual’s awareness of the need to use and manage resources in a sustainable way.

More schooling enables the chairman to run the syndicate better, encourage members to

86 abide by the set rules of use, oversee the implementation and enforcement of ageements, and plans to improve the water source and reduce gazing pressure.

The age of the syndicate represents members’ experience working together. It also represents the length of time the syndicate has been in existence. Syndicates that have operated for a longer time may ﬁnd it easier to implement and enforce ageements, and management plans because members know each other and have more experience working together. I hypothesize that the age of the syndicate has a positive impact on whether improvements are made to the water source and reductions in stocking density.

I hypothesize that current range condition has a positive impact on the improvements made to the water source and stocking density (McCarthy, et. al., 2001). If the range is in good condition, more cattle can be kept on a particular gazing area.

Conversely, if the current range condition is bad then fewer cattle can be kept on the same gazing area. I constructed a dummy variable for range condition based on the current range condition scores from the visual assessment. The current range condition dummy represents a different range condition class according to a scale from one (bad) to

ﬁve (excellent).

I hypothesize that the use of supplementary feed has a positive impact on improvements made to the water source and stocking density in the study area. The ability to purchase supplementary feed indicates access to cash to pay for improvements for the water source. It also allows members to keep more cattle than they otherwise would in the absence of supplementary feed. There use of supplementary feed is prominent in the area. 77 percent of the syndicates in the study area use supplementary feed.

87 The use of an alternative source of water during the wet season on improvements

made to the water source and on stocking density is ambiguous. Using alternative water

sources in the wet season may lower the stakes for members to make improvements to

their water source. On the other hand, it may not because the use of alternative water

sources does nothing to relax the dry season water constraint. Similarly, for stocking

density, using alternative water sources may encourages members to keep larger herd

sizes than they would otherwise would. But then it may encourage them to keep smaller herds because accessing these water sources is difﬁcult and often causes disputes. For

example, when cattle are at the alternate water source they also gaze on the surrounding

land reducing the gazing available for the cattle belonging to syndicates in the vicinity of

the alternative water source at the onset of the dry season when it is needed the most.

Water shortage in the dry season is hypothesized to have a positive impact on

improvements made to the water source and a negative impact on stocking density. Water

shortages in the dry season raise the stakes for members to improve their water source

since this is when they need water the most. For stocking density, individuals are likely to reduce herd size if there are water shortages in the dry season since it indicates a lack of

sufﬁcient borehole water for cattle.

Turnover ratio expresses the number of members who joined or left the syndicate in the last five years as a fraction of the number of members currently in the syndicate. 37 percent of the syndicates reported at least some turnover in the last five years. I hypothesize that turnover ratio has a negative effect on improvements made to the water source and a positive impact on stocking density. It is difficult to reach ageements,

implement plans and enforce decisions if more people are leaving the syndicate than

88 those who join it. High turnover also makes people less inclined to contribute to big

investments since they might not be around to enjoy the beneﬁts.

Getting assistance from other neighboring syndicates has an ambiguous impact on

improvements made to the water source and stocking density. For water, if a syndicate

always has to seek assistance from neighboring syndicates it may encourage members to

develop their own water source. On the other hand, if members know that they will

always get assistance from others when they need it, they may put off making

improvements to their water source because they know they will get help from others.

Similarly, for stocking density getting assistance from others may make an individual cull

his herd or increase it because he knows that if there is a shortage of water he can always

get some water from a neighboring syndicate.

The index representing members not following rules has an ambiguous effect on

whether improvements are made to the water source and stocking density. The ambiguity

stems from the fact that this index is constructed from a combination of indicators that

suggest a lack of collective action (disputes and non payment) and one which indicates

collective action (taking strong step to punish violators). On one hand, if there is a high

incidence of disputes and nonpayment we expect less improvements to be made to the

water source and stocking density. On the other hand, disputes and nonpayment is

accompanied by strong steps to punish violators we may observe improvements being made to the water source and stocking density.

I hypothesize that the index representing members’ active participation in borehole water management has a positive effect on improvements made to the water

source and stocking density. This variable is constructed ﬁ'om the number of meetings

89 and percentage attendance at meetings, both of which represent members’ involvement in steps taken to improve the water supply.

Finally, the presence of hirers should increase the number of cattle around the borehole because each hirer brings his herd to the syndicate borehole.

3.7. Econometric Results

Robust results from the econometric analysis on improvements made to the water source and stocking density are shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 respectively. Some variables that are sigriﬁcant in the model on improvements made to the water source are not sigriﬁcant in the stocking density model. This observation points directly to how the management problems of the two resources are perceived by syndicate members, and how this perception translates to the actual management practices for the two resources.

Nevertheless, the same variables that are sigriﬁcant for improvements made to the water source and stocking density when the models are run with the indices remain consistently signiﬁcant when the actual indicators are used. This lends support to the arguments presented below.

Looking at Table 3.3, wealth heterogeneity has a positive and sigiiﬁcant effect on improvements made to the water source at the ten percent level. This suggests that where there is geater wealth heterogeneity, syndicate members with larger herds make improvements to the water source because they have a larger stake in ensuring that the supply of water is reliable all year round (Olson, 1965; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Even though members divide the cost of improvements made to the water source equally, if an improvement has to be made some members with ready cash may undertake the

90 investment and collect money owed to them ﬁom other members later. Those who fail to pay are punished and ultimately evicted if they continue not paying. Such an arrangement is mutually beneﬁcial since water is crucial to keeping cattle.

The total distance to the main market where cattle are sold has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on improvements made to the water source at the one percent level of signiﬁcance. This supports the hypothesis that syndicates located in remote areas have fewer exit options and geater reliance on the natural resource (Baland and Platteau,

1996; McCarthy et al., 20001) raising the stakes for members to invest in the water source because of their reliance on it for their livelihoods (Fujita et al., 1999). See

Appendix B for a further exploration of how average herd size per member and total distance from market relates to wealth heterogeneity, the level of collective action and improvements made to the water source.

Membership in other village organizations has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on improvements made to the water source at the one percent level. This supports the hypothesis that experience from being in other organizations enables better management of resources (Wade, 1986; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Baland and Platteau,

1996)

Years schooling of the chairman has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on improvements made to the water source at the one percent level. This supports the hypothesis that education increases an individual’s awareness of the need to use and manage resources in a sustainable way. More education enables the syndicate chairman to run the syndicate better, encourage members to abide by the set rules of use, oversee

91 the implementation and enforcement of ageements, and plans to improve the water

source.

Age of the syndicate has a positive and sigriﬁcant effect on improvements made

to the water source at the ﬁve percent level. Older syndicates have members that have

more experience working together and ﬁnd it easier to reach ageements, implement

investment plans and enforce ageements.

The use of supplementary feed has a positive effect on improvements made to the

water source at the one percent level of sigriﬁcance. This supports the hypothesis that the

ability to purchase supplementary feed indicates access to pay cash for improvements to

the water source.

The presence of hirers has a negative impact on improvements made to the water

source at the one percent level. The reason for this ﬁnding is not clear, but one possibility

is that syndicates that take hirers may do so because they have a shortage of cash and try

to raise extra money through the fees that they collect from hirers. Therefore, lack of

investment in the water source may reﬂect lack of cash available for the investment.

Getting assistance from other syndicates when there is a water shortage has a negative impact on improvements made to the water source at the one percent level. This

supports the hypothesis that those syndicates that get assistance from other syndicates in times of need can delay improvements to their own water source.

The index of number of meetings and percentage attendance at meetings, which represents members’ active participation in borehole water management, has a positive

and sigriﬁcant effect on improvements made to the water source at the one percent level.

This supports the hypothesis that members’ active participation in borehole water

92 management increases the likelihood that improvements will be made to the water source. In other words, collective action over rules and actions related to access and use of borehole water result in investments being actually made to improve the water source.

The following variables yield interesting results: average herd size per member and turnover ratio. Average herd size per member has a negative and sigrificant effect on improvements made to the water source. This result appears to contradict the hypothesis that syndicates with higher profitability make improvements to the water source. It could be that syndicates have big herds because they did not have a water problem and thus they did not need to improve the water source. Turnover ratio has a positive and significant effect on improvements made to the water source at the five percent level.

This result is unexpected.

The following variables were not signiﬁcant although they have the expected sigi: syndicate size, range condition, the main source of water in the wet season, water shortage in the dry season and the index for members not following rules.

When the model for improvements made to the water source is run with the indicators in place of the indices the same variables apart from wealth heterogeneity remain consistent. Number of meetings in the last year has a positive and sigriﬁcant effect on improvements made to the water source at the one percent level. The presence of defaulters has a negative and sigriﬁcant effect on improvements made to the water source at the ten percent level.

Turning to the stocking density model in Table 3.4, the total number of households in the syndicate has a positive effect on stocking density at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. This supports the hypothesis that as syndicate size increases so does

93 the number of cattle watered at each borehole because each member brings with him additional animals.

The age of the syndicate has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on stocking density at the one percent level. Within the study area, syndicate members have not yet devised or set limits as to the number of cattle each syndicate member is allowed to keep, although such discussions are underway. Therefore the effect of age of the syndicate on stocking density as it currently observed is indicative of the cattle accumulation goal of most syndicate members. Whether the length of time the syndicate has been in existence has a negative effect on stocking density remains to be seen once syndicate members have ageed upon and established stock limits.

The presence of a water shortage during the dry season has a negative effect on stocking density at the five percent level of sigrificance. This supports the hypothesis that unreliable sources of water prevent or constrain individuals fi'om building herd sizes.

When I use the indicators in place of the indices in the stocking density model the same explanatory variables stated above remain consistent in both models. All the other explanatory variables in both models for stocking density are not sigriﬁcant although they have the expected sigrs.

Putting the results from the two models together, I found signiﬁcant relationships between the following syndicate speciﬁc variables and improvements made to the water source: heterogeneity in cattle ownership, total distance to cattle market, membership in other village organization, years of schooling of the chairman, age of the syndicate, use of supplementary feed, getting assistance from neighboring syndicates, and the index for

94 members’ active participation. I found that collective action over water provision within

the syndicate does not have a sigriﬁcant effect in reducing stocking density.

3.8. Conclusion and Policy Implications

Two indices related to collective action were used to determine the impact of

collective action over borehole water provision on investments made to improve the

water source and reduce gazing pressure on its surrounding land in Kgatleng district.

The two indices were developed to represent members not following rules (for a lack of

collective action) and members’ active participation in borehole water management (for

collective action). In each case, econometric analysis was ﬁrst done with the indices

related to collective action, and then with the indicators of collective action themselves.

The results showed that collective action over borehole water provision matters

for investments made to improve the water source. Conversely, I found that collective

action over borehole water provision does not have a signiﬁcant impact in reducing

gazing pressure in Kgatleng district. These results were corroborated when the actual

indicators themselves were used in place of the indices related to collective action.

Based on an investigation of collective action over water provision at the

syndicate level, the study presents evidence that small goups do work well together to provide water considered vital for cattle keeping and that this translates into investments to improve the water source. However, there is no conclusive evidence that such cooperative behavior necessarily translates into conservation behavior for the range resource which is becoming scarce. The study does not provide evidence that syndicates can or cannot engage in conservation.

95 The issue is complicated much more by the several loopholes which exist within the current institutional environment all of which act together and make it difﬁcult to

explain why collective action over water results in investment in improving the water

source but not conserving the range. First, huge government incentives (high prices, input

subsidies and heavy cattle marketing infrastructure) completely overwhelm any interest in range conservation amongst members. Members accumulate cattle and are able to sustain this practice through the use of supplementary feed. Second, in the wet season the syndicate’s control over the gazing area surrounding its borehole becomes less deﬁned as other syndicates nearby make use of alternative water sources. Third, syndicate members are wonied about the Land Board’s ability to authorize other syndicates to drill boreholes close to existing boreholes as it has done in some places. All these factors act together and make it difﬁcult to pin point exactly why there is no conservation behavior towards the range resource.

Perhaps the removal of price supports and input subsidies could remove the

incentive for individuals to overstock but this strategy is politically unpalatable. The study contributes to the search for a communal resource management strategy in

Kgatleng district by showing that small syndicates can work together to invest in improving the water source from a between and within goup perspective. However, under the current institutional environment we do not necessarily observe conservation behavior over the range resource because factors outside their control make it hard to know if they can really do it.

96 Table 3.1: Extent and Severity of the Conditions of Access to Water and Grazing Botswana’s Kgatleng District

Reasons for difﬁculties in accessing surface water in wet season Frequency Percentage Poor rains, pans do not hold enough water 17 24.3 Too many boreholes and cattle in the area 12 17.1 Only one dam and it is broken 1 1.4 Borehole is located far away from rivers or pans 4 5.7 Arable land encroachment 1 1.4 We use borehole all the time 35 50.1 Total 70 100 Reasons for concerns grazing availability around the borehole Too many boreholes and cattle in the area 13 43.3 Stray cattle 1 1 36.7 Bush encroachment 2 6.7 Poor rains 4 13.3 Total 30 100 Reasons for not making improvement to water source Existing borehole has enough water 20 27.4 Awaiting permission from land board to drill additional borehole 2 2.7 Lack of funds 17 23.3 Plenty of water in the rivers 2 2.7 Members do not meet regularly l 1.4 We have already made improvements 31 42.5 Total 73 100 Things members think can be done to halt degradation Fencing and better management, paddocking 42 18 Adhering to carrying capacity by selling cattle u-‘UJ wu—I Reducing the number of people in the syndicate Stop arable encroachment Stop borehole congestion Plant gass Remove donkeys and wildlife from gazing areas Stop ﬁres Set limits to the number of cattle syndicate members can have

Water cattle in holding pens HH—bwhxlv— We just need more rains and manage cattle movement 18

\i—H—n—wmwhua 100 Total bulb-l Source: Survey data. Makepe (2002).

97 Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable Obs. Mean Std. Min Max dev Disputes last year 73 0.40 0.49 0 1 Number of meetings last year 73 6.31 8.28 l 52 Percentage attendance at meetings 73 0.61 0.26 0.14 1 Presence of defaulters 73 0.79 0.40 0 1 Severity of punishment 73 2.55 1.19 l 5 Index of disputes, non payment, punishment 73 0.52 0.28 0.08 0.96 Index of number of meetings, percentage attendance 73 0.60 0.09 0.48 0.99 Improvements made to the water source 73 0.43 0.49 O 1 Current range condition 63 3.24 0.59 2 5 Age of the syndicate 73 35.6 19.6 4 77 Total number of households 73 17.97 10.55 3 49 Years schooling of the chairman 73 7.45 4.01 0 17 Membership in other village organizations 73 0.52 0.50 0 1 Total number of cattle watered at the borehole 73 1110.51 1103.62 200 6000 Average herd size per member 73 63.70 69,70 4 440 Main source of water in the wet season 73 0.75 0.43 0 1 Total distance to major market 73 173.52 54.74 35 283 Heterogeneity in cattle ownership 73 0.21 0.10 0 0.67 Presence of hirers 73 1.93 3.57 0 15 Percentage women members 73 0.12 0.13 0 0.82 Water shortage during the dry season 73 0.37 0.49 0 l Turnover ratio 73 0.0023 0.53 -2.66 3

Source: Survey data (Makepe, 2002)

98 Table 3.3: The Impact of Collective Action for Borehole Water Management on Improvements Made to the Water Source Botswana’s Kgatleng District Improvements made to the Improvements to the water water source source (with indices) (with indicators )

Number of households 0.0036 0.0103 [0.90] [0.25]

Wealth heterogeneity 6.8474“ 7.6256 [1.87] [1.56]

Average herd size per -0.0081** -0.0096*** member [2.09] [2.71]

Distance to main cattle 0.0466*** 0.0475*** market [3.86] [3.40]

Membership in other village 2.6776*** 2.6578*** organizations [2.92] [3.06]

Years of schooling of 0.1809" 0..2124*** chairman [1.90] [2.91]

Age of the syndicate 0.0442" 0.5324" [2.09] [1.901

Range condition 0.5728 0.7720 [1.50] [0.80]

Supplementary feed 3.0078"* 3.5044"* [2.91] [2.73]

Water source in wet season 0.8340 1.5886 [1.29] [1.57]

Water shortage in dry season 0.8131 0.8224“ [1.47] [1.68]

Turnover ratio 1.5783* 1.5527“ [2.48] [2.39]

Hirers -1.8958*** -2.3895** [2.70] [2.31]

Assistance from other -2.3843*** 2.8025" syndicate [2.83] [2. l9]

Disputes, non payment and -0.9400 punishment index [0.82]

Number of meetings, and 13.9827*** percentage attendance at [3.26] meetings index

99 Table 3.3 (cont’d)

Number of meetings 0.1342"* [2.64]

Percentage attendance at 2.6762 meetings [1 .23]

Disputes in the last year —0.2603 [0.45]

Presence of defaulters -1.3702* [1.69]

Severity of punishment 0.2559 [0.72]

Constant -21.0421**"' 45.4514" [2.23] [-2.30]

Observations 63 63 Wald 29.49 38.33 LR )8 statistic 0.02 0.01 Pseudo R2 0.57 0.59 Log likelihood -18.82 -l7.75

Source: Survey data Makepe 2002 Numbers in brackets are 2 statistics. Sigrificant at the "*1 % level "significant at the 5 % level ***sigrificant at the 10 % level.

100 Table 3.4: Impact of Collective Action for Borehole Water Management on Stocking Density in Botswana’s Kgatleng District Stocking density in logs Stocking density in logs (with indices) (with indicators) Number of households 0.0346 0.0342 (2.47)" (2.29)"

Wealth heterogeneity -0.9975 -l.1115 (0.10) (0.11)

Average herd size per 0.0005 0.0005 member (0.31) (0.28)

Distance to cattle market -0.0009 -0.0007 (0.41) (0.33)

Membership in other village 0.3559 0.3578 organizations (1 .33) (l .24)

Years of schooling of -0.0415 -0.0487 chairman (1.20) (1.43)

Age of the syndicate 0.0167 0.0185 (2.96)”* (3.12)*"‘*

Range condition —0.1289 -0.7l40 (1.54) (0.24)

Supplementary feed 0.3723 0.2856 (1.34) (1.06)

Water source in wet season 0.2475 0.2662 (0.61) (0.59)

Water shortage in dry season -0.5156** -0.5119" (2.28) (2.10)

Turnover ratio 0.0230 -0.0990 (0.42) (0.42)

Hirers 0.3263 0.3789 (1.36) (1.43)

Assistance from other -0.0214 -0.0025 syndicate (0.07) (0.00)

Disputes, non payment and -0.2504 punishment index (0.53)

Number of meetings, and 0.5321 percentage attendance at (0.45) meetings index

101 Table 3.4 (cont’d)

Number of meetings -0.0106 (1.28)

Percentage attendance at -0. 1055 meetings (0.18)

Disputes in the last year -0.0848 (0.29)

Presence of defaulters -0.2114 (0.40)

Severity of punishment 0.1663 (1.36)

Constant 1.6929 1 .5474 (1.24) (1.01)

Observations 63 63 F 3.17 4.77 [0.01] [0.00] R2 0.47 0.49

Source: Survey data (Makepe 2002). Numbers in parenthesis are absolute t statistics. Numbers in brackets are absolute p values. Significant at the “*1 % level Msigrificant at the 5 % level ***significant at the 10 % level.

102 Figure 3.1: Land Use in Kgatleng District, Botswana

—22°00'

": ' ' . a lat-zinc Predominantly . : ' of r Predominantly -cP ludndfarminﬂ ‘3 Village area Mntobulong/ - v/f/f %/ Malolwane ° vurase Oodi «I. ,,//‘ /- Ramonaka ‘w-Ruilwnylim Jgdl 1’ Mathubudukwane Road Modipane ” ab . : . Sikwane ' 0 40 W. km

Source: Allen, (1996)

103 Figure 3.2: Kgatleng District Boreholes

Kgatleng District Boreholes

In . V.”

‘59?

‘

I»

”Aﬁie‘é'

"it:

in»: raise.

'fiafisfie

lit tag-W

{if ‘

43'“

Op‘o

eager as:

. Boreholes [:] Stocking Density Area

104

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agawal, A. (2001). Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources. World Development Vol. 29. No. 10 pp 1649-1672.

Amtzen, J. W. (1990). Economic Policies and Rangeland Degadation in Botswana. Journal of International Development. 2: 4, 471-499.

Baland, J. P. and J. P. Platteau (1996). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Communities? Oxford University Press.

Baland J. P. and J. P. Platteau (1999). The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management. World Development. 27 (5): 773 - 788.

Bardhan, P. (1993). Analytics of the Institutions of Informal Cooperation in Rural Development. World Development. 21 (4): 633- 639.

Clarke, C. (1973). The Value of Agricultural Land. Oxford Pergarnon.

Field, D. I. (1977). A Handbook of Basic Ecology for Range Management in Botswana. Land Utilization Division. Ministry of Agiculture. Government Printers. Gaborone, Botswana.

F ujita, M., Y. Hayami and M. Kikuchi, (1999). The Conditions of Collective Action for Local Commons Management: The Case of the Philippines. Paper presented at World Bank Seminar, Washington DC: September 1.

Government of Botswana (2000). Environmental Statistics Bulletin. Government Printers. Gaborone Botswana.

Gebremedhin, B; Pender, J and G. T esfaye (2000). Community Natural Resource Management: The Case of Woodlots in Northern Ethiopia. EPTD Discussion Paper No. 60. IFPRI. Washington, DC

105 Jeltsch, F. Milton, S. J; Dean W. R. J. Rooyen-van, N. Harcombe, P. and M. Palmer (1997). Simulated Pattern Formation around Artiﬁcial Waterholes in the Semi- Arid Khalahari. Journal of Vegetation Science 8: 2, 177-188.

Makepe, Patricia. 2003. The Evolution of Institutions and Rules Governing Communal Grazing Lands in Botswana. Paper One. PhD dissertation, Dept. of Resource Development, Michigan State University.

Meinzen- Dick, R.S; K. V. Raju and A. Gulati. (2000). What Affects Organization and Collective Action for Managing Resources? Evidence from Canal Irrigation Systems in India. EPTD Discussion Paper No.61. IFPRI Washington, DC.

McCarthy, N.; Dutilly-Diane, C. and B. Drabo (2002) Cooperation, Collective Action and Natural Resources Management in Burkina Faso: A Methodological Note. CAPRi Working Paper No.27. Washington, DC.

Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ostrom, O. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.

Peters, P. (1994). Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana. Charlottesville and London: University Press to Virginia.

Poteete, A. R. (1999). Disaggegating State and Society: Accounting for Patterns of Tenure Change in Botswana 1975-1996. PhD Dissertation. Duke University.

106 Ramussen, L. N. and R. Meinzen-Dick. (1995). Local Organizations for Natural Resource Management: Lessons from Theoretical and Empirical Literature. Environment and Production Technology Division Discussion Paper No. 11. Washington DC. IFPRI.

Ringose, S. 1996: The Use of Integated Remotely Sensed and GIS Data to Determine Causes of Vegetation Cover Change in Southern Botswana. Applied Geography. Sevenoaks. l6. 3, 225-242.

Van Vegten, (1981). Man-made Vegetation Changes: An Example from Botswana’s Savannah. Gaborone, University of Botswana.

Wade, R. (1986). The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 11, 95 - 106

White, R. (1992). Livestock Development and Pastoral Production on Communal Rangeland in Botswana. Food Production and Rural Development Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

107 APPENDIX A

The Range Condition Score Card

Factor Quantity Scale of scores Actual score

1. Lower level cover 75-100 25-32 50-74 17-24 25-49 9-16 5-24 3-8 <5 0-2 2. Botanical composition 2.1 Poor species 0-5% 24-19 6-25% 18-13 26-50% 12-7 51-75% 6-1 76-100% 0 2.2. Annual species 0-5% 8-7 6-25% 6-5 26-50% 4-3 5 1-75% 2-1 76-100% 0 2.3. Weed species 0-5% 8-7 6-25% 6-5 26-50% 4-3 51-75% 2-1 76-100% 0 3. Plant vigor Healthy 4-3 Stunted 2-1 Weak 0

4. Litter. >50 hits 4-3 20-50 hits 2-1 <20 hits 0

5. Erosion None 0-8% 4-3 Slight 8-16% 2-1 Severe >16% 0

6. Trees and Shrubs Grassland 0-250/ha 16-13 Tree & shrub savanna 251-500/ha 12-9 Savanna shrub land 501-1000/ha 8-5 Savanna woodland 1001-2000/ha 4-1 . Woodland >2000/ha 0 Important tree and shrub species Total Score

Source: Field, (1977).

108 APPENDIX B

The relationship between population density, size of operation, and collective action

for monitoring and investment

The literature on agicultural land use and location theory (Clark, 1973) predicts

that near cities where population density is high and land is expensive, we should expect to ﬁnd a large number of small sized operations with low ﬁxed costs and relatively good

infrastructure. In contrast, far from cities where population density is low and land is cheap, we should expect to ﬁnd a small number of large sized operations with high ﬁxed

costs and poor infrastructure. In addition, far from cities we may also ﬁnd a small number of small sized operations facing high ﬁxed costs and poor infrastructure. But on these

small sized operations production is generally at a subsistence level.

Due to the factors outlined above, close to the city we should expect the need for

investments in infrastructure to be lower than it is in areas far from the city because near the city most investments in infrastructure have already been made. In contrast, far from

the city we should expect the need for investments in infrastructure to be higher because

far from the city the infrastructure is relatively poorer.

Therefore, based on the population density and the size of operations found in

each location, we should expect differences in the amount of collective action needed to make the required investment. Close to the city where there is high population density, a

large number of small sized operations and little need for investment, collective action for

making investments ought to be low and focused more on monitoring resource use. Far

from the city with low population density, a small number of large sized operations and

109 high need for investment, less collective action may needed to make the investment and monitor resource use because the small number of operations in this location makes self regulation easier. However, with a large number of small sized operations far from the city where there is a high need for investment, we expect more collective action focused on both making the much needed investments in inﬁ'astructure and also to monitor resource use.

The survey data were explored to examine the above relationships. Initially, the survey data were explored to determine how the borehole syndicates in the study area are actually distributed in terms of size of operation and population density. Average herd size per member was used to measure the size of operation and distance from cattle market was used to measure the population density. Since there were no data available on population density at the syndicate level for the study area, I used distance traveled to cattle market as an indicator of population density. Distance traveled to the cattle market is a good indicator of population density because we expect more people to be settled near the market than far away from the market or we expect markets to be located where there are more people.

The data were categorized according to the average herd size per member and the distance traveled to market based on the using two thresholds or cut off points which emerged from the data. Different ways of categorizing the data using other possible cut off points were tried. For example, I tried setting the goups into three different categories of size (small, medium and large) and distance (near, medium and far) in the hope of spotting a larger difference between the largest and smallest goup, making the selection of the threshold value have less inﬂuence on the ﬁndings. But for one thing some cases

110 some of the categories did not have any cases and for another thing there were no significant findings. In the final analysis, I used the criteria based on the two actual cutoff points which emerged from the data itself because this method gave the most distinct and identifiable goups.

For average herd size per member the cut off point I used was 70 cattle.

Syndicates with members having an average herd size of less than 70 cattle were taken to be small sized operations. Conversely, syndicates with members having an average herd size geater than 70 cattle were considered to be large sized operations. For distance traveled to the market the cut of point was 167 km. Syndicates which were located less than 167km ﬁom the market were considered to be close to the market and hence, were in high population density location. Conversely, syndicates located more than 167km from the market were considered far ﬁ'om the market and located in a low population density location. A scatter plot of these observations which emerged from the data can be seen in Figure B-l.

Four goups emerged from the analysis. Group one consisted of 30 syndicates which were small in terms of average herd size per member (< 70 cattle) and near the market (< 167km). For this goup, I expect to ﬁnd a low level of investment and collective action focused on monitoring resource use. Group two consisted of 30 syndicates which were small in terms of average herd size per member (< 70 cattle) but were far from the market (> 167km). For this goup, I expect to ﬁnd more investment accompanied by a higher level of collective action focused on both making the investment and monitoring resource use. Group three consisted of 5 syndicates which were large in average herd size per member (> 70 cattle) and near the market (< 167 km).

111 For this goup I expect to ﬁnd low level of investment and collective action. Group four consisted of 8 syndicates which were large in terms of average herd size per member (>

70 cattle) but far from the market. For this goup I expect to ﬁnd a high level of investment but with less collective action required to make that investment. For the four goups I used AN OVA to test the hypothesis that there are sigriﬁcant differences in the following variables of interest: investments made to improve the water source and collective action across all four goups. The two indices related to collective action, which were developed earlier using factor analysis,32 were used to measure collective action.

Recall that the results from the probit analysis in chapter two showed that average herd size per member had a negative and sigrificant effect on investments made to improve the water source. This was taken to mean that larger sized operations made fewer investments to improve their water source now because they had already made the necessary investment much earlier. The same probit analysis also showed that distance to cattle market also had a positive and sigrificant effect on improvements made to the water source. This meant that those syndicates which were located far from the market made investments to improve their water source because they were located in areas where there is poor infrastructure. In that same analysis, wealth heterogeneity turned out to have a significant effect on investments made to improve the water source suggesting that in cases of significant wealth heterogeneity members with a larger stake in the investment would undertake the needed investment and collect money fiom other syndicate members later. In light of these earlier findings, the ANOVA took the analysis firrther and explored

’2 A detailed explanation of how the two indices were constructed is given in chapter two.

112 the relationship between the four goups and wealth heterogeneity, investments made to improve the water source and collective action.

The results from the ANOVA are shown in Table B-1. There are not very many sigrificant relationships as can be seen from the lack of sigrificant differences between wealth heterogeneity and investments made to improve the water source across the four goups. Nevertheless, the analysis on the two indices of collective action gave sigrificant results.

The index on disputes, nonpayment and punishment which was chosen to represent members not following rules is almost the same across goups. This indicates that in the study area, syndicates face similar problems regarding members not following rules regardless of the size of operation and population density. For the index on number of meetings and percentage attendance at meetings chosen to represent members’ active participation I found that for both small and large syndicates the level of collective action was signiﬁcantly higher for syndicates that were farther away from the market. This conﬁrms the hypothesis that farther away from the city we should expect more collective active. However, it was not possible within the limits of the data available to determine whether collective action was focused on making investments in the case of the small syndicates and on monitoring for the larger syndicates.

113 Table B — 1: Relationship between average herd size per member, total distance from cattle market and investments to improve the water source and level of collective action

Variable Small and near Small and far Large and near Large and far (n = 30) (n=30) (n= 5) (n= 8)

Wealth 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.16 heterogeneity

Between goups SS 0.03 F = 0.99 Prob. > F 0.40

Improvements 0.30 0.80 0.47 0.50 made to water source Between goups SS 1.26 F = 1.76 Prob. > F 0.16

Index of 0.45 0.49 0.62 0.45 disputes, nonpayment and punishment Between goups SS 0.51 F= 2.33 Prob. > F 0.08

Index of 0.60 0.69 0.58 0.60 number of meetings and percentage attendance

Between goups SS 0.06 F = 2.79 Prob. > F 0.04

Source: Survey data, Makepe (2002).

114 Figure B-l: Scatter plot of borehole syndicates according to size of operation and distance to market

283 — o o

o oo o o c 0 § 0 O o o o f a 0 (U o O E O O O O o co oo o 5 4-0

a_ o ‘3 0 g 0 Q o e

E q

0 db 0 C o o o 0 £9 a o .2 o O O O o o 'O 0 0 g) c S __ o 9.. o o 35 O T f l f T 13.0769 266.667 Average herd size per member Source: Survey data, Makepe (2002).

The above table is divided into four quadrants. Each quadrant represents one of the four goups. The quadrant on the bottom left hand side of the gaph represents goup one, small and near with less than 70 cattle and less than 167km from the market. The quadrant on the top left hand side of the gaph represents goup two, small and far with less than 70 cattle and more than 167 km from the market. The quadrant to the bottom right hand side represents goup three, large and near with more than 70 cattle but less than 167 km away from the market. Finally, the top quadrant on the right hand side represents goup four, large and far with more than 70 cattle per member and more than

167 km away from the market.

115 APPENDIX C

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

IDENTIFYING VARIABLES

District:

Village:

Syndicate:

Date:

l. BOREHOLE SYNDICATE: STRUCTURE

1.1. In what year was the syndicate formed?

1.2. How did you acquire this borehole?

1.3. How many households are members of your syndicate?

1.4. Of these households, how many of them are headed by women?

1.5. Can relatives or dependents water their animals at this borehole? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

1.6. If yes, how many dependents are allowed to water their cattle at the syndicate borehole?

1.7. Are there any members of the syndicate who are also members of other village organizations? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If not, go to question 1.9)

116 1.8. How many members of the syndicate are members of the following types of other village organizations?

= village development committee

2 = farming cooperative

3 = farming association

4 = other (specify)

1.9 Heterogeneity in cattle ownership at the syndicate level

Number of cattle No of syndicate members

Under 20

20—60

60— 100

100 — 200

200 — 300

300 — 400 400+

117 1.10. Individual level information for syndicate members

Name Age Position in Number of Other income Years

syndicate cattle made in the last schooling

year completed

Source Amount

Coding:

Other income Amount income from other source Schooling

1 = salaried employment 1 = mostly livestock 1 == primary school

2 = trader 2 = half livestock 2 = junior high school

3 = remittances 3 = mostly other 3 = senior high school

4 = crop cultivation 4 = university

5 = other (specify) 5 = technical training

6 = other (specify)

1.11. How many cattle watered at this borehole during the last dry season?

118 2. BOREHOLE SYNDICATE: FUNCTION

2.1. What kinds of decisions are made by the syndicate members?

2.2. How are these decisions made?

2.3. Does the syndicate have meetings? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 2.10)

2.4. If yes, what are the meetings for?

2.5. How many times did the syndicate meet during the last one year?

1 = once a year

2 = once a month

3 = once a week

4 = if the need arises

5 = other (specify)

2.6. When did you hold the last meeting?

2.7. How many people attended the last meeting?

2.8. How do you rate this level of attendance?

l = poor

2 = moderate 3=high

2.9. If poor, what do you think is the reason for poor attendance?

119 2.10. How are the operation and maintenance costs shared amongst the syndicate

members?

l = depends on household size (per person)

2 = depends on livestock holdings (per head of livestock)

3 = ﬂat rate irrespective of above

4 = other (specify)

2.11. Are there any members who did not pay fees in the last year? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 2.15)

2.12. If yes, why did the not pay these fees?

2.13. 15 this a problem? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

2.14. What happens to members who do not pay fees?

2.15. Do you allow non-goup members or hirers to water their cattle at your borehole for

a fee? (1 = yes; 2 = no).

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to section 3)

2.16. If yes, how much do they pay per animal during:

a) the wet season?

b) the dry season?

2.17. How many hirers are related to the members of the syndicate?

2.18. How many hirers are not related to the members of the syndicate?

120 2.19. Is there are limit as to how many hirers can water and gaze cattle at the borehole?

(1= yes; 2 = no)

2.20. What form of payment is acceptable in return for access to water?

3. WATER SOURCES

3.1. Can you rank the main problems you face as livestock farmers in order of importance

(starting with the problem that concerns you the most)

3.2. What is your main source of water during:

a) the wet season?

b) the dry season?

3.3a. During the wet season do you have any difﬁculty getting access to water in seasonal pans? (l = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 3.4a)

3.3b. If yes, what kinds of difﬁculties do you face in accessing water in seasonal pans?

3.3c. Would you say that it is becoming more difﬁcult to access water in seasonal pans now than it was ten years ago? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 3.4a)

121 3.3d. If yes, why do you think it is becoming more difﬁcult to access water in seasonal pans?

3.4a. During the dry season do you sometimes experiences any water shortages? (1 = yes;

2=no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 3.4d)

3.4b. If yes, explain the types of water shortages you experience during the dry

8638011.

3.4c. What do you do to get enough water for your cattle when there is a water shortage?

1 = seek assistance from neighbors

2 = reduce cattle numbers

3 = water cattle every other day

4 = move cattle to other areas

5 = other (specify)

3.4d. Have you ever done anything to improve your water source? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

3.4c. If yes, what have you done to improve your water source?

3.4f. If no, why have you not done anything?

122 3.5a. Water shortages

Syndicate Distance Do you get Type of Do you get Type of How

name from assistance arrangement assistance arrangement many

own from them 1 = sell from them 1 = sell times have

syndicate (1 = yes; 2 2 = trade (1 = yes; 2 = 2 = trade you

(km) = no) 3 = reciprocal no) 3 = assisted

reciprocal each other

in the last

5 years?

4. RANGE DEGRADATION AND IMPROVEMENTS

4.1. Are members of the borehole syndicate concerned about the availability of gazing within the vicinity of the borehole? (l = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 4.3)

4.2. If yes, why?

4.3. Are you now more restricted in terms of the amount of gazing available around your borehole than you were ten years ago? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

4.4. If yes, what do you think is the reason for this restriction?

123 4.5. Have you ever done anything to improve on the pasture around your borehole? (1 = yes; 2 = no).

4.6. If yes, what have you done to improve on the pasture around your borehole?

l = bush burning

2 = bush clearing (remove thickets)

3 = paddocking

4 = [perimeter fencing

5 = other (specify)

4.7. If not, why has nothing been done?

4.8. Are there ever times when the pasture cannot support the herd? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

4.9. If yes, at what time of the year is this likely to occur?

4.10. If yes, how do you prevent your animals from starving?

1 = provide supplementary feed

2 = ﬁnd better pasture

3 = do nothing, wait for the rains

4 = ensure controlled burning

124 4.1 1. When do you usually carry out these measures?

1 = immediately after the end of poor rain season when the gazing is limited

2 = when the amount of hay standing begins to decline

3 = after the ofﬁcial declaration of drought

4 = when cattle start losing weight

5 = only when the cattle start dying

6 = all the time

7 = others (specify)

4.12. What do you see as the main causes of the problem of overgazing?

4.13. What do you see as possible solution(s) to the problem of overgazing?

125 4.14. How many of you provide supplementary feed for your animals when there is a

gazing shortage?

Type Source Time when you started

using feed type

5. EXTENT AND CAUSES OF CONFLICT

5.1. How many people have joined the syndicate in the last 5 years?

5.2. How many people have left the syndicate in the last 5 years?

5.3. What do you think made them leave the syndicate?

5.4. Do you have any regulations within your syndicate that govern the gazing of cattle around the borehole? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

5.5 Do you have any regulations with other syndicates that govern the gazing of cattle around your boreholes? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 5.11)

126 5.6. If yes, what are these regulations?

a) internal (within) regulations:

b) external (with others) regulations:

5.7. Have any of the above rules been violated in the past ﬁve years? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 5.11)

5.8. If yes, which ones have been violated?

5.9. Which goup of users violated the rule?

1 = members

2 = dependents

3 = hirers

5.10. How do you deal with people who violate these rules?

5.11. Who takes care of the gazing?

1 = members

2: herd boys

3 = other (specify)

127 5.12. Livestock or gazing disputes in the last twelve months

Nature of l = yes 1 = internal Level at which Cost

dispute 2 = no 2 = external dispute settles incurred

in pula.

Level at which dispute settles

1 = neighbors 3 = local chiefs 5 = magistrate

2 = elders 4 = police 6 = high court

5.13. Are there more conﬂicts now than in the past ten years or so? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 5.15)

5.14. If yes, why are there more conﬂicts now?

5.15. Ifno, why not?

5.16. 15 it easier to resolve grazing/livestock/water conﬂicts now than it was in the past ten years? (1 = yes; 2 = no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 5.18)

5.17. If yes, why?

5.18.1fno, why?

5.19. Do syndicate members cooperate more now than they did in the past? (1 = yes; 2 =

no)

(If yes, continue) (If no, go to question 5.21)

5.20. If yes, why?

128 5.21. If no, why not?

6. ACCESS TO LIVESTOCK MARKETING INFRASTRUCTURE

6.1. How far away is it from your borehole to the main market where you most often sell your cattle?

Road type Distance in km

Trekking route

Rural access road

Tarred road

Total distance

129