REMINISCENCES OF OLIVER TAMBO1 By E.S. Reddy

Our First Meeting in 1960

I first met Oliver Tambo at the United Nations around October 1960, during the session of the General Assembly.

I was a political affairs officer in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, primarily engaged in research on Africa and Asia, especially on problems under consideration by the United Nations. I used to go often at lunch time to the Press area ­ to the office of Donald Grant, correspondent of the St. Louis Post­Despatch and Ms. Mary Hagen, correspondent of the Patriot and Link in New Delhi – to get the latest news and exchange views. At that time our main interest was in news about the Congo and Patrice Lumumba.

One day, when I was there, Oliver Tambo dropped in and I was introduced to him. I had, of course, known of him for many years.

Oliver had come to the UN to lobby for sanctions against the South African regime. At that time, there was no precedent for a UN hearing of a petitioner from South Africa. He could only meet delegates to the General Assembly.2

After escaping from South Africa at the end of March 1960, Oliver had met many leaders of the Commonwealth at their meeting in London and had attended the Second Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa in June. So he knew and could contact many African delegates and several Asian delegates, including V.K. Krishna Menon, Chairman of the delegation of India to the General Assembly.

The Non­aligned Group at the UN set up a small sub­committee on South Africa, chaired by U Thant, ambassador of Burma. Oliver was in contact with the

1 See also: extracts from letters of Oliver Tambo to E. S. Reddy, 1964­1973, at www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/or­es.html.

2 A “South African United Front” in exile – consisting of ANC, PAC, South African Indian Congress and SWANU – was set up earlier in the year in London. (It lasted only for a year). Vus Make of PAC came to New York around the same time as Oliver. He was given a job at the Ghana Mission to the UN and stayed on in New York for one or two years. But Oliver stayed only for a few weeks. sub­committee. A year later, after the death of Dag Hammarskjold, U Thant was elected Acting Secretary­General of the UN.

U Thant had developed great respect for Oliver. As Secretary­General he did not meet Oliver (except perhaps at some receptions) and Oliver did not seek a formal appointment with him in order not to embarrass him. But they were in communication through Dr. Ralph Bunche, Under­Secretary­General of the UN, and through me when I became Principal Secretary of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid in March 1963.

I remember that Oliver was warm and modest. He did not boast about the strength of his organization or resort to radical rhetoric, as many representatives of liberation movements did. He was a thinker and an intellectual with a knowledge of world affairs. He had a very positive attitude towards the United Nations. We discussed the prospects in the UN.

The Security Council had passed a resolution on 1 April 1960, after the Sharpeville massacre, calling upon the South African Government “to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality… and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination; and requesting the Secretary­General, “in consultation with the Government of the Union of South Africa, to make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the (United Nations) Charter…”

The Secretary­General, Dag Hammarskjold, went to London during the Commonwealth meeting and met the South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw on 13­14 May. (Prime Minister Verwoerd could not attend). He did not visit South Africa until January 1961 because of his preoccupation with the Congo crisis.

I did not know at the time but Robert Resha told me in July 1963 that Oliver requested an appointment to see Hammarskjold in London. He was received by Mr. Weischoff, a director in the UN, who accompanied Hammarskjold to London and later to South Africa. After the meeting, Weischoff warned Oliver not to tell the media that they had met; if he did, Weischoff would deny any meeting.

Meetings with Oliver during the General Assembly session in September­ December 1963

I met Oliver again several times during the session of the General Assembly in 1963. The Special Committee against Apartheid was established by a resolution of the General Assembly on November 7, 1962, and held its first meeting on April 2, 1963. I was appointed its Principal Secretary, after its membership was decided at the end of February.

The Western Powers declined to become members of the Committee, the first Committee they boycotted. It was expected that with the Western boycott and the intransigence of the South African Government, the Special Committee would be totally ineffective. But it proved to be one of the most dynamic committees of the United Nations and gained respect even from Western delegations.

The Special Committee set a precedent by hearing petitioners from South Africa. In July 1963, an ANC delegation came to New York and appeared before the Special Committee. It was composed of Duma Nokwe, Robert Resha and Tennyson Makiwane. Robbie stayed on for several days after the meeting. (He was then in charge of Algeria, France, Britain and the United Nations.) We became good friends. The delegation reported to Oliver how helpful we were.

The Committee presented two interim reports to the General Assembly and the Security Council, in May and July 1963, and a detailed annual report in September 1963 recommending a series of measures by the United Nations and Member States to exert pressure on the South African Government and to provide assistance to the families of the political prisoners.

Diallo Telli of Guinea, the first Chairman of the Special Committee, was a true African patriot. He was chairman of the political committee of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held in Addis Ababa in May 1963 which established the Organization of African Unity. The Committee, and then the Conference, unanimously adopted a substantive resolution on apartheid, endorsing all the recommendations of the first interim report of the Special Committee. The Conference decided to despatch a delegation of foreign ministers of four countries – Liberia, Tunisia, Madagascar and Sierra Leone – “to inform the Security Council of the explosive situation existing in South Africa”.

At the request of these foreign ministers, representing all of Africa, the Security Council met early in August and adopted a resolution recommending an arms embargo against South Africa. The United States voted for this resolution and announced an arms embargo. Britain and France abstained.

Oliver came for the General Assembly session which followed. His main concern at the United Nations was to secure effective sanctions against South Africa. But we were also seriously concerned about the enormous repression in South Africa. Thousands of people were arrested in South Africa in 1963 and there were numerous reports of torture of detainees. Leaders of the Umkhonto, the ANC military wing, were arrested in Rivonia in July. A series of trials were taking place.

The Special Committee did all it could to publicise the situation. It recommended to the General Assembly and the Security Council to call on South Africa to end all repression, terminate the trials, and release all political prisoners. At my suggestion, it also recommended an appeal to all governments to provide assistance to the families of political prisoners.3

Resolution on the Rivonia Trial

Shortly before the General Assembly session, I received a letter from Mary Benson in London that Nelson Mandela and the Rivonia prisoners would soon be brought to trial.

I spoke to Diallo Telli and we agreed that an emergency debate should be proposed in the General Assembly when the trial began.

In terms of the United Nations Charter, Article 12, when the Security Council is acting on a dispute or a situation, the General Assembly cannot make any recommendations. Since the Security Council had the situation in South Africa on its agenda, I was concerned that the General Assembly might be precluded from adopting any resolutions on the matter. That would have been unfortunate, as we could get little from the Security Council where the five permanent members ­including Britain, France and the United States – had the right of veto. I felt, however, that if the question of political prisoners was taken up in the General Assembly, no delegation would raise the procedural problem. And the South African problem would remain on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Perhaps my fears were exaggerated. No delegation had raised the procedural problem earlier though the Security Council had discussed the South African situation after the Sharpeville massacre and kept the matter on its agenda.

On October 8, 1963, I heard on the radio at 8 a.m. that Nelson Mandela and others were brought before the court. I telephoned Diallo Telli at the other end of the city and rushed to my office as soon as I could.

3 I had read a report in the British press that Canon Collins had made an urgent appeal for more contributions to the Defence and Aid Fund as its resources were inadequate to provide legal defence for the political prisoners and assistance for their families. Diallo Telli acted immediately. At 10.30 a.m. the large Group of African States at the United Nations held a meeting – the meetings of groups were always closed – to discuss the situation. They agreed to call for an urgent debate in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly that afternoon. (The apartheid item was assigned to this Committee by the General Assembly and the Committee was due to meet to discuss the order of discussion of items assigned to it.) They also decided to meet with the Secretary­General, U Thant, to convey their concern.

Soon after the African Group meeting, I found Oliver Tambo and informed him of its decision.

At the meeting of the Committee that afternoon, Diallo Telli moved for immediate consideration of the grave developments in South Africa, and proposed that it hear Oliver Tambo. This was the first time a South African “petitioner” spoke in the Assembly.4

The draft resolution I had prepared was co­sponsored by 55 delegations and was approved, with one revision, by the Special Political Committee on 10 October. The next day, the General Assembly in Plenary Meeting adopted the draft as resolution 1881 (XVIII) by 106 votes to 1.5 This was the beginning of the world campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners.

Discussion on apartheid continued in the Special Political Committee and Oliver made his main statement on 29 October, focussing on sanctions. Meanwhile Rt. Rev. Ambrose Reeves appeared as a petitioner on 18 October.

Reception for Oliver at the United Nations Headquarters

At a meeting of the Bureau of the Special Committee, I suggested a reception for Oliver Tambo, Bishop Reeves and Miriam Makeba (who had appeared earlier before the Special Committee). I said that I could arrange a modest reception at the United Nations Headquarters and pay the costs, while my staff and I would serve. I asked if the Chairman would be willing to sponsor the reception so that there would be high­level attendance.

Diallo Telli readily agreed and suggested that the reception be in the name of the three officers of the Special Committee – the ambassadors of Guinea, Costa Rica and Nepal.

4 Potlako Leballo had spoken a year earlier, but as a petitioner on Basutoland. 5 Only South Africa voted against. Portugal absented itself. Because of this sponsorship, the attendance was way above my expectations. Ambassadors of many countries (including Britain and the United States) came. Secretary­General U Thant arrived with Ralph Bunche and other senior officials.

The reception was on 17 October, the day before Bishop Reeves made a statement in the Special Political Committee.

This was the first time a leader of a liberation movement was guest of honour at a reception at the UN Headquarters. I arranged several other receptions at the UN later in honour of Oliver, Amilcar Cabral, Canon Collins and leaders of anti­ apartheid groups.

General Assembly Resolution on Assistance to Prisoners

While preparing the draft of the annual report of the Special Committee, I had very much in mind the appeal of Canon Collins for more resources to assist the political prisoners and their families.

I had included in my draft a recommendation that in view of the persecution of thousands of South Africans for their opposition to apartheid and the serious hardships faced by them, the international community should provide relief and assistance to them. I had expected that there would be hesitation by delegates to support such an unprecedented measure ­ assistance to revolutionaries in an independent State. But the Bureau of the Committee readily agreed, with the addition suggested by the Costa Rican Vice­President that the assistance should be provided “for humanitarian reasons.”

I did not expect that there would be large­scale contributions by governments to the Defence and Aid Fund. But I felt that a UN resolution would help Canon Collins in approaching foundations and other sources of funds.

I discussed the matter on several occasions with Oliver. He was very hesitant. He was afraid that the proposal would divert attention from sanctions. Moreover, Western Governments may provide some humanitarian assistance and expect to be commended while they continued collaboration with the apartheid regime.

I told him that we would do all we could to prevent any diversion of attention. I did not see assistance as humanitarian, but as highly political. If any of the prisoners broke down because their families were destitute and starving, there would be a serious setback to the movement. Assistance was essential for the morale of the fighters for freedom.

It was only in the middle of December, after Diallo Telli spoke to him, that Oliver agreed. The resolution was moved and adopted on 16 December 1963. (This was one of two resolutions on apartheid).

"The General Assembly,

"Taking note of the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, in which the Committee drew attention to the serious hardship faced by the families of persons persecuted by the Government of South Africa for their opposition to the policies of apartheid, and recommended that the international community, for humanitarian reasons, provide them with relief and other assistance,

"Considering that such assistance is consonant with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

"Noting that those families continue to suffer serious hardship,

"1. Requests the Secretary­General to seek ways and means of providing relief and assistance, through the appropriate international agencies, to the families of all persons persecuted by the Government of the Republic of South Africa for their opposition to the policies of apartheid;

"2. Invites Member States and organizations to contribute generously to such relief and assistance;

"3. Invites the Secretary­General to report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session on the implementation of the present resolution."6

Security Council meetings, November­December 1963

Meanwhile, the Security Council met again, at the request of the four African foreign ministers, from 30 November to discuss the situation in South Africa, and adopted a resolution on 4 December 1963.

6 Oliver returned to London after the resolutions were adopted. I was due to stop briefly in London in February on my way to meetings in Geneva. I received a letter from Oliver in January that people in London were excited about the resolution and that I should meet them on my visit to London. While the African States wished to obtain stronger action against South Africa, the main focus of the discussions was on a “Nordic initiative.”

Per Haekkerup, Foreign Minister of Denmark, speaking in the General Assembly on 25 September 1963, had declared that Denmark agreed that pressure must be increased on the South African government to abolish apartheid. But sanctions alone were not sufficient to bring about a peaceful solution and may well aggravate the situation. The great majority of the European population in South Africa wrongly assumed that the abandonment of white domination would mean the abandonment of their own existence.

It was, therefore, necessary to make clear the alternative desired by the world – a truly democratic, multi­racial society with equal rights to all individuals, irrespective of race. Such a transformation could not be achieved by the South Africans alone. The United Nations must play a major role. It must consider how it can, in a transitional period, contribute to the maintenance of law and order, and how it can best assist South Africa in laying the foundation of its new society.

Norway, as the Nordic member of the Security Council, negotiated the draft of the Security Council resolution. It was adopted unanimously on 4 December 1963.

In this resolution, the Security Council declared that the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination as practised by the South African Government "are abhorrent to the conscience of mankind and that therefore a positive alternative to these policies must be found through peaceful means". It requested the Secretary­ General to establish a small group of recognised experts "to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa through full, peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all inhabitants of the territory as a whole, regardless of race, colour or creed, and to consider what part the United Nations might play in the achievement of that end."

Oliver was not consulted by Denmark before the speech by Haekkerup. Nordic delegates spoke to him during the consultations on the resolution.

Oliver was apprehensive about the Nordic initiative. He felt that it gave prominence to white fears rather than the oppression of the blacks and the need for sanctions and other pressure on the South African government. He was concerned that it might lead to pressure on the liberation movement to make concessions. He stressed that it was for the South African people, not for an outside body, to formulate plans for the establishment of a democratic society. He told me: “Even if we have a prolonged struggle, we will need to go to a tent and negotiate an armistice. We will make concessions to the enemy during those negotiations, because he has the power. But we cannot make concessions to other governments now.”

The Nordic initiative was understood by many as envisaging the establishment of a United Nations force to maintain law and order in South Africa during a transitional period. In view of the Congo experience, many delegations and liberation movements were extremely wary, to say the least, of any United Nations force.

Oliver’s apprehensions were reflected in comments he prepared on the draft resolution which were subsequently published in South Africa Freedom News. He said:

(1) The Security Council should avoid repeating appeals to South Africa. The General Assembly has done this for more than a decade and in the result has encouraged South Africa to believe that it can, with impunity, ignore these appeals. The fact that South Africa has failed or ignored to carry out or comply with a decision of the Security Council should itself be an issue for consideration by the Security Council. The latter should not resort to merely taking the same decision once more. Certainly, South Africa should not be allowed to continue reducing the UN, including the Security Council, to a debating society and nothing more. A successive repetition of appeals by the Security Council would have precisely this effect.

(2) The production of a blueprint prescribing the mode of transition from apartheid to a nonracial society should be the responsibility of the South African people, save that the United Nations can place its services, including its expert advisers, at the disposal of the people or government of South Africa. Such services and such advice could only be furnished in furtherance of the aims of the Charter and the principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A declaration assuring South Africa of the United Nations' willingness to assist in the process of eliminating racial discrimination should suffice at this stage.

(3) The South African Government rejects the idea that there are any better experts than itself on the South African situation. It seems quite unwise to proceed on the basis that this Government needs expert advice as to an appropriate alternative to apartheid. It wants no alternative and will produce none until it finds itself unable to make headway with, or maintain itself in power on, apartheid. At best a committee of experts can only produce an opinion, which, as an opinion, stands little chance of being any more acceptable to South Africa than the world's unanimous condemnation of apartheid.

(4) The idea of a body of experts is born of the feeling that the white man's fears should be considered. But the issue before the United Nations is not what is being done to the white man, but what the white man is doing to the African. The only complaint before the United Nations is that apartheid is an inhuman policy. There is no other problem. It is to this problem that the United Nations should devote its attention. It is only when South Africa's whites are becoming exposed to a possible danger that the United Nations would be justified in addressing itself to their complaints. At the moment, they do not even recognise the right of the United Nations to interfere in any way with what they are doing to the African people…

(6) Nothing should be done to lift the pressures which have been built on South Africa and which offer the sole hope for any of the changes demanded of the South African Government…

(7) The expression "positive alternative" suggests that the demand on South Africa to abandon apartheid and the action of governments taken in terms of [General Assembly] resolution 17617 or the independent action of the African States are "negative pressures" incapable of compelling the South African Government, of its own, to seek and find policies that are not abhorrent to the conscience of mankind.

(8) There is no balance between increase of pressures and the quest for "positive alternatives". In the terms of the resolution the UN directs its attention to an academic solution and all but abandons the pressures which would lend any relevance at all to these alternatives. In this respect the resolution fails to take into account the realities of the South African situation. In particular, it takes no account of the fact that this situation is deteriorating. What the resolution does therefore is precisely what South Africa's trading partners would have wanted to do: to focus attention on the "positive alternatives" and relegate the issue of the pressures, e.g. sanctions, to the background and in the process to undermine the efforts of countries which are rightly carrying out the terms and spirit of resolution 1761…

(10) The Security Council resolution of August 7th, calling for an embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa, should not be regarded as calculated to induce a change on the part of the South African Government. It seeks to terminate the manifestly unethical practice of

7 General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) of 7 November 1962 requested member States to take a series of measures to persuade South Africa to abandon apartheid. furnishing South Africa with the instruments for, and therefore of assisting in, the murder of its opponents. It does not operate to prevent the murders, much less the policy which must inevitably lead to such murders. Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution therefore does not touch the policy of apartheid as such and does nothing to weaken its foundation or even slow down its tempo.

(11) There has always been the fear on our part that of the two portions of the Nordic proposals, the first and more important might be shelved and the second given a dominant position to a degree which would make it practically impossible to discuss or decide on pressure, e.g., oil sanctions. The present draft resolution, having regard to operative paragraphs 4 and 5, does little to eliminate this fear.

UN Group of Experts

The Secretary­General, U Thant, appointed five members to the Group of Experts:

Mrs. Alva Myrdal (Sweden) Edward Asafu­Adjaye (Ghana) Sir Hugh Foot (United Kingdom) Dey Ould Sidi Baba (Morocco) Josip Djerdja (Yugoslavia)

[The group elected Mrs. Myrdal Chairman and Sir Hugh Foot Rapporteur. Djerdja resigned before the Group completed its work.]

I was offered the post of Secretary of the Group. I accepted the assignment mainly because of Oliver’s apprehensions. I remained Principal Secretary of the Special Committee. Both were full­time jobs and I could only manage with goodwill of the two committees.

I briefed Mrs. Myrdal at our first meeting, about the apprehensions of Oliver. She took them seriously and told me that she had no intention of proposing any United Nations peacekeeping force.

Soon after the Group arrived in New York, I arranged a meeting with the Chairman of the Special Committee, Ambassador Diallo Telli. Mrs. Myrdal and Lord Caradon, who were the key members, made it clear that the Group would not recommend a blueprint for South Africa’s future, but means to help South Africans to consult and decide their future. They also stressed that they had no intention of proposing a peacekeeping force. The two Chairpersons got along very well. I could reassure Oliver.

Oliver, my “host” in London

I stopped for a few days in London in February 1964 on my way to Geneva to meet the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross to consult on assistance to South African refugees and to families of political prisoners.

The day I arrived in London, Oliver arranged a party at his home and invited several South Africans and volunteers of the anti­apartheid movement. I was under jet lag and his flat at the North end was so far away from Bailey Hotel near the Gloucester tube station that I fell asleep in the taxi. Oliver and Adelaide were gracious hosts. I was driven back to my hotel by (Pascal?) Ngakane.8

Oliver asked Robert Resha to take me to Canon Collins, Mrs. Clara Urquhart of Amnesty, Yusuf Dadoo and others.

Not far from my Hotel, there was New Africa House, owned by the Ghana Government at 3, Collingham Gardens. ANC had its office there.

I was able to have extensive discussions with Oliver and Robbie during this visit. I arranged a meeting between Oliver and Sir Hugh Foot.

I stopped again in London, on my return from Geneva, for meetings of the Group of Experts.

I attended a public meeting of the Defence and Aid Fund at Westminster Central Hall where Marlon Brando and the Archbishop of Cape Town, Jooste de Blanc, spoke.9 Sir Hugh Foot also attended the meeting. Sir Hugh and I spoke to Mrs. Myrdal about the meeting. This helped to bring about the subsequent Swedish contribution to Defence and Aid Fund.

Oliver’s visit to New York in March 1964

8 Oliver advised me to keep in contact with the Anti­Apartheid Movement. He asked Abdul Minty to help me. That was the beginning of the close association between the Special Committee against Apartheid and the Anti­Apartheid Movement. 9 That meeting was my first experience of a public meeting in Britain. There were several hecklers shouting “What about Ghana?” They could not be ejected as would have happened in New York. Canon Collins offered to return them the admission fee if they left and they left after a while. After my return to New York, I prepared a report for the Special Committee on the repression and the many trials in South Africa. We arranged meetings of the Special Committee in March to discuss the situation.

I informed Oliver about the meetings and he came to New York with Tennyson Makiwane – and made a statement before the Special Committee. The Committee adopted a report to the General Assembly and the Security Council drawing attention to the grave developments. It also sent appeals to all Heads of State to use their influence to secure an end to death sentences and to repression in general. Many of them issued statements or conveyed their concern to the South African government.

Oliver also met with the Group of Experts and there was a fruitful discussion. He created a very good impression.

I discussed with Oliver what we should do next. He advised against rushing to call a meeting of the Security Council soon. “The Security Council is our trump card. We should not use it unless we are confident of effective action.”10

Oliver, I heard, travelled to Ghana and other African countries to request their Heads of State to intervene to prevent death sentences in the Rivonia trial.

Report of the Group of Experts and the Sanctions Conference, April 1964

The UN Group of Experts met in London in April 1964 to prepare its report.

There was great difficulty with regard to sanctions against South Africa. Ambassador Sidi Baba of Morocco was pressing for a recommendation on sanctions as his position as an African diplomat would otherwise be difficult. On the other hand, Mrs. Myrdal, an ambassador of Sweden, could not call for sanctions, since her government had not supported sanctions at that time. She told me that she could not sleep the night before the last meeting.

Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon) was then all for a crusade against apartheid. He was free as he had retired from government service. He met with Ronald Segal and was persuaded about sanctions.11

10 The Special Committee and the African States called for discussion of the South African situation by the Security Council in June when the sentences in the Rivonia trial were expected. The report of the Group of Experts had been conveyed by the Secretary­General to the Security Council on 20 April. The Special Committee had made another report after the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa in London.

11 When the Labour Party came to power later in the year, he was appointed a Minister of State and representative to the United Nations. He maintained an interest in South Africa until the end

I deliberately suggested several different formulations on sanctions at the last meeting. The members could then freely denounce my formulations without hurting the feelings of other members. Finally, agreement was reached on a formulation I suggested with slight revision.

The report called for an immediate amnesty for opponents of apartheid and the formation of a National Convention fully representative of all the people of South Africa. It proposed that the South African Government be invited to send its representatives to take part in discussions under the auspices of the United Nations on the formation of the National Convention. It added:

"If no satisfactory reply is received from the South African Government by the stipulated date, the Security Council, in our view, would be left with no effective peaceful means for assisting to resolve the situation, except to apply economic sanctions. Consequently, we recommend that the Security Council should then take the decision to apply economic sanctions..."

It recommended that in the meantime the Security Council should undertake a study of sanctions. The report was unanimous.

I stayed on in London as the Special Committee decided to send a delegation to attend the International Conference for Sanctions against South Africa, 14­17 April 1964.

Before the delegation arrived, I had the report of the Group of Experts typed and pouched to New York. (It was issued as a UN document on 20 April 1964, the day when Nelson Mandela made his historic statement from the dock in the Rivonia Trial.)

I called Oliver on 11 April and offered to show him the report. Oliver was very busy. He came with Robbie to my room at the Russell Hotel at 5.00 a.m. on 12 April and read the essential parts of the report. He was relieved and satisfied.12

The Sanctions Conference was organized by Ronald Segal for the Anti­ Apartheid Movement of Britain.

of his life.I last saw him at the funeral for Canon Collins.

12 Hardly any UN civil servant would have done what I did – showing the report to people outside the UN before publication, even before the UN Secretary­General received it. But Oliver always kept confidence. Ronald had helped and accompanied Oliver into exile – and wrote a book about their escape from South Africa. He loved Oliver and named his son Oliver. He was bright and resourceful. He was able to secure the participation of many governments and top experts in the Conference. Oliver was naturally given a prominent role.

After the Conference, the delegation of the Special Committee held hearings at Church House in London for a day. Robbie was most helpful to me – contacting people to appear and even finding interpreters as I could not find them commercially.

Statement of Chief Luthuli on the sentences in the Rivonia trial

Robert Resha, ANC representative, was in New York in June 1964 for the Security Council discussion on the Rivonia trial and the situation in South Africa.

Early one morning, we heard of the sentences on the radio. Robbie came to my office and showed me a statement by Chief Luthuli. It was probably received by Oliver some time earlier13 and Robbie was authorised to make consequential revisions in the light of the sentences. He amended the first and seventh paragraphs.14 I requested my secretary to type it urgently and we rushed to the Security Council Chamber a few minutes before its meeting.

The two African members of the Security Council at the time ­ Morocco and Ivory Coast ­ were both French­speaking. But the Moroccan delegate, Sidi Baba, knew some English. Robbie gave him the text and he read it to the Council in English. And Robbie then called London to inform the ANC office of the revisions he had made.

The statement was thus issued first in New York.

Oliver the “moderate”

Oliver had a very pleasant disposition. He rarely got angry. But when he did, his pupils would roll in circles and he was furious.

At the sessions of the OAU, the delegates looked down on him as a “moderate.” He did not compete with PAC on rhetoric. Young delegates who

13 Oliver had fairly good communications with people inside South Africa until about 1965.

14 These paragraphs had been drafted on the assumption that death sentences would be imposed. never had experience of struggle, and never made any sacrifice for freedom, would try to lecture the liberation movement on how South Africans should fight.

Oliver used to absent himself from OAU meetings for many years and send Robert Resha, Duma Nokwe and others. Resha, and later Johnny Makatini, were useful as they knew French; half the delegates at OAU were French­speaking.

Defence and Aid Fund and the PAC

In April 1965, A.B. Ngcobo, then treasurer of the PAC, came to New York and appeared before the Special Committee against Apartheid.

He complained to the Chairman – Achkar Marof of Guinea – that the Defence and Aid Fund was favouring ANC and discriminating against PAC prisoners. Marof suggested that I speak to Canon Collins when I visit to London.

I met Canon Collins soon after in London. He denied that there was any discrimination. In fact, he said, there was more assistance to families of PAC prisoners because the Dependants Conference in Cape Town was composed of liberals and churchmen who were against Communists and were more sympathetic to PAC.

When I saw Oliver, I asked him about this. He also denied there was any discrimination against the PAC. And he said very firmly that the Defence and Aid Fund should assist all political prisoners and banned people, and their families, irrespective of their political affiliations. He was always firm on this principle.15

On further enquiries, I was convinced that members of the staff of Defence and Aid Fund, like Phyllis Altman and Rica Hodgson, who belonged to the ANC, implemented this policy.

There was more assistance to dependants of PAC prisoners; in 1963­64 there were more PAC prisoners than ANC prisoners.

But as regards legal defence, the costs for the Rivonia trial and other high profile trials were high, though the lawyers worked for nominal fees. Similar amounts could not be spent on PAC trials – arising from murder of some vacationers in Bashee River or of Chiefs in the Transkei etc.

15 Oliver also recommended several non­ANC people to me for UN scholarships. This was unlike ZAPU and ZANU which pressed that no scholarships should be given to anyone they did not approve.

SWAPO, especially Peter Katjavivi, also recommended candidates who were not with SWAPO. Perhaps Canon Collins provided more assistance to ANC leaders in exile in London because of his regard for them.

I also found that PAC had often not approached Canon Collins for help. It was seeking funds for Robert Sobukwe and wrote to me but Canon Collins did not know. On my advice, Canon Collins called the PAC representative in London, Matthew Nkoana, and told him that they cannot complain when he was not informed of the needs.

There were no more complaints from the PAC against the Defence and Aid Fund for many years.

1966 – Scholarship for Mrs. Adelaide Tambo

On a visit to London in 1966, I went to see Oliver at his flat. He was not home yet and Adelaide, his wife, was sick in bed. Adelaide, a nurse, had been working hard to maintain the family and her health was affected.

The United Nations had just established a scholarship programme for South Africans. I asked Adelaide if it would be helpful for her to take an advanced or specialist course in nursing. I said that I would be happy to recommend a one­year scholarship for her. She was interested and I explained the procedure for an application.

Oliver came soon after. He was angry that Adelaide had asked me for a scholarship. She was crying.

I told Oliver that I had offered to help her get a scholarship without any request from her. The programme had a provision for short­term scholarships for South Africans who had suffered persecution for their opposition to apartheid. Adelaide did not ask me for a favour and I was not doing her any special favour. I would offer the same to families of other political sufferers, whether they were leaders or not.

Man of Integrity and Courage

In 1967, I was faced with deliberate efforts by a new African official to undermine my position. I was criticised, among other things, for employing a white South African in my office.16

16 She was a young woman who had to go into exile to escape arrest for underground activities. In 1964, Mrs. Myrdal had requested the employment of a person who knew Afrikaans to assist the Group of Experts in research. The only suitable candidate available was a white South African woman. I obtained references from Oliver Tambo of ANC and Nana Mahomo of PAC before employing her. After the Group of Experts concluded its work, I continued her contract as a research assistant.

I was deeply disturbed by the circumstances and nature of this move against me. I wrote to Oliver and told the Chairman of the Special Committee that if they or the Secretary­General had any doubts about my integrity, I would resign. I also informed the United Nations. Oliver immediately sent me a cable urging me not to take a hasty step.

He wrote me a letter that he had recommended the candidate after consulting colleagues who knew her. “Needless to say I have given no thought to her skin colour, and have had no reason to do so since.”

Only a leader of a liberation movement with great courage and integrity could write such a letter in those days when anti­white sentiment was prevalent among leaders of African governments.

I developed enormous respect for Oliver. I did not show his letter to any one at that time so as not to cause any embarrassment to him.

Oliver wrote to Robbie to speak to me. Robbie spent three days in London persuading me not to take any hasty action as my presence at the UN was important for the liberation movement.

Kitwe Seminar, 1967

The United Nations organized the “International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa” in Kitwe, Zambia, from 25 July to 4 August 1967.

Oliver arrived in Kitwe from Lusaka the day before the Conference and came to see me at my hotel. I apologized to him for bothering him with the problem of white South African in my office and we discussed possibilities of further action by the United Nations. Alfred Kgogong was the ANC delegate at the Seminar. Oliver sat behind him and did not speak.

A few days later, Alfred came to give me an oral message from Oliver that he had to leave urgently on important business and could not say goodbye to me. I would know the reason soon. ANC­ZAPU combatants soon entered Rhodesia.

Special Session of the Special Committee in Stockholm, London and Geneva, 15­26 June 1968

The Special Committee was authorised to hold a session in Europe during the UN Human Rights Year (1968). It decided to hold meetings in Stockholm, with the participation of a number of eminent persons from all Nordic countries; in London, at Friends’ Meeting House, mainly with anti­apartheid groups and a few special invitees; and a one­day session in Geneva with representatives of the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations.

The Committee invited Oliver Tambo and Canon Collins to the meetings in Stockholm and requested them to present papers. (It paid their fares and subsistence, and $500 for each paper, a respectable fee in those days.)17 Oliver’s paper was on “The present stage of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.” He was the only South African invited to the session, as the PAC was then under suspension in the OAU.

I was in constant communication with the Swedish government as regards the arrangements for the session and made a number of suggestions to them – through their ambassador at the UN, Sverker C. Astrom ­ to help make the meetings significant.

I suggested to Sweden – as they liked planning – that they might perhaps think of offering support to ANC for planning for the future of South Africa.

I also suggested that they might think of announcing a fund in memory of Chief Luthuli to assist the South African people. I had in mind particularly financial assistance to the liberation movement for travel, publicity etc. I received a reply that they would consider a small foundation in association with the Hammarskjold Foundation. But I soon heard from Robert Resha that the ANC had already decided on a Luthuli Memorial Foundation and had set up a small committee in London to prepare a plan.

A third suggestion I made to Sweden was to arrange a confidential meeting with Oliver Tambo; Canon Collins; Chairman of the Special Committee, Ambassador Achkar Marof of Guinea; Ambassador of Sweden to the UN, Sverker C. Astrom (who was Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the UN Trust Fund for South Africa); and the Ambassador of Nigeria, Edwin Ogebe Ogbu,

17 This was the second time that a paper was requested by the United Nations from a leader of a liberation movement. Eduardo Mondlane had prepared a paper for the Kitwe Seminar. Vice­Chairman of the Committee of Trustees ­ to consult on assistance to South Africans – how much to channel to the various funds etc.

Sweden was most gracious. The Special Committee meetings were held in the Parliament House. Each major political party – Social Democratic Party, Liberal Party and Moderate Party ­ organized a lunch or dinner for the entire Committee and its staff.

Hotel accommodation became difficult as the Special Committee had changed its dates, but the government found us some rooms at Hotel Foresta. Oliver and I shared a suite with a large terrace on the river.

Oliver came the evening before the meetings and started working on his speech for the opening session. Our press officer, my secretary and I were waiting on the terrace for the text so that we could have it typed for the interpreters and the press, and for a UN press release in New York. It was long after midnight, and dawn had arrived, when Oliver came with the text. He was a perfectionist!

Planning for a Free South Africa

At the opening meeting of the Special Committee session, Mrs. Myrdal suggested the need for planning on several aspects of the future of South Africa ­ e.g. the constitution, bill of rights, social problems, education ­ and enquired if such planning was being undertaken. Oliver replied:

“… there is, in fact, at this stage no positive answer to the question of what preparations we are making for the time when we shall be taking over. These are too insignificant at this stage to deserve mention. They depend largely on the cooperation not only of the United Nations and its agencies but on a whole number of people who would place at our disposal their services and facilities. Our people cannot leave South Africa. We have no immediate means of doing anything with them, except put them behind the wheel of struggle in South Africa… Therefore there is no impressive state at present, short of real assistance from friends and countries and Governments, on the basis of which we could make various preparations. But we have them in mind.”

The Reverend Gunnar Helander, Chairman of Swedish Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, suggested assistance by Sweden for the employment of a person to prepare plans for a future non­racial South Africa in consultation with the liberation movement. Oliver replied:

“… we do have our Freedom Charter which sets out the kind of South Africa that we are fighting for. It contains the principles on which South Africa should be governed. The task of converting these principles into a constitution in all its detail has not been embarked upon because we think they are clear enough to indicate what would happen if we gained our freedom. But this question, particularly because it involves the possibilities of an offer from a government which has given freely and liberally to our struggle, is one which I would need to discuss even before it is examined by the Special Committee on Apartheid. It is something which falls peculiarly within our sphere of concern, namely the future South African State of the kind we are fighting for.”

Oliver was always very firm that planning for the future was the responsibility and the prerogative of the liberation movement.

Assistance

On a Saturday morning, we had a private meeting at the summer home of Per Wastberg to discuss various aspects of assistance to South Africans.

When asked about ANC plans for a Luthuli Memorial Foundation, Oliver said that its terms of reference should be as “broad” as the vision of Chief Luthuli. It would not be for assistance to ANC alone, but for all South Africans.

Mrs. Alva Myrdal, on behalf of the Swedish Government, made a statement at the next meeting of the Special Committee that when the ANC decided on the Foundation, Sweden would consider a contribution.

Direct Assistance to Liberation Movements

In Stockholm, the Special Committee, composed of ambassadors, was received by a Minister.

But as soon as the Special Committee meetings were over, the Socialist Party treated Oliver as its guest. He was received by Prime Minister Tage Erlander. [This was one further step in raising the status of Oliver. By the late seventies, he was being treated by many governments as if he were a Head of State. He was already a statesman, “Presidential.”]

Oliver raised the question of assistance by the Swedish Government directly to the liberation movement. Earlier, the Socialist Party had given small contributions to the ANC. The government made generous contributions, but only for humanitarian and educational assistance to “victims of apartheid.” Oliver had said at the meeting of the Special Committee:

“We have appealed for direct assistance to the liberation movement, precisely because in the final analysis it is the liberation movement, it is the people of South Africa, acting politically, that will destroy apartheid, and if the world is so concerned about the destruction of apartheid and the removal of that scourge from mankind, the task of doing that rests on the liberation movement and there is every reason why we should come to Sweden as an organization, as a liberation movement, and ask to be directly assisted. We have asked the United Nations to authorise this so that individual governments and peoples and countries will have no excuse for refusing us direct assistance.”18

After Olof Palme became Prime Minister, Sweden decided in 1969 to give direct assistance to African liberation movements for non­military purposes. Sweden became the first Western government to give direct grants to liberation movements and the only government for several years.

Oliver and the PAC

Oliver and I happened to take the same flight from Stockholm to London.

Oliver expressed appreciation for the fee he had received for his paper. He said he would use it for a vacation with his wife and children; they had not had a vacation for a long time.

I mentioned to him a matter that disturbed me. On the way to Stockholm, I had stopped in London, where I was invited by Barney Desai for dinner. I had known him as leader of the Coloured People’s Congress, allied to the ANC. But he was condemned by the ANC in 1966 or 1967 for a statement he made in Oslo and for other reasons; he then joined the PAC.

When I went to Barney’s flat, he was downstairs with other guests. His wife was trying to get the four or five children to bed and I spent some time with her. She was very tired and I could see she was unhappy. She had married Barney when his prospects seemed very good – and now she was living in rather depressed conditions as a refugee.

18 The UN General Assembly, in resolution 2302 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, had called on all States to consider effective political, moral and material assistance to all those combating the policies of apartheid…”

In 1968, on the recommendation of the Special Committee, the General Assembly, in resolution 2396 (XXIII) of 2 December 1968, called upon all States and organizations to provide greater assistance to the South African liberation movement in its legitimate struggle. This resolution facilitated the decision of the Swedish government in 1969 to provide assistance to the ANC. We then went downstairs. Barney was sitting with two or three Coloured people listening to a tape of Malcolm X in a dark room, as if in a mysterious ceremony. It seemed as if they were sharpening their swords to kill whites. After dancing and dinner I returned to my hotel rather disturbed.

I suggested to Oliver that the human problem should be considered apart from any political considerations. He listened patiently.

In London the African ambassadors gave a reception for the Special Committee at Russell Hotel. Oliver and Adelaide came. Oliver very warmly embraced Barney who approached him with great hesitation.

I noticed many times that Oliver treated members of the PAC and other organizations with respect as fellow South Africans, without in any way ignoring the political differences. He emphasised and was always clear that the enemy was the racist government, not the PAC.

Whenever I asked Oliver about PAC’s exaggerated claims, he was vehement like other ANC leaders in denouncing them. But he did not carry on a campaign against PAC. He was inclined to ignore the PAC rather than attack it or get into an argument with it.

Some years later, he spoke to me about a visit to Nigeria in the 1970s. The Nigerian government asked him about the PAC. [I knew that the Nigerian government, which had been treating ANC and PAC equally, was at that time considering full support to ANC.] Oliver said: “I did not oblige them. I told them that they should find out for themselves.”

Many members of the PAC respected Oliver. At a meeting of the African Liberation Committee in the late 1970s in Dar es Salaam, the Chairman rudely interrupted Oliver and asked him to cut short his speech. Then David Sibeko, head of foreign affairs of PAC, took the floor and protested. He said Oliver could have been a rich man if he had practised law in South Africa and did not join the liberation struggle. He had sacrificed much and was respected by the South African people. David called on the Chairman to treat him with due respect.

Oliver meets Matanzima

In the late 1960s, I believe, Kaiser Matanzima visited London. The Anti­ Apartheid Movement organized demonstrations against him.

Robert Resha told me that Oliver and he met Matanzima. They encouraged Matanzima to press for more land for Transkei etc. They wanted to create more friction with the regime. Robbie saw no contradiction between the protests of the AAM and his meeting with Matanzima.

Anxious to go inside South Africa, around 1974

I believe it was around 1974 when there was an upsurge in South Africa – with strikes by workers and the rapid growth of SASO as a force – when I visited Oliver at home in London.

South Africa had for many years enforced laws prohibiting ANC publications, banning quotation of ANC leaders or display of ANC symbols etc. It hoped that the people would forget the ANC and its leaders. The ANC had to find ways to counteract this.

Oliver said: “E.S. I have not told even my wife but I was anxious to go inside South Africa. The people inside need guidance and leadership from the ANC at this time. But the national executive was against my going to South Africa. They felt it was a great risk, since I know all about the underground and the armed struggle.”

“I know everything,” he sighed as if he was disappointed.

1975 – South Africa, a Colonial Question?

The Special Committee organized a Seminar on South Africa at UNESCO House, Paris, from 28 April to 2 May 1975.

Oliver came a day late and had to leave before the Seminar ended.19 I went to see Oliver at his modest hotel to consult him.

There had been a feeling at the OAU that priority should be given to colonial territories, especially to territories where liberation movements had launched armed struggle. As a result, the South African movements received little assistance from the OAU Liberation Fund.

Some representatives of the ANC and PAC tried to counter this by arguing that the problem in South Africa was a colonial problem. [ANC and SACP leaders described the South African situation as “internal colonialism”.]The OAU

19 Elias Ntlodibe, the PAC representative who came earlier, said that he had met Oliver at the Nairobi airport. He added proudly that Oliver told him to represent the ANC until he arrived! Though said in jest, this remark showed Oliver’s personal relations with PAC people. Council of Ministers referred this matter to a committee for study. Nothing came out of this.

I told Oliver that reference to apartheid as a colonial problem would create confusion in the United Nations and the West. Not only Netherlands but other governments will conclude that the intention was to throw whites out of South Africa as alien occupiers. That would disrupt the consensus we had all been able to build up against apartheid around the world.

Oliver said that apartheid had now become a hated term internationally. It is important to preserve that.

In South Africa, power was transferred by Britain to the whites. Since then the black people had no voice in any decisions concerning the country. What the ANC wanted was for all the people to participate as equals in the decisions.

I said that I was confident that we could get wide support for a resolution by the United Nations that its objective was self­determination by all the people of South Africa, irrespective of race, colour or creed.

Oliver agreed with that formulation. This formulation appeared in many subsequent resolutions and declarations on apartheid at the United Nations.

Oliver and Robbie

After going into exile, Oliver asked the movement to send Robert (Robbie) Resha to assist him. Resha became perhaps his closest colleague.

He was very effective in Algeria, a country which provided military training and material assistance to the ANC. He was also very good at maintaining personal relations with the exiles. I never saw him use an address book; he knew all telephone numbers from memory. He gave the image of a “radical” and could counter the rhetoric of the PAC.

I met Robbie in New York in July 1963, when he came in an ANC delegation to the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, and we became good friends. Robbie was in charge of relations with the United Nations until 1969 and visited New York several times. I also met him in London and Africa when I went on missions.

When the ANC leadership was reorganized at the Morogoro Conference (April­ May 1969), Robbie was dropped from the national committee. I did not know all the reasons then. I heard soon after that he had become anti­Communist, anti­ white and anti­Indian. From what I knew of him, I could not believe that he could become anti­white and anti­Indian.

On my next visit to London, he came to see me and we talked until long past midnight. He explained that if he were going into battle with Joe Slovo, he would totally trust him. He respected Joe as an individual. But Joe, he said, is not the representative of any constituency.

As for Indians, he made a distinction between some rich Indians who collaborated with apartheid and others who were opposed to apartheid. But he claimed that all Africans suffered from apartheid and were against apartheid. They were all potentially in the movement. That seemed a blind spot with him.

Some time later, he associated with a group of “Africanists” in the ANC who were eventually expelled shortly after he died.

Around 1974, on a visit to London, I met him at his residence. He offered to drive me to the airport. During the ride I asked him about Robbie and the Africanists. He got very agitated and the drive was hardly smooth, to say the least.

He said that these “Africanists” came to meet him after the Morogoro Conference. They asked for a meeting of the African members of the ANC for a thorough discussion, especially about the participation of people of other racial origins in the ANC.20

Oliver asked them what they would do if he did not call such a meeting. They said they would consider leaving the ANC.

Oliver said he turned to Resha and asked him if he would go with them. Resha kept silent. Oliver said Robbie had a strong loyalty to the ANC.21

“We have no choice but to fight”­ 1977

I spoke to Oliver by telephone in London shortly before the World Conference for Action against Apartheid in Lagos, 22­26 August 1977, of which I was secretary. I wanted to consult him on the draft declaration I was preparing, but we could not meet.

20 At the Morogoro Conference, the ANC admitted white, Coloured and Indian members. Their organizations had been persuaded not to set up separate offices abroad, and they were now accommodated in the ANC structures. M.P. Naicker, an Indian, became the Director of Publicity. Indians and “Coloured people” were appointed Chief representatives or deputies in ANC missions in some countries. For instance, Reg September, a “Coloured”, was appointed Chief Representative in London, and Alex La Guma in Havana. 21 Resha had joined the ANC as early as 1940. I had known that he was proud of the ANC. Oliver said something like the following: “E.S., the situation in South Africa is very serious. There may be enormous bloodshed. We know that in liberation struggles, the oppressed people lose many more lives than the oppressors. More than a million people died in Algeria and South Africa is facing a similar situation. But we have no choice. You should draw the attention of the Western Powers to this and tell them that they should impose sanctions against the regime. That is the best assistance to us and the best way to save human lives.”

Mandela’s 60th Birthday, July 18, 1978

In March 1978, I started writing personal letters to many anti­apartheid movements and governments drawing their attention to the 60th birthday of Nelson Mandela on July 18, 1978, and suggesting world­wide observance. I also spoke to many friends. I felt that I should seek the approval of the ANC before I proceeded further.

Oliver happened to come to New York briefly in April 1978. I sent him a note on the matter but we could not meet. Shortly after, I went to London and met him at the ANC office.

After I explained to him what I had in mind, Oliver said, “You know some of our people have been saying that my birthday should be observed as I am the President of ANC.”22

He paused for a while and said: “Yes. Nelson’s birthday should be observed. It is better if this comes from outside rather than from the ANC. You go ahead. We will associate ourselves with it in due course.”

The response to my personal letters was far beyond my expectations. Many anti­apartheid movements took the matter seriously. About 10,000 messages went to Nelson in prison or to Winnie. Reference to the birthday was made in the British Parliament and there was response by several governments.

The campaign for Mandela took off and became an important aspect of the campaign for a free South Africa. Numerous awards and honours were bestowed on Mandela.

I met Oliver a year or two later and said that I had in mind to follow up with birthday observances and honours to other leaders in prison – Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, etc.

22 He had opposed and prevented the observance of his 60th birthday in 1977. Oliver said that ANC would like to focus on Nelson Mandela as the leader.

So we concentrated on Mandela. The British press spoke of a “Mandela fever” in the country – as the British Anti­Apartheid movement carried on a great campaign. There was action in several other countries. I was able to promote several awards. No leader in prison had ever been honoured so much.23

Soon I came to know that Oliver was discouraging and opposing any honours to himself.

On May 9, 1986, during a visit to India, the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi gave him an honorary doctorate. On his return to London, I heard, he scolded his colleagues who, he suspected, had suggested the award.

In 1987, I wanted to promote the world­wide observance of Oliver’s 70th birthday. I spoke to Bishop Trevor Huddleston and we agreed to promote it jointly.

But we had to obtain the approval of the ANC. I spoke to Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the ANC, when I met him in Delhi. He said that “Oliver would not hear of it, but we will try to find a way.” He promised to write to me after he returned to Lusaka. But I never got the message from him and could do little except for the publication in India of a book in tribute to him, with a message by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. I heard only of observances in Lusaka and Moscow.

In 1985, I had collected and edited Oliver’s speeches at the United Nations and at UN Conferences. I transcribed some of the speeches from tapes. I wanted to publish the collection in a book, timed for the fiftieth anniversary of the UN. Racial discrimination in South Africa had been on the agenda of the UN General Assembly from its first session. The Defence and Aid Fund agreed to publish the book, and I arranged with a publisher in India.

I wrote to Oliver to inform him about the book. I received a curt telegram asking me to stop the publication immediately and confirm to him. He said the National Committee of the ANC would contact me. I stopped the publication and confirmed to Oliver. But I never received any message from the National Committee. I spoke to a couple members of the National Committee later and they had never heard of this matter.

Oliver decided to return to South Africa towards the end of 1990. I spoke to Bishop Trevor Huddleston and we felt that it would be desirable to make the UN speeches available in South Africa, as they had been banned earlier. Trevor spoke to Oliver and obtained his permission. The book was published in India – and by

23 There were a few honours to other leaders – Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Ahmed Kathrada. Kliptown Books, associated with Defence and Aid Fund, in London. It was sent to South Africa from London.24

India – a frontline State, 1981

Oliver and I met at the “International Conference in Solidarity with the Frontline States and Lesotho” held in Lisbon, 25­27 March 1983. Our rooms at the hotel were opposite each other.

Oliver had visited India just before the Conference and he was excited about the visit. He said: “E.S., in Africa, we have frontline States by geography. But India is a frontline State in action. The government and the people are so committed in support of our struggle.”

“Do not Press the French Socialist Party now”, 1981

The United Nations organized the “International Conference for Sanctions against South Africa” at UNESCO House, Paris, 20­27 May 1981.

We were in high spirits as the Socialist candidate, Francois Mitterand, had just won the Presidential elections. He had sent a message to the French anti­apartheid movement before the elections. Lionel Jospin, Secretary­General of the Socialist Party and Claude Cheysson, the new Foreign Minister, participated in the Conference.

Until then France was opposing UN action against apartheid and was even supplying military equipment to South Africa. It was one of our biggest problems.

At a dinner attended by many diplomats and other delegates active in anti­ apartheid work, people were talking about what the new French government should be pressed to do.

Oliver intervened and said that it was a great source of satisfaction that the Socialist Party had won. That was good by itself. We should not press them now. We should give them time to consider their policy.

He had in mind that Parliamentary and local elections were coming soon. It was important that nothing should be done to jeopardise the chances of a Socialist victory.

24 Kliptown Books moved to South Africa later in 1991. All of us kept that advice in mind.

Arusha Conference, 1984 – soon after the Heart Attack

In early September 1984, I attended the “Conference on Southern Africa of the Socialist International and the Socialist Group of the European Parliament with the Frontline States, ANC and SWAPO” at Arusha, Tanzania (4­5 September).

The conference was attended by Olof Palme from Sweden; Lionel Jospin, Secretary­General of the Socialist Party of France; President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; President Samora Machel of Mozambique; Oliver Tambo, Sam Nujoma etc. etc.

The day before the Conference, when we arrived, I saw that Oliver did not look well. Sam Nujoma told me that at a large public meeting addressed by President Nyerere on Army Day in Dar es Salaam, Oliver had collapsed in his chair on the platform. He had a heart attack.25 Sam, who was sitting next to him, picked him up and he was taken to the hospital for emergency treatment.

But Oliver arrived in Arusha with the ANC delegation. Either his ANC colleagues did not persuade him to rest and get medical treatment or he resisted any advice. He read a long speech at the conference – though he looked and was ill. I was very upset.

I spoke to Bengt Save­Soderbergh, a senior delegate from Sweden and asked if Sweden could arrange for rest and medical treatment for Oliver. He thought the Socialist Party would gladly do that if requested.

I also mentioned this to Vladimir Shubin, a leader of the Soviet Solidarity Committee, who was attending the Conference as a journalist. He said Oliver had an open invitation from the Soviet Union.26

Reiulf Steen, a Norwegian delegate, and I spoke to Oliver and suggested that he should take rest in Norway. He seemed interested. But from Arusha he went to Addis Ababa for the 10th anniversary of the Ethiopian “revolution”; he got worse

25 Oliver had a heart attack around November 1983 and was very sick. ANC arranged for him to recuperate at a nursing home in England for several weeks. That was kept secret, as was the second heart attack in Tanzania. ANC felt that the news would be bad for the morale of the freedom fighters, especially in South Africa. I may be confusing between heart attack and stroke.

26 Oliver was born in the week of the Soviet Revolution. The Soviet Union had extended an open invitation to him to attend the anniversary of the Revolution but he had not attended yet. after sitting through the 6­hour speech of Mengistu. From there he went to Arusha for a brief rest.

Returning to New York, I spoke to the Swedish ambassador, Anders Ferm, who was a close friend of Olof Palme. He spoke to Olof Palme, the Prime Minister, and said that Sweden would invite him for rest and medial treatment.27

Then I spoke to Bishop Huddleston when he visited New York on 11 October. I knew that Oliver had the greatest respect for Father Trevor Huddleston – and felt he would be the best person to persuade Oliver. Trevor said that he would call Oliver on return to London and “order” him to take rest.

I was informed in November 1984 that the Swedish International Labour Centre had invited Oliver to spend a month in Sweden for a rest and peaceful vacation. But he did not reply to them, though I wrote to him several times urging him to take a vacation in Sweden.

Oliver did not go to Sweden or the Soviet Union – and did not take a vacation.

I met Oliver at the UN Conference on Sanctions against Racist South Africa, at UNESCO House in Paris in mid­1986. He put his arm around me in the aisle of the conference hall, and said: “E.S. You look tired. You should take a vacation.”28 He looked well. In my various meetings with him, it seemed as if his health changed with the state of the liberation struggle.29

27 Olof Palme had great respect for Oliver 28 I was not ill. He knew I was tired and under some stress.

29 Some time later Oliver suffered a stroke in Lusaka, President Kenneth Kaunda and Shridath Ramphal arranged for him to be flown to Sweden.