E Grassroots Transformation of the African National Congress in the 1940S-1950S

Home , African Communist, Harold Wolpe, Oliver Tambo

THE JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH University of Kansas | Summer 2008

!e Grassroots Transformation of the African National Congress in the 1940s-1950s

Nelson Mandela’s 1994 inaugu- ing the latent power of the frustrated ration as South Africa’s "rst demo- urban masses, new leadership in the cratically elected president soothed ANC incorporated organic strikes and decades of racial tensions in that boycotts in the 1940s into a more co- country. State-sanctioned racism, herent and durable movement during known as apartheid, crumbled under the 1950s. !e masses and leadership the spasms of the violence that shook developed a symbiotic relationship; Johannesburg and other cities in the the former o$ered economic leverage 1980s, but apartheid’s eventual de- and popular legitimacy, while the lat- struction became possible because of ter articulated a vision of racial equal- strategic changes among the left in the ity to counter the Nationalists’ oppres- 1940s and 1950s. !e African National sive paternalism. !e state cracked Congress (ANC), originally founded down on the better organized ANC-led as an interest group for the educated movement in the 1960s, but the closer African elite, in the 1940s and 1950s relationship between the ANC leader- forged a wide coalition of workers and ship and grassroots carried the move- intellectuals to challenge apartheid’s ment through its di#cult times on the legitimacy. Together with the South long walk to freedom. South Africa still African Communist Party (SACP), the faces serious racial disparities, but its mid-century ANC became a broad- progress from the apartheid age shows based grassroots organization com- the e#cacy of a broad-based move- mitted to nonracial democracy. !e ment in a$ecting signi"cant change. ANC’s transformation happened be- Contemporary progressives might cause demographic and economic model the ANC’s structure and strat- changes in the 1930s and 1940s shifted egy as they pursue their agendas. the ANC’s constituent base from rural !e Dutch "rst settled in South areas to the cities, especially Johannes- Africa in 1657, but their small popula- burg, and the new members pushed tion and rural lifestyle precluded any the Congress toward more confronta- racial dominance.1 Occasional skir- tional and ambitious ends. Recogniz- mishes over land or cattle peppered an

ANDREW MacDONALD is a senior in political science and history at the University of Kansas.

7 otherwise peaceful racial coexistence African population. For example, the until the discovery of precious met- 1927 Native Administration Act em- als in the 1860s. !e British, who had powered compliant tribal chiefs in the come to South Africa during the Na- reserves to deter any uni"ed African poleonic Wars, became interested in resistance. More importantly, social the mineral-rich interior. !e descen- legislation constructed a regime of ra- dants of the Dutch settlers, now known cial hierarchies that informed later Na- as Afrikaners, resented the British in- tionalist policy. !is state ideology pos- cursions and fought the South Afri- ited a world strictly separated by racial can War at the turn of the century. !e groups of varying degrees of advance- British won a costly victory for control ment, and healthy social relations de- over the natural resources, but reached pended on clearly de"ned group roles. an understanding with the agricultur- !e compliant tribal chiefs, then, pro- ally inclined Afrikaners to together ex- moted the state’s racial paradigm, since ploit African labor on the farms and in they accepted and pro"ted from the the mines. As historian Bernard Muga- racial divisions. Some groups began to bane notes, “Africans and their welfare challenge this framework in the early were sacri"ced to promote an abiding 20th century by forwarding new con- settlement for the whites.”2 !e Treaty ceptions of group relations. African of Vereengiging ended hostilities in nationalists, black trade unionists, and 1902 and precipitated a series of laws Marxist groups challenged the eco- that solidi"ed economic and political nomic and social order by rejecting dominance by whites. the state’s interpretation of race. Un- !e British and Afrikaners con- fortunately, internecine disputes and summated their peace in the 1910 the respective groups’ strict organiza- Union Act, which established the re- tional structures stymied their e$orts gions of Natal, Cape, Transvaal and to change South Africa at the begin- the Orange Free State as a single Brit- ning of the 20th century. Political re- ish colony. !e economic needs of the sistance to white rule took shape in the British mine owners in%uenced the 1910s, but %oundered until the ANC political agreement between the Brit- and SACP together embraced grass- ish and Afrikaners.3 !e newly uni"ed roots in%uence.i South African state passed several laws !e "rst uni"ed African national- that forced African men to work part of ist movement began when Pixley Ka the year in the mines or on Afrikaner Izake Seme, an African educated in the farms, and spend the rest on barren United States and Britain, called on 60 reserves. Harold Wolpe, a South Afri- educated Africans to meet at Bloem- can specialist, terms this arrangement fontein on Jan 8th, 1912 to “together the “dual economy,” since Africans devise ways and means of forming our split their time between industrial and national union for the purpose of cre- agrarian labor.4 Uprooted from their ating national unity and defending our homes, Africans became more vulner- rights and privileges” by forming a Na- able to whites’ economic hegemony. tional Congress, the forerunner to the !e new government augmented ANC.5 Few Africans had any rights or its economic disenfranchisement of privileges to defend, making this na- the African community with socially scent ANC an intrinsically elitist or- debilitating policies that divided the ganization. !e Congress accepted i. I distinguish political resistance from military resistance, which e"ectively ended after the British annexation of Zululand in 1887.

8 support from sympathetic whites, sands of striking workers would likely but welcomed no non-Africans to its have garnered communist support in membership. Its narrow focus led it any European country, South Africa’s to concentrate on small issues ger- racial dynamics estranged the strik- mane only to the small African upper ing black miners from the white work- class. For example, its "rst major cam- ers who made up the International paign attempted to defend the lim- Socialist League (ISL), the forerun- ited African franchise in the Western ner the SACP . !ough one ISL leader, Cape Province, where blacks able to S.P. Bunting, fought to unite white and pass a “civilization test” could vote. black workers, his pleas came to no !e ANC’s e$ort garnered little sup- avail. Despite the racial progressivism port outside those few Africans con- of one its leaders, the ISL responded cerned with limited voting rights, and to its white base and idly observed ultimately failed to protect what rights the strike.8 !e communists surren- that some Africans could claim at the dered their chance to lead a multira- time.6 !e ANC failed to attract a large cial working class movement in 1922, following in the decades after its birth, when it supported white demands for and labor groups soon eclipsed it as preferential racial treatment. Africans’ political voice. !e 1922 strike began when While the early ANC was focus- the Chamber of Mines announced a ing on the political rights of “civilized” higher ratio of black to white workers, Africans, the state continued to push prompting fears among whites that Af- most of the black population into the rican workers would depress wages capitalist economy. Draconian labor and threaten jobs. Groups of Afrikaner laws like the 1916 Labor Registration workers branded themselves “com- Act funneled Africans into low-wage, mandos”, on the model of Boer guerril- unskilled labor. Wretched conditions, las from the South African War, and led especially in the gold mines, eventu- the strike under the slogan “Workers of ally provoked organic resistance, but the World unite for a White South Af- black workers lacked the organiza- rica.”9 !ough some communist lead- tion to e$ectively wield their latent ers discouraged such outright racial economic power. In 1920, forty thou- animosity, most dismissed African sand Africans walked out of the mines workers as irrelevant “pre-proletari- on the Rand, prompting one newspa- ats”, prompting many black workers to per to observe that “!e strike is un- associate communism with the white doubtedly an instinctive mass revolt working class. !e communists’ ac- against their whole status …!e Na- quiescence to white racism alienated tive Congress had very little to (do) the Party from most black workers, but with the movement…!e strike is in it hardly won it deep support among no man’s control.”7 !e ANC’s hands- whites. A Labor-Nationalist Pact gov- o$ approach is unsurprising, given its ernment won the 1924 election with outlook in 1920. Conditions in the gold the support of the white working class, mines had little to do with the ANC’s co-opting the communists’ white emphasis on voting rights in Western base.10 Abandoned by the white work- Cape; the mineworkers’ goals fell out- ing class, the communists tried to re- side the ANC’s mission, namely, to pair relations with the black popula- protect rather than extend the limited tion, but it took nearly thirty years for African rights. the Communist Party to integrate with !e African mineworkers also fell the ANC. outside the constituency of the Com- !e racial tensions on the Rand munist Party. !ough tens of thou- foreshadowed the friction to come

9 with South Africa’s impending demo- ANC activists like Nelson Mandela and graphic upheaval. Whereas blacks had Oliver Tambo sought to incorporate mostly lived in rural areas and worked city dwelling Africans and their causes seasonally on the "elds or in the mines, into the ANC. Younger ANC members that “dual economy” began to collapse pushed a structural overhaul of the or- in the 1920s, precipitating an exodus ganization that encouraged wider par- to urban areas and a revolution within ticipation among the African masses, the political movements. A drought in and their participation in turn changed 1922-23 devastated small black farms the ANC’s mission and strategy. across the country, making city life A series of clashes over housing marginally superior to the subsistence and transportation rights outside Jo- farming that had supported Africans hannesburg gave impetus to those ar- for half the year.11 A trickle toward the guing for a broader base and mission cities turned into a %ood when the Sec- for the ANC. Tens of thousands of Af- ond World War soon increased urban ricans "lled factory jobs in Johannes- labor demands, and this industrializa- burg, but restrictive land laws shunted tion attracted most of the former sub- the newcomers to the city’s periphery. sistence farmers to cities, especially Tents and shanties popped up on the Johannesburg. !e population of Af- strips of vacant land surrounding Jo- ricans living in urban areas more than hannesburg, the population reliant doubled from 1921 to 1945, and Jo- upon white owned bus companies to hannesburg’s 5,500 new factories drew take them to work in the downtown fac- over 150,000 new black residents in tories.16 !e bus companies exploited that period.12 their very captive market by arbitrarily !e African political leadership raising rates in 1942, prompting a mass only slowly adjusted to the new de- town-meeting, unsanctioned by the mographic realities. !e Interna- ANC, which resulted in a bus boycott. tional Commercial Workers Union For eleven months, tens of thousands brie%y uni"ed over a hundred thou- of Africans walked 24 miles round-trip sand newly urbanized Africans in the to the factories every day, eventually 1920s, but failed to mount any power- forcing the bus companies to reduce ful strikes or leverage any concessions their fares.17 for its members. Lacking any accom- Just like the 1920 Rand mine strike, plishments, the ICU’s support dwin- the bus boycott proceeded without dled toward the end of the 1920s, but much organizational support. Unlike the ANC hardly sought to organize that earlier incarnation of African re- the ICU’s constituency of new urban sistance, though, the progressive lead- blacks.13 Instead, it focused its e$orts ership this time sought to turn popular on opposing Prime Minister Hertz- discontent into a viable political force. og’s Native Bills, which completely re- Dr. Alfred Xuma took the reins of the moved Africans from the voting rolls ANC in 1940, and though a moderate in Western Cape Province.14 !e ANC’s himself, he recognized that the ANC failure to halt the Afrikaner assault on needed to expand its recruitment, lest blacks’ limited political rights brought it follow the ICU’s path to oblivion. !e the ANC to a crossroads. It could qui- ANC’s failure to stop the Hertzog Na- etly dissolve itself, as some old-guard tive Bills was indicative of a weak or- members suggested, or it could re-ori- ganization, and its membership num- ent its goals and tactics by embrac- bered less than 4000 — hardly enough ing the plight of the new urban black to represent the hundreds of thou- population.15 Inspired by organic re- sands Africans that were just perma- sistance among urban Africans, young nently entering the white-controlled

10 economy.18 Xuma presided over the closer ties with the ANC, and had been 1942 ANC Convention, which birthed trying to improve relations with the two important developments. First, it black community since the 1922 white authorized Anton Lembede, A.P. Mda, strike debacle. !e Party sponsored Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu and Nel- broad-ranging night schools for African son Mandela to form a Youth League to workers and organized black unions. promote causes relevant to the mostly !e Communist Party also published a young new urban African class. Sec- “Native Republic !esis” that situated ond, these "rst Youth Leaguers suc- South Africa’s racial tensions within a cessfully pushed the Congress to hire larger class narrative. Importantly, the a community organizer to build better !esis called for nonracial democracy relations with people like the bus boy- as a step toward a classless society, cotters.19 !e existence of a commu- thereby aligning itself closely with the nity organizer signaled a shift within ANC’s stated goals. !e state banned the ANC. No longer would it limit it- the Party in 1950, pushing many of its self to protest letters and deputations, members into the ANC. !e party re- which do not require broad partici- formed underground as a more dy- pation, but it would build upon the namic and diverse organization than groundswell of political unrest begun previously existed. To evade the law, by the bus boycotters. By hiring a com- small, independent “discussion clubs” munity organizer, the ANC made clear met in private homes. Absent a stul- its commitment to ally itself with the tifying Central Committee, the SACP urban masses. pursued closer cooperation with the !e new ANC leaders branched ANC.22 Some ANC Youth Leaguers met out to both the larger black popula- the mostly white SACP with suspicion, tion, as well as to leftist white leaders. but the two groups both sought nonra- !e ANC adopted a new constitution cial democracy, and by the early 1950s at its 1943 convention that welcomed they became o#cially aligned. !e anyone, regardless of race, that sup- SACP imbued the growing ANC with ported its goals.20 !ough some black more activist zeal, and together the nationalists initially distrusted white groups organized the mass protests of and Indian allies, they worked together the 1950s. to articulate a platform acceptable State racism wore heavily on to all. !e CPSA, then the only viable black South Africa for the "rst half of political home for progressive whites, the twentieth century, but the 1948 also sought common ground with the election of the Nationalist Party made ANC.ii !e Council of Non-European a bad situation worse. !e Nationalists Trade Unions (CNETU), a previously campaigned on a platform of white marginal player, elected J.B. Marks its chauvinism, and their policy of “sepa- leader in 1943.21 As a leader in both the rate development” ossi"ed South Af- Communist Party and the ANC, Marks rica’s already stark racial divide. Just strengthened the bridges between the as the formation of a united South Af- two groups and encouraged more as- rica in 1910 preceded a %urry of dis- sertive action, especially by organized criminatory legislation, the election of labor. the Afrikaner government unleashed !e Communist Party welcomed a cascade of racial laws. !e Popula-

ii. Cape Province hosted a small Liberal Party, but it had virtually no voice in interracial dialogue in the 1940s. See: Richard Dale “Review: Liberalism’s Failure in South Africa” !e Review of Politics 35.4 (1973), 573.

11 tion Registration Act of 1950 assigned an active organizing campaign, the all citizens a speci"c race — white, Af- ANC turned popular enthusiasm into rican, South Asian, or Coloured. !e a targeted and sustained mission. On Mixed Marriages Act prohibited inter- June 26th, 1952, thousands of black racial marriage, while the Group Areas South Africans, as well as allied Indi- Act strengthened the government’s ans and whites, purposefully broke hand in racial zoning and pass laws. apartheid’s cornerstone laws. Blacks Unlike the left’s inchoate response in entered white areas and anti-govern- the 1910s, though, progressives in the ment speakers gave public addresses, 1950s uni"ed and fought for an alter- forcing police to arrest nonviolent ac- native vision for South Africa, based tivists. Peaceful protesters "lled up on equality rather than group hierar- jails across the country, signaling pop- chy ular commitment to the ANC’s new as- !e ANC’s 1949 Annual Confer- sertive agenda. Unlike the intermit- ence showcased the movement’s more tent protests and unorganized strikes coherent and assertive approach. on the early 20th century, the De"ance Youth League leaders Nelson Man- Campaign funneled popular anger dela, Oliver Tambo, and Walter Sisulu into a well de"ned mission to expose drafted a Programme of Action to out- apartheid’s absurdity. line the ANC’s response to the new Apartheid survived the De"ance government. !e ANC’s new mani- Campaign. Few volunteers could af- festo invited closer cooperation with ford to miss work, and the ANC feared allied groups, leading to a Joint Plan- that a "zzling campaign would de- ning Council to coordinate strategy volve into violence. Riots broke out in with organizations like the South Af- Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg in rican Indian Congress.23 !e Council November as police arrested peaceful soon undertook the largest and most protesters. !e Campaign’s organiz- intellectually coherent endeavor ever ers faced more serious charges for in- staged by government opponents. On citing the unrest, and the ANC began November 8, 1951, the Council re- to focus on their legal defense. None- solved to stage a nationwide campaign theless, the Campaign established the of civil disobedience to target apart- ANC as a mass movement. Its mem- heid’s six cornerstone laws (Popula- bership swelled by tens of thousands, tion Registration Act, Group Areas Act, convincing its leaders to solicit pop- Separate Registration of Voters Act, ular suggestions for a new manifesto Bantu Authorities Act, Natives Act, and written its constituents.26 !e public Suppression of Communism Act).24 enthusiastically responded; Mandela !is De"ance Campaign, set to begin recalls that contributions “came on June 26th, 1952, invited all apartheid serviettes, on paper torn from exercise opponents to join. Walter Sisulu, J.B. books, on scraps of foolscap, and the Marks, and other ANC and trade union backs of our own lea%ets. It was hum- leaders canvassed the country, speak- bling to see how the suggestions of or- ing at rallies and meetings, to encour- dinary people were often far ahead of age widespread participation. As Na- the leaders.”27 !e ANC compiled the tional Volunteer-in-Chief, Mandela responses into the Freedom Charter, traveled the country to set up commit- which it presented to an enthusias- tees at every ANC branch, with local tic rally outside Johannesburg on June Volunteers-in-Chief spearheading re- 25th, 1955. !e Freedom Charter de- cruitment e$orts.25 !e masses had "ned the ANC’s mission, namely, to proven their willingness push against create a nonracial social democracy the state during the bus boycotts; with in South Africa.28 All the ANC’s subse-

12 quent actions rested upon the thoughts cess depended, though, on its ability to articulated in the Freedom Charter. cogently articulate the popular agenda. !e Freedom Charter’s inspiring !e Freedom Charter expressed the language served its compilers well. hopes of the African masses, and em- !e government feared a popular bodied the relationship the ANC de- movement grounded in clear thinking. veloped between its leadership and !e state banned the Congress in 1960, member base in the preceding de- forcing its leaders into exile or hiding. cades. !e ANC organized and com- Mandela and "ve other leaders were piled the public suggestions, but the convicted of treason in 1964 and sen- public authored the message. Politi- tenced to life imprisonment; for nearly cal groups today could learn from the 30 years they drew strength from the ANC’s balance of popular legitimacy knowledge that their actions earned and visionary leadership. !e present popular support. Indeed, the ANC sur- anti-war movement, for example, con- vived brutal government crackdowns sists of countless eccentric groups pur- because of the bonds it built with the suing di$erent strategies; the leaders South African masses. !ough its strat- of organized labor, on the other hand, egy varied through the years, the ANC seem more intent on maintaining ac- ultimately forced and won free elec- cess to power than representing most tions in 1994 because it maintained workers. No one can expect utopia the grassroots model developed in the from human led endeavors, and con- 1940s and 1950s. temporary struggles can only hope for Contemporary movements can progress toward their goals, but South learn from the ANC’s bottom-up Africa’s transition from apartheid to model. !e Congress failed as an inter- democracy shows that broad based est group for the elite, but thrived when movements can built lasting and fruit- it incorporated a broader base. Its suc- ful connections with the public.

END NOTES 1. D.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 16. 2. Bernard Mugabane, Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 47. 3. Mugabane, 47. 4. Harold Wolpe, “Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation and to Apartheid” Economy and Society 1.4 (1972), 425-56. 5. R.V. Selopa !ema, “How Congress Began,” Drum, 1953. Accessed April 3, 2008 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/congress/began.html. 6. Paul Rich, State Power and Black Politics in South Africa, 1912-51 (Manchester: Macmillion Press, 1996), 16. 7. “!e Great Native Strike” !e International 27 Feb 1920. In Alison Drew, South Africa’s Radical Tradition, 1907-1950 (Cape Town: Mayibuye Books, 1996), 45. 8. Edward Roux, Time Longer !an Rope (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 134. 9. Roux, 148.

13 10. Davenport, 257. 11. Bonner, Phillip, “!e Politics of Black Squatter Movements on the Rand, 1944-52. Radical History Review 46.7 (1989), 89-116. 12. David Welsh “Urbanisation in South Africa: 1929-1979. Race Relations in South Africa Eds. Ellen Hellmann and Henry Lever (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 133. 13. Roux, 251. 14. Davenport, 280. 15. !omas Karis and Gwendolen Carter. From Protest to Challenge Vol. 2 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973) 82. 16. A.W. Stadler. “Birds on the Corn#eld: Squatter Movements in Johannesburg, 1944-47 Journal of Southern African Studies 6.1 (October 1979), 92. 17. !omas Lodge. Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (New York: Longman, 1983), 12. 18. Karis and Carter, 85. 19. “Resolutions of the ANC National Conference, 1942” In Karis and Carter, 202. 20. “Constitution of the ANC” 16 Dec 1943. In Karis and Carter, 204. 21. Roux, 333. 22. D. Everatt, “Alliance Politics of a Special Type: !e Roots of the ANC/SACP Alliance, 1950-54” Journal of Southern African Studies 18.1 (March 1992), 21. 23. “Programme of Action: Statement of Policy adopted at the ANC Annual Conference” 17 Dec 1949. In Karis and Carter, 337. 24. “Report of the Joint Planning Council of the ANC and South African Indian Congress.” 8 Nov 1951. In Karis and Carter, 458. 25. Sisulu, Elinor. Walter and Albertine Sisulu: In Our Lifetime (Claremont: David Phillip Publishers, 2002), 99. 26. Working Committee of the Cape ANC. “Circular Letter to All Congress Branches of the Province” December 1952. In Karis and Carter, 489. 27. Nelson Mandela. Long Walk to Freedom (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 172. 28. “!e Freedom Charter” !e Anti-Apartheid Reader ed. David Mermelstein (New York: Grove Press, 1987), 208.