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Reading List Reading List Anwar, Raja, The Tragedy of Afghanistan, (Verso, London, 1988). Arney, George, Afghanistan, (Mandarin, London, 1990). Arnold, Anthony, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, Parcham and Khalq, (Stanford University Press, California, USA, 1983). Borovik, Artyom, The Hidden War, (Faber, London, 1991). Bradsher, Henry S., Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, (Duke University, USA, 1985). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kabul, DRA, Undeclared War, 1984. Dupree, Louis, Afghanistan, (Princeton, USA, 1980). Ghaus, Abdul Samad, The Fall of Afghanistan, (Pergamon­ Brassey, London, 1988). Gupta, Bhabani Sen, Afghanistan, Politics, Economics and Society, (Frances Pinter, London, 1986). Isby, David, War in a Distant Country, (Arms and Armour Press, London, 1989). Klass, Rosanne, ( ed.), Afghanistan, The Great Game Revisited, (Freedom House, New York, 1987). Majrooh, S. B. and Elmi, S. M., The Sovietization of Afghanistan, (Afghan Jehad Works Translation Centre, Peshawar, 1986). Malik, Hafeez, Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, (Macmillan, London, 1987). Metge, Pierre, L'URSS en Afghanistan, (CIRPES, Paris, 1984). Prokhanov, Alexander, A Tree in the Centre of Kabul, (Progress, Moscow, 1983). Roy Olivier, Islam and resistance in Afghanistan, (Cambridge, 1986). Saikal, Amin and Maley, William, (eds), The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, (Cambridge, 1989). Social Sciences Today, USSR, special issue 1981, on Afghan­ istan. 269 270 Reading List Tapper, Richard, (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan, (Croom Helm, London/St. Martin's Press, New York, 1983). Urban, Mark, War in Afghanistan, (Macmillan, London, 1988). Appendices Appendix A People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) LIST OF INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN THE PDPA, IDENTIFIED BY FACTION AND POSTS HELD, 1983. PARCHAM FACTION KHALQFACTION Babrak Karma!, President (P) Abdurrashid Aryan, Vice President Nur Ahmad Nur, Vice-President (P) Dr Saleh Mohammad Zeary (P) Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Chairman Dastigir Panjsheri (P) Council of Ministers; Prime Mohammad Danesh, Minister Mines Minister (P) and Industries (P) Maj. Gen. Mohammed Rafi, Deputy Professor Guldad, Deputy Chairman Chairman, Council ofMinisters (P) Council Dr Najibullah, Chief of Secret Police Maj. Gen. Sayed M Gulabzoi, (P) Minister Interior Mahmud Baryalai, Secretary (P} Lt. Col. Sher Jan Mazdooryar, Lt. Gen. Yasin Siddiqui, Director Minister Transport General, Political Affairs (P) Dr Khalil Ahmad Abawi, Deputy NEITHER FACTION­ Chairman, Council NATIONALIST Shah Mohammet Dost, Minister Lt. Col. Mohammad Aslam Foreign Affairs Watanjar, Minister Suleiman Layeq, Minister Tribes and Communications (P) Nationalities Lt. Gen. Abdul Qader, Minister Sarwar Mangal, Minister Higher Defence (P) Education Mohammad Khan Jalalar, Minister Commerce * P indicates 'Politburo member' NEW AFGHAN CABINET PRESENTED TO WOLASI JIRGA, 21 MAY 1990 Fazl Haq Khaleqiar, Prime Minister Dr Nametollah Pazhwak, Deputy Mahmud Baryalai, Deputy Prime Prime Minister Minister Abdol Qayum Nurzay, Deputy Prime Dr Abdol Wahed Sorabi, Deputy Minister Prime Minister and Minister of Sarwal Mangal, Deputry Prime Planning Minister 273 274 Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-91 Mahbobollah Koshani, Deputy Dr Faqir Mohammad Nekzad, Prime Minister Minister of Construction Affairs Masoma Esmati Wardak, Minister of Abdol Samad Salah, Minister of Education and Training Mines and Industries Prof. Gholam Mahaynodin Darez, Hamidollah Tarzi, Minister of Civil Minister of Justice Aviation Prof. Mehr Mohammad Ejazi, Sayed Nasem Ulowi, Minister of Minister of Public Health Communications Abdol Wakil, Minister of Foreign Mir Abdol Ghafur Rahim, Minister Affairs of Water and Electricity Raz Mohammad Paktin, Minister of Abdol Bashir Roygar, Minister of Internal Affairs Information and Culture Saleha Faruq Etemadi, Minister of Dr Prof. Mohammad Anwar Shamas, Social Security Minister of Higher and Vocational Mohammad Hakim, Minister of Education Finance Fateh Mohammad Tarin, Minister of Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Returnees Affairs Minister of Defence Hayatollah Azizi, Minister of Roads Gholam Faruq Yaqubi, Minister of and Rural Development State Security Khalilollah, Minister of Transport Mohammad Sediq Saylani, Minister Nur Ahmad Berits, Minister without of Islamic Affairs and Endowment Portfolio Gholam Mayhodin Shabaz, Minister Dr Faqir Mohammad Yaqubi, of Central Statistics Minister without Portfolio Sarjang Zazi, Minister of Border Dr Shah Wali, Minister without Affairs Portfolio Mohammad Ghofran, Minister of Sayd Ekram Paygir, Minister without Agriculture [and Land Reform] Portfolio Dr Mohammad Anwar Dost, Minister of Light Industries and Foodstuffs Appendix B Afghan Opposition Parties 1. PAKISTAN-BASED PARTIES Seven Sunni Muslim parties were grouped in a loose alliance Fundamentalists/Islamists Leaders Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) Yunis Khalis Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) Burhanuddin Rabbani Ittihad-i-lslami (Islamic Union for Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf Liberation of Afghanistan) Conservative/Nationalists Leaders Mahaz-i-Melli (National Islamic Sayyid Ahmad Gailani Front of A(~hanistan) Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Melli (National Sibghatullah Mujaddidi Liberation Front of Afghanistan) Harakat-i-lnqilab-i-Islami Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Islamic Revolution Movement) 275 276 Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-91 2. IRAN-BASED PARTIES Eight Shi'a Muslim parties were grouped in a Council in 1988, at the time of the UN-sponsored Geneva Accords. Only three were really significant in the guerrilla war against the PDPA government. Three major Shi'a parties Leaders Harakat-i-Islami (Islamic Ayatollah Mohsini Movement) Sazman-i-Nasr (Organisation for Shaikh Abdul Karim Khalili Victory) Pasdaran-i-Jihad-i-Islami Regional leaders inside (Guardians of Islamic Holy Afghanistan War) Smaller Shi'a parties, with Regions regional followings Nahzat-i-Islami (Islamic Jaghori, Hazarajat Movement of Afghanistan) Da'wat-i Ittehad-i lslami Angora, Ghazni province (Invitation to Islamic Unity) Niru-i-Islami (Islamic Force) Behsud, Jowzjan Hizb-i-lslami Rad-i-Afghanistan Qari Ahmad (Party of Islamic Thunder) Jebh-i-Mutahed (United Front) party formed in 1988 Afghan Opposition Parties 277 3. OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES Shi'a parties independent of Regions, remarks Iran, operating in central Afghanistan Shura-i-Inqilab-i-Itefaq-i-Islami Sayyid Ali Beheshti, Ghazni (Council of Islamic Revolutionary Alliance) Sazman-i-Mujahidin-i-Mustazafin secular-oriented mainly Shi'a (Organization of Warriors of party, active Ghazni and Oppressed) Bamiyan By the mid 1980s, defunct or inactive Afghan parties included various regional fronts, Afghan Mellat, SAMA, (Afghan People's Liberation Front), Fedayan Islam. SOME KEY GUERRILLA COMMANDERS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN Ahmad Shah Massoud, (Tajik), Engineer Bashir, (Pushtun), Hizb-i­ Jamiat-i-Islami. Northeast lslami (Hekmatyar). North provinces Ghulam M Aryanpur, (Tajik), Abdul Haq, (Pushtun), Hizb-i-Islami Jamiat-i-Islami. North (Khalis). Kabul province Qari Taj Mohammad, (Pushtun), Ismail Khan, (Tajik), Jamiat-i­ Harakat. Ghazni area lslami. Herat Anwar, (Hazara), Harakat Sayid Jaghlan, (Hazara), Shura. (Muhsini). Kabul area Hazarajat Haji Abdul Latif, (Pushtun), Jalaluddin Haqani, (Pushtun), Hizb­ NIFA. Kandahar area i-Islami (Khalis). Pakhtya Appendix C Shabnamah (night letter) of Kabul Opposition, summer 1980 THE SOCIETY OF REVOLUTIONARY WOMEN Oh Babrak - oh you Russian puppet! Do you remember- have you got in your dirty memory that eternal day of sehum-i-aqrab (25 October 1965, when a Kabul demonstration of students urged on by Babrak Karmal was shot at by troops)? That day when you were shouting about 'the cowardly killing of the martyrs of sehum-i-aqrab, and about their slayer [General] Sardar W ali, and the black reaction using weapons against our penholding youth'. Yes - you were uttering these words to deceive people - but damnation be upon you! You yourselfused guns, tanks, machine guns and helicopters against schoolgirls who had no weapon but their headscarves and against boys who had nothing but books and pens. You killed hundreds of them (in demonstrations against the Soviet takeover in Kabul in 1980), filling up your prisons with this courageous youth, leaving thousands offamilies in sorrow and anguish. But Babrak, be afraid of the tears of the sorrowing, suffering mothers! These tears will turn into a rebellious flood which will wash away you and your [Russian] masters. The fate of Amin and Taraki - your comrades in crime - is awaiting you too, but more ominous and more terrible. If they killed at midnight, you kill by full daylight - you, with your impudence, which is a part of your low nature - damnation upon you, shameless one! Your bloodthirsty face shows what you are, you henchman of Russian colonialism, with cleaver in hand. Your true bloodthirsty face hides behind the mask of democracy which your masters designed for you. You reached power by fawning like a 278 Shabnamah (night letter) of Kabul Opposition, summer 1980 279 dog, rubbing your nose like a dog in front of the Kremlin's doors. The good hearted youth, not knowing your servile mentality, thought you still had some patriotism left in you. But when you were sent to Kabul on thousands ofRussian tanks, your barbaric actions showed themselves one after another - you loudspeaker of Brezhnev! The truth has become as clear as the light of the sun, that you have no fate in front of you but your self-destruction.
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