Islam and Civilisational Renewal

A journal devoted to contemporary issues and policy research

Volume 6 • Number 2 • April 2015

Produced and distributed by ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Professor Mohammad Hashim Kamali

EDITORIAL TEAM Dr Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil Dr Daud AbdulFattah Batchelor Abdul Karim Abdullah Tengku Ahmad Hazri Norliza Saleh Siti Mar’iyah Chu Abdullah

REGIONAL EDITORS Americas: Dr Eric Winkel Europe: Dr Christoph Marcinkowski Africa & Middle East: Mahmoud Youness Asia & Australasia: Dr Syed Farid Alatas

ADVISORY BOARD Professor Gholamreza Aavani, Professor Carl W. Ernst, Professor Ingrid Mattson, Iranian Philosophical Society University of North Carolina University of Western Ontario Dr AbdulHamid A. AbuSulayman, Professor John Esposito, Professor Abbas Mirakhor, International Institute of Islamic Georgetown University International Centre for Thought Professor Silvio Ferrari, Education in Islamic Finance Professor Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Università degli Studi Professor Chandra Muzaffar, International Islamic University HRH Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, International Movement for a Islamabad Jordan Just World Professor Azyumardi Azra, Professor Claude Gilliot, Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr, State Islamic University Jakarta Aix-Marseille Université George Washington University

Professor David Burrell CSC, Professor Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Professor Tariq Ramadan, University of Notre Dame Organisation of Islamic Oxford University Dr Mustafa Cerić, Cooperation Professor Mathias Rohe, Former Grand Mufti of Bosnia- Professor Yasushi Kosugi, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Herzegovina Kyoto University Professor Abdullah Saeed, Professor Hans Daiber, Emeritus Professor Hermann University of Melbourne Johann Wolfgang Goethe Landolt, McGill University Professor Miroslav Volf, Universität Professor Tore Lindholm, Yale University Ahmet Davutoğlu, University of Oslo Professor Abdal Hakim Murad, Foreign Minister of Turkey Professor Muhammad Khalid University of Cambridge Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr Masud, International Islamic Brigham Young University University Islamabad

AIMS AND SCOPE

· Islam and Civilisational Renewal (ICR) offers an international platform for awakening the civilisational potential of the Islamic legacy. Revitalising synergies between Islamic and other civilisations in a spirit of self enrichment through discovery and research may facilitate renewal within Muslim societies and more significant contributions by Muslims to the global human community. · ICR explores contemporary dynamics of Islamic experience in legal and religious practice, education and science, economic and financial institutions, and social and intellectual development. · We seek viable policy-relevant research yielding pragmatic outcomes informed by the best values and teachings of Islam as well as of other contemporary civilisations. · ICR is inter-disciplinary, non-political and non-sectarian. We seek to contribute to prospects of peace among all nations, and assist the conceptual and societal transformation of Muslims. · ICR encourages a fresh discourse for self renewal informed by an inclusive tolerant approach to diverse schools of thought and expression of ideas. The intent is to integrate over 1,400 years of Islam’s civilisational resources of diversity, dialogue and coexistence for meaningful exchanges with other world civilisations. · ICR promotes the Malaysian initiative of Tajdīd Haḍārī or Civilisational Renewal, with its component principles: 1. Faith, Ethics & Spirituality, 2. Just Governance, 3. Independence & Self-Determination, 4. Mastery of Knowledge & Science, 5. Islamic Economics & Finance, 6. Human Dignity & Ecological Wellbeing, 7. Cultural & Aesthetic Integrity, 8. Equity & Fraternity, 9. Diversity & Dialogue, 10. Peace & Security.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE Comments, suggestions and requests to: [email protected]

Printed by Vinlin Press Sdn Bhd, Jalan Meranti Permai 1, Meranti Permai Industrial Park, 47100 Puchong, Selangor CONTENTS

Editorial 145–147 Mohammad Hashim Kamali

Articles

Extremism, Terrorism and Islam: Historical and Contemporary 148–165 Perspectives Mohammad Hashim Kamali

Implementation of the Islamic Criminal Law in Malaysia: Prospects and 166–174 Challenges Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad

Globalisation and Muslim Minorities: Integration and Identity Dialectics 175–195 in the West Asif Mohiuddin Standardisation of Fatwa in Malaysia: Issues, Concerns and Expectations 196–211 Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil

Arabic Literature in the Rise of Islamic Civilisation and the Present 212–228 Educational System Suleiman Mohammed Hussein Boayo

The Rise and Decline of Scientific Productivity in the Muslim World: 229–246 A Preliminary Analysis Asadullah Ali Al-Andalusi

Viewpoints

State-Building Dilemmas after the Arab Spring 247–249 Tengku Ahmad Hazri

The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013: An Overview and Appraisal 250–253 Hakimah Yaacob

Balancing Power and Love Towards Global Stability in the Muslim World 254–256 Ahmad Badri Abdullah

Commemorating the International Mother Language Day: Resisting 257–260 'Banglish' Tawfique Al-Mubarak 144

Significant Events and Developments

Islam and Constitutionalism: Interview by the Islamic Culture Foundation 261–277 (FUNCI), Spain Mohammad Hashim Kamali & Tengku Ahmad Hazri

Seminar on Gender and Islamic Legal Reform 277–278 (IAIS Malaysia, 9 December 2014) Tengku Ahmad Hazri

Visit by Professor Tariq Ramadan to Malaysia 278–279 (Malaysia, 29 January - 1 February 2015) Tengku Ahmad Hazri

Roundtable Discussion on "Extremism, Terrorism and Islam: Toward a 280–281 Better Understanding of Issues" (IAIS Malaysia, 22 January 2015) Elmira Akhmetova

Book Reviews

Jocelyne Cesari, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy 282–284 Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri

Call for Papers 285 EDITORIAL

The Islam and Civilisational Renewal journal is focused on restoring the civilisational potential of Islam and its guidelines in conjunction with contemporary issues. In this April 2015 edition we provide six papers and four viewpoints as well as an interview, event reports and book review. The articles in this edition cover four highly topical civilisational themes – dealing with extremism in Muslim communities; strengthening aspects of Islamic law in Malaysia; responses needed to assist members of the Muslim diaspora living as minority communities to find security and realise a fitting identity; and fourthly, looking into two seminal elements of Islamic civilisation, past and present – Arabic literature and scientific advancement. Fast-developing political events are nowadays widespread within the heartlands of the Muslim world, particularly the MENA countries and West Africa, where extremism, terrorism and violence have become all too common and are ripping communities apart. Extremism and terrorism in tandem with sectarian violence and security breakdown are widespread in ‘core’ Muslim countries to such an extent that a non-Muslim and even Muslim citizens shake their heads in disbelief that this can happen in societies presenting themselves as followers of a divine revelation, the Noble Qur’an, and life example of its exemplar, Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Consequently I am motivated to provide an explanation of this phenomenon in the article on “Extremism, Terrorism and Islam: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives”, and to look at avenues to address the underlying issues and suggest policy scenarios, responses and recommendations. This topic was also the subject of a well-attended Round-table discussion held at IAIS on 22 January 2015. Two articles then address separate issues of Shari’ah law in Malaysia. Firstly, Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad, the former Chief Justice of Malaysia (2007-2008), discusses the “Implementation of Islamic Criminal Law in Malaysia: Prospects and Challenges” – this at the time when the Malaysian opposition party, Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), has just submitted a controversial private member’s bill for consideration by the Federal Parliament. PAS’s overt purpose is to facilitate implementation of hudud law in Kelantan whose Legislative Assembly passed the Hudud Bill amendments in March 2015. These amendments introduce minor changes to the original Hudud Bill of Kelantan 1993, which has remained in abeyance ever since due to its conflict with the Federal Constitution. A neighbouring country that is contemplating a thorough implementation of Shari‘ah law, Brunei Darussalam, has yet to decide on implementing that part of its Syari‘ah Penal Code Order 2013, which contains hudud offences. The fourth article “Standardisation of Fatwa in Malaysia: Issues, Concerns and Expectations”, is by Deputy CEO of IAIS, Mohamad Azam Mohamed Adil. It is an intriguing subject and discusses the issue of conflicting fatwas that sometime arise from different state jurisdictions and how these differences could be resolved across the country through a standardisation process led by the National Fatwa Committee.

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A proposal is also made for appointment of a Grand Mufti who would however not supercede the roles of the respective State Muftis. Asif Mohiuddin from the Department of Islamic Studies, University of Kashmir, in his article, “Globalisation and Muslim Minorities: Integration and Identity Dialectics in the West”, focuses on Muslim minorities, how they are affected by globalisation, and the challenging process of finding one’s place and identity in an adopted Western country while often experiencing feelings of exclusion and insecurity. This often results in multiple identities forming within the Muslim community. Mohiuddin proposes meaningful dialogue in order to promote more effective and harmonious integration of Muslims into the host society. It is fitting that both the arts and science are discussed in discourses on Islamic civilisation – its remarkable past and its enticing future waiting to be grasped. Suleiman Mohammed Hussein Boayo, senior lecturer at the Center for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science and Civilisation (CASIS), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, has written on “Arabic Literature in the Rise of Islamic Civilisation and the Present Education System” He stresses here that in addition to the bedrock of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, the Arabic language with its literature has also provided a major foundational source for Islamic civilisation. Its study will enable one to reach the heart of the Islamic civilisation. To cap our articles section, Asadullah Ali Al- Andalusi in his article, “The Rise and Decline of Scientific Productivity in the Muslim World”, provides a preliminary analysis on some leading ‘theories’ for the observed rise and decline of scientific activities in the Muslim world, with start of the decline being noticed around beginning of the 15th century. He rebuts with justification the ‘classical narrative’ of orientalists - that Muslims were no more than custodians of Greek, Persian and Indian science and that Imam al-Ghazali was responsible for a swing to a more conservative bent that hindered free scientific enquiry. The Viewpoints generally support the foci of preceding articles including Hakimah Yaacob’s overview and appraisal on The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, and the proposed antidote to extremism and moderation of hard power which is love in Ahmad Badri’s insightful viewpoint on “Balancing Power and Love towards Global Stability in the Muslim World”. Another flip of the coin is Tengku Ahmad Hazri’s “State-Building Dilemmas after the Arab Spring” – after all good governance with representative public participation can engender stability and moderation if detrimental external parties do not rock the boat. Also in this vein, the book review by Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri addresses the rise of mass aspirations for democracy in the Muslim world. The section is rounded off by Tawfique Al- Mubarak, a Bangladeshi scholar, writing on “Commemorating the International Mother Language Day: Resisting ‘Banglish’” in support of the Bengali language and its rich literature. International Mother Language Day is celebrated annually on 20 February in commemoration of the Bengali experience.

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL EDITORIAL 147

Significant events also reported in this edition include the FUNCI interview with Mohammad Hashim Kamali and Tengku Ahmad Hazri on Islam and Constitutionalism; the visit to Malaysia of Professor Tariq Ramadan in Late January-February; and the successful Seminar on Gender and Islamic Legal Reform in December 2014. We also highlight that we believe our readers too have many valuable ideas on the important issues facing Islamic civilisation, and encourage your submission to IAIS for consideration as an ICR article (5,000 to 7,500 words) or viewpoint (1,000 to 1,500 words), with analyses proposing solutions and policies to help project the ummah to a successful and sustainable future. Great intellectual movements are underway in the Muslim world today – we wish to capture the essence of these developments as well as contribute to these from our own platform. I would finally like to thank all our contributors, the ICR Editorial team, and my colleagues in the Publications Unit for their continued cooperation and support.

Mohammad Hashim Kamali Editor-in-Chief

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia ARTICLES

EXTREMISM, TERRORISM AND ISLAM: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES

Mohammad Hashim Kamali*

Abstract: A conceptual characterisation of extremism at the outset is followed by an outline of its principal indicators and types, such as the fanatic pursuit of one particular view. The extremist tends to be self-righteous, power-hungry, willing to inflict harm and hardship on others, and also inclined to conflate the order of values. Then follows an exposition of the varieties of extremism and a review also of the Islamic sources concerning them. There are references in this connection to Arab Spring, ISIS, Boko Haram and Charlie Hebdo, and then a review of expert opinion, policy scenarios and responses to extremism and terror. The article concludes with a set of actionable recommendations.

Meaning and Scope of Extremism Extremism is usually self-evident and easily identifiable for the most part, but it may require further scrutiny in technical and contextualised situations. Killing another person is an extreme behaviour, yet if it is done in the context of self-defence that repels an overwhelming and instantaneous attack on one’s life, it would not be considered extreme. This contextualised and relative aspect of extremism also becomes evident by reference to strong political currents and sets of circumstances with the results, for instance, that one person’s extremism becomes another person’s moderation, and the freedom fighter of one becomes the terrorist of another and so forth. Gay marriage gains legal recognition under one set of values and is considered an abomination in another. This would suggest the need for one to know moderation and normality, and the source of authority and values they refer to in order to be able to identify when they are violated by extremist behaviour. Extremist behaviour in technical subjects would not be self-evident to a lay person, and would need specialised input to enable a credible assessment. Extremism is usually definitive and deliberate, yet it can also be due to ignorance and error of judgment, especially in technical matters that require specialised know-how.1

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Extremism is the conceptual opposite of moderation and almost as extensive in that it just about relates to every subject of concern to moderation. Whereas moderation is centripetal and strongly tends toward the centre, extremism is centrifugal that pushes away from the centre toward the outer edges and extremes of its subject matter. Extremism violates the limits of moderation. These limits can often be identified by reference to authoritative sources and documents, such as laws and constitutions, religious scriptures, such as the Qur’an and hadith, moral standards and the general mores and customs of society. But since world religions and philosophies, as well as the mores and customs of societies, and the values they uphold or deny, tend to differ widely, what may one consider to be extremist or moderate under one is also likely to vary accordingly under another code of values. Like moderation, extremism also applies to the entire spectrum of values, good and bad, positive and negative. One can be extremist in what may be deemed as virtuous, such as measure for measure justice that verges on literalism and severity in the application of rules and in treating, for instance, recidivists and first time offenders under the same rules without consideration of the differentials. Similarly, continuous fasting even outside the month of Ramadan, and all night vigil, such that may damage one’s health and family life would amount to extremism in religiosity. One can also be extremist in pursuit of one’s rights and liberties, as in the case of freedom of expression when used so as to offend others – almost all the provocative cartoons of the Prophet of Islam by some Danish and French publishers illustrate this. One may have the right to just retaliation, even revenge under due process, but it can be taken to excess for what may be a minor provocation, as in the case of Israeli retaliatory attacks against Palestinian rocket fire. Extremism in the interpretation of ideas can be illustrated by the Islamic militant group ISIS’s interpretation of the Islamic caliphate and so forth. The clash-of-civilisations narrative found credible manifestations in the 9/11 attacks and the numerous other instances of terrorism, military aggression and violence that followed and brought Islam increasingly into the focus of world attenton. Experts and media pundits often saw Islam as the sole explanation of extremism among Muslims. Too often, Islam is portrayed negatively and monolithically as a growing threat to world peace, obscuring the diversity of opinions within Islam and the fact that most Muslims condemn extremism and violence. Expert opinion reviewed in the following paragraphs indicates that a great deal of extremist behaviour among Muslims is reactive and related to military aggression and humiliating violence by superior military powers. Unlike the common perception that connects extremism with religion, closer scrutiny

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 150 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI reveals that religion has a minimal role and that most of the causes of extremism are extraneous to religion. Muslims the world over do not see the mainstream media depictions of Islam as a true portrayal of their religion, rather they see a total contrast between these and their own image of moderation that characterised Islamic civilisation. Muslims view Islam as a religion that values truth and justice, and shuns laxity on one side and extremism on the other. There is no denial on the other hand that extremism existed, in varying degrees, among Muslims, as among other communities and traditions, almost everywhere and at any given time. Yet the Muslim world has evidently been witnessing an escalation of extremism and violence in recent years. Even the rosy promise of the Arab Spring when it first began, yielded to extremism across swathes of West Asia and North Africa. Extremism has not, however, commanded a credible majority in Muslim societies. Extremists are usually small groups of people that advocate narrow and radical views and ideologies. They are not able to persuade and influence the majority through rational debate, which is why they usually take to the street and resort to violent methods to buttress their claims. Extremists are also groups of people who allege that they are championing the cause of justice and correct wrongs resulting from the conduct of others. Extremism may also be a reaction against the leadership of a country or in opposition to a dominant ideology. The larger than real presence of extremism is felt due to views and claims clamorously expressed, and actions taken boldly beyond the ordinary, done in order to attract attention or merely to gain sympathy. While such daring extremists and desperate tactics shock society, they are short-lived and ultimately self-defeating.2

Hallmarks of Types of Extremism One of the first markers of extremism is fanatic advocacy of one view or opinion and ignoring others, even though the person knows of the existence of other views. This kind of fanaticism is in a state of denial to all else, including that which may be in the public interest and in harmony with the objectives of the religion he follows. This denial also extends to the prevailing conditions of time and place, dialogue and search for balanced and well-moderated solutions. The extremist even does not stop at mere denial but goes on to accuse others of ignorance and transgression, especially those do who not follow his or her views. The extremists also tend to be certain of the correctness of their cause so much so that they focus clearly and project unequivocal positions. They have a black and white view of their purpose that helps create certainty in an uncertain world. That also explains why they possess an ability to attract attention disproportionate to their numbers or percentage in any given population. By contrast, the moderates

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL EXTREMISM, TERRORISM AND ISLAM 151 tend to be reflective, see nuances and rarely exhibit certainty of that kind. Extremists tend to triumph not because of their inherent strength but more often because of the weakness and hesitancy of moderates. Furthermore, the extremists turn a blind eye to the needs and wishes of others and show eagerness to impose harsh and taxing demands on them. They are prone to ignoring people’s weaknesses and refuse to acknowledge that some people may be weak, in poor health and unprepared to comply with their demands.3 The extremists are also inclined to confuse the essential with the subsidiary. One learns from a perusal of the Qur’an and guidelines of Sunnah of the existence of a certain order of priorities wherein emphasis is placed on essentials, and observance of subsidiary requirements is treated with a lighter touch and less emphasis. The Qur’anic guideline on this is found in the following verse: “If you avoid the most heinous of the prohibited conduct, We shall conceal all your sins and admit you to a gate of great honour” (al-Nisa’, 4:31). The verse clearly conveys the message that avoidance of major sins can by itself act as a concealer of the minor ones a person may have committed. Al-Qaradawi recounts, in this connection, instances where the Prophet of Islam turned a blind eye to the misgivings of certain individuals even if they only did the bare minimum of obligatory duties and added little or nothing else by way of supererogatory practices of the religion.4 To be overemphatic on every detail can be exhaustive and demanding and can also distract attention from that which is essential. Reflecting on Islamic history, three varieties of extremist activities are distinguishable: theological, political, and practical - even though they are not always mutually exclusive of one another. Theological extremism (al-taṭarruf al-iʿtiqādī) is noticeable when the extremist subscribes to particular beliefs that stand in conflict with the clear text of the Qur’an, authentic hadith, and general consensus (ijma’) of Muslims.5 A reference is made in this connection to early theological movements that arose in the first two centuries of Islam, such as the Qadariyyah, the Jahmiyyah, the Murji’ah, and Batiniyyah as explained below. The Qadariyyah (advocates of free will or qadar) subscribed to the view that man is the sole creator of his own conduct. The Jahmiyyah (followers of Jahm bin Safwan) subscribed to total predestination; the Murji’ah (suspenders of judgment and upholders permanently of hope or rija’) suspended passing any judgment on sinners. They also include those who held extremist views concerning the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad - going as far as to charge some of the prominent Companions with infidelity and kufr.6 The Batiniyyah (esotericists - also known as Isma‘iliyyah, a Shiʿite sub-sect) held that every overt speech and word of God in the Qur’an had a hidden meaning known only to their Imam.

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To these may be added perhaps the ghulat (extremists) of Shiʿa as well as some of the contemporary movements that include the Takfir and Hijrah Association (Jamāʿāt al-takfīr wa’l-hijrah) of Egypt, which charged the Egyptian state with infidelity that had allegedly turned into Dar al-Kufr (abode of unbelief). It was a duty therefore of Muslims to leave that country and emigrate.7 Political extremism (al-taṭarruf al-siyasi) is marked by confrontation and challenge of the authority of a lawful government. Noted in this category are the Kharijites (lit. outsiders) who emerged in Iraq and boycotted the authority of the fourth caliph ‘Ali Ibn Abu Talib, as well as declaring permissible the killing of all Muslims except for their own followers.8 The Kharijites held the extremist view that committing a major sin amounts to a renunciation of Islam. One of the Kharijites factions, namely the Azariqah, further added that a person renounces Islam even if he committed a major sin by error or personal interpretation and ijtihād, which is why they charged the caliph ‘Ali with infidelity over the issue of Arbitration (taḥkīm). For the Caliph had exercised his own ijtihād in that matter. The Caliph was charged with infidelity for the mere fact of his agreeing to arbitration between him and his challenger, the then governor of Sham, Mu’awiyah b. Abu Sufyan.9 Lastly, practical extremism (al-taṭarruf al-ʿamalī) that consists of extremist conduct, such as self-immolation, excessive fasting and all-night vigil, renouncing marriage and acts that depart from sound human nature (fiṭrah), valid Sunnah and precedent of the Prophet. One may add to these such other instances of practical extremism as excessive dieting to keep slim, especially among younger women, excessively disciplinarian practices with one’s children and the like, which are injurious and harmful. Terrorism is also practical extremism, be it local, national or international, in peacetime or war that consists mainly of acts of terror and violence, bombing and use of explosives that kill innocent people and cause destruction. Such activities may even occur in the course of a legitimate war that may have been duly declared by the lawful leader. The basic position of such acts of terror is the same in Shari’ah whether its victims are Muslim or otherwise, and whether it is against a weak, or a more powerful party or state.10 Terrorism may have different causes that may, on that basis, be classified under one or the other variety of extremism mentioned above. As we watch the so-called Islamic State group, ISIS, fighters rampaging through the Middle East, the tearing apart of states and cities and massacres of innocent civilians, it may be difficult to believe we are living in the twenty first century. The sight of terrified refugees and indiscriminate violence is all too reminiscent of Crusaders and the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan. The ferocious cruelty of these militants, that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Boko Haram in

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Nigeria, the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris etc., raise a distinctly modern concern over the connection between religion and violence. Global security, safety and well-being of people are also jeopardised in laws of some Muslim countries that violate citizen and human rights with impunity and uphold religious beliefs by force. ISIS is a product of decades of “failed governance in the Arab world and Pakistan.”11 The radicalisation of Muslim youth within Western societies that turn them against the common values and ideals of their new domicile, and extremism that spreads like a cancer in failed states are among the previously unknown manifestations of extremism we are witnessing in increasing proportions. State-sponsored terrorism is no less a manifestation of extremism than actions by non-state actors and may, indeed, even be the direct cause that provokes retaliation by non-state actors. Media estimates mention that one-third of the ISIS forces are foreign, including hundreds, even thousands, of young Muslims from France, Belgium, Britain and other countries of Europe. Some are hardline jihadists, but many are just losers, misfits and adventure seekers. The hardline elements of Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan who are not satisfied with the more moderate Muslims among them, plus the fact that the Taliban have generally become weak, are beginning to align themselves with ISIS. Media reports indicate that some of these new followers may have already started carrying the black banner of ISIS as their rallying point.12 The other one-third of ISIS is made up of former Sunni Ba’thist army officers, Iraqi Sunnis and tribesmen; for many Sunni villagers under ISIS control, ISIS is just less bad than how they were treated by Iraq’s previous Shiʿah-led government. The remaining one-third of ISIS is composed of true ideologues, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who have their own apocalyptic version of Islam. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman maintains that this version of Islam would not be resonating so forcefully were it not for the fact that “both religion and politics have been hijacked” in the Arab world and Pakistan.13 The Arab peoples have been mostly ruled by radicals and reactionaries. Without the prospect of legitimate politics that genuinely responds to popular grievances, no amount of top-down attempts to engender a moderate version of Islam will succeed. Islam has no Vatican to decree whose Islam is authentic, so it emerges differently in different contexts.14 Governments in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries are taking note of the need to work more closely with community partners, religious institutions, education centres and the media to create an anti-extremist current of opinion and environment. With reference to Malaysia, among the factors prompting young Muslims to undertake these dangerous assignments of travel to Syria, one is “the lack of basic religious fundamentals, which cause them to be easily influenced by extremist teachings.” Furthermore, the “West is seen as an enemy of the

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Muslims; and the Muslim community at the international level is seen to have failed to protect the oppressed Muslim countries,” which has in turn caused these individuals to join the ISIS militant group.15 Social media also plays a role in enabling the extremists to spread their message with the rapidity that was not possible before. While saying this, Asri Zainul Abidin, Mufti of the northern state of Perlis, Malaysia, also commented that by “invading and bombing Muslim countries, the US and its Western allies have engendered a sense of despair in Muslims worldwide … Disappointed with their own governments for corruption and injustice along with anger at the US has made them look for solutions elsewhere.” When they hear of ISIS, they are led to believe that it’s a revival of the Caliphate during Islam’s Golden Age.16 The Mufti further added that Caliphate was certainly not meant to perpetuate violence and warfare like what the ISIS is doing. The Caliphate’s aim was to establish good governance, instill Islam with a positive message for the rest of the world, and most of all to uphold justice.17 Those who commit cowardly murder behind a mask of “Islam” and imagine they are taking revenge and waging jihad are in fact, in the eyes of the true Islam, murderers. It is despicable to hunt down defenceless people and shoot them in a vicious act of terror simply because they think wrongly, or insult or are hostile to Islam.18 Protection of life (hifz al-nafs) - of all human life - is one of the overriding goals and purposes (maqasid) of Islam and the Shari'ah. Human life must be safeguarded as a matter of priority. “One who saves the life of another,” says the Qur’an, “it would be as if he saves the life of the whole of humankind” (al- Ma’idah, 5:35). The text also declares in the same verse: “And one who kills a human being without the latter being guilty of murder or corruption in the land, it would be as if he has killed the whole of humankind.” Elsewhere the Qur’an enjoins: “Slay not the life which Allah has made sacrosanct unless it be in the cause of justice” (al-Isra’, 17:33). These passages capture well the increased inter-dependency of human security in the age of globalisation. To say that the slaying of one human is tantamount to an attack on the sanctity of human life generally is the essence of the threat humanity is now facing. Al-Bukhari and Muslim, the two most authoritative collections of hadith, have recorded the following hadiths from the Prophet: “One who raises arms against us ceases to be one of us;”19 and a rehash of the same in another hadith in the same chapter and source: “One who unsheathes his sword against us is not one of us.”20 In yet another hadith, it is provided: “All that belongs to a Muslim is forbidden to other Muslims; his blood, his property and his honour.”21 Terrorising innocent people that may or may not lead to loss of life and limb constitutes the crime of hirabah, which carries the death punishment by the clear

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL EXTREMISM, TERRORISM AND ISLAM 155 text of the Qur’an (5:33). The prohibition of hirabah in this text is conveyed in general and unqualified terms that subsume individuals, groups, state and non- state parties all alike.

Terrorism: Changing Trajectories and Fresh Appraisals Judging by the scale of violence in recent years in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Pakistan and elsewhere, Muslims are themselves the principal victims of violence in the name of religion. The victims of crude brutality and indiscriminate drone attacks are also defenceless Muslim civilians, women and children for the most part. In a revealing interview published in January 2013 in Foreign Affairs, retired General Stanley McChrystal said about counterterrorism: Americans have got to understand that if we were to use our technological capabilities carelessly – I don‘t think we do, but there is always the danger that you will – then we should not be upset when someone responds with their equivalent, which is a suicide bomb in Central park, because that’s what they can respond with.22 The ugly truism flies in our faces that violence begets violence; that militarism is itself a problem, not a solution. The unprecedented violence and terror attacks the world is witnessing is also not all religious – oppression, discrimination, humiliation, socio-economic factors, exaggerations and provocative media all come into the picture. Religion is also not the primary cause of violence in any of the countries mentioned, although it is being used and abused in so many ways that hardly need elaboration. Local and regional dynamics that propel terrorism tend to differ in Europe, America, the Middle East and Afghanistan, although this does not rule out similarities between them in certain areas. Europe and the US tend to have one feature in common, for instance: Islamophobia. There are literally hundreds of websites, radio programmes and TV networks that specialise in anti-Islam propaganda. The twitter hashtag #killall-Moslem has been around since 2011. While this abundance of offensiveness may comfort those concerned about freedom of expression, “it does not give me any comfort,” wrote Sami Mahroum, "as a European Muslim.”23 Europe’s Muslims are by and large peaceful. There are no real home-grown Islamic terrorist organisations of any significance in Europe. Almost all terrorist acts in Europe are the works of a single umbrella organisation – al-Qaeda. Western spy agencies are also widely suspected to be involved in provocative and tension generating assignments. Yet it is comforting to know that violent ideology has very limited appeal among the Muslims of Europe. Radicalised European Muslims

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 156 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI must look elsewhere for support. Sami Mahroum added the information that in late 2014, the Mayor of Sarge-leslie Man's, a French town of about 3,500 people with 180 Muslim students, sought to impose pork meat on all schools. A couple of years earlier, the then French president Nicolas Sarkozy joined in a campaign to ban halal meat branding, which became an election issue. The Swiss meanwhile, have banned minarets. The list goes on.24 Following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, United States Senator John McCain told New York Times on how to stop this from happening on the US soil next: It would require a more aggressive American military strategy across the greater Middle East, with ground troops and no-fly zone in Syria and more troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fareed Zakaria who quoted McCain followed on with his own assessment: This theory was sometimes described in the Iraq War as ‘We fight them there, so we don’t have to fight them here.’ “It was wrong then and it is wrong now.”25 Zakaria added that intervention has, on the contrary, been the cause of a great deal of suicide bombings and violent attacks in recent years. In this connection, he referred to a CNN report that back in 2007, Cherif Kouachi, one of the Paris terrorists, revealed the source of his radicalisation. “I was ready to go and die in battle. I got this idea when I saw the injustices shown by television on what was going on over there (in Iraq). I am speaking about the torture that the Americans have inflicted on the Iraqis.” Zakaria went on to quote the scholars Robert Pape and James Feldman, who analysed all of the more than 2,100 documented cases of suicide bombings from 1980 to 2009 and concluded that the vast majority of the perpetrators were acting in response to American intervention in the Middle East rather that out of a religious or ideological motivation. When people are attacked they invariably become extreme. But only a tiny proportion of the Muslim respondents in a Gallup poll actually agreed with terrorism: 93 per cent answered ‘no’ to the Gallup poll whether the 9/11 attacks were justified.26 The reasons that drive the terrorists vary from a sense of adventure to radicalism and total despair, but battling a foreign (Western) intervention is often high on the list. Another scholar Zakaria has quoted in support of his own assessment is Andrew Bacevich, who pointed out that before Syria, Washington had already launched interventions in thirteen countries in the Islamic world since 1980. Will one more really do the trick?27 In answer to an interview question “are terrorists primarily traumatized?” Karen Armstrong said that some of them are and some of them are plain wicked. Osama bin Laden “was a plain criminal.” But there is also great fear and despair among them.28 Armstrong then recounts that surveys have been done by forensic psychiatrists who interviewed people convicted of terrorism since 9/11. They interviewed hundreds of people in Guantanamo and other prisons. And one forensic psychiatrist, who is also an officer of the CIA, concluded that Islam had

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL EXTREMISM, TERRORISM AND ISLAM 157 nothing to do with it. The problem was “rather ignorance of Islam. Had they had a proper Muslim education they wouldn’t be doing this. Only 20% of them has had a regular Muslim upbringing. The rest are either new converts – like the gunmen who recently attacked the Canadian Parliament; or non-observant, which means that they don’t go to the mosque – like the bombers in the Boston Marathon; or self-taught. Two young men who left Britain to join the jihad in Syria ordered from Amazon a book called Islam for Dummies. “That says it, you see.”29 The unqualified condemnation that Muslim religious and political notables have expressed against the ISIS and Charlie Hebdo atrocities and similar acts of despicable terror is to be welcomed. Muslim leaders, international organisations and fatwa councils, including the Majlis Ulama Indonesia, the National Fatwa Council of Malaysia, and the Mufti of Saudi Arabia, denounced the brutality and violence of the ISIS group as violating the core principles of Islam. This line of condemnation from Muslim quarters also became evident within days of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Condemnation alone will not, however, address the causes of such heinous violence, which in the case of ISIS is the political mess, power vacuum and failure of good governance in Syria and Iraq, where states failed and social order collapsed. Angry and disillusioned men and women, Shi’ah, Sunni, Kurds and others feel that the path of violence is the only one left for them to take.30 Prolonged dictatorship in the Arab world has spawned extremist (mostly religious) opposition movements. The more repressive the regime, the more extreme the opposition. Islam became the language of opposition because it was a language that could not be shut down or censored. Now, the old Arab order is crumbling, but it has led to instability which created new opportunities for militant and extremist groups.31 Unless the root causes of radical extremism are addressed, many have warned that extremism is likely to be on the rise. Once a radical group falls by the wayside, discredited or irrelevant, another, often more radical and violent emerges. This is what ISIS is to al-Qaeda by upping the stake in the radicalisation contest and becoming even more destructive and violent than its predecessor.32 When modern Middle Eastern terrorism first appeared on the scene in the 1960s and 1970s, the historian David Fromkin wrote in an essay in Foreign Affairs that from its very beginnings, after the French Revolution, terrorism has been a strategy of the weak, designed to project false strength and, above all, make onlookers miscalculate. Fromkin provided examples, one of which referred to a meeting in 1945 with a leader of the Irgun, a group of about 1,500 Jewish militants in Palestine, which was then part of the British empire.33 The Irgun knew they could not defeat the mighty British army, so they decided to blow up buildings and create the appearance of chaos. The Irgun leader said

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 158 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI that this would lead the British to overreact, garrison and militarise the empire that would, in turn, strain British resources to the point that it may eventually decide to leave Palestine. Seeing that it was too small to defeat Great Britain, the Irgun decided as an alternative approach that “Britain was big enough to defeat itself.”34 While quoting Fromkin, Fareed Zakaria commented that the ISIS strategy in many ways resembles that of the Irgun. The targeting of America and its allies, the videos and the barbarism are all designed to draw Washington into a ground battle in Syria and a protracted war that would sap the superpower’s strength. The conclusion is then drawn: “though terrorism cannot always be prevented, it can always be defeated. You can always refuse to do what they want you to do.”35 In an interview following the launch of her new book, Fields of Blood, Religion and the History of Violence, Karen Armstrong, whom we already mentioned, was expressive of her feelings to say that “I am filled with a sense of dread as to where we are going.” We have created bombs that can wipe out the world, and it is accepted in international law that if your nation is threatened it is acceptable to fire off a nuclear weapon. It won’t be long before Al-Qaeda or one of these groups gets hold of a nuclear device. “The situation is so dangerous that we are forced to open our eyes and see what’s going on. And that is not about religion, Islam or otherwise.”36 To the suicide bomber who goes in with explosives knowing that he will die, it matters little whether the explosives that kill him are conventional or nuclear! Razali Ismail, the former Malaysian envoy at the UN and President of UNGA, observed that contrary to the warning that “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” extremism is not caused singularly by unrestrained power. Rather, it is caused by the over-zealous promotion of one view, one approach and one thought to the exclusion of all else. Long before extremism can congeal in the form of terrorist groups, rogue states and ultra-violent social configurations, each of these bodies have acquired an orthodoxy that resists any form of intellectual challenge, changes of time and circumstance.37 Lisette Thooft who had read Karen Armstrong’s new book, Fields of Blood, said at one point “reading the (500 page) book I realised: what a river of blood and tears is running through our world history.” To this, Armstrong commented: “And misery and oppression, and injustice. Great injustice and we are still unjust. Because we talk about our Enlightenment as if the Messiah came down ... And it was great. It was very important for us.”38 But look at the founding fathers of the United States, who said that all men are created equal: they had no problem owning African slaves. Liberty was only ever for Europeans. “And it is still like that, because of the greed for oil. We give huge support to the Saudis, who give their people no human rights.”39

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It is also well to remember, as Paridah Samad points out, the December 1983 meeting between the US secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld and the dictator Saddam Hussein, which was designed to emphasise America’s “close relationship” with Iraq as an ally.40 In a similar vein, the US championed Egypt’s Husni Mubarak before demanding his arrest, and tolerated Pakistan’s General Zia- ul-Haq, who helped Talibanise Pakistan, and then of course invaded Afghanistan, a country that had no involvement in the 9/11 attacks.41 Extremism is also a co-traveller of the power-hungry, one that denies others their due in total pursuit of one’s own interests. The problem is not always a lack of formula for a reasonable solution to a contentious issue, but refusal to accede to an obvious solution. This is the problem of one party’s preference for the winner-takes-all option, as in the case of Israel, that generates belligerence – the very reason also for Palestine to burn on a regular basis. Given a huge imbalance of power and continuous reinforcement of Israeli military power by the United States and Israel’s refusal to budge from its one-directional policy of occupation, expansion and oppression, the prospects of peace in the Middle East are bound to remain elusive.42 Rabbi Mark Winer wrote in a 2012 article “Fundamentalists versus Moderates” that the future of humanity may well depend on the ability of moderates within each religion to overcome their extremist co-religionists. It would appear, he added, that extremism spawns interfaith bigotry and sanctions violence, war and terrorism. In the twentieth century, more people died in the name of religion than in all of history before. There is a real fear that the twenty-first century may even eclipse the grisly record for interfaith bigotry and terrorism of the previous century. A great deal therefore depends upon our understanding of the eternal conflict between extremism and moderation, and upon the strategies the religious moderates devise together to combat their common scourge.43 It is indicative of the wisdom of the early pioneers of Islam who called the Kharijites (Khawarij, lit. outsiders) by this name, and made it known from early on that this group has exited itself from the mainstream community of Muslims. They have the choice to change their behaviour and rejoin the community or else to stay as outsiders. The same can be said of ghulat (lit. exaggerators), the name so unmistakeably expressive of its purpose, that was given to a small group of Shiʿites who exaggerated in their interpretations of the doctrine of imamate so as to elevate the first Shiʿite Imam, ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, to a deity. There should be no doubt that massacre and mayhem can never be accepted in the name of Islam, and we need to be vigilant and decisive on criminality of the kind that has become so frequent and keeps putting the good name of Islam and vast majority of peaceable Muslims on the line. In combating terrorism, states and societies need to be firm and decisive, of

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 160 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI course, but they must not let the terrorists get what they want. An early indication of this could be noted in what President Francois Hollande of France, and the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said in their speeches following the Paris killings. Speaking at the Arab World Institute in Paris, President Hollande said: “It is Muslims who are victims of fanaticism, fundamentalism and intolerance,” adding that the Muslim community in France, Europe’s largest, had “the same rights and same duties as all citizens” and must be protected. The German Chancellor in her speech at the Bundestag declared her country’s unity with France, adding the remark that Islam was not the cause; rather it was extremism that was the common enemy.44 At a time when the self-styled Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident, or Pegida, were planning several rallies in various German cities following the Paris attacks, Chancellor Merkel went on record to say that “Islam belongs to Germany ... I am the chancellor of all Germans.” She also announced she would join a Muslim community rally in Berlin against extremism along with her ministers, to be followed by attending a vigil at Berlin’s iconic Brandenburg Gate, organised by the Central Council of Muslims in Germany under the banner “Let’s be there for each other, Terror: not in our names.” Merkel thanked the leaders of four-million-strong Muslim community for “quickly and clearly condemning the violence committed in the name of their faith.”45 Timely efforts by the Muslims of Germany and Merkel’s announcement seem to have had a calming effect on curbing the prospects of further unrest in the country. It was also not accidental to see media reports that revulsion with “Pegida’s xenophobic message” had sparked growing counter demonstrations and rallies, which helped to dwarf the anti-foreigner movement and “its regional clones.”46 The World Economic Forum in Davos 2015 also followed in close succession, where the U.S Secretary of State, John Kerry, made a statement on 13 January 2015 that extremists who are killing children and others in Iraq, Syria, Nigeria and other parts of the world may cite Islam as a justification, but the West should be careful about calling them “Islamic radicals.” He added that it would be a mistake to link Islam to criminal conduct that was rooted in “alienation, poverty, thrill-seeking and other factors ... The biggest error we could make would be to blame Muslims for crimes ... that their faith utterly rejects.” Kerry’s message resonated in fact what President Obama had earlier said in a September 2014 speech that “No religion condones the killing of innocents and the vast majority of the Islamic State’s victims have been Muslims.”47 Then also at the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington DC in the first week of February 2015, when Obama went on record to say: “Christians have been equally guilty of such atrocities. We are no better that Islamic State. Remember that during the Crusades, people committed terrible deeds in the name of Christ.”

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These are encouraging signs, indicative perhaps of a change of policy by Western leaders that could have beneficial effects. For juxtaposing Islam with terrorism, as had hitherto been the case in mainstream media, only had the effect of aligning the vast majority of peaceable Muslims with the terrorists – forcing some perhaps to take up common causes with them. There is now an acknowledgment that much of the Muslim unrest in Europe had been related to equality and anti- discrimination issues rather than religious provocations. If there were instances of religious unrest at the early stages of the cartoon episodes, that phase seems to have passed and European Muslims may be having fresh perspectives over issues, and have consequently become more proactive and quick to join hands with the anti-terrorist campaign. One can hardly think that anyone could soil Islam’s name so badly as the likes of ISIS, Boko Haram and Charlie Hebdo attackers. If there be enough realisation of this among the extremists, when they are convinced that they are doing more harm than good to the cause of their religion, “as Islamic leaders all over the world are already pointing out, their numbers will eventually diminish.”48 Scott Thompson who made this remark also observed that “the Paris terrorists are not to be taken as representatives of Islam. Thousands of Islamic groups and convocations have joined the outrage and made clear ... that such actions are contrary to the nature and central teachings of the Prophet.”49

Conclusion and Recommendations Our review of the concept and types of extremism in the Islamic sources was followed, in this article, by an examination of expert opinion and policy scenarios that offered insights on how to understand and address issues in their proper context. We also learned that terrorism is not confined by reference to geographical, religious or cultural divides. It is global in that no country or community is immune to the growing menace of global terrorism. Then it would follow that countries and communities need to join hands, design and plan common strategies and solutions to fight extremism and terror if the hope for a peaceful world were to become a realistic prospect. I conclude with the following recommendations: • When dealing with instances of violent extremism, states and security forces should avoid the trap of reacting to violence with greater violence. Should they respond in that manner, it would lead to a situation where the terrorists have won an even greater victory, for the whole country would then be in a state of constant fear. • Advocacy of public welfare, job creation, poverty eradication efforts, protection of the rights and dignity of all citizens and good governance may well be the main solutions to nullify the strongest magnet of extremism in

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the Muslim world. This is all the more important in pluralist societies where people of different persuasions need to stand together for the common good, advocate the values of moderation and take a common stand on combating extremism. • To defeat ISIS and not to see another emerge in its place, it is necessary to expose the mendacity of its ideas and enlist Muslims’ concerted effort to discredit the extremist interpretations of Islam. • We learn from the wisdom of the pioneers of Islam who declared their purpose so clearly when they named the Kharijites and the Ghulat extremists by these names. Our political leaders, scholars and ulama should emulate them by identifying and excommunicating the terrorists at an early stage and indeed every opportunity when they address their constituencies and audience. • Collective actions and strategies at national and international levels are called for to stem the injustice, corruption and sectarianism now rampant in much of the Arab world and Pakistan. With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is the most pervasive, the conflicting parties should recognise each other’s legitimate concerns - Palestine’s right to self- determination, return of the occupied lands, and cessation of Settlement building - and Israel’s concern for recognition and assurances of peace with its neighbours, and cessation of rocket fire. Without these and perhaps other confidence-building measures, no amount of negotiation is likely to bring lasting peace to the Middle East. • The Sunnis of Iraq should be enabled to carve out their own autonomous region and a share of the national oil wealth similar perhaps to that the Kurds of Iraq in the Kurdistan province. • Afghanistan’s peace efforts and on-going negotiations with the Taliban with China’s mediation should be encouraged to lead to the signing of a peace pact by the concerned parties. Pakistan’s constructive participation should also be encouraged with the hope that China’s presence will provide an assurance of Pakistan’s proactive policy stance for the future of peace in Afghanistan.

Needless to say that those who offend in the name of freedom of expression and do more of the same in the wake of painful incidents of provocation and violence, as in the case of the satirical Charlie Hebdo publishers printing millions of additional copies with offending depictions of Prophet Muhammad, they are certainly not helping the cause of peace or freedom. For if that is what freedom of expression must mean, then whoever advocates it is putting his credibility in question, and with it also the peace and security of his own community and people.

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They have a cause for reflection and should take note perhaps of what President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel did, which was to show sensitivity and concern not to inflame situations any further. To do otherwise benefits probably no one, but if one were to name a beneficiary, then it would most likely be the terrorists.

Notes * Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Founding CEO of IAIS Malaysia, graduated from Kabul University, and took his PhD in Islamic and Middle Eastern Law at the University of London in 1969. Professor Dr M. H. Kamali served as Professor of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM, 1985– 2007), then Dean of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC). He also held Visiting Professorships at McGill University’s Institute of Islamic Studies; Capital University, Ohio; and the Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin. A member of the Constitution Review Commission of Afghanistan (2003), he has provided expert legal consultation to the new constitutions of Iraq, the Maldives and Somalia. Eminent authority on Islamic legal studies, he has published over 170 academic articles and 35 texts, including standard textbooks at universities worldwide. He can be contacted at [email protected]. 1. In the context of the Air Asia Indonesia crash that killed all of its 162 passengers and crews on 28 December 2014, the black box data showed that in the final four minutes before the aircraft crashed into the sea, it had started climbing very steeply at the rate of over 1,800 meters per minute, which is far in excess of the 300 to 600 meters for passenger aircraft - only a fighter jet can climb at that speed. This was identified as the main cause of the crash. This may be said to be extremist behaviour in that situation, which is somewhat specialised and the relevant information is such that the layman would normally not know. It may also have been due to ignorance or an error of judgment on the part of the pilot. 2. Cf., Zainal Ujang, “High hopes on Farhan,” (Ujang, currently a fellow at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, U.K – wrote this comment in anticipation of a public lecture Farhan Nizami the Director of that Centre was due to deliver in Kuala Lumpur), Kuala Lumpur: New Straits Times, May 26, 2014, p. 17. 3. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi,“Min al-Ghuluww wa'l-Inhilal ila-Wasatiyyah wa'l-Iʿidal,” in Mu'assasah Aal al-Bayt al-Islami, Mustaqbal al-Islam fi'l-Qarn al-Hijri al-Thamin al-ʿAshr, Jordan: Amman, 1425/2004, pp. 303-4. 4. Ibid., p. 304. 5. Wahbah Al-Zuhaylī, “al-Tatarruf fi’l-Islam,” in Mu'assasah Aal al-Bayt al-Islami, Mustaqbal al-Islām fi'l-Qarn al-Hijri al-Khamis ʿAshr, Jordan: Amman, 1425/2004, p. 205. 6. The Murji’ah were divided into in two groups, one suspended passing any judgment on differences that arose among the Companions referring them to God’s judgment, and the second group, which held that God forgives all sins except disbelief (kufr) and that faith is not obliterated by sin. See for details al- Zuḥaylī in the previous note. See also Majid Fakhry, “Philosophy and Theology,” in John Esposito (ed.), The Oxford History of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 277ff.

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7. Al-Zuḥaylī, “al-Tatarruf fi’l-Islam,” 205. Hadi Abu Talib who also wrote on the subject of extremism (al-taṭarruf) in the same collection of essays where Zuḥaylī’s article appears, considers hasty pronouncements of infidelity and kufr by those who wrongfully lay this charge against others as a manifestations of religious extremism (al-taṭarruf al-dīnī). See for details ‘Abd al-Hadi Abu Talib, “al-Taṭarruf al-Dīnī wa Wasaṭiyyat al-Islām,” in Mu’assasah Aal al-Bayt, Mustaqbal al-Islām, pp. 185-6. 8. Cf., Muhammad ʿAbd al-Latif Al-Farfur, Al-Wasaṭiyyah fi’l-Islām, Amman: Dar al- Nafa'is, 1988, p. 94. 9. See for details Al-Farfur, al-Wasaṭiyyah fi’l-Islām, p. 94. 10. Al-Zuḥaylī, “al-Tatarruf fi’l-Islam,”, p. 208. 11. Thomas L. Friedman, “Defeating IS with moderation,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, March 2, 2015, p. 15. 12. Paridah Abd Samad, “The Muslim Dilemma in France,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 10, 2015, p. 14. 13. Thomas L. Friedman, “Defeating IS with moderation,” p. 15. 14. Ibid. 15. Bernard Cheah, “Why Malaysians willing to join IS,” Kuala Lumpur, The Sun, December 18, 2014, p. 2. 16. “Perlis mufti speaks his mind on IS,” Mohd Asri Zainal Abidin interviewed by with Choong Boon Siew, Kuala Lumpur, The Sun, March 18, 2015, p. 7. 17. Ibid. 18. Cf., Harun Yahya, “Getting Islam’s peaceful ethos across amidst terror,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 16, 2015, p. 17. 19. Muslim, Mukhtasar Sahih Muslim, ed. Muammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, K. al- Imarah, bab. man hamala ‘alayna al-silaha, hadith 1235. 20. This second hadith is narrated on the authority of Salamah ibn al-Akwa’ whereas the first on the authority of ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar. Both are reliable. 21. Muhyiddin al-Nawawi, Riyad al-Salihin, 2nd ed. by Muhammad Nasir al-Din al- Albani, Beirut: Dar al-Maktab al-Islami, 1418/1998, hadith 1527. 22. Quoted in Fareed Zakaria “Keep calm and carry on to effectively fight terror,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 24, p.16. 23. Sami Mahroum, “Charlie Hebdo and the anti-Muslim media factory,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 19, 2015, p. 17. 24. Ibid. 25. Fareed Zakaria, “US intervention is not the answer,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 19, 2015, p. 15. 26. Several Gallup polls post 9/11 confirm that one’s religious affiliation has little relevance to one’s view of violence. www.gallup.com/poll/157067/views-violence. aspx (accessed 23 March 2015). 27. Ibid. 28. Karen Armstrong: “There is nothing in the Islam that is more violent than Christianity,” interviewed by Lisette Thooft, http://www.nieuwwij.nl/english/karen-armstrong- nothing-islam-violent-christianity/ 18 January 2015 at p. 3 (accessed 19 March 2015). 29. Ibid, p.4. 30. Amnesty International, Escape from Hell: Torture and Sexual Slavery in Islamic State Captivity in Iraq, United Kingdom: Amnesty International Ltd., 2014. 31. Cf., Fareed Zakaria, “Keep calm and carry on to effectively fight terror,” Kuala

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Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 24, p. 16. 32. Cf., Farish Noor, “Radicalism’s pool of support,” Kuala Lumpur: New Straits Times, August 25, 2014, p. 12. 33. David Fromkin as quoted by Fareed Zakaria in “Denying Islamic State what it wants,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, February 7, 2015, p. 16. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Karen Armstrong: “There is nothing in the Islam,” p. 4. 37. Razali Ismail, “Moderation must be ubiquitous,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 7 2012, p. 28. 38. Karen Armstrong: “There is nothing in the Islam,” p. 3. 39. Ibid. 40. Paridah Abd Samad, “A president’s campaign Against the American ego,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, February 10, 2015, p. 15. 41. Ibid. 42. Cf., New Straits Times Editorial page on ‘Malaysia’s strategy for peace,’ Kuala Lumpur, November 28, 2012, p. 14. 43. Rabbi Mark L. Winer, “Fundamentalists vs. Moderates: The War within Judaism,” Arches Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 9 (Spring 2012), p. 117. 44. “Hollande: Muslims the victims,” AFP report carried in Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 16, 2015, p. 25. The present writer personally watched both leaders shown on BBC World Service evening news on 15 January 2015. 45. AFP report from Dresden, “Germany slams anti-Islamic March,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 14, 2015, p. 26. 46. Ibid. 47. Quoted in Paridah Abd Samad “A president’s campaign,” as in fn. 40 above, p. 15. 48. Scott Thompson, “Liberty’s 9/11,” Kuala Lumpur, New Straits Times, January 14, 2015, p. 17. 49. Ibid.

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW IN MALAYSIA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES** Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad*

First of all, I would like to correct a common mistake. Many people thought that Brunei has implemented hudud law. That is not correct. In fact, to this day, Brunei has yet to enforce that part of the Syari’ah Penal Code Order 2013 which contains hudud offences. Brunei has gazetted the law. The effective date has not been fixed yet. The most recent information I received from the Assistant Solicitor General of Brunei on 15th December, 2014 confirmed that thehudud law has not been enforced. In fact, the provisions of the Syari’ah Criminal Procedure Code necessary for the implementation are still under discussion. If we want to talk about criminal law and what is now called “Islamic criminal law”, in the Malaysian context, we have to start from the Federal Constitution. Criminal law is placed under federal jurisdiction. The Constitution does not define “criminal law”. However, the offences that had existed in the Penal Code at the time the Constitution was enacted, must necessarily be “criminal law”. If not, what else? The words “Islamic criminal law” are not used at all. What is provided is: “.... Creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List;” Note the conditions mentioned: 1. offences committed by persons professing the religion of Islam, 2. against precepts of that religion 3. except in regard to matters included in the Federal List;

Do not misunderstand and think that “criminal law” is under federal jurisdiction, while the “Islamic criminal law” is under the jurisdiction of the state. The Constitution only allows the State Legislature to enact laws for offences committed by persons professing the religion of Islam against the precepts of Islam, even then if it is not in respect of matters included in the Federal List, that is, “criminal law”. Apart from that, there are also restrictions, such as the provisions of the Syari’ah Court (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 (Act 355). To understand why the division of powers regarding criminal law and “offenses against the precepts of Islam” was made in such a way, we have to understand the situation in the Malay Peninsula at that time.

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Throughout the history of the Malay States, the Sultan was the Head of Islam in his State and matters concerning Islam were always under the authority of the Sultan and the State. Before Merdeka there was no “religion of the Federation”. In fact, the Malay Rulers objected to UMNO’s proposal to make Islam the official religion of the Federation. Maybe, the Rulers feared that their power as Head of Religion in their respective states would be undermined. Since the establishment of the Malayan Union and the Federation of Malaya, criminal law came under the Federal jurisdiction. Not only that, one of the Terms of References given to the Reid Commission was to create a strong federation. That is why, amongst others, external affairs, defence and internal security are placed under federal jurisdiction. Regarding law, Civil and criminal law and procedure and the administration of justice are placed under federal jurisdiction. Those laws (particularly criminal law) are general laws that involve public order and national security and the application of which is not limited to Muslims only or to the border of a state only. The implementation is supported by the Police Department, the Department of Prisons and the Civil Court whose jurisdiction covers the whole country. It should be remembered that, international agreements on cooperation in combating crimes such as Interpol are agreements between country and country. International law does not recognise a state like Kelantan. It recognises countries like Malaysia to become parties in the agreements. Extradition law also involves countries, not states. The State Legislature is given power to make law for the “creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List;” That is all. As far as I know, at that time, neither states nor groups had sent a memorandum to the Reid Commission proposing that criminal law be placed under State Governments. Although PAS was already in existence, PAS too did not think it that way at that time. In fact, In Kelantan, at that time, there was a group that wanted Kelantan to secede from Malaya. At the same time too, religious matters which fell under the jurisdiction of the states were limited to family law. In most states, there were no Syari’ah courts then. It was under those circumstances that provisions regarding criminal law and offences against precepts of Islam were enacted. Thus, criminal law is placed under federal jurisdiction. Since 7th January, 2014, I have spoken five times on the implementation of hudud in Malaysia. Let me reiterate the points that I have made.

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First, criminal law is under federal jurisdiction and offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against the precepts of Islam, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List, is under the jurisdiction of the state. Both the Federal Parliament and the State Legislative Assembly may not make law with regard to matters under the jurisdiction of the other. Second, offences that have existed in the Penal Code since 1936 and in force when the Federal Constitution was enacted, for example, causing of death to others, theft, robbery, rape and causing injury to other persons, necessarily fall within the words “criminal law” used by the drafters of the Constitution. If not, what else is “criminal law”? Further, if not, then all the trials of offences under the Penal Code in Civil Courts since Merdeka are unconstitutional, null and void. That is an unreasonable proposition. Third, among the hudud offences, there are “criminal law” offences provided for in the Penal Code while others are not. There are offences that have already been provided for in the Shari’ah Criminal Offences Enactments of the states. For example, adultery, accusing another person of committing adultery and offences associated with consumption of alcoholic drinks. It is arguable that such offences are not “criminal law”. Fourth, if hudud punishments were to be imposed for federal offenses, it can only be done as a federal law, that is, as “criminal law”, not as “offences relating to precepts of Islam” as provided in List II (State List), the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. There is no constitutional barrier for doing so. Parliament may choose whatever punishment for any criminal offence, including punishments in accordance with Shari’ah. The law would apply to Muslims and non-Muslims. As criminal law it is under the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Civil Court has jurisdiction over Muslims and non-Muslims. For the Malaysian Parliament to make such a law, no amendment of the Constitution is necessary and the bill need only be passed by a simple majority. This situation may be compared to the law on Islamic banking and finance and takaful. Fifth, it should be emphasised that the federal criminal law must apply to all Muslims and non-Muslims because it is a general and not a private law and offenses provided for in the State List. If it is made applicable only to Muslims, it contravenes the provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution because it is discriminatory on ground only of religion and therefore unconstitutional, null and void. Sixth, with regard to offenses that are not provided for in the Penal Code or any other federal law, but have already been provided for in the Syari’ah Criminal Law Enactment States, they may be made hudud offenses under state law if the existing obstacle is removed. The obstacle is not a constitutional obstacle but an

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW IN MALAYSIA 169 obstacle by federal law that limits the punishments that could be provided in the state law and given jurisdiction to the Syari’ah Court. That law is the Syari’ah Court (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, 1965. If the Federal Government is willing to amend the act to allow the State Legislature to impose hudud punishment, the State Legislative Assembly may make such a law. As the law is a state law under List II of the Ninth Schedule (State List) it applies only to Muslims and falls under the jurisdiction of the Syari’ah Court. There is no constitutional issue here. If we do that, the effect will be that some hudud offences would be a federal criminal law that applies to all Muslims and non-Muslims and tried by the Civil Court. Besides, there will also be hudud offences which are under the state law that only apply to Muslims and are administered by Syari’ah Court. Should we have such laws? I leave it to you to answer for yourself. Seventh, most people think that, because the offences are hudud offences and because Islam is under the jurisdiction of the state, the State Legislative Assembly may make such laws. At most, that view is only partly right. In Malaysia, any law made must be in compliance with the Federal Constitution. As I have mentioned earlier, some of the offenses are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government and Civil Courts. If the offences are made offenses under state law it is unconstitutional, null and void. If the State Legislative persists in doing so, its application will not cover non- Muslims. The reason is, the Constitution only empowers the State Legislative to make laws that apply to people who profess the religion of Islam. So if the State Legislature makes it applicable also to non-Muslims, the law is unconstitutional, null and void. Syari’ah Court has no jurisdiction over non-Muslims. If the State Legislative Assembly makes a law to empower the Syari’ah Court to try non- Muslims, the law is also unconstitutional, null and void. Eighth, we often hear people saying that such offences will only be made applicable to Muslims. It is only partly right. The reasons are: 1. with regard to federal criminal offenses, such offenses are not personal law or “offences relating to the precepts of Islam” as provided in the State List. It is a public law. That is why prosecution is done by the Public Prosecutor, on behalf of the country. 2. As I have said earlier, if the law imposing hudud punishments for criminal offences under federal jurisdiction applies to Muslims only, it is inconsistent with Article 8 of the Federal Constitution and, therefore unconstitutional, null and void.

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Syari’ah Criminal Code (II) Enactment 1993 (Kelantan) In my papers since 7th January 2014 I said that the Syari’ah Criminal Code (II), 1993 (Kelantan) is null and void because it is unconstitutional because it creates hudud offenses, including offenses which are under the federal jurisdiction, besides legislating on other federal criminal law offences. For offences which are within the jurisdiction of the State, it is also null and void because it conflicts with federal law, that is, the Syari’ah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965, mentioned earlier. On 2nd April 2014, the Kelantan Exco had decided to move a Private Bill in Parliament to seek Parliament’s for the State Legislature to make laws on matters that are within federal jurisdiction, as provided for by Article 76A(1) of Federal Constitution. In his press statement, the Menteri Baser, among others, reportedly said: “He said, most of the hudud and qisas offences such as theft, robbery, rape, causing injury and murder are within the jurisdiction of the federal government as provided in the Penal Code ...... ” From the statement, it appears that the State Government accepted my view that a part of the Kelantan Hudud Enactment was invalid because it violated the provisions of the Federal Constitution. Therefore, to solve it, they decided to seek Parliament’s approval for the State Legislative Assembly to legislate on such (federal) offences and impose hudud punishment for them. They rely on Article 76A(1) of the Federal Constitution. In the papers I had also tried to guess how Kelantan would find a way to solve the problems and the issues that may arise afterwards. This is what I said, assuming that Parliament permits and the State Legislative Assembly makes the law and provides hudud punishment for the offences, what is the legal position of the law? Does it remain as “criminal law” or does it become a law made under the State List? In my view, its nature remains as “criminal law”. I say this because: 1. From the beginning the offences are criminal law offences within federal jurisdiction. They are not included in the State List. That is why the state had to request permission under Article 76A(1). 2. Parliament does not amend the Constitution to place the offences under the State List. What Parliament does is only to permit the State Legislative Assembly to make law on the subject to be enforced in the state. The nature of the law does not change. I emphasise that in order to place it under the State List, it would require amendments to the Constitution and a majority of two thirds.

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If that is the case, what is the effect of such law? In my opinion: 1. It must be applicable to all, Muslims and non-Muslims because it is a federal criminal law and not a law made under the State List. Otherwise it is unconstitutional as it contravenes Article 8. 2. Which court has the jurisdiction to try such cases? The answer is, Civil Courts. The reason is, first, it is criminal law and not a law made under the State List. Second, the Civil Court has jurisdiction over Muslims and non- Muslims while Syari’ah Court only has jurisdiction over the Muslims.

The Syari’ah Criminal Code (II) (1993) 2015 Enactment On March 18, the bill was tabled in the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly and was subsequently passed. Looking at its contents, all the problems that I had mentioned in regard to the Syari’ah Criminal Code (II), 1993 (Kelantan) Enactment still exist. Apparently, the State Government’s strategy is to make the law first. Then it will try to get the approval of the Parliament under Article 76A (1). The question is, without the prior approval of Parliament, can the State Legislative Assembly make the law? In my opinion, no because at the date the State Legislative Assembly passed the bill, it had no jurisdiction to do so. Only when Parliament gives the permission that the State Legislative Assembly is vested with the jurisdiction to make the law. To me, the law is null and void for reasons similar to those that I gave for the Syari’ah Criminal Code (II), 1993 (Kelantan) Enactment. Briefly, the reasons are: 1. State Legislative Assembly makes the law as a law that is under the State List, while some of the offenses are “criminal law” under federal jurisdiction. To this day the Ninth Schedule is not amended to place the offences under the State List. 2. Parliament does not or has not given the permission to the State Legislative Assembly to make law with respect to such offenses. Even if subsequently, permission is given, it will not make the law a valid law, because when it was made, it was made without jurisdiction. 3. Even if Parliament gives the permission, the offences remain as criminal law under the jurisdiction of the civil courts and not offenses under the State List because the Ninth Schedule has not been amended to transfer such offenses from the Federal List to the State List. By reason of such offences remaining as criminal law, the law cannot be made applicable to Muslims only. It violates the provisions of Article 8 of the Federal Constitution.

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4. With regard to offences which are under the State List (such as adultery and drinking of intoxicating drink), the law violates the provisions of the Syari’ah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965. (Reasons 1 to 4 are also applicable to qisas and ta’zir offenses in the Bill. In other words, they are also void on the same grounds).

The Way out Within the framework of the Constitution that exists now, what can be done are: First Option a. the State Legislative Assembly may make law for offences under the State List (e.g. adultery, accusing a person of committing adultery and drinking intoxicating drink) and provide hudud punishments for them. But Parliament must first amend the Syari’ah Court (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 to allow the State Legislative Assembly to do so. The law is the law under the State List, applicable only to Muslims and administered by the Syari’ah Court. b. Besides implementing the First Option (a), the State Government may request the permission of Parliament under Article 76A(1) with regard to hudud offences under the federal jurisdiction (for example, causing death, theft, robbery) and also for qisas and ta’zir offences. If permission is granted, the State Legislative Assembly may make laws on them and provide hudud, qisas and ta'zir punishments for them. But the law is criminal law, applies to Muslims and Non-Muslims and is administered by the Civil Court.

Second option a. The first option (a) is implemented too. b. With regard to hudud offenses which are under federal jurisdiction (e.g. causing death, theft, robbery) and also for qisas and ta'zir offences, Federal Parliament may make law providing hudud, qisas and ta'zir punishments for them. It can be done by amending the Penal Code with a simple majority. The law is criminal law, applies to Muslims and non-Muslims and is administered by the Civil Court. If it is necessary for Syari’ah Judges to hear such cases, then people who are qualified to be Magistrates, Judges of the Sessions Court and Judges of the Superior Court, and also qualified in Syari’ah, if any, may be appointed to the posts. The options mentioned above do not involve amendment to the Constitution.

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It should be noted that, for the Second Option (b) the power lies with the Federal Government. Whether the Federal Government is willing to do it or not or able to do it or not, is another matter. Whether the first or the second option is chosen, it is not a satisfactory solution. From the legal and administrative perspective, it will create new problems that did not exist before. Do not blame the Constitution for it. The Constitution does not envisage such things. It clearly divides the jurisdiction over criminal law and jurisdiction over offences against the precepts of Islam. The problem arises when the State Government tries to take over the legislative power over criminal offences that lie under the Federal jurisdiction. That is the root cause of the problem.

Conclusion In this speech I do not comment on the detail provisions of the Enactment. I also do not discuss other options that would involve amendments to the Constitution. That is because each of these would require a separate paper. Insya Allah, if invited and if my health permits, I will do it. This Enactment, if implemented, would change the whole structure of criminal law in Malaysia. Actually, the state (Kelantan) is trying to take over the jurisdiction over criminal law from the federation, in the name of Islam. As a result, while in other states, criminal law is under federal jurisdiction, applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims and administered by the Civil Courts, in Kelantan part of it will be under the jurisdiction of the state, applicable only to Muslims and administered by the Syari’ah Court, while another part will remain under the federal jurisdiction, applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims and administered by the Civil Courts. Is that what the State and Federal Governments wish? It is a matter of policy for them to answer. In doing so, I hope they realise the full implications. With respect, on the issue of hudud, I find that there is a lot of confusion regarding the law and the implementation. We should be able to differentiate the discussion regarding the law and discussion regarding the implementation. What we are discussing now is the implementation. We are not questioning the law. To raise issues that should be considered in the implementation is not challenging the law. Caliph Umar Ibn Al-Kattab suspended the implementation of hudud during a famine. No one accused him of challenging hudud and challenging God’s law. He only decided that, in that situation, at that time, it was not suitable, indeed it would lead to injustice if the application of hudud were to be continued. So, he suspended its application. Remember, hudud is only a means, not the end. The end is justice.

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Something similar happened in Pakistan in our time. When the Hudood Ordinance was enacted in 1979, the offence of rape was made a hudud offence. Subsequently, there were cases of injustice to victims of rape who became pregnant as a result of it and who could not produce the required number of witnesses ending in being convicted of adultery. In 2006, the offence of rape was removed from the Hudood Ordinance and placed under the Penal Code again and tried by the Civil Court, until now. I am aware that my speech may disappoint many people. But, if you want to hear my honest opinion about the reality from the perspective of the Constitution and the law, that is it. Borrowing the words of Imam Abu Hanifah, "This is only my opinion. If there is a better argument follow it.” I would add, “If there is a better argument, I too will follow it.” I believe the question whether the Enactment is constitutional or not will eventually go to court. The court having jurisdiction to decide the issue is the Civil Court because it is a constitutional issue. I would like to see what the Federal Court says about it.

Thank you. [email protected] http://www.tunabdulhamid.my

Notes * Tun Abdul Hamid Bin Haji Mohamad read law at the University of Singapore (LL.B (Hons)) in 1969. He was appointed as the Chief Justice of Malaysia in 2007 and retired in 2008. He is still active as Chairman of the Law Harmonising Committee of Bank Negara Malaysia, and a member of the Shari’ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara and the Securities Commission, he is also a member of the Judicial Appointments Commission. He can be contacted at tunabdulhamid@ gmail.com and http://www.tunabdulhamid.my. ** This paper was presented as keynote address at Seminar on Implementation of Hudud in Malaysia - History and the Future organised by Department of Syari'ah Faculty of Islamic Studies, UKM and Tuanku Mizan Zainal Abidin Mosque, Putrajaya on 1st April 2015.

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL GLOBALISATION AND MUSLIM MINORITIES: INTEGRATION AND IDENTITY DIALECTICS IN THE WEST Asif Mohiuddin*

Abstract: In much of the popular literature, globalisation is frequently associated with an increasing economic integration. However, from the perspective of Muslim minorities, globalisation has led to phenomenal changes in the processes of integration and identity construction that have resulted in a flourishing of composite discourses and narratives on integration and identity. This paper explores the issues related to Muslim minorities in the context of globalisation. While examining the issues related to Muslim immigration and integration, it attempts to understand how far the policies of immigration and integration have bolstered insecurity and exclusion within the multicultural societies in the West. Furthermore, this paper analyses the emergence of multiple identities among Muslim minority groups in response to discriminatory policies and practices. Finally, in order to situate the Muslim minorities in an endless pursuit of developing an open, free and diverse political community, the paper focuses on a meaningful dialogue that attempts to promote inclusion within the society.

Keywords: Globalisation, Muslim minorities, identity, policies, immigrants and multiculturalism.

Introduction Among the most fascinating issues at the turn of the twenty-first century one of particular importance is the phenomenon of globalisation.1 Globalisation or in its most literal sense, the international integration, is not new, though. For centuries, people – and later institutions – have interacted with each other through cross- border processes such as inter-regional trade, population migration, and the technological dissemination. In the present era, globalisation is indeed one of the hotly contested concepts.2 For some theorists, it has lead to dramatic changes in the structure of national and international markets. According to one line of argument, globalisation ushers in the concepts of freedom, peace and democracy. Some authors present globalisation as beneficial, generating economic development, democratic liberalisation and a new era in the development of civilisation. Critics point out that neoliberal policies have created widest economic disparities between the people. In addition, they see globalisation as an inexorable force that undermines democratic values and cultural homogenisation.3 The rise in a global interdependence and the compression of space and time have led to what should be called an age of uncertainty. This can be said to have started

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL 176 ASIF MOHIUDDIN with the dissolution of the Soviet Union that produced a spectacular flow-on effect all over the world. Among many other factors, it triggered the transformation of entire world political state of affairs and alliances across the world. While the impact of the phenomenon should not be exaggerated, it is clear that most of the world is facing immigration on an unprecedented scale. At the same time, on the one hand, the rise in global migration is seen as a threat to identity.4 On the other hand, the racialised framings on the current migrations are producing an intense backlash in many countries across the globe. The complexity of the situation has promoted insecurities, and skepticism among Western citizens. In response, they have developed an acute alertness to the movement of people and their cultural beliefs. The expressions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural, and even racial hatred, have intensified racism in many Western societies at the same time as many minority populations, in particular Muslims, have been targeted.5 In the recent years, the issue of minority rights has become very prominent. In the same vein, the claims for separate identities based on religion, ethnicity or tradition have also become very evident. The phenomenon of globalisation in the context of immigration has defined the world in terms of insecurity, fear, and terror. Due to the underlying impact of September 11, the structure of nations, ethnic groups, and religions has been radically transformed.6 The situation of Muslim minorities in the West is not altogether very different, but it presents a complex view in terms of future developments. The Muslim minority status in multicultural societies has led Muslims living in the West in different directions. One of the directions is conceived as defensive and centered on the cultural reflex of self-protection and the sense of belonging vis-à-vis the surrounding ambience. The second reflects on the deeper understanding of what it means to be a Muslim in a non-Muslim majority country. The two attitudes are not necessarily incompatible, but they broadly give way to profoundly divergent outcomes. The first one seems quite unavoidable in a sense that the inherent characteristic of survival cannot be sidestepped. Any legitimate identity functions independently of exclusive forces. However, the sense of alienation can also engender feelings of intense seclusion that might end up denying the positive values and human virtues of others. Therefore, the issue demands serious reflection on how to ascertain the appropriate balance between particularity and cultural variance on the one hand, and universality and human state on the other. Given the problem stated above, this paper attempts to analyse the issues related to Muslim minorities with a view to position them towards a dialogical path that is generous, respectful and inclusive.

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Immigration of Muslims into Europe and America The rapid movement of populations is one of the most consequential developments in the contemporary era of globalisation. In particular, the rapid settlement of Muslim communities into the Western societies has raised many questions about the alteration of culture and its impact on identity. For Chamsy el-Ojeili and Patrick Hayden, migration changes the structure of community and brings cultural transformation and dislocation. Accordingly the superior culture impinges on smaller traditions and alters them. Therefore, the issue of immigration raises many questions regarding the protection of cultural diversity in these societies. It is striking to observe that the framework of analysis of Islam in all Western societies is closely associated with the immigration debate. Immigration remains the top issue in terms of its importance within the broader context of Muslims in the West.7 Studies on Muslim immigration to Europe and America have revealed a number of interesting facts. In order to cope with temporary labor shortages and a chronic demographic crisis, the main motivation behind global migrations is the non-accessibility to certain cultural and informational resources in the countries of origin.8 Richard T. Antoun contends that most of the works on migration focus on labor migration and on the economic and social implications of migration. Little attention has been given to international migration for education.9 Generally, students migrate in pursuit of seeking education to gain extraordinary skills in more developed educational institutions. Apart from that, migration has united people of different ethnicities and historical backgrounds possessing a common immigrant origin. For example, in the case of France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the majority of immigrants are from Morocco. Muslims of Turkish descent constitute 70% of the total population of Germany. In the United Kingdom, most of the Muslims are from South Asian countries and majority of Muslims in Greece are from Abania.10 Muslims in the United States of America are the most racially diverse religious groups. Islam acts as a unifying force among Muslim groups and each of them expresses it differently.11 As a result of their class predicament, most Muslims tend to be economically and politically marginalised. Similarly the rates of employment are quite low in several European countries including Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands.12 After the economic crisis of the early 1970s, immigration in Europe became a legal and security issue and created a conflict between those who wanted to maximise immigration control sovereignty and state actors that defended immigrant rights. Following the dramatic loss of state control, EU member states cooperated on immigration policy and other political issues.13

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The arrival of increasing numbers of extra-regional immigrants created a lot of skepticism concerning terrorism and radical extremism. These changes even forced countries such as Netherlands and Germany to restrict further influx of foreigners. The foreigners’ law in Germany disclosed the reformation of policies based on an active integration framework. French political stakeholders, in response to the gradual increase of Muslim population, called for a ‘selective immigration’ (immigration choisie), and paid less attention to ‘imposed’ immigration (immigration subie). ‘Imposed’ immigration necessitated a reduction of asylum seekers and family reunification, and ‘selective’ migration focused on non-EU workers.14 In Sweden, the increasing flow of refugees prompted the government to acknowledge the larger labor migrant category for a gentle and humane immigration policy towards family reunification.15 In Britain, the British Nationality Act (1948) gave rights of settlement and citizenship to citizens of former colonies in the United Kingdom. The largest group of British Muslims today is predominantly from Pakistan (residing in north- central England, a region known for the production of textiles), Bangladesh and India.16 With regard to the fact that neither Canada nor the United States had any colonial interests in the beginning, the nature of immigration into North America as opposed to Europe has been quite distinct. Regardless of whether minorities had political citizenship, they were not considered full and equal citizens and were excluded from the national conversation. Even with liberal immigration policies, Canada and the United States have also regarded immigrants as outsiders. However, Canada has nurtured a majority political culture in which new immigrants are required to enter into the political nationality as equal citizens. Compared to the Native Americans, immigrants have been given small security benefits.17 In short, the immigration policies adopted by various citizenship regimes across Europe and America appear to be increasingly subversive as reflected through stricter immigration policies.

Muslim Integration and the Policies of Exclusion The Muslim minority integration is one of the most overarching issues in the immigration debate in Europe and America. Western policymakers are attempting to develop minority policies and services that respond to individuals and are relevant to their communities. The complexity of ways in which these issues are addressed reveals both the multifaceted goals of governments and the dilemmas they confront when they seek to assimilate new groups into their societies.18 The visibility of Muslim communities and the demographic changes have aggravated public anxieties about immigration of people. Furthermore, the unwillingness of Muslim minorities to integrate has projected them as a security threat to the

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL GLOBALISATION AND MUSLIM MINORITIES 179 existing political structures in the West. In response to this situation, Western political establishments have developed more restrained policies towards Muslims as a religious minority. Research suggests that the number of Muslims in Europe has grown from 29.6 million in 1990 to 44.1 million in 2010. Pew forum on religion and public life estimates that by 2030, Muslims will number around 8 percent of Europe’s population.19 The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) has published surveys estimating the Muslim population at 6–7 million in the United States.20 For many Europeans and Americans, the concerns related to the growth of Muslim populations, security fears and identity issues, have united to form an impression that Muslims are politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable and theologically alien. Throughout history, the policies of integration adopted by many Western nations have been based on the idea of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, for Modood, constitutes a two-way process of integration but it is taken to work differently for different groups. This is because each group is distinct, and thus integration cannot consist of a single process. The ‘culturalism’ refers to the understanding that the groups in question are likely not just to be marked by newness or socio-economic context but by certain forms of group identities.21 Multiculturalism recognises groups and people at the level of identities, ethnicities, and religion, including diasporic associations and political actions. This means that multiculturalism fosters different plans for accommodating minorities into specific societies. As the number of immigrants continued to rise, the multicultural policy underwent transformation. Subsequently, the approaches towards integration also changed dramatically. The multicultural approach towards integrating minorities in the United Kingdom was similar to that of the Netherlands. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid and London (7/7 and 21/7), the legal system in the United Kingdom made Muslims more vulnerable in a sense that the discrimination exacerbated against them with forms of colour racism and cultural racism.22 The criticism against the multicultural model escalated following the London terrorist attacks in 2005, and impelled people to question the very possibility of cultural difference and the imposition of an ideal British citizenship. In the Netherlands, Muslims and their religious identity values were devalued by large parts of the majority.23 In the beginning, multiculturalism was the explicit policy of the Dutch government and much of the state policy was thus oriented towards assisting minorities with difficulties in education and in the labor market. But in the light of present integration policy, the growing assumption is that the unwise application of multicultural policies was merely to confirm to the notion of political correctness. In this context, the Dutch government enacted laws which emphasised the adoption of Dutch culture and assimilation to a common set of values.

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In Germany, there are over three million Muslims, which makes them close to three percent of the total population of 82 million.24 The new citizenship law enacted in 2000 appears to be more inclusionary, although still limited, in the sense that it provides German citizens of migrant origin with opportunities in civil, social, political, cultural and economic rights. However, the general requirement of having to renounce one’s former nationality continues to prevent some Muslim minority communities, including the German-Turks, from integrating.25 It has become a requirement for immigrants to participate in integration courses where they are required to obtain general knowledge on Germany, the state system, and the German language. Governments have sought to restrict practices comprehended as opposing national or liberal democratic principles and norms, especially those that condone violence and undermine gender equality. For instance, in Denmark, it is a necessary prerequisite to sign a document that necessitates mutual respect and tolerance for individual freedoms and gender equality. The oppressive policies related to religious headwear for women have proved very factious. In France, the immigrants are required actively to take on the French culture, including the French language, and participate in political life. In this regard, immigrants become part of the French nation as individuals, not as groups having a common ethnicity or religion.26 The imposition of stricter laws banning burqa and other forms of face covering in public had the most far-reaching impact on Muslim integration. On April 11, 2011, France implemented a law that banned wearing any form of face coverings in public. The implementation was seen to ensure the promotion of public order and secularism. However, in implementing this law many basic and fundamental rights have been restricted. In terms of being a member state of the European Union, France does not possess any legal authority to implement laws banning religious freedom but it is also subject to the minimum criteria of equality and human rights as stated in the European Convention on Human Rights.27 As Gerhard van der Schyff and Adriaan Overbeeke point out: Article 9(1) ECHR guarantees everyone the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in public and private, while Article 9(2) provides that any interference with such protection must be prescribed by law, be in the pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary in a democratic society in order to be justified.28 In order to justify the interference, the state must ensure that the interference is legal and directed at a legitimate aim. On the contrary, the European Court of Human Rights has been castigated for rejecting “neutral” laws of general applicability as evidences for interference, because in doing so, it arguably ignores the immanent experience of the plaintiff. Moreover, the court defends mainstream religions over minorities by acknowledging the non-applicability of neutral laws that might cause interference. In short, Article 9 of the European Convention

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL GLOBALISATION AND MUSLIM MINORITIES 181 on Human Rights presents a compelling debate on diversity of interpretation. Despite the growing skepticism, the court is willing to determine a legitimate aim on the basis of any legal argument that contributes to a public good. However, the court’s strict position on neutral laws and the margin of appreciation leave significant opportunity for governments to discriminate against minorities. For countries like the United States and Canada, the uniqueness of the minorities is the most remarkable feature that has been recognised. Canada, for example stresses the protection and enhancement of ethnic diversity. To incorporate all the ethnic groups, Canadians focus on civic assimilation and ethnic identities. Furthermore, Canada has adopted multiculturalism as a state policy, giving due importance to ethnic cultural diversity, towards integrating minorities.29 Despite the restricted policies, the Muslim minority communities have reacted with resilience, political advocacy and profound intellectual and psychological activism. While protecting the unity of the American social and legal establishments, Muslims minorities are trying to combat discrimination and xenophobia through extensive social and political networks. From a historical point of view, Muslims in North America constitute the most diverse population, representing most of the races and ethnic groups present in the world today. Furthermore, they speak many languages and endorse a variety of social, ideological and educational viewpoints. The unprecedented and exponential growth of Muslim minority community has been quite striking. Unlike the United Kingdom, America has witnessed the immigration of middle-class professionals, educated Muslims from the Middle-East and South-Asia.30 The European countries, on the other hand, have witnessed the influx of poor and non-professional Muslims. The Socio-economic context in turn has situated the American Muslims in a better position of synthesising western culture with immigrant culture, and structured the probability of an innovative form of integration that is seen to protect the cultural heritage and their religious values.31 Among the Muslim minorities, the higher level of education and economic prosperity are the indicators of successful integration. Contrary to the general public, fewer Muslim Americans have finished their graduate school and more than one-fifth of U.S Muslims are studying in graduate colleges. With regard to financial rewards, Muslim Americans have mixed feelings. In the case of immigrant Muslims, the financial situation is better than that of the native born Muslims and in contrast with the general public, a smaller percentage of Muslims is employed full-time.32 In recent years, various Muslim public affairs groups have subsequently emerged in support of Muslims against discrimination and are voicing their concern for them in the public arena.33 Following 9/11, there has been a marked increase in the social and dialogical activism of Muslim organisations, focusing on providing direct services, opinions, and

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 182 ASIF MOHIUDDIN developing institutional networks. Although, there is scanty evidence related to the existence of coordination between the immigrant and non-immigrant groups, the prominence of an inter-organisational dialogue between these two distinct communities reveals a different perspective on this issue. The diversity exists within the Muslim communities on the basis of racial and ethnic group characteristics, socio-economic context, citizenship, and identity. In the same vein, feelings of inclusion vary by ethnic and racial identity within the group. For example, African-American Muslims are more dissatisfied than Arabs and South-Asian Muslims. They presume as if the existing socio-political scene is hostile, dangerous and against their religious beliefs. In addition, with respect to social media issues, South Asian Muslims are better projected than Arabs. The American connections to the various nations vary enormously and owing to the weak and less problematic connections to South-Asia, Americans have been very comfortable in establishing dynamic social and cultural relations with them. In other words, unlike the Middle Eastern countries, the non-existence of politically charged relations with South-Asia is one of the reasons behind the stability of this relationship.34 On the other hand, racial or ethnic divisions reflect a diversity of factors, including the immigrant assimilation and exceptional social-economic status of South-Asians and the marginalised status of African-Americans. In many ways these factors demonstrate a distinct pattern of identities that emerge through the interaction between religious and political groups. They also indicate that the Muslim subjectivity may be different in contrast to indigenous values. During the past twenty years in America, there has been a proliferation of state legislation that challenges the limited role of state in the promotion of religious expression. Lori Beaman, regarding the acrimonious relationship between church and state, argues: …While the United States has a clear separation of church and state in its Constitution, an examination of cultural symbols reveals that church and state are intertwined to the extent that politicians frequently invoke the name of god to assist in state matters. The relationship between church and state is not solely a matter of internal law and politics, however. Church-state relations are influenced by, and themselves influence, global forces which may take the shape of international human rights declarations, the activism of internationally organised groups, or broader cultural vectors such as events that work to create a culture of fear or which demarcate a social phenomenon as a cause for concern.35

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The relationship between church and state must be analysed in terms of state- level legislative developments that influence the activities of religious groups within the state. However from the above discussion, it can be clearly discerned that there is a huge contradiction between what is stated in law and the ways in which the laws are enforced. This postulates the exposition of religious symbols and the constitutional framework around religion. The results show that the legislation is largely a product of the evangelical Christian movement, which stresses the inclusion of religion, and in particular, a fundamentalist group, as an important component of governance. In some Western nations, population stability depends on immigrants who usually come from racially and ethnically diverse societies. Since the religious texture is different and changing, the state needs to counter different religious groups and defining voices that are necessary to be recognised with an aim of integrating people. The transformation of civic engagement among Muslims is also an indication of successful integration. Certain organisations have emerged for providing services and representing Muslims on political issues from time to time. From their inception, these groups were typically service oriented, providing information and religious education up to a certain level. During the 1960s these organisations started political advocacy and provided a platform for unity. In this manner, political advocacy became an inalienable part of associational life in the United States of America.36 The role played by several governmental agencies in identifying advocacy organisations in order to securitise the state against any illegal activity, has given a particular identity to Muslims. For this purpose, the US Department of justice organised many programmes and meetings, addressing issues related to terrorism and civil society. In America, the largest component of civil society is represented by religious institutions, hospitals, schools, cultural centers. Historically, these institutions have played a significant role in engaging people from different ethnicities and backgrounds. It is estimated that more than half of volunteer activity in the United States is undertaken in religious settings. Further, a wide majority of Americans are associated with religious organisations, performing important functions such as maintaining stable relations between the state and its ethnic minorities. Such institutions have a huge impact on civil society integration and the American political structures and it is through these associations that people participate in politics, organise meetings and elect governing boards. The representation of Muslims in some countries is undermined by the problems that arise in demarcating Muslim minorities beyond their ethnic complexities. On the political level, the fragmented identities necessitate a dialogical adhesion between political establishments and religious communities. Moreover, the fragmented identities create competitive atmosphere among various associations

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 184 ASIF MOHIUDDIN and try to influence Muslim communities. In the United States, the problems of political representation do not exist but still ethnic–based communities promote division among the Muslim minorities.37 Since the US immigration policy was influenced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US government took strict action against non-citizens suspected of terrorism. With a view to empower the Department of Justice, the Patriot Act was signed into law by the American President in October 2001.38 Similarly, the Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR), was legislated to improve the enforcement of immigration laws by applying stricter penalties on those who violate the law.39 In response, the Muslim stakeholders maintained that these policies systematically create oppressed nationalities; intense hatred and exclusion within the society. In addition, the violation of civil liberties by the media and legal organisations made Muslims more vulnerable to the physical abuses and social discrimination. Muslim minorities in America were projected as inassimilable even though a majority of them supported the adoption of American cultural values. Overall, after 9/11, the American Muslim experience changed exceptionally and in contemporary times, America is witnessing a declining power of religious structures, and rising anti- Muslim sentiment. All these factors have excluded Muslims from mainstream political and social life.

Muslim Identities in the West In the era of globalisation and insecurity, the capitalist world-view has imposed a certain form of cultural homogeneity, challenging the existence of the already surviving cultures. Consequently, this has further led to the emergence of contested identities among individuals on the basis of ethnicity, religion and race. Similarly, the global western culture has radically marginalised the individual cultures that promote distinct identities. In contemporary times, Islam is seen as such a contested macro social identity globally.40 In the words of Jocelyne Cesari: Globalisation is a cultural process that favours the development of non- territorialized cultures and communities based on race, gender, religion, or even lifestyle. In this respect, Islam is a powerful element in identity formation, weaving together solidarity between various groups that are separated by the constraints of diverse nations, countries and cultures.41

In recent times, the transnationality of Islam has attracted a lot of attention in different parts of the world. The transnational networks in the form of diasporic communities along with the revivalist movements emphasise the existence of

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL GLOBALISATION AND MUSLIM MINORITIES 185 a global nexus between Muslims living in various parts of the world. These networks include professionals, religious leaders and intellectuals who develop connections and identities that exceed national circumferences. Thus the adaptation of Islam to the new environment reveals a complex perspective in relation to the identification with global forms of Islam and national cultures. In the post-September 11 context Islam has been projected as a threat to international security and peace. This reflects the existence of an essentialist approach in response to the confrontational situation created by the host societies in the form of exclusive policy framework. At the core of this conflict, it must be stated that the historical relationship between the Muslim World and Europe is a history filled with confrontation, appreciation, and a host of conflicting narratives. The stereotypical representation of Muslims has been crystallised through specific historical events such as violence, heresy and brutality. This perception has given rise to a discourse that presents Islam as an impediment to the world’s progress towards peace and modernisation. Therefore, the minorities especially Muslims are forced to integrate at the expense of their cultural values. The idea that Islam is a serious threat to the internal security is further reinforced by the application of essentialist approaches towards minority integration. From the perspective of representation of Muslims, they are seen to act within the interstitial space between representation and the real existence of the community.42 Thus, the paradoxical status quo has obscured the relationship between the dominated and the dominating, giving rise to three possible settings: acceptance, avoidance, or resistance.43 Acceptance implies the acknowledgement of a dominant discourse. This connotes either the acceptance of cultural values and mutually acceptable choices, or the intricate complexity of agreement to disagree. Through the process of dialogue and debate it further stresses the obliteration of fear and uncertainty. A strategy of acceptance gives least importance to ethnic, religious or other identities. However, what is emphasised in empirical terms are similarities and acceptance and tolerance for Muslims and non-Muslims alike and practical solutions to real and formidable threats. It is through this process that the policies of exclusion and discrimination can be challenged in a more robust manner. Avoidance evokes a response of withdrawal from the social context and sees the socio-political environment as hostile and intolerant towards minorities. This identity perspective emphasises the removal of oneself and staying away from the public domain as much as possible. Resistance regards socio-political context as confrontational and refuses to acknowledge the status given by the majority. There also exist other forms of resistance that are centered on positive commitment to religion and progress. Muslim identity is influenced by a variety of factors including the national context, the status of different religions, the framework of acquiring nationality, and the acceptance

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 186 ASIF MOHIUDDIN and application of multiculturalism in different societies. In this way, the Muslim identities emerge in response to the dominant political and cultural discourses. In the secular context, ethnicity is seen as a more peripheral way of framing subjectivity which involves identifying oneself in terms of one’s attachment to a place. Religious identity, on the other hand, denotes a form of global identity which is not affected by national boundaries.44 The separation between the two has become very prominent in the multicultural societies and now Muslims define themselves in relation to the specific secularised context which is detached from the ethnic or racial identification. The process of globalisation which stimulates the movement of ideas and concepts beyond nation states has enormously impacted the religious identity of Muslims. The ways in which Muslims become aware of other Muslims and their experiences have nurtured a different sort of global identity among them. Since globalisation has already increased communication between people in all parts of the globe, it has led to the formation of Muslim transnational solidarity. Consequently, due to the intensified migration, Muslims living in the West are facing numerous challenges regarding traditional identities and cultural affiliations. To address these problems, they try to affirm their identities on the basis of faith. As Melanie Reddig states: Identity affirmation is achieved by defining the meaning of being a Muslim and identifying with the global Muslim community. Migrants who have lost their social and cultural connection to the country of origin tend to favour a concept of Muslim identity which defines Islam independently of a particular cultural setting.45 The argument offered here is further substantiated by the experiences of second and third generation Muslims in the West, who see themselves excluded from the cultural roots of their parents. These Muslims experience a serious identity crisis and in order to resolve it they turn to Islam for religious and social security. Although the religious values and practices differ considerably between Muslim societies, the existence of different cultural ethos can cause problems in ascertaining the form of religious identity that can remove uncertainty resulting from the process of globalisation. Due to the inevitable fear of losing Muslim identity, independence and values in the context of western dominated globalisation, the Muslims focus on establishing a clear form of identity that protects their religious and cultural values. At the same time, culture forms an important part of the religious identity. Therefore the issue of Muslim identity can’t be separated from its historical and cultural context. In this respect, Muslim identity becomes indistinguishable from the secular identity.46 Masud observes that the religious activists among Muslims are propagating education to strengthen their religious identities. By contrast,

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL GLOBALISATION AND MUSLIM MINORITIES 187 some consider this development as an aspect of Islamic revivalism. Eickelman regards this as a modern development which exists independently of old forms of religious understandings.47 In Great Britain, the call for separate religious schools provoked a dramatic response from the British government. The Swann report (1981), analysed the issue from three different angles; cultural pluralism, multiculturalism and cultural relativism. The report concluded that the existence of separate schools will harm and isolate the Muslims from the mainstream society. Because of viewing religion as an entity that must not have any political manifestation, the Swann report saw religious education as a matter of ethnicity and cultural identity. Likewise, in the Netherlands, the question of religious education was taken seriously by the church. The Christian schools formulated a policy for education and introduced certain conditions. The non-acceptance of conditions from the Muslim side further made policymakers to deliberate on the issue and finally they came up with a new policy initiative in the form of a paper that discussed the issue from three perspectives. The paper preferred the second approach that was based on admitting Muslim children only if there is a dialogical understanding between the two. The third approach stressed ethnic and cultural identity, permitting Islamic education only if it was culturally oriented. Ultimately, Muslims focused on establishing independent Islamic schools.48 Thus, from the above discussion, it becomes clear that religious identity is a dynamic entity that influences the personal and collective lives of the people. The preservation of cultural identity from a theological point of view was the main objective behind the establishment of independent schools for Muslim children. As a result, the acculturation process became more influential in the creation of subcultures among Muslim minority groups in the West. In the examination of subcultures, Olivier Roy identifies tensions between five levels of identity among Muslims in Europe: 1. The transposition of a robust solidarity group based on a geographical setting. 2. A larger group or national identity, based on a common language and culture. 3. A new definition of Muslims centered on neo-ethnic relations irrespective of language and literature. 4. An innovative definition of a Muslim identity based on religious understanding, excluding culture and language. 5. The adoption of culture along Western lines and relegating faith to a subordinate position, leading to the creation of a Western subculture that is usually identified as an ethnically described category having little to do with the hereditary culture.

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The analysis of the above stated dynamic levels reveals the absence of Muslim cultural ethos in relation to ethnic national culture and religion. It demonstrates the effectiveness of the solidarity of a native group which provides the motivation for emigration. In Britain, the phenomenon is more prominent than in France. The citizenship regimes also shape the identities of migrants in a manner that immigrants are forced to adopt the host culture and external beliefs and rituals. In this way, the traditional-solidarity groups are more affected by the Western acculturation processes that result in their transformation and reconstruction. Cultures see transformation when people migrate to other places and when they confront other cultures, the minority identities are reduced to ethnic identities and at that point of time the ethnic culture undergoes further transformation. Hence, the global Muslim identity functions independent of any particular culture and through the process of deculturation, the universal religions lose their social authority.49 The arrival of immigrants along with their ethnic cultures in America triggered the emergence of a unique form of identity that was manifested through language, religion, music and certain family patterns. In the aboriginal countries there was no conflict between the contested patterns of identities. But, in the host countries these levels sometimes contradicted with one another. Since, subjectivity wasn’t able to address the questions related to the higher group, the citizenship regimes in the West attempted to strengthen the process of acculturation by restructuring and reinventing the collective identities.

From the beginning, the American establishment formulated new policies and tried to address issues related to Muslim minorities. In 1960s, the new immigration policy recognised and preferred professionals and in this way many Muslims emigrated and became an important part of a well established American middle- class. As the immigrants arrived in increasing numbers, they started to establish Muslim institutions especially the community centers. Islamic organisations became more visible in addressing issues and establishing amicable relations with other communities. About three million Arabic speaking people constitute about one percent of the American population. This Arab community exhibits diversity in terms of its religious, ethnic, tribal and national identities. In response to these policies, Arab-Americans themselves fashioned their identities through the experiences, places of settlement, dialogical understanding, and the diversity of the community. The prejudice and intense hatred towards Muslims has been also quite influential in shaping the identities of people.50 The establishment of the Arab-American institute in 1985 urged Muslims to take active part in civic life and politics.51 In addition, the institute stressed creating a sense of national identity and further encouraged people to adopt American values. The council

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL GLOBALISATION AND MUSLIM MINORITIES 189 on American-Islamic relations (founded in 1994 to protect civil liberties of Muslims) attempted to promote justice and clarified the position of Muslims on numerous important issues. In America, the new immigrants came with a distinctive mindset and tried to negotiate their identities in a typical uncongenial ambience. While the parents wanted to keep their children within the traditional environment, the children followed a different trajectory that identified them with the growing alienation of Muslims. The Americans, on the other hand, demanded answers from Muslims regarding American values, traditions and their identity as American citizens. The complexity of identifying themselves as Americans and Muslims made many young Muslims experience hatred and discrimination.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations Historically, the settling of immigrants and their arrival in the Western societies increasingly challenged the policies of integration and assimilation. This was the era in which the politics of essentialism emerged as regimes and cultures responded to the long-term presence of minorities and struggled with racist and antiracist forces. Further, this lead to the emergence of an intricate psychology of insecurity among minorities and in response to this state of affairs, different identity strategies were adopted by them. The strategic responses to insecurity in the form of essentialism and retreatism were perceived as reactive in a manner that the existence of foreigners was regarded as a security threat. In multicultural societies a sense of alienation was nurtured through intensified checks and security measures forcing minorities to rethink their economic, social and political lives in their societies. In her analysis of citizenship’s exclusions in the United States, Kristen Hill Maher states that the policies towards minorities often fail to uphold the criteria stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The violations have been clearly documented by the Human rights organisations. The violation of labor rights, the failure of state intervention and the use of threats in order to preempt organised demands are ample evidences regarding the prevalence of injustice in these societies. Current policies related to deportation, detention and asylum procedures, have further violated rights. While analysing these policies, it can be stated that the political culture in these societies subordinates the universal brotherhood to citizenship as a basis for rights.52 In other words, the violations and vulnerabilities of rights in the context of the inimical acts and policies, illustrate the existence of a cultural logic that regards human rights as entitlements exclusive to citizens. Such policy initiatives have forced minorities to take either a retreatist or essentialist position as responses to insecurity. These positions can be avoided

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 190 ASIF MOHIUDDIN if both structural and psychological factors are addressed. This can be achieved by analysing the lived experiences of people and how such experiences are redacted in relation to the socio-economic and political settings in society. Thus automatically people can utilise the resources by challenging the status quo and getting dialogically involved with other community members. In addition, the dialogical perspective gives equal advantage to dominant voices by contextualising the rights given to the dominant group. Hence these rights are to be examined within the framework of the Western metanarratives and as such they act as analytical tools in the understanding of other complex phenomena. The majority and minority community members can thus exceed their limitations through a sustained process of dialogue.53 But the current status quo offers little prospect for the achievement of a universal human community. At the same time, globalisation obliterates the communitarian linkages through segregated groupings. Therefore, no alternative seems adequate in the context of globalisation. Finally it would be appropriate to conclude with the following policy recommendations, which would emphasise the establishment of a viable and tolerant political community: • The host communities must show a stronger commitment to a pluralistic cosmopolitical order in which people of all faiths and communities must contribute and continuously engage in a dialogical process that emphasises the politics of inclusion with renewed multicultural potentialities. • The dialogical process necessitates the openness of agents to the possibility of transformation. • The dialogical engagement entails the acceptance of distances and differences; self and other: the possibility of arriving at a common platform, even at the time of disagreement: and how much is held in common. • To the Muslim citizens, the dialogical participation may mean having to accept and live with laws and regulations of the host societies that grant full rights and a degree of freedom of expression to non-conformists. • Eventually, the dialogical path will provide the requisite orientation to all agents in the society along with the possibility of a commitment to a common citizenship.

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Notes * Asif Mohiuddin, Doctoral candidate from the Department of Islamic Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinigar, India. He can be contacted at [email protected]. 1. Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation, (London: Routledge, 2003), 1. 2. Philip G. Cerny, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 27. 3. To illustrate the point that “Globalisation generates economic development,” the phenomenon of globalisation is studied from three perspectives: trade, capital flow and labor flow. In terms of trade or export, the ratio between gross value of export is used as an index to evaluate the level of participation of economic bodies in the global market. The global ratio between gross export and GDP has increased from 7 percent to 19 percent today. Similarly, the amount of trade has increased sixteen-fold. Capital flow in terms of direct foreign investment comprises 6 percent of global investment. In recent decades, each nation has significantly relaxed limits on capital flow, increasing the global flow of financial capital. The trade of financial goods has increased almost 30 percent annually. At the top of this, the ratio of U.S securities and stock trade between countries to GDP has risen from 9 percent to 135.5 percent. For Manfred Steger, economic globalisation has stimulated flow of trade in goods and services, creating new linkages among national economies. This increasing amount of trade and investments under globalisation has promoted growth and created more jobs. There is a plethora of literature implicating economic globalisation in the demise of social democracy. This thesis is contested by a number of recent studies which have delivered significant insights into how the domestic institutional structures are mediating the socio- political influence of globalisation. Regarding the point that “globalisation generates a new era in the development of civilisation,” hyperglobalists view globalisation as legitimate and inexorable historical process, which leads to a world order based on the market and global institutions. This process is understood as progressive and socially desirable. Globalisation is seen to destroy all previously established structures. The role of nation-state in this context is also significantly losing ground. Multinational corporations concentrate vast resources, and become main carriers of economic activity on a global scale. This creates a new era in the development of a global civilisation in which the market is integrated on a global level multinational companies are being major actors in the process and global institutions subordinate the role of nation states. See Zoran Stefanovic, “Globalization: Theoretical Perspectives, Impacts and Institutional Response of the Economy,” Journal of Facta Universitatis 5, no. 3, (2008), 264-265. Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.), Globalization and the Civilizations, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 47. For a thorough analysis of globalisation and economic development see, Dean Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin, Globalisation and Progressive Economic Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. For an excellent delineation of academic discourses on globalisation see, Douglas Kellner, “Theorizing Globalization,” Sociological Theory 20, no. 3 (2002), 286. 4. Lada Timotijevic and Glynis M Breakwell, “Migration and Threat to Identity,”

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Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 10, (2000), 357. 5. For analysing the role of citizenship regimes in the context of globalisation and cosmopolitanism, see Catarina Kinvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, The Political Psychology of Globalization: Muslims in the West, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4. 6. Ibid., 9. 7. It is pertinent to note that immigration is a central issue in Europe due to the fact that majority of Muslims are either immigrants themselves or have an immigrant background. Hence any such discussion pertinent to Muslims in Europe must take place, at least in part, within the context of Muslims as immigrants in their communities. This point provides the framework through which we can understand properly the issue of Muslim immigration in Europe. Considering this as our starting point, it should be understood that the attacks of 9/11 and the distinct connection between Muslim immigration and the socio-economic situation, have significantly challenged the policies of immigration in Europe. See http://www. euro-Islam.info/key…/ immigration/ (accessed on 15 February 2015). For a detailed and critical discussion on cultural globalisation, see Chamsy el-Ojeili, Patrick Hayden, Critical Theories of Globalization, (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2006), 150. 8. Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider and Rainer Winter (eds.), Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Globalization, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003, 155. 9. Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds.), Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, (London: Routledge, 1994), 157. 10. See Jocelyne Cesari, et al. “Securitization and Religious divides in Europe: Muslims in Western Europe after 9/11: Why the term Islamophobia is more than a predicament than an explanation,” Submission to the changing landscape of citizenship and Security 6th PCRD of European Commission, June 1, 2006. 10- 12. 11. Akbar Ahmad, Journey into America: The Challenge of Islam, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 214. 12. Cesari, et. al, op. cit. 17. 13. Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke, “The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization,” The Policy Studies Journal 32, no.1 (2004), 148. 14. Ayhan Kaya, Islam, Migration and Integration, (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2009), 69. 15. Pontus Odmalm, Migration Policies and Political Participation: Inclusion or Intrusion in Western Europe? (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2005), 56. 16. For a nuanced discussion on Muslim integration in Europe, see Robert J. Pauly, Jr. Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? (New York, Ashgate, 2004), 100. 17. Diane Sainsbury, “Immigrants' social rights in comparative perspective: welfare regimes, forms in immigration,” Journal of European Social Policy 16, no. 3 (2006), 232. 18. Jonathan Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The state’s role in minority integration, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 245.

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19. Brian J Grim and Mehtab S Karim, The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030, (Washington DC: Pew Research Center, 2011), 121. 20. See Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith (eds.), Muslim Minorities in the West Visible and Invisible, (Walnut Creek, California: Atamira Press, 2002), vi. 21. Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, 2nd ed.), 44-45. 22. Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds.), Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 43. 23. Mieke Maliepaard, Religious Trends and Social Integration: Muslim Minorities in the Netherlands, (Amsterdam: Ipskamp Drukkers B.V, 2012), 86. 24. Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-reading Finland and Ireland, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 205. 25. Ayhan Kaya, op. cit. 60. 26. Kathryn Boustead, “The French Headscarf Law before the European Court of Human Rights,” Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 16, no. 2, (2007), 191. 27. Lina Ragep Powel, “The Constitutionality of France’s Ban on the Burqa in light of the European Convention’s Arslan v. Turkey Decision on Religious Freedom,” Wisconsin international law journal 31, no. 1, (2013), 129. 28. Gerhard van der Schyff and Adriaan Overbeeke, “Exercising Religious Freedom in the Public Space: A Comparative and European Convention Analysis of General Burqa Bans,” European Constitutional Law Review 7, no. 3, (2011), 435. 29. Andrada Costoiu, “Modes of Minorities’ Integration: Explaining Historical, Economic and Political Factors,” Journal of Identity and Migration Studies 2, no. 2, (2008), 2-3. 30. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith, Muslim Women in America: The Challenge of Islamic Identity Today, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 4. 31. John H. Morgan, “Islam and Assimilation in the West: Religious and Cultural Ingredients in American Muslim Experience, Journal of Religion and Society 16, (2011), 3. 32. http://www.pewresearch.org/pubs/483/muslim-americans ... (accessed on 1 February 2015). 33. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West from Sojourners to Citizens, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 169. 34. Ibid., 236. 35. Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman (eds.), Religion, Globalization and Culture, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 391. 36. Ebrahim Moosa and Jeffrey T. Kenny (eds.), Islam in the Modern World, (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 376. 37. Birgit Schaebler and Leif Stenberg (eds.), Globalization and the Muslim world: Culture, Religion and Modernity, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 85. 38. John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden, “Forfeiting Enduring Freedom for Homeland Security: A constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives,” American University Law Review 51, no. 6, (2002), 1088.

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39. Maha M. Ayesh, “The Clear Act: When the Wars on Terrorism and Immigration Collide,” Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy 2, no. 2, (2005), 1. 40. Fareed Kazmi and Sanjeev Kumar, “The Politics of Muslim Identity and the Nature of Public Imagination in India: Media and Films as Potential Determinants,” European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 4, no. 1, (2011), 172. 41. Aziz al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas (eds.), Islam in Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 56. 42. Ibid., 53. 43. Gerard A. Postiglione, Ethnicity and American social theory, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983), 181-2. 44. Naser Meer, Citizenship, Identity and Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness, (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2010), 83. 45. Tughrul Keskin, The Sociology of Islam: Secularism, Politics and Economics, (UK: Ithaca Press, 2011), 169. 46. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates, (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2009), 262. 47. According to Muhammad Khalid Masud, The recent growth of institutions of higher education in Pakistan and Malaysia illustrate the growing concern for protection of Muslim identity through mass education. He argues that the continued stress on the theological basis of religious identity by modern movements for religious education have faltered progress of a pluralistic world view. It has rather given way to religious extremism, fundamentalism and violence. In contrast to the ideal mass education theory, the exclusionist approach to religious identity has nurtured a sense of insecurity and fear of others. Dale F Eickelman completely disagrees with the scholars who identify these developments as a “revival” of the old forms of religious world view as espoused by religious activists as well. He regards them as modern developmental initiatives that are necessary for the growth of social and economic activities. See Johan Meuleman (ed.), Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim Attitudes towards Modernity and Identity, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 233-234. For the critique of revival of old forms of religious understanding in the context of establishment of institutions of higher learning see for instance, Dale F. Eickelman, “Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab Societies”, American Ethnologist, 19, no. 4 (1992), 643. 48. Johan Meuleman (ed.), op. cit. 177. 49. Olivier Roy states that in order to define a global Muslim identity one must delink Islam from any given culture in favour of a transnational and global set of patterns. There appears to be a robust relationship between deculturation and religious reformulation in a sense that when a religion is experienced not so much by a minority without relation to ethnicity and culture, it loses social authority. Thus what evolves is not religion but religiosity which describes the way in which believers build their relationship with religion. See Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, (New Delhi: Rupa and Co, 2005), 117-120. 50. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Becoming American? The Forging of Arab and Muslim

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL GLOBALISATION AND MUSLIM MINORITIES 195

Identity in Pluralist America, (Texas: Baylor University Press, 2011), 14. 51. Ann Malaspina, The Ethnic and Group Identity Movements: Earning Recognition, (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2008), 136. 52. Alison Brysk (ed.), Globalization and Human Rights, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 21. 53. Catarina Kinvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, op. cit. 193.

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia STANDARDISATION OF FAT WA IN MALAYSIA: ISSUES, CONCERNS AND EXPECTATIONS Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil*

Abstract: The establishment of the institution of fatwa can be traced back before the independence of Malaysia. In the beginning, a Mufti was placed under the respective Islamic Councils. To a certain extent, a Mufti was also a judge (kadi) and presided over cases in the Shari’ah courts. Legally, a Mufti’s views are not considered as fatwas. Only fatwas issued by the respective States’ Fatwa Committees are regarded as fatwas. A fatwa is binding upon Muslims of the state where it is issued after being consented to by the Sultan and later gazetted. The problem is that more often than not, conflictingfatwas at state and national levels do occur, and this has led to confusion and problems. This article attempts to analyse the problems surrounding the conflicting fatwas. It suggests that the standardisation of fatwas at state and federal levels could be done by requesting the respective States’ Fatwa Committees to abide by the fatwas issued by the National Fatwa Committee. It is also suggested that fatwas issued by the respective States’ Fatwa Committees should be brought up to the National Fatwa Council for standardisation. It is also suggested that a Grand Mufti should be appointed on rotational basis like the selection of the Yang Di Pertuan Agong, after being consented to by the Council of Rulers. However, the position of Gand Mufti will not supersede the position of the respective States’ Muftis.

Introduction The Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution provides powers and jurisdictions to the respective States to manage and administer Islamic affairs. This is in line with the position of the respective Sultans as heads of the religion of Islam except in the states of Penang, Melaka, Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal Territories.1 The Yang Dipertuan Agong (YDA) and respective Sultans hold the highest position in matters relating to Islamic affairs. The Islamic Religious Council is established in every state. It has a role to facilitate and to advise the YDA and the respective Sultans in matters relating to Islam. The importance of the Religious Council can be traced back to the establishment of the Religious Council of Kelantan in 1915.2 The role of the Religious Council is to ensure the welfare of Muslims from the spiritual, social, educational and economical aspects.3 To ensure that the Islamic Councils are effective and efficient, the state governments separated the administration of the Islamic Councils from that of the Islamic Departments / Shari’ah Courts / Departments of Mufti. For the purpose of this

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL STANDARDISATION OF FATWA IN MALAYSIA 197 segregation, all states’ enactments have a specific provision for the appointment of a Mufti and a Deputy Mufti (not in every state) to administer the fatwa affairs in the respective states.4

The Legal-Institutional Framework of Fatwa (i) The Establishment of Fatwa Committee The respective States’ Islamic Administration Laws have empowered the states to establish a Fatwa Committee to assist the Department of Mufti in issuing fatwas.5 The Committee has several names, among others: • Islamic Ruling Committee (Jawatankuasa Perundingan Hukum Syara’) • Shari’ah Committee (Jawatankuasa Syariah). • Fatwa Council (Majlis Fatwa). • Fatwa Board/Body (Lembaga Fatwa). • Fatwa Committee (Lujnah/Jawatankuasa Fatwa). • Council of Ulama (Jama’ah Ulama).6 The total of the Fatwa Committee members differs from one state to another. Normally it consists of 5-17 members.7 For example, in Selangor, Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 provides: “There shall be a committee by the name of Fatwa Committee that consists of: a. Mufti – Chairman; b. Deputy Mufti; c. State Legal Advisor; d. Two members from the Islamic Council (Majlis); e. An officer from the Selangor Islamic Department who is an expert in Islamic rulings appointed by the Islamic Council (Majlis); f. No fewer than two members and no more than seven members who are fit to be appointed by the Islamic Council (Majlis); and g. An officer from the Department of Mufti to act as the secretary.” All members of the Committee including Muftis and Deputy Muftis are appointed by the respective Sultans and YDA. The National Fatwa Council is set up by the Council of Rulers (MRR) in accordance with the National Rulings of Islamic Affairs amended in 1971, 1973, 1976 and 1980.8 In carrying out its duties and roles, the National Fatwa Council has endorsed two approaches: National Fatwa Council Meeting under the order of Council of Rulers (MRR); and National Fatwa Committee Discourse (Muzakarah) in which this meeting takes place occasionally without order from the Council of Rulers (MRR).9

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Membership of the National Fatwa Council should consist of the following: a. Chairman; b. Respective States’ Muftis; c. Five members appointed by the Council of Rulers (MRR); and d. A member who is a Muslim from the legal or judicial profession appointed by the Council of Rulers (MRR).10 Except the Chairman and respective states’ Muftis, the other candidates must first obtain consent from the Prime Minister before submitting the names to the Council of Rulers (MRR). Such appointment is valid for three years, and can be extended after the term expires should the authority think to do so. Without prejudice, the members, at any time, can tender a resignation without giving any reasons.11

(ii) The Role of Mufti and Fatwa Committee The States’ Fatwa Committees assist and advise the respective Sultans over matters relating to Islamic rulings. The Mufti shall advise the Sultan in respect of all matters of Islamic law. He shall be the chief authority in the State after the Sultan, except where otherwise provided in the Enactment.12 The State’s Fatwa Committee can act on its own or upon the request from the public, which should be addressed to the Mufti to seek a fatwa over a disputed matter.13 A Mufti could issue a fatwa or give his view or evidence in case requested by either the Civil Court or the Shari’ah Court. But the judge is not obliged to accept the view given by the Mufti as he is deemed competent to handle a case brought before him. However, a Mufti cannot be summoned to be present before a judge.14 In Isa Abdul Rahman and Others v the Penang Islamic Council,15 the view of Mufti and the gazetted fatwa were referred to by the Court when the plaintiff who was the next-of-kin of the owner wakaf property objected to the plan by the Penang Islamic Council to demolish Masjid Jamek Haji Abdul Wahab and to erect a new five-floor building which places Bank Islam (floors 1-3) and mosque (floors 4-5) on the wakaf land. The High Court turned down the injunction applied by the plaintiff and requested the Penang Islamic Council not to continue with the plan until a new fatwa is issued on this matter. Apparently, there were two conflictingfatwas : the former fatwa was meant that the wakaf land was for the purpose of building a mosque; and the latter fatwa giving a nod for the Penang Islamic Council to demolish the mosque and to erect a new building but with condition to reserve two floors for mosque purposes. What was interesting about this case was that the provisions in section 36 (4-5) of the Penang Administration of Islamic Law No. 7/1993 provide that all written fatwas must be recognised by all courts in the State of Penang, and any written document made by the Mufti is considered as fatwa.

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Judge Abdul Hamid Mohamad who presided over the case did not accept these provisions as he believed that the “courts” referred to here were the Shari’ah courts, and not the civil courts. As a result, laws passed by the Penang State Assembly do not take away the powers and jurisdiction of the civil courts as enshrined by the Federal Constitution. Apparently, a fatwa that is in accordance with written laws is referred to by the civil court. In Re Dato Bentara Luar (Deceased), Haji Yahya Yusoff & Others v Hassan Othman & Others,16 the High Court of Johor made reference to the fatwa issued by the Mufti of Johor over a specific wakaf (wakaf khas). It was decided that such wakaf was valid under Islamic law as provided in Section 11 of Prohibition Wakaf Enactment of Johor, 1911 and Section 41 Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment of Johor, 1978. Interestingly, at the Supreme Court, Salleh Abas (CJ) ruled out that the court should neither accept nor decline the fatwa. But since the judges were not competent in Islamic law and the fatwa was in line with other scholars’ writings, they could accept such fatwa. In Hajjah Halimatussaadiah v Public Service Commission, Malaysia & Anor,17 the appellant, who was a clerk at the Perak Legal Advisor’s Office, was given a warning followed by a show-cause letter because she did not conform to the General Order that prohibits women from covering their face during office hours. She argued that her understanding from verse 24 of Surah al-Nur was that covering her face except the eyes was obligatory. Indeed, such attire could protect her dignity. She also argued that such practice was guaranteed in Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution. After considering the fatwa issued by the Federal Territories’ Mufti, the Court held that Islam neither make it compulsory nor encourages such veil. It was also held that freedom of religion as provided in Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution was not absolute as this Article must read together with Article 11(5) that restricts religious freedom on the ground of public peace, public health and morality. Hence, such prohibition regulated in the General Order never takes her constitutional right in professing and practicing her religion. In another case, Dalip Kaur v Bukit Mertajam’s Police Officer and Others,18 the appellant made an appeal before the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that his late son was non-Muslim at his last breath and therefore she could claim the body. The Kedah Fatwa Committee held that his late son was a Muslim at his death because there was evidence that he had converted to Islam, and no declaration had been made by any Shari’ah Court otherwise. The Supreme Court also accepted the fatwa issued by the Kedah Fatwa Committee for the following reasons:

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a. Whereby a Muslim who has made a deed-poll declaration that he is no longer practicing the religion of Islam is indeed an apostate. b. That a Muslim who prays in the Sikh temple and seeking Sikh prayers is indeed an apostate. c. That a Muslim who has converted to Sikhism is indeed an apostate. However, such rule can only be made by the Shari’ah court. Unless and until such declaration is made, that person is considered as Muslim. d. That a Muslim who consumes pork is still regarded as Muslim. e. That a male who converted to Islam but did not circumcise is considered as Muslim. Hence, the Kedah Fatwa Committee held that the appellant’s son was a Muslim at his death because there was evidence that he recited the testimonial (shahadah) and became Muslim. Furthermore, there was no declaration made by any Shari’ah courts that showed he was not a Muslim upon his death.

(iii) Issuance and Gazetting of Fatwas Legally, only a gazetted fatwa is binding. A Mufti’s view cannot be binding even if it is done before a judge. With an exception in Penang, a written statement by the Mufti is regarded as fatwa by the Court.19 In most practices in the states of Malaysia, the process of fatwa starts with an inquiry to the Islamic Council (Majlis). The inquiry is then passed over to the Mufti, Chairman of the Fatwa Committee. Occasionally, it is addressed directly to the Mufti. The Mufti, as Chairman of the Fatwa Committee, upon receiving the request/inquiry will prepare a concept paper.20 On many occasions, a research committee is set up to carry out thorough research. The result of the research will then be discussed before the members of the State Fatwa Committee. Later, the office of the Department of Mufti will prepare a fatwa draft and refer it to the State Legal Advisor for scrutiny. The draft will be discussed and debated in the State Fatwa Committee and later brought to the Islamic Council meeting chaired by the Chairman. Once the fatwa is accepted, it will then be brought up to the Sultan for consent and later gazetted. The gazetted fatwa is binding upon all Muslims in the state concern and should be recognised by the court at that state.21

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The State Fatwa Committee Structure:

Sultan / YDA

State Religious Councils

Mufti

State Fatwa Committees

As for the state of Selangor, Section 48 of Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 provides the procedure for issuing a fatwa. A Mufti can request research to be carried out before the State Fatwa Committee sits for a meeting. The research committee is expected to prepare a concept/working paper. The Mufti will call the State Fatwa Committee for a meeting to discuss the proposed fatwa. After an in-depth discussion and debate in the meeting, the Mufti will then pass the proposed fatwa to the Islamic Council (Majlis). The Islamic Council (Majlis), after scrutiny of the proposed fatwa could suggest the proposed fatwa to be brought up to the Sultan for consent and later gazetted. The proposed fatwa should be written clearly under sub-section (4) together with details and comments. Once the fatwa is approved by the Sultan, the Islamic Council (Majlis) should inform the State Government before the fatwa is published in the gazette. A fatwa published in the gazette shall be followed by a statement that the fatwa is made under this section. All fatwas shall be published in Bahasa Melayu in Romanised transcript but the Bahasa Melayu version can also be made public. Statements made by the State Fatwa Committee could not be regarded as fatwa unless it is published in the gazette under sub-section (6). From the technical point, a proposed fatwa must be scrutinised by the Selangor State Legal Advisor before bringing it up to the Sultan. Once it is approved by the Sultan, the fatwa can be for gazetted.22

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 202 MOHAMED AZAM MOHAMED ADIL iv) The Position of National Fatwa At the Federal level, a fatwa is issued by the National Fatwa Committee or National Fatwa Discourse meetings, which take place under the National Fatwa Council, headed by a Chairman. Usually, the National Fatwa Discourse (Muzakarah) meets regularly because it does not require an order from the Council of Rulers (MRR). All State Muftis are automatically members of the National Fatwa Council including those who are from the judicial and legal service who are appointed by the Council of Rulers (MRR).23 The National Fatwa Council secretariat is placed under the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM).24 A fatwa can be decided either unanimously or by a majority vote of two-thirds of the members excluding the Chairman. Unfortunately, a fatwa decided by the National Fatwa Council is not binding from the legal perspective. In fact it is only binding within the states if the states adopt and enforce the fatwa.25 Normally, a fatwa issued at the Federal level will be forwarded to the respective States’ Fatwa Committees for consideration. If accepted, the fatwa will be brought up to the next process for gazetting purposes. Apparently, the National Fatwa Council is a “body of discussion” to decide on a fatwa involving national interest. It does not bind the states including the Federal Territories.26

The Controversy over Conflicts of Fatwas (i) Conflicts between Fatwas issued by the National Fatwa Council and the Respective States’ Fatwa Committees Conflicts between fatwas can be traced in the Emotional Spiritual Quotient (ESQ) Leadership training module. The Federal Territories Fatwa Committee in its meeting on 27 August 2009 simply banned ESQ fearing that it could harm the faith and the religion of Islam.27 A similar stand was also taken in Perlis by its Fatwa Committee. However, the National Fatwa Council in its meeting on 16 June 2010 gave a green light for ESQ organisations to continue their activities with conditions that they must appoint Shari’ah Advisors to monitor their activities. This stand was also taken by the Pahang and Penang Fatwa Committee which have endorsed the ESQ organisations.28 Another example is the question of investment in Amanah Saham Bumiputra (ASB)/Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN). The States of Selangor and Penang have prohibited it because, apparently, ASB/ASN investment is involved in interest (riba) transactions which are non-Shari’ah compliant. But there was confusion in the Penang fatwa issued on 30 August 1983 which allowed Muslims to perform hajj using money from the ASN.29

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The National Fatwa Council in its meeting on 1-3 February 2008; the Federal Territories Fatwa Committee in its meeting on 27 May 2008; and the Kelantan Fatwa Committee in its meeting on 27 December 2009 have opined that putting an investment in ASB/ASN is permissible mainly because it is the only institution that is available to Malay-Muslim investors for purpose of earning profits considering the low and poor economic background of the majority Malays. Another point made was that if PNB, which is the agent of ASB/ASN pulls out its share from Maybank which is considered the largest bank in the Asia Pacific, it could easily harm the economy of the Malays who are Muslims. What is important is that, PNB does not invest in the provision of gambling services and the production of liquor. In its investments, PNB has managed to invest 70% of its investment activities in Shari’ah compliant ways. The remaining 30% investment in Maybank which is non-Shari’ah compliant is strictly monitored by the Shari’ah Advisors appointed by PNB under the Special Project.30 Indeed, according to the National Fatwa Committee, the schools of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’ie and Hanbali are of the views that Muslims are permitted to invest in companies that invest in both halal and haram activities under certain circumstances based on public interest (maslahah ammah). In sum, the Committee is of the view that protecting the interest (maslahah) of the Muslims is more important than avoiding harm (mafsadah) and that this should be the main criteria in this regard.31 Another example is the prohibition of smoking. Some states have made it abominable (makruh) while others have regarded it as forbidden (haram). The states of Kedah and Selangor have made it forbidden (haram), while Pahang banned smoking in places of worships. At the Federal level, the National Fatwa Council has banned smoking completely.32 In reality, the respected States’ Fatwa Committee should adopt the National Fatwa Council’s fatwas. For example, Section 52(1) the Selangor Islamic Administration, 2003 provides: “The Fatwa Committee should adopt the advice and recommendations made by the National Fatwa Council in matters that have been consented by the Council of Rulers (MRR) as enshrined in Article 38 2(b) of the Federal Constitution.”

(ii) Conflicts ofFatwas between the Respective States’ Fatwa Committee Conflict among fatwas issued by different states is quite apparent in some cases. One example is zakat on income. The states of Selangor and Perak have a different stand in making zakat on income obligatory. The Selangor Fatwa Committee has gazetted a fatwa that made it obligatory for Muslims in Selangor to pay zakat on income since 9 May 2001. What is interesting about this fatwa is that such

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 204 MOHAMED AZAM MOHAMED ADIL zakat must be handed over to Lembaga Zakat Selangor (LZS), the collector of zakat for the Selangor Religious Council. The payment of zakat on income can be made through salary deduction despite the fact that this method of collection does not meet the requirement of nisab and haul according to the majority of the schools of Islamic law. The approach taken by LZS is basically based on ta’jil al-zakat (payment of zakat before the haul) but it does not meet the requirement that the payment of income/salary zakat can only be made if it meets the nisab.33 A similar approach was also taken by the Federal Territories’ Religious Council (MAWIP) requirements of ta’jil where a fatwa gazetted on 29 April 1999 has made it obligatory upon Muslims in the Federal Territories to pay zakat on any income including salary, allowances and bonus.34 The National Fatwa Council did not make it compulsory for Muslims in the Federal Territories to pay income zakat but made it optional (9 December 1992). However, on 22 June 1997 it changed its fatwa by making it compulsory for Muslims who were earning a steady income. In its meeting on 7 May 2003, the National Fatwa Committee had issued the calculation for the income zakat payment which was based on 2.5% from nisab in one-year hijrah (haul) period.35 In contrast, the Perak Fatwa Committee is against the stand taken by Selangor, Federal Territories and National Fatwa Council in requiring Muslims to pay income (salary) zakat simply because income/salary will only be taxable when it reaches the one-year hijrah period. In its meeting on 7 March 2013, the Perak Fatwa Committee had endorsed one statement: “That zakat on income/salary is only obligatory when it reaches the nisab and haul as agreed by the majority schools. Hence zakat on income/salary is not compulsory”.36

Will Standardisation of Fatwas Resolve the Conflicts? Standardisation of fatwas is often discussed by many parties. This is because conflicting fatwas have caused confusion and problems in society. In general, conflicting fatwas can occur due to several reasons, among others, conflict of fatwas between issuing institutions of fatwa. This can be seen in different fatwas issued by the National Fatwa Council and the respective States’ Fatwa Committee. Similarly, different fatwas are issued in different states. Another conflict between fatwas involves private fatwas. This occurs as a result of a conflict betweenfatwas issued by institutions and fatwas issued by private; there is also conflict between some privatefatwas and other private fatwas.37 Datuk Seri (now Tun) Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, then Vice-President of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant party in the ruling

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Barisan Nasional coalition in Malaysia, once commented: More often than not, we hear of contradictory views or rulings by Mufti in matters pertaining to zakat fitrah and others. Therefore, it’s important to have a standardised fatwa so that people will no longer be confused.38

Apparently, all Muftis have endorsed the proposal. Based on our research,39 13 Muftis (93%) agreed that the activities of all fatwa bodies should be coordinated and standardised. As for the officers, 10 of them (71%) agreed that the activities on the respective fatwa bodies should be coordinated and standardised. Three officers (21%) did not agree and one officer (7%) did not come out with any comments. Those who disagreed gave the following reasons for their views: i) Fatwa is a state matter as provided in the state constitution. ii) Powers relating to Islam are under the respective Sultans and states’ government jurisdictions. iii) The background and environment vary from one state to another. iv) Diversity of opinions is good practice.40

Nevertheless, the outcome of our research shows that many high-ranking religious officers did not agree with the standardisation of fatwas. Among reasons given are: i) It is provided in every state’s enactment that a Sultan shall appoint a Mufti to advise him in matters relating to Islam. ii) The appointment of Mufti within the respective states is effective as he is the expert in matters pertaining to Islamic law, which falls under state jurisdiction. This is very different from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. iii) The establishment of Mufti in every state could be an impetus for the states to set up the Council of Fiqh (Majma’ al-Fiqhi) for collective fatwas.41 However, there are views that support the coordination of fatwa bodies because too many Muftis will lead to inefficiency in the issuance of fatwas. To a certain extent, there should not be a Mufti appointed at a state level. Instead, there should be coordination among all fatwa issuing bodies so that they could produce standard fatwas for the entire nation taking into account the public interest. However, if the fatwa meets the local needs, for example, by determining the rate of zakat fitrah, it should not be standardised.42 As for the public, 95% responded that a standard fatwa is important to ensure that no misunderstanding of the fatwa takes place. Some suggested the appointment of Grand Mufti. This was proposed in Parliament in 17 Sept. 2003. The issue was originally raised by Tuan Haji Mo’min Abdul Aziz, Chairman, Melaka Islamic Religious Committee in 1996. It was then re-suggested by

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(Dato’) Dr. Syed Ali Tawfik al-Attas, the Former Director-General of IKIM in December 2006. However, Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Harussani Zakaria, the Mufti of Perak stood against the idea. Dato’ Seri Najib Tun Razak (the then Deputy Prime Minister) and Datuk Seri Dr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi (the then Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department) were also of the view that the proposal to appoint a Grand Mufti was not suitable.43 The reasons for objections include: i) The appointment of Mufti is under the privilege of the respective Sultans (YDA for non-Sultans’ states). ii) Sultans are not willing to lose their small powers given by the Federal Constitution. iii) The suggestion seems contrary to Article 74 and Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution.44 However, the standardisation of fatwa bodies could be possible if there is a political will.45 With effect from 2 Sept. 1997, there was an agreement by the respective Muftis that they should refer to the National Fatwa Council before gazetting a fatwa.46 But does this take place? It was revealed that 36% of Muftis in Malaysia do not agree on the establishment of National Fatwa Council. This is because the Council has no power and cannot compete with the States’ Fatwa Committee. Fatwa issued by the National Fatwa Council is not binding at all. What has been decided at the National Fatwa Council can be challenged by the State Fatwa Committees. The National Fatwa cannot be gazetted and as a result it has to be brought to the respective States’ Fatwa Committee for consideration and later gazetted, if they wish to do so.47 In order to introduce a standard fatwa, a proposal to set up a Federal Darul Ifta’ was turned down by the Council of Rulers (MRR). As a result, the secretariat for the National Fatwa Council has been streamlined. On 2 January 2009, the Division of Management and Development of Fatwa was introduced at JAKIM. One of the objectives of the setup was to undertake in-depth study before a fatwa is issued. This does not mean that such study was not carried out before.48 It is quite difficult to come out with a common fatwa in Malaysia as there are 14 Muftis with different backgrounds. Furthermore, there are 14 States’ Fatwa Committee with differing views. More often, the State Fatwa Committees are reluctant to accept fatwas issued by the National Fatwa Council. They have two simple reasons: a. That the powers and jurisdictions of the religion of Islam are within the exclusive rights of states and Sultans; and b. That powers and jurisdictions are clearly provided in Ninth Schedule, List II State List and Article 74(2) of the Federal Constitution.

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The powers and jurisdiction of Islam are under the purview of the respective states have made it difficult to standardise fatwas in Malaysia. Standardising fatwas across the nation is not impossible since the National Fatwa Council is set up to assist on the standardisation. The role of the National Fatwa Council seems limited but one could find that this Council could advise to the Council of Rulers, State Governments or States’ Islamic Councils to look at matters concerning the Islamic law or Islamic administration and the religious studies. The composition of Fatwa Committee is also insufficient. Very few of the members of the Fatwa Committee are highly educated. Out of 129 of members of fatwa committee throughout the nation, only 27 are from academics. Another factor that contributes to the conflicting fatwas is the difference fatwa methodologies applicable in Malaysia. The state of Perlis which based on Ahli Sunnah wal Jama’ah’s teaching, does not practise the Shafi’i’s school which is dominant across Malaysia.49 Similarly, some Muftis issue conflicting fatwas on controversial issues in the mainstream media, which has led to confusion among the public. What is worse is that an “open debate” on a particular issue does not solve any problem. In fact, debates should take place in designated institution like the National Fatwa Council or during the National Fatwa Committee Discourse (Muzakarah) meetings. Actually, there was an attempt to standardise the process of fatwa in Malaysia. For example, an informal body called the Council of Muftis Malaysia (Majlis Mufti-mufti Se-Malaysia) was established in 1998. The council comprises all state Muftis. It serves as a platform for discussion between them in matters of religion more freely. For example, the first decision by the Council was to seek a reduction of Bollywood movies on television in Malaysia. In response, the government adopted the view of the Council and subsequently made a study of the decision.50

Conclusions From the above discussion, it can be said that conflicts between fatwas do occur in Malaysia because every State Fatwa Committee has a power to issue fatwa. As a result, a resolution is required so that fatwas issued by the National Fatwa Council would be adopted in the respective states. • It is suggested that fatwas issued by the respective States’ Fatwa Committee should be brought up to the National Fatwa Council for standardisation. • To appoint a Grand Mufti who is highly knowledgeable with Shari’ah background. The present Chairman of the National Fatwa Council has no Shari’ah background and only functions as a spokesperson. The Grand Mufti must be senior by age. This criterion is to include the State Muftis.

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• The appointment of Grand Mufti is on a rotation basis like the selection of YDA. It must be approved by the Council of Rulers (MRR). The position of Grand Mufti will not supersede the position of respective States’ Muftis. • Fatwas issued by the Grand Mufti are binding. The respective States’ Muftis must accept the fatwas issued by the Grand Mufti so that they are not in conflict. This could be done by amending the Ninth Schedule, List II – State List and Article 74 of the Federal Constitution. • The States’ Muftis are prohibited from issuing controversial statements. Only the Grand Mufti is authorised to issue any statement after discussing the matter at the National Fatwa Council. • As for remuneration, the Grand Mufti should be at par to Turus III. As for States’ Muftis, they should be remunerated at par to JUSA A.

Notes * Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil is Associate Professor and Deputy CEO, International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia (Email: [email protected]). 1. Article 42 (10) of the Federal Constitution. 2. Abdullah Alwi Hassan, The Administration of Islamic Law in Kelantan, Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, pp. 69-70. 3. Section 7, Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003. 4. For example, Section 44 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003. 5. Farid Sufian Shuaib, Tajul Aris Ahmad Bustami & Mohd Hisham Mohd Kaal, Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia – Text and Material, Malayan Law Journal, 2001, pp. 266-70. 6. Suwaid Tapa, Perundangan dan Penguatkuasaan Fatwa in Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, 2004, pp. 26-7. 7. See respective States’s Administration of the Religion of Islam. Johor: 5; Kedah: 9; Kelantan: 17; Melaka: 8; Negeri Sembilan: 7; Pahang: 10; Perak: 9; Perlis: 7; Penang: 10; Sabah: 6; Sarawak: 7; Selangor: 10; Terengganu: 10; and Federal Territories: 9; see Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Organisasi dan Pentadbiran Jabatan Mufti in Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, 2004, p. 51. 8. Suwaid Tapa, Perundangan dan Penguatkuasaan Fatwa. supra, pp. 26-7. 9. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, “Penyelarsan Fatwa:Isu, Masalah dan Harapan,” Jurnal Hukum, Jld.38. Bhg 1, Rabiulakhirn1435H/February 2014M, pp. 2-3. 10. Section 14 of the Regulation of National Council of the Religion of Islamic Affairs as amended by the Council of Rulers (MRR) 117th meeting, 17 February 1980. 11. Section 13 of the Regulation of National Council of the Religion of Islamic Affairs as amended by the Council of Rulers (MRR) 117th meeting, 17 February

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1980. 12. Section 45, Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003; see also Farid Sufian Shuaib, Powers and Jurisdiction of Syariah Courts in Malaysia, Malayan Law Journal, 2003, pp. 43-7. 13. Section 47, Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003. 14. For example see Section 53, Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003; Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, “Penyelarasan Fatwa:Isu, Masalah dan Harapan,” supra, p. 3; Suwaid Tapa, Perundangan dan Penguatkuasaan Fatwa, supra, p. 29. 15. [1997] 5 Jurnal Syariah (1) 125. 16. [1981] 2 MLJ 352. 17. [1992] 1 MLJ 513. 18. [1992] 1 MLJ 1. 19. Suwaid Tapa, Perundangan dan Penguatkuasaan Fatwa, supra, p. 34; Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, “Penyelarasan Fatwa: Isu, Masalah dan Harapan,” supra, pp. 5-6. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Section 48 of Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003. 23. Suwaid Tapa, Perundangan dan Penguatkuasaan Fatwa, supra, pp. 36-37; Farid Sufian Shuaib, Tajul Aris Ahmad Bustami & Mohd Hisham Mohd Kamal, Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia – Text and Material, supra, pp. 271- 82. 24. In practice, the Director-General of JAKIM is the Secretary of National Fatwa Council. 25. Suwaid Tapa, Perundangan dan Penguatkuasaan Fatwa, supra, pp. 36-7. 26. Ibid. 27. www.e-fatwa.gov.my; Muhammad Ikhlas Roslee, “Konflik Fatwa di Malaysia: Satu Kajian Awal”, Jurnal Fiqh, supra, pp. 38-39; Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Penyelarasan Fatwa: Isu, Masalah dan Harapan, supra, pp. 11-2. 28. Ibid. 29. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Penyelarasan Fatwa: Isu, Masalah dan Harapan, supra, pp. 12-3. 30. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, “ASB, ASN Berlandaskan Maqasid Syariah – Pelaburan Diharuskan Bagi Menegakkan Keadilan, Basmi Kemiskinan,” Berita Harian, 4 Mac 2014, p. 33. 31. http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-kebangsaan/pelaburan-dalam-asn-asb-dan- seumpamanya. 32. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Pengaruh Adat Tempatan dalam Menentukan Fatwa di Malaysia in Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2004, pp. 202-23. 33. Suryani Masnan, Kaedah Pembayaran Zakat Pendapatan Melalui Skim Potongan Gaji Oleh Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Dissertation, Master of Shari’ah, University of Malaya, 2012, pp. 146-51; 203.

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34. http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/zakat-penggajian-2. 35. http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-kebangsaan/zakat-gaji-beserta-kadarnya. 36. http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/zakat-atas-gaji-pendapatan-0. 37. Muhammad Ikhlas Rosele, Luqman Hj Abdullah, Paizah Hj Ismail & Mohd Anuar Ramli, “Konflik Fatwa di Malaysia: Satu Kajian Awal”, Jurnal Fiqh, No.10 (2013), pp. 37-8. 38. NST, 30 August 1997. 39. A comprehensive research Analysis of Contemporary Fatwas in Malaysia under IRPA RMK7 University of Malaya was carried out from 1997-2000 led by Ahmad Hidayat Buang. Other members were: Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Suwaid Tapa, Raihanah Abdullah and Khadijah Hambali. 40. Ahmad Hidayat Buang et.al, Laporan Projek Penganalisaan Fatwa-fatwa Semasa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, 2000; see also Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Organisasi dan Pentadbiran Jabatan Mufti, supra, pp. 58-9. 41. Ahmad Hidayat Buang et.al, Laporan Projek Penganalisaan Fatwa-fatwa Semasa di Malaysia, supra; Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Organisasi dan Pentadbiran Jabatan Mufti, supra, pp. 59-60. 42. Ahmad Hidayat Buang et.al, Report Analysis of Contemporary Fatwas in Malaysia, supra; Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Organisasi dan Pentadbiran Jabatan Mufti, supra, p. 60. 43. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Organisasi dan Pentadbiran Jabatan Mufti, supra, pp. 58-61. 44. Ibid, pp. 58-61. 45. Ibid, p. 61. 46. Ibid. p. 61. 47. For example, see Section 48 Issuance of fatwa, Selangor Islamic Administration Enactment, 2003. 48. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Penyelarasan Fatwa: Isu, Masalah dan Harapan, supra, p. 11. 49. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Organisasi dan Jabatan Mufti, supra, p. 51. 50. Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, supra, pp. 65-6.

References 1. Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2004. 2. Ahamad Hidayat Buang, Analisis Fatwa–fatwa Syariah in Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2004. 3. Ahmad Hidayat Buang et.al, Laporan Projek Penganalisaan Fatwa-fatwa Semasa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, 2000. 4. Suwaid Tapah, Perundangan dan Penguatkuasaan Fatwa in Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2004. 5. Suwaid Tapah, “Undang-undang Pentadbiran Fatwa di Malaysia,” Jurnal

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Syariah, Jilid 1, Bilangan 2, 1993, pp. 347-56. 6. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, “Penyelarasan Fatwa: Isu, Masalah dan Harapan”, Jurnal Hukum, Rabiulakhir 1435H/Februari 2014M, pp. 1-16. 7. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, “ASB, ASN Berlandaskan Maqasid Syariah – Pelaburan Diharuskan Bagi Menegakkan Keadilan, Basmi Kemiskinan”, Berita Harian, 4 Mac 2014, p. 33. 8. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Organisasi dan Pentadbiran Jabatan Mufti in Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang- undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2004. 9. Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Pengaruh Adat Tempatan dalam Menentukan Fatwa di Malaysia in Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Fatwa di Malaysia, Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2004. 10. Muhammad Ikhlas Rosele, Luqman Hj Abdullah, Paizah Hj Ismail & Mohd Anuar Ramli, “Konflik Fatwa di Malaysia: Satu Kajian Awal”, Jurnal Fiqh, No.10 (2013), pp. 31-56. 11. Suryani Masnan, Kaedah Pembayaran Zakat Pendapatan Melalui Skim Potongan Gaji Oleh Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Dissertation, Master of Shari’ah, University of Malaya, 2012. 12. Hasnan Kasan, Institusi Fatwa di Malaysia, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 2008. 13. Abdul Monir Yaacob & Wan Roslili Abd Majid (Penyunting), Mufti dan Fatwa di Negara-negara Asean, Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM), 1998. 14. Abdullah Alwi Hassan, The Administration of Islamic Law in Kelantan, Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka,Kuala Lumpur, 1996. 15. Farid Sufian Shuaib, Powers and Jurisdiction of Syariah Courts in Malaysia, Malayan Law Journal, 2003. 16. Farid Sufian Shuaib, Tajul Aris Ahmad Bustami & Mohd Hisham Mohd Kamal, Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia – Text and Material, Malayan Law Journal, 2001. 17. Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 18. Selangor Islamic Administrative Law Enactment, 2003.

Reported Cases 1. Hajjah Halimatussaadiah lwn Public Service Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 513. 2. Dalip Kaur lwn Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah Bukit Mertajam dan lain-lain [1992] 1 MLJ 1. 3. Isa Abdul Rahman and Others v the Penang Islamic Council [1997] 5 Jurnal Syariah (1) 125. 4. Re Dato Bentara Luar (Deceased), Haji Yahya Yusoff & Others v Hassan Othman & Others [1981] 2 MLJ 352.

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia ARABIC LITERATURE IN THE RISE OF ISLAMIC CIVILISATION AND THE PRESENT EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM Suleiman Mohammed Hussein Boayo*

Abstract: Every given civilisation has foundations on which it rises. These foundations form the way of thinking for the people to whom that civilisation belongs, and define the scope within which they operate. The foundations differ from one civilisation to another; they may be a revelation, a divine or civil law, or customs and or norms that prevailed in a given society. Islamic civilisation sprung from the original Islamic sources, namely the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition. However, Arabic literature is seen as one of the additional foundations that have played a pivotal role in the rise of this civilisation, as well as in its development and flourishing. The purpose of this paper is to study critically some characteristic view-points of the relationship between Arabic literature and Islamic civilisation and to demonstrate the role Arabic language has played in the rise of this civilisation through its important periods. The outcome of this study will interpret Arabic literature as reflecting virtues and values, as revealing the ethos of different cultures of the Islamic civilisation, the processes of its rise and certain types of social facts. It will also illustrate the significance of teaching Arabic literature in the present day education, for it allows us to reach the heart of the Islamic civilisation through its literary, philosophical and political texts, along with its historical context.

Keywords: Arabic, literature, Education, Islam, Civilisation.

Introduction: The Role of Arabic Literature in the Rise of Islamic Civilisation Our prophet (pbuh) had a clear vision, plans and programs on how to build a civilisation out of the religion of Islam that can face the challenges of the world right from the beginning of his mission as the messenger of God to mankind, to the moment of his departure from the world. Hence, when the Islamic civilisation is taken into account, one can argue that Islam in which this civilisation is rooted, arrived in this world to announce its existence through three interrelated circles, namely human, state and civilisation. It succeeded in building a good human being during the Meccan period, but it could not proceed to the second circle that was the establishment of a state. Obviously, without a state there will not be a civilisation. What blocked the way of Islam in achieving the other two goals in Mecca were political, social, religious and economic impediments.

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The migration of the prophet to Medina began when he realised that Mecca was not a proper place to build a state. There were many reasons for this, the most obvious ones were that the valleys of Mecca were surrounded by mountains, and the Ka‘abah swarmed with idols. Therefore, it was impossible for a state to be established there, let alone a civilisation. Another reason was that, after a struggle that lasted for more than a decade, the prophet became certain that it was difficult for the idolatrous Meccan leaders to embrace the new religion. His migration to Medina was then justified by these tangible reasons. Arabic language and literature were among the foundations that gradually helped to develop the Islamic Civilisation from the period of the prophet until the time of its decline. The holy Qur’an, in which this civilisation is rooted, was revealed in Arabic. The Prophet’s mastery of this language contributed in designing the plans, building the institutions and fulfilling all the additional requirements for the new emerging civilisation. Besides this, Arabic literature preserved the Arabic language as the language of Islamic civilisation, and it played a significant role in its rise. For it made this civilisation to enjoy the beauty of its language through the sophisticated literary expression, the construction of correct and meaningful sentences, the articulation of the language according to the cultural, social, philosophical and political thinking of the Islamic civilisation. This was due to certain facts explored in Arabic literature through illustrating and parsing every single word and expression grammatically, morphologically, rhetorically and linguistically. In this paper, I shall discuss briefly the role of Arabic literature and its components, namely prose, oration and proverbs in the rise of the Islamic civilisation. These elements will be covered under the section of pre-Islamic, early Islamic, Umayyad and Abbasid periods. The role of grammar in the Arabic language and its literature cannot be neglected because it has equal importance as the other components, which will also be discussed.

Status of Arabic Literature in the Pre-Islamic Period (‘Asr al-Jāhilī) It is necessary to explain the term jāhiliyyah in this context, because there is a general misconception that it means sheer ignorance, simply because it is an antonym of knowledge. The meaning of the term jāhiliyyah is not derived from al-jahl (ignorance), which is the opposite of knowledge. In this context, it is from Jahl, which means foolishness or silliness in behavior or in conduct, being ill-tempered or quickly becoming angry and disdainful, as well as acting in an uncivilised manner. What justifies this meaning is the statement of the Qur’an: And the servants of (God) Most Gracious and those who walk on the earth in humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say peace.1

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The ignorant in this verse refers to foolish or silly people who behave in an uncivilised way. This is brought into account to clarify this misconception, so that it will not amount to a belief that the Arabs of the pre-Islamic period were ignorant, uneducated and had no share of knowledge. As a result they were in complete isolation from other educated and civilised people.2 They were against life in towns, because they were proud of their own way of life and activities as bedouins. One of their poets Al-Qattāmi states: He who has been attracted by the sedentary life, Then what kind of rural men does he see us to be. We attack neighbors wherever they are, When we are destitute for robbery. We attack whoever the time has come for, In the cold morning at dawn. Sometimes it is … our own brother, If we could not find anybody except him.3 In these poems al-Qattami boasts of the Bedouin way of life of his tribesmen over that of the town dwellers, and the attacks on people even on their relatives when there is a need for that. It was this type of life the Qur’an has called jāhiliyyah and states: “Do they then seek after a judgment of the days of ignorance? But who, for a people whose faith is assured, can give better judgment than God.”4 Regarding their activities and the economic life, there were contacts between them and other nations. They had two commercial trips, one to Al-Sham where Rome was situated during the summer, and the others to Yemen, Ethiopia and Persia in winter. “Their covenants covering journeys by winter and summer.”5 Based on this explanation, it is unfair to think that the term jāhiliyyah or hayat jāhiliyyah refers to sheer ignorance. Shi‘ir or poetry will take a lion’s share of our discussion because of its importance in Arabic literature. Even literary critics who dealt with the subject of the classification of poets and their poetry, when they refer toadab (literature) they mean shi‘ir (poetry) only,6 but there are other parts of the literature such as nasthr prose, khitābah oration, amthāl proverbs and hikam wisdom sayings. The word adab, which is known in Arabic language as literature, has another meaning, which is good behavior, respect and politeness in dealing with other people. It can be defined as an ethical quality of the soul, good upbringing, urbanity and courtesy.7 In the Middle Ages it referred to a banquet or special invitation. It was implied to mean the etiquette in eating, drinking and clothing, the etiquette of the boon companion, the etiquette of disputation and the etiquette of study and teaching. Starting from the first century of theHijrah , it was employed to refer to the intellectual sciences as distinct from religious knowledge. In the third to ninth

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL ARABIC LITERATURE IN THE RISE OF ISLAMIC CIVILISATION 215 century, Jāhiz emerged as a prominent adīb poet of Arabic poetry (shi’ir), prose (nathr), and ethics (akhlaq).8 The main elements of adab are moral and social upbringing, intellectual education and entertainment.9 The word shi‘ir is derived from sha‘ara; for example, sha‘ara fūlan shi‘iran, “he says poetry.” Sha‘ara bihī shu‘ūran means, “to sense it and to know it.” And sha‘ura fulān shi‘iran: means “to possess a skill in poetry and to master it.”10 For example, yā layta shi‘irī means “I wish I knew.”11 According to Al-Jurjani, al-shi‘ir (poetry) literally means knowledge; technically, it is a rhymed statement with meters composed with intention, and because of this last condition we can exclude, for example, the Qur’anic verse: Allazī anqaḍa zahrak, wa rafa‘anā laka zikraka. This verse is a rhymed statement, yet it is not poetry, though it is composed with meters and rhymes, but it is not intended to be poetry.12 He further states that in the terminology of logicians, shi‘ir is “an analogy which consists of mukhayyalāt (imaginations), and its intention is reaction of the soul to the desired and undesired things, (al-targīb wal al-tanfīr), for example, the poets in their poetry do call alcohol yāqūt sayyāh (liquid ruby), and honey murrah muhwi’at (vomiting bitter).13 In the Qur’an the words shi‘ir (poetry) and shā‘ir, (a poet), the plural of which is shu‘arā, are mentioned. In surah al-shu‘arā the famous verse: And the poets, it is those straying in evil, who follow them, seest thou not that they wander distracted in every valley? And that they say what they practice not? Except those who believe, work righteousness, engage much in the remembrance of God, and defend themselves only after they are unjustly attacked. And soon will the unjust assailants know what vicissitudes their affairs will take.14 The surah from which this verse is quoted chronologically belongs to the middle Meccan period, during the encounter of the prophet with the pagans of Mecca. The prophet’s message was resisted by the votaries of evil, but the truth is not like vain poetry, and ought to triumph at last. The lesson learnt is this surah is that the Qur’an is pure truth unlike poetry of vain poets, and that the prophet, according to the Qur’an: “He does not speak (yanṭiqu) of his wish, it is but what has been revealed unto him.”15 For this reason, we see that other verses in the Qur’an repeatedly stress the difference between the purity and authenticity of the truthfulness of the message that the Qur’an reveals to the prophet and the poetry of vain poets, which does not bear any truth. We can deduce this understanding from the following Qur’anic verses: “We have not instructed the prophet in poetry nor is it meet for him; this is no less than a message and a Qur’an making things clear.”16 “Nay they say these are medleys of dream! Nay he forged it! Nay

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 216 SULEIMAN BOAYO he is but a poet! Let him then bring us a sign like the ones that were sent to prophets of old.”17 “And say: what! Shall we give up our gods for the sake of a poet possessed?”18 Or do they say: a poet! We await for him some calamity hatched by time.19 It is not the word of a poet, little it is ye believe!20 We do understand from these verses that the Qur’an does not refer to the language of poetry or to the beautiful composition of its phrases, but to the truthfulness of the substance in it. Besides, it is not the entire shi‘ir poetry that was evil. This can be justified by the hadith of the prophet: “Surely there is wisdom in some poetry, if something becomes obscure or ambiguous before you in the Qur’an (in terms of the language) you should search for it in the poetry, verily it is a classical Arabic language.”21 Arabs were known for their poetry, it was popular and it spread widely, for it was a record of their pride, dignity as well as news of their tribes and relatives. Jāhiz says: “Every mankind or nation depends on the continuation of their heritage and the protection of their virtues. Therefore, the Arabs in their jāhiliyyah times strived to preserve that by depending on the poetry which was put in meters and the rhythmic speech and that was their book of the treasury.”22 Ibn Qutaybah made a similar remark: “Indeed God made poetry as a treasure for the sciences of the Arabs, as a protection for their literature, as a book of record for their linage and news; it does not become ragged or damaged across the time.”23 It is worth mentioning that during this period, every tribe had a poet, and the role of the poet was to defend kinship and the dignity of the tribe he belonged to. Poetry was considered as an important means of communication. It was known that every tribe burst into celebration in the event that a poet sprung from it. There were many good ideas and elements in pre-Islamic poetry, such as encouragement of seeking knowledge, politics, justice, freedom, advice and ethics. Tarafah bin al-Abdah’s poetry was famous for ethical ideas, Hārith bin Hillizah for knowledge and Zuhair bin Abī Sulmah for wisdom (al-hikmah) amounting to philosophical theories.24 Prose was another important component of Arabic literature in pre-Islamic times. It included advice which sprung from their experience of life. A prominent figure in this field was Ibn al-Hārith bin Muhrith bin al-Zarb, known for orations; Qass bin Sā‘adah al-Iyādī was one the popular orators. Other types of literature included proverbs, oracular sayings, and stories of love, adventure and entertainment. There were other poets whose ideas were right and good for human civilisation, but these did not emerge until the arrival of Islam.

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Poetry (Shi'ir) in Early Islam The civilisational ideas and elements in the poetry and prose of the pre-Islamic era were brought to early Islamic period. However, to discuss the role they played in this early period of Islam, it is noteworthy to make it clear that when Islam came, it rejected unethical poetry of the pre-Islamic period on account of various ideas that were perceived as being against Islamic principles, such as poetry describing women features, igniting flames of wars between the tribes, and inciting oppression of the weak by the strong. Hence, during the early period of Islam, poetry was purged of these kinds of negative elements. Some veteran poets, such as Hassān bin Thābit, Abdullah bin Rawwāh and others, were even classified as Islamic poets. The influence of Islam on the poets and their poetry was very obvious. ‘Umar bin Khattāb once sent for Lubaid bin Rabia‘at al-‘Amirī, who was among the poet-writers, and asked him to write poems on Islam. Lubaid went to his house and wrote surah al-Baqarah on paper, brought it to ‘Umar, and said to him: “This is what Allah has substituted for me in Islam in the place of poems.”25 Hassān bin Thābit’s poems uplifted the morals of the prophet’s civilising mission. He composed poems to silence the non-believers among the Quraish people, and to halt them from hindering the prophet in continuing his mission toward laying the foundations of the Islamic civilisation. According to some sources, poetry (shi‘ir) was recorded during the time of jāhiliyyah by virtue of the fact that writing was already known at that time. And when the Qur’an was revealed, it called on the Arabs to employ writing in some of their business transactions to secure their rights.26 There is a difference of opinion among scholars on the issue of books.27 However, there were indications that some recording of literature already took place during the early period of Islam. One of these was the use of special terms used in the process of recording, such as al-daftar, al-karrāsah, al-kitāb and al- mushaf. These terms were classical Arabic terms. They were used in both pre- Islamic and early Islamic poetry.28 Books of military campaigns and the biographies of the prophet, al-magāzī wa al-siyar, were also recorded alongside hadīth and tafsīr, and contained lots of poetry composed by pre-Islamic poets and veterans. They were the materials that many commentators of the Qur’an resorted to in order to identify the causes of revelations, ascertain citations and for the purpose of understanding the meaning of the unusual terms.29 Some of the companions of the prophet were eager to record poetry. Therefore, the permission given by Umar bin Khattāb for pre-Islamic poetry to be written down was not an innovation. Umar bin Khattāb, while on the podium giving

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 218 SULEIMAN BOAYO sermon one day, asked: “What are you saying in it?” He was referring to the Qur’anic verse: “Au ya’akhuzuhum ‘alā takhawwufin ‘Or that He may not call them to account by a process of slow wastage, for thy Lord is indeed full of kindness and mercy.’” Everybody was mute; an old man from Huzail tribe stood up and said: “This is our language, our dialect. Takhawwuf means attanaqus.” ‘Umar then asked, “Do the Arabs know that in their poetry?” He said, “Yes, our poet Abu Kabīr described his she-camel,” and he recited the poem. Umar said: “You must hold on to your book of the treasure, you would not go astray.” The companions said: “What book do you mean?” He said: “Shi‘ir jāhiliyyah, surely there is in the commentary of your book the meaning of your speech.”30 Ibn Abass was also aspired by pre-Islamic poetry. It is narrated that an Arab bedouin came to him and said: “Takhawwafanī mālī akhun lī zuāalimun, falā takhzulnī al-yauma yā khaira man baqiya.” Then Ibn Abbas said: “Takhawwafaka means tanaqasska,” and the bedouin said “Yes,” and then he said: “God is great!” And he recited the same Qur’anic verse mentioned earlier. He was an avid admirer of pre-Islamic poetry and urged people to learn it, and to employ it in commenting on the Qur’an. On that occasion he stated: “If you are asked about something concerning strange words in the Qur’an, you should search for it in the poetry; surely it is the book of treasure of the Arabs.”31 In a nutshell, the existence of poetry in this period was obvious. Tāhā Hussein declared that when we look at the Islamic countries during this period of Islam, we find that poetry existed and flourished in some of the regions, but it barely existed in others. It existed and flourished in al-Hijaz and Iraq and in its urban and rural areas. In Al-Sham, there was little poetry as one could hardly find a poet except for one or two. The poetry that we find in al-Sham during the Umayyad period was brought there from other regions.32

Poetry (Shi'ir) in the Umayyad Period Poetry improved in this period, in terms of its linguistic diversity, rhetorical expression and other artistic merits, to the extent that they were far superior to those of pre-Islamic poetry, and “the reason for it [is] that those who lived under Islam benefited from the model of high-class speech provided by the Qur’an and Hadith.”33 In this period, Al-Walīd bin Yazīd collected a lot of poetry written by Arabs and recorded it, but he was not the first to do so. Those who preceded him among the caliphs of the Umayyads did the same. Walid bin Abdul Malik for example had a special writer whom he charged with collecting and recording poetry as well as news about Arabs. Abdul Malik bin Marwan requested his writers to write down the commentary of the Qur’an for him, and when they finished, he kept it

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL ARABIC LITERATURE IN THE RISE OF ISLAMIC CIVILISATION 219 in the dīwān. He treated poetry the same way he treated the commentary of the Qur’an. He had even gone beyond this and authorised his writers to collect al- mu‘allaqāt for him.34 There was a humanistic kind of literature (adab) that taught politeness and imparted culture, which took on a nationalistic character during the time of the Umayyad régime, and that was when the poet become an expert in the knowledge of the ancient Arab poets.

Shi'ir in the Abbasid Period When the Arabs conquered Iraq, Iran, Sham and Egypt, they started to absorb various elements of other civilisations into their own. The caliphs, ministers, mayors and leaders in this period were extremely generous to scholars and poets. Amīn exaggerated his generosity, when he approved a daily payment of hundred thousand of dirhams to a poet called Abdullah bin Ayub al-Taymi. These floods of gifts to scholars, physicians and poets had a huge impact on the renaissance in the sciences, literature and the arts.35 Poetry improved greatly during this period. The main reason for this was the development of the social life within the Islamic civilisation, and the interaction between the Arabs with other nations, namely Persians, Byzantines and Egyptians. They benefited from their thoughts, ideas, and experiences. Also, great importance was attached to poetry by the rulers. They showered the poets with precious gifts. This led to a rapid renaissance of new ideas. Many literary and scientific works were translated into Arabic from other languages. The poets of this period followed in the steps of their predecessors in composing poems. They developed the old objectives of poetry as well as identified new ones. The new objectives included admonition and asceticism. A prominent figure in this field was Abu al-‘Itāhia. Another novelty was educational and character-building poetry. A well-known figure in this area was Aban, who composed poems about the rules of fasting and alms giving. Other well-known poets at this period included Bashār bin Burd, Abū Nawwās, Abū Tammām, Ibn Rūmī, Al-Buhtury, Abū Tayyib al-Mutanabbī and others. Popular topics in Arabic poetry included al-rathā (elegiac poetry), al-madīh (eulogy), al-hijā (defamatory poetry), al-wasf (description), al-nasīb (amatory) and al-mujūn (impudence). The prose in this period reached its zenith of beauty. The art of writing developed tremendously. Many new elements were added to it, which were not known even during pre-Islamic times. It is important to mention the influence of the holy Qur’an and the hadith in the prose of this time. The most important contribution of the Qur’an and the hadith was the recognition of the need to state clearly the purpose of speech, to choose the right words, and make the content conform to the aim of speech.

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The political and social conditions of the period motivated people to learn. Among the well-known figures in this domain was “Al-Jahiz (d.255/868-69). His “Book of Animals” is a fine specimen of an amalgamation of art and science. Ibn al-Muqafa’s social prose was also well known. He was Persian and represented this trend in Arabic literary prose. Kalīlah wa Dimnah, his most popular work in Arabic literature, is a translation of the Pahlavi version of An Indian Marrow of Princes, a work which centers on moral improvement and intellectual refinement.36 His other work, which serves the same purpose, is al-Adab al-Ṣagīr; the first part of the book treats rulers and the second, friends. One observes that the intermingling of different cultures and norms widened the domain of adab to include Arabic poetry and prose, Persian literature of the epic, gnomic and narrative tradition, the Indian world with its fables, and the Greek world with its practical philosophy, especially in ethics and politics.37 Story cycles, high-class fiction, literacy epistles (risāil) and rhetorical works (maqāmāt) all contributed to the flourishing of prose in this period.38 The proverbs (al-amthāl) as essential components of Arabic literature and their role in the rise of the Islamic civilisation, cannot be overstated. Pre-Islamic Arabs were scrupulous in writing down proverbs and preserving them. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that among the first works recorded by the Arabs during early Islam was the ‘Books of Proverbs.’ Other books of proverbs, such as that of Sahara bin ‘Ayyāsh al-Abdi, were written since the reign of Mu‘āwiyah. Concerning the khitābah (oration), “It is an art of the public speech for the purpose of convincing and winning the hearts of people.”39 Arabs knew it as they knew poetry. The word is mentioned in the Qur’an in the aforementioned verse: “And the servants of (God) Most Gracious and those who walk on the earth in humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say peace.”40 Every tribe possessed an orator as they did in the case of poetry. The orator was the official spokesman of his tribe in wars, hopes, ambitions, happiness and sadness. The oration had huge impact on pre-Islamic tribes, in terms of their unity, power, prestige and respect from the other tribes. They employed their orations in the services of the tribe as well as individuals, and for establishing good relations with other tribes. The oration from the beginning was considered as a weapon in peace, in war and in striving to realise tribal aspirations. Therefore, it was not unusual for the oration to be considered as a communiqué to guide people, to call them to the worship of Allah, and to abandon associating Him with other beings. The oration had tribal, political, religious and social objectives. These were periodically discussed on communal occasions. The oration was intended to strengthen the determination of the members of the tribe and to inspire them with high ambitions. As for religious objectives, the holy Qur’an had a great influence on them, because even before Islam, the aims of the orators included

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL ARABIC LITERATURE IN THE RISE OF ISLAMIC CIVILISATION 221 participating in religious rituals and customs that were practiced before Islam. But when the holy Qur’an came with Islam, the orators started to mimic its ways of expressions, adapting, quoting and citing them.41 Al-khitābh consisted of various types, namely al-hamāsiyyah, (enthusiastic) al-wa‘aziyyah, (admonition) al-mausimiyyah, festival al-rasmiyyah (ceremonial) and al-amlāk (possession). The content of khitābah was typically composed of three parts, namely al-muqaddimah (introduction) al-‘ard (body of presentation) and al-khātimah (conclusion). The characteristics of al-khatīb (orator) were also of utmost importance.42 It is worth mentioning that al-khitābah played an important role in the rise of the Islamic civilisation. The aims it fostered included freedom, the ambition of the ummah to a better life, the eradication of illiteracy, bringing wars and revolutions to an end, and an ability to accommodate a multiplicity of political parties.

Role of Grammar and Grammarian At the end of the Umayyad period a large group of scholars in Basrah and Kufah developed an interest in collecting the expressions within the Arabic language and preserving the poetry of the Arabs, from both pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. One of the most important reasons behind this campaign was the dire need of foreigners who converted to Islam to learn the language of the holy Qur’an. Another reason was the spread of errors in the use of Arabic among both the Arabists and the Arabs themselves. Three consecutive generations of Basran and Kufan scholars were active in the collection and systematisation of the Arabic terms and Arabic poetry. The leader of the first generation in this important project in Basrah was Abu ‘Amru bin ‘Alā (d.154 H). He was a recognised authority in his field. Jahiz states: “He was the most knowledgeable of the people in rare words, the Arabic language, the Qur’an, the poetry and the history of Arabs and of other people.”43 The grammarians would seldom come across good poetry from the pre-Islamic or Islamic period without making sure that they recorded, illustrated and explained it. These efforts made it easier for the contemporary poets as well as for other people to learn good Arabic and to use it well. According to Shawqī Daif, the main reasons that induced the grammarian of this period to undertake this painstaking work were the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions. They did not want the meaning of these two main sources of the Islamic civilisation to become ambiguous in the understanding of people and the scholars themselves. He quoted Jāhiz as stating: Arabs do possess proverbs, etymology of words, morphological structures and the coinage of speech, which signify what they mean

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and intend to say. He, who does not know them, becomes ignorant in interpreting the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition. And he who studies these speeches and these kinds of sciences and he is not from this field of specialisation, ruins himself and ruins other people.44 In addition to this, since the Qur’an and the hadith are the two main sources of the Islamic civilisation, the caliphs of Abbasid era made a determined effort to protect the language of the Qur’an and hadith. They sent scholars to various places to study Arabic, and to gather the knowledge of all that is related to it, including genealogy, history and poetry. The intellectual life of this period flourished, because of lots of books were translated into Arabic from Hindi, Persian and Greek. As we have mentioned earlier, Kalīlah wa Dimnah, whose Persian translation from Hindi was rendered into Arabic by Ibn Muqaff‘a, significantly impacted the wise sayings and proverbs during the Abbasid era.45 When Islam came, Arabic was rich in various forms of expression. It also had a literary heritage for expressing different types of heartfelt and social sentiments; the language was wonderful since the pre-Islamic period. The Arabs were eloquent people, the ‘ukāz market was the place where poets and men of letters and rhetoric assembled to compete with one another in their poetry. For this reason, Arabic was purified from various errors. Consequently, classical Arabic became the official language of every tribe. But when the Arabs began to interact with foreigners after the expansion of Islam into neighbouring lands, people began to commit errors in the language. So the need for grammar to salvage the language became evident. Many sources agreed that the study of Arabic grammar started in al-Basrah, where it was nurtured and developed. The scholar who initiated the study of Arabic grammar was Abu al-Aswad al-Duali (d.67 H). There were two schools of thought on Arabic grammar, the Basran and the Kufan Schools. The tribal tension between the people of these two famous towns in Iraq was always conspicuous. The conflicts between them, however, turned into political and intellectual discourse. As a result, many discussions, disputes and debates occurred between them. One such debate for example, was the famous debate between Sībawaihī and al Kisā’ī. In other debates the relative importance of grammar and logic was discussed. The debate between Abū Bishr Matta Ibn Yūnus, and the grammarian, Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī was one example. The main reason for this debate was provided by Abū Bishr declaration: “The logician has no need for grammar, whereas the grammarian does need logic; since logic enquires into the sense, whereas grammar enquires into the sound.”46 Al-Sīrāfī as the grammarian rose to the

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL ARABIC LITERATURE IN THE RISE OF ISLAMIC CIVILISATION 223 occasion and debated Abū Bishr vehemently in favor of grammar. Scholars, such as Muhsin Mahdi believed that the debate was considered in the literary and academic milieu of Baghdad a victory of grammar over logic, as well as a victory of the grammarians and theologians over logicians and philosophers.47 According to early sources, Abu al-Aswad al-Dualī was the leading scholar in al-Basrah, where his students taught Arabic grammar. He invented the vocalisational signs of al-raf‘a, al-nasb, al-jarr, and al-tanwīn. These were known as “Dots of Abu al-Aswad al-Dualī.” This could well have been the most important service he contributed to the development of Arabic grammar, as this was one of the first steps in this direction. Also, his students Nasr bin ‘Asim and Yahya bin Ya’mar introduced the use of the single and double dots that are used with Arabic letters to distinguish them better from each other, such as al-bā’a, al-yā‘a and al-nūn.48 One will not be able to enumerate all the scholars of this school and their contributions to Arabic language and literature. But one could mention al-Khalīl Ahmad al-Farāhīdī. He became known for his identification and clarification of a number of obscure terms in Arabic. He was the first to discover the science of metrics or prosody (‘ilm al-‘arūd) and to apply it in the study of poetry. He was also the author of a book, the first of its kind in this area, that explored the accuracy of language, kitāb al-‘ain. Sībawaihi and his book al-kitāb are considered to be the zenith of Basran grammar school of thought. Abu Ja‘afar al-Ruwasi was a prominent figure within the Kufan school of thought, the rival of the Basran school. However, he also sought knowledge in al-Basrah. He schooled first under Abu ‘Amru bin al-‘Alā, and later under Issah bin ‘Umar al-Thaqafī. He was the first Kufan to write a book on Arabic grammar entitled, al-Faisal. Al-Kisāī and al-Farrā also became very famous within the school; both were students of Abū Ja’afar. The differences of opinion and robust debates about grammar between these two schools were initially due to the personal proclivities and political tendencies of the participants. These later turned into intellectual narrow-mindedness between the two schools. Yet, the results brought tremendous benefits to the development of the Arabic language and literature, which greatly contributed to Islamic scholarship and the rise of the Islamic civilisation. The most popular works in the field of the Arabic grammar are al-Kitāb of Seebawaihi, al-Tasrīf and al-Munasaf of Ibn Jinnī, al-Muffasal of al- Zamakhsharī, Lam’al-Addilah of Ibn al-Anbār, al-Al-fiyyah of Ibn Mālik and Mugni al-Labeed and Shuzūr al-Zahab of Ibn Hishām. These works represent different commentaries by different scholars. It is worth mentioning that Arabic grammar subsumes other subjects relevant to it, namely lexicography, rhetoric, morphology and linguistics.

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Mother Sources of Arabic Literature Al-Masādir Al-Adab Al-‘Arabī In addition to books on Arabic literature based on a broad meaning of literature, there are other books, with distinctive characters and methods with specific objectives, such as the books of the classification of poets, in which the poets were classified since the pre-Islamic period. 1-Al-Bayan wa al-Tabyin of Abu Osman Amru bin Bahr al-Jahiz. 2-Al-Kamil of Muhammad bin Yazid al-Mabrad. 3-‘Uyun al-Akhbar of Abdullah bin Muslim bin Qutaibah. 4-Al-Iqd al-Farid of Ibn ‘Abd Rabuh al-Andalusi 5-Kitab al-Agani of Abu al-Faraj al-Asfahani. 6- Nihayat al-Arab fi funun al-Adab of shihab al-Din al-Nuwairi. The different categories of the sources of Arabic literature are: 1- Kitab al-Amali of Abu ‘Ali al-Qali, 2-Tabaqat al-Shuara of Ibn Sullam al-Jumahi. 3-Mu‘ajam al-Shu‘ara of al-Marzabani. 4-Mu‘ajam al-Udaba of Yaqut al-Hamawi. 5-Nafh al-Tiyyib min Gusn al-Andaws al-Ratib of Ahamad bin Muhammad popularly known as al-Maqqari.49 One should not forget linguistic and lexicographic sources.

Conclusion and Recommendations Important issues arising from the discussion above with regard to the status of the Arabic literature and its components, namely poetry, prose, oration and proverbs in the pre-Islamic period, during early Islam, and throughout the Umayyad and the Abbasid periods include: (1) the Arabic literature contained distinctive civilisational features, (2) Arabic literature played an important role in the rise of the Islamic civilisation, and (3) while Arabic poetry cannot be called a philosophical work, it is of great value in so far as it provides valuable insights into the various stages of the Arab and non-Arab way of life. Similarly, the educational influence of Arabic poetry on Muslims and non-Muslims cannot be under estimated. Arabic literature and its components should be taught through translation. The recommended method is to keep close to the Arabic, while allowing the English idiom to develop its natural strength, and making adjustments as required by the sophistication of the originals. • Literature plays an important role in civilising a given society. • Literature can play a significant role in helping to achieve civilisational renewal. • Prizes and funding should be made available to aspiring young writers. • Literature has an important ethical role to play in education. • Literature should be guided by the knowledge of the Qur’anic revelation and the example of the prophet as contained in the collected works on the prophetic traditions.

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Notes * Suleiman Mohammed Hussein Boayo is a senior lecturer at at the Center for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science and Civilisation (CASIS), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. Prior to his appointment at CASIS, he served as an Academic Fellow at International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), from 2007 to 2009, and as an Assistant Professor at the Department of General Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia, from 2009 to 2012. He obtained his Ph.D. in Islamic Civilizations, from International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), Kuala Lumpur in 2006. 1. Al-Furqān, 25:63. Translations of all Qur’anic verses in this paper are based on Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Quran: Original Arabic Text, with English Translation & Selected Commentaries (Kuala Lumpur: Saba Islamic Media Sdn. Bhd., 1998). 2. For more information on the contact of Arabs to other past civilisations see, Al- Asad, Nasir Al-ddin, Masādir al-Shi‘ir al-Jāhilī wa Qīmatuhā al-Tārīkhiyyah, 7th ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Jīl, 1988), pp. 18-19. 3. Saba, Tawfiq Mohammad, Qiyam Hadāriyyah fi al-Quran al-Karim (Cairo: Dar al-Manār, 1984), p. 21, Al-Qattami is ‘Umair bin Shuyyim al-Nasrānī al-Taglabī, he was contemporary of Al-Akhtal who is also Amawi. The translation of these poems is mine. 4. Al-Mā’idah, 5:50. 5. Quraysh, 106:2. 6. Al-Majālī, Jihād, Tabaqāt al-Shu‘arā fī al-Naqdi al-‘Adabī ‘inda al-‘Arab. 1st ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Jīl, 1992), p. 59. 7. H. Kilpatrick, ‘Adab’, Encyclopaedia of Arabic Literature, (London, 1998), p.56, see chapter 10. 8. F. Gabrieli, ‘Adab’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed. vol. 1, p. 175. 9. H. Kilpatrick ‘Adab’, Encyclopaedia of Arabic Literature, pp. 56-7. 10. Al-Muajam al-Wajiz, Majma‘a al-Lugat al-Arabia (Cairo: Dar al Tahrir liltabi wa- al-Nashr, 1973) p. 344. 11. Ibn Manzūr, Lisān al-‘Arab, vol. 4, (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, undated), pp. 2273-4. 12. Al-Jurjānī, Ali bin Muhammad, Al-Ta‘arīfāt, 1st ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al- Masry), p. 140. 13. Ibid, p. 140. .arā, 26:224-227׳Al-Shu .14 15. Al-Najm, 53:3-4 16. Yasin, 36:69 17. Al-Anbiya, 21:5 18. Al-Naml, 27:36 19. Al-Tur, 52:30 20. Al-Haqqah, 69:41 21. This hadith is quoted from Ibn Manzūr, Lisān al-‘Arab, vol. 4, (Beirut: Dār al- Ma‘ārif, undated), pp. 2273-4. 22. Al-Asad Nasir al-addin, Masādir al-Shi‘ir al- Jāhilī wa Qīmatuhā al-Tārīkhiyyah, 7th ed. (Beirut: Dar al- Jīl, 1988), p. 109. 23. Ibid, p. 109.

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24. Farrukh,‘Umar, Al- Fikr Al-‘Arabī. (Beirut: Dar ‘ilm Lilmalāyīn, 1996), p. 170. 25. Al-Asad Nasir al-addin, Maṣādir al-Shi‘ir al-Jāhilī wa Quiyamuhā al- Tārikhiyyah, p. 115. 26. Ismail, ‘Izzudin, Al- Masadir al-Adabiyyah wa al-Lugawiyyah fī al-Turāth al- ‘Arabi, (Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-Arabiyyah.1975), p. 14. 27. It is known that the recording of the linguistic, poetry and general Arabic literature did not take place except at the end of the second century and the beginning of the third century of hijrah; however, some scholars deny this late date. The available recordings, which were ascribed to the men of letters of the end of the second century, were only verbal lessons, they did not write them down; rather it was written down by their students or by the students of their students and then ascribed by them to their teachers. See, in the footnotes in Al-Asad Nasir al- addin, Maṣādir al-Shi‘ir al- Jāhilī wa Quiyamuhā al-Tārikhiyyah, p. 134. 28. Ibid, p. 138. 29. Al-Asad Nasir al-Addin, Maṣādir al-Shi‘ir al- Jāhilī wa Qīmatuhā al- Tārīkhiyyah, p. 151-2. 30. Ibid, p. 152. 31. Ibid, p. 152. 32. Tāhā Hussein, Min Tārīkh al-Adabi al-‘Arabī (Beirūt: Dar ‘Ilm Lilmalāyīn, 1970), pp. 69-70. 33. M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy Vol. 2 (Wiesbaden, 1968) p. 996. 34. Al-Asad Nasir al-Addin, Maṣādir al-Shi‘ir al-Jāhilī wa Quiyamuhā al- Tārikhiyyah, p. 158. Mu‘alaqāt consisted of ten or seven poems chosen by the Arabs from old poetry, which was written with golden ink and hanged on the curtains of the Ka‘abah. This practice was due to the attachment of Arabs to the poetry. 35. Daif, Shawqi, Tārīkh al-Adab al-‘Arabī, Al-‘Asr al-‘Abbasī al-Awwal, 6th ed. (Cairo: Dar al- Ma'ārif: 1966), p. 48. 36. This work was first published by Matba‘at Karam in Damacus Syria in 1957. 37. Gabrielli, ‘Adab’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 175. On Ibn Muqafa’a and his contribution to adab, see, Moralia: Les Notions morales dans la Literature Persane du 3e/9e au 7e/13e siècle, Moralia: The moral notions in Persian literature form the 3rd/9th to the 7th/ 13th century, by Charles-Henri de Fouchecuor, Institut Français de Recherché en Iran, Paris, 1986, pp. 414-20. 38. M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy Vol. 2 (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 107. 39. Al-Janābī, Abdul Karim Ibrahim, Tārikh al-Khitābah al-‘Arabiyyah. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfiyyah al-Dīniyyah, 2005), p. 20. 40. Sūrah Al- Furqān: 63. 41. Al-Janābī, Abdulkarim Ibrahim, Tārikh al-Khitābah al-‘Arabiyyah, p. 23. 42. Ibid, pp. 24-34. 43. Daif, Shawqī, Tarikh al- Adab al-‘Arabī, 6th ed. (Cairo: Dar al- Maarif, undated), p. 119. See also, Al-Jāhiz, Abu ‘Usman ‘Amru bin Bahr, Al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn, edited by Abdu al-Salam Harun, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Maktatabat al-khanji in Egypt and Al-Muthana in Baghdad, 1960). 44. Ibid, p. 139. See also, Al-Jāhiz, Al-Hayawān, edited by Abdu al-Salam Harun, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab, 1969).

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45. Ibid, p. 149. 46. The Discussion between Abū Bishr Matta and Abū Sa‘īd al-Sīrāfī on the Merits of Logic and Grammar. The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1905, p.116. 47. Al-Fārābī, Kitāb Al-khurūf, (Book of Letters), edited by Muhsin Mahdi, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dar El-Mashreq publishers, 1990), p. 47. 48. Al-Afghānī, Saeed, Min Tārīkh al-Nahwu, (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Falāh,1980), p. 27. See also, Al- Najaār Muhammad Abdul Aziz, Diyā’a al-Sālikīn ilā Awḍah al-Masālik, vol. 1, (Cairo: Mahtabat Ibn Taymiyyah, undated), p. 13. 49. Izzual al- Din Ismail, Al-Masādir al- Adabiyyah wa al-Lugawiyyah, fī al-Turāth al-Arabī. (Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-Arabiyyah, 1975), pp. 132-277.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Al-Afghani, Saeed, Min Tārīkh al-Nahwu, Kuwait: Maktabat al-Falaah, 1980. 2. Al-Hassan, Mohammad al-Bashir & Mohammad Tayib Abdallah, Al-Adab wa al-Nusūs, Al-‘Asr al-Jāhilī, 9th ed. Dar al-Nashir al-Tarbāwī, 1994. 3. Al-Fārābī, Kitāb Al-khurūf (Book of Letters), edited by Muhsin Mahdi, 2nd ed. Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq Publishers, 1990. 4. Farrukh, Umar, Al- Fikr Al-‘Arabī. Beirut: Dar ‘ilm Lilmalāyīn, 1996. 5. Musah, Mohammad Othoman Mohammad, Al-Adab wa al-Nūsus, al-‘Asr al- Amawī Abassi, 8th ed. Dar Al-Majid Litibaa. 1994. 6. M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. 2, Wiesbaden, 1968. 7. Al-Asad Nasir al-addin, Masadir al-Shiar al- Jāhilī wa Quiyamuha al- Tarikhiyyah, 7th ed. Beirut: Dar al- Jil, 1988. 8. Daif, Shawqi, Tarikh al- Adab al-Arab, 6th ed. Cairo: Dar al- Maarif, 1966. 9. Daif, Shawqi, Tarikh al-Adab al-Arab, 2nd ed. Cairo: Dar al- Maarif, 1973. 10. Daif Shawqi, Al-Fannu wa Mazahibuhu fi al-shiar al-‘Arabi, 9th ed. Cairo: Dar Maarif, 1960. 11. Al-Majali, Jihad, Tabaqat al-Shuara fi al-Naqdi al-Adabi inda al-Arab. 1st ed. Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1992. 12. Al-Rufai, Anwar, Al-Islam fi Hadāratihi wa Nuzumihi, 3rd ed. Dimashq: Dar al- Fikr, 2002. 13. Al-Janabi, Abdul Karim Ibrahim, Tārikh al-Khitābah al-‘Arabiyyah. Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfiyyah al-Dīniyyah, 2005. 14. Abbass, Ihsan, Tarikh al-Naqd al-Adabi inda al-‘Arab. Amman: Dar al-Shuruq, 1993. 15. Al-Najjar, Mohammad Abdul-Aziz, Diyāu al-Salik ila Awdah al-Masalik, Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyyah, undated. Vol.1 16. Saba, Tawfiq Mohammad, Qiyam Hadariyyah fi al-Quran al-Karim. Cairo: Dar al-Manar, 1984. 17. Abdul-Baqi, Mohammad Fuad, Al-Lua lua wa al-Marjan. Cairo: Dar al-hadith, 2007. 18. Muhammad bin Ismail, Sahih al-Bukhari, 6th ed., edited by Nassar, Mahmud Mohammad. Beirut: Dar Al- Kutub Al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2009. 19. Ibn al-Muqqafa, Abdul-Allah Kalilah wa Dimnah, 1st ed. Dimashq: Dar Kiram, undated.

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20. Dermenghem, Emile, Les plus Beaux Textes Arabes. Paris: Editiona du vieux colombier, 1951. 21. The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1905. 22. Al-Jāhiz, Al-Hayawān, edited by Abdu al-Salam Harun, 3rd ed. Beirut: Dar al- Kitab, 1969. 23. Al-Jāhiz, Abu ‘Usman ‘Amru bin Bahr, Al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn, edited by Abdu al-Salam Harun, 2nd ed. Cairo: Maktatabat al-khanji in Egypt and Al-Muthana in Baghdad, 1960. 24. H. Kilpatrick, ‘Adab’, Encyclopaedia of Arabic Literature. London, 1998. 25. Izzual al-Din Ismail, Al-Masadir al-Adabiyyah wa al-Lugawiyyah, fi al-Turath al-Arabi. Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-Arabiyyah, 1975.

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL THE RISE AND DECLINE OF SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS Asadullah Ali Al-Andalusi*

Abstract:Scientific productivity has been in decline in the Muslim world since as early as the 15th century and is only now reviving. Many factors have been attributed to the rise and decline, falling under two broad categories: external and internal influences. The popular understanding of scientific decline in the Muslim world, known as the 'classical narrative' promulgated by orientalists, suggests that only external influences – mainly the synthesis of Persian and Greek elements of civilisation into the Arab imperialist project – were the reasons for the sharp rise of the sciences within Islamic civilisation. Simultaneously, this narrative also suggests that internal influences, exemplified in the impact of Al-Ghazālī’s thought towards a more conservative religious approach, as opposed to the more 'rationalist' elements of the Mutazilite School of theology – played the most significant role in decline. This paper shows that the classical narrative is invalid, that there were more legitimate factors at play in both the rise and decline of science in the Muslim world, and that the contemporary stagnation in scientific productivity is a result of this misunderstanding.

Introduction The Muslim world was once known as a “cradle of civilisation”, leading a golden age of scientific discovery and past advancement between the th9 and as far as the 16th century CE, unheard of since the time of the Greeks and their protégés: Plato and Aristotle. New mathematics was constructed, such as Algebra. New medicines, surgical tools and procedures were invented, such as can be evidenced by Ibn Sina’s monumental work, The Canon of Medicine – used by Muslim and non-Muslim alike as an authoritative source for nearly 700 years. Astronomy was revolutionised to the point where most of the known stars, and the sophisticated astrolabes created to chart them, bear Arabic names – a tribute to their devout observers. Agriculture, architecture, and urban design in the Western part of the Islamic Empire, now modern day Spain, were developed far beyond the limits of any prior civilisation. However, these days are now but a glorified memory in the collective consciousness of the Muslims. From around the beginning of the 15th century CE, Islamic civilisation took a turn for the worse – a decline which would not rescind till the contemporary era. The current stage of post-regression, what might be called the “Period of Stagnation,” has yet to be fully remedied, although many historians and Muslim intellectuals have attempted to diagnose and offer solutions towards curing this ailment.

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This paper wishes to assess the popular understanding of the rise, decline, and stagnation of science within the Muslim world, in the hope of discerning whether it represents all three phenomena accurately. What motivates this effort is the hypothesis that the inability to revive scientific productivity – and the misplaced initiatives towards revitalisation among Muslims - is directly linked with this popular conception, and thus it must be challenged so as to pave the way for a newly realised reconstructive initiative for the future.

Constructs of the Discourse The initial question that should be asked is how the discourse behind rise, decline, and stagnation of scientific productivity in the Muslim word is conducted; meaning, what are the primary terms and concepts incorporated into the research on these phenomena. Understanding these terms and concepts is most important for fully comprehending the subject at hand, which revolves around scientific productivity in the Muslim world. It should not be surprising then that the first term that needs to be defined is ‘science’, especially in the context of the present discussion. The term ‘science’ has a long history, for which the scope of this research is not prepared to present an all-encompassing account of in its various usages throughout time. However, comparisons will be made between the traditional understanding of the term based on the perspectives of Islamic scholars, and its Western counterpart; the latter of which is, according to the Oxford Dictionary: “The intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.”1 In other words, science encompasses the natural study of the physical world through various disciplines such as biology, ecology, medicine, physics, etc. It may also be argued that the common usage of the term includes the aspect of technology as well, or the “application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry.”2 However, according to the traditional Islamic understanding of science, it is a much broader activity that includes other areas of study beyond the scope of the natural world and technology. This broader usage is similarly used in the West in a loose way to define other fields, such as sociology, history, and the like. Osman Bakar, a Muslim scholar who focusses on the philosophy of science from the Islamic perspective, notes the distinction between the formal usages of the term in the West and the Muslim world: The different understandings of the term science in the contemporary discourse present another major issue that needs clarification. To begin with, there are disagreements on terminological usage itself, whether

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the domain of knowledge to which the term ‘science’ is applied is to be confined to the natural sciences, or to be extended to cover the humanities and social sciences as well. Some people use the word in both senses. Given the fact that the term science has been used in modern scholarship in its broadest sense of an academic or scientific discipline, as in Islamic tradition in which the Arabic term ‘ulūm (sciences) is used, we prefer to adopt this usage.3 Based on the above view, Islamic scholars themselves are called ulama (scientists), for their knowledge of the various fields of understanding within Islam, which includes, but are not limited to, theology (aqidah), jurisprudence (fiqh), mysticism (tasawwuf), etc. This broader definition of science as a “body of knowledge (in the sense of discipline),”4 is further expounded upon by Alparslan Açikgenç as having essential aspects or content through which it is defined. These essential aspects are: (1) subject matter, (2) method, (3) theory, and (4) accumulated knowledge.5 The first aspect, known as the subject matter, is simply an “object of study” that “excludes all unrelated subjects of inquiry,” determined by the conventions of the community attempting to learn about the object in question.6 Following this is the aspect of method, or “the manner in which a scientific investigation is carried out,” which may vary between disciplines.7 The third aspect, known as theory, is “a formulation given as a provisional solution to a certain problem.”8 Açikgenç includes that a science can hold many theories for different problems and may even have ‘super-theories’, or doctrines which act as an umbrella for a cumulative number of theories addressing much more complex and intricate problems within the discipline.9 The final aspect that a science must have is that ofaccumulated knowledge, or the function of acquiring new information which can be named and organised, and which promotes the construction of a community of scholars that study the science in question.10 In other words, in order to be a science, it must become a tradition of acquiring knowledge about the object it studies. According to the above, anything may be considered a ‘science’ as long as it has these attributes. What makes one science different from another is simply the subject matter which it is concerned with. However, the types of subjects considered worthy of being considered ‘science’, as well as the problems which they seek to address, may differ depending on the axiological motivations towards creating a scientific tradition.11 For instance, the content of a purely secular science may differ tremendously in its goals and output with one which is more religious, because the values of the scientists of both traditions differ. As such, an ‘Islamic Science’ is one which takes place within the context of the worldview of Islam,

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 232 ASADULLAH ALI AL-ANDALUSI projecting it through the values of the Muslim scientists at work.12 However, not all worldviews are equal in the sense of aiding in the construction of a scientific tradition. Although all societies have some form of tradition of knowledge, or compilation of considered facts about the world they live in and their values, this does not necessitate that a science will necessarily be built around this tradition. It is outside the scope of this paper to give a full account of the differences between non-scientific worldviews versus scientific ones, however, it can be said that the above mentioned aspects that make up a ‘science’ must be inherently possible within a worldview prior to the rise of a scientific tradition. Any worldview that discredits or makes impossible any of the above mentioned aspects cannot ever produce science in the broadest sense of the term. However, the focus of this paper is not on the broadest sense of the term ‘science’, although the topic is within the context of Muslim world history. While the broader definition is utilised among Muslim scholars – and is influential in the grand scheme of reviving the Muslim word in ‘scientific productivity’ – this notion of science is not their major concern when speaking about its rise, decline, and stagnation; it is in reference to the more narrow definition mentioned prior. Likewise, this research adopts the latter understanding of the term. After having clarified the construct of ‘science’, it is imperative to this discourse to understand the terms representing the major influences behind the rise, decline, and stagnation of science in any given civilisation. These influences can be divided into two categories: internal and external. Historian of science Tony Huff considers internal influences to be “methods, theories, paradigms, and instrumentation of science,” and external influences as being “cultural and institutional structures that give scientific inquiry a secure place in the intellectual life of a society and civilisation.”13 However, Huff’s categorisation is in no way exhaustive, as it does not include other external influences outside of the context or will of the civilisation being analysed; for instance, the impact of natural disasters on a society, uninvited warfare, or geographical and economic disadvantages. While Huff does engage with these other factors when discussing the rise, decline, and stagnation of a particular scientific tradition, his focus on the purely internal and external influenceswithin a civilisation taints the integrity of his work, especially when speaking about Islamic civilisation, as will be evidenced later in this discussion. Following the above, a cursory analysis of the history behind the rise and decline of science in Islamic civilisation will be given. While it is not within the scope of this paper to elucidate a full picture of the various opinions surrounding these points in history, a summary of the popular narrative and the problems associated with it shall be explained so as to give a clearer picture as to some of the major internal and external influences behind the rise and decline.

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The ‘Classical Narrative’ and its Dissent Research centred on the phenomena of rise, decline, and stagnation of scientific productivity in Islamic civilisation and the contemporary Muslim world often projects the popular conception developed over time by many historians writing and lecturing on the subject. This popular conception, mostly promulgated by Orientalists,14 is referred to as the ‘classical narrative’ by historian George Saliba;15 an Arab Christian who has made great strides in deconstructing the former narrative and its biases. Saliba summarised the major assumptions made by the classical narrative in terms of rise and decline in his monumental work, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance: The narrative seems to start with the assumption that Islamic civilization was a desert civilization, far removed from urban life, that had little chance to develop on its own any science that could be of interest to other cultures. This civilization began to develop scientific thought only when it came into contact with other more ancient civilizations, which are assumed to have been more advanced … the Greco- Hellenistic civilization on the western edge of, and overlapping with the geographical domain of the Islamic civilization, and the Sasanian (and by extension the Indian) civilization. These surrounding civilizations are usually endowed with considerable antiquity, with high degrees of scientific production (at least at some time in their history), and with a degree of intellectual vitality that could not have existed in the Islamic desert civilization.

This same narrative never fails to recount an enterprise that was indeed carried out during Islamic times: the active appropriation of the sciences of those civilizations through the wilful process of translation….In this context, very few authors would go beyond the characterization of this Islamic golden age as anything more than a re-enactment of the glories of Ancient Greece, and less so the glories of ancient India or Sasanian Iran. Some would at times venture to say that Islamic scientific production did indeed add to the accumulated body of Greek science a few features, but this addition is usually not depicted as anything the Greeks could not have done on their own had they been given enough time…. The classical narrative, however persists in imagining that the Islamic science that was spurred by these extensive translations was short-lived as an enterprise because it soon came into conflict with the more traditional forces within Islamic society, usually designated as

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religious orthodoxies of one type of another. The anti-scientific attacks that those very orthodoxies generated are supposed to have culminated in the famous work of the eleventh-twelfth-century theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.16 Saliba rejected this understanding of the rise and decline of science in Islamic civilisation as a Western projection of its own history with the Church; a war between rationalism and traditional religious thought.17 This perception is indicative in the narrative’s double standards of giving absolutely no credit for the rise of science to the internal influence of the religion of Islam, all the while making it the main culprit of its demise. The Canadian Islamic scholar Muzzafar Iqbal noted that this projection can be traced back to the Hungarian Orientalist Ignaz Goldziher18 and his work, “The Attitude of Orthodox Islam towards the Ancient Sciences.” Goldziher’s paper, as evidenced from the title, emphasises the attitudes of religious scholars towards the so-called ‘foreign sciences’ of the Greeks and Persians as being wholly negative, based on the latter’s supposed contradictory nature towards cherished doctrines of the faith. His thesis would gain popularity and eventually become the backdrop for the ‘classical narrative’. That is why there are journalists writing that “Islamic civilisation did not have a culture hospitable to the advancement of science”19 and astrophysicists and popular science educators like Neil deGrasse Tyson who echoes the idea that al-Ghazālī’s instrumentalist20 belief that “manipulating numbers is outside of your spiritual responsibilities and that all the events around you are the will of Allah,”21 was ultimately responsible for the decline of scientific productivity among Muslims. Along with the lay-community, historians have not been immune from the influences of Goldziher. For instance, Tony Huff – mentioned earlier – credited the former as a major influence numerous times in his work, The Early Rise of Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West. Huff was not hesitant to carry on the former’s ideas: If in the long run scientific thought and intellectual creativity in general are to keep themselves alive and advance into new domains of conquest and creativity, multiple spheres of freedom – what we may call neutral zones – must exist within which large groups of people can pursue genius free from the censure of political and religious authorities. In addition, certain metaphysical and philosophical assumptions must accompany this freedom. Insofar as science is concerned, individuals must be conceived as being endowed with reason, the world may be thought to be a rational and consistent whole, and various levels of universal representation, participation, and discourse must be available.

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It is precisely here that one finds the great weaknesses of Arabic-Islamic civilization as an incubator of modern science.22 Huff’s reliance on Goldziher’s thesis reflects his bias towards the religious thought and institutions of Islamic civilisation – going so far as to parrot the phrase “Arabic sciences” so as to focus on the linguistic characteristics of the translation movement over any perceived influence of religion on scientific productivity during the period. According to Huff and others, the only positive contribution by the Muslims during this period was their unified language, which only facilitated the learning, preservation, and wholesale copy of Greek thought, which was later to be destroyed by the religiously anti-scientific spirit within. However, one has to wonder how such learning, preservation, or supposed wholesale copying of Greek thought would have been possible if anti-scientific sentiments existed prior to and during the translation movement; if ‘foreign sciences’ were already not welcome because of the intrinsic nature of Islam, then it is difficult to ascertain how they were tolerated to begin with and for so long. Despite the impact and popularity of the above conflict-bound thesis, there has been a rise of historians realising the anomalies in Goldziher’s research, suggesting that his thesis was possible only by “quoting remarks out of context from Islamic texts and by presenting them as delivering one single message.”23 Scholars such as Sonja Brentjes,24 Dimitri Guntas,25 Ahmad Dallal,26 and George Saliba have attempted to offer more nuanced and evidence-based perspectives on the scientific tradition in Islamic civilisation – the last of whom offers the most salient deconstruction and alternative to the above-mentioned narrative.

The Alternative Rise Saliba offers a very different account in contrast to the classical narrative; positing rather that the rise of science within Islamic civilisation was less an accidental appropriation of Greek thought through translation and more a product of an already scientific intellectualism intrinsic to the culture. While he offers several evidences for his position this paper shall only summarise his findings. Saliba began his deconstruction of the popular conception of the rise of science in Islamic civilisation by first addressing when it actually commenced – as opposed to the classical narrative’s assumption that it was spurred by the sudden genesis of the translation movement during the reign of the Abbāsid caliph, al- M’amūn (813-833 CE). According to legend, al-M’amūn had a mystical-like experience through a dream where he met Aristotle, who informed him that he should begin learning the sciences of the ancient Greeks.27 Although this story is an unconfirmed account and most likely a mythological, post-hoc explanation, supporters of the classical narrative still include it in their research and attempt

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 236 ASADULLAH ALI AL-ANDALUSI to pinpoint around this time when the sciences were miraculously born in Islamic civilisation and what influenced it. However, Saliba believes that the period of the rise was much earlier, and constructed his opinions based on the 10th century Persian Muslim historian Abū al-Faraj Muhammad b. Abī Ya’qūb Isḥāq al-Nadīm, who wrote al-Fihrist in 987 or 988 CE; an intellectual history of Islamic civilisation up to his period.28 Al- Nadīm was the first to propagate the story that the Persian elements of Islamic civilisation were the main influences behind the desire for science – an attempt perhaps at bolstering his own cultural identity? However, many of the stories he relates are apocryphal, for he even included the story of al-M’amūn’s dream. Saliba contested that al-Nadīm was simply recording popular accounts of the day, and that he did not intend for them to be used as a necessary means to derive an historical account.29 Even the Orientalists use of al-M’amūn’s dream experience is viewed differently from al-Nadīm; the latter saw the dream as having impact on the spread of scientific knowledge, but not its initial motivation or source.30 Similarly, al-Nadīm contradicts the classical narrative by asserting that the Byzantines could not have possibly “passed down” Greek learning to the Muslims, because the former had no interests in learning the sciences and considered their own ancient works as irrelevant31 – meaning, the Muslims desired to learn about the sciences and to translate these texts. This suggests that the Muslims themselves were scientifically inclined – and learned to an extent – prior to their contact with the Greek texts. How else could they have known about them and sought them out, had they not already been aware of their value? As Dallal states: This translation movement provided the knowledge base of the emergent sciences. But while this explains part of the picture, and admittedly one of its most important parts, it does not provide a full explanation of the beginnings. To start with, what are the socio-political conditions and the cultural aptitudes that triggered interests in the translation and science in the first place? Second, what were the cultural conditions and the cultural aptitudes that enabled a significant community of interest to know how to translate complex scientific texts, to develop the technical terminology needed for the transfer of scientific knowledge between two languages, to understand scientific texts once they were translated, and to constructively engage the knowledge derived from them? Seen in this light, translation is not a mechanical process but part of a complex historical process that is not reducible to the transfer of external knowledge; rather, it involves forces intrinsic to the receiving culture – most important, the epistemological conditions internal to Islamic culture at the time of the translations.32

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However, al-Nadīm’s account of the rise of science in Islamic civilisation doesn’t end at anecdotes, but concludes with a final, more realistic story which Saliba considered was his own opinion on the subject. Al-Nadīm recounted a story where Khālid b. Yazīd b. Mu’āwiya – “a lover of science” – had ordered some Greek scientists who had mastered Arabic to translate works on alchemy. This short tale – for which there is little explanation beyond the above – is considered by al-Nadīm to be the first attempt at translation. Following this account, al-Nadīm mentioned the translation of the diwan (record of government revenues)33 by Khalid’s contemporary and superior, Hisham b. ‘Abd al-Malik, the Umayyad caliph who ruled from 724 to 743 CE.34 The first part of the story is not precisely explained by al-Nadīm, other than by the mention of Khālid’s love of science. However, external sources indicate that Khalid was ordered by ‘Abd al-Malik to begin the translation of works on alchemy based on the need to mint independent metal coinage. This was due to the fact that ‘Abd al-Malik wanted to no longer depend on Byzantine and Persian currencies.35 This pragmatic concern, based on the values of the Islamic state, was the primary motivation behind the desire to learn alchemy. Likewise, al-Nadīm noted that the diwan was translated for a similar pragmatic goal, in that government revenues constituted the foundation of its operational fortitude. The reasons for the diwan being in Persian seems to be tied to the fact that the Persians were more apt at “handling arithmetical operations carried over fractions and the like,” which were required in order to produce such a record.36 As such, ‘Abd al-Malik insisted on ‘Arabising’ the diwan for better function of the state and its flow of wealth. However, this process would eventually lead to a necessity for a larger acquisition of the sciences, since the recorders of the diwan not only required skills in arithmetic, but also of astronomy for being able to know on which date taxes were to be taken, geometry for land surveying, the knowledge of weights and measures for the collection of commodities, and much more.37 This very important government position then became the springboard for deciding which other scientific texts were to be retrieved and translated. Likewise, other sciences were learned in order to fulfil certain job functions and necessities for the newly found Islamic empire. Most importantly, practicalities related to religious practice or ibadah, were more efficiently able to be carried out as a result of learning these sciences. For example, if one learned astronomy, knowing the specific times for obligatory acts of worship, such as the times for prayer (salat), when the month of fasting (Ramadan) would begin and end, and the period of religious holidays (Eid), would become much easier to predict, therefore effectively organising and administrating the most essential aspects of the Muslim societies’ core activities and values.

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Given the above, the translation movement did not just happen suddenly with the Abbāsids, but was set in motion prior by the Umayyads for practical reasons related to the values of the Islamic polity at that time; knowledge acquisition was necessary for better functioning of the state, which along with it developed greater efficiency for the society as a whole, whose Islamic identity was intrinsically tied with the former. In other words, the internal influence of Islamic values was the prime motivating factor behind the translation movement, and ultimately towards the acquisition of the sciences. The strong emphasis the Qur’an places on the quest for truth has also played an important role in the advancement of scientific enquiry by Muslims. There are also various evidences from both the Qur’an and Sunnah indicating that knowledge acquisition in general is a noble cause in subservience to Allah and the raising of one’s status in the after-life. Among these evidences, the Qur’an clearly commends those who try to obtain knowledge of the physical world as being a way towards wisdom and devotion to Allah: Surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and in the alternation of the night and the day there are signs for men possessed of minds who remember God, standing and sitting and on their side, and reflect upon the creation of the heavens and the earth…38 The Prophet Muhammad (sallAllahu alayhi wasallam) preached to the same effect, emphasising the virtues of obtaining knowledge: The seeking of knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim.39

A servant of God will remain standing on the Day of Judgment until he is questioned about his (time on earth) and how he used it; about his knowledge and how he utilized it ....40

Knowledge from which no benefit is derived is like a treasure out of which nothing is spent in the cause of God.41

Acquire knowledge and impart it to the people.42 This understanding also eliminates idealistic notions of knowledge acquisition “for its own sake” or by way of “accident”; both preached by Orientalists, especially when attempting to force into history the tenuous view that the more ‘rationalist’ understanding of Islam – known as Mu’tazilitism – was responsible for the translation movement and the subsequent rise of science in Islamic civilisation. This view not only discounts many of the evidences proposed by scholars such as Saliba, but relies on a very short-lived reign by the so-called ‘rationalists’,

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL THE RISE AND DECLINE OF SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 239 which lasted only between 813 and 847 CE and was eventually overturned by the more traditional elements of society later.43 As such, the supporters of the ‘classical narrative’ must formulate a more substantial justification for the rise and decline of scientific progress in Islamic civilisation rather than on the rule of a minority position that had less than a 40 year lifespan. While there is no doubt that the Mu’tazilites may have had some impact on Muslim thought, it is difficult to believe that they were solely responsible for all scientific advances over a seven century period. But what of the external influences at play? It would seem that the rise of science was also predicated on the environment in which the Muslims lived at the time. The desire to acquire these sciences and to translate was spurred not only by the values inherent within Muslims, but also by the conditions which may have provoked such decisions; the desire to function through the unification of language, and to progress, could have well been influenced by the desire to survive and compete with other warring empires, such as the Byzantines and Persians, which engulfed the Islamic polity on both sides till they were conquered later. This effect of isolation, which will be discussed later, drove Muslims to look inward, creating a unified – linguistically and ideologically – state that would later be able to incorporate and even alter foreign ideas and civilisations.

Decline and the ‘Age of Dependency’ If the classical narrative cannot account for the rise of science in Islamic civilisation based on the poor assumptions of a ‘conflict between religion and science’, then it certainly cannot account for its decline. Evidence already points in the direction that, rather than restricting scientific thought, the more conservative elements of Islamic tradition allowed for it to thrive freely without much limitation. However, the model of the European experience with the Church was transferred fluidly onto Islamic history without concern for the differences in culture or ideology, thus making it far easier for the West to essentialise, and ultimately demonise, many aspects of Islamic civilisation without the faintest clue of the realities or the need to study them. As such, it remains a convincing myth that only seems to cultivate a complex of superiority in the internal influences of a particular culture; that is the West. Saliba noted that one of the main targets of the promoters of the classical narrative is Abu-Hamid al-Ghazālī, whom they lay the burden of the decline of science. Al-Ghazālī is often blamed in this respect because of his refutation of the Aristotelian philosophers within Muslim society during the 12th century CE, through his now famous work, The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 240 ASADULLAH ALI AL-ANDALUSI al-Falāsifa). It is argued that as al-Ghazālī’s treatise eventually became popular, it buttressed more traditional and mystical elements of the faith at the expense of the more ‘rational’ and scientific variations of Islamic thought. His main argument, as many Orientalists would have one believe, was his refutation of one of the foundational concepts of scientific inquiry: the necessity between cause and effect, although such a necessity is doubtful in certain sciences today, such as Quantum Physics. Al-Ghazālī’s apparent disregard for causality, for the sake of undermining the philosopher’s heretical theological beliefs of an eternal universe, would eventually lead others to abandon the scientific enterprise all-together, thinking that because God is in control of all things in their causes and effects – known as ‘occasionalism’ – there is no need to pursue scientific knowledge. Despite this being a clear non-sequitur,44 especially in light of contemporary science, it is an objection that holds virtually no merit because scientific productivity continued to thrive long well after the publication of al-Ghazālī’s treatise, up until the 16th century. Saliba catalogues several important scientific discoveries, well advanced beyond previous generations, which occurred centuries after The Incoherence. Although these discoveries are at the individual level and don’t appear to be developed by any institutionalised initiatives, they still reflect a scientific mentality prevalent within society and one which had no real restrictions. For instance, Saliba noted the discoveries of scholars such as Ibn al-Nafīs, the 13th century medical practitioner who discovered the circulation of blood,45 and Kamal al-Din al-Farisī of the 14th century, who advanced beyond the science of optics of his more famous predecessor, Ibn al-Haytham – also known as the “father of the scientific method.”46 Al-Farisī was the first person to understand how the colours of a rainbow were produced by creating his own instruments to observe the phenomenon.47 However, perhaps the greatest discoveries were made in astronomy, leading to a thorough critique of the Ptolemaic system, which would pave the way for Copernicus to create a necessary paradigm shift in the understanding of the revolution of the planets and our solar system. All of this is evidenced in the sophisticated commentaries produced by the likes of the 16th century astronomer, Shams al-Dīn al-Khafirī.48 In other words, the ‘post-Ghazālī’ centuries were ripe with scientific discoveries and treatises that would eventually influence the European understanding of these fields. Al-Ghazālī’s innocence is more profoundly understood in the context of his actual thoughts on causality. Although it can be admitted that al-Ghazālī may have been overzealous and extreme in some of his statements, many scholars have mistaken his views as anti-rationalist simply because he denied a necessary link between cause and effect. However, whether such a view can be blamed

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL THE RISE AND DECLINE OF SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 241 for the decline in science is questionable, especially given the fact that he still believed the there was a necessary connection, but not as intrinsic quality of the things themselves: The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary, according to us…Their connection is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side by side, not to its being necessary in itself, incapable of separation.49 So the idea that al-Ghazālī was solely responsible for the decline of scientific productivity is unsubstantiated, especially given the fact that none of his thoughts were necessarily anti-scientific. It is further claimed that his apparent “dislike for non-instrumental sciences” may have also been a cause in the decline, although there is little to no evidence for this accusation, which appears to be nothing more than a projection of the internalist’s understanding of ‘knowledge for its own sake’, a view that has never truly existed in the history of civilisations – knowledge has always been sought for ulterior motives, usually practical. Following Saliba’s deconstruction, he offers an alternative account of the period of decline, on the basis of events that occurred around the 16th century CE. During this period, evidence of several external influences come into play, such as the de-unification of the Islamic civilisation into three independent polities, the ongoing wars with the Western world, and the migration of the West across the Atlantic in search of new wealth and resources given the Muslim’s monopolisation of trade routes and land in the southern and eastern parts of the European region.50 Here, we begin to see the phenomena of decline manifesting itself, where educational institutions for the sciences began to wane and total dependency on foreign scientific discoveries, institutions, and technology began to take hold.51 The reaction of Muslims to the new influx of resources and wealth into Europe, their own political division, and losing ground to Western military forces (such as in Vienna), may be better called the ‘Age of Dependency’, rather than decline, since science was still valued and sought after, but this time externally to one’s own civilisational context. Rather than looking inward for answers, Muslims took to expediency and quick results to advance their power so as to keep up with European progress. Instead of a patient and considered strategy to these new problems, the reaction resorted to the acquisition of innovations from Europe and elsewhere in a period where self-reliance, independence, and a true ‘Islamic’ science would eventually come to an end. This ‘Age of Dependency’ manifested itself more prominently during the time of the Ottoman Empire, where the Turks attempted to modernise their societies

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 242 ASADULLAH ALI AL-ANDALUSI through European invention and ideas. It would eventually become the primary feature of Muslim majority societies during the colonial and post-colonial period, with Muslims adopting a perspective of science as the ultimate universal standard of truth and knowledge – known as positivism – motivated by their utmost degradation at the hands of Western forces for nearly two centuries.52 However, the internal aspects of this decline may have developed as early as around the beginning of the 15th century, with the political turmoil within the Andalusian caliphate and the various rebellions across the Muslim world. Al- Andalus would eventually fall by the 15th century to Christian forces and the rebellions would eventually lead to three separate Islamic polities competing for power. The intellectual climate and institutions to support science during this period may have been stifled dramatically due to the focus on political conflict and warfare within and external to Islamic civilisation. Although ideological factors have yet to be researched in detail, it is certain that they were a direct result of these other internal influences occurring during that time. While Saliba has documented numerous discoveries beyond the 14th century C.E., showcasing that scientific ingenuity had not completely died off, were these merely the remnants of what was left of a scientific culture now no longer widely operative within Islamic civilisation as a whole? Had Muslims become victim to a positivistic understanding of science as a result of the glorification of past achievements based on the inability to pursue further research? Did this inability therefore become compensated by a synthesis between science and revelation?

Schemes of Revitalisation? What can be said then of current attempts at revitalising scientific productivity in the Muslim world? Do these schemes reflect the historical realities of rise, decline, and stagnation, or do they reflect a post-colonial view of positivism, still entrenched in Western values and ideologies? Is the current attempt at Islamisation a viable concept, or does it suffer from an impractical understanding of the past and present? Though it is not within the scope of this research to study these questions, perhaps a comprehensive elucidation on the contemporary schemes of revitalisation need to be assessed, so as to come to an ideal solution that not only reflects an accurate historical picture of the ‘Age of Productivity”, but also of the ‘Age of Dependency’ which still remains a major defining aspect of the Muslim world. Also, the Muslim world currently has no great example of scientific productivity or ingenuity, save one place that is often excluded on the basis that it represents a minority position in Islamic theology: Iran. This historical Persian nation has been known for being the centre stage of Western propaganda and war-mongering,

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL THE RISE AND DECLINE OF SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 243 insinuating that it is a grave threat to the world. Countless sanctions and military efforts have placed Iran in a spot of isolation, forcing it to survive based on its own initiatives and desire to protect itself. As a result, Iran is now considered to be the fastest growing country in the world in scientific growth,53 and has made several discoveries in the fields of nano-technology, medical technology, and military. Like Europe before, which was isolated from the rest of the world due to the monopolisation of trade and resources by the Islamic civilisation, Iran has had to make desperate decisions in order to survive. Has this forced isolation and instrumentalists variation of science become a proof for the alternative narrative proposed by Saliba, and likewise a model by which a scheme of revitalisation can be constructed? If so, how can it be emulated and put into practice across the Muslim world at large?

Conclusion The above discussion has shed light on the realities of the phenomena of rise, decline, and stagnation in Islamic civilisation and the Muslim world, deconstructing the popular conception, known as the ‘classical narrative’, and offering a salient alternative based on contemporary and more nuanced studies. Given this, this research offers the following policy recommendations for future initiatives and studies on the subject towards reviving scientific productivity in the Muslim world: 1. Firstly, re-educate the Muslim masses in terms of their history and the nature of science as a pragmatic enterprise – not a positivistic one. To achieve this, the ‘classical narrative’ needs to be exposed and disposed of once and for all and replaced with more nuanced and evidenced-based perspectives, such as those given in the previous discussion. Along with this, the phenomena known as ‘rise’, ‘decline’, and ‘stagnation’ should reflect a more sociological and value-laden perspective so as to bring awareness to the flaws of perception on this issue. This research recommends that ‘rise’ – and other labels such as ‘golden age’ – be replaced by “Age of Productivity”, and ‘decline’ be replaced by “Age of Dependency”, to reflect the behaviours of Muslim majority societies more accurately. Furthermore, schemes towards revitalisation need be further studied and should only be promoted if they cohere with historical and contemporary realities. 2. Studies on Iran’s forced isolation and current surge of scientific growth should be more closely studied as a case example of how the Muslim world at large can further advance from its current stage. 3. Another necessary step towards reviving scientific productivity in the Muslim world is to make hijra away from dependency on Western systems.

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This policy of isolation in no way resembles a complete closing off from other societies, nor does it encourage ‘Islamisation’, but rather ensures independency and need. In other words, there needs to be less dependency on foreign aid, foreign funding, foreign institutions, foreign ideas, and foreign languages. While the appropriation of other ideas can still occur, more solutions derived from Islamic values, and not carbon copies of the former with Islamic labels, need to be brought to the table. This can only be achieved by implementing policies at the government level to reformat a colonised system and mentality.

Notes * Asadullah Ali al-Andalusi is a part-time researcher for IAIS. He holds a B.A. in Western Philosophy from Benedictine University (USA) and an M.A. in Islamic Philosophy, Ethics, and Contemporary Issues from ISTAC, International Islamic University of Malaysia, and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at the University of Malaya (Malaysia). He is also an international speaker and independent researcher who lectures on the topics of comparative religion, science, politics, and extremism in the Muslim world. 1. Oxford Dictionaries. “Science,” accessed March 15, 2015, http://www. oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/science. 2. Oxford Dictionaries. “Technology,” accessed March 15, 2015, http://www. oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/technology. 3. Osman Bakar, Tawhid and Science, 2nd ed. (Shah Alam: Arah Publications, 2008), xxx-xxxi. 4. Quoted in, Alparslan Açikgenç, Islamic Science: Towards a Definition (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation, 1996), 35. 5. Alparslan Açikgenç, Islamic Scientific Tradition in History (Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 2014), 12-15. 6. Ibid, 12. 7. Ibid, 13. 8. Ibid, 45. 9. Ibid, 45-46. 10. Ibid, 15. 11. Axiology is the philosophical study of values. The term ‘axiological’ here is being used in a very broad sense as meaning ‘value tradition’. Açikgenç considers human values as essential to the rise of all scientific traditions, however, I believe he mistakenly labels this condition as ‘moral sensitivity’ (Ibid, 27.), given that morals are only one aspect of the values of a society and its motivation towards knowledge acquisition. Values are the cherished beliefs of a community which guide them in their affairs – morals are concerned primarily with right conduct, and do not necessarily move one towards knowledge acquisition. 12. Açikgenç, Islamic Scientific Tradition in History, 27. 13. Tony Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19.

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14. An Orientalists is broadly defined as “someone who studies the Orient [the east].” However, it is specifically being used here to refer to those who study the East through the lens of the Western bias known as ‘Orientalism’, which views Eastern cultures and religions as static, underdeveloped, and culturally inferior. 15. George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 1. 16. Ibid, 1-2. 17. Ibid, 234. 18. Muzzafar Iqbal, The Making of Islamic Science (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2009), 73. 19. Hillel Ofek, “Why the Arab World Turned Away from Science,” The New Atlantis, Number 3 Winter 2011, accessed March 16, 2015, http://www.thenewatlantis. com/publications/why-the-arabic-world-turned-away-from-science 20. Instrumentalism is the view that scientific knowledge should ultimately have some sort of practical use and should not be studied for any other reason than to benefit society. 21. Stephen Shankland, “Neil DeGrasse Tyson: US need not lose its edge in science,” CNET, June 20, 2014, accessed on March 16, 2015, http://www.cnet.com/news/ neil-degrasse-tyson-the-us-doesnt-have-to-lose-its-edge-in-science/ 22. Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science, 219. 23. Sonja Brentjes, “Reviews: Oversimplifying the Islamic Scientific Tradition”, Metascience 13 (2004): 83-86, accessed on March 17, 2015, https:// www.academia.edu/1335377/Oversimplifying_the_Islamic_Scientific_ Tradition_Metascience_Volume_13_Number_1_83-86_DOI_10.1023_B_ MESC.0000023270.62689.51, DOI: 10.1023/B:MESC.0000023270.62689.51 24. Sonja Brentjes, “On the Location of the Ancient or ‘Rational’ Sciences in Muslim Educational Landscapes (AH 500 – 1100),” Bulletin of the Royal Institute of Inner-Faith Studies 4 (2002): 47-71, accessed on March 17, 2015, https:// www.academia.edu/625038/On_the_Location_of_the_Ancient_or_Rational_ Sciences_in_Muslim_Educational_Landscapes_AH_500_-1100_, DOI: NA. 25. Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbasaid Society (2nd-4th/5th-10th c.) (New York: Routledge, 1998). 26. Ahmad Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 27. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 13. 28. Ibid, 28. 29. Ibid, 40. 30. Ibid, 52. 31. Ibid, 42-44. 32. Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History, 10-11. 33. Ibid, 54. 34. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 45-46. 35. Ibid, 50-51. 36. Ibid, 53. 37. Ibid, 54-55. 38. Al-Qur’an, Surah al-Imran (3:190-191).

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39. Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith # 74 40. Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith # 148 41. Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith # 108 42. Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith # 107 43. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 13-14. 44. Meaning “the conclusion does not follow logically from the premises”. 45. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 239. 46. Ross Pomeroy, “Ibn al-Haytham: The Muslim Scientist Who Birthed the Scientific Method,”Real Clear Science, March 25, 2014, accessed on March 16, 2015, http://www.realclearscience.com/blog/2014/03/the_muslim_scientist_ who_birthed_the_scientific_method.html 47. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 239. 48. Ibid, 240. 49. Quoted in, Hamid Zarkaysi, Al-Ghazali’s Concept of Causality: With Reference to His Interpretations of Reality and Knowledge (Gombak: IIUM Press, 2010), 210-211. 50. Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 249-255. 51. Ibid, 247. 52. Positivism was formally introduced into the Muslim world by Jamāl al-Dīn al- Afghāni, the so-called ‘Islamic reformist’ of the 20th century, who agreed with many of the positivistic critiques of the Muslim world by French Orientalist Ernest Renan. Renan argued that Muslims (and Arabs) lagged in science because of the very inherent nature of Islam being opposed to the universal, objective nature of science. Al-Afghāni responded to Renan, agreeing about the nature of science, but that Islam was inherently welcoming to it. Al-Afghāni’s perspective would later be adopted by the majority of Muslim society, spurring popular ideas about how there are ‘scientific miracles’ in the Qur’an. 53. Shahin Akhondzadeh, “Iranian science shows world's fastest growth: ranks 17th in science production in 2012,” Avicenna Journal of Medical Biotechnology (5)3 (2013): 139, accessed on March 17, 2015, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ articles/PMC3732862/

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL VIEWPOINTS

State-Building Dilemmas After the Arab Spring

Tengku Ahmad Hazri*

The alarming state of West Asia and North Africa (WANA) today reverses conventional wisdom regarding constitutionalism. For long the Holy Grail of constitutional reform was on finding the best way to limit government authority. Yet the sheer chaos and instability of Middle East regimes now leads many to wonder if indeed the real problem is not the lack of functioning statehood to start with. How could one “limit” state authority when the personal dictatorships across the land hardly qualify as functioning states at all? That the states disintegrated into chaos after the fall of the rulers—evident especially in the case of Libya— provokes the question whether the so-called state institutions were not merely extended shadows of one man, whose downfall naturally brought with it the end of the entire political infrastructure. The political crises that now attend the region are not merely peripheral but they challenge the whole map of the Middle East, and question the very sobriety of the imposed territorial settlement that has guided—or perhaps, misguided— foreign policies towards WANA since the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement divided territories of the ailing Ottoman Empire into Western spheres of influence. Amidst such debates, old grievances long since brewing in Islamic intellectual circles have now resurfaced: the long censure of the Westphalian nation-state system by leading ideologues and intellectuals from Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abu’l A’la Maududi to Ayatollah Khomeini. The limits of this model are now evident in the fragmentation of states after the Arab Spring such as the move towards a separate homeland, Kurdistan for the Kurds carved out of Iraq. These critiques have acquired renewed respectability in the light of developments in Europe itself—Scotland’s failed bit to secede from the UK, Catalonia’s call for independence from Spain, the contested status of Crimea between Russia and Ukraine, and more generally, the never-ending crisis in the European Union—all of which like the falling stones that foreshadow an avalanche. Indeed, there is growing recognition even in Europe itself that the Westphalian system has reached its limit. The rise of legal pluralism further challenges the jural integrity of nation-state based on legal uniformity, echoed succinctly by the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen who conceived the “state” as identical with its legal order.

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Notwithstanding these developments, constitutional reforms in the Middle East have only the Westphalian model as the sole template on offer. When viewed in the light of global transition towards a post-Westphalian order, the imposition of such framework in the nascent post-dictatorship states of WANA can be construed either condescendingly as naive neglect of global trends or cynically as a deliberate attempt to keep these states “lagging behind” as they struggle to accommodate the very system which the “advanced” nations themselves have rejected in search of what is perceived to be a better system. The supposed “better” system sought for by the Western states is one that fosters greater cooperation between states underpinned by respect for international law and international standards of human rights. These can be interpreted as gradual moves towards the construction of a moral core around which international relations revolve, marking a retreat from the amorality that ostensibly necessitated the system to start with. As Henry Kissinger concedes in his recent work, World Order, a primary weakness of the Westphalian system is its value-neutrality, its conscious moral agnosticism in favor of procedural claims on territorial integrity, sovereignty of states and non-interference in domestic affairs among states. Consequently, it gives no sense of direction and is incapable of generating legitimacy. The void which the system creates thus now came to be filled by extremist ideologies and movements promising certainty and direction—indeed, even martyrdom and salvation. Curiously enough, these concerns mirror those of many Muslim intellectuals who charged the nation-state as the very culprit responsible for the deplorable plight of Muslim minorities in different parts of the world from Palestine in the Middle East, Chechnya in Central Asia, and Xinjiang in China to southern Thailand and Myanmar. It is seen as symptomatic of the failure of the system itself. This is exacerbated by failed state-building projects in the Muslim world such as Iraq and Libya, all of which have degenerated into failed states. Thus these critics argue for a system transcending the (real or perceived) divisive nature of the current arrangement. That the global trends are now moving in the direction envisaged by these critics, i.e. away from the nation-state, thus can easily be read with a triumphalist tenor, seeing in them an emphatic vindication if not solid confirmation of the very thesis they have been advocating all along. No doubt even within the current framework, attempts have been made to advance the post-Westphalian agenda. In fact, Article 11 of Iran’s constitution, under direct inspiration from the Holy Qur’an (Surah al-Anbiya’ 21:92), explicitly proclaims the entire Muslim world as a “single nation” and obligates the Islamic Republic to secure the “unity of all Muslim peoples”. The nation- state’s merits must thus never be underestimated. Among others, hitherto

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL VIEWPOINTS 249 unimagined fraternities have been forged in its name, suggesting its viability as the starting point to transcend itself. For a start, this effort must begin even within the nation-state. Conventional political wisdom often dictates the exclusion of religion from the public sphere to make way for what has been called ‘public reason’. But in a world of instant communication, ideas that find no currency at home may be swiftly smuggled for consumption in the ‘black market’ abroad, among dissidents ready to countenance violence. The state’s attempt to suppress ideas will then backfire as its policies aimed at promoting national unity turned out to be productive of homegrown detractors seeking political goals outside the legitimate boundaries of the public sphere which have been denied to them. Thus states which have nurtured a healthy pluralist and multicultural tradition must continue to allow the different communities to flourish with their civilisational heritage intact, and not forsake the latter to be replaced by a vaguely defined “national identity”. Instead, they should mutually reinforce and enrich one another. Religious discourses must thus actively pervade the public domain. Should such a move generate conflicts in the initial phases, these must be seen as but the birth-pangs of a more creative and better system. The hour before dawn, after all, is always bleak.

Notes * Tengku Ahmad Hazri is Research Fellow at IAIS Malaysia. He can be contacted at [email protected].

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 250 HAKIMAH YAACOB

The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013: An Overview and Appraisal

Hakimah Yaacob*

More than two decades after the enactment of the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and Takaful Act 1984, a new legal framework has been drawn up. The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA 2013) seeks to provide for the regulation and supervision of Islamic financial institutions, payment systems and other relevant entities. The Act came into force on 30 June 2013 and consolidated all laws related to Islamic banking and takaful into one Act. The Act contains 291 sections and is divided into 18 parts with 16 schedules. It covers inter alia the oversight of the Islamic money market and Islamic foreign exchange market to promote financial stability and compliance with Shariah. The new legal framework will not only streamline the legal requirements across sectors, but will also ensure that the law is reflective of the nature and features of Shariah contracts and that the degree of regulation will commensurate with the level of risks that Islamic financial institutions, markets and products pose to the overall financial system. The Act lays the foundation for a comprehensive regulatory regime to promote a robust and resilient Islamic financial system in Malaysia. It repeals the Islamic Banking Act 1983 [Act 276] and the Takaful Act 1984 [Act 312]. IFSA 2013 also imposes more stringent obligations on financial holding companies and helps strengthen regulation, supervision and governance of financial services groups. In line with the current challenges in the global banking landscape, IFSA gives the central bank stronger supervisory and regulatory oversight of financial services groups. The Act enhances the level of governance and disclosure between financial holding companies and their subsidiaries. In sum, the new law has changed the whole spectrum of the Islamic banking and takaful operations. The industry believes there are drastic changes in the game. However, positive attitude is believed to be key in accepting the changes. Below are some of the main features of the new Act; i. IFSA 2013 has articulated the Shariah governance concept into the law for the first time in history with regard to the Islamic finance industry. Shariah non compliance will amount to a violation of law. Strict penalties of up to RM25 million are imposed on those who are in breach of Shariah and failed to comply with Shariah in their business, operation, aim and objectives. ii. IFSA 2013 also regulates the roles and responsibilities of actuaries, auditors and Shariah committees and it places greater emphasis on consumer

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protection. The implication of IFSA 2013 would be felt more deeply in the takaful industry due to the higher number of composite licenses issued to them compared to their conventional insurance counterparts. It will intensify the recruitment of talent, hence mergers, cost implications and acquisitions between companies is expected. iii. IFSA 2013 distinguishes investment account from Islamic deposit. An investment account is defined by the application of Shariah contracts with non-principal guarantee feature for the purpose of investment. Notwithstanding this, IFSA 2013 provides adequate legal basis to support the further strengthening of investment account operations that provides appropriate protection to investment account holders (IAH) whilst ensuring stability of the Islamic financial system. Mudarabah accounts, which are based on the concept of profit sharing, should not be deemed to be deposit accounts, as in the current practice, because under this principle, there can be no guarantee that the principal amount will be protected. iv. Deposits under the investment account like musharakah and mudarabah are no longer guaranteed by Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM). Currently, all depositors (whether business or individuals) are insured by Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM) up to RM250,000 per depositor per member financial institution. Mudarabah deposits, once classified as investment accounts, may no longer be guaranteed by PIDM. v. Additional cost is associated with the changes in the operational systems, which may affect the end user. This may involve miscellaneous charges imposed on the customer. vi. The IFSA 2013 increases the general and specific duties of directors. The general duties of directors include the duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the institution; to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence; and to exercise sound and independent judgment. As for the specific duties under the IFSA 2013, directors are required to ensure and oversee the effective design and implementation of sound internal controls, compliance and risk management systems as well as to set and oversee the implementation of business and risk strategies. These duties complement and do not derogate from the duties of directors under the Companies Act 1965. It should also be noted that in discharging their duties, directors need to have regard to the interest of depositors or policy owners, which may present a potential conflict with the duty to act in the interests of the company and its shareholders. vii. A number of these requirements, such as the material disclosure provision, are not new. They previously existed under the Bank Negara (Central Bank of Malaysia) Guidelines but have now been codified by the IFSA 2013. This means that breaches will attract statutory penalties, such as the removal of

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the directors, imprisonment for a term of up to eight years and/or a fine of up to RM25 million. viii. A major change brought by IFSA 2013 is the separation of family and general licenses into independent entities by 2018. It is clearly stated in Section 16 (1) that a licensed takaful operator, other than a licensed professional takaful operator, shall not carry on both family takaful business and general takaful business. ix. IFSA 2013 has redefined takaful as “an arrangement based on mutual assistance under which the takaful participants agree to contribute to a common fund providing for mutual financial benefits payable to the takaful participants or their beneficiaries on the occurrence of pre-agreed events”. The prior definition of takaful in Takaful Act 1984 was “a scheme based on brotherhood, solidarity and mutual assistance which provides for mutual financial aid and assistance to the participants in case of need whereby the participants mutually agree to contribute based on that purpose”. The new definition of takaful has been enhanced, more accurate and definitely important. x. It should be noted that the minimum capital requirement for takaful operators is no longer explicitly defined in the governing Act. Instead, IFSA 2013 states that the regulator will specify the minimum capital requirement. Previously, a minimum capital requirement of RM100 million was explicitly stated in the Takaful Act 1984. xi. IFSA 2013 has introduced section 133 known as the “financial ombudsman scheme” which means “a scheme for the resolution of disputes between an eligible complainant and a financial service provider in respect of financial services or products”. It further explains that “eligible complainant” means any person who is eligible to refer a dispute to a financial ombudsman scheme in accordance with the terms of reference of the scheme”. Terms of the scheme set out the followings as required under IFSA 2013 are: 1. Types of disputes 2. Eligible complainants 3. Membership requirements 4. Application, operations and procedures 5. Fees to be charged 6. Types of award to be granted In a concept paper issued on 29 August 2014, Bank Negara Malaysia explained the approach and dispute resolution mechanism involved. However, settlement of disputes via mediation and adjudication without looking into other aspects or other methodologies has been scaled down. To date, no terms

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of reference has been spelt out by Bank Negara pertaining to this scheme. The industry is definitely keen to know more about the alternative to the court system by having this scheme. The establishment of the scheme is for the purposes of ensuring effective and fair handling of complaints and for the resolution of disputes in connection with financial services or products. In conclusion, IFSA 2013 provides greater clarity and transparency in the implementation of the law. This includes clearly defined regulatory objectives and accountability of Bank Negara Malaysia in pursuing its principal object to safeguard financial stability. The Act provides transparent triggers for the exercise of Bank Negara Malaysia's powers and functions, and transparent assessment criteria also for authorising institutions to carry on regulated financial business, and for shareholder suitability. There is a clear focus on Shariah compliance and governance in the Islamic financial sector.

Notes * Hakimah Yaacob is Associate Fellow at IAIS Malaysia. She can be contacted at [email protected].

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 254 AHMAD BADRI ABDULLAH

Balancing Power and Love Towards Global Stability in the Muslim World

Ahmad Badri Abdullah*

The Muslim Ummah is currently suffering from a deteriorating crisis namely the crisis of love and power. This is evident with the recent unfolding events of ruthless actions taken by some extremist groups who have recklessly portrayed Islam as a religion of hatred and violence. The extent of this was unprecedented with other political turmoils in middle-eastern countries which have given rise to calamities and great loss of life among citizens. Moreover, the rise of terrorism in the Muslim world now is the quintessential crime of those who feel powerless and thus seek to undermine the perceived power of a targeted group. These anecdotes exhibit the obsession of power among the Muslims along with the absence of love for fellow humans. On the other hand, there are other groups in the Ummah overemphasising on the urgency to restore love within the Ummah as if power has no significant role in realising the love. The proponents of this trend believe that issues ranging from cultural or racial conflicts, environmental degradation, and economic inequality can be resolved by the transformation of the heart by enlightening and refining the inner faculty of the human being. The society is perceived as being in dire need of individuals whose actions are the manifestation of their loving and refined hearts. Love is indeed an impactful impulse in individual and collective societal life. It is a drive to unite the separated which is manifested in a focus on relationships and connection. It is also a predisposition toward helping another person to become complete i.e. to develop their full potential. Paul Tillich, a German philosopher defined love as the other-acknowledging, other-respecting, other-helping drive that reunites the separated. A quantum physicist David Bohm elucidated the pragmatic capacity of love which is “to break the boundaries between peoples, so we can operate as a single intelligence. This is the natural state of the human the world, separation without separateness.” Power could be defined as a generative drive of a living entity to realise itself by increasing its intensity and extensity. It expresses purposefulness, wholeness, and agency. It is also the force that triggers change in the world as well as the means by which new social realities are created. However, the pursuit of one’s self-realisation might easily compromise that of others. Nonetheless power is essential in pursuing change and development in individual or collective life, be it in economic, political, social, or educational fields. Love in Islam is all-encompassing, rather than being restricted to merely a single

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL VIEWPOINTS 255 form namely the intimate relation between man and woman. The proclamation of this is indicative in a hadith which was reported by Abu Hurayrah, the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: By Him in Whose Hand my soul is, you will not enter Paradise unless you believe, and you will not believe unless you love each other. Should I direct you to something that if you constantly do, you would love each other? Spread the greetings of peace among you, (No. 54, The Book of Faith, Sahih Muslim)

It is interesting to note that the Prophet (peace be upon him) associates the salvation of one’s soul in paradise to one’s social life of loving the other. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah in his book entitled ‘The Garden of Lovers’ (Rawdhah al-Muhibbin) in which he discusses extensively the subject of love, suggested that the compatibility of the soul is the strongest cause of love since each soul longs for the other soul that possesses similar characteristics. This also shows the capacity of love to unite the separated. Nonetheless, love without power is sentimental and anemic. In other words, overemphasising love and unity without the space for self-realisation is unconsciously reinforcing the status quo. Love provides potentials whereas power is imperative for such potentials to be brought into reality. Unity or dialogue without power will not be able to create a new reality; in reality, it re- creates and reinforces current realities. On the other hand, power without love is indeed reckless, abusive, and likewise prone to maintain or worsen the status quo. Hence, the real challenge is to mediate and search for a balance between the exercise of power and the promotion of love and unity. The act of walking is an epitome of the feasible measure to mediate between love and power. To walk in a stable way, one need to first move one leg and then the other so as to be always in a dynamic balance. Therefore to reconcile power with love, the time factor is imperative. Despite that, the key to stable walking is that even when one focuses on one leg, he should not forget the other. This notion of the balance of power and love is prevalent in Islamic juristic and ethical traditions. As an elementary example, in the implementation of Islamic criminal law, which is an exercise of power, there is still a space for love which is manifested in the encouragement for individual reconciliation and forgiveness by the Prophet (peace be upon him) himself, especially on some prescribed punishments (hudud) offences which infringe both the right of Allah and the right of the individual, such as theft (saraqah), robbery (hirabah), and false accusation of adultery (qazaf). In two hadith the Prophet (peace be upon him) touched on this matter by mentioning:

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Avoid condemning a Muslim to a prescribed punishment whenever you can, and when you can find a way out for a Muslim then release him for it. If the imam errs, it is better that he errs in favour of innocence (pardon) then in favour of guilt (punishment). (No. 1424, Sunan Al- Tirmizi, No.4384, al-Hakim)

Forgive each other among you for prescribed offences (if committed). When an offence reaches (informed to or tried by) me, it becomes enforceable. (No. 4376, Sunan Abu Daud)

The Islamic ethical guidance in war is another hallmark for the effective management between love and power. It signifies the balance between the two forces according to the time factor. Saidina Abu Bakr, the first Caliph in Islam immediately after the Prophet’s death, issued the following instructions to his commander who went on a military campaign to Syria: Do not kill women, children, or the aged. Do not cut fruitful trees. Do not destroy inhabited places, Do not slay sheep, cow or camel (sic) except for your food. Do not burn bee-hives nor destroy them. Do not steal from the booty and do not be cowardly. (No. 1294, Book of Jihad, Muwattha’ Malik)

This injunction clearly elucidates that even in the state of war, which is a battle for power; love for innocent people, children, property, as well as nature should not be absent. Nonetheless, the element of power prevails in such circumstance since the immunity of a civilian will cease if they get involved in the war or threaten Islam. This can be seen when the Prophet (peace be upon him) did not condemn the killing of a woman from Banu Qurayzah who had attacked Khallad ibn Suwayd. These Islamic guidelines on the conduct of war are among others, a clear indication of the approach of searching for the point of balance between love and power. Maintaining a balancing-loop between power and love is thus imperative in addressing the pressing global issues nowadays. Despite the crises of terrorism and insecurity, there are also other complex and challenging problems faced by our global community. The issues include climate change, food security, water security, economic inequalities, and the spread of diseases. In order to address effectively these issues the two forces of love and power need to be in a state of balance to ensure stability in the global community of our Ummah. .

Notes * Ahmad Badri bin Abdullah is Research Fellow at IAIS Malaysia (Email: badri@ iais.org.my).

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Commemorating the International Mother Language Day: Resisting ‘Banglish’

Tawfique Al-Mubarak*

21 February marks the International Mother Language Day (IMLD). The day was first recognised as an international day for celebration in November 1999 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Since February 2000, International Mother Language Day is being observed globally to recognise and promote cultural and linguistic diversity. In 2007, the UN General Assembly called upon its member states “to promote the preservation and protection of all languages used by peoples of the world.” This resolution was followed by a proclamation designating the year 2008 as the ‘International Year of Languages,’ aimed at promoting unity in diversity and international understanding through multilingualism and multiculturalism.1 UNESCO celebrates the day – 21 February – in commemoration of the language martyrs of the ‘Bangla language movement.’ In 1952, students of Dhaka University and other institutions in Dhaka gathered for a protest rally against the then Pakistani Prime Minister Khwaza Nazimuddin’s determination to establish Urdu as the state’s official language. Earlier on 20 February, the government imposed an order under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code to prohibit and restrict any demonstration. Students defying the ban, protested against the declaration of Urdu as the only official language. Police and the paramilitary forces shot teargas shells and later opened fire on the gathering. Muhammad Salahuddin, Abdul Jabbar, Abul Barakat, Rafiquddin Ahmad and Abdus Salam and a few others were shot dead. 21 February every year, since then has been observed as the ‘omor ekushey’ (immortal twenty-first) in Bangladesh and elsewhere among the Bangla speaking community. The ‘Bangla language movement’ began taking shape in 1947. Immediately before the independence of greater Pakistan (including Bangladesh as East Pakistan) from British India, the Vice Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed remarked that Urdu should be the official language of the Muslim state to be formed. In response to this, prominent Bengali linguist Dr. Muhammad Shahidullah wrote an article in the Daily Azad on July 29, 1947. He refuted Ziauddin Ahmed’s claim to impose Urdu as the lingua franca, arguing that Bengali being the mother tongue of 55% of population of Pakistan deserves to be the State language of the new nation. Once Bengali is adopted as the State language, the government may then consider whether or not Urdu should also be afforded the status of one of the State languages of Pakistan.2

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After the independence of greater Pakistan in August 1947, the controversy over lingua franca remained unresolved. Independent Pakistan’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan once again demanded that Urdu be the official language of state. In the second session of the Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan, Mr. Dhirendranath Dutt, a member of the East Pakistan Congress Party, proposed to enact Bangla as an official language along with Urdu and English. Bengali is a provincial language but it has been the language of the majority of the people of Pakistan, he argued. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and other members from West Pakistan strongly opposed his proposal in the belief that it would create a rift between the people of Pakistan, and that it would weaken the unifying force that binds Muslims of the two parts. Hence Dutta’s proposal was rejected. In September 1947, Tamaddun Majlis – a Bengali Muslim literary organisation – headed by Professor Abul Kashem strongly advocated for Bangla, rationally opposing the government’s adamance towards Urdu. In their booklet entitled Pakistaner Rashtra Bhasha: Bangla na Urdu? (Pakistan’s State Language: Bangla or Urdu?), the authors demanded that Bangla be the only official language of education and the language of the courts in East Pakistan. Bangla, along with Urdu, should also enjoy the status of the official language of the Central Government of Pakistan.3 In February 1948, the ‘All Party State Language Committee’ called for a strike on 11 March. Police reacted against the mass demonstration, arresting and injuring hundreds. Qaid-i-Azam Muhammd Ali Jinnah then paid a visit to Dhaka between 19 and 24 March. He strongly opposed the demand that Bangla be considered an official language, and declared: Ultimately it is for you, the people of this province, to decide what should be the language of your province. But let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan will be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan.4 Later, on 27 November 1948, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited Dhaka, and spoke at the Dhaka University Gymnasium ground. Student leader Ghulam Azam, the then General Secretary of the Dhaka University Central Students Union (DUCSU) presented a memorandum with demands to consider Bangla as an official language of the state.5 Soon the movement took shape and with political changes mass agitation spread throughout East Pakistan. In 1951 Liaquat Ali Khan was succeeded by Khwaza Nazimuddin, a fellow Bengali and the former Chief Minister of East Pakistan. In January 1952, Nazimuddin declared in Dhaka once again that only Urdu shall be the state language. This led to mass upheaval across the state. Defying bans, students gathered to protest. Police shot down

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL VIEWPOINTS 259 several students on the eve of 21 February 1952. That year witnessed a nation shedding blood for their language. UNESCO decided to observe the day every year at their headquarters in Paris with respect and dignity. Language is undoubtedly a powerful tool to express one’s freedom and peaceful coexistence, uphold and transmit one’s cultural values and most importantly reflect one’s identity. It is a vehicle of cultures and traditions which live on from generation to generation. With a glorious history of the Bangla language, it was utterly undesirable for Bangla to risk losing an essential part of its pristine cultural heritage. Further, the fear of Bangla being substituted with ‘Banglish’ – a blend of English into day-to-day Bangla conversation – is slowly intensifying. As the access to the international media and the affordability to send one’s child to an English medium school is increasing, the usage of Banglish is becoming prominent. Kiyokazu Okita rightly argued that while the fear of such Banglish is justified, similarly narrow-minded linguistic-nationalism should be avoided. “Unfortunately, this is what happened in post-independence Bangladesh” he claimed.6 Upholding Bangla language in its authentic form should not however render one incapable of communicating in other languages. The mother tongue has a significant impact upon one's understanding of one’s own culture. Receiving education in one’s mother tongue has also been recognised as a basic right in UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Linguistic Rights.7 In fact, the prophet of Islam spoke, delivered his sermons and dictated in his mother tongue. Almighty Allah sent prophets to each and every community, who would convey the message of tawhid in their own language.8 Reports have shown that education in one's native language has a greater effect on the learner compared to his education in a foreign language.9 By the same token, native Bangla speakers10 should stress more on speaking Bangla language in its classical form and resist Banglish. Research shows that more than fifty-percent of the seven thousand languages spoken around the globe are likely to become extinct within a few generations. Besides, ninety-six percent of the languages are spoken by only four percent of the population.11 If Bangla persists in incorporating Banglish over time, it would slowly die out within a few decades. Therefore, the government of Bangladesh should emphatically emphasise language education in the school curricula, including that of the English medium schools. Diversity of languages and cultures is among the signs of Allah’s omnipotence, omniscience and blessings.12 The religion of Islam, too, is not privileged for a certain language or a cultural group. The Holy Qur’an recognises and appreciates the wide varieties of languages in multiple verses.13 Despite the diversity of languages across the globe, humanity is bound together by the uniformity of creation and structure, and unity of Creator. This reflects the One Creator and His mercy over the entire humanity. It is a sign of unity in diversity. Multilingualism

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 260 TAWFIQUE AL-MUBARAK and multiculturalism, being among the prime objectives of the International Mother Language Day, are therefore perfect means to reconnect one’s lingua- cultural identity with the Merciful’s blessings and compassion for humanity.

Notes * Tawfique Al-Mubarak is a Research Fellow at International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, Malaysia. He can be contacted at [email protected]. 1. UN, “International Mother Language Day”, available online: http://www.un.org/ en/events/motherlanguageday/, accessed on 18th February, 2015. 2. M. Waheeduzzaman Manik, “Dhirendranath Datta and the Making of the Bengali Language Movement”, available online: http://www.globalwebpost.com/bangla/ info/articles/manik_dhiren.htm, accessed on 17th March, 2015. 3. Musarrat Jabeen, Amir Ali Chandio and Zarina Qasim, “Language Controversy: Impacts of National Politics and Secession of East Pakistan”, South Asian Studies, Vol. 25, (1), January-June 2010, 99-124. 4. Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan, Harvard University Press, MA and London, 2014, 56-57. 5. Interview of Ghulam Azam on Language Movement (in Bangla), Dhaka Digest, January 1979 issue. 6. Kiyokazu Okita, ‘Celebrating Linguistic Diversity on International Mother Language Day’, Oxford University Press Blog, 21st February, 2015, available online: http://blog.oup.com/2015/02/international-mother-language-day/, accessed on 17 March, 2015. 7. UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Linguistic Rights, 9th June, 1996, available online: http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/linguistic.pdf, accessed on 23 March, 2015. 8. Surah ar-Ra’d (13): 7, Surah al-Nahl (16): 136, Surah al-Fatir (35): 24 among many other similar verses. 9. Umar Farooq, ‘Mother Tongue First’, Dawn, 21st October, 2010, available online: http://www.dawn.com/news/574399/mother-tongue-first, accessed on 23 March, 2015. 10. It applies to all other languages alike. 11. UN, ‘International Mother Language Day: 21 February’, n.d., available online: http://www.un.org/en/events/motherlanguageday/background.shtml, accessed on 16 March, 2015. 12. Al-Qur’an, Surah Rum (30): 22. 13. For instance, Surah al-Baqarah (2): 30, Surah Rum (30): 22, Surah ar-Rahman (55): 4, Surah al-‘Alaq (96): 4-5 among other verses.

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS

'Islam and Constitutionalism': Interview by the Islamic Culture Foundation (FUNCI), Spain (12 September 2014, IAIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur) Mohammad Hashim Kamali and Tengku Ahmad Hazri

The following interview was conducted by and at the initiative of the Islamic Culture Foundation (FUNCI), Spain, as part of the latter’s project towards the development of common principles of governance and constitutionalism derived from the Islamic tradition that can be applicable across the Muslim world. The interviewees from IAIS Malaysia were Mohammad Hashim Kamali (Founding CEO), Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil (Deputy CEO) and Tengku Ahmad Hazri (Research Fellow). We would like to acknowledge and thank FUNCI and our interlocutors, Laura Sisnieaga (Research Coordinator) and Encarna Gutiérrez (Secretary General), as well as Alfonso Casani who oversaw the project subsequently.

Laura: Laura Sisniega (FUNCI, Research Coordinator) Encarna: Encarna Gutiérrez (FUNCI, Secretary General) Kamali: Mohammad Hashim Kamali (IAIS Malaysia, Founding CEO) Azam: Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil (IAIS Malaysia, Deputy CEO) Hazri: Tengku Ahmad Hazri (IAIS Malaysia, Research Fellow)

Laura: There seems to be a double message in Islam with regards to human rights. On the one hand, it empowers the individuals with rights as contrasted with the pre-Islamic tribalism heritage of Arabia. On the other hand, Islam also gives a special importance to the community, i.e. the ummah, whose rights in some respects even trump that of the individual. How can these competing rights be balanced, and can the balance be reflected in, say, the charter of rights of a standard constitution?

Kamali: The focus of rights in the sources of Shariah is on the individual. One finds in these sources conceptions such as the rights of God huquq( Allah) and rights of the servants of God (huquq al-‘ibad) but the “rights of the community” (huquq al-ummah) is nowhere to be found. The ummah is a theological and political concept which comes to the picture when there is a clash of interests,

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 262 ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERVIEW in which case according to a legal maxim, the public interests, the interests of the plurality, prevail over the individual, but only up to a point. For example, the essential rights of the individual are sacrosanct, and thus cannot be compromised. The ummah as such cannot have any rights as Islam as a faith is primarily addressed to the individual, not the ummah. Faith is a matter of belief and state of mind, and thus has to begin with the individual. Indeed the language of the Qur’an itself is addressed to the individual. The idea of ummah in fact is a later development which came after the Prophet’s emigration to Madinah, and thus was absent in the first thirteen years of revelation. It is of course an important, overall and even umbrella concept subsuming all individual Muslims but when it comes to fundamental rights, their protection is the main focus of the maqasid al-shariah (objectives of Shariah) such as protection of religion, life, intellect, wealth and lineage and thus cannot be forfeited. Islam is not against the basic idea of nation-state. For after all, the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him!) established the first Arabian state in Madinah which then became a vehicle and carrier of the teachings of Islam. Ever since its early beginnings, Islam and state have operated together. Provided that the nation-state upholds the basic Islamic principles of good government, equality and justice, there should be no necessary conflict. Islam and nation-state can thus be expected to be supportive of one another, not the opposite. It may be said that Muslims today tend to have three bases of identity, and they do not live in a dichotomous world of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, but in the world of the ummah, the nation-state, and their natural homeland respectively. The first is basically founded on the idea of unity in religion, whereas the second is a political framework, and the third is rooted in innate human nature (fitrah) and custom. Muslims today find themselves in these three circles of which the ummah is the outer circle, whereas the natural birthplace, whether village or town is the inner circle. In between lies the nation-state. These three circles represent three levels of loyalty which need not be seen to be necessarily divisive and conflicting, for they have the potential no less to be complementary and integral. People can naturally belong to a plurality of circles and have multiple layers of loyalty. The village and family home often remains as much of a reality today as it might have been in the past. The nation-state is the political home and the wider framework where individuals realise their aims and objectives in life and utilise opportunities that can exist at this level, not only for personal growth but also for greater and more effective cooperation with other communities and states. If the Muslim countries of today decide to take up a plan to have greater levels of interaction and cooperation, the nation-state can well provide a valuable instrument and vehicle for it. This remains to be largely a prospect, at present, but there is greater

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 263 awareness of the need for wider cooperation in economic, political and other spheres that can substantiate the essence of ideological unity within the ummah. We should therefore recognise the primacy of the individual while the ummah is only significant if there is a direct clash. Otherwise they can coexist. Laura: Yes, agreed, but the ummah is still a very interesting concept particularly when one contrasts it with its opposite. In Europe today for example, there is excessive individualism at the expense of society. The concept of ummah, even as a theoretical and abstract idea, may be instrumental towards attaining some common objectives transcending individual interests.

Kamali: The primacy attached to the individual via the concept of fundamental rights in no way vitiates the importance of ummah, for this latter concept is grounded in the Qur’an and hence fundamental to Islamic theology and law. Nor should there be clash between ummah, nation and nationality. The nascent Muslim community in Madinah, for example, has a distinctive status relative to the rest of the ummah – even the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence recognises the doctrine of ijma’ ahl al-madinah (consensus of the people of Madinah) as a source of law because Madinah was where the Prophet and his Companions lived. It was their adopted homeland, and what came to be known as Sunnah had much to do with customary practices of the people of Madinah. Of course the notion has its difficulties but they mainly feature when there is a conflict. Islam as a pragmatic religion recognises the customs of society. Concepts such as constitutionalism, state laws and the nation-state have been widely accepted, almost universally. The Muslim world too has adapted itself accordingly, applying the nation-state model for over a century and has even adopted written constitutions. These have become the prevailing ‘urf (custom) as it were of the present generation of Muslims, which is a recognised basis of law and judgment in Islam. Custom that is not in conflict with the text can also qualify the text and extend its meaning to new situations.

Laura: But the idea of nation has its disadvantages as seen in Libya for example, where people are discriminated based on their nationality. So the concept of ummah can function as a basis for unity, even at an abstract level. I agree that participation and interaction in the international scene may require communities to constitute themselves as nation-states, but to avoid the dangers of the idea of nationality, can a synthesis nevertheless be effectuated between the ummah and the nation-state?

Kamali: Yes, I think so; the world in fact is moving in that direction. Regional integration is underway such as the European Union and the African Union. That

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 264 ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERVIEW may bring us closer to the universalism inherent in the notion of ummah but if it is to acquire more concrete form, a lot more needs to be done. In principle it is possible to have constitutional recognition that the nation is a reality but part of a larger entity which is the ummah. It would be desirable to move in that direction as it can bring greater unity and cooperation based on an entrenched principle of the scripture and history of Islam. But that is unfortunately a far-cry from the present. The Arab world is disunited; the Arabs speak of the ummah but can, for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran be persuaded to become one ummah and to reflect this principle in their constitutions? As an idea though, it is a forceful and beneficial one but more work needs to be done. Laura: How do we reconcile diversity with stability? There is great diversity and disagreement in the Shariah – between schools, groups and even individuals, but there is also a need to implement a legal system which is stable yet supportive of the diversity.

Kamali: To understand how Shariah and politics can coexist, we must first understand the meaning of Shariah. The Subcontinent scholar, Abu al-A’la Maududi once posed the question, “What is the real Shari’ah?”, to which he replied, initially, that it refers to “the Qur’an and Sunnah”. But that was too broad so he specified it as “the decisive injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah”. That is the real Shariah, without any reference to the madhahib or other things. So Shariah can be visualised as a cluster of injunctions and decisive rulings. Does this come into clash with politics? Are there mechanisms by which Islam’s respect for diversity and disagreements can be constitutionally enshrined? There is already in the constitutions of Muslim states the recognition of Shariah in different ways. In Egypt the Shariah is the “principal source of legislation” while in other countries, different phrases and clauses have been adopted. But Shariah has also historically co-existed with other forms of law, like the administrative decrees of the caliphs and rulers, the positive law (qanun), and authoritative custom (‘urf) of society. These are even recognised by the Shariah, just as the Shariah also recognises the ulu al-amr (people who are in authority), which indicates its recognition for political leadership. The idea of madhhab (school of law), is not Qur’anic but a later development three centuries after the revelation. There is in any case the concept of ijma’ (consensus) in Shariah. If we take the much larger entity of the text, the madhahib and others, some very basic collection of rulings and say that this is what is in common among the madhahib, we can come together and unify the madhahib over the substance of what they have in common and give it recognition as such. So it is possible that you can think of uniting these various interpretations and

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 265 madhahib by reference to the decisive injunctions of the Quran and the Sunnah and narrow down the scope of diversity and disagreement. To do this would require not only the existence of political will but a strong spirit also of ummatic unity on the part of the ulama and scholars.

Laura: What are the boundaries of government authority and power? Does the concept of Islamic state offer any clue as to where the limits of state authority are?

Kamali: Well, I think this idea of Islamic State, what it means actually and exactly, is not a matter of consensus. There is no consensus about what an Islamic state is like. There are different approaches and ideas, the fundamentalist will have one idea, but people of different orientations may understand what Islamic state actually means differently. Unless we have that, we cannot be sure. To say for example that this state, Pakistan is founded according to Islam and Shari’ah, Afghanistan too, but Bangladesh is not, or Iraq is not - so we cannot say this unless we have a categorical concept or definition of what Islamic state means. That said, we do have a certain flexibility in our understanding of Islamic State. We do not have a model, or organised format of a state. What we are talking about is a set of principles, and if you have a clear idea of those principles, whether it is justice, consultation, consensus, equality, accountability, leadership and so on. Principles that are essential to the identity of an Islamic polity need to be recognised; if you have those then you can say that a state is Islamic, that it is according to Shari’ah. We don’t have that specific definition, but only principles. Yet there is some flexibility in the understanding of many of these principles. The idea of justice is essential, consultative government is essential, the idea of some kind of commitment to the protection of the basic rights of the people, the sanctity of the property of people, their basic freedoms and equality. Those are the ideas that will come in the order of priority. You might mention the maqasid, at least the essential maqasid. They are high up. They will come in the first order of principles that the state must fulfill in order to be designated as Islamic. Laura: So I understand that this set of principles can sometimes be materialised in a constitutional text, for example, or through other practical means of realisation.

Kamali: It would not be unthinkable for a constitution to recognise this and to articulate it. A constitution (of Afghanistan for example) should specify what an Islamic republic means. It should have some basis of the assurance that Afghanistan is say an Islamic Republic.Then you can have the basis of an answer to people, such as the Taliban in the case of Afghanistan, who tell you: “we want a Shari’ah State”. And I say to them “what do you mean? We already have what

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 266 ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERVIEW you might be thinking of, but may be your idea of Shari’ah is not really that. You may be after power.” So I think that you have to have this eventually in your constitution to be able to address some of these wild claims, unfounded claims. The general public is not well informed, but if the constitution addresses the matter and clarifies existing ambiguities, then you will have some assurance and and authoritative basis on which to reject unwarranted claims.

Encarna: This is the aim of this project: we want to see if there is a possibility to establish some of these principles that all the ummah and the nation-states could agree on. We want to see if there are certain principles that cannot be denied by any government, any sect or any interpretation of Shari’ah; a minimum common agreement to start working on.

Kamali: Perhaps you might think that it is a good idea for this project to come up with a set of principles. The Shari’ah is of course divided into ‘ibadat, mua’malat and other areas of the law. ‘Ibadat and ‘aqidah are not really a part of what we are talking about. Yes, the constitution must recognise ‘ibadat and ‘aqidah as bases of the Islamic identity of state, but the state has very little role other than regulating [and] administering them. So the state is not really a religious idea; it is a civilian idea. Al-Qaradawi and others will tell you this as well.

Laura: You have already talked a little about shura, but I was wondering if you wanted to add something else about it, as it is a subject that interests me quite a lot, with regards to democracy.

Kamali: I think it is an important concept. Quite a few books have been written on it. There are at least two verses in the Quran on shura, but some say that shura is not binding, and I think that scholarship has taken this, that despite the primacy of this concept to the state and to democracy, to know the people’s place in the polity. Still they hang on to the idea that this is not compulsory but only recommended or even optional. We should recognise this as a necessary ingredient and an important pillar of an Islamic state. It is a consultative, participatory state as a whole, not just to have a consultative assembly or majlis al-shura. We can also bring into the picture the idea of bay’a, the pledge of allegiance. The two together come close to the idea of electoral procedure.

Laura: Could this diversity play a role as checks and balances between different schools? Or is it difficult to keep this diversity inside a nation-state? There are two ways of organising authority: centrality (one institution that issues all norms) or diversity (many institutions that can issue those norms). How do we balance them?

Kamali: Islam stands for diversity within unity. There are two concepts in

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Islamic jurisprudence: one is the idea of disagreement and diversity, ikhtilaf. That has a role because it is another name for ijtihad. You have to be free to take a different line, disagreement is perfectly acceptable provided it is reasonable; but no community can live its life permanently through disagreement. Then there is the concept of ijma’, or consensus. We must visualise that ijma’ is a more authoritative concept. We recognise diversity, but not on its own as such. If it would lead us to some kind of unity and agreement on principles, then that is the kind of diversity that is recognised in Islam. But in my personal view, the Muslim world today is in much greater need of consensus and unity than it is of disagreement. There is so much disagreement, very little unity. We ought to recognise that disagreement would not help us a great deal.

Laura: Notwithstanding the disagreements within the Muslim ummah, do you think it is nevertheless possible to establish, say an international tribunal of Shariah consisting of representatives from each school as a step towards unity?

Kamali: Well, it should be possible if we could have an effective Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), if we could have an effective Arab League council, if we had an authoritative body that could take important decisions and there is a mechanism that can put some clout behind those decisions. Then I think it is important that we work towards that and remove the levels of disagreement towards some kind of [agreement on] the important principles.

Laura: What do you think about Islam and human rights after the Arab Spring? In countries like Tunisia and Egypt, there appears to be tensions between human rights groups and Islamic movements, each appropriating human rights and Islamic discourses respectively. Can this dichotomous and dialectical approach be overcome towards greater constitutional consensus?

Kamali: Yes, I have actually written a little on Shariah and human rights, and on Islam and human rights. The general tendency in my own writings and those that have sat in conferences with me is that they are not in opposition or contradiction; the commonalities are much stronger between human rights and Islam. One ought to recognise that the basic rights of individuals are recognised both in Islam and human rights. Human rights are actually an authoritative concept. It is gaining traction among Muslims. There is interest to make recognition of human rights as an obligation of the state so as to implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the extent that it does not conflict with the principles of Islam. The idea is that they are not contradictory concepts, there are commonalities between the two. Nevertheless, tension exists, with regards to women, freedom of religion, and maybe one or two other areas. These are quite well known. As

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 268 ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERVIEW far as I can tell, a large number of Muslim as well as some western scholars have tried to minimise rather than maximise these. I have written a book on freedom of expression in Islam and my conclusion is that freedom of religion is a normative principle of the Quran. The punishment by death for apostasy is not there in the Quran and times have changed. I have looked at history: there was a time for it but now I think we should try to minimise the differences, some of the rights, like the right to equality of women, have gained greater recognition. I think it is advisable to highlight and increase the commonalities. I don’t say that there will be one hundred per cent agreement- people do not expect that either. We can look at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and then look at Shari’ah and identify specifically, not in an expansionist way but in a reasonable way, the similarities and differences.

Laura: In Europe today, democracy is on the decline. There is cynicism towards it due to various problems such as corruption and rampant individualism among others. Do you think there is something that Islam can offer towards the renewal of democracy in Europe?

Kamali: The first thing that comes to mind that Islam can contribute tothe European idea of democracy is to bring a greater awareness of ethics and giving them recognition in law and government. But ethics in this sense would entail some recognition also of religion in politics, as a great deal of ethics originates in religion, and that may also bring us closer to recognition of metaphysical truth. This may depart in turn from the Enlightenment conception which draws a hard line of separation between religion and state. Modern liberal democracy as we know it today is heir to the Enlightenment philosophy which posits secularism as the best option. This is something that Islam can moderate. We still share with Europe the idea of government as a civilian rather than religious institution. Al-Qaradawi in his book, Min Fiqh al-Dawlah fi’l-Islam (On Public Law in Islam) developed the idea that the Islamic conception of government is civilian, not theocratic. But Islam can also contribute to the greater recognition of religion as a reality in people’s lives. The separation of religion and state is not so black and white or even realistic in Europe. When someone commits something contrary to religion, even in Europe he is taken to task. The distinction between religion and politics should of course be kept, but there should be sharing of values. Electoral democracy itself has proven to be problematic. In almost every election in developing countries there are claims of fraud, rigging, etc. In the last decade or so, hardly any election in Muslim countries is spared from such claims, and the matter will not end there.

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In fact Europe has already accepted one aspect of Islam without question: Islamic banking and finance has now been taken by Europe and the United States. Similarly the halal industry is finding a niche in these markets. So there is recognition of Islamic contribution although it may be selective and vary in line with the general climate of relations between countries and regions. One other thing that Islam can contribute to democracy in Europe is the recognition of local context. Islam recognises culture and custom (‘urf). In history also, when a certain region was conquered, like in the time of ‘Umar al- Khattab who conquered Jerusalem and some parts of Syria, he left the customs of these places unchanged so long as they did not conflict with the principles of Islam. This comes close perhaps to the idea of multiculturalism, the recognition of customs and cultures of people as an apect of diversity that Islam recognises. Then there is a degree of support in Islam for consensus-based politics. You have already raised reservations about democracy that certain aspects of electoral democracy should be revised. We ought to move to the idea—and it is an Islamic idea–of consensus based politics, rather than counting of votes and dictatorship of majority. These are some of the areas perhaps where Islamic ideas and institutions can add value. So we are actually exchanging ideas and practices. If in the realm of democracy, there is an openness of kind, such exchanges might be the ways. Maybe my colleagues can comment if they have any thought, whether we can see aspects of Islam that would be worth bringing into the picture in the context of merging European thought with Islamic thought in some other ways. Perhaps there are ways—what would that be? I said consensus, ethical core and reducing this black and white distinction between religion and politics.

Azam: My perspective resonates with Prof Kamali’s. Maybe electoral democracy has to be selectively applied, like in the Middle East for example. In Malaysia, we do recognise the Parliamentary setup with the practice of election as part of the process of democracy. In fact the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) recognises this setup. This is something that perhaps can be accepted, so we may produce practices in some Muslim countries which differ from each other.

Hazri: You are probably aware that, historically, Islamic law developed outside the context of nation-states, as opposed to the Westphalian nation system of Europe, where legal system developed within the context of the nation-state. One important contribution Islamic law could make to Europe is to make it realise that the nation state has its limits and the idea of a legal system predicated on the nation state is itself dwindling. We have seen this in the case of Europe, for example. The idea of a constitution of Europe did not materialise, precisely because the idea of

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 270 ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERVIEW the nation-state was so entrenched. The project towards the unification of Europe failed precisely because of that, so, in other words, the boundaries between the nation states have crumbled and Europe is now realising that it is in need of a legal system, a legal order (which is methodologically sophisticated) that goes beyond the boundaries of the nation states. That, historically, was realised by Islamic law and Islamic law was able to organise itself and did achieve stability, as you mention in your paper, through the doctrinal schools. These doctrinal schools are basically independent of nation states. This is precisely one of its flexibility and it’s also one of its strengths, and I think that, as global events unfold, there is a possibility and a prospect that what has historically been the practice in Islamic law will in the future be the practice of global society, as the nation state system itself crumbles. So Europe needs to realise this early on.

Laura: Yes, I agree with you there. Indeed, in some ways Europe is heading towards a scenario which was in fact the historical reality of Muslim societies. Europe now realises the artificiality of the division fostered by the nation-state system and the need to forge universal fraternity transcending state borders—an idea which had long since been present in Islam.

Encarna: In Europe we have only managed to come to an agreement when it comes to financial issues. So ultimately, the European Union is merely an economic community. It’s the same that we’ve seen when it comes to innovation, or rather a new approach in Shari’ah. When it comes to financial things, in certain countries which are very restrictive, like Saudi Arabia, they accept new point of views, they change, etc. We have also seen, like you have said, the limits of the nation state concept in Europe. Taking in this account the doctrinal schools from the Islamic point of view, which would be the mechanism to control the utilisation of a specific doctrinal school to go against the principles of Shari’ah, of consensus, democracy and freedom? How can we prevent the government from using a specific doctrinal school to implement tyranny or dictatorship?

Hazri: There are two aspects to the issue – firstly, the need for mechanisms to function as effective checks on the power of the state, and secondly, the instrumentalisation of religion, or specific doctrine or school, in justifying abuse of power. As far as the first point is concerned, means of countering the power of the ruler are in fact diffused across the social spectrum, and assume a variety of forms. To start with, prevention is better than cure, and to that end, philosophers, theologians and jurists alike have deliberated on the essential qualities and traits of a ruler. These function as moral and ethico-religious guidelines for believers—

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 271 the rich and the poor, the elite and the laymen alike—as to whom they should entrust as the ulu al-amr (literally, “those in charge of affairs”, a Qur’anic term in 4:59). Of course in some cases, leadership is imposed from above against the people’s will, in which case there will be de facto rather than de jure government, by-passing the moral and normative pronouncements as aforementioned. But even then, the scholars dwelled at some length on the conditions permitting outright rebellion: a great deal of them seems to be concerned with the dangers of anarchy and lawlessness and thus assign some form of recognition even to such government, albeit not without coming up with measures by which change can nevertheless be effectuated without disrupting social harmony. Apart from prevention, even when rulers have transgressed the boundaries of Shari’ah, again the moral imperative is operative: the greatest jihad, according to the Prophet (peace and blessings be on him) is to speak truth to an unjust ruler. Similarly he counseled that if a person sees wrong being done, he has to change with his hands, or if not possible, with his words, or even if this is not possible, then at least rejection with his heart. These arguments point to the fact that the concern for justice, as befitting its primacy in the Qur’an itself, begins even at the level of the individuals who can act collectively as “the people”, by means of moral principles that should be followed. Apart from individuals, institutional mechanisms—although some informally— are also in place to check state power. During much of Islamic history, the abuse of power by the rulers was curbed and curtailed among others by the ‘ulama (scholars) in their various capacities: as representatives of the community in issuing fatwas as to whether or not the ruler should be obeyed or whether the ruler still has legitimacy from the standpoint of the Shari’ah, as de facto lawyers interceding on behalf of wrongly arrested or punished individuals, and as judges (who are themselves appointed from among the ranks of the ‘ulama). That was until the arrival of colonialism and the onslaught of Western modernity in the Muslim world which disrupted the institutional balance of power between the scholars and rulers, apart from initiating radical socio-political and education reforms which ruptured continuity with some of the traditional practices. Admittedly, those mechanisms have not altogether disappeared so that even at present we see traditional scholars playing their role. For instance, during the Arab Spring, Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued an opinion on the permissibility of revolt against Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. In Syria there was a debate: on the one hand, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hasoun and Said Ramadan al-Buti defended Bashr al-Assad, while on the other hand, Muhammad al-Yaqoubi fiercely condemned the Assad regime and stood as one of the earliest ‘ulama to support the popular uprising in

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Syria in 2011. But even Hasoun’s and Buti’s support was qualified: they did not endorse some of the brutalities of the Assad regime but only cautioned against what they perceived to be a worse alternative to “reforming within”, namely falling prey to the geopolitics of “divide-and-conquer” and anarchy spearheaded by foreign intervention. And in Egypt, some quarters evinced confidence in the institutional and scholarly authority of al-Azhar University that there were even calls for its role to be constitutionally enshrined. What I’ve said thus far nevertheless assumes a religious context, and this if I understand correctly, is the second concern underlying your question, namely, the use of religion, or at least religious doctrine or school in the perpetration of injustice. The fear is that, when religion is invoked, the act of injustice would then have the veneer of legitimacy and validity, if not piety. But this again, is the peculiar concern of modern societies living in modern states in which the multiple centres of authority as found historically have been centralised if not uniformised under the purview of the state. Some Muslim states today have adopted Islam as the official religion or even a specific madhhab as the official legal school of the state. Relative to the long history of Islam, this development can be said to be quite late, only in the 16th century when the Ottoman Empire adopted the Hanafi school as its official school, although admittedly, theologically it was even much earlier, in the ninth century when the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun elevated the Mu’tazili school as the caliphate’s official theological doctrine. Yet none of these developments should be construed as assigning either the state or its organs with the fiat authority to speak on behalf of Islam. At best, the institutionalisation of religious practices should be understood as facilitating the administration and governance of society whose moral order is shaped by the Shariah as mentioned earlier, of course among other norms such as custom and statutes. The role of individuals as I’ve said earlier, and the ummah (throughout the world, not just the Muslims living in the polity, especially in our globalised world) in ensuring justice is always attained, is not diminished by the institutional facilitation of Shariah through the state. What this implies therefore, is that the mechanisms of preventing injustice can be various, as I said at the very beginning. There can be state or non-state measures to achieve that objective. At the state level, in the contemporary world, many Muslim states have adopted the three-tiered model of governance found in the West, namely the division of government into the executive, legislature and judiciary. It is the checks and balances underpinned by a principle of separation of powers between them that ensured no one body predominates, giving it leeway and excessive power. But even then this has not prevented societies applying them, Muslim and others alike, from lapsing into constitutional crisis, as when the three bodies could not work together, when say the court declares

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 273 unconstitutional every piece of legislation issued by the legislature, or when parliament enacts law repealing judicial decisions, if not revoking their authority together. Consequently, Muslim societies adopting this practice may be open to the same risks. Since the 19th century, written constitutions have also been adopted by Muslim states. At the beginning the intent was less to control and limit executive authority than to centralise political authority, to assert sovereignty and statehood and to express ideological intentions, which can be seen in the earliest constitutions of Tunisia, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. But later constitutionalist motives seem predominant, as can be seen in the constitution making processes after the Arab Spring, although aberrations can still be detected. In a way a constitution can be a mechanism to prevent tyranny and secure limited government, but this will not work if there is no commitment from the people and the state itself and the constitutional will only amount to nothing more than “parchment promise”. Some countries establish constitutional courts towards that end, such as Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, but this will not solve the problem if such court is equally populated by pro-regime faction among other possibilities. However, I think there is one peculiar feature in the constitutional drafting process in the Muslim world, not just Arab countries, but even elsewhere, such as in Malaysia, which carries a latent possibility to be developed into genuine measure of constitutionalism. That feature is the on-going debate on the place of Islam in the constitution or the state. It is interesting that such debates have generated considerable body of literature in the various jurisdictions. There are some common themes in all these states but there are also distinctive, local narratives that can be identified, signifying that there is unity in diversity when it comes to debates on Islam and the constitution throughout the Muslim world. These debates could have been the foundation of a new corpus juris—the closest civil equivalent may be the discipline called “conflict of laws”—which studies how Shariah can be applied in the constitutional and legal makeup of modern nation-states. Now this point relates to two points that we’ve discussed earlier, namely the “internationalism” of the ummah as opposed to the provincialised outlook of nation-state with its nations, and the fact that Islamic law historically developed outside the context of the state. By developing such corpus juris, these two characteristics can be given fuller recognition, although that would merit an in- depth discussion in its own right.

Encarna: We are actually looking for a possibility to achieve a perfect system, so that there is no misuse of the powers of the government. But, as you know, this is very difficult. We wanted to know if there is a possibility of thinking of

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 274 ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERVIEW a mechanism of prevention in the constitutional document. Which would be the mechanism to prevent this from happening? Is there even a theoretical possibility, a concept coming from Shari’ah, that could prevent the misuse of a specific interpretation? For example, it is not possible in the United States. Theoretically, it is, but at the end citizens can’t, or at least, don’t do it. Is it possible, from an Islamic point of view to find another point of view which would be more effective? Kamali: These mechanisms and procedures are generally left to the people themselves through consultation and agreement-based solutions. This is the subject of the Islamic public law principle of siyasah shar’iyah (judicious policy, or Shariah-oriented policy) providing scope and flexibility for new initiatives by the authorities which are harmonious to the spirit and purpose of Shariah. It is the primary duty of the state to ensure that essential Islamic principles are duly observed but the problem starts when the state itself becomes unjust. In Islamic history, there was no idea of constitutionalism. What existed was a set of commitments—to justice, to the authority of the ruler—but when things went wrong, there was no mechanism like a constitutional tribunal, or a constitutionally prescribed impeachment procedure, to try the head of state. What happened was lawlessness (khuruj - mutiny), challenging the authority of the state often leading to internal strife and violence. In present times, such mechanism exists in a number of ways. In Iran, there is a Council of Guardians, and even above that, the Public Interest Council (shura-e maslahat). We should recognise an authoritative council or body that consists of Islamic scholars and constitutional law experts which can function as the final arbitrator in the event of disagreements in the community or conflicts between the organs of state. However, that would be for the people to come up with consultative proposals. The state, according to the Hanafis, is a matter of good management, public interest (maslahah), consultation (shura), consensus (ijma’) and independent legal reasoning (ijtihad). These are basically civilian, not theological concepts. These doctrines really give you an idea that the people are authorised to come up with control mechanisms. Whatever mechanism that seems best and effective, that would be acceptable. Perhaps some kind of council would be an idea that the constitution itself recognises, at times when there is conflict, like what happened in Afghanistan recently. In Afghanistan, you have these two candidates. They were disagreeing even after the elections. That scenario is still unfolding I suppose: this is the recipe for total breakdown and chaos. So if you have an authoritative tribunal, it may be a Supreme Constitutional Court like in Egypt, Turkey and many other countries, that have the authority to issue the final conclusion or command. That is a question of finding a mechanism which cannot be based in

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 275 theology; it has to be a civilian concept that comes from the people and those who make the constitution to think what seems best.

Laura: As you have argued, democracy assumes a cultural context. How do you think the Asian model of Islam and democracy can contribute to the development of democratic systems in the Arab world, some of which are still under construction? The Arab world itself seems not very aware of the Asian model of Islam.

Kamali: There are many good aspects of culture and custom in the Muslim world which is so diverse. If we were to look to Indonesia, to Malaysia, to the Arab World, to North Africa, Turkey, and many other places, you will find that there is a great deal of diversity, very good aspects of culture. It requires a study. I would say if I were to be asked, what we can learn from Southeast Asia, I think, one example would be Indonesia - they are open to the voice of people, to the voice of the community. Religion is recognised but there is a civic component which is quite strong. It’s not a totally doctrinaire approach to state and politics. We have the value system and a set of principles in Islam, but you contextualise them. What is notable of Indonesia is that they tend have a softer version of Islam, and I think I would go for that because the fundamentalist interpretations, the hard line interpretations of Islam, have not done a good service to the people or to Islam. Islam itself recognises people’s welfare, their authority, their values, their customs to the extent that in one hadith (it is said): “What the Muslims consider to be good is good in the eyes of God”--“Muslims” of course [are here referred to] in their totality, in terms of their consensus. And I think it’s hard to specify. Some of the very ugly aspects of Jordanian, Afghan and Turkish honor killings have nothing to do with Islam. It is really a travesty of all values. But there are other good values in all these places, certain things are very good. We can try to identify and recognise them. And we have the idea of political parties, which is not integral to the Islamic conception of state as such, although Ibn Taymiyyah and others have spoken in support of people’s right of association and their formation of parties that promote good and prevent what is to be rejected and evil. We don’t recognise political parties as such. Maybe this is something we can take further if it is deemed the best way now to articulate some of the Islamic ideas more effectively. You have in the Qur’an the basic idea of ‘promotion of good and prevention of evil’. But promoting good and preventing evil by individuals poses problems; organised parties and associations can be more effective and better organised. So you might recognise that this Qur’anic concept can be more effectively implemented by organised party structures. This may be a way of injecting the European

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 276 ISLAM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERVIEW democratic system into our conception of the state in Islam. As to what different communities can contribute, there are ways, but it has to be studied. We cannot simply come up with this value or that value. It has to be a research-based effort.

Laura: One final question: has your experience in redacting the constitution of Afghanistan changed your perception on the role of Islam in the state? In particular, how you dealt with issues like the locus of sovereignty. How do you face this kind of challenge and how do you apply in this practical context your theoretical ideas on Shari’ah and constitutionalism?

Kamali: We made a special effort. I was in the Constitution Commission of Afghanistan. Every country has its own set of priorities at a certain juncture of its history. Constitutions are all like that. Constitutions are changed because circumstances change. And this was a set of circumstances we sat together to construct a new constitution for Afghanistan. At that time it was soon after the 25 years of the war involving the mujahidin and the Russian invasion. And Afghanistan had the world’s largest refugee population. These were some of the issues that we were facing. And there was a strong component of Islam because we thought that we owed it to Islamic platforms and movements that ousted the Russians. So we thought that we should give Islam a clear recognition, [so an] Islamic Republic came into being. There are 17 references to Islam in the constitution of Afghanistan. But there was also the idea of inclusivity. There were many times that people split, but they need to heal their wounds, to come together and unite for a new future. There were some new developments: we recognised the Shi’a madhhab for the first time as a valid madhhab. This was a big development for the constitution of Afghanistan, even for today’s Sunni countries, although Shi’is may be a minority but we need unity and the effort that can bring the people closer together. It was one of the ways that we thought was needed, after 25 years of war, fighting the Russians and so on, to bring our people closer together. We did recognise that: it was a step toward unity. It was a good move as it so happens in Afghanistan we do not to this day have a Sunni-Shia problem that has plagued some other parts of the Middle East. Then we also imposed a quota in the Constitution for women’s participation in government and in parliament. There was a new provision. From every province of Afghanistan, there must be two members of parliament. That brought 68 women to parliament as a requirement of the Constitution. I thought it was unprecedented. Even now in Afghanistan 27% of the parliamentarians are women, even Europe cannot match that. It is so unrealistic though given the wider scale of problems facing women in that country, but it is quite a significant step. In the Constitution, we had this idea of inclusivity, and there was

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 277 recognition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recognition of international standards of justice. I think that the Afghan constitution stands out for some of these features. I think some of them are worth considering for other Muslim countries as well. But, of course, Afghanistan has not practiced much of what we have done. There has not been an effective government ever since. Much of the Constitution remains. There is no effective rule of law or effective government, unfortunately. I think rule of law is something which is not really quite well-recognised. The sanctity of this principle merits greater visibility, greater commitment and recognition in Muslim countries. We talk about it in the Constitution, a lot of things, fundamental rights, liberties of the people, wonderful chapters in all Muslim constitutions, but how much of it is reality? And I think these are some of the challenges and some of the gains but as I said, these were my experiences some of which are clearly related to circumstances that surrounded us. As for sovereignty which you mentioned, we had no dispute over this subject in the Constitution of Afghanistan. I know this has given rise to much debate in the Constitution, for instance, of the neighbouring Pakistan, but in Afghanistan, in almost all of its Constitutions, sovereignty (hakimiyat) is declared to belong to the people. This is also the position in the current Constitution.

Seminar on Gender and Islamic Legal Reform (Kuala Lumpur, 9 December 2014) Tengku Ahmad Hazri

On 9 December 2014, IAIS Malaysia hosted two academics from the University of British Columbia, Canada, for the Seminar on Gender and Islamic Legal Reform, namely, Dr Rumee Ahmed (who presented on “Islamic Legal Reform: A View from Within”) and Dr Ayesha Chaudhury (“The Great Muslim Gender Debate: Learning to Disagree Agreeably”). The challenge of Islamic law reform, claimed Rumee Ahmed, lies in the fact that Islamic law is embedded in a wider realm of ideas. Consequently, law is connected to “rules of concomitance”—to exegesis, to theology, to spirituality, among others—rendering a challenge to a single law to be a challenge to the entire conceptual narrative. A legal ruling rarely applies in a vacuum but instead is arrived at by bringing together suppositions from a variety of parts in the same whole narrative. This can be readily illustrated by tracing the evolution of Hanafi legal thought towards prisoners of war. By strict interpretation of Surah al-Anfal (8:67-69), taking such prisoners is impermissible. But if that is the case, then how

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 278 VISIT BY PROFESSOR TARIQ RAMADAN TO MALAYSIA does one explain the Prophet’s (peace be on him) decision to ransom prisoners of war after the Battle of Badr instead of executing them as ‘Umar al-Khattab advised, citing al-Tawbah to “kill the polytheists wherever you find them” (9:5)? This then moved to the theological issue of whether the Prophet can “sin” (as opposed to a mere mistake or error), and to the question of the possibility of increase or decrease of faith (iman). The conceptual narrative is even applicable in the domain of gender justice. Ayesha Chaudhury contrasted what she called “patriarchal” and “egalitarian” idealised cosmologies which she claimed are responsible behind interpretations of Surah al-Nisa’ (4:34), which seemed to allow husbands to beat their wives. Whereas “egalitarian idealised cosmology” depicts both man and woman to be equally connected to God, “patriarchal idealised cosmology” presents a woman’s relationship to God as “mediated” by men, specifically husbands. Pre-colonial interpretations of the verse appear to concur in the husband’s “privilege” to “discipline” their wives, their differences merely in terms of procedure and extent of harm allowed to be inflicted. But thanks to encounter with colonialism, progressive interpretations of the verse began to emerge. Underpinned by an “egalitarian cosmology”, post-colonial scholars now denied that the verse is to be taken literally, so that husbands are not permitted to smack their wives, literally, symbolically or otherwise.

Visit by Professor Tariq Ramadan to Malaysia (29 January 2015 – 1 February 2015) Tengku Ahmad Hazri

The renowned Muslim public intellectual, Tariq Ramadan, currently Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies at the University of Oxford, held a lecture tour in Kuala Lumpur from 29 January 2015 to 1 February 2015. Among others he spoke on reclaiming the true meaning of jihad at a conference organised by the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) and on the Qur’an, “The Word and its Signs” at the Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia (IAMM). In the latter Tariq restored the true meaning of “ayat” as “sign”, whose spiritual wellsprings have been obscured by the word’s rendition into English as “verse”. In reality the Qur’an, as a “school for intellectual humility and spiritual openness” addresses both the mind and heart, thus its significance transcends its rational meanings. Its substance then includes its form, its poetic expression as well as the manner in which it is to be read and recited. The richness of the content of the Qur’an corresponds to the richness of one’s experiences: to read the Qur’an is to dialogue with God.

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One of the highlights of his visit was his lecture on Islamic reform at IAIS Malaysia. In the lecture on “Understanding Reform from an Islamic Perspective” (IAIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 30 January 2015), Tariq reframed the discourse on reform by emphasising reform of the self as the prelude and prerequisite to social reform, inspired no less than by the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be on him!) himself, who “prayed at night to transform the world during the day”. This personal reform should culminate in a sense of personal security (salamat al-nafs) in the individual, a state necessary to attain to the Qur’anic ideal of the “tranquil soul” (nafs al-mutma’innah). Such objective necessitates the intensification and accommodation of Shariah in the heart (tatbiq al-Shari’ah fi’l-qalb) by transcending what Imam Nawawi described as the “lower” level of worship i.e. based on expectation of reward, to the “higher” form of worship which is performed out of sheer love for God. Reforming the self also means reforming one’s attitude towards the environment or nature. In fact, nature functions as both the “context” to which one must adapt with the goal of transforming, and also on a higher plane, as ‘revelation by other means’. Indeed, the Qur’an as revelation itself connects to nature, as evidenced by various references to nature, how God makes oath by the events of nature (“By the dawn”, “By the night”, “By the ten nights”, etc), and how the Prophet himself wept when one such verse was revealed. The reform envisaged here is thus wider than popular depictions of reform, especially those which are propagated by some jurists, for whom ijtihad (independent reasoning), tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform) are construed from a strictly legal standpoint thereby reducing the reform agenda to questions of rulings (ahkam) alone. To the contrary, law itself is a means, not an end: it merely circumscribes, not prescribes – the latter being the function of ethics. This explains the need to move from “adaptation reform” to “transformation reform”, two approaches by which the text (i.e. revelation) and the context (the lived social reality) may interact. Whereas adaptation reform only “responds” to changes as and when they happen so as not to lag behind, transformation reform calls for active participation as agents of change itself. To accomplish the latter, Muslims should look to their own tradition, its intellectual and historical heritage, to set their own goals and objectives rather than merely responding and reacting to “the West”. Too often the Muslim world judges its own accomplishments by reference to the West (e.g. by locating “Islamic” antecedents to existing Western “achievements”), which in a way detracts the pursuit of independent objectives. In reality, Islamic tradition, especially its ethical thrust can infuse contemporary agendas towards the betterment of the ummah—recall that the Prophet (pbuh) was also sent for the refinement of ethics (makarim al-akhlaq).

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 280 ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON "EXTREMISM, TERRORISM AND ISLAM"

Roundtable Discussion on “Extremism, Terrorism and Islam: Toward A Better Understanding Of Issues” (IAIS Malaysia, 22 January 2015) Elmira Akhmetova

Extremism and violence are universal phenomena that existed throughout human history. However human beings, both in the West and the East, are becoming more radical and much brutal in our days. Extremist acts are today committed as much by transnational and supranational groups as by official and legitimate governments, both in the West and in the Muslim world. As history reveals, balance and moderation have been clearly imprinted on the character of classical Islamic civilisation. For many centuries, Islam exposed itself as a religion of moderation, committed to establishing a system of truth and justice that shuns laxity on one side and extremism on the other. Yet, violence and radicalism are spreading like a cancer in the failed states of the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region and South Asian countries. The Arab Spring where people sought genuine democracy and good governance has morphed into a hotbed of extremism across swathes of the Middle East and North Africa. The safety and well-being of the entire Muslim world is today jeopardised by the creation of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – ISIS. This extremist militant group is responsible for many brutalities and transgressions, primarily hostile to the core principles of Islam and humanity. International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) organised a closed-door Roundtable Discussion entitled “Extremism, Terrorism and Islam: Toward A Better Understanding of Issues” on 22nd January 2015 to contemplate the root causes of extremism and to search for feasible solutions to nullify the strongest magnet of extremism in the Muslim world. The panellists were Prof. Dr. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Founding CEO of IAIS Malaysia, Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST), Prof. Dato’ Paduka Mohamad bin Abu Bakar, Department of International and Strategic Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya (UM), and Mr. Ahmad El-Muhammady, lecturer at Centre for Foundation Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Prof Kamali was the first speaker who expounded the subject of extremism from juristic and historical perspectives. He differentiated theological or religious, political and practical types of extremism, and acknowledged that, throughout history, extremism hardly commanded a credible majority in Muslim societies. Unless the root causes of radical extremism are addressed, radicalism is likely to carry its own momentum. Extremists tend to triumph not because of

ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 281 their inherent strength, as Prof. Kamali underlined, but because of the weakness of moderates. He consequently called upon the religious moderates to combat their common scourge. Second panellist, Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, underlined three important dimensions of extremism occurring in the Muslim world. Firstly, most of the terrorist and extremist acts done by Muslims in our days are reactive behaviour provoked by countless injustices and brutality committed by the West and their own dysfunctional governments. Secondly, violence in the Muslim world arose from various types of manipulations, particularly of Islamic values and principles, by international actors as can be observed in the creation of Taliban or Al-Qaida by the United States. The third dimension of the recent wave of extremism, in Chandra’s view, is that Muslims today are largely exploited in false flag operations. The third panellist, Prof. Dato’ Paduka Mohamad bin Abu Bakar, addressed the widespread expression of ‘Islamic terrorism’ as an example of misrepresentation of Islam and its fundamental values. There are no ways to end extremism completely but Muslims can learn how to reduce it by exercising noble values of Islam such as moderation, toleration and integrity. Based on his personal experience of dealing with those who are suspected in terrorist activities, the last panellist, Mr. Ahmad El-Muhammady, asserted that terrorism is a response to the global injustices faced by Muslims worldwide. According to him, people who are deprived from justice and basic human rights are more willing to join extremist groups such as ISIS simply because these groups promise to bring justice to them. The panel session was followed by a productive discussion among the panellists and the audience, which included representatives from 26 embassies in Malaysia. All agreed that the issue of extremism among Muslims is critical and requires an urgent resolution. Restoration of peace and stability in the Muslim world depends on the ability of Muslim governments to respond to the needs of their people as well as on the ability of the local and international powers to protect the rights and human dignity of their citizens.

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia BOOK REVIEWS

Jocelyne Cesari, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 423, ISBN: 978-1-107-66482-1 by Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri, International Islamic University Malaysia

The book argues against the prevalent theory of modernisation and democratisation that the separation between state and religion should be the natural outcome of a modernising Islamic society, similar to the historical trajectory of the West as a liberal political system. Instead, the author shows through her meticulous work in the Middle East that to the contrary, Islam is further politicised in the region following the formation of nation-states because there is a lack of demarcation between Islam and the nation as an identity. The main tenet of the book is that “[t]he use of Western secular techniques in law and constitutions created a strong connection between Islam and politics and contributed to the redefinition of Islam as a political norm in ways unknown under the Muslim empires.” (p. 7) It is this conflation between the religious and political self of Muslims in the early twentieth century that makes it difficult for state institutions to ignore the people’s natural desire for a religious life and therefore political system. Although this conversation is far from new, the author’s argument is meant to rattle the prevalent discourse so that we can find a way forward for democratic Muslims without having to undermine their experience or reality. Since the book covers various countries from Iraq to Turkey, it is filled with important information that is beneficial to readers who are not familiar with the background of the region. The book is divided into three main parts that also correspond to the chronological order of events: the making of Islam as a modern religion, Islamism as the preeminent political force pre— and post—Arab Spring, and the disjunction of democracy and secularism—lessons learned from the Arab Spring. This structure allows readers to have a better understanding of how Political Islam became what it is today and its evolution from the periphery toward the centre. Although a reader can easily get lost in the wealth of information on the many Middle Eastern countries one finds in this book, the author’s choice of structure and style of writing makes it much easier to comprehend the main argument of a modern Islam that is different from modern Christianity as a result of state-formation preceding that of nation-building during modern Islam’s recent development.

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Part II of the book concerning Islamism is more relevant today as it discusses the rise and fall of the unique subset of political actors in relation to the events of the Arab Spring and its aftermath. Specifically, now that Political Islam is in the forefront of democratisation in the Middle East, there is a need to understand better where and how it will lead a country or community to a new reality. From the author’s observation, she concludes that the ability of Islamists to capture the support of the people does not directly depend on its Islamic platform but on the subversion of the authoritarian state system and the ability of the Islamists to reach across multiple groups in society. In other words, Islamists in the Middle East are no different from the opposition in the Communist states during the Soviet era—their success or failure depends heavily on the political environment before the fall of the regime and the alliance built thereafter. However, the author argues that it is inaccurate to read too much into the recent decline of Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Ennahda in Tunisia to mean the end of Political Islam. As the main argument of the book goes, as long as Islam is aligned with the conservative tendencies of society, Islamism will not go away that easily. Another interesting point made by the author is on the role played by Islam in furthering the democratisation effort in these Middle Eastern countries. Specifically, in the chapter “The Rise of Unsecular Democracies”, the author makes an argument for the use of nondemocratic methods by the state to impose an institutionalised Islam to the people in order for these countries to see a more democratic future. Since Muslims are very passionate regarding the role of Islam in the running of the state, it would be unreasonable to expect the state to limit its involvement in maintaining the rights and liberties of people from different faiths. On the other hand, such effort is crucial to allow for democratisation to happen even without full liberties to minorities. This is what is meant by unsecular politics. The author’s ability to illustrate clearly the practicality of such exercise, even in Western countries such as the United States of America, provides an optimistic analysis to readers who are concerned with the current state in the Middle East. Cesari’s main contribution to the literature is that there is an urgent need for Muslims to dismantle their religious identity from their national identity in order for Islam to modernise, a project that is not happening in the near future. The book calls into question the prevailing idea that for Islamic countries in the Middle East to democratise it is required for the state to avoid getting involved in religion and to allow the privatisation of religion. It is undeniable that her observation is meant to challenge those who, in no uncertain terms, stressed that the role of the state is to keep Islam away from the public sphere of discourse. In other words, the author argues for a greater role of the state. However enlightening this

ICR 6.2 Produced and distributed by IAIS Malaysia 284 THE AWAKENING OF MUSLIM DEMOCRACY argument is, it does not go far enough as there is no denying that the political actors involved are huge components in the modernisation project in Islamic countries as Islam and politics are one of the same to a majority of conservative Muslims in the Middle East. The book is commendable for its breadth and depth, a testament to the author’s capability as one of the leading analysts on the Middle East. However, there are times when the reader feels like the book is pulling itself thin by trying to cover so much without a clear indication as to where it is going. For example, there are many references made to Turkey and Pakistan in discussing Part II of the book when discussing the Arab Spring, which seems odd when these countries were not directly embroiled in the revolution. This is, of course, a minor shortcoming of the book when compared to its larger contribution to the rethinking of Political Islam and its future as a viable option in countries that seek to have greater freedom and democracy. For this, the book is worth reading especially by specialists in the area who are looking for a fresh lens to view the current situation in the region.

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CALL FOR PAPERS

Islam and Civilisational Renewal (ICR) invites scholarly contributions of articles, reviews, or viewpoints which offer pragmatic approaches and concrete policy guidelines for Malaysia, the OIC countries, civic non-governmental organisations, and the private corporate sector. The principal research focus of IAIS is to advance civilisational renewal through informed research and interdisciplinary reflection with a policy orientation for the wellbeing of Muslim communities, as well as reaching out to non-Muslims by dialogue over mutual needs and concerns.

Our enquiry and recommendations seek to be realistic and practical, yet simultaneously rooted in Islam’s intellectual and spiritual resources, Muslim political and social thought, inter-faith exchanges, inter-civilisational studies, and global challenges of modernity.

ICR invites contributions on the following topics:

• issues of good governance and Islamic law reform in Muslim societies • science, technology, development and the environment • minorities and culture-specific studies • ethical, religious or faith-based issues posed by modernity • inter-faith, inter-civilisational, and Sunni–Shi‘ah dialogue and rapprochement.

ICR is published in English and it is essential that to help ensure a smooth peer-review process and quick publication all manuscripts are submitted in grammatically correct English. For this purpose, non-native English speakers should have their manuscripts checked before submitting them for consideration. The Editorial Board holds the right to make any necessary changes in the approved articles for publication upon consultation with the writers.

Contributors to ICR should visit the following website for guidelines to consider in their contribution: http://www.iais.org.my/icr/index.php/icr/about/submissions

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ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL