Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Home , Kristall, Marisat 3, Nimbus 5, Nimbus 6, PAGEOS, ProSpace

University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Documents on Outer Space Law Law, College of

6-1982

Civilian Space Policy and Applications

U.S. Office ofechnology T Assessment

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelawdocs

Part of the Astrophysics and Astronomy Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

U.S. Office ofechnology T Assessment, "Civilian Space Policy and Applications" (1982). Documents on Outer Space Law. 16. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelawdocs/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Documents on Outer Space Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Civilian Space Policy and Applications

June 1982

NTIS order #PB82-234444 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82-600564

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 .

Foreword

This assessment responds to a request to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for an evaluation of the present state and possible future directions of space applications technologies in the civilian sector. Four technologies are examined in detail: satellite communications, land remote sensing, materials processing in space, and space transportation. In addition, the assessment investigates the national policy that has guided the development of these and other applications technologies. For the past quarter century, the United States has been the acknowledged world leader in the exploration of space and the use of technologies developed to operate in the space environment. Now, however, the United States faces increasing foreign competition in many areas of the space program, particularly in applications with commercial promise. Civilian Space Policy and Applications examines several means for addressing this competitive challenge. In particular, it investigates the options available for the future deployment of U.S. land remote-sensing systems, and explores the status of advanced satellite communications research within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Further, the report assesses the potential for manufacturing useful products in space and for commercializing space transportation systems. OTA was greatly aided by the advice of the project advisory panel, as well as by participants in several specialized workshops. The contributions of contractors, who provided important analyses, and of numerous individuals and organizations that gave generously of their time and knowledge, are gratefully appreciated.

Director

.,. Ill .—— . — . . —

Civilian Space Policy and Applications Advisory Panel

Jerry Grey, Chairman American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Fred E. Bradley Michael B. McElroy McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. Center for Earth and Planetary Physics Sam Brown Harvard University Private Consultant James A. Michener John G. Burke Author Department of History Bernard J. O’Keefe University of California EG&G, Inc. Hal Clement (Harry Stubbs) Thomas O. Paine Author Northrop Corp. Terry Dawson, Jr. Merton J. Peck The Analytic Sciences Corp. Department of Economics Hugh Downs Yale University American Broadcasting Co. Charles Sheldon * Daniel J. Fink Science Policy Research Division General Electric Co. Congressional Research Service Arnold Frutkin Marcia Smith The Burroughs Corp. Science Policy Research Division “ Congressional Research Service Eilene Galloway International Institute of Space Law of the Martin Summerfield Princeton Combustion Research Laboratories, Inc. Ivan Getting Verner E. Suomi Consultant Space Science & Engineering Center University of Wisconsin Willis M. Hawkins . Lockheed Corp. Anthony F. C. Wallace Department of Anthropology Ida R. Hoos University of Pennsylvania Space Sciences Laboratory University of California Roy A. Welch Department of Geography James A. Loveli University of Georgia Fisk Telephone Systems, Inc.

NOTE: The Advisory Panel provided advice and comment throughout the assessment, but the members do not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse the report for which OTA assumes full responsibility.

* Deceased, iv Civilian Space Policy and Applications Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director OTA Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Ray A. Williamson, Project Director Adam Wasserman Philip P. Chandler, II Richard DalBello* Gordon Law Richard Marsten** Thomas Thornberg***

Contributors Scott Finer Donna Valtri

Administrative Staff paula Walden Jannie Coles Marion Fitzhugh Jean G. Monroe

Contractors Trudy Bell Leonard David Russell Drew Rowland lnlow John Logsdon Thomas Potts Edward Risley

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

● In-house contractor ● ● project Director until March 1981. ***On detail from NASA (Septem!xr 1980 September 1981) Workshop on Policy Alternatives

Jerry Grey, Chairman John Logsdon Robert Shaw American Institute of Aeronautics Technoscience Associates Exxon Enterprises and Astronautics Arthur Morrissey Jerome Simonoff Russell Drew Office of Science and Technology Citibank Science and Technology Consultants Policy David Williamson Executive Office of the President Louis Friedman NASA Headquarters Planetary Society Willis Shapley Private Consultant Ronald Konkel Planning Offices National Bureau of Standards

Workshop on Commercialization of Land Remote Sensing

Ralph Bernstein Robert Greenberg Charles Sheffield IBM Scientific Center Private Consultant Earth Satellite Corp. Dennis Burnett Leonard Jaffe Don Walklet COMSAT Computer Sciences Corp. Terra-Mar Associates Charles Dannaman Vladimir Naleskewicz R. Gordon Williams Space Operations Group Satellite Systems Engineering TRW Electronics and Defense General Electric Co. David Ferguson Information Systems and Services

Workshop Materials Processing in Space

Darrell Branscome Charles Fritts John Logsdon Committee on Science and National Productivity Group Graduate Program in Science, Technology U.S. General Accountimz Office Technology, and Public Policy U.S. House-of Representatives Laurence Gilchrist George Washington University Joseph E. Coleman Space Applications Board Louis Testardi McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. National Research Council Material Processing in Space Divison David Cummings James A. Kirk National Aeronautics and Space Universities Space Research Department of Mechanical Administration Associations Engineering Donald Edgecombe The University of Maryland Battelle Columbus Laboratories

Workshop on International Issues in Commercial Space Systems

Jean-Pierre Fouquet Ryo Kimura Wilfred Mellors Scientific Attache for S~ace Affairs International Space Division European Space Agency o Science & Technology Embassy of France Kenneth Pederson Agency Embassy of Japan Tadahico Inada International Affairs NASDA Representative Sebastian Lasher NASA Headquarters Embassy of Japan INTELSAT

Workshop on Space Transportation Issues

W. C. Armstrong Gilbert Keyes Robert White Northrop Services, Inc. Boeing Aerospace Co. General Dynamics Corp. William French Gilbert Moore James Wilson United Technology Corp. Thiokol Corp. McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co, Chuck Gould Morgan Sanborn Kenneth Zitek Rockwell International Corp. Rockwell International Corp. Martin Marietta Aerospace Corp. Don Ingram Charles Tringali Grumman Aerospace Corp. Lockheed Corp. vi Workshop on Remote Sensing: Government User Concerns

Wolf Drews Charles parrish Edward Risley World Bank Earth Resources Data Analysis Department of the Interior Roland Inlow Charles Paul William Wigton OAO Agency for International Department of Agriculture Development Ahmed Meer Richard Williams Department of State Irv Pikus U.S. Geological Survey National Science Foundation James Nycum U.S. Genera! Accounting Office Bruce Rado Georgia State Department of National Resources

Acknowledge ments

OTA thanks the following people who took time to provide information or to review part or all of the study. john Alic S. E. James William Raney Office of Technology Assessment FSD Houston NASA Headquarters IBM Corp. john Benson Edward Risley Private Consultant David Johnson U.S. Geological Survey National Oceanic and Atmospheric Department of the Interior Marjorie Blumenthal Administration Office of Technology Assessment A. Schnapf D. J. Jones, Jr. RCA Astroelectronics Division Harvey Brooks General Dynamic Convair Division RCA Corp. Harvard University Systems Development Corp. Willis Shapley j. R. Burnett Thomas Karas Private Consultant Defense Systems Group Private Consultant TWR, Inc. peter Sharfman G. W. Keyes Office of Technology Assessment R. P. Buschmann Boeing Aerospace Co. Lockheed Corp. Michael Simon R. L. Kline National Aeronautics and Space Joseph Coleman Grumman Aerospace Corp. Administration McDonnell Douglas Astronautics CO. Sebastian Lasher Delbert Smith William Colglazier INTELSAT COMSAT Harvard University Pamela Mack Norman Terrell Burt CowIan Private Consultant Arms Control and Disarmament Private Consultant Agency Joseph Mahon Kenneth Craib National Aeronautics and Space Louis Testardi Resource Development Corp. Administration Materials Processing in Space Ray Crowe!! Division M. J. Maltagliati Office of Technology Assessment National Aeronautics and Space Aerospace Industries Association of Administration Jean Pierre Fouquet America, Inc. French Embassy P. S. Visher Wilfred Mellors Hughes Aircraft Co. J. L. Gait European Space Agency International and Business Affairs M. 1. Yarymoych Arthur Morrisey Planning North American Aerospace Martin Marietta Aerospace Corp. General Electric Co. Operations Charles Parrish Rockwell International Corp. G. J. Gleghorn The Naisbett Group TRW DSSG Charles Yost Kenneth Pederson National Aeronautics and Space Noel Hinners International Affairs Administration National Air & Space Museum NASA Headquarters S. L. Zieberg Roland Inlow R. A. Pepping Martin Marietta Aerospace Corp. OAO McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co Tadahiko lnada Ian Pryke NASDA Representative European Space Agency Embassy of Japan VII Contents

Chapter Page 1. Executive Summary ...... 3 2. Introduction ...... 21 3. issues and Findings ...... 27 4. Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ...... 81 5. U.S. Civilian Space Program ...... 105 6. Relationship Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ...... 145 7. International Efforts in Space ...... 175 8 Commercialization of Space Technology ...... 219 9 Institutional Considerations ...... 241 10, Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment...... 267

APPENDIXES

Appendix Page A. Institutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program ...... 307 B. Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior ...... 315 C. Foreign Agriculture Service, Department of Agriculture, Crop Condition Assessment ...... 329 D. Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity...... 334 E ,World Climate, the Oceans, and Early indications of Climatic Change . . . . . 341 F. The International Legal Regime of Outer Space ...... 347 G. Background for International Programs ...... 360 H. Industrial Innovative Process ...... 365 1. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as Amended ...... 372 Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary ...... 385

ix Chapter 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Contents

Page Overview ...... 3 Space Policy ...... 4 Current Status ...... 4 Specific Issues ...... 5 Amending the National Aeronautics and Space Act ...... 5 Civilian/Military Relationships ...... 5 Emphasis of the Program ...... 6 Future Programs ...... 6 Strong Response to Competition ...... 6 Moderate Response to Competition ...... 7 Low Level of Response to Competition ...... 8 Policy for Space Applications ...... 9 Federal Operation of Space Systems ...... 9 Commercial Ownership of Space Systems ...... 10 Technologies ...... 11 Advanced Satellite Communications ...... 11 Satellite Land Remote Sensing ...... 13 Materials Processing in Space ...... 15 Space Transportation ...... 15 International Issues ...... 17 Policy for Science ...... 17 Charting the Policy Future ...... 17 Chapter 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OVERVIEW

The United States orbited its first satellite in 1958, nearly a quarter century ago. In the intervening years, the United States has made great strides in developing peaceful and practical uses of space technology. However, in spite of the dramatic successes of the space program, among which are the recent flights of the Columbia shuttle orbiter, many informed observers express considerable unease about the future of our civilian efforts in space, particularly in light of increased foreign competition and stringent fiscal restraints. Because of these uncertainties and also because of emerging new prospects for using the space environment, this assessment was requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and endorsed by the House Committee on Science and Technology. It investigates America’s civilian space policy from the point of view of its effects on the primary areas of space applications technology, including space transportation. It does not address military/intelligence applications projects, activities in space science, or space exploration except insofar as

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The successful launching (11-12-81) and return (11-14-81) of the second flight of space shuttle Columbia. The first reuse of a manned spacecraft with Astronauts Joe H. Engle and Richard H. Truly aboard

3 —. —. —

4 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications these affect civilian applications. Its aim is to in- tional status, when and under what circum- vestigate Federal policies, public and private instances commercial involvement is appropriate, stitutions, and the external circumstances that and how to respond to commercial competition shape space applications today. In keeping with from overseas. It also addresses questions of this emphasis, the assessment explores the ques- space policy suggested by the Nation’s ex- tion of Federal involvement in space research perience with applications of technology in and development (R&D), the issues that arise space. in the transition from R&D to full-fledged opera-

SPACE POLICY Current Status ficult for the executive agencies to set specific timetables for developing space systems that meet In 1958, the basic institutions and policy prin- user needs, to encourage private sector invest- ciples for civilian space activities were established ment, and to initiate new and/or implement man- in the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act. dated programs. In addition, there is no clear and This supporting structure, though amended and predictable policy or process to define at what extended by legislation and presidential direc- rate and by what criteria the transfer of technol- tives, remains essentially unchanged to this day. ogy from Government research, development, During this time much has happened–not only and demonstration programs to the private sec- with regard to the space program, but also with tor should take place. regard to the commercial, national, and international context within which the program The lack of consensus is of concern because functions. many desirable space activities require continued Federal support. The Government continues to One of the most striking changes since 1958 play a crucial role in at least four areas that are is that space applications are now common and essential to the Nation’s future in space but have pervasive parts of day-to-day life. We rely increas- little potential for immediate commercial return: ingly on space for vital private and public func- contribution to advanced R&D, continuation of tions (commercial communications and military space science, provision of public goods and reconnaissance) and for useful services (land services, and regulation/coordination of na- remote sensing, navigation, and weather forecast- tional efforts, particularly with respect to inter- ing). In the near future, we can foresee commer- national agreements. cial possibilities for processing materials in space. All of these applications of space technology re- The failure to agree about the aims of the U.S. quire the support of a space transportation sys- space program has occurred as other nations tem, including launch vehicles, spaceports, and have been expanding their own programs. When tracking networks. the U.S. space program began, the Soviet Union was our only competitor in space. The Soviets In spite of these advances, however, there is have never challenged our leadership in space no overall agreement about the direction or applications. Now, however, international com- scope the civilian space program should assume petition in space applications is a reality. The in the future. For the most part, our increasing Europeans and the Japanese have targeted spe- reliance on space systems has not been appreci- cific space technologies for development, and ated by the general public, which responds most they will soon be providing stiff competition for readily to spectacular manned and scientific mis- services heretofore offered only by the United sions. States. Their increased activities threaten the loss For space applications in particular, lack of of significant revenue opportunities for the United agreement on appropriate goals has made it dif- States as well as a potential loss of prestige and ——-—

Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 5 influence. Japanese and European technologies nology developed under Federal sponsorship. now capture a small but growing portion of the In addition, certain provisions of the act, such world market in satellite communications tech- as the commitment to leadership in space, and nology. Their position is likely to strengthen in the civilian/military separation, may have to be time. In the near future they are also likely to be reinterpreted in light of current needs. Possible in a similar position with respect to launch serv- changes or reinterpretations are raised as ap- ices and remote-sensing systems. propriate in the following discussion. Unless the United States is prepared to com- Civilian/Military Relationships mit more of its public and private resources to space than it now does, it will lose its preemi- The separation of the military from the civilian nence in space applications during the 1980’s. space program has served this country well. It has Both technological and commercial leadership allowed both programs to develop along paths are at stake. The U.S. leadership position will that reflect their different roles and missions. The depend not only or even primarily on spending civilian program has been conducted openly and more money, but on effectively allocating our has provided spectacular technological achieve- technical, financial, and institutional resources ments, many useful applications, and solid scien- to meet international competition. Given the tific research results; the military and national in- likely constraints on the Federal budget, it will telligence activities, while providing critical be important to decide in what areas the United security services, have contributed significantly States wishes to compete, because attempts to to our understanding of space. Cooperation and maintain a comprehensive program without addi- technology transfer between the two programs tional capital and manpower may lead to sec- have involved launch vehicles, launch and recov- ond-best technology and systems and/or inade- ery facilities, tracking and communications, and quate institutional support. an array of spacecraft technologies, to the mutual benefit of both programs. Although the Federal Government must continue to play an important part in space, it can- In certain cases, the sensitive and highly clas- not do the job by itself. The twin factors of sified nature of military and intelligence space sys- diminishing Federal resources for civilian space tems has made it difficult to transfer technology activities and the dynamic qualities of the pri- from these programs to the civilian sector. As the vate sector make it important that the private military program has grown in the past decade, sector participate more actively in U.S. space such difficulties have become more common. efforts. A great part of the success of the Euro- The joint military and civilian roles in NASA’s cen- pean and Japanese programs results from their tral program, development of the space shuttle, institutional arrangements within which private have raised serious questions of how to divide and public sectors can work well together. financial and operational responsibilities. In addition, the rise in military activities may occasion doubt in many foreign countries about the Specific Issues peaceful and civilian character of the civilian space program. The current climate of domestic Amending the National Aeronautics and fiscal restraint and competition with other coun- Space Act tries argues for: 1) more timely transfer of mili- The NAS Act allows for a very broad range of tary technological capacity to the civilian sec- activities; in itself it is not a constraint on en- tor; 2) assurance that past restraints on permissi- acting or implementing U.S. programs. How- ble civilian applications activities be reexam- ever, it may need to be amended to allow the ined; 3) appropriate assignment of lead respon- National Aeronautics and Space Administration sibility where classified and unclassified space (NASA) to operate space systems after the R&D programs have similar technical requirements; phase is complete, or explicitly to encourage and 4) increased joint management of programs commercialization of space applications tech- common to both. — — .—. ———

6 ● Civilian Space policy and Applications

Emphasis of the Program Strong Response to Competition The current institutional structure of the This response would require a strong political civilian space program is well-suited to major commitment and a consequent increase in the programs of technology development such as Federal budget for space. A strong response to Apollo or shuttle. It is probably too large and competition could lead to two different space too tehnologically ambitious in an environment programs, depending on the nature of the com- of level or decreasing budgets for programs hav- petitive threat. it would follow from the evalua- ing few major new projects. NASA’s organization tion that energetic development of U.S. space would constitute an effective base for embark- technology would lead to a strong competitive ing on a substantial new project, but it is not well- position for the United States in other high tech- -suited to undertake broad responsibilities for nology areas as well. operations. ● Apollo-1ike, Government-run program. The Embarking on any ambitious development proj- structure of the U.S. civilian space program ect involving advanced technology carries with was decisively shaped in the early 1960’s by it the inherent risk of fiscal and institutional com- the high-risk, manned Apollo program and mitment which, unless carefully planned, could its associated projects. As in the Apollo era, overwhelm other important parts of the space commitment to a new large centerpiece program. The experience with the shuttle is il- project such as a permanent manned space lustrative of this danger. Because of insufficient station, or a manned exploration of Mars allowance for unforeseen (but not unexpected) could be prompted by major new civilian development problems, it has been significantly and military initiatives from the Soviet Union, more expensive and difficult to bring to full opera- coupled with a desire to build on the tech- tional status than originally estimated. The un- nical and institutional resources developed intended (and unfortunate) result is that, during over the past two decades. A strong U.S. re- a period of constrained Federal budgets, impor- sponse could also include a focus on applica- tant space science and space applications proj- tions projects as part of an effort to empha- ects have been slighted. size certain capabilities such as communications or remote sensing in conjunction with a central program. In either case, such Future Programs efforts would be Government dominated, with commercial activities probably taking In considering programs in space applications, a secondary place to the goal of increasing one must take into account the overall context U.S. prestige. within which such an effort would take place. The ● Competitive, applications-oriented program. future of the U.S. space program as a whole will A strong reaction to European, Japanese, and depend on three key factors: 1) the desire to de- possible Soviet economic competition in ap- velop space technology to meet national needs, plications systems could lead to an aggressive 2) the degree and kind of foreign competition, Federal effort to maintain U.S. technological and 3) the amount of Federal and private re- and commercial preeminence across-the- sources available, board. It would be based on the estimation OTA has selected alternatives that bracket a that foreign government support and subsidy range of possible future space programs, with em- for their own programs could be met only phasis on the implications for the four applica- by similar support in the United States. Such tions technologies addressed in the report. In the a program might well be dominated by the following, three possible levels of U.S. response Federal Government, but because one of its to foreign competition are used to order options primary aims would be to develop commer- for space applications. Foreign competition was cial applications, strong efforts would be chosen as a basis for comparison because it leads made to enlist private industry as a major to the clearest distinctions between options. Ipartner. Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 7

Summary of Operational Landsat Applications in the Statesa

A. Water Resources Management

SOURCE: National Governors Conference.

Moderate Response to Competition ticular “targets of opportunity” would have This response would follow from an evaluation to be selected to take best advantage of fi- that foreign competition in space constitutes a nancial resources. significant, but not overriding commercial or ● Program with several emphases. This con- political challenge. There are two variations: figuration could occur when the shuttle ● Single emphasis program (majority of becomes fully operational, or if it were taken resources devoted to a single project, e.g., out of NASA and operated by a private firm, the shuttle). This option describes the cur- a separate Government agency, or the mil- rent situation, where NASA’s other applica- itary. Though NASA’s overall budget would tions and science efforts have been steadily be reduced, nontransportation applications reduced as shuttle development has taken might then have a larger and protected share a dominant share of a constrained overall of NASA’S lower budget; their portion could budget. Private sector involvement in appli- not be reduced as a result of increased cations would be strongly encouraged. Par- budgeting demands from the transportation 8 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

activities. Private sector participation in ex- or closed. Private sector efforts would be en- tended, cooperative generic R&D would be couraged, but significant Federal funding for solicited to reduce costs and increase the joint projects would not be available. prospects for commercialization. For simi- ● Transfer of all of NASA’s applications re- Iar reasons, NASA’s space science programs sponsibilities. A possible response to civilian could also be expanded. budget cuts and a weak competitive response by the United States would be to Low Level of Response to Competition transfer any remaining Government applications programs, particularly the shuttle, to This response would result from a view of for- the Department of Defense (DOD) and eign competition as either not threatening or other Government agencies. Appropriate unimportant, and a low estimate of the intrinsic NASA laboratories and facilities would be value of the public benefits of space applications, transferred to DOD, Interior, Commerce, coupled with severe constraints on the Federal and universities or private firms. NASA civilian space budget. would retain responsibility only for basic Severe/y constrained. Additional large cuts research in space science and aeronautics, in the civilian space budget would leave very with little or no applications R&D or opera- little room for new applications projects; the tional role, Such a scenario would require amount available for them would depend in a radical restructuring of the civilian space part on the resources devoted to the shut- program. It should be recognized that a tle. Major programs and perhaps entire transfer of some NASA activities to DOD categories of activities in science and applica- may be desirable even without major budget tions would have to be eliminated and some cuts, as suggested above in the section en- field centers would have to be restructured titled “Program with several emphases. ”

1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 T.Q,a 77 78 79 80 81 1982

Year a T,Q, s Transitional Quarter.

SOURCE: Off Ice of Management and Budget, —

Ch I—Executive Summary ● 9 -. —-. ——- —— .—————..—— —.—.— —— —— .—-——— -— — — .—.— — ——

POLICY FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS

What are the appropriate roles of the U.S. Government in funding or otherwise encouraging civilian space applications research, development, and demonstration? Who should operate space systems once they are developed and demonstrated? Discussion of these two fundamental questions forms the basis of much of this assessment.

Federal Operation of Space Systems At present, NASA is the civilian agency designated to conduct R&D of space systems and to operate launchers. The National Oceanic and At- mospheric Administration (NOAA) operates the weather satellites and is scheduled to assume operation of the Landsat system until the latter is transferred to private hands. Decisions on when a technically successful space system changes from R&D to operational status, and where operational responsibility lies (whether in NASA, a separate agency, a mission agency, or a private firm), have been made ad hoc. Insofar as the current procedure maintains flexibility, it has worked well; nonetheless, the absence of guidelines for the transition from R&D to operations leads to uncertainty and inefficiency in the various programs.

In particular, NASA’s role in operating, as opposed to developing, applications systems needs to be clarified. The NAS Act itself gives NASA only limited operational responsibilities, and succeeding executive and congressional interpretations of the act make it clear that NASA is not to be primarily an operations agency, with the exception of providing launch services. Never- theless, one approach to circumventing potential conflict between NASA and the Federal agencies which manage space systems and to easing the transition of applications systems from R&D to operational status would be to restructure NASA’s charter in the NAS Act and to allow it to operate selected Federal civilian space sys- Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration tems. Such a broadening of NASA’s role would require the agency to restructure itself internally ERTS-1 satellite counting down, July 1972. The ERTS program so that it couId gain expertise in specific mission was the first step in merging space and remote-sensing technologies into a system devoted to managing the Earth’s areas. resources more efficiently .——. - —.

10 ● Civilian space Policy and Applications

On the other hand, insofar as the mission agen- dustrial participants should be involved in plan- cies already have the necessary knowledge and ning for the demonstration phase (i.e., the phase supportive institutional structures, there are good prior to commercialization) in financing, in set- reasons to place mission-related space systems ting technical specifications, and in articulating in their care. It must be noted, though, that space the goals of potential customers. systems often support the activities of several mission agencies. If mission agencies are to operate The effectiveness of tax and other incentives space systems, the lead agency with respect to (e.g., patent policy and antitrust policy) for en- each application should be designated early in couraging stronger industry participation in space the R&D phase in order that it may be involved technology R&D varies according to the technol- in designing specifications and planning for the ogy and the industry. Though general policies demonstration phase, with a view to the services such as changes in depreciation allowances or they are to provide to other agencies and the tax credits for R&D can have major effects on private sector. private investments, OTA has not evaluated the Whether space systems are operated by NASA implications for space of such approaches. The or by other Federal agencies, adequate planning “Joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA),” recently infor the use of space technology requires that the troduced by NASA, is a promising and innova- needs of ultimate users of the new technology tive initiative to encourage private sector interest be considered in the development stages. poten- by allowing individual treatment of industry tial users must also be involved in planning and needs in the context of NASA’s overall goals. evaluating the demonstration experiments. Through JEA, NASA agrees to provide free shuttle launches and limited on-board services for Commercial Ownership of private sector experiments or technology demon- Space Systems stration programs that meet certain criteria—such as technical merit, contribution to innovation, One important way to strengthen the Nation’s and acceptable business arrangements. Though space program is to enlist a greater share of pri- originally designed to encourage private sector vate resources and responsibility in space tech- participation in NASA’s materials processing pro- nology. To do so will require the development gram, JEA, along with similar arrangements al- of innovative institutional mechanisms and incen- lowing for different degrees of participation, tives, examples of which are discussed later in may also be useful in encouraging new advances this chapter. One way to focus attention on this in satellite communications and remote sensing. aspect of the space program would be to amend In addition, NASA could also encourage in- the NAS Act to include commericalization as an dustrial development of space R&D by offering explicit goal for appropriate space systems. to launch experimental private sector devices or satellites in return for some portion of their ac- There is no single best model for commercial- tivity being devoted to public service. Another izing space applications technologies. The par- possibility is to allow NASA to collect a royalty ticular series of steps that led to the COMSAT fee on future profits from satellites in return for Corp., for example, though effective in promoting a free launch. satellite communications, will not necessarily serve as a paradigm for other technologies. Com- mercialization of other space technologies re- If the move to commercialize space applica- quires that the special circumstances and different tions technologies is to develop successfully, Gov- requirements of each be considered in determin- ernment and industry must show an increased ing whether and to what extent any system willingness to work together to share the risks and should be privately owned. At a minimum, re- benefits of new technology. In particular, private gardless of the means considered appropriate for firms must not expect publicly financed technol- transfer of federally developed technology into ogies to be transferred gratis, and Government the private sector, at a minimum interested in- agencies must be willing to relinquish control Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 11 over their projects and to plan ahead for even- panded. Consequently, in order to strengthen tual commercialization. NASA’s role in supporting advances in satellite communications technology, it may be desirable Commercializing space technology raises a for Congress to direct NASA to pursue a vigor- number of complicated regulatory issues. Domes- ous program in advanced satellite communica- tic and international problems concerning direct tions R&D. broadcasting technologies, remote sensing of foreign territories without prior consent, and the Projections of increasing demands for commu- development of private launch vehicles have nications services, especially television distribu- already arisen. As the technology to support tion, indicate that technology for exploiting the materials processing in space improves, new Ka-band (30/20 GHz) of the radio spectrum can chemicals, alloys, and pharmaceuticals may be be developed into profitable operational systems produced, some of which may require Govern- well before 2000. Development and demonstra- ment oversight to assure their content, quality, tion of this technology require at least some and safety. Because the technologies and the generic research of the sot-t not customarily done regulatory issues each raises are so different, by the private sector. Already the Europeans and regulation of each is best handled by agencies the Japanese are developing 30/20 GHz systems that specialize in each technology. In some cases, heavily subsidized by their governments. The vir- such as developing new drugs, regulatory policies tual certainty that foreign systems will come on- (e.g., those of the Food and Drug Administration) line sometime in this decade has occasioned are already in place; in others, such as private debate about whether NASA should undertake operation of launch vehicles, new policies or in- a large 30/20 technology R&D program, including stitutions are likely to be required. flight-testing of 30/20 hardware. Proponents of a NASA program argue that the private sector Technologies alone cannot afford to develop 30/20 systems, but that if they are not developed, the United States Of the many technologies that can be applied will lose an important market and its strong lead in space, OTA chose advanced satellite commu- in communications technology. An important nications, land remote sensing, materials process- consideration is that several companies are ing, and space transportation to study because: already doing some Ka-band work near 30/20 1 ) these technologies raise issues that are of cur- GHz for the military. It appears that 30/20 de- rent interest, 2) they illustrate a range of issues velopment is an area in which creative new faced by space applications, and 3) they have mechanisms for Government/private sector co- commercial potential. operation could be tried. A joint public/private demonstration project, with substantial finan- Advanced Satellite Communications cial participation from several corporations, might be possible and desirable. However, in The private sector has operated communications satellite systems since 1964. Today, largely order to encourage the private sector to enter into such an arrangement, appropriate incen- because of original research conducted by NASA and several private laboratories, the industry is tives would have to be devised. flourishing. It is the most profitable area of space On the other hand, perhaps the salient issue technology to date. In 1973, because of strong for commercial 30/20 systems, especially in the industry pressure, NASA began to phase out its United States, is not whether NASA should lead advanced satellite communications research pro- the way, but when the private sector judges it gram. By 1977, however, the communications inappropriate to bring such systems into the mar- dustry had decided that NASA had a role to play ket. Systems currently in use, both satellite and and urged it to begin advanced communications ground based, can still be substantially improved, research again. Although NASA reinstituted a and the private sector is working to do so. Until small program in 1978 ($26.7 million in 1981 and most of these improvements are made, private $15.9 million in 1982), it may need to be ex- firms, acting alone, may not find it advantageous ——

12 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The Communications Problem

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. to jump to 30/20, even if firms of other nations expanded point-to-point services. The major do. However, there is no doubt that eventually question to be answered by a possible develop- the United States will need to develop 30/20. The ment and demonstration project is whether the question is when. An important consideration is alleviation of congestion in the geostationary orbit that crowding of the geosynchronous orbit and and reduced costs outweigh the problems of as- the radio spectrum has led to international po- sembling them in orbit. A further important ques- litical problems that the private sector cannot tion is whether the risk of development is low resolve on its own. Accelerating the availability enough so that the private sector will be able to of 30/20 technology could render these problems develop large communications platforms on its more tractable. own, or whether a NASA program is necessary or desirable, perhaps in cooperation with The case of 30/20 demonstrates that in satellite INTELSAT or other interested international communications, as with other space applications parties. technology=, the United States lacks a consistent policy to assure coordination of military, civilian, Many of the pressing issues in satellite com- and industry efforts. This absence of clear vision munications are not related directly to the use will again become a problem as a new configura- of space but concern regulation or involve question for communications satellites, large com- tions of national sovereignty. Direct broadcast munication space platforms, becomes possible television and geostationary orbit allocation are in the 1990’s. Large communications platforms examples of such important issues (see the recent could support large multibeam antennas and the OTA repot-t, Radio frequency Use and Manage- associated switching electronics needed for vastly ment: Impacts From the World Administrative Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 13 —. — — . . — ... .—.———.——— - . - — ———-—. -

Radio Conference of 1979). Although these issues are not fully addressed in this report, it is important to note that because the Federal Government and relevant international organizations have not decided how direct broadcast television is to be regulated, industry’s investment in this technology is laden with extra risks. Designing appropriate regulations requires considerable technical knowledge and some research. In order to aid the regulatory bodies, it may be desirable to modify NASA’s legislative charter to direct the agency to support the research needs of their prospective regulatory actions.

Satellite Land Remote Sensing The future of U.S. civilian satellite land remote sensing is in considerable doubt. The question of what to do with the U.S. system is a critical one for the future of the management and development of U.S. natural resources. Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Whatever is decided, the question should be Landsat-D, an experimental satellite used primarily for resolved with dispatch. The needs of the data monitoring and management of food and fiber resources, users make it essential that continuity of data water resources, mineral and petroleum explorations, land flow be maintained and that price increases be cover, and land use mapping predictable and incremental. However, at the present time, it is unclear whether the United ellite remote-sensing systems makes it certain that States will have a civilian remote-sensing capa- the United States will no longer have a monopoly bility after the flight of Landsat D, and what in providing these services; the French have prices will be charged for data. Landsat D is already begun to market their SPOT system, scheduled to be launched in the third quarter of scheduled for operation in 1984. In addition, the fiscal year 1982 and has a mission goal of approx- Soviet Union has recently flown a new advanced imately 3 years. land remote-sensing satellite. Although it is NASA has managed the Landsat program as a unclear what use they plan to make of their new quasi-operational system for several years. Under capability, the Soviets could also compete with its leadership, the value of Landsat data for pro- the United States in this important technology. viding synoptic views of the Earth has been proved. The launch of Landsat D will bring this CURRENT POLICY: PRIVATE SECTOR OWNERSHIP technology nearer to operational status under the Both the previous and the current administra- management of NOAA. However, there are sev- tions have been committed in principle to com- eral general concerns about the viability of the mercializing a satellite remote-sensing system, Landsat program. First, because Landsat D will but, no specific guidelines have been provided carry new and untried sensors as well as proved to specify the terms and speed of transition to ones, one cannot be certain that it will provide the private sector. More than 3 years of experi- full operational service. In addition, budget ence in exploring the possible institutional ar- restrictions might make it difficult for NASA to rangements have already demonstrated that the complete and launch Landsat D’, an identical sat- transition is likely to be very difficult to ac- ellite that is now in production. Finally, the deter- complish. Several general proposals have been mination of the French, the Japanese, and the made for the means of transfer to the private European Space Agency to build their own sat- sector. .—. —.—

14 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

● Designating a single entity (either an existing information before the sensed country is able to corporation, or one created by legislation) to obtain it. Even if controls deemed adequate by own and operate the entire existing system the United States are instituted to prevent un- (space and ground segments). scrupulous use of the data, other nations may still ● Establishing a laissez-faire policy that would judge private control of the data to be unaccept- leave to the marketplace the decision to launch able, and might try to promote international over- and operate the entire system, with the Federal sight and control in various international forums. Government committed to leaving the field at a specific time. MULTILATERAL ALTERNATIVE TO CURRENT POLICY ● Commercializing the space and terrestrial The concerns of other nations might be segments independently of one another, either alleviated and a much stronger market for land through designation or laissez-faire. remote-sensing data developed if, instead of continuing a domestic system, the United States Each possibility has potential benefits and draw- offered to share the ownership and operation backs. One promising means of effecting transfer of Landsat with other nations. A single to the private sector would be to commercialize multilateral management authority could assume the space and the ground segments at different responsibility for global operation of a land rates. The ground segment already has a strong remote-sensing system; its responsibility would private component; the small, but important include establishing technical specifications, pro- value-added industry, which processes and en- curing and operating satellites, and receiving and hances satellite data to meet particular user preprocessing satellite data. Such an approach needs, is certainly growing, if not yet flourishing. would spread the investment risk, as well as en- The remainder of the ground segment, the receiv- courage member nations to be more aggressive ing and processing centers, could be operated in developing their own internal markets for by the private sector, provided continuity of data- satellite data. It could also contribute to the flow from the space segment were assured. In development of a strong market for U.S. data- the next 5 to 10 years, the market is not likely processing hardware and software, and broad to sustain commercial operation of the entire data-processing services. In addition, a multi- satellite land remote-sensing system without lateral system might make it easier to use the substantial direct or indirect Government fund- power of Landsat data in combination with ings. A multilevel pricing structure, in which weather satellite data to tackle some of the press- some users pay more than others, or an explicit ing global problems that face the world, such as subsidy to the operating entity could be used. No the buildup of carbon dioxide, or deforestation. matter how Government funding is provided, If the United States is to pursue the initiative of however, commercialization of the ground seg- a multilateral system, it must do so soon. The ment for land remote sensing will require a Fed- French SPOT system is well along in the planning eral commitment to the long-term, user-oriented phase and the Japanese system will follow a few operation of the satellite portion of the system. years after SPOT is in place. India, Brazil, and China are planning to develop their own systems Placing the satellite land remote-sensing sys- in the 1990’s. tem in private hands creates an inherent conflict of interest for the firms that control the However, if the system were internationalized, distribution of primary data. This might create the United States could no longer determine its significant problems for foreign users, particular- characteristics unilaterally. The United States ly those less developed countries whose main could not guarantee that the resulting system economic and social potential lies in exploiting would continue to serve U.S. needs to the same indigenous raw materials or agricultural products. extent as the current Landsat system. To retain Some less developed countries fear that a com- control, the United States would need to develop mercial operation may give private corporations and market its next generation of Landsats in a or industrialized countries access to vital resource much more aggressive manner. Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 15

CONTINUED FEDERAL OWNERSHIP Ieadtime needed to design experiments and An alternative to either a privately held or an schedule shuttle flights at optimal times, 3) need internationally owned satellite remote-sensing for multiple-flight opportunities in many cases, system is a thoroughgoing commitment to a sys- 4) uncertainty of return on investment, 5) industry tem owned and managed by the Federal Gov- distrust of long-term arrangements with Govern- ernment. Meteorological satellites, which, like ment, and 6) unfamiliarity with space systems and Landsat, provide data of benefit to the general the benefits they may offer. public, have always been owned and managed The United States can expect significant com- by the Government. Unlike satellite communica- petition in the long term from Germany, France, tions technology, which is already fully commer- Japan, and the Soviet Union, all of which are con- cialized, and materials processing in space, ducting a wide range of experiments in materials which, if successful at all, seems particularly ap- processing. [n the near term, according to their propriate for private sector operation, satellite published plans, their efforts will concentrate on remote sensing could certainly be retained as a the basic science end of the R&D spectrum. Al- Government system on the grounds that the good though at present it is sharply curtailed by budget it provides is primarily public. At the present time, reductions, the U.S. effort is directed toward 100 percent of the costs are borne by the Govern- commercializing this technology as well as pur- ment through the budgets of NASA and the De- suing R&D. At present it is unclear which pro- partment of the Interior, and about so percent grams will produce the greater near-term results. of the data soId are “purchased” by various Gov- ernment agencies. The Government, in effect, makes the market. Space Transportation

Materials Processing in Space Civilian space transportation, by means of both the reusable shuttle and expendable launch The prospects for manufacturing commercial vehicles, is likely to remain a function of the products in space are unclear, based on data Federal Government throughout this decade. obtained to date from limited in-space and ter- The aerospace industry is reluctant to assume restrial studies. Additional fundamental science ownership of the presently operating space and technology research such as will be con- launching systems because: 1) the majority user ducted in Spacelab is required before the private is the Government, 2) the Federal Government sector can be expected to initiate large-scale, ex- owns and controls the existing facilities, 3) the pensive manufacturing of goods in space. How- initial investments are very high compared to ex- ever experiments that have been conducted so pected revenues, and 4) indemnification in case far do suggest that the pursuit of space process- of disasters (e.g., an explosion on the launch pad, ing techniques might yield unique high-value, or misguidance) could be very expensive. low-volume products for the pharmaceutical, electronics, chemical, “specialty” glass, and ad- The aerospace industry has been willing, how- vanced alloy industries. Much of this research will ever, to operate any and all space transportation also lead to greater understanding of the effects services under contract to the Government. of gravity on chemical and physical processes. There has also been some limited commercializa- At Ieast two commercial ventures to produce tion of space transportation hardware. Upper commercial products or services in space are launch stages are routinely sold directly to the underway through joint endeavor agreements user, rather than through the Government. All with NASA. Other firms have also begun to ex- lower stages of expendable launch vehicles press interest in similar projects. (Scout, Delta, Atlas, and Titan), however, are still purchased and launched under the control of the In addition to the lack of adequate knowledge, Federal Government. other factors that will affect the willingness of some companies to invest in space R&D are: If the Space Transportation System (the shut- 1 ) the cost of experimentation in space, 2) the tle and its related components) is to be commer- 16 ● Civilian space Policy and Applications —— —...... - —_ .-— —. —.-——-——— —— . . . ..—.— ————

Current NASA Expendable Launch Vehicles 150

10C 30

5(I

o 0

a) Payload values are for east launch from Eastern Test Range for Delta and Atlas Centaur b) Scout values are for launch from wallops, c) Atlas E/F values are for launch from Western Test Range SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. cialized, the Federal Government will have to of- today, and decisions regarding the phaseout fer realistic incentives to the private sector. could be made in light of more realistic demand These might include: 1) committed purchase of projections. It may even be appropriate to con- an attractive number of flights, 2) provision of an tinue R&D of expendable launchers, particular- accelerated schedule of investment credits, 3) low ly to develop a low-cost reliable launcher for rental costs for Federal launch facilities, and boosting small payloads to geosynchronous orbit. 4) decision by the Government not to recoup in- U.S. dominance of free world space transpor- vested costs, tation faces strong competition. The Ariane Ex- NASA had planned to phase out most expend- pendable Launcher, developed by the European able launch vehicles in the mid 1980’s as the Space Agency, is being marketed by a private, space shuttle becomes fully operational, How- French-incorporated company. Several U.S. com- ever, it appears that the growing future need for panies have already changed their plans to launch services will exceed the shuttle’s availabil- launch on the shuttle, in favor of launching on ity, If demand outpaces availability, and if the Ariane. The Japanese now launch their own satel- United States has no expendable vehicles ready lites by means of Delta-class launchers, which to launch commercial satellites at affordable they construct under agreements with the U.S. prices, then the private sector will be forced to firms that developed the technology. The Soviets continue to purchase launch services from the and the Chinese also launch their own satellites, French. NASA is now reconsidering its policy, As but with locally developed technology. The Sovi- experience is gained with the shuttle, the launch ets are willing to place satellites of certain other needs for the future will be clearer than they are countries in orbit. Thus, although the foreign mar- Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 17 ket for satellite launches is growing, foreign capa- national proposals to regulate the free flow of bility is also growing rapidly. information. Similarly, many countries fear that unrestricted dissemination of high-resolution re- in addition to launch vehicles developed by the mote-sensing data would threaten their sover- Government, at least one private U.S. company eignty and national security. The question of re- plans to build and launch its own commercial ex- quiring the prior consent of a country before sell- pendable launchers. This fact has caused the ing or otherwise distributing high-resolution sat- Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal ellite data has been debated frequently at the Communications Commission, the State Depart- United Nations and other international bodies. ment, and NASA to begin to analyze the regulatory problems that may result from private launches from the United States and other na- Policy for Science tions. At this writing, it is unclear what agency(ies) U.S. leadership in developing innovative tech- will have the responsibility for such issues as: nology results from the strength of its scientific, launch authorization, aerial and maritime clear- engineering, and educational institutions. innova- ance, the development of new commercial tions in space applications require that these in- launch sites, the need for a system of indemnifica- stitutions maintain their interest in the oppor- tion, and payload authorization. These issues are tunities for science and engineering made possi- more likely to be resolved if a lead agency is des- ble by continued operations in space. If the vitali- ignated to coordinate launch regulations. ty of the U.S. space program is to be preserved, the United States must also be willing to com- International Issues mit sufficient resources and attention to basic NASA has had marked success in arranging co- science research and advanced engineering in operative ventures in space with other countries. all areas related to space, including space sci- A healthy program includes: support of However, as has been noted previously, foreign ences. educational programs in science and engineer- competition is almost certain to increase. One ing, innovation in laboratory equipment, and result is some kinds of cooperative international basic research in science and engineering. It ventures will become more difficult to initiate or would maintain a strong space science effort: new sustain. In particular, projects having potential missions to gather data in and from space, a cor- commercial payoff, such as future activities in materials processing that may prove of interest responding set of projects to guarantee adequate analysis of these data, and a stable infrastructure to chemical or pharmaceutical companies will be of facilities and support technologies. problematic. On the other hand, there may be more scope for joint ventures, or subcontracting, between companies from different countries, Charting the Policy Future notably in selling equipment and services to the The discussion in the first section of this sum- third world. mary describes current problems that reach all Proliferation of direct broadcast satellite segments of the civilian space program. A per- systems and improvements in the resolution of vasive element is the lack of consistent long-term civilian remote sensing data raise issues of na- goals and clear policy initiatives, from either the tional sovereignty and open data policy. Many executive or the legislative branches of the Gov- countries fear that unregulated translational radio ernment. This situation derives in part from the and (especially) TV broadcasts direct to home fact that since the Apollo decision was made in receivers will undermine their sovereignty and 1961, the number of major actors in civilian space their cultural values. Direct transmissions would activities has increased from one agency (NASA) also provide unwelcome competition for national to include six Federal agencies and numerous pri- broadcast monopolies. Issues surrounding the ap- vate firms. Not surprisingly, the many groups with propriate use of direct broadcasting systems are direct and indirect interests in space agree neither likely to be raised in the context of recent inter- about the overall importance of the civilian space —

18 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications program nor about specific applications projects. advise the President and Congress on space. One In the absence of broad consensus and a means attractive option in the executive branch would for deciding between opposing views, the scope be a reconstituted and broadened National Aero- of individual projects is determined by the an- nautics and Space Council, with representatives nual budget deliberations among the executive from civilian agencies, DOD, and the private agencies, the Office of Management and Budget sector. (OMB), and Congress. Over time, the sum of Because Congress is the Government’s major these decisions determines the overall course of forum for the representation of differing views, the space program. However, the annual budget it is there that one would expect to see the in- cycle bears little relationship to the long-term, terests of different parties debated. However, evolutionary cycle of space systems. In addition, space issues have not always received the coor- OMB has not chosen to view investment in space dinated attention from the committees that they activities from a long-range perspective. Until probably deserve. In addition, the space activities such time as a broad consensus is formed, it is of the Federal Government are carried out by a left to the President or Congress to set forth a variety of mission agencies, most of which are coherent, strategic framework for civilian space not concerned primarily with space. As space policy. In the absence of such direction, the cur- technologies have developed and begun to af- rent drift will continue and worsen. fect so many aspects of our society, space issues Periodic, open, high-level discussion of the have come to be dealt with in several different space program is needed to focus attention and committees and subcommittees. If the different sharpen debate on our national objectives in views are to be synthesized into a consistent space. Reviews of space policy such as those be- space policy, coordination of responsibility is ing conducted by the President’s Office of Sci- necessary. Congress would then be in position ence and Technology Policy, and by Congress, to formulate a comprehensive space policy that including this assessment, serve part of this pur- would set long-term goals for the U.S. space propose. Nevertheless, such one-time efforts cannot gram, military and civilian. substitute for a sustained forum for debate about If the congressional committees wish the issues the program. In order to plan for the future of to be raised and debated in a noncongressional the space program in the context of other na- environment, an option for bringing together the tional needs, the United States needs a multi- major interests in space would be a Presidential representative forum to discuss and recommend commission with a limited lifetime, established comprehensive, long-term goals. Such a forum under concurrent resolution by Congress. To be could coordinate the interests of all the major most effective, it should also include represen- actors in order to allow equitable and stable tation from Congress. After the commission’s decisions to be made about the overall direc- business was completed, congressional hearings tion of the civilian space program. Though such on its report could be held, followed by a new a body would not itself direct the course of the or revised charter for the space program and a space program, because this responsibility lies with the President and Congress, it could focus clear statement of goals. This option would not remove the need for further governmental action. the debate and provide timely advice. A temporary commission, though highly useful Several different institutional options are dis- for initiating a new focus for the space program, cussed in this report. They range from establishing cannot substitute for longer term policymaking a new Department of R&D, of which NASA and coordinating bodies in the executive or the would be a part, to establishing a commission to legislative branches. Chapter 2 INTRODUCTION

. —

Contents

Page Introduction, ...... 21 Organization of the Report ...... 23

● Chapter 2 INTRODUCTION

The space age is 25 years old. Yet in this short social, legal and political questions,” OTA was time period, one-third of an average citizen’s life- asked to develop “criteria and analyses to assist span, the United States has landed men on the Congress in deciding the many complicated pub- Moon, explored portions of the two nearest plan- lic policy issues that are likely to arise in chart- ets, Mars and Venus, and flown near Jupiter and ing the Nation’s future in space. ” Saturn. A thriving satellite communications and Although this report analyses the effects of pol- data transfer industry has also been established, icy decisions on applications of space technology, and a highly successful satellite weather observa- it also takes a broader view. In examining deci- tion system has been developed. The United sions made in an applications context, certain is- States is on the threshold of an operational land sues surfaced that affect the entire space program. remote-sensing system and will soon be experi- The course of shuttle development, the emphasis menting with new industrial processes in space. on cost-benefit analysis, and the absence of broad In just a quarter of a century, this country has consensus and consistent support for the overall come to rely in a significant way on the unique space program goals have had their effects on vantage point and special properties of space. programs outside of space applications. As far as The stunning success of the first flight of the is possible, this assessment addresses these wider space shuttle raised anew U.S. aspirations for a policy areas and suggests policy options for mak- vital, useful space program, reflective of the re- ing the civilian space program a more robust part cently developed technical capabilities. Yet in of the Nation’s future. It does not explore the na- spite of substantial technical progress and a new tional security space program except insofar as capability to place men and objects in orbit, this it affects the civilian space program. country’s civilian space policy lacks a coherent Applications of space technology involve rather strategic framework. Though lack of clear direc- different assumptions than do scientific missions tion affects the entire space program, public and such as planetary exploration or the deployment private, it has had a particularly detrimental ef- of telescopes in space. They therefore necessitate fect on the applications of space technology. In a different policy treatment. The National Aero- spite of the increasing dependence on space nautics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958 established technologies, there is some uncertainty about the the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- future direction and what questions should be tion (NASA) as a research and development asked. (R&D) agency for space technology. In that role, Requested by the Senate Committee on Com- it has served the Nation well. Yet development merce, Science, and Transportation, ’ and en- implies that a point will be reached when a new dorsed by the House Science and Technology device or technical system is ready for use in an Committee2 this assessment attempts to lay the operational mode. It is at this juncture, in the foundation for a broad review of national space transfer of developed technology to the realm of policy, particularly as such policy may relate to routine operation, that many of the most impor- civilian applications of space technology, includ- tant issues in applications of space technology ing space transportation but not including track- surface. Technology developed with NASA funds ing, data, and relay or navigation systems. Be- is technology paid for by the U.S. taxpayer. Will cause the “changing nature of this country’s ac- another agency or a private firm receive the tech- tivities in space raises a number of economic, nology? If so, how will the transfer be made? The history of the space program provides us with sev- 1 Letter from the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, eral examples of how that transfer can be ef- and Transportation requesting the OTA Space Policy and Applica- tions Assessment, September 1978. 2Le~er from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on jL@@r from the LJ. !j. Senate Committee on Commerce, science, Science and Technology, June 1981. and Transportation, op. cit.

21 . . — ——. . .

22 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

fected. Communications satellites were “spun er experts from the major space technologies off” to the private sector very early, weather sat- OTA selected to study. They treated: ellites to the National Oceanographic and Atmos- Remote sensing: Government user concerns. pheric Administration (NOAA). Navigation satel- Though still an R&D system, the Landsat pro- lites have remained under Department of De- gram has provided data to users of remote- fense control; terminal equipment for civilian use sensing data since 1972. This workshop was is available commercially. Land remote-sensing an effort to learn what problems some of the satellites are at a historic juncture in their major users of the data had faced in the past development as they pass from R&D to opera- and what concerns they have for the future tional status, This assessment examines different as the Landsat program moves into opera- possibilities for their future operations. tional status. It included Federal, State, and In addition to the issues raised in considering local users of the data, as well as representa- the transition from Government-supported R&D tives of two private corporations that process to operational status, there is a prior concern: Landsat data, and the international banking when, where, and for how long should the Gov- community. ernment involve itself in funding space R&D ef- Commercialization of remote land sensing. forts? By its nature, space R&D is expensive, large- Several proposals have been made to trans- ly because the costs of raising people and mate- fer part or all of the current Landsat system rials beyond the atmosphere and supporting life to the private sector. This workshop con- in orbit are very high. The risks of R&D in space vened to: 1) assess the strength of the mar- are also high, not only because traveling to space ket for remotely sensed data from space and is inherently risky to humans and equipment, but to identify the factors that affect this market, also because so little is yet known about the ef- and 2) explore appropriate models for com- fects of extended microgravity and high vacuum mercializing remote sensing. Since space on physical and chemical processes. Even with communications technology is already high- more than two decades of experience the United ly commercialized, OTA invited several par- States still has little more than 8 hours of experi- ticipants who have had considerable expe- mental results on space-based processing of ma- rience with the communications satellite in- terials. These risks also bear an economic cost dustry as well. that must be taken into account when consider- Space transportation issues. For the present, ing R&D in space. What is the proper balance NASA will be operating the space transporta- between Government and private funding for tion system. What interest does private in- R&D? What incentives are needed to encourage dustry have in owning and/or operating a the private sector to assume a major role in inno- reusable shuttle-like transportation system? vation of space technology? What are the effects Is industry interested in marketing and of emerging foreign competition on the U.S. launching expendable launch vehicles? This space program? workshop asked these questions and, in ad- These and other issues in the space program dition, explored the nature of the incentives exist in the context of similar issues relating to that the aerospace industry sees as necessary Government-supported R&D in other Federal to help it do further space transportation and programs. Accordingly, a considerable body of space construction research, development, analysis on this broader subject is already avail- and demonstration. able. For space, however, many of the issues are Materials processing in space. The shuttle too current to have been discussed in detail. has raised expectations for using the special Hence, a major part of OTA’s task was to deter- properties of space to manufacture low- mine just what are the important issues for space mass, high-value products that cannot be applications. In order to identify and refine the made on Earth. This workshop explored the issues that are amenable to policy treatment, OTA state of national and international programs convened a series of workshops that drew togeth- in materials processing and the prospects for Ch. 2—introduction ● 23

manufacturing products in space. It dis- Following the development of the issues in cussed the NASA/industry Joint Endeavor these five workshops, OTA convened a Work- Program, which brings NASA into working shop on Policy Alternatives to consider a variety partnerships with other firms, and suggested of options for addressing the major concerns other incentives that could attract industry identified. The workshop identified as crucial the to invest in R&D in space. need to develop a high-level Federal forum for ● International issues in commercial space sys- reaching consensus on the direction of the space tems. Other industrialized countries of the program and devoted substantial discussion to world also have a strong presence in space, policy options addressing this need. some components of which will compete di- In addition to the workshops, several contrac- rectly with U.S. systems. This workshop ex- tors contributed to this report, as well as a num- plored the complicated relationship between ber of individuals conversant with the issues dis- cooperation and competition in space in the cussed herein. A large body of literature now ex- free world and compared commercialization ists on the space program, but we as a society policies in the United States, Europe, and are just beginning to understand the depth and Japan. Among other topics, it discussed the breadth of its effects on our economic, social, and private French corporations Spotimage and political fabric. Policy analysts are now able to Arianespace, and the competitive challenge perceive long-term effects of past decisions and that they present to comparable U.S. sys- can assess with more boldness the possible future tems, as well as the prospects for future mul- effects of our efforts in space. tinational applications organizations like INTELSAT.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Space technology, whether we are aware of it the important question of transfer of technology or not, is pervasive in our lives. After the presen- developed for the military space programs to civil- tation of the report’s chief issues and findings in ian uses, and how the pace of that transfer might chapter 3 the main body of the report begins in be increased for the ultimate benefit of the civilian chapter 4. Conceived out of concern over Soviet program. achievements in space in 1957, the NAS Act remains a basic foundation for national space pol- Chapter 7 presents the current status of foreign icy. Chapter 4 discusses the policy history of the space achievements and future prospects for con- U.S. space program and outlines the changes that tinued cooperation and competition between the have been made since 1958 in space policy. United States and other states in space science. Based on an analysis of past history, it also sug- Of major concern is the competition in space ap- gests areas for review today. plications that foreign entities pose for U.S. efforts. This chapter also outlines some of the gen- Chapter 5 begins with a discussion illustrating eral foreign policy questions raised by different our dependence on space technology, followed space policies, along with the outstanding inter- by a summary of the current status of the U.S. national legal problems that could affect U.S. ap- space program and a short section on U.S. public plications programs. attitudes and perceptions about space. After summarizing the major features of the mil- Chapter 8 summarizes the prospects for trans- itarv space program and how it interacts with the ferring the results of space R&D to the private civilian program, chapter 6 discusses the ques- realm for commercial exploitation, it also de- tion of the separation between the two programs scribes the process that American industry follows that is built into the 1958 NAS Act. It also explores in deciding to do R&D. In a more specific way, 24 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

it further develops the kinds of incentives and bar- the policy framework that now exists. It analyzes riers to entering upon a program for space R&D. a range of major policy options that could form the foundation for the U.S. future in space. Institutional effectiveness is critical to policy success. The institutional questions that have to The appendixes contain material that was con- be solved in transferring an R&D system to opera- sidered germane to the assessment, but too de- tional status, whether it be operated for the public tailed for inclusion in the body of the report. good or for private profit, are complex. Because Among these are summaries of case studies pre- Government policy strongly conditions the frame- pared for this assessment by the Bureau of Land work within which private sector activities exist, Management and the Foreign Agricultural Serv- chapter 9 builds on the issues concerning com- ices of the Department of the Interior and the Na- mercialization of R&D that are developed in tional Climate Program in NOAA of the Depart- chapter 7, as they relate to institutions. It also ment of Commerce. Three contributed reports reviews the institutional frameworks that have on materials processing in space from the TRW been set up in the public good. Corp., McDonnell Douglas Corp., and from NASA, plus material gathered by an OTA con- Whereas each of the preceding chapters raises tractor make up the case study on materials proc- several policy issues, chapter 10 summarizes the essing. policy foundation of U.S. space activities. Further, it suggests new policies and integrates them with Chapter 3 ISSUES AND FINDINGS 9

Contents

Page Page Overview ...... 27 Overall Prospects for Space Applications Technologies ...... 34 Section 1: General Policy Issues...... 27 Issue 3: What Policy Principles Have Introduction: The Inadequacy of Guided the U.S. Civilian Current Policy ...... 27 Space Program? ...... 35 Issue 1: What Are the Key Factors of To Maintain National Preeminence.. 35 the Current Situation? ...... 28 To Derive Economic and Social Reliance on Space...... 28 Benefits ...... 37 Need for Continued Federal To Increase Knowledge ...... 38 Activities ...... 28 To Keep Civilian and Military Space International Competition...... 28 Activities Separate ...... 39 Need for Greater Private Sector To Limit NASA to R& D...... 47 Participation ...... 29 To Foster International Cooperation . 43 Present Government Institutions Ill-Suited to Current Conditions . . . 29 Section 2: Applications Policy Issues . . . . 44 Issue 2: How Are We To Manage Our Introduction: Generic and Specific Future in Space? ...... 29 Technology Issues...... ,.. 44 Future Options for the Civilian Space Communications Satellites ...... 47 Program ...... 29 Issue 4: What Are the R&D Needs for Toward a Coherent Federal Space Optimal Advances in Satellite Policy ...... 33 Communications? ...... 47 Page Increasing Use of the Geostationary Requirements for the Orbit ...... 47 Commercialization of MPS NASA’s Past and Future Roles ...... 48 Technology ...... 68 Opportunity at 30/20 GHz ...... 48 Government Incentives for Crowding at 6/4 GHz ...... 48 MPS Research ...... 69 Large Communications Platforms. . . .51 How Business Sees NASA ...... 70 Possible New Institutional Land Remote Sensing by Satellite...... 53 Frameworks ...... 71 Issue 5: What Role Should the Federal The Space industrialization Government. Play in Developing or Corporation ...... 72 Operating a Satellite Remote- International Competition in MPS . . . 73 Sensing System? ...... 53 Characteristics of Satellite Remote Space, Transportation ...... 74 Sensing ...... , . 53 Issue 7: What Are the Major Barriers Current Status of the U.S. Land to Commercialization of Space Remote-Sensing Satellite System . . . 53 Transportation Facilities and Criteria for a Satellite Remote- Services ...... 74 Sensing System ...... 54 The Background ...... 74 Foreign Users of Landsat Data ...... 57 Military and Civilian Use of the Importance of Landsat Data: Shuttle ...... 75 Three Asian Countries ...... 58 Foreign Competition in Space Importance of Landsat Data: Case of Transportation ...... 76 Costa Rica...... 60 Regulatory Needs ...... 76 Market for Satellite Remote-Sensing Prospects for Commercialization . . . . 76 Data ...... 61 Commercialization of Remote LIST OF TABLES Sensing: Domestic and Foreign Concerns ...... 62 Table No. Page Foreign Policy Concerns ...... , . 63 1. Summary Matrix of Primary Policy - Foreign Competition ...... 64 Principles Across Four Major Space Potential Policy Initiatives for a Land Application Technologies ...... 45 Remote-Sensing Satellite System , . . 64 2. Data Needs of Foreign and Potential of Land Remote-Sensing Domestic Users ...... 55 Data and the U.S. Economy ., . . . . 66 Materials Processing in Space ...... 67 Issue 6: What Are the Technological and Commercial Prospects for MPS? ...... 67 Chapter 3 ISSUES AND FINDINGS

OVERVIEW

As its title indicates, the scope of this assess- This chapter gathers the principal issues and ment has been determined by two axes: space findings of the entire assessment. Some of these policy as it pertains to applications and space are treated in greater detail elsewhere in the policy in general. Although the major considera- assessment; others, particularly those which con- tion has been to explore the issues surrounding cern the technologies themselves, are discussed space applications technologies, it has been im- in full here. The chapter has, therefore, been portant to frame that exploration by a considera- divided into two major sections: “General Policy tion of issues germane to the entire civilian space Issues” and “Applications Policy Issues.” program.

SECTION 1: GENERAL POLICY ISSUES Introduction: The Inadequacy of 25 years of significant U.S. capability to conduct Current Policy space operations. The act was designed to develop these capabilities rather than to give From the beginning of the space age nearly 25 guidance on how to make use of them once de- years ago, there has been general public agree- veloped. In particular, very important services are ment that the United States should play a major or soon can be provided by space applications role in the utilization of space. Although there technologies, but specific policies to ensure that continue to be questions about appropriate fund- their potential is fully realized are not in place. ing levels and the relative priority of specific proj- The goal of this assessment, therefore, is to ex- ects, the United States as a nation has been and amine the interrelation of space policy and space remains committed to the development of space applications technologies, four of which—satellite activities. communications, land remote sensing, materials processing in space (MPS), and space transpor- The National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act tation—are treated in detail. Weather observa- of 1958 articulated the policy principles for tions and navigation are not covered except by overall guidance of the U.S. civilian space pro- reference. It should be noted that space transpor- gram, but the act alone has not provided (and tation is not usually considered an applications cannot be expected to provide) the particular technology. OTA’s reason for so classifying it is goals for civilian space activities. Lacking such that it, like the other applications, is a means to guidance, the space program has instead been further ends, and also has a strong potential for directed by political and budgetary pressures not commercialization. always relevant to a logically ordered exploration and use of space. At the same time, none of the Six policy principles form the core of the NAS policymaking bodies successively established in Act. These six, which are discussed in detail later the executive branch nor any of the congressional in this chapter, have provided the framework and committees have been able to ensure that a long- goals in accordance with which the civilian space range plan of particular policies and programs program has evolved to the present day. These would be pursued. principles may be stated as follows:

Furthermore, it may be important to recast the that U.S. preeminence in space science and NAS Act to reflect the development over the past applications be maintained;

27 28 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

● that economic and social benefits be de- to ensure the success of our space ventures, a rived; determination of the appropriate Federal role ● that knowledge be increased; should be made and, once made, pursued con- ● that civilian and military activities be sep- sistently. In this assessment, at least four areas in arated (though they are to be coordinated which the Federal Government should continue and are not to duplicate one another unnec- to be involved are identified: contribution to ad- essarily); vanced R&D, provision of public goods and serv- ● that the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- ices, continuation of space science, and coor- ministration (NASA), the civilian agency, be dination of national efforts, particularly with limited largely to research and development respect to international agreements. (R&D); and ● that international cooperation be fostered. International Competition Issue 1: What Are the Key Factors of the The United States no longer has a monopoly Current Situation? on free world space activities. The Europeans and the Japanese have targeted specific space Reliance on Space technologies for development and are already We depend increasingly on space for vital pub- providing stiff competition for a number of services and facilities heretofore offered only by the lic and private services (national security and commercial communications); we rely on it for United States (e.g., launch facilities and commu- useful services (remote sensing of land, naviga- nications ground stations). in particular, the tion, and weather reporting); we can foresee French will soon be marketing an expendable commercial possibilities for MPS in the near term. launch vehicle, the Ariane, to compete with the All of these space applications require an ade- shuttle, and they plan to begin operating, in 1984, quate space transportation system, including the Systeme Probatoire d’Observation Terrestrial (SPOT) remote-sensing system to compete with launch vehicles, spaceports, and tracking net- the land remote-sensing satellite system (Land- works. Because of our significant reliance on space, we will certainly retain some sort of space sat). Making good use of available U.S. technol- program. However, broad agreement about the ogy, the Japanese are developing their own direction or scope the program should assume launchers, as well as communications and remote in the future has not been achieved. Furthermore, sensing satellites, particularly for ocean surveil- there is no set of procedures in place whereby lance. The Europeans and the Japanese have also a national consensus about the future program developed excellent space science programs. can be generated. The Europeans are not only technologically competitive, but have founded new semiprivate Need for Continued Federal Activities institutions, e.g., Arianespace and Spotimage, to Lack of basic agreement is of concern for the operate and market their new systems. These in- whole U.S. space program, not only for applica- stitutions are subsidized by their sponsoring tions technologies. But it is of particular concern governments and are, therefore, able to price for the latter because the range of desirable their services significantly lower or offer more at- civilian space applications, on account of their tractive financial terms than could unsubsidized economic risk and high expense, cannot be un- firms. In addition, their profitmaking character en- dertaken by the private sector alone, in accord- courages them to seek efficiencies that a program ance with ordinary market forces. On the other managed by government agencies might not. hand, it is inappropriate and unnecessary for the Through the European Space Agency (ESA), Federal Government to undertake all of the space member countries cooperate in developing ad- activities in the United States. For the foreseeable vanced systems for which no one country has all future, we will continue to be in a period of the resources required (expertise as well as mixed public and private responsibilities. In order capital). Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 29

Need for Greater Private Sector Participation spaceports, and tracking systems. Responsibility A great part of the promise of the European and for operating other federally owned civilian Japanese programs results from the structure of systems rests with the National Oceanic and At- their institutions, under which private and public mospheric Administration (NOAA); it operates sectors can work well together. Their plans, how- U.S. weather satellites and is scheduled to ever, should not necessarily cause the United manage the Landsat system as well. States to imitate their institutional arrangements, NASA’s emphasis on developing new technol- but to discover equally effective arrangements ogies makes sense in the context of a highly visi- compatible with our political and economic tradi- ble project on which national prestige is staked. tions. The twin factors of the diminution of Fed- In the current political and economic context eral resources for civilian space activities, and the (i.e., diminishing Federal resources allocated to dynamism of the private sector, make it impor- space, increasing competition from abroad, and tant that private corporations participate more ac- growing need to involve the U.S. private sector tively in U.S. space efforts whenever commer- more substantially), NASA and other Federal in- cial success is possible. if we are to develop space stitutions which make extensive use of space- applications that have the most social value, derived data may require reorientation, first, to signals from users must guide our efforts; it is the ensure that a balance of diverse space activities private sector that responds to and uses such emerges, and second, to be more responsive to guidance most effectively in the marketplace. user needs. Some specific suggestions for possi- Above all, we must remain flexible in determin- ble reorientation appear in chapter 10; chapter ing whether one sector or the other, or some 9 explores the principles upon which such re- novel combination of the two, should assume the orientation could be based. responsibility for particular activities. As responsibilities are divided, it is essential to consider both the stage of development–basic research, Issue 2: How Are We to Manage development, demonstration, or operations–and Our Future in Space? the kind of application—communications, remote sensing, materials processing, or transportation, Future Options for the Civilian Space Program To help meet foreign commercial competition This section considers a range of legislative ap- as well as to foster the more efficient use of our proaches the Congress could take concerning ap- national resources, the United States should con- plications of space technology. Although these tinue to seek further innovative relationships, like options are derived from considering the specific the Joint Endeavor Agreements (JEAs) sponsored technologies we have addressed in this report by NASA, which bring public and private sectors (i.e., satellite communications, land remote sens- into effective partnership in planning for and car- ing, materials processing and space transport- rying out space activities. Because we have been ation), they generally reflect the needs of the en- less than effective in discovering such arrange- tire spectrum of space applications. At one end ments, many of our space applications systems of the range, Federal involvement dominates, and have not evolved smoothly from research to op- public goals drive the development of all space erational status. applications. At the other, Federal involvement is very low, and the pursuit of space applications Present Government Institutions Ill-Suited is a function almost solely of private sector to Current Conditions activity. By charter and by subsequent legislation, NASA The U.S. space program is an investment for is primarily responsible for the R&D of civilian the Nation. Consideration of options for the U.S. space systems, not their operation. The excep- space program must take into account what we tion to this rule is NASA’s operation of space can do, what we can afford to do, and what we transportation systems, including launch vehicles, must do, to meet external competition and in- 30 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications ternal demands. What we can do is determined HIGHLY COMPETITIVE APPLICATIONS PROGRAM by our technical and institutional capabilities; As other parts of this report have stressed, the what we can afford to do is bounded by overall competitive challenge from other nations is strong Federal resources and judged by ranking the and growing. With the exceptions of materials value of space activities against other Federal pro- processing, in which competition has not yet grams; what we must do is driven by external developed because it is too new, and of naviga- challenge and domestic requirements. The rel- tion satellites, all space applications originally ative importance to be granted these various developed in the United States now face com- determinants is, finally, a political decision. The petition from other countries. For both economic shape of the resulting program can vary widely, and political reasons, foreign activities must be but it is important that Congress recognize the taken seriously by U.S. policymakers. Strong Fed- cost of inconsistent Federal support of planned eral intervention might be warranted if failure to programs. The time stretching from initial con- pursue new technologies would result in signifi- cept, through research, development, and dem- cant loss of revenue or U.S. prestige, or if the onstration (RD&D), to final operations may in- threat was much greater than could be met by clude major political changes. if these changes current Federal and private programs. A highly occasion major financial perturbations, both competitive applications program would fit most money and talent are lost. appropriately into an overall space program that Our technical and institutional capabilities pro- seeks to achieve ambitious goals. Two different vide, perhaps, the least constraint. The success approaches bear consideration. of Apollo proves that we can undertake and com- Ž Apollo-like program. Such a space program plete challenging new projects. We have a wide would likely arise only in response to a per- range of future possibilities to choose from, and ceived threat from the Soviets. If they were to we have much of the experience and expertise initiate an ambitious and highly publicized necessary to carry them out. The availability of project such as a manned planetary mission, Federal resources, on the other hand, is less or a large, advanced orbital base, space might predictable, depending, as it does, on the overall again become an area of superpower competi- state of the economy. It is expensive to develop tion in which we tried to best Soviet efforts. space technology, and for the next 3 or 4 years, New applications and enhanced capabilities at least, many Federal programs are likely to be for existing ones could result as byproducts of under severe financial constraint. In addition, the a singly focused space effort. The institutional relative priority of space activities in the national structure and large budget required to com- economy depends on an evaluation of their con- plete the R&D for a single large project could tribution to overall national goals. Though the lend itself, for example, to development of a need for some civilian space program is clear, its new generation of communications or land re- appropriate level is not. Finally, as international mote-sensing satellites. If competition were to competition increases, serious thought must be focus on a single dramatic project, it could spill given to planning an effective response. over into a broad range of areas if the United Space applications exist in the context of an States attempted to emphasize its across-the- overall Federal commitment to the exploration board capabilities, as it did during the Apollo and use of space for civilian and military pur- program. The development of the shuttle, poses. Accordingly, the following discussion out- however, argues the reverse: a single lines the legislative choices OTA has selected for showpiece program might drain all others of discussion and relates them to the sorts of overall much-needed funds. programs within which they might exist. The Because this program would be politically three levels of overall commitment presented motivated, it would be aimed primarily at in- below are determined by different evaluations of creasing U.S. prestige in a short period of time, foreign competition. and therefore would inevitably be dominated Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 31 —— .— —-———.—————— ————.—

by the Government. The private sector would The high costs of Government subsidy in such be seen as the source of expertise and contract- a program could be justified as leading to even- ing capability, but would not, at least imme- tual commercial payoff, as well as considerable diately, be a prime beneficiary of U.S. pro- public sector benefits. grams. Encouragement of commercial activities other than those directly supportive of the MODERATELY COMPETITIVE major project would depend on the overall re- APPLICATIONS PROGRAM sources available: unless these resources were Such a response to foreign commercial com- substantial, large crash programs could absorb petition would arise from the judgment that the funding and expertise to such a degree that United States retains significant strength in many other interests would receive little attention. sectors and should target “areas of opportunity” for Federal attention. Private-sector involvement ● Applications-dominated program. If competition from European and Japanese and, possi- in development projects and in planning for even- bly, Soviet applications systems were seen as tual takeover of potential commercial systems especially threatening, it might be appropriate would be encouraged. In the near term, 30/20 to concentrate an aggressive Federal effort on GHz communications technology, land remote maintaining U.S. preeminence across-the- sensing, and space transportation are the most board. This course of action would place a high likely areas to receive Federal attention under this value on civilian space technology as an instru- scenario. Materials processing projects would be ment for maintaining U.S. technical capabilities aided, largely through use of JEAs. Federal in- and general economic strength. It would be volvement would be initiated on the grounds that based on the estimation that the support and the private sector cannot afford the high risks of subsidy of foreign governments for their own entering a given area without help. Industry programs could be met only by similar support groups would be encouraged to expand their in- in the United States. volvement by entering into joint ventures with each other and with the Government where ap- This program would emphasize the applica- propriate (see ch. 8 for a full discussion of some tions segment of NASA’s activities, including of these possibilities). Technology transfer from space transportation, and could be carried out military to civilian use would be increased wher- even without a commitment to a very large ever possible. single project. It would require a significant This applications program could fit the follow- redirection away from NASA’s present orien- ing general scenarios: tation toward spectacular missions. Except for use of the shuttle, manned programs would be Budget-constrained, with most resources reemphasized and made a part of specific ap- devoted to a single large project (e.g., the plications projects, where pertinent. Space shuttle). This reflects the current situation science research that contributed directly to where more than 50 percent of the NASA applications efforts would receive priority; budget is devoted to the shuttle. Although basic research that used shuttle capabilities in the effort to develop less expensive transpor- near Earth orbit would be favored over expen- tation to space will eventually benefit the en- sive planetary probes and long-term experi- tire space program, at present it has led to ments. Like the politically motivated Apollo- foreclosing or deferring many opportunities type program, this highly competitive course in space science and in applications. Under of action would be dominated by the Govern- such conditions, if the applications program ment, but insofar as its aim would be leader- (exclusive of space transportation) is to pros- ship in commercial applications, private in- per, the private sector must be involved to dustry would be encouraged to become a full a much greater extent. If that involvement partner. various joint-ventures and other is not forthcoming, the U.S. competitive po- cooperative agreements might be encouraged. sition will necessarily suffer. Of particular 32 ● Civilian space policy and Applications

concern is the future of 30/20 GHz commu- eliminate space science and/or defer produc- nications technology (see “Communications tion of parts of the space transportation sys- Technology,” below) and land remote sens- tem. It could not allow for a major Federal ing by satellite (see “Land Remote Sensing,” role in developing the next generation of below). communications satellites or remote-sensing Budget-constrained– “balanced spending. ” technologies. In this situation, private at- This is not the current situation, but one that tempts to develop or operate space systems might prevail when the shuttle is fully opera- would be encouraged, but significant Federal tional and its costs are borne by the users— funding for joint projects would not be avail- provided NASA’s budgets stay relatively able. Transfer of technology developed by level. Under “balanced spending” condi- the military to the civilian realm could pro- tions, an applications program (including ad- vide incentives for private involvement, es- vances in space transportation) would con- pecially if military spending on space were sume a significant portion of the budget. relatively unconstrained. This might allow Space science would receive a comparable the private sector to concentrate on modi- share. NASA would play a strong role in de- fying military-derived technologies to civilian veloping new communications and remote- uses and on developing areas, such as ma- sensing systems, in conducting experiments terials processing in space, where the military in materials processing, and in planning and is not heavily involved. constructing space platforms and large structures. The private sector would be solicited DISPERSAL OF NASA’S RESPONSIBILITIES to participate in many of these activities. This would result if, because of budget con- NONCOMPETITIVE APPLICATIONS PROGRAMS straints and a desire to consolidate all Govern- ment space programs, the shuttle and other ap- If the competition from other states is not con- plications developments were to be transferred sidered especially threatening to the U.S. to the Department of Defense (DOD) and other economy, and to our general position of leader- Government agencies. Under such a scenario, ship, and if space applications are not viewed as advanced communications, atmospheric (weath- worth developing for the public benefits that er and climate) sensing, and land and ocean might be derived, a greatly reduced Federal ef- remote sensing would be developed first for the fort in space applications would be a potential military, and spun off to the private sector or policy option. Such a stance would force depend- civilian agencies later, if ever. Desensitized data ence on private investments to develop and op- could be made available for civilian consump- erate space systems, but would not provide ap- tion and sale to other nations through public en- preciable Federal funding to do so. tities or through specially licensed private cor- Although this option could apply to any of the porations. However, a much more relaxed view civilian space programs considered above, it is of security would have to prevail if the data were more likely to be part of a highly constrained to be as valuable as data derived from com- civilian space program: petitive international systems. Launches would be conducted by the military, with appropriate ● Severely constrained. Such a program, some arrangements for private sector and foreign users. 30 to 50 percent smaller than the current one, would allow little room for a civilian NASA would retain responsibility only for basic Federal applications effort, especially given research in space science. NASA’s centers now the large percentage required for continued working on applications and operations would development of the shuttle. Major programs be turned over to DOD, Interior, Commerce, or and perhaps entire categories of activities universities and private firms. Such a scenario would be eliminated. Depending on the size would contravene a major premise of the NAS of the cuts it might be necessary virtually to Act, that civilian and military space activities are Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 33 — to be conducted separately, and hence might re- well suited to view investment in space activities quire explicit legislation. It would certainly raise in long-range perspective, Finally, insofar as the questions about the act’s premise that “activities civilian space program remains essentially in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes NASA’s to direct, it suffers from inattention to the for the benefit of all mankind.”~ concerns of users, those in the public sector, as represented by Government agencies, as well as Toward a Coherent Federal Space Policy those in the private sector. In order to focus the partly because most civilian space technologies U.S. civilian space program and to introduce arise within NASA, which is primarily an agent more consistency into all U.S. space activities, of technology push, commercial interests and in- the President or the Congress must set forth new itiatives have not developed to the extent that goals. In the absence of such direction the cur- they ordinarily do in industry. Other contributing rent drift will continue and worsen. factors include: lack of consistent congressional In order to focus attention on the country’s ob- or executive policy direction facilitating the jectives in space, periodic high-level review and development of a stable market, the complexity discussion are needed. The Carter administration of the technologies themselves, and the high costs undertook several reviews of space policy under and economic risks the private sector would have the aegis of the National Security Council which to bear. Aside from the general public, whose in- resulted in Administration Policy Directives terest is periodically sparked by space spec- PD-37, 42, and 54 (see ch. 10). In the Reagan ad- taculars, the communities NASA serves have up ministration, the Office of Science and Tech- to now been users rather than partners. Lacking nology Policy (OSTP) is conducting a major policy on the one hand effective guidance from the Con- review for a Cabinet Council chaired by the gress or the President, and on the other an ade- Secretary of Commerce. It is scheduled for com- quate forum in which user needs may be ex- pletion sometime in 1982. Such reviews are pressed, civilian space policy is often made de useful for focusing attention on the needs of the facto by NASA and the Office of Management space program. However, these short-term, and Budget (OMB). Essentially, there are two highly focused reviews cannot substitute for sus- problems. First, the United States currently lacks tained examination of our long-term goals in the appropriate means to bring the scientific, space and high-level attention to policy setting. commercial, and political communities into consensus about the broad goals for civilian space The many authorization and appropriations activities. Second, the Federal Government has hearings on space within the Congress, as well given insufficient attention to establishing ar- as reports from its support agencies, keep the Congress informed on pressing space policy rangements whereby the private sector can be issues. However, because of the press of other brought into effective partnership in the development and operation of civilian space systems. items on the national agenda, the relatively small weight that space matters receive in most con- Lack of foresight and, especially, lack of coor- gressional districts, and the fact that space issues dination have characterized much of the recent are dealt with in several different committees, U.S. space effort. Increasingly, the direction and space policy has not received sustained and scope of our space program are determined by broad-based attention. It would be helpful to the annual budget deliberations among the ex- establish a high-level, multirepresentative body ecutive agencies, OMB, and the Congress. This to recommend goals and objectives for the over- approach presents several problems, one of all U.S. space effort. Such a body should be able which is that annual budget cycles bear little rela- to articulate, and gain support for, the broad goals tion to the long-term evolutionary cycle of space of our civilian space program, and to suggest systems. Another is that by its nature, OMB is not major programs to implement these goals, though it should not be expected to achieve consensus ‘National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (Public Law 85-568, 85th Cong., H.R. 12575, July 29, 1958, 72 Stat. 426.) on all the details of our future space effotts. sec. 102 (a). Indeed, consensus on specific activities, e.g., the 34 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications level of effort devoted to space science, may bers of Congress should be included as never be reached, for at that level, the political members of the commission. process of balancing competing interests (with in- Raise the importance of OSTP. Within the put from the scientific establishment) properly executive branch, civilian and military space takes precedence. policy is studied and formulated in OSTP and NSC. Currently, OSTP is conducting a policy Several alternatives for this proposed body, review. Although this arrangement may varying in potential effectiveness and feasibility serve as a focus for developing space policy, are as follows: access to the President may not be direct ● Establish a new version of the National enough to insure his attention to the needs Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC). As of the civilian space program. it operated in the past, the NASC consisted Institute joint congressional hearings. At of a permanent White House group, chaired present, civilian space activities are reviewed by the Vice President and composed of rep- by separate subcommittees of the House and resentatives from the major Federal agencies. Senate. For many years, both Houses had It was charged with recommending policy full committees responsible for space. One and programs directly to the president. If a way to put space more prominently on the future council is to be effective, its chairman congressional agenda might be to reestab- would have to take a significant personal in- lish full committees whose staff and mem- terest in space activities. A membership re- bers would have a strong interest in estab- stricted to Federal agencies, however, would lishing goals and supervising their implemen- not include all of the potentially interested tation. Periodic joint hearings between com- parties. To represent the broader perspec- mittees responsible for various aspects of the tive characteristic of the maturity of the U.S. civilian and military space programs would presence in space, a reconstituted NASC help to provide coordination of national should also include several members from policy. the private sector in addition to those of the Though each option has attractive features, Federal agencies. none appears to resolve completely the twin ● Activate the Policy Review Committee issues of representing all major participants fair- (Space) in the National Security Council ly and adequately, and of influencing key deci- (NSC), the body charged in the Carter ad- sionmakers. Without a commitment from the leg- ministration with advising and recommend- islative and the executive branches to pursue a ing on space matters. If chaired by a civilian long-term course, none of these alternatives can Cabinet-level officer, it would have visibil- be effective. However, their activities could at ity. However, such a course of action might least define the major problems over time and have the drawback of overemphasizing na- ensure that regular reports are sent to the Presi- tional security interests at the expense of the dent or Congress. scientific, Government-user, and commercial representatives. Overall Prospects for Space Applications Technologies ● Establish a Presidential or national commission composed of representatives from all Whereas the military and political threat of the the major communities interested in space. Soviet Union sparked the initial drive toward U.S. The terms of the commissioners should be preeminence in space, the challenge to U.S. lead- long enough to outlive any particular ad- ership in applications programs now and for the ministration. The influence of such a com- forseeable future will come from commercial mission would depend on the personalities competition from our allies. The Japanese and and talents of its members and the receptivity the Europeans have heavily involved their private of various administrations rather than on a sectors with government programs. These gov- solid political/institutional base. Key Mem- ernment/industry partnerships have made for Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 35

vigorous space programs; government con- suffice to allow reasoned consideration of civilian tributes various kinds of subsidies and technical space policy. Indeed, these six principles form resources as well as a sense of national interest, the core of U.S. civilian space policy, and they the private sector contributes a whole range of have helped to shape the programs and institu- commercial and technical expertise along with tions for implementing that policy. risk capital. Although the United States still re- The six policy principles may be stated as tains its lead in technology in most space applica- follows: tions, foreign technical and managerial capabilities are growing rapidly. that U.S. preeminence in space science and applications be maintained; Of the four space applications technologies that economic and social benefits be here under review, U.S. success with satellite derived; communications is in many respects exemplary. that knowledge be increased; To begin with, it is flourishing. The rate of growth that civilian and military activities be sep- in this industry has been and probably will con- arated (though they are to be coordinated tinue to be over 20 percent per year. It provides and are not to duplicate one another unnec- an increasingly greater range of services on which essarily); users worldwide have come to rely. The keys to that NASA, the civilian agency, be limited its success seem to have been the early and major largely to R&D; and involvement of the private sector and a firm that international cooperation be fostered. understanding of the potential market. Thus, the issues and findings organized by these There is, however, no single model for com- six policy principles include those that are generic mercializing space applications technologies. to all four technologies under review, and those Markets for each are in different states of develop- that extend beyond space applications to the con- ment; the proportion of activities aimed at public duct of the entire civilian space program. (rather than private) good varies from one technology to the next; and the maturity of the tech- To Maintain National Preeminence nologies themselves is not the same. Further- more, there may be some portions of these tech- [n what sense has the United States been nologies that are not at all suited for commer- a leader in space applications? Is it still so cialization. The special needs and effects of each today? For how long can we expect to main- technology should therefore be considered in tain our leadership? commercializing technology developed by the Especially since World War II the United States Government. has seen itself as preeminent in science and technology and as having a special expertise in both Issue 3: What Policy Principles Have the military and civilian applications thereof. Guided the U.S Civilian Space Program? Maintaining a technological edge has been considered crucial for several reasons. First, national Before the issues specific to each of the tech- security has become increasingly dependent on nologies are addressed, it is useful to consider the rapid and sustained technical advances in elec- foundation upon which the space program now tronics, aerospace, and nuclear energy. Second, rests, the 1958 NAS Act. The discussion in this high technology has increasingly become a stra- section considers six of the major policy prin- tegic sector of the economy; that is, high tech- ciples articulated in the act and in subsequent ex- nology so thoroughly pervades other sectors of ecutive and legislative directives. Although the the economy that the United States cannot af- act contains other principles (e.g., that peaceful ford to be dependent on foreign countries to pro- uses of space are to be developed, and that vide it. Other advanced nations behave similar- benefits to all mankind are to be sought), the prin- ly. Third, economic competitiveness in global ciples selected for discussion in this assessment markets, as well as continued domestic prosperi- 36 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ty, stems in large part from a broad R&D base satellites were making local weather coverage in high-technology industries. Particularly in available to many parts of the world; U.S. launch- highly developed countries such as the United ers were available to other countries for scien- States, where the costs of labor and raw materials tific and applications projects; an ambitious pro- are high, advanced technology products are a gram of unmanned planetary missions to explore major export item. For the preceding reasons, Mars and the other planets was underway; and and also because scientific and technical progress a promising remote-sensing technology was gives a general impression of vitality and strength, under development, the data from which were scientific and political decisionmakers often to be made available at low cost to all countries. believe our political influence abroad to be direct- As a result, the United States was able to reap ly dependent on national programs in the the political and economic gains of unchallenged sciences and on advancements in high-technol- superiority in space applications. ogy sectors of the economy. In the following years, however, this picture Attention to national preeminence has been the began to change. Defeated in the race to man major formative influence on the conduct of the the Moon, the Soviet Union concentrated on de- U.S. civilian space program. The 1958 NAS Act veloping a permanent manned Earth orbital states as one of its aims “the preservation of the laboratory, the Salyut. From 1975 to 1981, while role of the United States as a leader in aero- the United States flew no manned missions, the nautical and space science and technology and Soviets flew 20, some of up to 6 months in dura- in the application thereof . . . “2 At its inception, tion. The Soviets conducted extensive experi- the space program had to meet the perceived ments in materials processing, remote sensing, threat to U.S. national security from the launch and the biological sciences, and they gained ad- of Sputnik and subsequent Soviet space initia- ditional experience in remote-controlled rendez- tives. The design of our manned programs of the vous and docking, and operation of manned sys- 1960’s and the shape of NASA’s institutional tems. The U. S. S.R. ’S investment in planetary ex- structure were driven primarily by considerations ploration and space science and applications has of national security and political prominence, and also been extensive, in some cases more than that only secondarily by regard for potential economic of the United States, but for the most part has and scientific benefits. If the Soviets had been yielded fewer results. Though less spectacular allowed to achieve clear superiority in any major than the U.S. flights of a decade ago, the steady category of space activity, they would, in the program of the Soviets has produced valuable ex- judgment of U.S. political leaders, have been like- perience largely unavailable in the West. Coop- ly to gain increased political support from neutral erative ventures with other Communist countries, countries. As a nation, we refused to accept sec- as well as with India and France, have provided ond place. Therefore, the United States em- them significant political gains, too. Future Soviet barked on a comprehensive and accelerated pro- plans are unclear, but are likely to include de- gram that included the development of a variety velopment of larger permanent orbital stations, of expendable launch vehicles, communications an operational land remote-sensing system, high- satellites, manned vehicles, and several orbital performance boosters, and, eventually, manned and planetary scientific probes. By the end of the planetary missions. 1960’s, we succeeded in matching or bettering More important to the present situation is that achievements of the Soviets in virtually every Japan and several European countries have re- area: in addition to our celebrated victory in the cently developed a number of advanced space race to the Moon, U.S. communications satellites technologies, many of which are comparable and were providing operational global service in the in some cases superior to those of the United International Telecommunication Satellite Orga- States and the Soviet Union. In addition, they nization (I NTELSAT) system; U.S. meteorological have established a number of innovative institutional arrangements that allow significant private- Zlbid., Sec. 102 (C) (5). sector/government cooperation. Beginning in the Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 37 early 1960’s, Europe and Japan saw the impor- Does the commercialization of space-based tance of developing competitive space capabil- technology differ from the commercializa- ities to avoid political and economic dependence tion of Earth-based technology? on the superpowers. Though their space budgets The commercialization of new technology is have only been a fraction of those of the United the last state of a complex process of innovation. States and the Soviet Union, their programs have Generally, this process begins with a period of achieved success by eschewing development of basic scientific research, proceeds through a stage expensive manned capabilities, borrowing tech- where practical applications are sought, and ter- nology from the United States, and concentrating minates in the identification of potentially mar- on a few key applications. Their motivations have ketable products. The time required for such a varied, from France’s highly political desire for project, the number of participants, and the cost independence and a domestic technology base will all vary, depending on the nature of the re- to support military programs, to Japan’s percep- search and the existing store of knowledge. tion of the space market as an arena in which advanced technology is likely to yield high long- In the private sector, the decision to invest in term profits. Especially significant has been the innovation is generally motivated by desire to sus- devleopment of an independent launch capabili- tain profits. Investments in innovation, like other ty in the form of ESA’S Ariane and Japan’s N-1 investments, are required to meet criteria of and N-2 vehicles. return on investment. Profitmaking enterprises tend to invest in projects which are designed to Because of the U.S. space program’s historical satisfy a recognized market or management need. emphasis on very large, expensive manned pro- Expensive, long-term, and high-risk endeavors grams, and because of institutional and political have to be justified by a reasonable expectation difficulties in transferring technology from the of high payoff and future profit. This basic rule public to the private sector and in coordinating applies, whether the proposed innovation is in private sector activities, commercial competition Earth- or space-based technology. from heavily subsidized foreign space systems may prove difficult to meet, Though the United Innovation in space-based technology is in- States will retain its lead in state-of-the-art herently expensive and highly dependent on technologies and especially in manned flight, its Government interest and cooperation; it involves institutional and financial capacity to support untried technology and is often not driven by operational systems and to meet user needs is clearly defined markets. As a result, such activities very much in question. cannot easily attract corporate capital. Given this generalization, it is important to review the pat- To Derive Economic and Social Benefits tern of past and current private sector investments in space technology. The civilian space program has been the source of an important flow of economic and social ben- The most obvious example of the successful efits. Some of these benefits have been derived commercialization of a space technology is the indirectly through the spinoffs from technology communications satellite. Early private sector in- developed for NASA, while others have resulted terest in satellite communications was motivated from direct technology transfers to the private by the realization that satellites provided a more sector and to Government agencies. Insofar as efficient and less expensive alternative to the commercialization of space applications technol- then-existing means of long-distance communica- ogies is a natural and accepted process in a tion. Substantial private sector investment was capitalist society, the problems inherent in in- later required to utilize this technology; however, dustry’s attempts to commercialize technology the investment was made with the knowledge orginally developed by or for NASA are of par- that the technology was well-understood and the ticular importance for this assessment. market large and well-defined. Other space-based 38 ● civilian Space Policy and Applications technologies, such as remote sensing and mate- accomplish the same result. Examples of such a rials processing, do not share these advantages. situation now exist in land remote sensing and Much of the present dialog about the commer- materials processing. cialization of new space systems concerns untried In land remote sensing, it is very unlikely that technologies directed toward undefined markets. the private sector could finance and operate the As a result, the private sector’s aversion to ex- presently structured Earth observation system. pensive, high-risk endeavors and undefined mar- (See Issue 5.) However, it is possible that if the kets has prevented and will continue to militate space and ground segments were separated, one against major private investment in these areas. or more private firms could profitably operate the Though reluctant to undertake the commercial- ground segment of such a system. Similarly, in ization of specific space-based technologies, the materials processing, the investment required for private sector has been actively involved in space- a single firm to identify a product, to design and related support services, providing such neces- launch the necessary experiments, and then to sities as flight hardware, project financing, in- manufacture the product in space, is too great surance, and tracking and control facilities. This to attract industry’s interest. However, recent ac- limitation of private sector involvement is under- tivities in the aerospace industry indicate a will- standable, for these suppont services require only ingness to design multiuser instrumentation to be limited risk, and rely on preexisting and/or Gov- used in conjunction with the shuttle for a wide ernment-funded technology or contracts. va’riety of in-space research. After its development, this instrumentation would be rented to To date, the major industrial participant in other private sector organizations for specific space activities has been the aerospace industry. research projects. As the cost of in-space research This fact may be attributed to that industry’s is gradually spread among a number of partici- familiarity with space technology, to its close pants, the risk to any single firm will be reduced, working relationship with Government, and to and the industry’s investment in space should in- its willingness to take a long view of product crease. (See Issue 6.) development. Other industries have been reluctant to engage in research projects which require To Increase Knowledge knowledge, personnel, and support facilities The goal of increasing knowledge is more char- which they do not already have. acteristic of the space sciences than of the de- Without substantial budget support from the velopment of applications technologies. None- theless, the goal of achieving a balanced and Government, private investment in new space sound space policy requires that it be fostered. technologies, such as materials processing, In addition, space science, especially studies of remote sensing, and space transportation sys- the near-Earth environment, plays a key role in tems, can be expected to proceed at a pace and the design and implementation of successful ap- in a manner consistent with normal investment practices in the private sector. There is some plications projects. An important aspect of this cause to believe, however, that the amount of goal is that it mediates between maintaining na- private sector resources devoted to space may tional preeminence and promoting international increase in the near future. This inference is large- cooperation. ly the result of what might be termed a disag- NASA, the National Science Foundation (NSF), gregation of space investment opportunities. In and the universities set the agenda and direction other words, as the opportunities for relatively of basic space science research. The National small investments in space technology multiply, Academy of Sciences, through its Space Science different industries are likely to pursue individual Board, also plays an important role in this proc- profitmaking activities. Instead of one firm at- ess, The yearly budget process determines the tempting to undertake a major space project, nu- level of funding for space science among the merous firms, pursuing their own interests in par- many other competitors for portions of the Fed- ticular segments of a space system, may indirectly eral budget. Ch. 3—issues ● nd Findings ● 39

Although this study did not assess the adequacy To Keep Civilian and Military of the U.S. space science effort, nor the institu- Space Activities Separate tions and procedures used to determine its goals, A cornerstone of U.S. space policy has been it is clear that a thriving space applications that civilian and military programs are to be con- technology program depends on maintaining a ducted separately. Up to the era of the shuttle, strong U.S. base in many key areas of science and this separation has served the Nation well: in- 3 tech nology. dependence of the civilian space program has re- What problems are associated with as- duced concerns of other nations that the United suming a continual growth of the knowl- States might impose a Pax Americana in space edge base? or that space might become just another arena for military competition; good relations between Conducting research in space is becoming NASA and DOD have reduced unnecessary du- more expensive, primarily because the easiest plication and promoted technology transfer; and studies have already been done. Furthermore, the civilian space program has served as a high- justifying basic science research is difficult technology analog of the Peace Corps—a point because direct tangible benefits from a quest for of focus for peaceful and scientific national aspira- knowledge cannot be immediately shown. Thus, tions and international cooperation. it is somewhat more difficult to generate public support outside of spectaculars such as the Mars Recent developments have led to serious con- Viking landing or the Voyager missions to the cerns that the separation of the two programs outer planets. may be diminished, that NASA funding and technical resources may be preempted by military As missions have become more complex and uses, or even that much of the civilian program expensive, and therefore more infrequent, it is may be subsumed under the military. The shut- becoming increasingly difficult for Government tle in particular, which will be operated by NASA, 4 and universities to maintain their science teams. though used by both NASA and DOD, is a com- As a result, there may soon be a narrowing of the promise between the requirements of both. Be- base from which new ideas can come. cause of this joint usage, there have been sug- Finally, there is a tendency within NASA to gestions that DOD assume all responsibilities for focus on development and launch of new space- space transportation. craft or payloads. Anaiysis of data and interpreta- Within certain boundaries, technology transfer tion of existing information or of material from from DOD to NASA has generally worked well past missions tend to be given lower priority and enough in the past, but the current climate of funding. In addition, the planning for data fiscal restraint argues for a more effective, more analysis prior to missions has often been inade- timely transfer of military technology to the quate. Space science has suffered from budget civilian sector. The United States finds itself fac- reductions caused by the growing costs of the ing considerable competition from Japan and shuttle program in an era of fiscal constraint. For Europe. Two different technologies illustrate the a long time, there has been inadequate integra- problems we face: tion of space-based and ground-based science ● Development of 30/20 GHz technology. In priorities, as well. Here, as in space applications, order to meet this competition, the United the appropriate allocation of financial resources States is being pressed to begin a program could be assisted by an effective forum in which to develop and demonstrate a civilian 30/20 comprehensive and long-term national civilian GHz communications system. At the same space policy goals could be established. time, however, military contractors are working on systems related to such a civilian ‘James A. Van Allen, “U.S. Space Science and Technology, ” 5ci- system. Many believe that the technology ence, Oct. 30, 1981, vol. 214, No. 4520. developed for the military can be transferred 4“Space Science Research in the United States, OTA Workshop,” May 5, 1982, to the civilian sector at a cost saving that 40 ● civilian space policy and Applications

would permit a commercial system to reach In addition, DOD will bear the costs of produc- operational status rapidly. ing its own shuttle-compatible payloads. Overall, ● Development of multilinear array (MLA) the two agencies have worked well together on technology for a civilian land remote-sens- the shuttle program, their cooperation ensured ing system. The French are already working by commitments at the highest policy levels. on MLA technology for their SPOT remote- At the same time, the payload programs of the sensing system. Although this technology is two agencies (focusing on applications only) have well known to military engineers, independ- developed along parallel, but generally separate ent development of a U.S. civilian system paths. in some areas, though, DOD’s technology would entail an expensive R&D program has not been unique and, in fact, has benefited and, subsequently, an expensive demonstra- from work done by NASA and the private section project. tor. For example, first generation military sea How can technology transfer from the mil- communications services were supplied by trans- itary to the civilian sector be facilitated and ponders Ieased from civilian maritime satellites; increased? the FLTSATCOM system became operational later. Similarly, DOD has learned from, as well There has been, and continues to be, a recog- as contributed to, the technologies of geosyn- nized need for military use of various space plat- chronous satellite emplacement, of orbit control forms to accomplish national defense missions. and station-keeping, and of satellite housekeeping Though the civilian program is separate from (i.e., thermal control, power supplies, signal proc- DOD’s program, they interact at both the man- essing, etc.). In addition, the two sectors have agement and technical levels. The 1958 NAS Act shared information on satellite structures, altitude specified the establishment of a civilian agency, and attitude control, sensors, and a miscellany called for technology transfer between the civilian of such items as composition of the upper at- and military programs, and established an exter- mosphere and transmission/reflection character- nal coordinating mechanism, NASC, to mediate istics of the Earth and its atmosphere. any interagency conflicts. In the intervening years, NASA’s program has been subject to ex- There remains a significant concern about the tensive public scrutiny, and it has developed an store of military technology, largely unknown to applications component which, because of our the public, that lies behind the curtain of securi- political philosophy and tradition, is oriented ty classification blanketing most of DOD’s ac- primarily toward developing systems that will tivities and interests in space. It is important to eventually be operated by the private sector. The recognize the nature of the barriers that exist with programs of DOD (and the intelligence com- respect to accessibility of DOD’s technology—for munity) have been highly classified, subject to use either in the private sector or in the civilian no extensive public debate or scrutiny, and have public sector (by NASA or NOAA). The technol- been highly focused on mission applications. ogy may be: These differing objectives (and others mentioned Unique to a given DOD mission. To reveal elsewhere in this report) have led to the develop- that DOD possesses a given technology ment of separate systems in many areas, but have would be to reveal that a specific classified not precluded common usage of certain systems. mission was being pursued. The primary example of a common system is, Not suitable for civilian use, Missions unique of course, the shuttle. This system, the major to DOD may require the development of sys- elements of which are funded by NASA, was in- tems with characteristics (and associated tended from its very beginning to satisfy the mis- costs) unnecessary in the civilian sector. For sion needs of both NASA and DOD. DOD example, the security and survivability cri- funded the development of an interim upper teria driving the design of many DOD sys- stage, the shuttle launch complex at Vandenberg tems result in a degree of redundancy and AFB, and extensive missions applications studies. circuit hardening unneeded in civilian sat- Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 41

ellites. If, in addition, a satellite with such limitation to R&D has been mixed. A primary characteristics were introduced into civilian benefit of NASA’s emphasis is that it has been use, the measures employed to ensure the able to make rapid technological progress be- survivability and security of its military twin cause it has not had to develop expertise either might be compromised. in operation of service systems or in commercial ● More advanced than needed for civilian ap- development. Drawbacks include pursuit of some plications. In Earth observations, for exam- projects that may be impractical because they are ple, military intelligence requires that data developed with insufficient appreciation of user of very high resolution be collected-a stand- requirements and constraints, and inefficient ard of performance well beyond that re- transfer of technology and services to potential quired (or even desired) for most civilian pur- operators. poses. Adoption of specific military systems Prior to 1958, the National Advisory Council or specific technology may be restricted for for Aeronautics (NACA) operated according to several reasons: it may reveal how capable a general policy, set in 1946, that directed R&D U.S. systems are, and it may reveal that a par- to cease prior to development of specific designs ticular technology, generally considered to of commercial aircraft equipment. This specific be well understood, achieves higher per- development was viewed as the proper role of formance through special modifications. industry. Government research was oriented These barriers apply to a greater or lesser toward proving a concept and generating suffi- degree to specific Earth-sensing and com- cient data to permit an industrial designing proc- munications capabilities, and they derive ess to start with a good chance of successful com- from concerns for national security, con- pletion from both the technical and economic cerns that cannot be ignored in assessing the point of view. This mission is simpler for the case question of technology transfer from DOD of aeronautical research than for space applica- to NASA. tions efforts, however, because the civil aviation However, there are cases in which the ex- market has been well defined for decades. Un- istence of a DOD technological capability fortunately, this same high degree of market ar- (though not necessarily the latest development) ticulation is not the case for all space applications has been shielded unnecessarily. In such a case, technologies. The market for international com- NASA has had to develop a demonstration system munications services was rather well understood incorporating the same technology before it can in the early 1960’s. Consequently, commer- be transferred to the public domain. Such meas- cialization could proceed from NASA generic ures are wasteful of public resources and should R&D much as aeronautic technology did in the be given careful review in the light of current past. For materials processing in space, however, resource constraints. the market is embryonic, and simple proof of concept will not move MPS into commercializa- To Limit NASA to R&D tion. Thus, the precedents of how and when to shift development into the private sector fit less With the exception of launch facilities and well for MPS. space transportation in general, NASA’s work has been confined to R&D–largely because when the Primarily because the NAS Act is silent on the 1958 act was written, the question of Govern- question of who is to operate space applications ment operation of, as yet nonexistent, space ap- (except for transportation), decisions about when plications technologies was not of great concern a system is ready for operation, and who should to the framers of the act. In addition to its many be given responsibility for operating it, are made contributions to aeronautics technology, NASA ad hoc. For satellite communications, Congress has developed communications and Earth obser- decided after much debate that responsibility for vations systems, and has studied the potential for operations should reside in the private sector, but manufacturing products in space. The experience because of fears that open entry would result in of the past quarter century with respect to NASA’s a virtual communications monopoly by one firm, 42 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications namely, the American Telephone and Telegraph an R&D agency may not be motivated to make Co. (AT&T), it created the Communications Sat- appropriate tradeoffs between cost and perform- ellite Corporation (COMSAT) in 1962. The polar ance; there may be unnecessary “gold plating.” orbiting TIROS weather satellite system was given Furthermore, the user agency can concentrate to the Weather Bureau, within the Department on operations and avoid unproductive conflict of Commerce, to operate in 1961. When NOAA between engineers and users. Users tend to be was formed in 1970, operation of the weather conservative: they would rather stay with a work- satellites was given to that agency. It now ing system that they know and trust than risk their operates the geostationary operational environ- time and resources on an untried system even mental satellite system as well. if it promises a vast improvement in capability. Clearly, a proper balance must be struck. Land remote sensing from space, after considerable infighting among the mission agencies, was The primary issues of concern in Government- finally assigned to NOAA in 1978, principally be- operated applications systems are when and how cause of its expertise in operating satellites, the transition is to be made from R&D to opera- though it had no prior experience in the special tional status and who has control over the course issues surrounding land remote sensing. Accord- of R&D. Though different systems should be ing to that policy decision, NOAA was also to in- treated with flexibility as this transition is planned, vestigate and develop mechanisms for eventually the lack of clear and consistent principles for transferring Landsat to the private sector. Mean- transfer introduces uncertainty and inefficiency. while, the Government committed itself to assur- Perhaps the most important consideration is that ing continuity of the data flow from Landsat. Cur- potential users of a new system must be identified rent policy calls for transfer of Landsat to the as soon as possible and brought into the process private sector “as soon as possible” and provides of planning its eventual operation. The cases of for no follow-on to the program if private oper- Landsat and the weather satellites have shown ators do not assume operational responsibility. how difficult this transition can be to carry out. NOAA was also to operate the now-cancelled With all good will on both sides, the perceived National Ocean Satellite System. needs of the users and the far-seeing vision of the In materials processing, NASA is pursuing a engineers and scientists were not always compati- vigorous basic research program. As the commer- ble. One of the reasons for the user communi- cial viability of this technology becomes clearer, ty’s current dissatisfaction with certain aspects of it seems likely that private industry, with NASA’s Landsat is that it has remained an R&D system help, will pursue specific opportunities for devel- too long. oping manufactured items in space. As with aero- If the Government is going to be the operator nautics or communications satellites, the Govern- of an applications system, one way to avoid in- ment’s role in materials processing R&D will teragency transition problems is to assign opera- change as the technology matures. tional responsibility to the development agency. The rationale for maintaining a separation be- For space applications, NASA would assume this tween R&D and operations is that better, more role, which has worked well for space transpor- innovative research may be done by an agency tation. In such a case, NASA would then have in which finding new and better ways to accom- to develop competence in a variety of new fields plish a task is the agency’s primary concern. On in order to plan effectively for the operational the other hand, leaving an agency free from the phase and to carry out the plan when it is im- ofien pedestrian tasks of operating a complicated plemented. If NASA were assigned an operational technology for the public good may result in a role in areas other than space transportation, the configuration of technology that will not serve the transition from development to operations could eventual user well, either technically or eco- be made smoother and would be more likely to nomically, Also, without a closely involved client lead to early returns from investment in space ap- intending to assume responsibility for operations, plications R&D. Where the period of governmen- Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 43 tal operations is likely to be of limited duration To Foster International Cooperation (e.g., for remote sensing), making NASA the What benefits has the United States re- operational agency seems appropriate. ceived from its cooperative programs? How When the private sector is to operate the ap- is the desire for cooperation reconciled with plications technology once Government R&D is maintaining U.S. preeminence? complete, the issues are somewhat different and The 1958 act encourages “Cooperation by the involve the vital question of whether Government United States with other nations and groups of should be doing the R&D at all. The primary nations in work done pursuant to this act and the reason for the Government to sponsor R&D, as peaceful application of the results thereof.”5 well as demonstration, in technologies intended Though in some ways opposed to the goal of for eventual commercial exploitation is to reduce maintaining national leadership, U.S. cooperative uncertainties about the technical and economic efforts have made useful contributions to overall risks associated with space applications systems. political and foreign policy aims. By entering into The key issue in making the transition from a a variety of formal and informal agreements with Federal R&D program to a commercial operation foreign governments (ranging from provision of is what additional Federal actions, if any, are scientific and technical data and participation in needed once the technology has proved its NASA science experiments to direct access to viability, The Government has a generally weak U.S. applications technology), the United States record in understanding the marketplace, al- has encouraged potential partners to look fav- though the aeronautical program in NASA has orably on the U.S. space effort. had a long history of moving technology successfully to the private sector. As a further com- In return, the United States has gained a variety plication, nonaerospace industry has had little ex- of tangible and intangible benefits. At first, in the perience in working with Government on space context of competition with the Soviet Union, the activities. United States enlisted the support of allies and potential allies by offering them a stake in the new The Federal agencies are learning how to col- and adventurous space program. In addition, we laborate effectively with business in the develop- gained access to a large number of foreign sites ment of commercial opportunities based on Gov- to provide tracking and relay stations for manned ernment-developed technology. Effective col- missions. Scientific data as well as general infor- laboration has been most effective in certain mation were widely disseminated, in accordance specific areas such as aeronautics, where the with our basic decision—diametrically opposed sometimes adversarial relationship between the to that of the Soviets—to provide the world with public and private sectors has not developed. open coverage of U.S. successes and failures. Our Eventually, however, the Government is likely to civilian space program has provided a concrete become more sensitive to commercial considera- demonstration of what we mean by an open tions in its dealings with new technology. As this society. kind of learning continues, Government can become a more effective partner with the Nation’s The United States took a leading role in estab- investment firms and industries in maintaining lishing INTELSAT in 1964 and in arranging for U.S. economic leadership based on technological broad international participation in the system. supremacy. However, there are probably in- The United States profited through its initial herent limitations in Government’s ability to ac- SNatiOnal Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Op. cit., Sec. 102. commodate all private sector priorities. (c) (7). 44 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

dominance of INTELSAT and its position as the the European Space Agency is building Spacelab main supplier of INTELSAT hardware. Because (at its own expense), in return for free flights on of the position of the United States, the Soviet the shuttle. European and Japanese payload spe- Union did not join INTELSAT, leaving the United cialists will participate in upcoming Spacelab mis- States as the central figure in international satellite sions. Though, overall, the Spacelab/shuttle ar- communications. rangement appears to be satisfactory to both sides, differences have arisen over timing of The United States has attempted in a number delivery, costs, and participation in operational of ways to involve third-world countries in its decisions. More generally, there are unresolved space program. The direct-broadcast experiments issues concerning the proper extent of coopera- conducted by NASA’s applications technology tive ventures and of information sharing about satellites in 1976 enabled India and Brazil to eval- potentially competitive commercial products, uate the feasibility of transmitting educational particularly in materials processing. Cancellation programing to remote rural areas. The Landsat of the U.S. portion of the international solar polar remote-sensing system was made accessible to mission (ISPM) has made the Europeans wary of all countries through the sale of global data at low entering other cooperative ventures with the prices, the establishment of foreign ground sta- United States. tions, and technical/economic assistance to less developed countries provided by the Agency for In international organizations, especially the International Development. In addition to foster- UN’s Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer ing goodwill, U.S. openness has helped forestall Space, the U.S. position on several important criticism directed at direct-broadcast and remote- legal and regulatory issues has increasingly come sensing systems that operate across national under attack. The United States was instrumen- boundaries. tal in drafting the major treaties dealing with outer space and in establishing the principle that broad- The United States has long had a policy of sell- casting and data collection from satellites could ing launches—vehicles and tracking facilities— be carried out without interference based on to foreign users for peaceful purposes. In one claims of national sovereignty. However, many major instance of direct technology transfer, third-world and Communist countries are resist- Japan has been allowed to produce Thor-Delta ing possible transmission of radio and, especial- expendable vehicles under license. Many scien- ly, television programing across their borders, as tific and R&D missions have been carried out for well as the collection and dissemination of high- developed and less-developed countries, in ad- resolution imagery of their territories without dition to cooperative ventures between NASA prior permission. Cooperation with the United and outside agencies. States may be disrupted by disagreements over More recently, the rise of competitive European these issues, especially as Japan and Europe are and Japanese capabilities, along with increasing rapidly becoming alternative sources of com- antagonism toward the United States on the part parable services and products and may make of third-world countries, has strained our coop- concessions to third-world and Communist coun- erative posture. European participation in the tries as a means for gaining commercial advan- space transportation system has been extensive; tage over the United States.

SECTION 2: APPLICATIONS POLICY ISSUES Introduction: Generic and Specific space technologies—e.g., the appropriate rate of Technology Issues transfer from military to civilian uses, or the appropriate role of the Government in supporting Each of the major space applications technol- R&D. In addition, each technology also creates ogies raises certain issues that are generic to all several issues that are specific to it alone—e.g., Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 45 the resolution limit of civilian land remote sens- issues by technology and the policy principle ing by satellites. under which they fit most appropriately. The generic issues were discussed in the previous sec- Through a series of workshops, OTA estab- tion. The following section discusses the most im- Iished a set of generic and specific issues that portant specific issues, technology by technology. underlie this assessment. Table 1 groups these

Table 1 .—Summary Matrix of Primary Policy Principles Across Four Major Space Application Technologies

Policy principle Communications Land remote sensing Civilian/military split 1. Is the transfer of technology from the military to 1.` Is the transfer of technology from the military to the the civilian sector adequate? civilian sector adequate? 2. Common/shared systems: a) What problems may 2. What limits of resolution are appropriate to civilian the civilian sector face if the military can systems? preempt civilian use? b) How should costs be 3. What impact would declassifying existing military shared? data have on prospects for transferring satellite remote sensing to the civilian sector? International cooperation 1. How should the United States respond to foreign 1. How will the problems of sovereignty and/or fairness competition in ground and space hardware? be addressed? 2. What are the impacts of Third World re- 2. What are the benefits/drawbacks of an international quirements for spectrum frequency allocation? system for remote-sensing system? (a la INTELSAT or 3. What policy focus should the United States some other model). develop toward foreign cooperation in satellite 3. What problems arise in our relations with other communications R&D? countries regarding private v. U.S. Government 4. What are the implications of U.S. application of ownership of remote-sensing system? its antitrust policies in foreign countries? 4. What should U.S. policy be regarding U.S. agency use of data collected by foreign systems?

5. What is the impact of the U.S.S.R. as a competitor in remote sensing? 6. What are the effects on the foreign user of an interruption of the data flow from Landsat? Leadership in science and 1. What improvements need to be made in policy 1. Are we losing our leadership in land remote technology and application implementation? sensing? thereof 2. How should United States respond to foreign competition? 3. What national goals or programs should the United States pursue? NASA focus on R&D 1. What is NASA’s role vis-a-vis the private sector? 1. Is the policy regarding flights of opportunity 2. How should program discontinuities be handled? adequate? 2. What steps might be taken to improve user inputs to the R&D process? 3. What continuing roles do NASA and NOAA have? Expansion of scientific 1. What is NASA’S role? 1. What is NASA’s role? knowledge (basic science research) Development and operation 1. What should NASA’s role be regarding 1. Why hasn’t the system been made operational? of space vehicles demonstrating publicly useful systems? 2. What mechanism(s) is (are) needed to decide on the (spacecraft) 2. Do civilian agencies have a role to play in operational readiness of a technology? operating satellite communications systems?

Promote commercialization 1, How should regulatory problems (delays) be 1. How can the market for data be aggregated and ex- of civilian applications handled? panded? 2. How should the Government regulate DBS na- 2. How should the technology be transferred to the tionality and internationally? private sector? 3. What should policy be regarding data availability from R&D systems? 4. What incentives does industry require to commercialize remote sensing? 5. What institutional models might be appropriate? 6, How do we determine that a technology is ready for commercialization? 7. Should system continuity be assured? 8. Who should decide what sensors are required for an operational system? 46 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table I.—Summary Matrix of Primary Policy Principles Across Four Major Space Application Technologies (continued)

Materials processing (MPS) Space transportation structures and manufacturing in space Common issues What should be DOD’s role and share? 1! Is there adequate coordination of ef- 1. Is there adequate transfer of technology from 1. What problems arise from the military’s forts between military and civilian military to civilian? right of preemption of a launch sectors? 2. How should systems be shared? opportunity? 2. On what basis can a potential space- 3. What problems occur from military in- based materials lab be shared? fluence on space transportation system design? How would this affect cost and pricing?

1. What problems arise with the perception 1. To what extent is the prospect of 1. What should our policies be regarding inter- of shuttle as a military system? commercial competition detrimental national competition? 2. How should we respond to competition to scientific cooperation? 2. What institutions may be needed to address from foreign transportation systems? international competition? 3. Is the United States a reliable partner for cooperative programs? 4. Is it possible or desirable for the United States to institute Government-indust~ cooperative ventures similar to those of other nations? 5. How should the United States protect technology developed by Government R&D?

1. What should the policy be regarding main- 1. How should the United States 1. Given that portions of U.S. policy are sound, how taining national facilities? respond to potential foreign can policy implementation be improved? competition? 2. Is Spacelab an adequate base for 2. Is the lack of program goals the problem with future MPS experiments? the space program or is it lack of implementation of existing policy?

1. What role can industry play as potential 1. Who should pay for basic ground- 1. What different role should Government and operator/owner of space transportation? based research? industry play? 2. Who decides what continuing R&D is 2. Who decides what space-based 2. Who should perform oversight? needed? research to do? Who pays? 3. What is NASA’s role in continuing R&D after 3. Should the operational system(s) pay for commercialization of a system? further R&D?

1. What is NASA’s role? 1. What is NASA’s role?

1. Who will operate the space transportation 1. How should costs of space-based 1. Who decides when a technology is ready for system in the near term? The far term? materials lab be allocated? a) How is the operational mode? the lab shared between Government, 2. What criteria should be used to determine the industry, and academia? operational readiness of a technology? 3. What role should NASA have in operating proven space systems?

1. How can the market for space transporta- 1. What new facilities may be needed 1. What steps should be taken to reduce risk to tion services be aggregated? to promote space-based materials the private sector? 2. How can shuttle pricing policies be made processing? 2. What incentives are needed to encourage more certain? private investment in space technology? 3. What regulatory/political constraints are 3. What should be the policy regarding opera- needed for privately run systems? tion of expendable launch vehicles? 4. What incentives might be needed to en- 4. What Iegal agreements/restraints are needed courage private investment In owning and to transfer technology developed with public operating space transportation com- funding to the private sector? ponents or systems?

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment. Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 47

COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES Issue 4: What Are the R&D Needs for chronous orbit, and, in the last of the series, a Optimal Advances in demonstration of broadcast technology from the Satellite Communications? satellite to small, low-cost ground stations. In 1973, OMB, acting on recommendations Because the satellite communications industry from the Office of Telecommunications Policy, has already achieved the status of big business, greatly restricted funding for NASA’s R&D in R&D is a significant part of its competitive stance. advanced communications. The assumption un- Nonetheless, there is a point, based on industry’s derlying this decision was that the U.S. private own view of return on investment, beyond which sector could conduct its own advanced R&D, it is unwilling to commit funds for advanced making NASA’s further participation mostly un- R&D–where the risks are great, the payoffs necessary. In the event, however, the private sec- uncertain, the technology unproved, and the tor has, for the most part, been content to ex- time-scale of needs unclear. For this reason, the ploit proved technologies already available and pioneers in advanced R&D are likely to be the to package them in even larger satellites; it has Federal Government, industry/Government joint done little R&D of advanced systems. As a result, ventures, or, if antitrust laws permit, private con- many of the new developments in satellite com- sortia formed ad hoc. It is widely believed that munication have come from the Europeans and individual firms cannot afford to finance the front- the Japanese; in some areas they seem to have end costs of performing truly advanced develop- leapfrogged U.S. technology. ment or substantial basic research, In this situation it is appropriate to ask what role Up to now, U.S. leadership in this field has not NASA should play in responding to current needs been threatened. But recently, Japan and several for advanced R&D. One possibility is for NASA European countries have entered this field deter- 6 to proceed with plans to complete a demonstra- mined to compete successfully. Supported by tion flight of a 30/20 GHz satellite system. Other government-sponsored R&D as well as contracts possibilities include demonstration projects for awarded by INTELSAT, European and Japanese a large communications platform, and, at a much firms have developed competitive satellite sub- lower level of expenditure, a large deployable systems and are now capable of designing, build- antenna. In addition, NASA could continue to ing, and operating complete telecommunications support a number of smaller projects for 30/20 systems. In several areas, foreign development GHz subsystem work. programs are more advanced than those in the United States. More concerned to maintain their Increasing Use of the Geostationary Orbit competitive position with respect to one another than worried about possible antitrust violations, By far the most useful communications satellites U.S. firms seem unwilling to coordinate an in- are those stationed in geosynchronous orbit dustrywide response to this potential threat to (GSO) in which they rotate about the Earth, in their markets. the plane of the Equator, at an angular velocity equal to that of the Earth itself. Stationed at a NASA took an early lead in the development point above the Earth’s Equator, a communica- of communications satellites, and even after com- tions satellite in GSO can provide continuous mercial success had been achieved, the agency coverage of nearly a third of the Earth’s surface continued to conduct R&D for advanced tech- with a broad beam antenna. nologies. These included advanced stabilization techniques, the control of satellite position in syn- Because many satellite systems must share relatively small numbers of orbit slots in space and bAnthony J. Calio, statement before the Subcommittee on Space frequency bands in the spectrum, there is a limit Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Tech- nology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., July to the number of spacecraft that can be stationed 8, 1981, p. 13. in a given arc of GSO. Satellites must be sufficient- 48 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Iy separated to avoid radio interference, the sep- japanese have already launched a direct broad- aration required for a given level of technological cast satellite for tests and preliminary operations maturity being subject to several physical con- in the Ku band. Although the first two satellites straints. In general, satellites along the geosta- in this program were bought from U.S. industry, tionary arc can use the same frequencies only if all subsequent models will be made in Japan. It they are far enough apart so that ground stations is also noteworthy that the Japanese have be- can point at one and not receive an interfering come the leading supplier of INTELSAT Earth sta- signal from its neighbor on either side. tions and, because of very advanced technology and established production lines, are likely to take To guarantee noninterference, the Federal the world market lead in the sale of TV receive- Communications Commission (FCC) and interna- only (TVRO) Earth stations designed specifically tional regulatory agencies have established for direct-broadcast reception. Some see these minimum orbital separations and have assigned efforts by the Japanese and similar activities in satellites to specific locations called orbital slots. Europe as serious threats to the U.S. lead in Each slot can accommodate one or more satel- satellite technology, systems, and market share. lites that, between them, utilize the full range of suitable frequencies. All the slots in view of the Opportunity at 30/20 GHz United States are filled with existing or authorized satellites, and FCC has had to choose from There are three frequency bands allocated for several competing carriers for allocating the last the use of civilian communications satellites: the few slots. When the capacity of these satellites, C bands (6 GHz uplink, 4 GHz downlink), the operating at either C or Ku band, is fully utilized Ku bands (14 GHz, 12 GHz), and the Ka bands (projected to occur in the last half of this decade), (30 GHz, 20 GHz). The technology for transmis- the growth of this industry will come to a halt– sion and reception in the C bands was developed unless a solution is found and implemented.7 Two first; almost all commercial satellites now operate possible solutions that will be examined here are in the C band. Ka band technology and large communication platforms. Crowding at 6/4 GHz While it is true that satellite communications NASA’S Past and Future Roles systems operating in the C band (6/4 GHz) are Through the middle 1960’s and 1970’s, NASA successful and cost effective, two major problems played a leading role in R&D for communications are becoming increasingly apparent. First, the satellite technology. Beginning in 1973, however, number of useful locations in GSO has been used NASA’s program was phased down considerably, up. With current technology, a 4° orbital separa- on the assumption that the private sector would tion between satellites operating in the C band continue necessary R&D. The industry did indeed is required. Not long ago, a 50 separation was make noteworthy progress in a number of areas, required, and, as transmitting and receiving tech- but only because these areas offered: 1) a modest nology improves, a 3” separation may soon risk for the cost, 2) a relatively immediate market become standard.a Although it is theoretically payoff, and 3) affordable development costs. As possible to reduce the separation between sat- it has turned out, however, the private sector has ellites further, each reduction increases the costs not funded long-term, high-risk, and high-cost of controlling the satellites’ susceptibility to in- satellite communications research. terference. Despite the introduction of new beam-shaping technology that will further reduce While the U.S. satellite communication R&D interference, the point at which it becomes im- program slowed between 1973 and 1979, the practical to squeeze additional satellites operating Japanese and European efforts accelerated. The at 6/4 GHz into desirable parking spaces in GSO z~enera[ Dynamics, Convair Division, and Comsat Corporation, is nevertheless rapidly approaching. Therefore, “Geostationary Platform Systems Concepts Definition Follow-On Study,” final review, July 28, 1981, pp. 8-38; see also, Calio, op. cit. p. 14. Scalio, op. cit., p. 14. —

Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 49 we are indeed running out of GSO locations with GHz–projected long-term requirements can be good “look angles” for 6/4 systems. met only by moving to the Ka band. On the other hand, there are several unresolved technical and The second problem is coordination with economic questions that prevent immediate es- ground microwave systems operating in the 6/4 tablishment of an operational Ka system. GHz bands. These ground-based systems are radio relay systems, used primarily for telex, The main advantage of developing Ku systems telegraph, and voice traffic. The problems are that is that the technology is already fully tested. The the satellite ground transmitters cause 6 GHz in- disadvantage is that the Ku band will not be able terference at the radio relay system receivers, and to meet the needs of a greatly expanded video that the radio relay system transmitters cause 4 market. In particular, with Ku only, full action, large screen video teleconferencing will almost GHz interference at the ground receivers of the satellite system. As these ground-based systems certainly not be possible; only the expanded proliferate, it has become too costly to protect capacity of 30/20 can handle the large data flow colocated two-way satellite ground terminals near of such a high-quality system. Ku band is, how- metropolitan areas against interference. This ever, an important interim solution; whereas C problem is especially acute in heavily populated band allocations total about 700 MHz, Ku pro- areas such as Japan, Western Europe, and the vides 1500 MHz. As a ready technology, Ku can Northeast United States. meet a service market having three times the capacity of the already crowded C band. Ka technology on the other hand is not ready for com- FUTURE NEEDS mercial use, and experiences three to five times As demand rapidly outpaces capacity of C band the transmission losses experienced at Ku. satellite systems, the United States has to make some difficult decisions as to what step to take A potential competitor to satellite systems is next. Should we fully develop the Ku band? transmission by fibre optics. By the 1990’s, fiber Should we jump to the Ka band? Should we at- optics will have come into its own as a major tempt to deploy fibre optics more rapidly? Should ground-based supplier of communications needs, we buy facilities and technology for service in the However, no matter how well this technology Ku and Ka bands from the Japanese and the Euro- performs, or how extensive its network be- peans? comes, it will not be on-line widely enough to fulfill the requirements of the expanding markets There are two main advantages of going directof the 1980’s. Furthermore, unlike satellite beams, ly to Ka: first, the enormous spectrum spread be- fibre optics is line-switched, not area-covering; tween 20 and 30 GHz allows for transmissions therefore, it is not so likely to be competitive for of much greater bandwidth and, hence, much broadcast or distribution services. greater versatility; and second, there are many more orbital parking slots if the Ka band is used. COMPETITION ABROAD Projections of demand for transponders in the The Japanese and the Europeans have already 1990’s differ on the question of the ability of the begun to develop 30/20 Ka systems. One reason Ku band to handle the traffic. If projections are that they have moved to 30/20 is that they already limited to increases in voice and data traffic, use the 14/1 2 Ku band for commercial radio. technical improvements will probably allow the Therefore, if they paid exclusive attention to Ku band to suffice up to approximately 199s- developing satellite systems in the Ku band, they 2000. On the other hand, if there is a large in- would face the same kinds of interference prob- crease in video traffic, particularly for teleconfer- lems there that plague the United States in the encing, the Ku band will be exhausted by about C band. Similarly, the United States already has 1992. It follows that while the Ku band represents INTELSAT-V and an SBS satellite and will soon a near-term solution to the problem of crowding have TDRSS/AW–all operating in Ku band. Five in the C band—e.g., the decision of Satellite new Ku systems, to be launched in 1983-85, are Business Systems (SBS) to operate at 14/12 under development. 5(’) ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

More important, however, the Japanese and POTENTIAL MILITARY INTERFACE the Europeans have concluded that the future of U.S. aerospace companies are developing sig- satellite communications systems lies in develop- nificant new satellite technology for the military, ing systems to exploit the Ka band, though they some of it designed for use at 30/20 GHz.1° Those are deploying Ku systems as well. Precisely be- firms do not (and could not afford to) maintain cause the Ku band represents only an interim separate working groups for military and civilian solution, they have decided to attempt long-range applications of a given technology. Rather, it is domination of the satellite communications mar- standard procedure for the same group to work ket. The Italian firm, Telespazio, for example, on both. As important work has been done for hopes to be in the forefront of 30/20 develop- the military at 30/20 and higher bands, the ex- ment, and plans to introduce a system to handle pertise exists to initiate a civilian program in short domestic telephone service and data traffic. In order (see ch. 6 for the broader context of this congressional testimony, some U.S. companies discussion). in effect agree with the foreign evaluation, albeit in hindsight, for they argue that without the con- By 1980, NASA and the Air Force had decided tinuation of a strong U.S. Government program, on joint funding of traveling wave tube develop- foreign countries will almost surely dominate the ment, in which the Air Force Space Division multibillion-dollar international communications would provide 30 percent of the total funding. satellite markets of the 1990’s.9 A strong U.S. pro- The Air Force, on the other hand, would handle gram is, however, not synonymous with 30/20 the IMPAIT transmitter development, with NASA exclusively; aggressive deployment of Ku is im- funding only a portion of that. For antijamming portant also. But a renewed effort by NASA purposes, DOD is interested in a 44 GHz uplink would concentrate on development and demon- band, but NASA is not. Thus, it seems clear that stration of Ka technology because the agency has with the military interest in 30/20 (and 40), the 11 already completed these tasks for Ku with the CTS research will continue with or without NASA. experimental satellite, from 1971 to 1977. At this Although there would be some problems with point, the industry has the knowledge and tech- transferring the technology because of military nology to proceed at Ku, without further need emphases on security and survivability, such for NASA to do product improvement. problems have been solved before and, in principle, could be in the present case. One course of action made possible by the development of 30/20 systems abroad is that U.S. RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR firms could buy the facilities and services In congressional testimony, private industry developed elsewhere. But to allow ourselves to representatives have provided an unequivocal fall into second place in an important area of answer: no individual firm can finance the R&D space applications would be to ignore a basic costs of 30/20 technology.lz On the other hand, tenet of U.S. space policy -i.e., that the United though the industry as a whole, acting as a con- States will maintain a position of leadership. Once sortium, might be able to provide the financing, the United States allows itself to take a back seat the structure of such an arrangement would have in the development and deployment of this (or to be carefully drawn so as to conflict neither with any) technology, it becomes ever more difficult to regain the lead. The United States cannot light- ‘Whomas F. Rogers, Edward C. Aldredge, Jr., and Elizabeth Young, ly abandon any area of technological leadership in separate statements before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, (especially in a strategic sector such as com- U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 2, 1982. munications), given the economic importance of I ljohn H, McE[roy, statement before the subcommittee on Tran$ maintaining a favorable trade balance in high- portation, Aviation, and Communications and the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology of the Committee on Science technology products. and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d sess., May 21, 1980. gDavid McElroy, MaRin Newman, and Johan Benson, statements IZDonald B. Nowakoski, statement before the Subcommittee on before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Repre- Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., sentatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., July 9, 1981, p. 149. jliy 8, 1981, pp. 56-57. Ch. 3—issues and Findings Ž 51 present antitrust laws nor with the competitive A second reason for skepticism is that the risks positions of the corporations. seem somewhat overestimated. The technology has already been bench-tested; the launch sys- This is not to say that private industry has not tems are not problematic. Thus, besides the com- in the past and will not in the future engage in plex but manageable business of developing a significant R&D. It is, rather, to say that industrial suitable spacecraft, there remains only the task R&D is generally conducted in support of primary of mating proved technology and reliable launch business goals. Unlike NASA’s R&D, it is product- facilities. Additionally, market studies of the com- or service-oriented. Furthermore, an acceptable mercial potential of Ka-band technology have percentage of industrial R&D must result in profit- been made and have been uniformly encourag- able business applications. ing. ’ 3 In short, the technical risks do not seem Furthermore, firms in the industry see them- great, while the prospects of return are high. selves as spending to the corporate limit in fulfill- A final area of concern, one which verges on ing needs for short-term R&D. There are not questions of policy, is that insufficient considera- enough funds to be applied to a long-term pro- tion seems to have been given to the possibility gram like civilian 30/20. NASA estimates, and in- of establishing a joint management structure for dustry concurs, that the agency’s flight program development of 30/20 technology. The Govern- to test 30/20 technology will cost $250 million ment might be a guarantor or a partner in such to $400 million over 3 to 5 years. A commercial an arrangement, One potentially attractive Gov- R&D program in satellite communications hard- ernment-industry relationship for 30/20 tech- ware (which a carrier conducts in a lab) is, by nology, as well as for the large communications contrast, on the order of $10 million per year. platform, might be a variation on the JEA currently instituted to promote materials processing in SOME CONCERNS space. In such an agreement, the Government One reason for concern is that the costs of flight could offer to bear the cost of launching a com- testing 30/20 technology are estimated on the as- munications satellite in return for a guarantee of sumption that NASA would do the tests. It is often a specified amount of public service communica- the case (and industry makes it frequently in other tions from the satellite. If successful, both par- contexts) that industry can do certain kinds of ties would benefit, If not, the losses would be tasks more economically than government can. shared. Presumably, therefore, if one of the large aerospace companies conducted flight tests of Large Communications Platforms 30/20 technology for civilian use, the costs would TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS be substantially lower. Whether industry would As one important means of meeting the prob- argue that they still could not undertake the lem of crowding in GSO, large communications necessary R&D, even if the Government fur- platforms (LCPS), on which several transmission nished launch, data acquisition, and tracking facilities are mounted together, are a promising services free, is an open question. The compli- new configuration of technology. In addition to cating factor, however, is that no appropriate fixed and mobile communications an LCP may spacecraft bus exists. It is not certain that a Ku- provide direct broadcast, navigational, meteor- band bus will suit Ka-band technology. if a new ological, and Earth observation services, and sup- spacecraft is required, it will cost over $100 mil- port for scientific payloads, thus becoming a mul- lion, excluding the costs of the new communica- timission platform. The large capital expenditures tions hardware to be tested. Nevertheless, if, for and the number of technological advances re- example, a consortium of the major satellite firms, builders and carriers, received contributions of —.— 1 JEliZab@h L. Young, statement before the Subcommittee on $10 million dollars per year from each, over a Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and 5-year period, a demonstration project could be Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., privately funded. Jllly 10, 1981, pp. 122-123. 52 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

quired make LCPS a much more speculative pros- . much lower transportation cost per pound pect than are 30/20 GHz satellite systems. —more efficient utilization of shuttle capacity. In general, an LCP is distinguished from conventional communications satellites by greater The critical need of the satellite communica- capacity, connectivity, and switching capability. tions industry of the 1990’s will be a spacecraft The LCP would provide high capacity by means capable of supporting the large multi beam anten- of multiple spot beams and multiple bands. It nas and switches needed to provide large-scale would provide good connectivity for a wide range frequency reuse for point-to-point services. A of communications users, and it would offer very large platform in GSO is ideally suited for this task. substantial in-orbit switching capability, far All other services provided by the platform must beyond that attainable by conventional sat- be compatible with this primary mission–i.e., ellites.1 4 they must not interfere with or compete for bandwidth with the point-to-point payloads.18 The The use of LCPS would bring several substan- primary and secondary services of LCPs in geosta- tial changes: 19 tionary orbit may be broken out as follows: ● The high power of the platform would dras- Primary use: tically lower the power needs and therefore the cost of the ground segment, resulting in ● Fixed point-to-point services: a proliferation of Earth stations. Space seg- –direct-to-user (DTU) or customer premise ment costs per channel would drop, despite services (CPS) network, and the larger initial investment required. –high-volume trunking (HVT), domestic, ● The large capacity of the platforms would regional, and international. result in a requirement for fewer slots in the Compatible services: geostationary orbit. This would relieve the congestion that would result from the use of mobile services: conventional satellites. —air mobile, ● The switching capability of the large plat- —sea mobile, and forms would eliminate the need for complex –land mobile, switching at the Earth stations. Earth stations Broadcast and relay services: would no longer be required to access more –TV distribution (separate Ku-band alloca- than one spacecraft.ls tion, —educational TV, The cost savings for LCPS, estimated to be sub- –direct-to-home TV, stantial,16 would result from three areas in which —tracking and data relay, and economies of scale could be achieved. These –data collection. economies result from:17 reduced mass in orbit: DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS –lower bus mass per pound of payload, and The development of large space platforms —much lower payload mass to perform the would require a significant number of technical same mission, accomplishments, though what has to be done slightly lower production cost per pound of to make them successful is, as theory, well- hardware, and understood. Thus, they represent significantly more than a relatively larger step in the evolutionary pattern that satellites have always followed–from smaller to larger, from less to more 14Future Systems Inc., Large Communications P/atforms Versus Sma/ler Sate//ites, prepared for NASA Headquarters, February 1979, reliable. p. ii. ‘sIbid., p. 203. IGlbid., pp. 203-204. ‘* Ibid., pp. 8-44. 1 zGeneral Dynamics, Op. cit., Pp. 8-15. lqlbid., pp. 8-45. Ch. 3—Issues and Findings ● 53

There are definite prerequisites that can, for the be assured to compensate for the much greater forseeable future, be provided only by the United expense of an LCP. States. First of all, the shuttle itself must be The requirements of long life and high reliability brought to operational status. Second, a vehicle could be met in two ways. Either the hardware capable of transferring a platform from low Earth- might be constructed to maximize these charac- orbit (LEO), where its components would be teristics, or it might be deemed more feasible to brought up on several shuttle flights and then rely on in-orbit maintenance of the platform. assembled, to its destination in GSO must be Maintenance, in turn, might be accomplished developed and proved. Third, satellite servicing robotically by, for example, NASA’s projected and construction techniques (including extensive teleoperator, a remotely controlled device that life-support and extra-vehicular activity (EVA), will would replace certain modules aboard the plat- have to be developed and demonstrated by form. Alternately, a manned orbital station in NASA in LEO before the private sector will con- LEO, which might be deployed in 1990-2000, sider deploying LCPS in GSO. Next, certain im- could be assigned maintenance duties; person- provements in the technology for the platform nel would be dispatched to a platform on a trans- itself are needed. Of these, one is the design of fer vehicle, not only to replace modules, but, if antenna beams capable of very accurate point- necessary, to make more extensive repairs. All ing; this project, however, is an extension of pres- of this must be accomplished at GSO and will ent technology. Another is the development of require substantial development for an upper a high-speed, low-power switch to interconnect stage and for the shuttle itself. the several antenna beams. Finally, the general requirements of long life and high reliability must

LAND REMOTE SENSING BY SATELLITE

Issue 5: What Role Should the in a single “scene”; and the ability to produce Federal Government Play in an enormous data flow in digital form suitable Developing or Operating a Satellite for direct computer processing. Unlike other methods, its development and present operation Remote-Sensing System? rest solely with the Government. Characteristics of Satellite Remote Sensing Each of these characteristics, as well as others Satellite remote sensing is one component of that will become apparent in the ensuing discus- a broad range of technologies and techniques sion, present new opportunities to the traditional that are used to acquire data about the Earth’s users of remotely sensed data, but they also raise resources. They range from simple direct human issues that must be resolved before satellite re- observation and measurement, to high-altitude mote sensing can become a large and thriving aircraft photography, to sensing by satellite. Thus, component of resource observation and devel- satellite remote sensing exists as one element of opment. an activity that has been part of the human scene since it first became desirable to survey the ex- Current Status of the U.S. Land Remote-Sensing tent and kind of resources available for human Satellite Program use. The world’s first civilian land remote-sensing Satellite sensing has unique properties that satellite was launched by NASA in 1972. Original- separate it from earlier methods: ease of opera- ly named the Earth Resources Technology Satel- tion, once established; the ability to see other lite (ERTS), the name was later changed to Land- lands without intruding in the country or its sat 1. The Landsat 1 and Landsat 2 satellites no airspace; the ability to sample very large areas longer provide data to users. Landsat 3 functions —— ——— .——-—

54 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

only partially. The present sensors are a multi- require a satellite system of greater capability: spectral scanner (MSS) that can sense the surface higher spatial resolution, stereo imagery, and of the Earth in four different spectral bands, each broader spectral coverage. A more important with 80 m resolution, and two television-like reason Landsat has not attracted a larger number cameras called return beam vidicons (RBV). Used of customers, however, is the uncertainty about together, the two sensor systems can produce whether the Landsat system will continue. data products that achieve 30 m resolution. The Many users of remote-sensing data from civilian data from Landsat are transmitted to Earth by satellites express considerable frustration with the radio link and received at some 12 stations current U.S. program. Though it is at a relatively located in various countries around the world (fig. primitive stage, the technology is far ahead of the 6). The MSS sensors aboard Landsat 3 are return- institutional arrangements necessary to collect ing only partial data, though the RBV sensors are and distribute the data in a timely and predictable functioning normally. A new satellite, having a manner. From the users’ viewpoint, the program broad resolution, high spectral coverage sensor is in disarray, and is characterized by a lack of called a thematic mapper (sensitive to emissions clear direction and by organizational am biva- in seven spectral bands) is scheduled for deploy- 22 Ience. According to U.S. policy, as articulated ment in late summer 1982. This satellite is in the Carter administration’s Presidential Direc- designated Landsat D. A second satellite with 23 tive 54, NOAA will be responsible for manag- similar sensors, Landsat D’, has been scheduled ing civilian operational land remote-sensing ac- for launch in 1985. tivities after the multispectral scanner aboard Although the system has been an R&D system Landsat D becomes operational in January 1983. designed to verify the potential of satellite remote NASA will remain in charge of R&D of satellite sensing, through the efforts of NASA, the data remote sensing for the civilian sector. This ad- from Landsats 1, 2, and 3 have attracted a wide ministration, as well as the previous one, is com- variety of users (resource managers) in this coun- mitted to transferring land remote sensing by try and abroad. These users consider Landsat data satellite to the private sector. The current policy to be an invaluable component of the larger is to make this transfer “as soon as possible.”24 realm of resource inventory data from all sources (see apps. B and C for details). For some, data Criteria for a Satellite Remote-Sensing System from Landsat have become a baseline require- Regardless of who operates a civilian satellite ment of their daily routine. For others, these data land remote-sensing system, the Federal Govern- serve the secondary, but important role of a comment or the private sector, the major users of parison data base. Generally, the users treat Land- satellite data have basic general needs for the sat as if it were an operational system, even conduct of an operational system, needs which though it is still officially an R&D system managed they have expressed clearly.25 26 Because each 20 by NASA. user has specific data needs (e.g., resolution, Although the system has found a variety of spectral ranges) closely related to his applications, users, it has yet to demonstrate that it can attract each will have a different view of the specific a large enough market for satellite data to sup- technology most suitable for his purposes. How- port even the management and operations of the ever, given an operational system for acquiring system without large Federal outlays. Part of the remote-sensing data by satellite, most users agree problem is simply one of technological maturi- on the following minimal criteria: ty. Very few technical improvements have been 22’’ Remote Sensing Government User Concerns, ” OTA Work- made in the characteristics of the data available shop, May 1981. from Landsat since 1972.21 Many applications will zJPresidental Directive 54, White House Press Release, Nov. 20, 1979. ZO’’Planning for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite 24J. wright, ~pa~ment of commerce statement, U.S. Senak and System: A Discussion of Issues and Options,” Department of Com- House of Representatives hearing on Civil Land Remote Sensing merce, June 1980. Systems, July 22, 1981. on the private SeC- ZI ~, Depa~ment of the Interior Position paper 250TA Workshop, op. cit. tor Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities, ” Depart- X4J.S. Senate and House of Representatives hearing on Civil Land ment of the Interior, October 1981. Remote Sensing Systems, July 22 and 23, 1981. Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 55

Ž Continuity of data flow. Reliable, continuous Table 2.—Data Needs of Foreign and Domestic Users flow of data is regarded by operational users ● Agriculture (Federal, State, and private): specific sampl- as mandatory. For each user, the term “con- ing areas chosen according to the crop; time-dependent tinuous data flow” has a slightly different data related to crop calendars and the weather patterns meaning. However, it generally means be- ● Forestry (Federal, State, and private): specific sampling areas; twice per year at preselected dates ing able to acquire the data that a satellite ● Geology and nonrenewable resources (Federal, State, could have taken, or did take, in a timely and private): wide variety of areas; seasonal data in ad- manner appropriate to a given application. dition to one-time sampling ● Civil engineering and land use (State and private): In the past, the data flow has been inter- populated areas; repeat data required over scale of rupted or slowed by failure of the tape re- months or years to determine trends of land use corders on the satellites, a natural enough ● Cartography (Federal, State, and private): all areas; repeat data as needed to update maps occurrence in an R&D system but unac- ● Coasta/zone management (Federal and State): monitor- ceptable in an operational one. Therefore, in ing of all coastlands at selected dates depending on order to ensure continuity, the users need local seasons ● pollution monitoring (Federal and State): broad, selected the most reliable possible system, consistent areas; highly time-dependent needs both for routine with obtaining the necessary data. A backup monitoring and in response to emergencies satellite for deployment should the first SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment. satellite fail in a major way is also an important requirement. Center notified users of Goddard’s intentions Delivery of data to the user has also been and asked them to suggest which scenes to interrupted or slowed by the inability of the save. Some early data, which are currently data center at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight being stored at Goddard, are scheduled for Center to process Landsat data fast enough .27 destruction. However, for many users, these Domestic users have experienced delays of early observations represent a valuable and up to 6 months in the delivery of Landsat irreplaceable baseline for comparison with data. Certain time-dependent data needs, later observations. In addition, much of the such as those of agriculture or pollution con- only cloud-free global coverage dates from trol programs, cannot be served if the data this early period in space remote sensing. cannot be processed within a few days (see Users agree that it is important to retain these table 2). The work of other programs is also early data and make them available upon re- slowed considerably by such delays. quest. They represent a large investment and Continuity of data also means retaining a valuable global resource for the future. data acquired in previous years. Landsat Looking toward the future, the users of satellites have provided data since 1972, Landsat data are concerned that data will not when the first remote-sensing satellite was have begun flowing from Landsat D before launched. The data are stored on magnetic the flow from Landsats 2 and 3 ceases. Will tapes that deteriorate over time. Thus, the Landsat D be available soon enough to tapes must be rerecorded in order to save assure continuity of the data flow? There are the data. Because of the storage problems presently no plans for backup should D fail involved with saving everything, the EROS to operate as planned. Data Center has selected standard scenes of ● Quality and integrity of data. It is important cloud-free data over the world. The NASA that data acquired in different time periods Goddard Data Center is transferring these be comparable and of uniform quality. scenes from the early tapes to the computer Landsat data are initially “preprocessed” compatible tapes (CCT), that will be stored at Goddard; the results are in the form of at the EROS Data Center and available upon high-density digital Tapes (H DDTs). These request to users. In the course of identify- HDDTS are then sent to the EROS Data Cen- ing the scenes to be saved, the EROS Data ter for processing. EROS in turn supplies data to users either in the form of film imagery ZY~TA Workshop, op. cit. or as CCTS. Some additional special process-

94-91!3 O - 82 - 5 56 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ing of data to meet particular user needs is ner. Users in some countries, including the done at EROS; other similar processing is United States, have experienced difficulties done by various value-added companies. in the past in obtaining needed data quick- Four problems have surfaced in the data ly from foreign ground stations. stream from satellite to user. First, the quality ● Adequate consultation with the user com- of data tapes is not always maintained at a mun;ty. This is an essential element of an op- high level. Users complain that errors in- erational space remote-sensing system, troduced in the HDDTs from Goddard are whether run by the Federal Government or passed through and appear in the CCTS from by the private sector. EROS. Second, abrupt changes over time in Although NASA has consulted other Fed- the format of CCTS, again a function of the eral agency users, neither users in the private R&D nature of the system, have seriously in- sector nor those in State and local govern- convenienced users. These changes have ment have been included in any way in the made it impossible to process older CCTS key decisionmaking processes. A successful with the techniques for processing current operational system depends on the full par- CCTS. Users must therefore go to unantici- ticipation of all elements involved on an pated and sometimes extraordinary lengths ongoing basis. to process the earlier tapes. These format In an effort to build interest in the capa- changes were made without sufficiently con- bilities of Landsat, NASA has sought the ad- sulting the needs of the user community. vice of the user community about its needs Thirdly, not all users want to purchase pre- with respect to sensors and resolution limits. processed data because preprocessing nec- However, as maybe appropriate in an R&D essarily causes some degradation of quality system, NASA has approached the problems or loss of information. For some applications, of the future orbital height, orbital planes, it is better to have raw data as they come and orbital path of the Landsat D satellite off the spacecraft. Finally, maintenance and from the point of view of optimizing space- management of the data base have been in- craft design, rather than the data product. adequate. This approach will result in abrupt changes ● Adequate collection of primary data. For a in data format and further disruption of the truly global satellite remote-sensing system, data base, to the discomfort of the potential all data must be collected. purchasers of the data from Landsat D. Con- As the example of Costa Rica illustrates sequently, the user community displays con- (see below under “Foreign Uses of Landsat siderable skepticism about the Federal com- Data”), the United States lost an important mitment to operate a complete land remote- opportunity to sell Landsat data because sensing system via civilian satellite, tailored Costa Rica is just out of range of receiving to providing standard and predictable data stations and because Landsat 3’s tape re- products for the public and private organiza- corders are unreliable. The tracking and data tions that are attempting to integrate Land- relay satellite system (TDRSS), when it is sat data into an ongoing operation, completed, will serve to gather and relay Continuation of remote-sensing R&D. The data from Landsat D and D’. Until then we current Landsat capabilities, though they will be dependent on foreign ground stations satisfy the basic needs of a large portion of for MSS data received by D and D’, because the potential users, are also limited. these spacecraft will carry no tape recorders. Users such as those represented by the Although the U.S. agreements require the Geosat Committee28 are very interested in foreign ground stations to make their data using stereo images of the Earth for explora- available to others in accordance with our tion of mineral and energy resources. Geosat open data practices, it is not clear that the has suggested development of the so-called

foreign ground stations will respond to re- 2a’’ Satellite Remote Sensing Data–An Unrealized Potential for quests for data in a timely and efficient man- the Earth Science Community, the Geosat Committee Inc., 1977.” Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 57

“stereosat” remote-sensing satellite.29 Car- the world in using remote-sensing data, created tographers would benefit from stereo imag- a de facto operational system .33 Its effort was ing and from higher resolution. Many other driven, in part, by a desire to justify the R&D pro- users agree that an automated mapping sat- gram to OMB. However, being by established ellite system based on multilineal array tech- policy an R&D, not an operations agency, NASA nology (MLA), a so-called “MAPSAT,” would has not been able to manage or fund an opera- serve their needs for high-resolution (20 m)30 tional system, and has therefore been unable to stereo imagery as well as their multispectral guarantee its continuity. Nor was NASA directed and spatial requirements and be far cheaper to assume operational responsibilities by the than Landsat D or D’,31 President or the Congress. NOAA, in turn, is not Even the heavy users of current Landsat scheduled to assume the management of the sys- data will find their needs expanding as they tem until 1983 (after Landsat D is launched). Cir- gain experience with the data and under- cumstances such as these have made the users stand their potential. They are likely to find extremely wary of investing in the manpower, needs for data from new sensors and ad- hardware, and software to process Landsat data, vanced data relay subsystems. Further, these uncertainties have limited the size ● Price of data. The major concern of the users and vitality of the market for Landsat data as well with regard to price of data is that inevitable as that of the private data-processing (value- price increases be reasonably predictable -added) industry. and incremental. In short, the future direction of satellite land Current data prices are much lower than remote sensing has reached an impasse: the users the marginal costs of generating the data. refuse to invest further in Landsat data because Users recognize that future data prices will the system is not operational, but many of them be higher as the prices are increased to also oppose changes because they have become reflect marginal costs. However, users would dependent on the system as it is currently con- not purchase the same volume of data if the figured. On the other hand, no existing institu- prices were doubled or tripled suddenly. tion, Federal or private, seems appropriate to Some State and local government users also undertake operations: first, because there are not face the difficulty of a 2-year budget cycle .32 enough users, and second, because the present If data prices are raised precipitously, these system is not advanced enough to generate a users cannot adjust to the increase for up to large market. Among other things, this has led 2 years, and will be forced to purchase fewer to a situation in which the French, using tech- data products than their needs would actual- nology originally developed in this country, will ly dictate. At a minimum, there should be shortly provide very strong commercial competi- a declining Federal price subsidy to bridge tion in land remote sensing. They have designed the gap in budget adjustment. their SPOT system from the first to be an opera- On the whole, these are not hardware or tech- tional system and have included user needs in nology problems, but rather derive from the the system specifications. management and structure of the system. The larger problem, at least in part, seems to be that Foreign Users of Landsat Data NASA, in an effort to test a broad spectrum of One of the basic tenets of the 1958 NAS Act applications and to interest potential users around is that “activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all man- 291 bid. kind.” 34 Our Landsat system, with receiving sta- 30A. P. Colvocoresses, “Proposed Parameters for Mapsat: Pho- tions distributed around the world and a prac- togrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, ” vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 501-506, April 1979.

31 Itek Corp., final report, “Conceptual Design of an Automated JJp. Mack, “space Science for Applications: The History of Land- Mapping Satellite (Mapsat), ” January 1981. sat. ’ in Space Science Comes of Age, P. A. Hanle and V. D. 32B. f&jo, statement to U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, Chamberlain (cd.), Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981. hearing on Civil Land Remote Sensing Systems, July 22, 1981. JQNational Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, op. cit. 58 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications tice of open data sales, certainly satisfies the interested in testing the use of Landsat data for junction of the NAS Act. It also satisfies section deriving information on agricultural production 102c (7) of the act, directing “cooperation by the and land use in order to promote optimal devel- United States with other nations and groups of opment of a section of northeastern Bangladesh. nations in work done pursuant to this act and in The initial project was quite successful and the peaceful application of the results thereof.” regional information on rice and other crop pro- In fact, from a pure cost-benefit approach, remote duction was obtained during the 1975 winter sea- sensing by satellite only makes sense as a global son. Interpretation of Landsat data during this system. For the continental United States alone, project also provided detailed information con- the investment in Landsat far exceeds the cost cerning changing pond, stream, and flood pat- of obtaining equivalent data by other means. terns, data that are invaluable for planning at both However, U.S. corporations and Government regional and village levels.37 After this initial in- agencies also need foreign data in order to pur- troduction of Landsat technology, its use in Bang- sue their operations abroad. More importantly, ladesh has rapidly expanded with diverse govern- Landsat, by providing low-cost images of the ment programs in agriculture, forestry, ocean- world to all purchasers, has enhanced our status ography, fisheries, and disaster prevention. In in the world. Our willingness to join others in 1980, in an effort to enhance the return from this solving problems of regional or global import can- effective and developing technology, Bangladesh not but strengthen our overall position in the established the Space Research and Remote Sens- world as a leader concerned for the good of all.35 ing Organization (SPARRSO), a lead government agency for R&D and operational activities.38 Importance of Landsat Data: is an island nation whose economy Three Asian Countries Sri Lanka is highly dependent upon agricultural production. Foreign users of Landsat data have found them Because of such constraints as the rugged topog- very helpful for problems of resource manage- raphy and its effect on transportation, as well as ment and control. The experiences of several a paucity of trained field personnel, continual ef- Asian countries illustrate the potential of Land- fective ground survey of agricultural production sat for these uses. Asia serves as an excellent ex- is not feasible on a continuing basis. In 1975, the ample because it is the location of five of the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands requested original 10 countries selected by the U.S. Agen- USAID assistance for establishing local capabil- cy for International Development (USAID)S6 in ity to use remote-sensing technology for accurate 1975 for initial testing of the applicability of using agricultural inventories. Specifically, the Landsat data for resource management problems Ministry requested assistance in digitally process- in developing nations. Two criteria have to be ing Landsat data. This project resulted in the met for this technology to be successful in development of an operations manual and digital resource management applications: a practical analysis capability in that country. Although the means of transferring it to the country must be accuracy was less than would be desired in a found, and the data flow should be maintained mature program for estimating agricultural acre- over an extended time. A brief historical review age, Landsat was recognized as a valuable re- of three of the original Asian programs and their source management tool, and in 1978 a national present day applications provide insight into the remote-sensing center was established.~ USAID ability of Landsat to meet these criteria. 37M. A. H. Pramanik, and A. K. M. Alam, “Space and Remote Bangladesh began its use of Landsat data with Sensing Activities in Bangladesh,” proceedings of the Second Asian the help of USAID. This Asian country was in- Conference on Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-2-l. MJT. W. Wagner, op. cit., pp. 69-81. Jgchristopher Nanayakkara, “The Sri Lankan Experience in Re- 35c. K. Pau[, and A. C. Mascarenhas, “Remote Sensing in ~velop mote Sensing, ” proceedings of the Second Asian Conference on ment,” Science, vol. 214, No. 4517, 1981. Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-7-l, MT. W. Wagner, and D. S. Lowe, AID’s Remote Sensing Grant q. Geiser, M. Sommer, and E. Nanayakkara, The Sri Lanka/Swiss Program (Ann Arbor: Environmental Research Institute of Michigan, Satellite Imagery Interpretation Project: Repott on Test Phase (Col- 1978, pp. 11-22). ombo: Center for Remote Sensing, 1981). Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 59 provided a followup grant in response to a Center perience with Landsat sampling and data analysis request for the development of a simplified low- techniques. This experience contributed to later cost Landsat data-processing system to address successes such as the national rubber plantation specific resource needs. This system will be survey and a continuing soil erosion study by the delivered to the Center in 1982. A unique pro- agricultural department. Landsat data are being gram also currently under way in Sri Lanka re- widely used by other government agencies, in- flects the value that another industrial nation cluding the Department of Mineral Resources and places on the application of U.S. space-derived the Royal Irrigation Department. Thailand is com- data for development assistance. The Swiss are pleting a major Landsat/Metsat ground receiving training Sri Lanka resource managers in tech- station that should provide timely data to the Thai niques for using U.S. Landsat data for monitor- user service center beginning in late 1982. Thai- ing rice production. Sri Lanka is also using land has not only committed itself to using data remote-sensing data for monitoring land use and from Landsat, but it has also shown its determina- for mapping its forest cover. Sri Lanka views Land- tion to assist other Asian countries. Data from this sat as a successful technology that can be em- ground station will be made available to these ployed without heavy capital investment if the nations. project is well planned, and is optimistic about These selected Asian cases demonstrate the the possibilities for using future satellites.41 utility of Landsat technology for peaceful uses and Thailand began its leadership role among the its applications to the resource management developing nations of Asia by establishing a na- problems of developing nations. Landsat tech- tional remote-sensing program in 1971. The ma- nology has not only been successfully introduced, jor goal of Thailand’s program was to develop the but has been shown to be effective in monitor- means to use remote-sensing technologies effec- ing resources over time, These factors make it an tively for natural resource management. As a effective tool in global resource development. result of its early initiatives, Thailand’s Royal One must remain cognizant that Landsat tech- Forestry Department was one of the first depart- nology, although transferable to developing ments of any country to develop an operational countries, is not a simple technology. It therefore Landsat-based system for monitoring deforesta- demands complex man/computer interaction and tion. Today, information derived from Landsat timely current data for the analysis of most data is a major component of the forestry policy renewable resource problems. decisions of this Asian nation.42 USAID’S 1975 However, though foreign users of Landsat data joint project with the Thai agricultural department have made good use of them, they often face that sought to obtain acreage information as problems very similar to those troubling domestic part of the annual rice, corn, and sugar cane users. The experiences of an Italian land planning survey was of limited value. Two major constrain- firm are not atypical of user experience in the ing factors affected this project: 1 ) continuous United States and abroad44. This firm attempted cloud cover during scheduled sampling periods to integrate Landsat data into its normal data and prior to harvest prevented data acquisition stream from aircraft and ground survey. After first by Landsat; and 2) the available Thai computers learning how to make the best use of the data, had not been programmed for Landsat data anal- it then experienced difficulties in obtaining timely ysis prior to terminating this project.43 However, data and data that were of high quality. As a the USAID project was beneficial in providing ex- result, it has made much less use of Landsat data then originally planned. Instead of being a major Alchrlstopher Nanayakkara, “The Sri Lankan Experience in Re- component of the firm’s land planning efforts, mote Sensing, ” proceedings of the Second Asian Conference on these data serve only a secondary role in its total Remote Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981, 1-7-6. AZSanga Sabhasri, pradisth Cheosakul, Boon Indrambarya and scheme. Suvit Vibulsresth. “National Remote Sensing Activities in Thailand,” unpublished report to the Second Asian Conference on Remote 44G. C. Bernardino, “European Industrial Space Projects, ” Ameri- Sensing, Beijing, China, 1981. can Astronautical Society, 19th Goddard Memorial Symposium, 43T. W. Wagner, op. cit., PP. 77-BI. March 1981, 60 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

A short case history of one country’s attempt pleted in March 1978.* The principal conclusions to use Landsat data will illustrate other problems for the forest sector were the digital-processed foreign users have faced. It also provides another Landsat data would be the most cost-effective al- illustration of the usefulness and cost effectiveness ternative for “Level l“ forest cover maps at a scale of Landsat data for attacking important renewable of 1 :200,000, and that color infrared (CIR) pho- resource problems. tography would be the best choice for “Level 11” and Level Ill” mapping. Landsat data could also Importance of Landsat Data: Case of Costa Rica be used effectively for urban mapping and anal- Deforestation and subsequent desertification ysis, but would be cost effective only if coupled have become problems of great concern in many with a project to maintain the forests that would countries throughout the world. The case of absorb the primary costs. Costa Rica demonstrates the importance of Land- The major problem confronted in the second sat data for dealing with these problems and the phase of the project was that of obtaining “cur- potential tragedy of unavailability of these data rent” Landsat data. After an initial request to through discontinuity in Landsat service. NASA was ignored, it was necessary for the Presi- The Government of Costa Rica (GOCR) Minis- dent of Costa Rica to make a direct personal re- try of Agriculture was aware in the early 1970’s quest to the White House in order to have the that loss of forest cover and watersheds had tape recorder aboard Landsat 3 activated, so that become a major problem. Personnel in the min- data on Costa Rica could be collected, stored, istry knew that a complete forest inventory would and relayed in a timely fashion. be necessary in order to assess the extent of the The third phase of the Costa Rican study was problem, but that if contemporary ground truth the pilot project (conducted between January and survey methods alone were used, 25 years 1978, and June 1979).47 Here the objective was would be needed to complete the inventory. By to develop in Costa Rica an operational system that time, there might be no forests to save. for resource management. The system was to be Recognizing that the problem was beyond the tested and established on a cross-sectional area capabilities of his staff, the Minister of Agriculture representing more than 20 percent of the entire requested assistance from the USAID to deter- country and running from the Caribbean to the mine whether Landsat technology could be ap- Pacific. This project demonstrated that a nation- plied effectively to map the resources of Costa wide program based on CIR photography and Rica. USAID commissioned a study that was com- Landsat data was both possible and practical. 45 pleted in March 1977. This initial study con- Such a program would be remarkably cost effec- cluded that the deforestation problem was even tive: the entire forest survey task could be ac- more severe than GOCR had thought, and that complished in less than 3 years for about $1 a combined aircraft and satellite remote-sensing million (compared with the earlier GOCR esti- program might be the most cost-effective way to mate of 25 years and $20 million, using only determine the full extent of the problem. Data ground and aircraft surveys.) from Landsat could not alone do the entire job because some areas (the watersheds most at risk) Despite the clear need for such a nationwide required detailed mapping and analysis at scales program in Costa Rica, despite its cost effec- and resolution beyond the capability of the cur- tiveness, and despite significant investments both rent Landsat series. by GOCR and by the United States, today–3 years later—no system to use Landsat data is yet As a second step in determining the feasibility of relying on Landsat data, USAID contracted for a“The Utility, Cost, and Effectiveness of Remote Sensing for Forest a test and demonstration project, which was com- and Urban Sector Assessment in Costa Rica, report to USAID/ROD/ LA/US and USAID/Costa Rica, contract No. AID/afr-C-l 135-9-10, March 1978. qS”An Assessment of Resource Inventory and Environmental prob- 47’’ Design of a Natural Resources lnvento~ and Information Sys- lems in Costa Rica,” Report to USAID, Office of Development Re- tem for Costa Rica: The Pilot Project Report, ” report for USAID, sources, LA/DR, contract No. AI D/afr-c-l 135-8, March 1977. contract No. Al D/la-C-l 253, June, 1979. Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 61

in place in Costa Rica because of the unreliabil- data is unknown. The domestic market con- ity of the present Land sat system. The system for sists of two kinds of users, the government deforestation analysis does not exist because (local, State, and Federal), and the private sparse data were supplied and because the sector. Federal Government users generate United States made no credible assurance that the largest demand in this category today. continuity of data would be maintained in the Although the records of the EROS Data Cen- future. During the entire period of the pilot proj- ter and the NASA Goddard Distribution Cen- ect (January 1978 through June 1979), only six ter indicate a relatively small primary market images were obtained over the western half of (approximately $5.7 million per year sold by the area and only two over the eastern half. Wet- the United States directly )49 this estimate season data were never obtained, and no CCT reflects only a portion of the true market, was ever available for the one usable image over which could be at least as much as 50 per- the eastern section. On the basis of this ex- cent greater. Some users obtain data directly perience, GOCR decided not to fund a nation- from other users at a portion of the original wide operational program. cost, or gratis (i.e., a certain amount of data sharing occurs). so Many of these user problems are due to the ● Even if the exact distribution of original R&D nature of the current system, but they point satellite data were known, however, it would up the care that will be needed in planning for represent only a fraction of the value of data a future operational system, whether operated by after they are computer-processed to provide the government, the private sector, or a mix of particular information. For example, the cost both. of a CCT is currently $200 to $300. To proc- Market for Satellite Remote-Sensing Data ess the data contained on a specific CCT and to present it in usable form to the ultimate Whatever entity (ies) operates a U.S. satellite user of the data can cost between $1,000 and land remote-sensing system, the size and breadth $20,000, depending on how much informa- of the market for the data it supplies is of major tion is extracted from it or merged with it, concern. in either case, recovery of the costs of and the number of steps taken to enhance investment and upkeep (particularly those of the the original information. Processing satellite space segment) is necessary. In a publicly owned remote-sensing data thus represents a signifi- system, political benefits, such as its use as a tool cant investment opportunity for a firm, es- of foreign policy or its value in enhancing U.S. pecially one that is already capable of digital- technological superiority, may justify a reasonable ly processing remote-sensing data from air- shortfall in cost recovery. But in a privately owned craft. Currently, some 60 firms are known system operating with no taxpayer subsidy, the to be capable of processing Landsat digital market alone must bear the entire burden of re- data. Another 35 firms (28 United States, 7 covering these costs. foreign) sell computer-processing equipment for Landsat, which range in price from The market for remote sensing data from space divides naturally into two categories: The market $50,000 to $500,000. Firms providing digital for primary data provided directly from the space processing of photographic data might also segment, and the much more lucrative market be interested, because the basic techniques for value-added data, which represents the largest for enhancing image data by computer are part of the ground segment. Based on its review similar for all applications, though most film of the size and nature of the market,QB OTA can processors would lack the analytical exper- make the following observations: tise in land resources. ● Nature of the market. One of the major dif- ● Size of the market. The true extent of the ficulties in defining the full extent of the market for primary satellite remote-sensing — —— — 49’’ Status of NASA’s Landsat–D,” GAO briefing, July 1981. a“Commercialization of Remote Sensing, ” OTA Workshop, May ‘“’’ Commercialization of Remote Sensing, ” OTA Workshop, May 1981. 1981. — .

62 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

market is its extremely diffuse and dispersed are derived. This conforms to long-standing condition. Each major category of user, both U.S. policy on the sale of maps prepared by foreign and domestic, has different spectral the U.S. Geological Survey. Users fear that and resolution requirements, is interested in this practice may be discontinued. The ques- different geographical areas, or needs data tion of whether unrestricted dissemination on a different time schedule. Table 1 sum- of remotely sensed data violates the sover- marizes the categories of major users and eignty of a sensed nation has occasioned vig- their general needs for Landsat data. orous debate in the U.N. and other forums for many years; no agreement has yet been In order to understand fully the data needs of reached. Many countries have objected on each user group, it would be necessary to analyze the grounds that they do not wish important in detail the records of the EROS Data Center, information about indigenous mineral re- the NASA Goddard Data Processing Center, and sources, crop conditions, or military activities the foreign ground stations to determine: to be made public. Private operation may ● Who uses the data (specific users identified heighten suspicion that such data will be by discipline)? used to enable interests outside the coun- Ž What regions are requested? With what fre- try to gain a competitive advantage, or that quency? Under what time constraints? data may be sold secretly to political adversaries. These concerns will increase sharply From this information and a projection of user as new sensors improve upon the current requirements, future market potential might be resolution of 80 m for the MSS aboard Land- determined. Predictions about new markets, sats 2 and 3. foreign and domestic, would have to be added ● to this information to reach an estimate of the Resolution limits. What regulations will be imposed concerning the limit of resolution total size of the market for Landsat data. To OTA’s knowledge, no analysis has reached the level of of the sensors? The thematic mapper on Landsat D and D’ will be capable of 30-m detail required for making reasoned decisions about the potential for commercialization of the resolution. The SPOT sensors will reach res- technology, olutions down to 20 and 10 m. Will there be restrictions on dissemination of high-res- Commercialization of Remote Sensing: olution data from some areas? For some ap- Domestic and Foreign Concerns plications (e.g., forestry), resolutions of 1 to 5 m over small areas would be useful. Fur- If commercialization of civil land remote-sens- ther, as other users become more accus- ing satellite activities is to occur, the major ques- tomed to the capabilities of remote sensing, tions before the country at this time are how and and as their ability to handle massive at what speed the transition to the private sector amounts of data improves and costs de- should be accomplished. Conversion from public crease, they are likely to find need for data to private ownership and operation of the civilian of higher resolution. As in other aspects of land remote-sensing system would affect the user satellite remote sensing, users want to be in- community in a variety of ways. Users perceive volved in the decision making process for that both advantages and disadvantages will result determining the limits to resolution. Resolu- from the change. In addition to the concerns of tion limits will also be of major international users previously expressed in relation to an opera- concern. tional system, they have raised the following con- ● Competition from governments. Both the cerns specific to a commercial enterprise: potential operators of remote-sensing sys- ● Open data. The U.S. current [y supports and tems and the value-added firms are con- follows the practice that any party, regardless cerned about potential competition from of nationality, may purchase Landsat data, governments, either the United States or regardless of the country from which they foreign entities. For example, NASA may Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 63

now compete with private industry when it Foreign Policy Concerns institutes an R&D project in a university or W/hat commitments does the United States government facility to process Landsat data. have to foreign purchasers of Landsat data if the These projects often result in computer soft- entire system is in private hands? Other countries, ware that competes directly with software particularly LDCS, are well aware that the posses- packages developed by private value-added sion of remote-sensing data carries with it the data processors. concomitant power to affect resource develop- ● Price of data. The user community is quite ment. In considering transfer of Landsat or other concerned about the price of primary data satellite information systems to private hands, from a privately owned satellite system. It U.S. policy makers must consider the effects on fears a dramatic increase in price if total costs our relationships with other countries. In addi- are to be recovered. 51 This is especially true tion, there is an added foreign and domestic for users who require repeat data on a time problem of conflict of interest if a private cor- scale of weeks or months. For users whose porate operator or its subsidiaries are allowed to needs are largely for one-time data from a offer value-added services. Advance knowledge particular region, the cost of a single CCT is of certain time-dependent data such as crop con- not as critical. It is doubtful that the price dition or water availability has the potential for elasticity is sufficient to allow prices to be exploitation by the firm before others could ob- raised to a full cost recovery level in the next tain the data. few years, ● Continuing Federal R&D. users recognize The largest market for satellite land remote- that neither they nor the actual operators of sensing data might eventually be the totality of land remote sensing are willing to provide foreign users. if foreign governments are to de- the resources to fund continuing R&D in the pend primarily on U.S. satellite data, they will, private sector. Yet there are a number of in most cases, have to restructure any systems technological improvements that could be they presently use for monitoring and managing made to the system even after Landsat D and their resources. If the space and primary delivery D’ are operational (e.g., stereo imagery, system were publicly held, and if a country ex- higher resolution, greater spectral coverage). perienced problems with the pace of data deliv- Users therefore see the need for continued ery, or with the continuity or quality of data, it research by the Federal Government, and for could then petition for redress directly through substantial involvement by the user com- diplomatic channels. If the space and/or recep- munity in the decisions about the directions tion component were in private hands, such such research should take. recourse could be only indirect. Competition • Archived data. What wiII happen to the ar- from other satellite systems could mitigate this dif- chived data that have already been provided ficulty somewhat, if the data were totally com- by Landsats 2 and 3, the shuttle, Skylab, and patible. Private operators would then have con- other means if the private sector assumes re- siderable incentive to meet contractual agree- sponsibility for U.S. satellite remote-sensing ments. However, data from other systems activities? As mentioned earlier, users are (French, Japanese, or Soviet) will not be exactly very concerned that the previous data be re- compatible with those from the Landsat MSS. Will tained. But retaining them is very costly be- the U.S Government therefore regulate the sale cause the high-density digital tapes have a of remote-sensing data to other states? If so, limited lifetime and, therefore, must be re- guidelines will have to be drawn up by an agen- copied at regular intervals. cy designated for the purpose. Foreign users of Landsat data have purchased ground stations and data on the understanding that the system would be subject to possible data Sljoint hearings, July 1981, oP. cit. gaps, change of data format, and other deficien- 64 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications cies peculiar to a system in development. Accord- launcher Ariane, and Spotimage is committed to ing to the policy of the previous administration, maintaining an operational system for 10 years. however, they could look forward to data con- In the area of ocean surveillance, the Japanese tinuity through the 1980’s. In light of the resolve Marine Observation Satellite (MOS) system is to transfer Landsat technology quickly to the scheduled to begin operations in 1985. The sat- private sector, foreign users who have invested ellite’s sensors will be capable of observing land in Landsat receiving stations and data-processing masses as well; this satellite is likely to be the equipment are questioning the value of our com- precursor to an operational land remote-sensing mitments. Total foreign investment in ground sta- system (for further details, see ch. 7). tions is about $60 million. Additional investments in data-processing equipment have also been Potential Policy Initiatives for a Land Remote- made, as well as systems to integrate Landsat data Sensing Satellite System with other necessary data. How will these ground stations and associated processing capabilities be If the United States is to continue to play a role integrated with a private system? in the operation of a satellite land remote-sensing system, what mode of operation would be As sensors improve, the civilian capabilities for most desirable? OTA has explored a number of land remote sensing will grow uncomfortably options for continued operation of a Landsat-type close to military/intelligence standards. The system (see ch. 10 for further details). Before a satellites owned by the private sector will there- decision is made to proceed with any one of fore require close supervision and oversight by them, each option would require much more de- the Government to: 1) monitor their technical ca- tailed study than it was possible to provide in this pabilities, and 2) prevent use of the data derived assessment. from them inimical to the security of the United States. Ž Designated private entity. The Government could ensure that its data needs were met by Foreign Competition private operators by licensing a single U.S. entity to operate the satellite system. This could Direct commercial competition to the U.S be done fairly quickly if a sufficient subsidy Landsat system will come from France’s SPOT sat- were provided, either through direct support ellites starting in 1985, at about the time Landsat for the difference between income and ex- D’ is now scheduled to be launched. The SPOT penditures or through a Government guaran- sensors will provide multispectral spatial resolu- teed market. tion of 20 m, and panchromatic resolution of This option might suffer the objection from 10 m (compared with Landsat D’s TM resolution some foreign countries, particularly less of 30 m); in addition, SPOT will be able to developed countries (LDCS), that leaving the “point” its sensors to the side, allowing it to ac- data distribution function in private hands quire stereoscopic data. Unlike the more expen- might allow corporations from developed sive and fragile optical-mechanical sensors on countries to use the resource information in Landsat, SPOT will use relatively simple solid-state remote-sensing data unfairly for their own MLA. The establishment of a semiprivate com- profit. This objection could be circumvented pany, Spotimage, to market SPOT data and serv- if the licensed corporation were a separately ices greatly enhances its competitiveness, espe- incorporated firm prohibited from entering cially in the absence of similar organizational cer- other fields; it would be, essentially, a reg- tainty for Landsat; pricing for the two systems is ulated monopoly. not yet firm. Spotimage is heavily subsidized: the French Government has funded purchase and ● Continued Federal operation of the space seg- launch of the first satellite as well as all ment only. In this scenario, the Federal preliminary R&D, and owns the overwhelming Government would continue to operate the majority of stock in the company. The first SPOT space segment while turning over the distribu- satellite will be launched in 1984 on the French tion of preprocessed data to private sector —

Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 65

operators. The rationale for such an approach benefits (i.e., the Government will remain the is that the private sector cannot make a profit largest purchaser of data). Therefore, this op- by operating the entire land remote-sensing tion carries with it the danger that the U.S. data system, but the Federal Government does not source will simply disappear if the private sec- have the expertise to market satellite data ef- tor fails to find customers to cover the cost. fectively and promote their expanded use. If U.S. companies chose not to launch a sat- Even if the relevant market experience could ellite, or if the data taken by U.S. satellites be obtained in the Government, Federal op- were not of the sort or quality to meet the eration of an enterprise that the private sec- needs of mission agencies, the Government tor might operate more efficiently would be might be in the position of having to purchase inappropriate. data from the French or the Japanese. This option might meet with the same ob- ● Broad-based cooperative arrangement. The jection that private ownership of the entire United States could follow a policy that would system would, viz., that it gives too much include other nations in the ownership and power over resources to a private corporation. operation of satellite remote sensing by set- ● Laissez-faire private ownership and operation. ting up an international entity patterned after The Government could declare that after the interim INTELSAT agreement in which this Landsat D & D’ reach the end of their useful country retained majority control for a speci- life, it will terminate operation of land remote fied period. sensing from space (present administration Under this arrangement, a single manage- policy) and leave the field open to all par- ment authority with multinational participation ticipants. The data needs of the U.S. civilian would assume responsibility for global opera- agencies would be filled by any supplier of tion of a land remote-sensing system, including satellite data, including foreign companies, establishing technical specification, procuring and U.S. ground stations and related equip- and operating satellites, and receiving and pre- ment would be sold to the highest qualified processing satellite data. Such an approach bidder or converted to other uses. The Gov- would spread the investment risk, as well as ernment might be able to protect its future encourage other nations to be more aggressive data needs by aggressive marketing of Land- in developing their own internal markets for sat D & D’ data in the expectation that a strong satellite data. It could also facilitate the even- market would encourage active private sec- tual development of joint ocean remote sens- tor participation in land remote sensing, or by ing systems and lead to global systems that using suitably degraded data obtained from would join land, ocean, and weather data in reconnaissance satellites. As for the designated order to monitor critical environmental factors. private entity option, the Government could Perhaps the major advantages of this option provide the incentive for this option by are that it might well forestall wasteful com- guaranteeing a market. petition among national entities and that it For the near term, however, a number of would provide an important forum in which factors make this option the least likely to re- international issues could be resolved within sult in an operational satellite remote-sensing the confines of responsibility for an operational system :52 1) the market is likely to remain small system. enough that private ventures would sustain The major disadvantage of this approach is very high risk; 2) other, less suitable, but less that the United States would no longer con- expensive data alternatives are available (if full trol its own system, still the only one in ex- recovery of Landsat operating and mainte- istence. U.S. users would face strong competi- nance costs is assumed); and 3) the largest tion for their views in an organization that in- benefits to accrue are likely to be public good cluded other major users of remote-sensing data, and U.S. technology suppliers could no ‘z’’Commercialization of Remote Sensing,” OTA Workshop, May 1981. longer count on assured sales. Because of sen- 66 ● Civilian Space policy and Applications

sitive issues involving national sovereignty and tions (see the Bureau of Land Management resolution limits, the United States would have and Foreign Agricultural Services case studies no guarantee that the resulting system would in apps. B and C). continue to serve U.S. needs as well as a U. S.- As the last part of this section on land remote operated system. If the Landsat system is dis- sensing argues, the data needs of the developers continued, however, a multinational entity, of nonreusable resources are large. However, with its possible drawbacks, would be far bet- even though the extractive industry finds Land- ter than the alternative of having to purchase sat data highly useful, its data needs will remain data from Spotimage. less than those of the managers of renewable On the other hand, a multinational system resources simply because the latter require re- might alleviate fears of the less developed na- petitive data. Therefore, in the Unites States, the tions that the industrialized nations will use majority user of data from a Landsat system is like- their superior technology to exploit the rely to remain the Federal and State Governments. sources of the LDCS. By buying shares in a multinational system, the LDCS would have Potential of Land Remote-Sensing Data the same access to data as any other country and the U.S. Economy in the system. There is no doubt that satellite land remote- ● Continued Federal ownership. Although cur- sensing data are useful for inventorying and rent policy is to transfer Landsat to private managing the world’s renewable and nonrenew- ownership, it would still be possible to reverse able natural resources. Table 1 lists the areas in that decision and make a thoroughgoing com- which satellite data are already being used in cost- mitment to a system owned and managed by effective ways for these purposes. Appendixes B the Federal Government. Meteorological sat- and C illustrate the use two Federal agencies ellites, which, like Landsat, provide data of make of Landsat data. As emphasized above in benefit to the generaI public, have always the section on the data market, however, the been owned and managed by the Govern- variety of users and their different data needs, ment. Unlike satellite communications, which coupled with slow technical advancement and is already fully commercialized, and materials considerable uncertainty about the status of the processing in space, which, if successful at all, Landsat system have acted to inhibit the market seems particularly appropriate for private- that many users53 insist is there to be tapped. sector operation, satellite remote sensing could certainly be retained as a Government Continuing to develop land remote sensing system on the grounds that the good it pro- thus represents a certain economic risk for the vides is primarily public. At the present time, Government or the private sector. If the market about 50 percent of the data sold is purchased cannot sustain the investment, the losses could by Government agencies. The Government, be great. However, the Government and private in effect, makes the market. industry have already committed more than $1 This comes about because most of the needs billion to the Landsat venture. To fail to make the for data are for the management of renewable best use of these sunk costs represents a con- natural resources (e.g., agriculture, forestry, siderable loss as well. As the need to manage range lands). Even for those resources owned global resources efficiently and inexpensively by the private sector, Federal and State govern- grows with the expansion of the population, the ment agencies set policies, quotas, and price need for a land remote sensing system increases supports on a regional basis that direct and proportionally. The use of Landsat data by Costa constrain the management of these resources. Rica is a case in point. For that country, use of Few private operators own enough land to find Landsat data is not only the least expensive and the expense of using Landsat data worthwhile, — 5J’’Analysis of the Private Market for Landsat Products and Ap- but the government agencies find the use of placations, ” report by OAO Corp. for NASA contract No. Landsat data highly cost effective for their func- NASW3358, 1981. Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 67

the most efficient way to monitor the rate of land surface. This is in spite of the fact that the depletion of its forests, it seems to be the only current system lacks stereoscopic capabilities, nor means for meeting the problem in time. 54 does it gather the most appropriate spectral data for this industry’s use.sG Though it is difficult to As large-scale forestry management methods assign a precise worth to the use of satellite data, improve, the worth of satellite-derived data will because the process of exploitation involves a likely increase for domestic uses as well. The variety of techniques and often takes many years same is likely to be true for the other categories to achieve success, those who use the data are of table 1. However, perhaps the most critical convinced of its usefulness and argue that if the area for the U.S. economy is in nonrenewable present capabilities were increased, their task resources such as coal, oil, gas, and minerals. 59 would be greatly simplified. The support of an Even at the slower rates of energy consumption operational surveillance system tailored to min- increase we have recently experienced, 55 our eral resources does not appear to be outside the dependence on foreign petroleum sources has financial capability of a consortium of resource and will continue to be strong, primarily because companies, though there would be problems of our own recovery rate for oil will continue to competition between members of such a consor- decrease in the future.56 Greatly increased ex- tium to be solved. ploration efforts will be needed to keep pace with the loss of U.S. reserves. Landsat data now play The French SPOT system offers the sort of sig- an important role in energy and minerals explora- nificant improvement in data capabilities that tion, especially in regions where vast land areas would be most useful to the exploration industry. must be evaluated. However, as far as the extrac- However, American industry is reluctant to be tive resources industry is concerned, the use of forced to rely on foreign sources for their data, Landsat data is still in its early development since it is unclear to what data they may or may stages. 57 In spite of this fact, it is the largest single not have access. Similar concerns apply to min- private purchaser of Landsat data. The extractive erals exploration in this country and abroad. The industry has now bought data covering from 10 question of what to do with the U.S. land remote- million to 15 million square miles of the Earth’s sensing system is a critical one for the future of the management and development of U.S. nat- 54’’ Design of a Natural Resources Inventory and Information ural resources. Whatever is decided, the ques- System for Costa Rica,” June 1979, op. cit. tion should be resolved with dispatch. SsWeekly petroleum Status Report, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Mar. 5, 1982. Sbu.!j. Congress, office of Technology Assessment, “world petroleum Availability, 1980-2000,” technical memorandum, October Sglbid. 1980, OTA-TM-E-5. ‘g’’ Department of the Interior Position Paper on the Private Sec- 57’’ Satellite Remote Sensing Data–An Unrealized Potential for tor Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite Activities,” U.S. Geo- the Earth Science Community,” the Geosat Committee, Inc., 1977. logical Survey, 1981.

MATERIALS PROCESSING IN SPACE (MPS)

Issue 6: What Are the Technological and with greater precision and fewer defects; others, Commercial Prospects for MPS? which cannot be made at all on Earth, may become possible for the first time. MPS looks par- The primary motivation for MPS research is to ticularly promising for pharmaceuticals, elec- use the microgravity environment unique to tronic devices, optical equipment, and metal space for scientific and commercial applications. alloysobo process variables such as temperature, composition, and fluid flow may be controlled far better

in an environment of microgravity. As a result, 60WVjA, kfaterja/S Processing in Space: Early Experiments, Wash- some materials can be manufactured in space ington, D. C., 1980. 68 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The U.S. civilian program has so far conducted Iy do not compete well for corporate capital. Proj- rather limited MPS experimentation in space, and ects that stimulate further corporate investment the results have been inconclusive.GO if there are as they begin to show promising returns are much great days ahead for MPS, they must be preceded more attractive; however, there are currently few by years of research and major improvements in such opportunities in the MPS area. In order to orbiting facilities. make a reasonable projection as to a project’s possible rate of return on investment, a firm must Despite the need for further basic research, have a clear view of the relevant market. When there may well be near-term opportunities for dealing with a new technology without a well- commercializing particular, carefully chosen defined market, the firm’s projections become technologies. Under a Joint Endeavor Agreement more suspect, so that its investment in that with NASA, the McDonneil Douglas Aeronautics technology would be at greater risk. The com- Co., (working with Ortho Pharmaceutical) and bined burden of developing new markets simul- the GTI Corp. are both moving vigorously ahead taneously with new technology may inhibit in- on R&D projects. Several other major corpora- vestment in MPS. It should be noted, however, tions, including John Deere, TRW, INCO, and that some MPS technologies (e.g., electrophoretic DuPont, have made significant commitments to processing) will be directed toward well-defined early exploratory R&D. If MPS is found to be well Earth markets (e.g., pharmaceuticals). In these in- suited to commercialization, several issues arise stances, the decision to invest in MPS technology with regard to how and when it can be taken over may be preceded by standard market analyses. by the private sector and by what means the U.S. Government can facilitate the transition. 2. The benefits of processing in space will be substantially greater than those of Requirements for the Commercialization of processing on the ground. MPS Technology The MPS experimentation conducted to date The space processing experiments that have indicates that many innovative uses of the space been conducted so far have focused on identi- environment are possible. From a commercial fying potential new processes and products. perspective, however, the question is not what Because the research conducted to date has been projects are technically possible, but rather which basic, with subsequent commercial applications are economically viable. For example, it has been uncertain, there has been little private investment claimed that if semiconductor electronic crystals in this area. Private industry will invest its risk were grown in space, they would be purer, with capital only if it is reasonably confident that the fewer imperfections, and would therefore per- five conditions listed below are met. form better. However, a recent study by the Na- 1. There is a reasonable chance that re- tional Research Council has found that the quality search efforts will result in a commer- of the preprocessed material is not the limiting cially viable product or process. consideration for most devices presently manufactured.G t Therefore, though space-based man- A firm seeking investment opportunities must ufacture of these devices may offer certain im- be reasonably certain that a proposed product provements, it is not clear that the benefits of the or process innovation can be developed in a improvements outweigh the costs of producing given time, at an affordable cost, and that there them. is a market capable of supporting a price that provides an adequate return on investment. The twin 3. The market for the product will not be factors of time and cost are extremely important replaced by advances in Earth-based to a firm, especially during periods of economic production. instability. Projects that require large initial invest- It is possible that improvements in Earth-based ment and take a long time to show a return usual- technology may make certain processing tech- 61The National Research council, /vfateria/s Processing in space, Washington, D. C., 1978, p. 5. Gzlbid., p. 38. Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 69 niques possible that previously could only be cessful project and a failure (as measured by done in space. Evidence for this view is provided dollar-return). Should MPS technology appear to by recent advances in the manufacture of glass offer a commercially viable product, some type products through the use of acoustic levitation, of long-term, in-orbit facility may be necessary and by the enlargement of latex polymers by to assure the continuing supply of specific quan- means of new chemical tech niques.G3 To the ex- tities of the product. At present, NASA cannot tent that such improvements confer some of the provide credible assurance that such a facility will advantages of space-based processing without the be provided. high costs of in-space production, there is less incentive to’invest resources in expensive space Government Incentives for MPS Research technology. In chapter 5, NASA’s MPS activities are de- 4. intellectual property rights in space tech- scribed. What follows is a discussion of the pro- nology must be assured. grams NASA has initiated to enlist commercial support in moving MPS toward operational status. Though NASA has given assurance that industry The ultimate goals of NASA’s MPS program are will retain the rights to patents and trade secrets to:66 developed while working with NASA, such assurances are in the form of policy and regulations, ● perform research to improve industrial tech- not law. The present law vests the ownership of nology or to develop new products; intellectual property developed under contract ● prepare research quantities of space prod- with NASA in the Government, but allows the ucts for comparison with Earth-based prod- Administrator to waive such rights. NASA has ucts; and been consistent in its policy of not claiming an ● encourage the production of commercially interest in such rights, but the specter of patent viable materials. and trade secret loss, either through a change in In hope of commercializing MPS, NASA has es- policy or as a result of a legal challenge by third tablished three levels of working relationships parties, still remains. with the private sector. On all three levels, the There is current congressional interest in new relationships are agreements between NASA and patent legislation that would grant greater rights its partners to cooperate in a defined area. Each to private developers working under Government agrees to accomplish specific tasks and to pro- contract.b5 Present law, however, is more liberal vide its own funding. The grading of these rela- with small business, universities, and nonprofit tionships marks the degree of the signatories’ firms than with large contractors. The status of commitments. proprietary information and trade secrets is con- For companies interested in the application of sistently more uncertain. microgravity technology, but not ready to com- 5. National commitment must be certain. mit themselves to a specific space flight experiment or venture, the Technical Exchange Agree- Industry’s planning is hindered by the fact that ment (TEA) has been developed. Under a TEA, all space research depends on a Federal funding NASA and a company agree to exchange tech- commitment to NASA, but the level of that com- nical information and to cooperated in the con- mitment remains uncertain. Decreases in NASA’s duct and analysis of continuing ground-based appropriations will cause delays in the flight research programs. In this agreement, a firm can testing of space technology. Such delays are cost- familiarize itself, at minimal expense, with ly, and in some circumstances could mean, at the microgravity technology and its potential ap- corporate level, the difference between a suc- plicability to a product line. Under the TEA, the

bj/ndustry Week, Mar. 3, 1980, p. 90. private company funds its own participation and MNAS Act 1958, see 305 (a); 42 USC 2457. — .-— bSGerald J. Mossinghoff, “intellectual Property Right in Space bbRobert A. Frosch, “NASA Guidelines Regarding Early Usage of Utilization, ” address before the ALI-ABA Conference, “Doing Busi- Space for Industrial Purposes, ” NASA Internal Document, June 25, ness in Space,” Washington, D. C., Nov. 12-14, 1981. 1979. 70 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

obtains direct access to and results from NASA’s time, NASA is allowed to publish the research facilities and research; in return, NASA gains the findings. support and expertise of the company’s research By establishing legal and managerial mecha- capability. nisms by which the cost and risk of early com- In an Industrial Guest Investigators Agreement mercial ventures can be shared, “constructive (IGIA), NASA and industry share sufficient mutual partnerships” have been formed between the scientific interest that a company arranges for one Government and the private sector. A number of its scientists to collaborate (at company ex- of cooperative agreements are in various stages pense) with a NASA-sponsored principal inves- of discussion. Agreements now in force, and tigator on a space flight MPS experiment. Once those that have been publicly disclosed are:hz the parties agree to the IGI’s contribution to the ● A TEA was signed in 1981 with Deere& Co., objectives of the experiment, he becomes a to study the effects of microgravity on solid- member of the investigating team, thus adding ification of metals. More recently, TEAs have industrial expertise and insight to the experiment. been signed with INCO and DuPont. The joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA) is a ● An IGI was appointed in 1980 by TRW to cooperative arrangement in which a private sec- study directional solidification. tor offeror and NASA share common program ob- ● Signed in January 1980, the first JEA pairs jectives, program responsibilities, and financial NASA with McDonnell Douglas. The process risk. The objective of a JEA is to encourage early to be investigated is continuous flow elec- private sector investment in MPS by sharing in trophoresis (CFE), in which materials in solu- the cost and risk of initial space ventures and to tion are separated by subjecting them to an determine the ability of MPS to meet needs of electrical field as they flow continuously the marketplace. A JEA is a legal agreement be- through a chamber. The CFE experiment, to tween equal partners; it does not initiate procure- be flown in the shuttle, is designed to dem- ment. Under a JEA, NASA and its partner ex- onstrate the applicability of the process to change no funds. An offeror from the private sec- the production of marketable quantities of tor selects an experiment and/or a technology pharmaceutical products. Ortho Pharma- demonstration in compliance with NASA’s ob- ceutical Corp. has joined McDonnell jectives for its MPS program, conducts the Douglas as a partner in this MPS business necessary ground investigation, and develops venture. flight hardware at company expense. ● GTI Corp. signed the second NASA JEA in January 1982. Under this agreement, NASA As incentive for a JEA investment, NASA agrees will fly a multiple microexperiment flight to provide transportation on the shuttle, provided package (MMFP) to be developed for GTI by that the project meets certain basic criteria, such a third party. The MMFP will be a furnace as technical merit, contribution to innovation, with multiple subenclosures designed to per- and acceptable business arrangements. As a fur- form and control several separate ex- ther incentive, the participant is allowed to re- periments in solidification, GTI’s role in this tain certain proprietary rights to the results, par- JEA is to serve as a broker between NASA ticularly the proprietary information that would and potential investors, customers, inven- yield a competitive edge in marketing products tors, and hardware manufacturers. based on the MPS flight data. NASA agrees not to enter into a JEA with a second potential source How Business Sees NASA to investigate a similar space-based process. NASA also receives sufficient flight data to Industry’s respect for NASA’s accomplishments evaluate the significance of the results, and can and technical talent is high. However, doing require as part of the JEA that any promising business with NASA is complex, involving par- results be applied commercially on a timely basis; 67R, L. Brown, and L. K. Zoner, “Avenues and Incentives for Com- if in NASA’s judgment the participant does not mercial Use of a Low-G Environment, ” MPS Projects Office, Mar- commercialize the results within a reasonable shall Space Flight Center, Alabama, undated. Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 71 ticular NASA policies and general Government ‘Possible New Institutional Frameworks policies. Uncertainty about NASA’s level of fund- Though NASA is attempting to encourage pri- ing, short- or long-term, makes for an unstable en- vate-sector interest in MPS through its TEAs, IGIs, vironment for private investment. To date, in- and JEAs, a different institutional framework may dustry has not been assured that NASA will have eventually be needed, if the private sector is to enough funding to continue development of MPS be brought into MPS in a major way. To date, systems beyond the early research stage. If unable discussion has centered around three possible to rely on NASA for continued basic development structures: an organization like COMSAT, a space of new technology, industry sees no long-term industrialization corporation, and a possible con- future for MPS (whatever the temporary success sortium of industries. No consensus on this ques- of McDonnell Douglas and CT!). tion has yet emerged. Additionally, industry not involved in MPS gen- The COMSAT Model. In this scenario, a private erally finds NASA’s JEAs to be in various ways corporation, established by legislative action, but unrealistic. Some industry observers read NASA financed through the issuance of capital stock, as (in order to free itself to do little other than would be given a monopoly in the provision of basic R&D) seeking partners who can do every- processing facilities in space. The Government thing—marketing, financing, hardware develop- would retain some degree of internal control over ment, etc NASA’s agreement with GTI is a bold the organization by holding a number of posi- step toward meeting this objection. Through the tions on the board of directors, by regulating guest investigator, technical exchange, and joint competition in the procurement of equipment endeavor process, individual companies, concen- and services and by involvement in the ratemak- trating on discrete tasks, can more easily enter ing process. the MPS field. The purpose of such a corporation would be Businesses that have considered some com- to supply a space platform with various facilities mercial activity in space have also expressed con- and services that users could rent. The extent of cern over the potential loss of intellectual prop- use by NASA, as a customer, and the degree of erty rights (e.g., patent, trade secret, and industrial Government R&D performed on such a platform techniques). There are several reasons for this would be matters of policy to be decided at some concern: 1 ) should such intellectual property point in the future. become a matter of “Government record,” competitors might be able to obtain this information A structure like COMSAT’S has certain advan- through the Freedom of Information Act, 2) the tages. First of all, even with the substantial interest 1958 NAS Act provision which states that NASA generated in MPS over the past 2 years, private shall “provide for the widest practical and ap- corporations might not wish individually to pro- propriate dissemination of information concern- vide all the services needed to support separate ing its activities, “ is at odds with the industry’s processing facilities. Secondly, despite the ob- desire to maintain the secrecy of R&D directed vious differences between communications and to potentially valuable products; and 3) section materials processing, one can envision an impor- 305 of the NAS Act vests in the United States, sub- tant similarity in the ways in which they might ject to the discretion of the NASA Administrator, be conducted in space. A private concern might the right to any invention “made in the perform- well operate a space platform with various facil- ance of any work under any contract” with ities and services that users could rent. So de- NASA. Though NASA’s Administrators have con- scribed, such a platform could as well be used sistently waived the Government’s rights under for materials processing as for communications. the act, industry’s concerns remain. In neither case does the operator of the platform concern itself with the use to which its rented facilities are put. In both cases the operator might —— be expected to put some of these facilities to its ‘–MOTA workshop, Materials Processing in Space, May 1981. own use.

94-915 0 - 82 - 6 72 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The biggest obstacle to the creation of a federal- H.R. 2337 was introduced to address the prob- ly chartered structure is that the basic science on lems of the private sector in developing space which MPS would be founded is insufficient for processing capabilities and to provide a thorough marketable quantities of products to appear in and orderly examination of the means to reduce the business venture risk of using space for com- the near term. It is the view of ESA, for example, mercial purposes. that at least 10 more years of basic science are needed before serious consideration of commer- If SIC were established, it would function essen- cializing MPS can be given.69 ESA, therefore, con- tially as an investment bank, providing capital siders MPS a scientific rather than an applications through direct equity investments, loans, and program. loan guaranties. The problems most often cited by those opposing SIC in its present form are that Two objections to the federally chartered struc- such an organization is premature and that it may ture have surfaced. One is that, at its founding, interfere with the activities of NASA.72 COMSAT was supported by significant expertise already existing in corporations and Government Some fear that given our limited knowledge agencies. No such MPS expertise now exists. The of MPS science and engineering, SIC might en- other is that COMSAT entered an established and courage technically and economically unsound revenue-producing market, whereas a similar projects, which could have a negative impact on MPS corporation would be entering an unknown the evolution of space industrialization. They also market. In any case, objections to the COMSAT argue that if companies are not required to put model for MPS that are founded on various in- up their own money, they will take excessive risks sufficiencies (whether of basic science, of rele- and give projects inadequate management atten- vant expertise, or of ready markets for products) tion. argue for no more than a delay in the time when A different set of concerns regarding the SIC such a corporation might be chartered. center around how this organization would af- Although no organizations are now processing fect NASA’s continuing activities. NASA has been materials in space, to the extent that processes given a broad mandate to serve as a research and to be implemented in an MPS program are ex- development center for U.S. space technology. tensions of current terrestrial processes, relevant SIC, as described above, would function primarily expertise exists in abundance. ’o Furthermore, to as an investment bank. Viewed in the abstract, the extent that MPS products may improve the these two entities would appear not to interfere quality of similar terrestrial products by one or mutually, but to be perfectly compatible. What more orders of magnitude, marketability for some many fear, however, is that, because space in- of them appears high. dustrialization technology and its commercial applications are yet unproved, SIC could do little The Space Industrialization Corporation (SIC) more than supply funds for basic R&D. If this Introduced primarily as a means to provoke were the case, then instead of complementing public discussion, the Space Industrialization Act NASA, SIC would act as a competitor. of 1979 (H. R. 2337) called for:71 INDUSTRY CONSORTIUM Establishment of a Space Industrialization Cor- One way to encourage high-risk, expensive poration to provide a means for financing the de- MPS research is to allow firms jointly to fund these velopment of new products, processes, and indus- activities. By allowing the sharing of key resources tries using the properties of the space environment. such as facilities, personnel and capital funds, the cost and the risk of space-based innovation would bgsee Ch. 7, p. 179. be reduced. A consortium of these firms-would ZOOTA Workshop, Material Processing in Space, May 1981. also have considerable market strength because zlThe Space Industrialization Act of 1979, Hearings on H.R. 2337, it could share the combined expertise of its before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Repre- sentatives, 96th Cong., 1st sess. zzlbid., testimony of Robert A. Frosch, p. 78. .———.

Ch. 3—Issues and Findings ● 73 members, which normally address differing cus- near-term activities, but are hoping for extensive tomer communities or markets. future use of the Ariane launcher to orbit processing facilities for scientific and industrial uses.77 The structure of such a consortium would have to be carefully drawn so as not to be in violation The Japanese program is similar to that of the of U.S. antitrust laws.73 Simply stated, these laws Germans.78 The Japanese plan to conduct MPS are designed to prevent monopolistic market studies aboard Spacelab, and are using an exten- structures and/or collusion between competitors sive sounding rocket program to gain preliminary leading to price fixing and market or customer knowledge. The Japanese expect that in the long allocation. It is possible that a consortium as term at least some MPS work will result in the described above could violate both of these development of marketable products. tenets. Far more extensive than any MPS efforts in the Because of the time and expense involved in West, the Soviet MPS program has, so far as can most antitrust litigation, firms tend to be cautious be ascertained, been geared to manufacturing when dealing with their competitors. it is unlikely process research, much of which extends to that in the absence of a well-articulated Govern- studies of terrestrial production techniques.79 ment policy condoning such conduct that poten- Because there is no private sector to participate tially interested firms would form such a consor- in the Soviet space program, and perforce, no tium. In 1980, however, the Justice Department concern for commercialization, any inference issued guidelines “clarifying” its position on from Soviet experience in MPS to Western at- cooperative ventures: as long as these ventures tempts to commercialize would be risky. Soviet are open to all prospective participants and the MPS experiments, which have been conducted research they undertake is fundamental and long aboard the Salyut 6 manned orbital lab, appear range, the Department will probably not object.74 likely to continue at a high rate during the next More than a score of the largest U.S. computer few years. manufacturers and their semiconductor suppliers Perhaps the best lesson to be drawn from this are forming just such a research consortium cursory review of the activities of other nations under the Semiconductor industries Associa- is that the United States has a variety of paths it tion.75 may follow in the development of MPS technology. If it is to establish and sustain a successful, International Competition in MPS long-term MPS program, basic research must The European states and the Japanese agree surely go forward. The speed of this research and that MPS has great long-term promise, and the extent of private sector involvement are mat- they support extensive basic research preparatory ters of policy to be decided in the context of our to possible commercial ventures. The ESA-funded overall space goals. Spacelab designed to be flown on the shuttle will provide facilities for such MPS experiments. A key question for the near future is the extent of international cooperation in MPS basic re- The Germans, who are the prime contractors search. U.S.-European collaboration on Space- on Spacelab, are particularly interested in MPS Iab makes it possible to conduct joint efforts at and plan an extensive combination of scientific the basic science level, provided competitive and industrial projects, with some hope of signifi- strains are not too great. cant near-term results.7b The French have fewer

mlj. s. Department of justice, Antitrust Guide Concerning Re- search joint Ventures, November 1980. 741bid. ‘sTom Alexander, “The Right Remedy for R&D Lag,” Fortune, Tzsee ch. 7, pp. 190-191. Jan. 25, 1982. TaSee ch. 7, pp. 201-202. %See ch, 7, pp. 192-193. Tvsee ch. 7, p, 207. ——.

74 . Civilan Space Policy and Applications

SPACE TRANSPORTATION

Issue 7: What are the Major Barriers about the same ratio. A recent study by the to Commercialization of American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro- Space Transportation Facilities nautics (AIAA), however, has projected a significant additional need for total launches, primari- and Services? ly for commercial communications satellites.81 Though the shuttle opens the door to relatively Until 1981, all U.S. experience had been with inexpensive access to space, it makes the prob- ELVS. Until recently, civilian ELVS were to be lem of transferring the U.S. civilian space trans- phased out by the mid-1980s, and the sole U.S. portation capability to the private sector more launch capability was to be the NASA STS, rep- complex. Because the shuttle is new, its track resented primarily by the shuttle and its record is insufficient to allow corporations to associated upper stage components. However, assess its long-term expenses and risks. Full com- delays and uncertainties in the shuttle program mercialization of expendable launch vehicles have caused NASA to reexamine this policy. Pro- (ELVS), however, is possible now. But whether ponents of retaining ELVS argue that the number a private launch service using ELVS could offer of launches that will be needed will exceed the a price competitive with the technologically capacity of the shuttle, leaving the United States superior shuttle or the ESA-subsidized Ariane re- without sufficient launch capacity if ELVS are mains an open question. Therefore, the near-term phased out. prospects for commercializing U.S. space transportation are unclear, and the long-term pros- Private industry has not generally marketed pects ride with the shuttle. In any case, the single launch hardware or services directly to custo- major impediment to commercialization of U.S. mers. ELVS are sold to NASA, which then charges launch systems is the absence of a comprehen- the customer. Industry has, of course, built the sive Government policy that favors and en- launch vehicles under Government contract and courages the participation of the private sector. to a degree, lesser (for NASA) or greater (for DOD), provided contracted-for launch services The Background at Government launch facilities. However, NASA has remained responsible for providing launch In the United States the Federal Government facilities and support services to all users. Already, has heretofore provided launch vehicles and NASA is facing its first competition. Arianespace, launch services for all users. While DOD general- a private French corporation with substantial ly launches its own spacecraft, NASA has pro- Government ownership, has begun selling vided these services for its own missions and, on launches after a successful development pro- a reimbursable basis, for other U.S. Government gram. Certain private corporations, such as Space users, foreign governments, and private entities. Services, Inc., of the United States, hope to offer (NASA’s policy on reimbursement seeks, in gen- launch vehicles and services within a few years. eral, to recover incremental, out-of-pocket costs An investment banking firm, William Sword, Inc., only, not capital already invested.) Of the roughly has offered to fund a fifth shuttle orbiter in return 20 to 30 U.S. launches per year over the last 10 for exclusive rights to market commercial pay- years, about one-third were DOD’s, one-third loads. Already, small military rockets and satellite were NASA’s own spacecraft, and the remain- kick stages have been commercialized, and one ing third were for other United States or foreign of the shuttle upper stages, the SSUS-D, is being government users and private entities. NASA’s mission model80 for the space transportation system (STS) for the next 10 years or so shows El American institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, projection of non-Federal Demand for Space Transportation Services Through 2000, Jan. 19, 1981, ~“Final Flight Manifest for Space Shuttle,” Aerospace ~ai/y, Dec. s2AviatjOn week arid $pace Technology, “Firm Sets Down-Pay- 18, 1981, pp. 253-257. ment for Buy of Space Shuttle,” Jan. 18, 1982. Ch, 3—issues and Findings ● 75

sold by the manufacturer (McDonnell Douglas) a west coast launch site for the shuttle, and directly to the end user rather than to NASA. development of an interim upper stage (I US) for boosting shuttle payloads into higher orbits. Military and Civilian Use of the Shuttle The resulting agreement gave NASA the re- DOD is the only other U.S. launch agency, sponsibility to purchase and operate the STS for handling many of its own launches. How will everyone. DOD would have missions solely for DOD share the shuttle with civilian users? DOD its use, but NASA would own and operate the has the right to preempt civilian flights in case launch capability equitably for all users. Certain of need. How will that right and its other special DOD requirements did drive initial shuttle costs requirements affect hardware and launch costs? higher than the estimates of NASA’s original pro- Generally speaking, OTA has not found any of posal, but most requirements also resulted in these concerns to be major impediments to ci- greater, if more costly, capabilities. As DOD has vilian use of the shuttle—provided that the pro- generated additional requirements (for its own jected launch schedule of one flight every 2 or mission control center for example), the Depart- 3 weeks is attained. Once this planned flexibil- ment has itself bought these capabilities. This divi- ity of the shuttle system has been realized, a DOD sion of responsibility is expected to hold hence- preemption of a shuttle flight would probably forth. NASA’s pricing policy for the shuttle re- have little adverse affect on civilian needs, most mains problematic, especially in view of the 73 of which are not time-sensitive over periods of percent increase in the projected average cost a few weeks. For now, it is essential that at least of a standard mission (from $16.1 million in June one line of ELVS be retained, both to provide ad- 1976 to $27.9 million as of September 1980). ditional capacity and to back-up the shuttle, In According to a recent General Accounting Of- addition, it may be prudent to continue develop- fice (GAO) study, NASA is “locked into a pric- ment of expendable launch vehicle technology ing policy that encourages space transportation for certain payloads (see ch. 10). system use at NASA’s expense and at the expense The questions of DOD’s share and require- of the space science, applications, and aeronautics programs. GAO believes DOD and other ments in STS decisions are mostly settled, but re- government agencies should bear a greater share tain historical interest. The shuttle was planned 3 of the shuttle’s early years operations costs . . .“13 to be a “national” program; i.e., it would serve all customary U.S. launch needs for payloads that The division of the U.S. space program into were in the shuttle range. Specifically, this im- civilian and military components has been a plied that NASA and DOD would need to define valuable tool of foreign policy. DOD’s involve- a common, acceptable payload bay size, oper- ment with and ultimate use of the shuttle have ating characteristics, and compatible subsystems. raised the issue of the possible militarization of The major premise was that such a substantial the entire U.S. space program, a possibility that investment in a new technological capability is unsettling to other nations, especially the third could not reasonably be made unless it could world and the Soviet Union. The United States serve the broadest set of national needs. The in- has assured other nations that the programs will itial concept included the possibility that DOD remain separate, but their concerns are likely to would assume some degree of responsibility to remain until the passage of time and experience fund development of the shuttIe. This was subse- with the shuttle show whether or not the civilian quently modified in view of DOD’s rather sub- program remains unmilitarized. stantial budgets already in existence for other weapons systems and space developments; the shuttle was included in NASA’s budget, though, of course, support for the program rested on congressional recognition of its military uses. It was 83 General Accounting offiCf?, “NASA Must Reconsider Opera- agreed that DOD’s direct share of the program tions Pricing Policy to Components for Cost Growth of the Space development costs would be limited to two items: Transportation Systems, ” Feb. 23, 1982, pp. ii-iii. 76 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Foreign Competition in Space Transportation flicts and space limitations, may not be sufficient to meet the future demands of private spaceflight Currently, the United States has no policy re- operations. The proper role of Government in the garding foreign competition in space transporta- construction, operation, and regulation of new tion. Though the Soviet Union has had a reliable commercial launch sites has yet to be addressed. launch capability for 25 years and has launched Indeed, the issue is so recent that the Federal satellites for several other countries, it does not agencies that have interest or jurisdiction have sell launches. However, commercial competition just begun to address it. Finally, it may be pru- from the ESA’S Ariane ELV is now a reality. The dent to devise some type of mandatory insurance Ariane (which is approximately twice the size of scheme to indemnify the Government and pro- the U.S. Delta) has recently completed a suc- tect the general populace from the possibility of cessful series of test flights, and the Europeans accidents resulting from private launches. are now selling space on future launches. Already several U.S. telecommunications companies have Once a comprehensive regulatory scheme is switched from NASA launches to Ariane, and adopted and a clear Government policy ar- more such decisions can be expected because ticulated, the institutional risks inherent in fewer shuttle opportunities are available and U.S. operating a private launch system will be ELVS have become more expensive. The Ariane’s diminished, and greater private sector participa- attractiveness is enhanced by the creation of tion may occur. Arianespace to market the Ariane and provide launch services. Arianespace, in conjunction with European banks, is offering customers below- Prospects for Commercialization market financing and other financial incentives Though the complete transfer of shuttle opera- that compare favorably to present U.S. pricing tions to the private sector does not seem likely procedures. Arianespace plans initially for five to in the near future, there is no reason why the six launches per year, rising to 10 per year in the private sector could not eventually supply this mid-l 980s. service. As technical experience is gained, the The Japanese space agency, NASDA, is current- reliability of shuttle systems proved, and infor- ly building and operating modified Delta launch- mation is obtained concerning the real costs of ers, designated N-1 and N-11, built under license operating the shuttle, the commercial potential from McDonnell Douglas. At present the Japa- of this system will also begin to be understood. nese are prohibited from selling launch services If the transfer of the shuttle to the private sector to third parties without U.S. permission; develop- is determined to be in the national interest, firm ment of a completely Japanese launcher is Government policies to this effect must be ar- planned but is not likely to be completed before ticulated and, where necessary, supported by fi- the end of the decade. nancial incentives. No private sector firm has yet expressed interest Regulatory Needs in operating the entire shuttle system (i.e., orbiters There is now no clarity with regard to regula- and related launch hardware, and ground sup- tion of private launches from the United States, port and maintenance facilities), but there has largely because there is no single Federal authori- been some interest in the operation or owner- ty for overseeing private space activities from ship of discrete parts of the launch service. Cur- launch to flight termination. The absence of such rently there are three areas where private sector authority creates a number of problems. First, al- involvement may become important: though certain agencies (FAA, FCC) exercise limited authority over private rocket launches, the Tracking, telemetry and control.–ln 1979 absence of clear Government policy and proce- COMSAT established the first commercial dures creates confusion as to who has the author- launch control facility that offered services ity to authorize a private launch. Second, existing previously only provided by NASA. As space Federal launch centers, because of launch con- activities become more common, oppor- Ch. 3—issues and Findings ● 77

tunities for the private sector to provide these rounding their operation. The market for services will increase. launches is steadily growing: though it is not large ● Shuttle refurbishment.–currently, NASA enough to support all the expendable lines contracts with more than 25 private firms to (Titans, Atlas-Centaurs, Deltas, etc.), it could cer- refurbish the orbiter between flights. NASA tainly support one of them. Because of various has recently decided to find one firm to act uncertainties, the aerospace companies have not as a manager for the entire process. shown much interest in dealing directly with any ● Orbiter ownership.–As mentioned above, group backing private launch services. A possibil- a U.S. investment banking firm announced ity here would be the mediation of a third-party its interest in purchasing the fifth orbiter, with broker, A further possibility might be the forma- the provision that NASA would continue to tion of a Government-chartered private corpora- operate the vehicle but that its payload tion to provide launch services, leasing facilities capacity would be marketed by the private at Kennedy Space Center. Rapid commercializa- owner. Should this venture prove to be suc- tion of U.S. ELVS would provide immediate ad- cessful, the likelihood that other orbiters will vantages: competition for the Ariane, added in- be privately owned will be greatly increased. centive to NASA to bring the costs of shuttle operations down, and a backup system for the Full commercialization of ELVS, however, is shuttle should it meet unexpected problems. possible now. There are few if any unknowns sur- Chapter 4 DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM

* Contents

Page Introduction ...... 81 Early Development ...... 83 Major Characteristics of the Space Program ...... 84 Open and Public Nature of the Program ...... 84 Use of industry and University Support ...... 85 Public Understanding ...... 86 International Cooperation...... 87 Major Milestones in Space...... 88 The International Geophysical Year...... 88 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as Amended ...... 88 The Apollo Commitment ...... 89 INTELSAT/COMSAT Commitment ...... 90 Weather Satellite Services ...... W...... 91 Scientific Research and Exploration ...... 93 Post-Apollo Planning ...... 94 Earth Observations ...... 95 Space Task Group ...... 96 The Shuttle Decision ...... 98 Communications R&D Decision ...... 101 President’s Space Policy Statement of 1978 ...... 101 NSC Policy Review Committee (Space) ...... 102 Chapter 4 DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM ——

INTRODUCTION

Nearly a quarter century after Explorer I and the U.S. entry into the space age, the space shuttle now presents the Nation with new and expanded opportunities for space operations. In the coming months and years, we will learn to operate and use the new capabilities of this system. It is indeed ironic that, at this time of brave new beginnings, the Nation again faces important questions about the future of the civilian space program. At the inception of the space program, the United States perceived Soviet initiatives in space as political, military, and technological threats. Having seen space as a field in which to compete, the United States directed its space program toward the primary objective of exceeding Soviet achievements. With the passage of time, and the great success of Apollo, Soviet competition no longer challenges the United States politically. But as the Soviet challenge has vanished, so has the motivation of beating the competition. Now the United States is faced with the more sophisticated challenge of devising a balanced policy framework—a framework that will enable the United States to identify new objectives and stimulate the Nation to achieve them. Lacking such a perspective, the Nation has, instead, begun to evaluate space more pragmatically. This evaluation suggests that “activities will be pursued in space when it appears that U.S. national objectives can most efficiently be met through space activities.’” It contrasts with the aggressive acceptance of the “role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application thereof . . . ,“ as prescribed in the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958.2 The act itself, however, established no spe-

1“White House Fact Sheet on U.S. Civil Space Policy,” Oct. 11, 1978. 2National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and related legislation. Prepared at the request of Hon. Howard W. The dawn of a new age in space flight, Space shuttle Cannon, Chairman Committee on Commerce, Science and Trans- Columbia blasts off Pad 39a, April 12, 1981, with astronauts portation, U.S. Senate, December 1978. John Young and Bob Crippen aboard

81 82 ● civilian Space Policy and Applications cific manned or unmanned missions, outlined no stitutional relations that are relatively unchanged priorities, nor specified a funding level at which since the earliest days of the agency. There are the program was to be carried out. Instead, the both strengths and weaknesses in such a situa- commitment to Apollo set the civilian space pro- tion. To the extent that it is desirable to prevent gram on the expansionary course that provides making the same mistakes as one’s predecessors, the baseline for current comparisons. Likewise, such continuity and institutional memory is im- this commitment generated the momentum that portant. To the extent that it serves to limit the is largely responsible for sustaining the program Nation’s ability to take a fresh look at the pro- today. But now, with current budgetary stringen- gram, how it functions and how it should respond cy, commitments to civilian projects are few and to a changing external environment, the strong uncertain, though the military and national secu- links to the past may inhibit the agency from rity programs continue to grow. Consequently, becoming a dynamic vehicle of change and the it is timely, as we embark on the next decade of source of new initiatives involving the use of space activity, to scrutinize and to consider revis- space systems. ing the framework of U.S. space policy. In addition, the relatively short span between Basic to any overall assessment of the U.S. civil- establishment of NASA and this assessment ian space program, particularly one which seeks makes it difficult to separate the objective views to assist Congress in setting public policy for of participants from a tendency to defend their charting the Nation’s future in space, is an inter- own decisions and roles. Because of this problem, pretive, retrospective review of our current pos- this history and analysis is primarily based on spe- ture in space, how the United States has pro- cific events, documented roles and decisions, ceeded to develop its current program and the observed consequences, and supporting state- capabilities on which the program is based, the ments. role of various external factors such as international competition, the processes that have Although the civilian space program is a rela- shaped its current posture, and other relevant tively recent activity of the U.S. Government, it forces and environmental factors that led to, or is unique among Government programs in its provided the foundation for, the current situation high public visibility. It has been the subject of facing the United States in space. This chapter many historical evaluations and popular histories. presents the results of such a retrospective review NASA from its very beginning devoted attention applied to the civilian space program of the to the development of an official chronology, and United States, emphasizing those aspects that are in the past there was an annual report of space relevant to space applications. It is intended to activities submitted to Congress, summarizing the highlight issues and lessons learned, as well as full scope of the U.S. civilian space program. characteristics of previous decisions regarding the Together, these resources report the history and program that may have applicability to current evolution of the civilian space program in great and future developments. detail, and there will be no effort in this report to duplicate such materials. The specific programs The civilian space program of the United States or decisions discussed in the sections that follow has grown from its early beginnings as part of have been selected to illustrate an issue or to sup- operations in connection with the International port a conclusion so the material selected is Geophysical Year, to the great successes of not a comprehensive or exhaustive Iising of Apollo, Viking, and Voyager, in the short span milestones or significant events. In keeping with of one generation—a little over 20 years. Thus, this assessment’s focus on civilian activities, the history and current practice are woven together present chapter does not discuss the extensive in a tapestry, with many threads still in place that military space program except as it illustrates a bind past and present: still present are many in- policy issue of significance for the civilian space dividuals in the National Aeronautics and Space program. Its focus is primarily on NASA’s activ- Administration (NASA) who have been with the ities, though it includes some discussion of pro- agency since its beginning, contractors that have grams of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric played a continuing role over this period, and in- Administration (NOAA). Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 83 — —————-. —- ————

EARLY DEVELOPMENT

The early development of the U.S. space ef- In the wake of Sputnik, however, the public fort was primarily a specialist’s concern; that is, demand for a U.S. response galvanized Congress the scientific research objectives associated with and the executive branch to act. Seeking to re- the prospect of access to the upper atmosphere vitalize technological and scientific development and eventually to an Earth-orbiting platform were across-the-board, they instituted programs to de- the province of a relatively small community of velop better science and engineering education, scientists and engineers. This community in- to increase Federal support for science, to attract cluded a few universities, not-for-profit institu- greater numbers of young people to technical cations, and several defense laboratories. There was reers, and to improve military systems. associated with this research-oriented community a larger engineering-oriented group that was de- One of the first measures taken was to appoint veloping propulsion systems, radio and inertial a full-time Science Adviser to the President, Dr. guidance systems, and control systems for ballistic James Killian, and to establish the President’s missiles. This second group provided much of the Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), a group of basic launch vehicle technology for the civilian 18 respected senior scientists and engineers. They program. Before Sputnik in 1957, these groups were asked to review and comment on the meas- pursued their objectives in relative obscurity. ures needed to carry out the peacetime mobiliza-

Spacecraft used in the early stages of space exploration 84 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications tion of skills in science and technology called for edge, performing specific functions that were en- by the President. Clearly, the major topics of re- hanced or made uniquely possible by utilizing view were: 1 ) the U.S. response to Soviet space space platforms, and to strengthen national pres- achievements and 2) the national security pro- tige and self-confidence, badly shaken by a suc- grams needed to counter Soviet military devel- cession of Soviet “firsts” in space. These objec- opments, particularly their ability to launch tives appeared prominently in the NAS Act, ballistic missiles and to detonate hydrogen which was prompted by Sputnik and very quickly bombs. drafted and signed into law in July 1958. One of the first tasks at hand was to explain As is clear from chapter 5, the essential char- to the public the significance of the Soviet and acter of the civilian space program has not U.S. entry into space. Many people could not changed significantly in the succeeding years: we understand how orbital flight around the Earth still seek new knowledge about the Earth, the was possible, and they found its realization threat- Moon, the Sun, the planets, and the more dis- ening. Thus, in its first public report, PSAC found tant objects in space; we remain active in exploit- it necessary, in 1958, first, to expound Newton’s ing applications that make use of the unique van- laws of motion to explain “why satellites stay up,” tage point or the unique environment (low grav- and second to assure the public that the Soviet ity, high vacuum) of space; we still attend to ex- space achievements did not signal a serious, im- ploration and technological “muscleflexing” in minent threat to U.S. national security.3 In this programs such as the space shuttle. Perhaps one same report, PSAC outlined the future evolution of the most remarkable aspects of the way the of the space program, including (under the cat- space program has developed is the fact that the egories of near-, mid-, and long-term possibilities) opportunities and areas of activity in the space the full range of missions that the United States, program have not changed appreciably over a with time, could adopt as the national space pro- quarter century. The developments in space ap- gram. The remarkable feature of the report was plications, the mission opportunities in science, the very complete characterization of future ap- and the manned space exploration program have plications, including manned planetary explora- largely followed the scenario laid out by the early tion and a lunar base, both listed as long-term advisers and space proponents—if anything, they goals, and both still possible as targets for future have failed to equal the imagination and vision space activity. of these early projections. This suggests that we have not yet penetrated beyond the initial learn- {n those early days of civilian space activity, the ing phase of space activity to a more mature treat- principal objectives were to acquire new knowl- ment of and familiarity with space systems, and how they can best serve us. J/ntro~uctjon tO Outer Space, report of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, 1958.

MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPACE PROGRAM

In order to build a foundation for the analysis open to public scrutiny from its inception. This of later chapters, this section will highlight a num- characteristic of the program has helped to shape ber of important characteristics of the U.S. civilian and, in a sense, to constrain the U.S. civilian prospace program which have been instrumental in gram. As the public has become more knowl- setting the stage for current issues. edgeable about space capabilities and costs, the objectives of NASA’s program have required Open and Public Nature of the Program more detailed justification, more planning, and even some marketing in order to build sufficient As the NAS Act separated civilian and military public understanding and acceptance. The grow- space activities, the civilian space program was ing complexity of technology and missions in Ch. 4—f)evelopment and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 85 space applications and science requires more manufacturing and environmental specifications sophisticated public understanding than did some and found ways in which they could be satisfied. of the earlier programs, As a result, NASA’s task They also developed a wide variety of associated of justifying its activities to the public has become techniques that could be perfected only through more difficult. actual space missions. Such specialized knowledge and specialized capability in industry and Contrasted with the public acceptance and sup- universities represent a national resource that, if port that NASA requires is the more restricted lost, could not be easily duplicated. nature of the decision process for the space program in the military and intelligence arenas. Here, An important characteristic of the U.S. program the very large majority of the program is space in this regard has been the diversity of industrial, applications, that is, activities which assist in per- university, and Government resources that were forming a specific mission or missions and which drawn into active participation in all aspects of are therefore amenable to cost-benefit analysis. the program. Through this diversity of resources, It is quite often the case that any one of several there has been enough competition so that new alternatives may achieve the objectives of a given ideas have had an opportunity to surface, space mission, and that tradeoffs may determine the op- expertise has been acquired by many technical timal allocation of resources from among the var- teams, and the entire program has been strength- ious alternatives available, For the most part, this ened. Furthermore, significant diversity has decision process takes place in the closed world always characterized intragovernment space ac- of the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Cen- tivities. NASA’s predecessor and major constitu- tral Intelligence Agency. There is, consequently, ent element, the National Advisory Committee no need to sell the program to the public, nor on Aeronautics (NACA), developed a major field do elected public officials participate in the selec- laboratory structure (Langiey, Ames, and Lewis tion, the configuration, or the operation of mis- Research Centers), and it promoted valuable sions. The important element in this process is cross-fertilization through good working relations the mechanism for generating requirements. The with its principal customers—DOD and the com- requirements provide a target toward which the mercial aeronautical industry. When space activ- technical community can work and by which the ities began, and the level of effort was substan- proposed system may be evaluated. It would be tially raised, in accordance with our commitment difficult to devise an analogue to this mechanism to the success of Apollo, NASA elaborated suitable for use in the civilian program because NACA’S pattern: it created new government in the early stages of R&D, civilian users and, per- research centers, each playing a major role in force, their requirements cannot be identified. program management, and each having unique facilities and a modest in-house research and Use of Industry and University Support technology development capability. NASA also enlisted the support of its counterparts in DOD, From its very beginning, the space program has particularly with respect to launch vehicles (Thor, been a high-technology endeavor, and the aver- Atlas, Agena). age citizen has not easily understood its operative concepts. Early failures in both launch vehicles With a few notable exceptions, manufacturing and satellites dramatized the problems associated and detailed system development were the prov- with space operations and taught invaluable les- ince of industry, while university teams designed sons to those who were actively participating in the instruments and experiments, formulated the their development. Practices and techniques that overall science objectives, and constituted the were adequate for most terrestrial systems had user community for the space science program. to be modified and adapted to the demanding For the most part, the relationships among these requirements imposed by the space environment. contributors have been beneficial and positive. As a result, highly skilled industrial teams were From time to time, however, some concerns have formed. These teams learned to apply specialized surfaced. For example, the university experiment- 86 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ers complain about the privileged position of their now our space program had become not only competitors inside the NASA research centers, a scientific investigation of a new medium, but or NASA headquarters claims it lacks adequate a human adventure into the unknown. As the first control over the centers. An abiding concern of astronauts were selected, communications media industry is that they will lose a significant business hastened to canonize them as national heroes. base from a combination of NASA’s shrinking Through extensive publicity, particularly live budgets and its desire to maintain an in-house television coverage, people throughout the world establishment. followed the early manned flights with great interest. Familiarity with the astronauts, their space Overall, the United States continues to call on vehicles, and the new jargon of the space age led and use capabilities that were created as part of to some understanding of the relevant concepts: the major expansion during the Apollo program. weightlessness (or “microgravity”), how satellites However, shrinking NASA budgets, particularly and launch vehicles operate, the difference be- when inflation is taken into account, have tween synchronous and low-altitude orbits, the gradually eroded the contractor base support- concept of satellite communciations relay, and ing the civilian space program. Many contractors Earth observations from space for weather or now prefer to work on DOD’s space program. other purposes, all became topics of casual con- New civilian activity has slowed overall, partic- versation. ularly in some of the advanced scientific areas. Similarly, universities made significant commit- In addition, even rather esoteric subjects of sci- ments to space in the early expansionist days, and entific investigation, such as the structure of the many specialized university space institutes or Van Allen belts around the Earth, the composi- laboratories were established. Several factors tion and characteristics of the Moon, and the threaten the ability of universities to continue nature of the planets in our solar system, became their support of the space program. These fac- matters of general interest. The space program, tors include: increasing time intervals between which began as the province of specialists, gen- successive launches; lack of funds to support con- erated ever more publicity and discussion, so that tinued data collection and processing of data the general public was eager to learn of, and par- from satellites after their initial period of opera- ticipate vicariously in, the planning and flight of tion; reduced funding for exploitation of data new missions. already gathered; and increasing complexity and Ieadtimes between initiation of an experiment Yet, even as the public came to understand the and the actual flight opportunity. The support for first steps into space, succeeding missions and the space program from universities and industry systems became more enterprising: simple instru- has enabled the United States to succeed in in- ments were being supplemented by complex de- creasingly advanced and more challenging mis- vices and systems, plans were made to investi- sions. This base of suport will be the key to the gate new objects, and the first surveys of these successful performance of commitments yet to objects were followed by detailed and highly spe- be made. Clearly, the vigor of space-related pro- cialized analyses. In Earth-orbital applications, grams in industry and universities is an appropri- naive signal propagation and tracking devices ate subject for periodic evaluation. evolved into sophisticated relay stations with multiple channel capacity and multiple spot Public Understanding beam retransmission capability; simple cameras and optical scanning devices were comple- The community most immediately affected by mented by multispectral scanners and infrared the awesome character of launching artificial sat- or microwave imagers; and the tracking systems ellites were those who operated, constructed, were supplemented by laser trackers of high and designed the various interdependent sys- spatial and range precision. The experiments to tems. The inception of manned flight brought the be performed by the next generation of space wonder of space exploration home to us all. For missions are even more complex. Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 87

Thus, the open and public nature of the civilian to represent the United States and, initially, to space program, coupled with its high technology be technical manager for the system. In this area content, presents a special challenge to policy- of commercial interest, many nations had to co- makers and the leadership in the civilian space operate if links among the various communica- community, if there is to be some continued de- tions systems were to be established. To this end, velopment of public understanding of space mis- the creation of a new international institution sions, program objectives, and the possible seemed the most feasible means. On the other returns to be expected. hand, introduction of Earth remote sensing through the experimental Landsat system has not International Cooperation yet required extensive international cooperation, so that no international institution to col- It is impossible to discuss the overall U.S. space lect data has been created.Q Of course, there has program without mentioning its international been extensive international dialog regarding component. From its very beginning, the civilian Earth observations, and the sale both of the re- space program has had an international char- ceived data and of ground stations for direct re- acter. International cooperation in science led to ception of Landsat output are proceeding apace. the first satellite launches as part of the multi- Thus the Landsat program has not been without national International Geophysical Year. The substantial international participation or commer- 1958 NAS Act explicitly recognized the objective cial interest. It has been customary for Govern- of fostering international cooperation, and it ment to supply meteorological data as a public charged NASA with integrating this objective into service, and this practice was continued with the overall program. Yet the consideration which weather satellites. As in the case of terrestrial dominated space policy in the early years was weather observations, free and open exchange competition with the Soviet Union, and policy of data has been the rule, where the United States decisions during this period tended to protect makes ground stations available for receipt of U.S. U.S. interests against possible foreign preemption. meteorological data. Cooperation has grown in Our treatment of international cooperation has this area, particularly as part of a series of large- also varied considerably, depending on the type scale atmospheric ocean observation programs of activity—space science, applications, or that gave other nations greater experience and manned flight. an incentive to create their own meteorological The approach taken to science has favored data capability at geosynchronous orbit. Navigational exchange, large-scale cooperative experiments aid, also largely a Government service, was orig- where multiple measurements at geographical- inally used to support military (submarine and ly dispersed locations are involved, and to a very surface ship) operations, but was later opened limited extent, foreign experiments on U.S. sat- to civilian and international users merely by their purchase of the appropriate receiver. A more ad- ellites or use of data acquired by the United States vanced system of position location is under devel- (such as lunar samples). In general, the United States has regarded cooperative efforts in science opment; it too will be available to civilian and international users. as less problematic than those in other areas, although it has been assumed that the United Manned space flight, by its nature a very cost- States would participate in each area of space sci- ly aspect of the space program, has been carried ence with sufficient vigor so that we would re- out only by the two space superpowers, the main in the forefront of current research and United States and the U.S.S.R. With the excep- would not abandon any area to foreign competition of lunar exploration, the U.S.S.R. has pio- tion. neered this area and has flown international In applications, the most notable activity has 4 been the commitment to a single international Remote Sensing of Earth Resources, Panel on Science and Tech- nology Thirteenth Meeting, proceedings before the Committee on communications satellite system, INTELSAT, and Science and Aeronautics, House of Representatives, 92d Cong., the creation of a chosen private entity, COMSAT, 2d sess.; Jan. 25, 26, 27, 1972; No. 13, Washington, D.C.

94-915 0 - .9? - ‘ 88 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications crews with members from Socialist bloc coun- work established by NASA (and DOD) that sup- tries. The U.S. program is moving toward inter- ported the manned flight program and many un- national participation in manned flight with the manned operations as well. advent of shuttle operations and a manned lab- More recently, other nations have designed oratory payload (Spacelab) supplied by a Euro- and begun to test space systems that will com- pean consortium. Indeed, the shuttle system is pete directly with U.S. projects in communica- an international cooperative venture, and the tions, remote sensing, and transportation (ch. 7). shuttle itself may very well be flown by multina- Thus, cooperation and competition are both pres- tional crews. In early manned operations, includ- ent in the international aspects of the civilian ing Apollo, the need for close contact and global space program. As a result, there is a certain flex- monitoring of flight crews and their capsules re- ibility in U.S. space policy, ensuring that analysis quired tracking, communications stations, and and debate will continue. recovery units around the world. These were part of a large-scale cooperative international frame-

MAJOR MILESTONES IN SPACE The following milestones have been selected National Aeronautics and Space to illustrate the major issues and characteristics Act of 1958, as Amended of the civilian space program of the United States and to lay a foundation for a retrospective assess- The basic foundation for the civilian space pro- ment of our current posture in space. gram is Public Law 85-568, the National Aero- nautics and Space Act of 1958. This act was the result of compromise, but represented a victory The International Geophysical Year (IGY) for those who supported a space program conducted principally by an independent civilian U.S. participation in the IGY program provided agency. The policy guidance in the act, essen- the explicit rationale for entry into civilian space tially unchanged from its original form, specified activities. It was fundamental to this participation that “activities in space should be devoted to that the experiments would be open and the re- peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.” sults published, consistent with the traditions of It also enumerated a set of broad objectives: scientific research. There would be international discussions and exchange of results, and the ● Expansion of human knowledge. knowledge gained would become part of the ● Improvement of aeronautical and space global scientific literature. in this work, therefore, vehicles. were laid the foundations for an open and public ● Development and operation of vehicles civilian program with a fundamental objective: (spacecraft). expansion of human knowledge. This contrasts ● Study of potential benefits to be gained from with the military and intelligence space objectives aeronautical and space activities. —support of the national security of the United ● Preservation of the role of the United States States–and the high degree of secrecy associated as a leader in aeronautical and space science with most of their activities. technology and their applications. ● Publication of information about discoveries. The search for knowledge is still an important ● Cooperation between the United States and objective of the U.S. space program and can other nations. serve to link people of diverse cultural and politi- ● Effective utilization of the scientific and engi- cal backgrounds. It involves its own form of com- - neering resources of the United States. petition, but also enables nations to cooperate, leaving a political deposition of value beyond the Significantly, the act is silent on responsibilities scientific measurements that are made. for operational space systems beyond DOD’s role Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 89 with regard to national defense. By implication, will not be rehearsed here. The most important since the “aeronautical and space activities” that aspects of Apollo for this assessment are its legacy are the principal responsibility of NASA, are de- and the issues flowing from that legacy. fined as “research . . ., development, construc- The major characteristics of the Apollo proposal tion, testing, and operation for research purposes were: of aeronautical and space vehicles, and such other activities as may be required for the explor- ● A multiyear joint executive branch and con- ation of space, ” operational roles are expected gressional commitment. to be carried out by other agencies. At the time ● An extremely challenging technological feat, the act was written, however, its framers did not feasible in principle, but with a great many foresee the variety of space applications that are engineering problems, and under a signifi- now possible. That the act neither specifies nor cant time constraint. precludes operational responsibilities for NASA ● A political measure–aimed at foreign policy suggests a pragmatic approach to each functional goals, national prestige, and self-confidence. area and a flexibility in determining which agency ● Commitment to a major expansion in the should take the lead in operating any given sys- civil space program and in the institutional tem. (NOAA’s current assignment as the lead base for the program. agency for Earth observational satellite systems ● Required contractor teams on a scale not in the civil sector may also need reexamination previously attempted. and evaluation in the light of its activities since In the process of accomplishing its goals, NASA assuming this role about a year ago.) added significantly to its laboratory structure, cre- This report presents a more detailed summary ating a combined Government-contractor work of the 1958 NAS Act in chapter 3. The following force that exceeded 400,000 people at its peaks observations are appropriate here, however. The Though Apollo dominated the agency’s priorities, legislative mandate for NASA has had great effect there was also a presidential commitment to pur- on the institutional configuration of the agency, sue satellite communications and meteorology, but has provided little guidance on the pace and and programs in these areas also expanded dur- content of the program. In some areas, notably ing the 1960’s. During this period, many were space communications R&D and Earth resources strongly attracted to the challenge and the prom- systems, the act was of no use in resolving policy ise of space activity. differences or in guiding executive branch action. However, even before the first successful lunar Recent congressional action, such as in the landing, there were signs of change. NASA budg- energy area, has been much more aggressive in et outlays, which peaked at nearly $6 billion in spelling out the objective of technological pro- 1966, began decreasing by almost $500,000 a grams and giving guidance on the level of in- year for the next 4 years. The total work force tended or expected spending, but not all such dropped from 400,000 to 160,000 in the same efforts represent a good legislative model. Clearly, period, beginning a period of aerospace unem- a balance between a detailed congressional man- ployment that was to have significant impact on date and a restrictive overspecification of the pro- future commitments to manned flight programs. gram must be struck. (Of the decrease in aerospace employment over this period, over 220,000 was in direct contrac- The Apollo Commitment tor employment, while only 6,000 was in civil No other single event has so profoundly shaped service or direct support service manpower.) A the U.S. space program and current issues as the backlash developed in the scientific and engi- decision for man to go to the Moon and return neering professions when individuals found that within the decade of the 1960’s. Much has been their opportunities for careers in aerospace were written about the personalities and pressures that sThe u.s. civilian Space Program—look at options. OMB Issues led to Kennedy’s decision, and that discussion Paper, Oct. 14, 1971. 90 . civilian Space Policy and Applications disappearing. During the peak readjustment peri- global system). NASA was to support COMSAT od, the political liability of large-scale unemploy- with R&D and with launch services, for which the ment in this work force prompted direct, Govern- agency was to be reimbursed. The COMSAT Act ment-supported, ameliorative measures. As a re- was passed in 1962, the first stock was issued in sult of this expansion and rapid contraction in the 1964, and its first satellite, Early Bird, was aerospace industry, political resistance to future launched into synchronous orbit over the Atlan- decisions causing major disruptions in the work tic in April 1965.7 force may be anticipated. (See discussion of the In 1964, the INTELSAT Agreements were space shuttle decision below). opened for signature, and COMSAT was desig- During the decade of the 1960’s, therefore, the nated the manager for the system. INTELSAT pro- overarching commitment to Apollo focused the vided a means for gaining international agree- space program; other space activities throve ment on the extent and type of services to be sup- amidst Apollonian largesse. By the beginning of plied, the charges for such services, the procure- the 1970’s, however, the program had lost its ment policies, and a host of related matters. In focus, and the continuing projects, all smaller in the United States, where there is no single gov- scope, began to lose their way in the twilight of ernmental entity responsible for providing tele- fiscal restraint. communications service, the relationships among the various potential suppliers of domestic satel- The large-scale commitment to the Apollo pro- lite telecommunications services are regulated by gram left a legacy that did not dissipate easily. the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). This legacy, while mostly positive, was also some- In 1970, after many years of debate, the princi- what disruptive because no equivalent subse- ple of open entry and competition for domestic quent project was identified. National prestige services was announced, followed by specific from such an amazing accomplishment contin- authorizations of domestic satellite services by ued long after the event, but ordinary citizens FCC in December 1972,8 which finally opened soon lost interest in space and began to ask: if up the domestic market to a variety of suppliers we can put a man on the Moon, why can’t of such services. The regulatory and commercial we . . . environment for domestic communications satellite services continues to change so as to affect INTELSAT/COMSAT Commitment the structure of the industry and the relationships Recognition of the importance of space plat- among the various services and common or spe- forms for communications came early in the cialized carriers. In addition, maritime services space program. As the common carrier respon- have been initiated, backed by the U.S. Navy’s sible for long distance communications in the guarantee to lease services from the system for United States, A.T.&T. funded a low-altitude sat- defined periods. An international organization, ellite, Telstar, while Hughes Aircraft Co. con- INMARSAT, somewhat parallel to INTELSAT, was structed the Syncom series of satellites, which started for support of these services. were intended for synchronous orbit placement. U.S. experience in the development of struc- (The concept of a synchronous communications tures to provide services that exploit the satellite was first suggested in 1945.6) With the capabilities of satellites has been unique from beginning of the Kennedy administration and a several standpoints: much more activist role for Government in space, however, the role of the private sector was rewrit- 1. New institutions were established: the quasi- ten for the newly created COMSAT Corp., the public, domestic corporation, COMSAT, and chosen vehicle for U.S. participation in a com- the international entity, INTELSAT. Both mercial communications satellite system (a single, TCommunicat;onS Statellhe Act of 1962, Public Law 87-624, 87th bArthur c. clarke, “Extraterrestrial Relays: Can Rocket StatiOns Cong., H.R. 11040, Aug. 31, 1962. Give Worldwide Radio Coverage?” Wire/ess Wor/~ October 1945, Scomsat @j& to the Intelsat, Marisat, and Comstar satellite SYS- pp. 305-308. tems, 95 L’Enfant Plaza, S. W., Washington, D.C. 20024. Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 91

were important in gaining support and co- Weather Satellite Services operation from other nations. The use of satellites for global synoptic cover- 2. The Federal Government initially provided major support of R&D for communications age of the Earth began with the experimental satellite technology, in accordance with the launch of Tires 1 in 1960, as a joint effort of DOD act establishing COMSAT. The Nixon admin- and NASA. This satellite’s global cloud coverage istration, however, as part of its policy of pro- pictures were the first in a long series, characterized by incremental improvements in succeeding moting more activity in the private sector, satellites and by developments in their use in ob- decided to downgrade NASA’s program in taining atmospheric and meteorological obser- satellite communications, terminating demonstrations of new spacecraft and substitut- vations.g Because DOD’s requirements were so ing a low-level program of technology devel- different from NASA’s, two separate meteorological satellite programs—one civilian, one military opment. The Carter administration reversed field: NASA’s R&D in space communications —were established. NASA’s satellites were inte- was to be returned to a higher level. grated into the Federal Government’s system for 3. The aerospace industry played the role of providing U.S. users with information regarding major suppliers of satellites and ground local and synoptic weather. These satellites also provided weather data to other nations and to equipment; NASA provided reimbursable launch services. international entities. Here, as well as in other civilian applications services, NASA led the way Before the space age, the communications in- in identifying appropriate technologies for air and dustry was already well established: the outlines space platforms. In the case of weather satellites, of its structure were fairly clear; the services it the relationship between NASA and its user agen- provided were well understood; and regulations cy was a somewhat turbulent one, occasioning governing its activities were in place. A new tech- considerable interaction and debate before a suit- nology, space satellite communications relays, able working relationship was developed. For revolutionized the industry: space provided a weather satellite services, NASA functions as a unique, high-altitude vantage point, to and from launching agency and also provides (through which a variety of signals could be transmitted. coordination with the user) the early experimen- Consequently, national policies had to be revised tal development of satellite sensors and platforms. in order to cope with the new space systems. These are, at a suitable time in their evolution, The example of satellite communications shows incorporated into operational systems for whose management the user agency, currently NOAA, that NASA’s role in the R&D of applications is specifically responsible. (The present good technologies may be interpreted in several ways, working relationship between NASA and NOAA depending on an administration’s staging of the forms the background for the decision to assign interaction between the private sector and the operational responsibility for civil operational agency. This history indicates some lack of clarity in the legislative mandate. Willingness to take Earth resources sensing to NOAA.) The major pat- risks in forming new institutional arrangements terns that emerged from the early experience with weather satellites were: (e.g., COMSAT or INTELSAT) can have a beneficial effect on development of a specific service. Ž Strong Government role. NASA developed An organized user community, the readiness of and NOAA operates a primarily civilian a given technology, an established tradition of service. commercial services with an approximate value 9NASA News, capsule t-iistory of Weather Satellites, Release No. set for each—all are important factors in deter- 76-1 46; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washing- mining the success of a space application. ton, D.C, 20546, 92 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

;1' ..."- .: ", If

.... . i

NOAA's weather satellite (SMS-2) photographed hurricane Katrina off the coast of Baja, Calif., Sept. 3, 1975

● Weather data distribution is a public service. prompts periodic review of the standing pro Data are supplied to non-Government users oosal to ioin them. These reviews unfailing at cost of reproduction, the Government iyconcl~de that specialized military applic~ beari ng the enti re cost of development of the tions require an independent program. Like system and of collection and dissemination wise, the very different requirements of the of data. civili~n syste~-widespread dissemination of uncensored data over various users in the ● Separate civilian and military weather satel United States, and interaction with the in lite systems. Similarity of the measurements ternational meteorological community-mil taken for the civilian and the military systems itate against a merger. Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program . 93

● Extensive cooperation with other nations. need for scientific research in space. A continu- The United States participates in large-scale ing strong, science-based program has been char- experiments and provides open and ready acteristic of the civilian space effort since its very access to the results. beginning. There are some important features of ● Open data policy. Data are supplied. . the science program that require further com- worldwide to”all users. ment: Because of the doubtful commercial potential ● University participation. The major partici- of weather satellite services, the Government’s pants in science programs have been univer- role of operator (as well as developer) of weather sity-based experimenters who provided the satellite systems was not controversial. As a result, basic ideas for measurements to be made the weather program, unlike the Landsat pro- and, in some cases, the basic designs of the gram, has sparked no debate over management instruments to be flown to make these meas- structure, data handling, or pace of development. urements. Commercial interest is almost in- If the data provided by the weather programs visible, and the principal competition for ex- were to be of commercial value, they would re- perimenter roles is between government lab- quire additional processing and integration with oratory scientists and university science other, related data. Until the recent COMSAT in- teams. terest in assuming ownership of the meteorologi- ● National Academy of Sciences. 11 The Na- cal satellites along with the Landsat system the tional Academy of Sciences, through its possibility that the private sector might convert Space Science Board, has done much to set such data collection and interpretation to its own the agenda for space science, identifying use seemed remote. both a general rationale for many measurement programs and the specific nature of the The weather satellite program has shown that most attractive experiments. The Academy’s global cooperation has been most active and ef- pronouncements have also had a major role fective in meteorological and weather services– in such areas as lunar quarantine and plan- areas where commercial and national security in- etary contamination, even to the point of terests are muted. Relations among NASA, stimulating major investments for such items NOAA, and the user community demonstrate as a quarantine facility for handling lunar that it is possible to have separate R&D, opera- samples and astronauts on their return from tional, and user responsibilities, and yet to main- the Moon. In planetary programs, the Acad- tain a viable service. Reasonable technological emy’s recommendations were instrumental progress has been made under this arrangement. in determining the criteria for judging the ac- Separate military and civilian programs have ex- ceptable degree of risk that Earth micro- isted because of differing user requirements, and organisms might contaminate a planet’s sur- prospects that military and civilian users can face. The Academy’s influence was reflected make greater use of common data streams, chan- in the programs by the requirements for pro- neled separately to each, must remain subject to longed heat soak sterilization, for spacecraft periodic review. encapsulization, and for selection of acceptable trajectories of approach to the planet. Scientific Research and Exploration ● International cooperation. Historically, the As pointed out in the section on the interna- science program has been international in tional Geophysical Year, the initial rationale for scope, and it appears to be moving toward the U.S. civilian space program was based on the even greater international cooperation in the

IOj. V. Charyle, testimony before the Subcommittee on Space Sci- 11 Outer P~net5 &p/oration, 1972-1985, National Academy of Sci- ence and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technol- ences, Washington, D. C., 1971, and Opportunities and Choices ogy, U.S. House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Sci- in Space Science, 1974, Space Science Board, National Research ence, Technology and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Council; National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C., Nov. Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, July 22, 23, 1981. 11, 1974. 94 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

design of missions and the development of program, and recognized that the next step of experiment payloads. equivalent scope would be a commitment to Difficulty of keeping project teams. As mis- manned planetary exploration. They did not, sions become more complex, expensive, however, endorse such a commitment. Instead, and international in flavor, and as the time they recommended a more balanced program in between mission opportunities grows, it which manned planetary exploration was still becomes increasingly difficult for U.S. sci- very much in the long-term picture, but which ence teams to remain active and involved would place greater emphasis on unmanned sci- with the program. Even assuming that only ence and applications missions in the short term. the best teams are retained, there is never- Manned flight would continue, but at a much theless a narrowing of the base from which more leisurely pace. Interestingly, the report rec- new experiments and ideas originate, with ommended work toward a space station module resultant long-term negative impact on the in the mid-l970’s, but suggested that this date quality of NASA’s science effort. Fewer flight could slip depending on the pace of a national opportunities also may bring about a subtle commitment toward manned planetary explora- leaning toward NASA experimenters, al- tion. The major justification for such a station was though it is intended that there be no bias long-duration studies of how humans react to toward the in-house groups; and lengthy exposure to the space environment. In Emphasis on spacecraft. The tendency the foreword to the PSAC report, the President within NASA has been to focus on develop- set a conservative tone, stating that the “oppor- ment and launch of the spacecraft and its tunities in space are great but the costs are high payload, and its operation to obtain the . . . “ without endorsing a future program or set desired data. Data analysis and interpreta- of new guidelines. tion and continuing exploitation of the information or material from these missions NASA pressed forward with ambitious plans for tends to be given lower priority and is almost post-Apollo lunar exploration, further develop- always in need of greater budget support. ment of the space station, manned planetary flight options using Apollo-based hardware and exotic Post-Apollo Planning new systems, such as the nuclear rocket then under development. No approval of such plans In the mid-1960’s, planners from NASA joined was forthcoming from a Johnson administration PSAC, which had kept a close involvement with that was preoccupied with the costs and public space policy (despite being overruled at critical impact of the Vietnam conflict. Thus, the dramat- points such as the choice of lunar landing mode) ic decline in NASA budgets mentioned earlier to look toward the post-Apollo period and to con- began. Although NASA planning was somewhat sider possible courses of action. In February 1967, fragmented among the various program offices PSAC published a comprehensive report attempt- and lacked coherence, the problem resulted prin- ing to answer the basic question, “Where does cipally not from a lack of planning, but rather the Nation go in space in the post-Apollo peri- from a failure to generate consensus on what the od?”lz Consistent with the major emphasis of the Nation wanted from its civilian space program and civilian program started by Apollo, one of the ma- was willing to pay for. jor preoccupations of that report was the future evolution of the manned flight program, for res- Long-range planning exercises can have a ben- olution of this issue would affect the budget more eficial result because they help to clarify the op- than any other. The advisory panels that drafted tions and develop consensus on what the next the report were acutely aware of the importance steps should be. However, they have little effect of Apollo in stimulating a very vigorous and broad on obtaining political and budgetary commitments, which often appear to depend more on lz~~e space ~fogfa~ in the Post-Apo/lo Period, a Report of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, the White House, Febru- external factors such as national or international ary 1967. crises. Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program Ž 95

Earth Observations Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS). But this effort occurred at a time when the gen- The experience gained in flying weather satel- eral attitude toward space ventures was lites and from military reconnaissance programs changing from the expansionary vision of (not publicly discussed at that time because of Apollo to a more conservative and cost- a policy decision to protect the “fact that” such conscious approach. The recommendations activities were taking place) indicated both the of PSAC are indicative: feasibility and value of Earth observations, pro- . . . a reasonably clear case of potential util- vided there was sufficient resolution either spatial- ity must be made, which includes potential ly or spectrally to evaluate the nature of the ob- economic benefit, before significant served scene. J Since there were multiple uses development costs are assumed. and users for Earth observation data, and no one .,. space technology has passed the point single user appeared to have a dominant role or where the demonstration of mere feasibil- need, there was considerable delay between rec- ity of a particular application has any technological or prestige significance.14 ognition of the value of satellite remote-sensing observations and the initiation of a program to In this environment, NASA was initially obtain them from space. There were a number unable to provide credible cost-benefit data of reasons for this delay. Among them were: and user contributions that would substan- tiate the need for such a system. Further ● Concern by the national security community studies ensued, more user support was en- that there would be some international pro- listed, and still the case for ERTS did not ap- tests if sufficiently high-resolution civil data pear persuasive. Finally it was approved, were to be collected that would have intel- largely on faith that existence of a real data ligence/military value. This was resolved by stream from the satellite would stimulate setting a limit on the resolution permitted for uses (and users) enough to build a positive any civil system; cost-benefit case to proceed toward an oper- ● Lack of a clear lead agency responsibility. ational system. The Department of the Interior tried to solve Opposition from those who supported air- this problem in 1967 by announcing an craft for Earth surveys. While not as signifi- EROS satellite program for Earth observations cant as the factors mentioned above, the ac- primarily of geological interest, but this an- tive promotion of the use of high-altitude air- nouncement was made without obtaining craft as an alternative to spacecraft platforms White House, Bureau of the Budget, Office showed the acceptance of satellite remote of Science and Technology, or National sensing. The arguments about the relative Security Council (NSC) approval. Conse- merits of each approach are not important quently, it was killed quietly (largely because to this assessment, but it is significant that these approval and coordination steps had aircraft data collection would probably have not been taken) in the budget process. NASA been carried out by one or more private con- had the responsibility for the necessary R&D, tractors whereas ERTS required NASA man- and the weather satellite experience dem- agement, direction, and participation in data onstrated that a suitable working arrange- handling, spacecraft operational control, etc. ment could be established between the R&D While NASA opposed reliance on aircraft, leader and the operator and user. NASA it nevertheless recognized their value and began to exercise this role and pull together subsequently organized a substantial high- the various potential users in connection altitude aircraft program based on the U-2. with the definition of the experimental Earth Of course, the ease of global coverage for a satellite as compared with an aircraft was

13A Retrospective on Earth-Resource Surveys: Arguments About not contested. It was simply unclear at that Technology, Analysis, Politics, and Bureaucracy. U.S. Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency; Photogrammetric Engineering and laThe Space program in the Post-Apollo Period, PSAC, Wruav Remote Sensing, vol. 42, No. 2, February 1976, Washington, D.C. 1967. 96 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tional innovation for Earth sensing, either nationally or internationally, as there was in the case of COMSAT and INTELSAT.)

Space Task Group At the beginning of the Nixon administration, the Apollo program was rapidly coming to a successful close, but no clear definition of a post- Apollo space program had emerged. Early planning efforts had failed to yield a consensus, and space program budgets had decreased dramatically, presenting the new administration with growing unemployment in the aerospace industry as well as a major technological agency that did not have clear signals regarding its future. in order to address these problems, the presidential Space SUN Task Group (STG) was established under the chairmanship of the Vice President. The STG review was the first comprehensive interagency ( planning effort that was carried out with respect to the civilian space program. It also included a component directed toward future military ap- time how ERTS data on other countries plications in space and was subject to special would be collected and used, particularly in security classification restrictions. Its principal a processed or interpreted form. focus, however, was on the future nature and ● Lack of an organized user community in the pace of activities in connection with the civilian private sector. Much of the early interest in manned space flight program, While NASA’s Earth observations from space centered in leadership was not particularly pleased to have Federal Government agencies whose mis- its future programs become the object of an inter- sions could be accomplished more effective- agency planning effort, it recognized the need ly if satellite data were available. Neither for broader consensus regarding its future objec- State and local governments nor potential tives, particularly because the new administra- users in the private sector were willing to tion had made no budget commitment. (This lack make early commitments. In each category, of budget commitment was a continuation of the there was a typical pattern: the potential user trend that had begun in the Johnson administra- might find the data useful, but was largely tion.) The assignment for STG included taking a incapable of analyzing his needs or even of rather long-range perspective extending out conducting the research necessary to under- through the decade. As in the earlier review by stand them more adequately. Therefore, the PSAC, a key issue was the question of NASA was funded to support a wide array whether to propose a new manned mission to of user experiments as part of ERTS-1, in the planets. order to improve the base of understanding In their recommendations, STG recom- of the value of the satellite output. (Lack of mended commitment to a balanced program that an organized and established user commu- included science, applications, and technology nity for ERTS, or Landsat, as it was renamed, development objectives, but no immediate com- contrasts with the situation for early space mitment to manned planetary missions. They sug- telecommunications services where the entities for long-haul telephone services already 1 srhe poSt.Ap//o Space Program: Directions for the Future,Space existed. Similarly, there has been no institu- Task Group Report to the President, September 1969. Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program . 97

gested no change in institutional structure nor an ● It did not attempt to seek a single consen- operations role for NASA. Emphasizing interna- sus on the program level, but rather provided tional cooperation, STG was given special em- a number of options from which the Presi- phasis and it was suggested that NASA should dent could select. give greater attention to possible cooperative opportunities. The major technological develop- STG provides an interesting example of the dif- ment STG suggested was the reusable space shut- ficulty of making long-term plans for the space tle system that could eventually lead to develop- program. The administrator of NASA was obvi- ment of a permanent space station. The clear pri- ously in a position that he would have rather ority was for shuttle development first, with space avoided (it being certainly less difficult to deal station modules as a potential future technical with a single OMB review on the budget and pro- development. Manned planetary exploration was gram than to obtain consensus from an interagen- retained as a long-range option for the civilian cy group, several members of which may have space program with a “manned Mars mission be- competitive objectives). Hence, STG represented, fore the end of this century as a first target.” on the surface, a very difficult forum for presentation, analysis, and eventual development of a STG presented a number of budget options in consensus on the NASA program. In this forum, connection with these recommendations, permit- the view of both NASA and DOD representatives ting the program that was recommended to be tended to favor continuing large-scale space in- carried out at several rates. The response to STG vestments with a multitude of new systems iden- recommendations was not immediately forth- tified by their technical laboratory and support- coming. The President’s advisers, faced with ing contractor structures. A more restrained note other serious budget and international relations was set by OMB and OSTP representatives. As problems including the Vietnam conflict, deferred the deliberations in STG proceeded, the question action on the basic recommendations until the of a major new focus for the civilian program in subsequent budget cycle. At this point, in a very the next decade, equivalent to the role that general response to the recommendations, the Apollo played in the previous decade, became clear image of a relatively conservative and con- a major issue. strained program emerged. New mission commitments were folded into a general ceiling for the In general, STG believed that the technology agency that was established at slightly above $3 existed for a manned Mars mission and that such billion. a mission, if accepted as a new goal, could serve to energize and focus attention on the space pro- The Space Task Group effort was notable for gram in a beneficial way. The Vice President be- a number of reasons: came convinced that such a mission would be ● It was the first major interagency planning an exercise of leadership which he viewed as effort with regard to the civilian space missing from the space area and he supported program. this goal as a target. He was not able to convince ● It involved participation from the general the remaining members of the task group that this public as well as agency representatives. goal was realistic, and acceptable to the public, ● OMB was involved, with the explicit reser- but it was endorsed in a somewhat ambiguous vation that its participation would not pre- way as a “potential” goal or “option” for the pro- clude its normal budget review and analysis gram. In this way, it could serve to guide deci- when specific budget requests were pro- sions regarding the development of new capabili- posed. ty for man in space. In STG’S recommendations, ● It was comprehensive in including both the terminology was chosen very carefully in DOD as well as NASA interests, particularly order to maintain an option for the Vice presi- with regard to launch vehicles. dent and the Administrator of NASA to make ● it took a long-term view, specifically focus- further appeals that would support their program ing on the next decade. objectives and yet have a report to the President 98 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

that all STG participants could approve. In addi- tude of space expenditures and questioned the tion, there were certain “code words” that were value gained from those expenditures, the STG used that had considerable significance beyond report appeared to be too optimistic, too positive their direct connotation. For example, the use of regarding the nature of new space opportunities. the term “new capability” implied very specifical- This ambiguity permitted individuals with some- ly a development program that would involve a what different perspectives to see in it what they manned, reusable launch vehicle as the first wished to see while the report retained some of major element. On completion of this first devel- its essential characteristics. Specifically, it per- opment, the next major commitment would be mitted the Vice president to advocate a vigorous to a continuing orbital habitat for man, i.e., a new commitment such as a manned mission to space station. The order in which these new the planets before the end of the century and systems would be developed was a major source OMB to look at a program which eventually was of controversy within STG, and the eventual projected at a very modest continuing budget agreement on the shuttle as the first element rep- level. STG issued its report as a public document resented a major change in direction within after briefing the President, and it was in this NASA. period that public and congressional response was evaluated to determine the nature of the The space shuttle appeared to be a logical and commitment that could develop around the con- most effective way to maintain the capability for cepts that were proposed. It was only later, in continuing use of man in space while simulta- the context of specific budget reviews, that the neously providing a capability for launch and decisions would be taken on the STG recommen- recovery of unmanned space payloads as well. dations. At the time, the space shuttle was not completely defined, but its essential and desirable operating Interagency reviews can serve to build a con- characteristics were clearly spelled out.lb The al- stituency for space program initiatives. For exam- ternatives for maintaining a manned flight capa- ple, the STG recommendation focused attention bility were: continued use of Apollo hardware in on the space shuttle program as the next major the future, wherein the cost and reliability of each step in technology development. NASA in-house succeeding hardware set would become more planning exercises do not appear to have the difficult to predict; or the development of a new same effect. A key element is participation by capsule and launch vehicle combination such as elements of the Executive Office of the President the Titan Ill, a modified Gemini system. in order to bridge the communications gap from agency to President. Such reviews are not suffi- Overall, STG accomplished several important cient to generate a political commitment to costly objectives. It clarified the nature of the major op- new programs, but may be a necessary precursor. tions facing the Nation with regard to the space program. it identified the rough costs associated with pursuing many of these options. It suggested The Shuttle Decision several new emphases for the space program (in- In the period immediately after the STG report, ternational cooperation, new systems that were NASA programs continued with no major new reusable) and the increased development of ap- commitment to a new development. During this plications. it made a clear call for continuing the period, the attention of the agency was focused man in space program and suggested the logical on completing revisits to the Moon using already steps in that program. However, it did not pro- developed and purchased Apollo hardware, and claim a specific new Apollo-type goal. As a con- using a modified version of this hardware in a pro- sequence, in the minds of many space enthusi- totype manned habitat called Skylab.17 Skylab asts, it did not go far enough. On the other hand, was an effort to stretch the utility of Apollo hard- to those who were concerned about the magni-

lbNeW Space Trans~fiation Systems, an AIAA assessment, Jan. I zArneriCa NeW &cade in Space, a report to the Space Task 9, 1973. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1290 Group prepared by National Aeronautics and Space Administra- Avenue of the Americas, N. Y., New York 10019. tion, September 1969. Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 99

ware, demonstrate manned flight in Earth orbit with a new-generation space capsule, or as part over a prolonged period, and perform a num- of a space shuttle program in which man would ber of operations, including observations with a be involved both as a pilot and as a participant solar telescope, During this period, NASA was in Earth-orbital experiment programs (including given initial exploratory funding for the space the launch and recovery of unmanned satellite shuttle design and early development work on systems from low-Earth orbit). a new liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen, high-pres- A firm commitment to the space shuttle re- sure rocket engine that would be suitable for a mained an open question until the very last shuttle. The need to make a major commitment to the shuttle came to a focus in the context of Presidential decisions were being made on the the review of the fiscal year 1973 budget that was fiscal year 1973 program. During this period, the employment impact of a positive decision on the carried out in the fall of 1971. At that time, the reelection campaign of 1972 loomed on the ho- shuttle was analyzed in great detail. In January 1972, the President made a well-publicized com- rizon for the Nixon administration. Also at that mitment to a space shuttle development program. time, unemployment in the aerospace industry This commitment was constrained by some key was a major political embarrassment, and the guidelines: review of the NASA program in the fall of 1971 gave particular attention to the short-term em- ● The shuttle would be carried out under a ployment picture. NASA was by this time com- budget target rather than on the basis of a mitted to a shuttle development program as the schedule that had to be met. The budget tar- next major step in the advancement of space get that was eventually agreed to was for a technology. Also developed by NASA was a considerably scaled-down shuttle from the major economic evaluation of the shuttle based one originally projected by NASA, with a on an elaborate mission model that projected development program cost targeted at slight- missions in various categories of activities out ly over $5 billion in constant 1971 dollars. through the end of the decade. In NASA’s presen- ● The shuttle was expected to be a “national” tations, the economic benefit of proceeding with program, that is, it would serve all agency a space shuttle was part of its argument in favor launch needs for payloads that were in the of adopting this program. To the analysts in OMB, shuttle range. Specifically, this requirement however, this argument was unpersuasive, be- implied that NASA and DOD would need cause, in part, shuttle development costs were to define a common, acceptable payload bay highly speculative and the mission model con- size, operating characteristics, and compati- tained a large number of questionable assump- ble subsystems. (At the time, the questions tions about the civilian program. In the analysis to be resolved included whether DOD for the fiscal year 1973 budget, the major issue would have its own shuttle orbiter, whether was whether or not the United States should con- DOD would have its own crews, whether tinue with a manned flight program, and if so, classified payloads would be incorporated with what technical systems. OMB concluded with an unclassified payload, etc.) The major that the United States would derive a majority premise was that such a substantial invest- of the benefits from space activities without a ment in a new technological capability could manned flight component. However, this deci- not reasonably be made unless it would sion would have had dramatic impact on the serve or be capable of serving the broadest nature of the NASA establishment (resulting in set of national needs. the closing of at least two major centers) and ● The initial concept included the possibility would have lowered NASA budgets to approx- that DOD would assume some degree of imately $2 billion or less per year. At this rate, funding responsibility for shuttle develop- there could still be a very vigorous unmanned ment. This was subsequently modified in science and applications program. Manned flight, view of the rather substantial DOD budgets on the other hand, could be continued, either already in existence for other weapons sys- with modified and extended Apollo hardware, tems and space developments. It was agreed 100 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

that DOD’s share of the program develop- tle development program. Thus, growth in shut- ment costs would be limited to DOD fund- tle funding requirements would have a tenden- ing for the west coast launch site for the shut- cy to squeeze out other new programs. It was tle and a companion interim upper stage de- this aspect that was viewed with great alarm by velopment for boosting shuttle payloads into those who supported greater emphasis on space higher orbits. science and applications activities. Thus, the shut- ● International cooperation in the shuttle pro- tle decision was not a completely happy one in gram was also an objective; it was satisfied this community. One of the most important by the eventual agreement that the Euro- lessons to be learned from the shuttle decision peans would construct a laboratory module is that a commitment to continued manned space to be carried as a shuttle payload. flight has the greatest budget impact and is the most politically driven part of the space program. The shuttle decision was a multiyear develop- Such factors as aerospace employment or na- ment commitment, not as aggressive or substan- tional image therefore have a strong bearing on tial as NASA would have liked, but yet ensuring the continuing utilization of the technical development and management capabilities of the Johnson and Marshall Space Flight Centers and a new development activity for the Kennedy Space Center. Most viewed the shuttle as a program that would act to stimulate some technology development, but would not be so complex or difficult to achieve as to be threatened by major overruns or schedule delays. The shuttle had great potential for changing the way people would think about placing payloads into space; e.g., it would change the design of these payloads to allow reuse and repair, it would permit human tending and space checkout prior to launch into orbit, it would increase the flexibility of space operations to allow larger crews and potentially less-trained scientific personnel to conduct operations in space, and ultimately it would be the key to any continuing Earth-orbital habitat for man, since it would provide resupply at a much more reasonable cost than use of expendable vehicles. On the negative side, the President and Con- gress recognized that initiating shuttle development and terminating the limited program utilizing existing Apollo hardware would result in a hiatus in manned flight for a period of 4 to 5 years. During this period the Soviet Union would have an opportunity to initiate new space spectaculars with uncertain international and domestic political impact. The commitment to substantial shuttle development funding within a constrained NASA budget implied an additional problem. As Photo credit: Nationa/ Aeronauts and Space Administration part of the shuttle commitment, NASA was given some assurance it could plan on level budgets, Air Force Titan ///-C lifting off to launch Applications Technology Satellite 6, May 30, 1974. The first in a in constant dollars, for the duration of the shut- generation of NASA communications satellites Ch. 4—Development and Characteristics of the U.S. Space Program ● 101 decisions that are made and must be factored into that were available and to package these tech- the technical aspects. nologies in larger and more capable satellites. Thus, in the intervening years, the telecom- Communications R&D Decision munications technology advancements that were typically a responsibility of NASA have for the NASA responsibility for a leadership role in most part not occurred in the United States. Start- developing space capabilities, performing the ing from a very inferior technological position, necessary R&D in all of the areas of interest in- the Europeans and the Japanese have built con- volving space systems, had included an early and siderable competence in this field, and in some substantial role in developing the basic technol- areas appear to have leapfrogged U.S. technologies that were vital to the increasingly sophis- ogy. ticated civilian communications satellite business. These technologies were demonstrated in a series The decision of the Carter administration to of applications technology satellites. The technol- return more responsibility to NASA for R&D in ogies included advanced stabilization techniques, satellite communications provided, somewhat the control of satellite position in synchronous belatedly, that the agency would again assert itself orbit and, in the last satellite of the series, a in this field as an agent for technology push. demonstration of broadcast technology from the NASA has interpreted its charge to mean that sat- satellite to small, low-cost ground stations. ellite systems initiated under this new, invigorated program should have a potential direct applica- The second of these broadcast satellites that tion; the agency expects industry to support these was scheduled to be launched was terminated programs to some degree. The current plan in- by OMB. Additionally, OMB acted to reduce sig- cludes, first, development of collaborative agree- nificantly the role of NASA as developer and ments certifying to OMB that industry’s interest demonstrator of advanced satellite telecom- is genuine, and second, provision that any dem- munications technology. The leadership for this onstration system, if successful, may have a direct change in emphasis came from the Office of application, Telecommunications Policy (OTP) and was consistent with the trend to place greater responsibili- Without Government support for high-risk ap- ty in the private sector for telecommunications plications systems R&D, the competitive posture systems developments. The assumption underly- of the United States may slip vis-~-vis other na- ing this decision was that NASA’s contributions tions that do subsidize their industry. The cur- were not necessary to maintain the sophistica- rent legislative authority for NASA does not pre- tion of current and projected communications clude major reductions in its role as a sponsor satellite systems. In addition, OTP believed that of advanced R&D, suggesting an opportunity to the revenues obtained from satellite communica- clarify the meaning and significance of “leader- tions to support work in the industry at such ship in aeronautical and space activities” as stated technical centers as the COMSAT Laboratories in the NAS Act, were sufficient to enable incremental improvements to be made during the foreseeable President’s Space Policy future. DOD’s R&D role in telecommunications Statement of 1978 satellites was not similarly reduced, and it was ex- In october 1978, President Carter released a pected that DOD would continue to support space policy statement that summarized the im- technology advances in this area. portant aspects of the administration review of The most immediate effect of the decision was space policy and provided guidance regarding to stimulate the technology development ac- the President’s view of national objectives in the tivities of a number of potential foreign com- space program over the next several years. This petitors in the telecommunications satellite area, statement reaffirmed endorsement of a balanced because the basic approach of U.S. industry was space program and committed the administration to continue to exploit the proved technologies to the continued development of the space shut- 102 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tle system and its use during the coming decade. ture to address such issues as might arise. This However, the statement made no new commit- role had previously been played by the National ments and specifically rejected any major new Aeronautics and Space Council until it was abol- technological development. No multiyear pro- ished in 1973. An important consequence of util- gram or goal was set to provide a focus for the izing the NSC structure is a rather strong orien- program and the general philosophy was best tation towards national security and military af- characterized by the statement that “activities will fairs. Issues arising in the civilian space program be pursued in space when it appears that national often have international importance, but as a mat- objectives can most efficiently be met through ter of practice, they have been considered sepa- space activities. ” Overall, the policy statement rately from those concerning national security or left many questions unanswered. It made several the military space program. The placement of this statements about what the United States would mechanism under the NSC provides a somewhat not do in space but remained very general regard- different flavor to the approach to civilian space ing the nature of what we would do in space. In policysetting. It is also important to note that this addition, it became clear that fiscal constraints mechanism is intended to provide a means for were likely, and as a consequence, commitment resolving issues but not to provide planning or to specific multiyear programs was very likely to goal setting for space activities. be taken only with great care. This announce- An alternative to the NSC structure would have ment was received with some dismay by the con- been to conduct space policy review under the gressional leaders involved with the space pro- auspices of the Federal Coordinating Council for gram and by the aerospace community. This con- Science, Engineering, and Technology, a group cern spawned a number of hearings and pro- that has a parallel function and is also chaired posed legislative approaches to a more vigorous by the Director of the OSTP. The Federal Coun- space policy for the United States and led to the cil has a charter, and is specifically charged with request to. OTA for the current assessment. the coordination of activities among the principal agencies performing R&D, the recommendation NSC Policy Review Committee (Space) of policy, and associated questions. Yet this mechanism was avoided in favor of the NSC set- The review of space policy undertaken by the ting. In part, this recognizes the great importance Carter administration revealed that there was no of space to the national security, the greater in- procedure for adjudicating interagency disagree- fluence of the NSC, and the fact that the space ments about space issues. To remedy this defect, policy review originally arose in the context of a policy review committee chaired by the Direc- an issue regarding civilian/military space relation- tor of OSTP was established within the NSC struc- ships. Chapter 5 U.S. CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM Contents

Page Table No. Page Our Dependence on Space ...... 105 9. STS Operations Traffic Model ...... 128 10. Distribution of Opinion Toward Current Status and Planned Future Federal Spending on the Space Activities ...... 109 Program: 1973 Through 1980...... 137 Applications ...... 109 11. Percentage of Americans Favoring Communication ...... 109 Increased Funding, and Relative Technology ...... 110 Priority Rankings, for ll Areas of New Programs ...... 114 Federal Government Spending, 1977 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and 1980 ...... 137 System ...... 116 12. Public Priorities for Federal R&D Navigation ...... 116 Spending ...... 138 Satellite Remote Sensing ...... 116 13. Perceived Benefits From Space Ocean Sensing ...... 116 Exploration ...... 139 Earth Resources Sensing ...... 117 Profile of Public Attitudes of Space Landsat Technology ...... 118 14. Exploration: “in General Do You Space Segment ...... 118 Favor or Oppose the Exploration of Ground Segment ...... 121 Other Remote-Sensing Programs . . . . 122 Outer Space?” ...... 139 International Weather Activities . . . . . 125 15. How Would You Rank the Importance Materials Processing in Space ...... 125 of Various Uses of the Space Shuttle? ...... 142 Space Transportation ...... 127 16. “ls the Space Shuttle Program Worth Space Construction ...... 128 Spending Several Billion Dollars Over Solar Power in Space ...... 130 the Next IO Years to Develop Its Full Space Science ...... 132 Potential?” ...... 142 Public Attitudes on Space ...... 135 Pubiic Opinion and Space Policy: 1965-80 ...... 136 interest Groups and Space Policy . . . 140 Space Achievement and Public LIST OF FIGURES Opinion: 1981 ...... 141 Figure No. Page l. The Communications Problem ...... 112 LIST OF TABLES 2. Earth Resources Sensing ...... 119 Table No. Page 3. Landsat Bands and Electromagnetic 3. U.S. Government Civilian Satellite Spectrum Comparison ...... 122 Systems ...... 105 4. Current and Probable Landsat Ground 4. U.S. Military Satellite Systems...... 106 Stations ...... 123 5. Selected Groups of Civilian Spacecraft 5. Shuttle Manifest Through 1984...... 129 Launched by NASA From 1950 6. Current NASA Expendable Launch to 1980 ...... 109 Vehicles ...... 130 6. Selected Groups of Potential Future 7. Initial Space Station Conception . . . . . 130 NASA Spacecraft ...... 110 8. Solar Power Satellite Reference 7. Overview of Landsat Applications in System ...... 131 the 50 States ...... 120 9, Long-Term Trend Polling Results of 8. Summary of Operational Landsat U.S. Public Opinion on the Federal Applications in the States ...... 121 Space Effort ...... 136 Chapter 5 U.S. CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM

OUR DEPENDENCE ON SPACE

The extent to which the modern world in gen- News reporting all over the world would be eral and the United States in particular have be- severely restricted and delayed. Global television come dependent on space technology is not gen- reporting would be out of the question, so that erally appreciated. If the United States were to news from the international wire services would cease using space systems, day-to-day life and be restricted to stories and photographs that business activities throughout society would be could be taped or transmitted as they were before disrupted. National security would be jeopard- the space age, through uncertain and congested ized as well. This section outlines the effects of ground links or via private courier. Newspaper doing without space, first in the civilian sector, editors in the United States would be left in the then in the military sector. Tables 3 and 4 list the same quandary as their television counterparts, major U.S. space systems. especially in receiving news from remoter regions such as the Middle East, South Africa, and South- In the civilian sector, long-cl;stance communic- east Asia. ations would be perhaps hardest hit. Already over two-thirds of all overseas telephone traffic Domestic television service of the major net- is carried over satellite links provided by the In- works would be severely curtailed, not only to ternational Telecommunications Satellite Organi- relatively remote locations such as Alaska and zation (1 NTELSAT) system. Not only would private Hawaii, but even within the continental United citizens be unable to complete many of their States, About two-thirds of all cable television calls, but the rates for those calls completed service would be shut down, for much of both would have to rise in order to provide enough the basic-service national programing as well as capital to lay additional transatlantic cable to premium pay-television programing is transmitted replace the capacity lost from satellite circuits. to cable television systems across the Nation via

Table 3.—U.S. Government Civilian Satellite Systems

Program Orbit Purpose GOES (2)...... Geosynchronous Meteorological NOAA (3)...... Geosynchronous Meteorological TDRSS (first launch...... Geosynchronous Communications relay from other early 1983) satellites to ground HEAO (High Energy Astronomy Observatory). . . LEO Scientific NIMBUS...... Polar Meteorological TIROS...... Polar Meteorological Landsat-3...... Polar Earth observation Landsat-D (mid 1982)...... Polar DE (2)...... (1) Elliptical Electromagnetic field observation, space science (Dynamics Explorer)...... (1) LEO Scientific SBS (3)...... Geosynchronous Communication data, voice, video RCA (4)...... Geosynchronous Communication data, voice, video Comstar (4)...... Geosynchronous Communication (COMSAT) data, voice, video Westar (3)...... Geosynchronous Communication (Western Union) data, voice, video AT&T (2)...... Geosynchronous Communication data, voice, video

Marisat (3)...... Geosynchronous Marine Communication (COMSAT) data & voice

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

105 —---..———. .—

106 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 4.—U.S. Military Satellite Systems

Program Satellites Functions Defense Satellite Communications System II (DSCS 11)...... 4 active High capacity super high frequency 2 dormant spares communications. Part of Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). Satellite Data System (SDS). . . . . 3 Carries AFSATCOM transponders.

Air Force Satellite Communications System (A FSATCOM) ...... Radio transponders carrod on UHF communications among National Command SDS, FLTSATCOM (other Authority, Joint Chiefs. Military Commanders in satellites?) Chief, and nuclear capable forces. Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM)...... 3 UHF and separate SHF uplink. Naval Communications System operates over U.S. Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Contains some jam-resistant 5-KHz channels for AFSATCOM, 1,500-KHz channel for Presidential support for Defense Support Program network of regional commands. (DSP) ...... 3 Early warning of ICBM, SLBM launches by infrared detection of rocket plumes. Also carries visible light detectors and radiation sensors for detecting nuclear explosions. Provides surveillance of missile test launches. Photographic Reconnaissance. . . 2 types Area-search and close-look remote sensing.

Electronic (Signals) Intelligence. . At least 5 launches since 1973

Geodetic Satellite...... 6 Photographic mapping in three dimensions. Radar altimeter for topographical mapping of Iand and seacoasts. Defense Meteorological...... 2 block 5D spacecraft Visual and infrared images satellite programs (most recent launch weather conditions, global failed) coverage four times a day. Navy Navigation Satellite System...... TRANSIT (5 operating?) NOVA Measurement in Doppler shift of radio emissions from satellites permits ship and aircraft navigators to find position. Global Positioning System (GPS)...... 6 NAVSTAR (18 now planned) Precisely timed radio beacons will allow users to determine position in three dimensions to within 10 m velocity to O.lm/sec. Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection System (IONDS). . . . . Aboard GPS, beginning with Detect and monitor nuclear explosions worldwide NAVSTAR 5 using bhangmeter sensors and GPS location data. Space Detection and Tracking System ...... Ground-based cameras, radar, Data funneled into Aerospace Defense Command and radio receivers Space Defense Operations Center, Colorado Springs, Colo. Identification and tracking of objects in space.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 107 communications satellite transponders, Future No longer would satellites be available for gath- plans for a variety of direct broadcast satellite ering data for studying the movement of air television and information programs to private masses and the transformation of pollutants in the homes and businesses would be canceled. lower atmosphere. Similarly, of longer term concern, it would no longer be possible to monitor Several less obvious services would no longer the chemistry, radiation exchange, and dynamics be possible. Weather reporting would be severe- of the upper atmosphere in order to predict the ly hampered; no synoptic view of large portions long-term effects of human activities on these of the Earth from either polar orbits or from geo- regions. Therefore, it might not be possible to synchronous orbit would be available. These know until too late whether man-made chemicals services are especially necessary for viewing the will continue to reduce the amount of ozone in development of large weather patterns over the the ozone layer, and what ill effects such a reduc- ocean several hundred miles off shore. Meteor- tion might have on human life in this generation ologists would have to rely once again on piec- and the next. ing together fragments of weather observations from observation ships, radiosonde balloons, The NIMBUS weather satellites of the National buoys, and light aircraft. Furthermore, observa- Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration tions of long-term changes in the ocean, atmos- (NOAA) with their coastal-zone color scanners, phere and polar ice would no longer be readily would no longer observe the colors of the oceans available. Without them, we could not predict over vast areas—revealing the murky green re- long-term trends as well as we do now. gions rich in plankton that are feeding grounds for schools of fish. Without this information, Navigation services would be significantly cur- fishing fleets would expend 10 to 20 percent tailed. Already more than 1,000 ships rely on sat- more marine fuel to locate their catches, and ellite transmissions to ascertain their positions would pass along that increase in cost to the con- with great accuracy. Similar services soon to be sumer as a higher price for seafood. made available for use in remote land regions would no longer be possible. Ship-to-shore and The search for new sources of minerals and en- ship-to-ship communications via the global mari- ergy resources would be curtailed; sensors under time satellite communications system (MARlSAT) development, such as improved magnetometers would be dangerously reduced; the task of the or the multilineal array would not be sent into Navy, Coast Guard, and commercial ships on orbit. Without the data they promise to return, search-and-rescue missions would therefore be the ability to search for resources of long-range even more difficult. The International Maritime strategic importance, such as cobalt, titanium, Satellite Organization (l NMARSAT) would have and petroleum would be hindered. no raison d’être. Not only would all these applications become impossible, but many parts of space science Satellite remote-sensing services, which have would cease. No longer would spacecraft be been important for the Departments of Agricul- launched into orbit to study the activity of the ture, Commerce, and Interior, would be elimi- Sun or to observe the atmosphere and surface nated. No longer would satellite sensors be avail- of the planets. In the absence of orbiting sensors able to improve the management of the Nation’s and telescopes above the atmosphere to investi- agriculture, forest, range, land and water re- gate radiation at wavelengths unattainable on sources—or to monitor large-scale catastrophic Earth, ultraviolet, X-rays, gamma rays, cosmic events such as the eruption of Mount St. Helens. rays, future understanding of the structure and Worldwide crop forecasting, an essential service evolution of the universe would be severely lim- for the U.S. agricultural sector, would be made ited. much more difficult, nor would the United States be able to help developing countries to inven- Meanwhile, in the military sector, many sys- tory and manage their own resources. tems on which we rely for national security and —

108 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications for which adequate substitutes do not exist would activities ceased. Not only would future entre- be lost. Perhaps the most dangerous loss would preneurial activities in such areas as materials be the capability to monitor the military activities processing be cut off at the outset, the disap- of potential enemies. Surveillance satellites, pearance of space science as an existing disci- which monitor the ground with high resolution pline would wash up into the halls of major con- at visible and infrared wavelengths, with syn- tracting centers such as the Jet Propulsion Labo- thetic-aperature radar, and by electronic “ferret” ratory in Pasadena, Calif., and in major univer- listening devices, are essential to ensure that for- sities heavily committed to space investigation eign countries observe the terms of arms control (some 10 to 20). With the dissolution of the treaties and to provide early warning of a nuclear civilian space activities of the National Aero- attack. Military and diplomatic communications nautics and Space Administration (NASA), agree- abroad and at sea would be slower, less reliable ments with some 100 prime contractors would and less secure. There would be less ready access be canceled–forcing those contractors to cancel to high-speed instant communications between orders from subcontractors for specialized com- ground stations, field commanders, ships, sub- ponents. Since approximately two-thirds of the marines and long-range strategic bombers. Nav- U.S. civilian space budget is awarded each year igation and global positioning for military units to private contractors, as those commitments would be deprived of the high degree of preci- disappeared some 50,000 jobs with contractors sion available through the use of positional sat- related to space would also disappear—un- ellite systems. doubtedly adding a bit more burden to the unemployment rolls. Furthermore, those companies The way in which our society does business affected would probably retrench a bit on cor- would be seriously affected by the loss of space. porate advertising in various trade and lay pub- Not only would the availability of space services lications. That loss in advertising revenue would be cut off, but the revenue from those services cause a number of the heavily space-oriented would cease to flow. Perhaps hardest hit would publications to reduce the number of editorial be corporations in the communications business. pages in each issue and to perhaps contract their Many of the major cable television operators staffs. would suffer, since their principal revenue flows from satellite-carried pay-television programmers Although many workers connected with space such as Home Box Office, Showtime, and a doz- activities would probably find other employment en others. Furthermore, the loss of commercial- (a good number in military and civilian high tech- ly sponsored “basic” cable programing beamed nology), an important infrastructure of expertise from satellite transponders would cause adver- and experience would be lost. The future U.S. tisers to cancel their commercials and withdraw position in many areas of advanced technology their support-resulting in the bankruptcy of a would also be jeopardized—e.g., sensors, data number of programing sources. Western Union analysis, precision control systems. in addition, with its WESTAR satellites, RCA with its SATCOM through losing the extension of our society’s col- satellites, would feel similar blows, although the lective eyes and ears throughout the solar sys- impact would be somewhat lessened since tem, and losing the heartpounding excitement of the parent companies are diversified. Still, sharing an astronaut’s launch and experiments those employees directly connected with in orbit, the United States would lose an impor- those companies’ space segments—plus com- tant aspect of its shared national experience— panies such as the Communications Satellite the sense of adventure, confidence, self-esteem Corporation (COMSAT) whose entire business and world leadership provided by pursuing and was related to space—would find themselves succeeding at space activities over the past 25 either idled or in desperate straits. years. A final but important result of the dependence The conclusion of imagining what life in the on space systems is that a large number of jobs United States would be like without space sys- and business opportunities would be lost if space terns is that it would certainly be very different Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 109 and in many respects poorer. The extent of our argue that our dependence on space is great and present uses of space systems and the increas- will increase. ing promise of future uses of space technology

CURRENT STATUS AND PLANNED FUTURE ACTIVITIES

This section reviews the civilian space activities video transmissions. It includes broadcasting from of the United States in Government, industry, and one point to many, distributed over relatively academia, and the direction those activities are large areas; position-location activities such as likely to take in the near future (through 1990). navigation, traffic control, and search and rescue; Department of Defense (DOD) space activities and transmissions to, from, and among mobile are not treated in detail in this report except as transmitters and receivers (e.g., aircraft, ships, they directly relate to the civilian program. Table motor vehicles). 5 offers a glimpse of the generic space flight ac- In the civilian sector, point-to-point satellite tivities and spacecraft that have comprised the communications has been a commercial activ- U.S. civilian program. Table 6 shows NASA’s ity since the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 flight programs for the future. established COMSAT and designated it to represent U.S. interests in international, commercial Applications satellite communication. The Federal Communi- cations Commission (FCC) “Open Skies” deci- Communications sion in 1970 opened domestic satellite communi- Broadly speaking, satellite communications cations services to competition among commer- comprises point-to-point message, data, and cial entities. Today (early 1982) there are four

Table 5.—Selected Groups of Civilian Spacecraft Launched by NASA From 1950 to 1980

Launches Sponsor Number Purpose Spacecraft names (if not NASA) successful/total Years Astrophysics ...... Explorer, Orbiting Observatories ., ...... , . . 60/74 1961-80 Planetary...... Pioneer, Mariner, Viking, Voyager ...... 20/24 1962-78 Communicaions—R&D operational ...... Echo, Relay, Syncom, ATS, 13/16 1960-74 Intelsat, Westar, etc...... Commercial . . . . 39/43 1962-80 Meteorology—R&D operational ...... TIROS, Nimbus, SMS (1) ...... 22/24 1959-78 ITOS, GOES, NOAA(2) ...... NOAA...... 19/22 1966-80 Geodesy ...... Explorer, PAGEOS, GEOS, LAGEOS (3) ...... 717 1964-76 Terrestrial ...... ERTS, Landsat ...... 3/3 1972-78 Oceanography ...... Seasat (4) ...... 1/1 1978

(l), (2), (3) Also benefit oceanography: (2) GOES series DCS Sensor key: ALT ...... Altimeter NOAA series DCS, IR Cs ...... Color scanner Spacecraft Sensor DCS...... Data collection system (3) GEOS-3 ALT IR ...... Infrared radiometer MR...... Microwave radiometer (1) TIROS-N DCS, IR SAR...... Synthetic aperture radar NIMBUS-5 MR (4) Seasat sensor complement: SCAT...... Scatterometer NIMBUS-6 DCS, MR ALT, IR, MR, SAR, SCAT NIMBUS-7 CS, MR SMS DCS

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 110 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 6.—Selected Groups of Potential Future NASA Spacecraft

Earliest Purpose Spacecraft names Acronym launch Astrophysics ● 8 explorer-class satellites 1981-87 ● Space telescope 1985 Origin of plasmas in Earth’s neighborhood OPEN 1987 Gamma Ray Observatory GRO 1988 Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility AXAF 1989 Planetary ● Galileo (Jupiter) 1985 Halley Comet Flyby 1985 Venus orbiting imaging radar VOIR 1988 Communications–R&D 30/20 GHZ 1987

Meteorology—R&D ● Earth radiation budget experiment ERBE 1984 Upper atmospheric research satellite UARS 1988 NOAA next and GOES next 1989, 1990 Geodesy Gravity Satellite (1) GRAVSAT 1987 Terrestrial ● Landsat D & D’ 1982, 1983 Oceanography Topography experiment TOPEX 1987 Free-flying imaging radar experiment (2) FIREX 1988 ● These are the only spacecraft currently under development. (1) Also benefits oceanography. (2) Also benefits terrestrial. separate domestic systems in orbit, with a total 1973, COMSAT also managed the INTELSAT sys- of 10 satellites, providing voice, data, video, and tem, a global, commercial satellite communica- networking distribution services to a variety of tions system providing voice, data, and video clients: 1 ) the Comstar system of COMSAT Gen- transmission services to 103 countries. As man- eral provides services to the American Telephone ager for INTELSAT, COMSAT specified, procured, and Telegraph Co. (AT&T) and the General Tele- arranged for launch, and controlled satellites in phone and Electronics Corp.; 2) the RCA Ameri- the INTELSAT system. Under the definitive ar- can Communications system furnishes point-to- rangements, entered into force in 1973, most of point and video network distribution services to these functions have been taken over by the Di- private customers as well as to cable and terres- rector General of INTELSAT, assisted by an inter- trial broadcasting systems; 3) Western Union’s national staff, though COMSAT retains some re- WESTAR supplies point-to-point services to pri- sponsibilities. Domestic carriers perform these vate customers and video and radio network dis- functions themselves for their own satellites. tribution services to the Public Broadcasting Serv- NASA provides launches and launch services for ice and National Public Radio; and 4) Satellite all corporations under reimbursable contract Business Systems (SBS) provides data transmis- arrangements. sion services to industrial organizations. In addition, several other firms, among them Fairchild Technology Industries’ American Satellite Co., Southern Pa- Most communications satellites are placed in cific Communications, and Xerox Corp. ’s XTEN, geostationary satellite orbit (GSO), a circular orbit supply specialized communication services the center of which coincides with the Earth’s through transponders leased from satellite-own- center, and which lies in the plane of the Earth’s ing corporations. Other firms, not in the business Equator. It has a radius of some 42,200 km, which of transmission, lease satellite data or voice chan- corresponds to an altitude of some 35,800 km nels directly from members of other sets of car- above the Equator. On the GSO, a satellite moves riers. around the polar axis with the same period and In addition, COMSAT General owns and oper- in the same sense as does the Earth: as a result, ates the MARlSAT system, providing message and the satellite, if visible, would appear from the data transmission services to ships at sea. Until Earth to be stationed at a fixed point in the sky. Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 111

Because its celestial latitude is fixed at 0°, a GSO of elevation below 50 are not used). A large satellite’s position is defined by its longitude. number of Earth stations may thus intercom- mu nicate. The definition of the GSO given above is theo- ● Three communications satellites can provide retical because several natural forces perturb the coverage of 90 percent of the globe; only the orbit of the spacecraft. A satellite placed in GSO polar regions cannot be reached. and then left unattended will suffer changes both in its longitude and in its latitude, Seen from the The disadvantages of GSO satellites are:3 ground, these changes become alterations in the ● Latitudes greater than 81 .25° north and elevation and azimuth angle of the satellite. In south (or 77o, if angles of elevation below order to keep the satellite in GSO, it is necessary 5° are excluded) are not covered. to resort to artificial, “stationkeeping devices. ” ● Because of the distance of the satellite, the At present, stationkeeping is considered ade- received signal power, which diminishes in- quately accurate if the satellite is maintained versely as the square of the distance, is weak, within a range of &/–O. 10 in both longitude and and the signal propagation delay is 270 mil- latitude. Because of the remaining motions of the Iiseconds. To minimize the effects of this satellite, GSO is not actually a circle, but rather time delay and the associated effects of echo, a narrow torus with dimensions corresponding which are problems both in voice conver- to some 150 km of north-south variation and 30 sations and in error correction equipment km of altitude variation. used with high-speed data circuits, echo sup- GSO belongs to a broader family of orbits pressors and echo chancellors have been de- called geosynchronous; these orbits are generally veloped. inclined with respect to the equatorial plane, they For a given position of GSO, there is a definite may be circular or elliptical, but satellites move area on the surface of the Earth within which all on them with the same period, and with the same points can effectively intercommunicate with sense of rotation, as the Earth. Geosynchronous a satellite in that given position, the so-called serv- satellites are seen from the ground to describe ice zone. In order to cover a maximal service figures of 24-hour periods and varying shapes.1 zone, positions for the satellite are severely Commercial communications satellites (except limited. Satellites intended for intercontinental, for some early U.S. experiments and some devel- or generally, global service must by necessity oped by the U .S. S. R.) lie in GSO. The reason for have priority for certain orbital longitude slots, this choice is that advantages of GSO far out- once the service zone has been defined. (This weigh its disadvantages. The advantages are as comment applies not only to telecommunication follows:2 services, but also to the observation zone in cases of meteorological or Earth observation missions.) ● The satellite remains essentially stationary On the other hand, satellites that service or relative to look angle of the Earth station an- observe a relatively small area of the Earth’s sur- tennas; the cost of computer-controlled face can generally be positioned with greater flex- tracking of the satellite can be avoided. A ibility, the more so the lower the mean latitude fixed antenna (with provision for manual ad- of the served areas. However, small service areas justment) will suffice. that extend to higher latitudes will also be limited ● There is no need to switch from one satellite in their satellite positions because of the limited to another as one disappears over the hori- visibility of the GSO from high latitudes. zon. ● Because the radius of GSO is so large, a GSO As a result of these various constraints imposed satellite is in line-of-sight from 42.4 percent on the positions of GSO satellites, with radiofre- of the Earth’s surface (or 38 percent, if angles quency constraints not yet considered, the GSO is not, and probably will never be, populated with ‘ International Aeronautical Federation, ‘ ‘On the Efficient Use of the Geostationary Orbit, ” 1980, p. 8. 2James Martin, Communications satellites, p. 45. lbid., p. 45. 112 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications —

a uniform density of satellites. [t follows that con- communications satellites carry a dozen or more gestion in desirable arcs of the GSO will proceed transponders, each capable of relaying as many more rapidly as demand for service grows than as 600 voice channels. Wide-band signals are was initially envisioned by the regulatory agen- beamed to the satellite from an Earth station on cies (fig. 1). an assigned up-link (Earth-to-space) frequency; the satellite receives the signals and retransmits Radiofrequency allocations and GSO positions them on a down-link (space-to-Earth) frequency are controlled by the International Telecommu- to an Earth station that may be thousands of kil- nications Union (ITU). ITU is responsible for the ometers away from the transmitting Earth station. maintenance of international cooperation in com- By convention, to describe the band used by a munications and it assigns operating frequencies particular satellite, the up-link frequency is given, and GSO slots to satellite communications sys- followed by the down-link frequency (e.g., 6/4 tems. GHz). With the early satellites, the enormous dis- tances involved, the limited channel capacity, Satellites must be sufficiently separated to avoid and the limited power available to the transpon- radio interference. The required separation be- ders–transmitter-and-receiver pairs on the tween satellites depends on several factors, in- spacecraft-dictated that Earth stations use cluding the beamwidths of satellite and Earth- powerful transmitters, very large antennas, and station antennas, the side-lobe performance of sensitive receivers. Those requirements generally Earth-station antennas, the modulation technique still hold true, but contemporary commercial employed, and the carrier frequency of the trans-

figure 1 .—The Communications Problem

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 113 missions. Currently, a 30 separation of spacecraft From 1980 to 1990, increasing demand for operating in the 6/4 GHz band is required. In any North American satellite circuits will outstrip the case, only a limited number of spacecraft can be available capacity of the geostationary orbit for accommodated in a given arc of geostationary 6/4 GHz systems, even with the application of orbit. frequency reuse techniques. In addition, the difficulty of locating Earth stations in and near the Current commercial communications satellites communication sources in population centers operate primarily in two bands of the microwave will accelerate the use of the higher frequency region of the radio spectrum, the 6/4 and the bands. To meet these projected demands, addi- 14/1 2 GHz bands (or, the C and the Ku bands, tional satellites will become operational in the respectively), well above the band used for ultra 14/1 2 GHz bands. Because there is no sharing high frequency (UHF) television broadcasting. At of these frequencies in the United States with the these frequencies, signals are propagated in terrestrial radio relay service, Earth stations could straight lines, requiring the satellite to be within be located directly in cities. Recent research (the line-of-sight of Earth stations. The very narrow CTS experiment) has indicated that 3-m ground beam widths require that the ground and satellite antennas are adequate for J 4/12 reception. Tech- antennas be alined precisely, within a fraction of niques such as increased satellite transmitter a minute of arc. power, higher antenna gain, and spot beam As use of the 14/12 band is still in its early spacecraft antennas must compensate for this use stages, nearly all commercially operated com- of smaller ground antennas and the occasional munications satellites operate in the 6/4 band. rain attenuation in the higher frequency bands Because this band is shared with heavily con- (discussed below). A disadvantage of spot beam gested microwave relay systems, collocating an antennas is that the area they can serve is re- Earth station poses the problem of finding an induced. Thus, multiple spot beams must be pro- terference-free location. There are few such loca- vided, and satellite transmitter power increased tions around large population centers, which to cover the same total area as before. have the greatest need for communications services. Moreover, relatively large antennas and A constraint on operations in the 14/12 GHz costly Earth stations are required to provide high- band is that signals transmitted from the satellite density telephone-type traffic. Once the allocated to Earth can suffer significant attenuation during band is filled, further increases in satellite capac- periods of intense rainfall (a problem that will ity can be achieved only by reuse of the available be worse at 30/20 GHz, the Ka band). Measure- frequency spectrum. Reuse is possible both by ments and analysis.have been made of the effects reducing the down-link beam width and by in- of this attenuation on satellite signal propagation. creasing the satellite antenna gain so that different Satellite systems using this band must have high beams cover different service areas. power levels (a factor that increases their cost), rely on paired Earth stations geographically sep- Capacity can be further increased by polariza- arated (“diversity”), or have some other form of tion diversity. A vertically polarized beam can be backup, if all ground locations require that serv- transmitted along with a horizontally polarized ice be available nearly 100 percent of the time. beam of the same frequency, and the two can However, for many commercial applications, rain be detected and received separately. Polarization outages can be tolerated. diversity occurs when two beams with identical or overlapping frequency bands are orthogonal- An important factor in satellite communication ly polarized. Receivers are designed to respond in the 1980’s will be the use of the space shuttle to only one polarization, so that the same fre- for many launches. The shuttle will facilitate the quency band can be used twice within the same introduction of physically larger, more powerful coverage area— i.e., using two polarized beams satellites with increased capabilities. However, in the same frequency range doubles the amount to achieve synchronous orbit, expendable rockets of information that can be sent with that band- to boost payloads from low-Earth orbit (LEO) will width. also be needed. In addition, so-called large plat- 114 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications ——. . forms may be assembled in LEO, where their tion that the private sector would continue the components have been transported on two or R&D, until 1980, NASA did not pursue such ac- more shuttle flights, and then raised to GSO with tivities vigorously except for completing the direct an expendable upper stage. Frequency reuse broadcast satellite programs of ATS-6 and, in con- techniques will be common on next generation junction with the Canadians, CTS. satellites, providing a further significant increase in total available capacity. Future satellites will also have increased sensitivity in up-link recep- New Programs tion, increased effective down-link power, and In 1980, because of growing concern over the reduced susceptibility to interference from signals perceived loss of a technological lead in com- associated with adjacent satellites in geostationary munications satellites, NASA reactivated its R&D orbit. program at 30/20 GHz. This work is directed Except for AT&T’s LEO TELSTAR, flown in 1962, toward wideband transponder capability in- the basic research, development, and demonstra- tended to explore the allocated but unoccupied tion (RD&D) establishing the practicality of bands at 30/20 GHz. Technologies under devel- satellite communications was done by NASA, opment include onboard switching, solid state with substantial industrial involvement. RD&D for transmitters, switched, multiple-beam antennas, direct broadcast satellites, including early at- and low-noise receivers for satellite use. NASA tempts to develop market constituencies, was hopes to demonstrate the new band technologies also done by NASA. From 1973, when its satellite in orbit on a new satellite, to be developed for communications research and development a 1986 launch. The system concept is based on (R&D) activities were curtailed on the assump- traffic projections developed for NASA by two

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Satellite frequencies Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 115 satellite communications carriers, COMSAT and vanced WESTAR, which will start flying in the American Satellite Co. NASA is also developing nexts years, include increased capacity sufficient adaptive, multibeam antenna technology at to accommodate traffic projections by using new L-band, the band in use for maritime (and aero- technologies such as switchable, multiple-beam nautical) satellite communications use. antennas, onboard switching and signal processing, and frequency reuse capabilities at frequen- While NASA pursues a program currently dom- cies of 6/4, 14/1 1, and 14/12 GHz. These will re- inated by R&D at 30/20 GHz, commercial enti- quire developing large, possibly deployable space ties are expanding their channel capacities in structures, distributed, solid state transmitters and lower frequency bands at 6/4 GHz and 14/12 low-noise receivers, precise and possibly adap- GHz. SBS’S launch in the fall of 1980 marks the tive phase control, and attitude stabilization in first U.S. commercial satellite use of the 14/12 the presence of solar-array or antenna-structure GHz band (Ku band). Canada’s ANIK-B and-C motions. were the first domestic satellites to exploit that band, predating SBS by 2 years or more. Except for the 9-m deployable antenna of INTELSAT-V, launched in late-l 980, is carrying NASA’s ATS-6, DOD (on the Defense Satellite traffic at both 6/4 and 14/12 GHz. Commercial Communications System, Phase Ill) and the com- carriers’ plans for future satellites through the mercial sector (l NTELSAT-V, Advanced WESTAR) 199o’s continue to concentrate on these bands, have the lead in multiple, switched-beam anten- using multiple-beam antenna technologies and nas and in somewhat larger, deployable anten- the frequency reuse technologies first developed na structures. ATS-6 included, these spacecraft in the late 1970’s and continuing in development types are the first so-called orbiting antenna today. Multiple-beam antenna technologies refer farms, carrying capability for multiband, multi- to the use of a single antenna to send and receive beam communications services. As future traffic more than one frequency signal. Frequency reuse projections indicate a limitation of capacity, plans technologies refer to the ability to handle the for the first satellite generation of the 1990’s could same frequency in different modes, thereby in- be expected to include 30/20 GHz frequencies creasing capacity without increasing spectrum in addition to 6/4, 14/1 1, and 14/12 GHz. The use. trend will be toward fewer, larger satellites carry- Continuing advances in technology, many of ing more bands, more beams, and more diverse them by industry in the late 1970’s as markets services. These satellites will incorporate some for 12 GHz Earth stations became viable, have of the space construction techniques developed made it possible for commercial carriers to pro- during the 1980’s. vide many of the services initially demonstrated Commercial sector hardware is provided by in- on ATS-6 by NASA under the classification “com- dustrial firms, many of them Japanese, French, munity broadcasting. ” Cable program distribu- German, and Italian. As part of its reactivated pro- tion, interactive services such as multipoint gram, NASA will conduct R&D in advanced tech- teleconferencing, educational broadcasting, and nologies for low-cost Earth stations. The results remote health-care services are now being proof this R&D, which also involves industrial firms, vided by the commercial carriers. These services, are intended for transfer to the private sector. together with the traditional point-to-point serv- NASA’s customary applications experiment-dem- ices, are carried on first generation satellites onstration activities with its ATS satellite series operating at 6/4 GHz. have been transferred to the National Telecom- Advances in bandwidth compression and fre- munications and Information Administration quency reuse technologies appear, for perhaps (NTIA) in the Department of Commerce, together the next decade, to allow first generation satellites with responsibility for stimulating new applica- to keep pace with traffic projections. Second gen- tions experiments and demonstrations and for ag- eration satellites such an INTELSAT-V and Ad- gregating future markets. —

116 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System NASA has continued to pursue studies in search Advanced WESTAR is a variation of the Track- and rescue, but not in navigation or traffic con- ing and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) being trol, based on special receivers attached to NOAA leased by NASA from Space Communications Co. meteorological satellites to detect signals of dis- TDRSS comprises two satellites in synchronous tress beacons carried by aircraft and ships. NASA orbit, controlled from a master station at White is pursuing this experimental work cooperative- Sands, N. Mex., and used to track and relay data ly with DOD, the Department of Transportation, from LEO satellites to the ground. it will replace and with Canada, France, and the U.S.S.R. The much of NASA’s terrestrial Space Tracking and United States is providing the spacecraft, launch Data Network (STDN) and will increase the po- vehicles, and the U.S. ground stations; Canada tential for continuous coverage of other, LEO satis providing the space telecommunications equip- ellites. For the lowest-altitude orbits, coverage will ment and ground station in their country; and, increase from about 15 to 85 percent, providing France is providing an onboard processor and a great improvement in timely data acquisition receiver. The Soviet Union will launch and main- for NASA experimental and NOAA operations. tain in orbit two spacecraft operationally com- This capability will greatly reduce the need for patible with the U. S., Canadian, and French sys- costly and unreliable satellite data recorders. tem and will operate their own ground station. While Advanced WESTAR carries 6/4, 14/11, and in addition to NASA, DOD, and the Department 14/1 2 GHz capability, TDRSS also carries capa- of Transportation are expected to purchase and bility in the space research bands at 1.7/1 .8, and operate ground stations and participate in the 2.0/2.3 GHz. Both spacecraft use the same basic program test and evaluation phase while NOAA structure, including deployable antennas for is providing the spacecraft for modification. some of the three or four bands they carry. The first TDRSS launch is planned for the shuttle in Satellite Remote Sensing early 1983, the second 6 months later. Two Ad- Remote sensing from satellites is one important vanced WESTARs will be launched in 1984; one component of the general field of detecting, will be dedicated to commercial service and the recognizing, and evaluating objects from a dis- other will serve as a shared spare between NASA tance by means of advanced electro-optical in- and Space Communications Co. struments with cybernetic interpretation. Radar, sonar, astronomical and aerial photography are Navigation all forms of remote sensing. Satellite remote sens- Most of the U.S. work on navigation has been ing is used in conjunction with aerial photogra- done by DOD. The Navy navigation satellite sys- phy and aerial radar scanning to assess and help tem transmissions have been made available to to control the productivity of the surface of the the public for the cost of the receiver and posi- Earth, to help locate subsurface resources, and tion-fixing computer equipment. Position can be to understand, forecast, and, eventually, help fixed to an accuracy of 50 ft if processing time control the environment. is long enough (up to 12 hours). Such perform- Satellite remote sensing will be discussed in this ance is suitable for ships but not for aircraft, section under the following three categories: whose positions change too rapidly. 1) ocean sensing; 2) Earth resources sensing; and Work by NASA and the European Space Re- 3) environmental sensing. Listed in this order, search Organization in 1969-70 had defined a they lead from an area with no current opera- system (Aerosat) that could work for aircraft. tional systems to an area that has had operational Capable of handling 500 aircraft simultaneously, space systems for 14 years. it was also of interest for air traffic control. Responsibility for Aerosat was transferred to the Ocean Sensing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) early in This is the newest, least developed of satellite 1971. in 1973, work on it was terminated. remote-sensing efforts. NASA, NOAA, DOD and Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 117 the oceanographic science community all recog- ing from space is expected to contribute to safe- nize the tremendous potential that satellites have ty, to improve the efficiency of weather forecast- for the study of the world’s oceans. Gathering ing, and to reduce the cost of shipping opera- ocean data from satellites may be the only rea- tions, air transportation, offshore oil and gas ex- sonable way to observe ocean processes routine- ploration and drilling, platform operations, ma- ly and continuously. Currently, there are no exist- rine construction, commercial fishing, pollution ing or planned U.S. civilian operational ocean- monitoring, ice monitoring, and marine search sensing satellite systems. and rescue. NASA’s SEASAT, which was flown in 1978 and NASA, in conjunction with academia, will use failed prematurely after 6 months, was a satellite the data primarily for R&D in weather and cli- demonstration to show what an operational mate. NASA also will increase its participation ocean-sensing system could do. Each of SEASAT’s with the oceanographic community by support- complement of sensors had been flown before ing university scientists and encouraging further but never together on a civilian, ocean-oriented commercial participation in carrying out a num- spacecraft. ber of advanced studies for future research missions in applying satellite remote sensing to Along with SEASAT, NIMBUS, and the Geody- oceanography. namic Experimental Ocean Satellite (GEOS) data have been used in ocean studies. NIMBUS is NASA’s ocean research programs will include classed as an experimental weather/climate processing SEASAT data records into final geo- spacecraft; GEOS was primarily to study ocean physical units and their subsequent analysis; eval- waves. The data these satellites supply consist uation of the performance of X/L/C-band aircraft primarily of global wind fields, sea states, surface synthetic aperture radar (SAR) in conjunction with temperature, ice coverage, and ocean color. experiments undertaken by the National Science Foundation (NSF) on warm Gulf Stream rings and SEASAT data have demonstrated that scatter- coastal ocean dynamics; characterization of sea ometer observations enable space mapping of the ice properties by various remote-sensing tech- detailed structure of the ocean surface wind niques; definition of altimetry dependence on sea fields, including atmospheric fronts and state; investigation of photoplankton productivity typhoons. Altimeter observations enable mapping associated with physical and chemical ocean of surface waves and circulation features such as properties near the Nantucket Shoals, in coopera- the Gulf Stream and mesoscale eddies. Micro- tion with the National Marine Fisheries Service; wave radiometer observations enable mapping refinement of techniques for assimilation of wind of the characteristics of sea ice. Color scanner data from the scatterometer into numerical mod- observations enable mapping of chlorophyll con- els; and development of a shipborne Iidar system centration. Taken collectively, these observations for basic studies of optical oceanography. The will help enable the determination of the general ocean processes program will develop techniques circulation of the ocean—both the wind-driven for assimilating satellite data–especially scatter- and geostrophic components—along with sea ice ometer wind data—into numerical models, and coverage and primary biological productivity in demonstrate a remote-sensing system that will the oceans. supply specific global oceanographic data on a Applications of ocean sensing divide into two routine and repetitive basis to meet specific user classes—operational and scientific. NOAA uses needs. the data from the experiments to support its operational responsibilities that include: the manage- Earth Resources Sensing ment and conservation of marine resources; the preservation, conservation, and development of The U.S. program addresses the needs for gath- U.S. coastal resources; the prediction of weather; ering the vital information required for managing and, the provision of maps, charts, surveys, and the world’s limited food, water, energy supplies, other specialized data for navigation. Ocean sens- and mineral resources, and for identifying poten- 118 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications tial geodetic (primarily earthquake) hazards. Its Landsat Technology objective is to develop and demonstrate the use of space technology for providing the United Space Segment States with a global capability for monitoring and The return beam vidicon (RBV), a kind of televi- forecasting major agricultural commodities, man- sion camera, was initally promoted for use in aging water resources, assessing land use, im- Landsat by the Department of the Interior. The proving the exploration for mineral and energy RBV uses a shutter to expose a light-sensitive plate resources, and understanding the dynamic char- and then scans the plate with an electron beam acteristics of the Earth’s crust. Many, if not most, to capture the image on videotape or to radio it Federal agencies use space data in the day-to-day to the ground. Although Landsat 3 carries only conduct of their missions (see fig. 2). two RBVS, three of these devices would allow the Numerous State and local governments, many reconstruction of color pictures. Each RBV im- in conjunction with academia, use satellite data age from Landsat 3 covers an area 90 km on a for a whole range of projects, including land cov- side (180 km total swath) and has an equivalent er classification, wetland development, and water instantaneous field of view (IFOV) of 40 m. The management (see tables 7 and 8). The universities low distortion of the RBV makes its especially useful for mapmaking. are studying ways to manipulate the data and apply them to a variety of problems. Industry has The multispectral scanner (MSS) uses a mirror made some use of space-generated data, espe- to scan the scene on the ground one line at a cially in its search for nonrenewable resources. time, reflecting the light onto a series of detec- Several companies that are characterized as “val- tors (photoelectric cells) sensitive to four different ue-added” firms take the raw satellite data, ma- spectral regions. MSS scans a swath 185 km wide nipulate it, integrate it with other data and sell and has an IFOV of 80 m, which for many scenes the information products to a variety of users. is approximately equivalent to a photographic Currently there are no plans for a Federal op- resolution of about 160 m. MSS provides better erational Earth resources-sensing satellite system. spectral resolution, but higher distortion, than NOAA will shortly (1983) assume operation of does RBV. It was therefore championed by the NASA’s experimental Landsat system, but there Department of Agriculture (USDA) as particularly are no plans for the Government to continue to useful for monitoring crops. operate a satellite land remote-sensing system The thematic mapper (TM) is a remote sensor once Landsat fails. NASA’s principal activities in- with seven spectral bands covering the visible, clude pursuing the R&D necessary for develop- near-infrared, and thermal infrared regions of the ing and improving space remote-sensing capabil- spectrum (see fig. 3). It is now scheduled for ities and the related information extraction tech- launch in the third quarter of 1982 aboard Land- niques, providing for the acquisition of space sat D, from which it will achieve complete cov- data, and joint research, development, and test erage of the Earth’s surface every 16 days. projects with users. Its goal is to establish the routine use of global data collection systems. The TM is designed to satisfy more demanding American industry has been the dominant source performance specifications than have previous- of equipment, provided largely under Govern- ly been applied to an instrument of its type. In ment funding, for the U.S. remote-sensing effort. response to these requirements, the design incor- It has supplied spacecraft, sensing instruments, porates advanced state-of-the-technology materi- Earth stations, data processing equipment, and als, structures, control techniques, calibration information extraction devices. mechanisms, data handling, and electronics. De- Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 119

Figure 2.— Earth Resources Sensing &Y- ,

~,--~, .. , ~- .. . \. I ..." I .' . . '.~ ~ . ••• • . ",. .

The top photograph shows upper Delaware, Maryland, and the Virgina peninsula taken from the Landsat 1 satellite at an altitude of 568 miles. The photo at bottom left shows a technician performing a quality control assessment of the Landsat 1 photo while on the bottom right, a technician prepared a negative of the Landsat 1 photo for printing in the Goddard Space Flight Center processing facility. 120 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 7.—Overview of Landsat Applications in the 50 States

Land Water Forestry/ Wildlife resources Environmental Geologic State resources rangeland management management management Agriculture mapping Alabama x x x x x Alaska x x x x x Arizona x x x x x x x Arkansas x x x California x x x x x x x Colorado x x x x x Connecticut Delaware x x x Florida x x x x x x Georgia x x x x x x x Hawaii x x x Idaho x x x x x Illinois x x x x x Indiana x x x x x x lowa x x x x x Kansas x x x x x Kentucky x x x x x x x Louisiana x x x x x Maine x x x x x Maryland x x x x Massachusetts x Michigan x x Minnesota x x x x x x x Mississippi x x x x x x Missouri x x x x x x x Montana x x x x Nebraska x x x x x x x Nevada x New Hampshire x x New Jersey x x x New Mexico x x x x x New York x x x x x x North Carolina x x x x x x North Dakota x x x x x Ohio x x Oklahoma x x x x x x Oregon x x x x x x Pennsylvania x x x x Rhode Island South Carolina x x x x x South Dakota x x x x x x x Tennessee x x x x Texas x x x x x x x Utah x x x x Vermont x x Virginia x x x x x x Washington x x x x x West Virginia x x x Wisconsin x x x x x Wyoming x x x x x x SOURCE: National Governors Conference, ,

Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 121

Table 8.—Summary of Operational Landsat Applications in the Statesa

(4)

SOURCE: National Governors Conference

velopment and fabrication of the TM are proof data transmission from satellite to ground sta- ceeding on schedule. Most of the subsystem pa- tion is on the order of megabits/second. rameters which have been tested so far have met A control center at the Goddard Space Flight or exceeded specifications. Center (Goddard) monitors and commands the Ground Segment satellite to acquire and transmit data directly to U.S. or foreign ground stations. Data can be transmitted to Earth when the satellite is within view of one of the receiving sta- The master recordings (station tapes) received tions (fig. 4)—the NASA stations in Alaska, Califor- at U.S. ground stations of Landsat 3 are sent to nia, and Maryland, and nine foreign-owned and Goddard for preprocessing. This initial step in -operated stations that function under agreements data reduction consists of segregating data from with NASA. Data acquired while the spacecraft each of the spectral bands and applying two sorts . is beyond the range of a ground station are stored of corrections: a) radiometric corrections to ac- by an onboard, wide-band video tape recorder count for the difference in response of the detec- until it is within range of a U.S. station. The rate tors in the various spectral bands, and b) geomet- 122 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Figure 3.—Landsat Bands and Electromagnetic Spectrum Comparison

aThematic mapper. SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey, ric corrections that account for distortions in the graphs, and computer compatible tapes (CCTS). satellite viewing process and relate the received The tape form is suitable for input to standard data to the exact position on the ground that was computers and lends itself to automated or spe- observed by the satellite. The results of this pre- cialized data handling and analysis. The digital processing are recorded in the form of high-den- form of CCTS makes them especially appropriate sity digital tape (H DDT), either as fully corrected for integration with other digital data. data, or with the required geometric corrections For most uses, the data as they emerge from only noted on the tape. Foreign ground stations preprocessing at Goddard and processing at perform an equivalent function, although not all EROS are still in raw form. It is at this point that of them apply a full set of corrections. firms in the private sector step in to process Land- HDDTs are provided to the Department of the sat data further. Such firms constitute the value- Interior’s EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls, S. -added industry. Value-added firms are found Dak., and the USDA facility in Houston, Tex. At both in the United States and abroad; most of the EROS Data Center, the data in HDDT form them are small. The kinds of work they perform are put through additional computer processes are: image processing, image enhancement, im- to convert them into standard data products suit- age interpretation, and integration of Landsat data able for sale to public or private sector customers. with data from other sources. They, in turn, may use these products in that form or further process them for their own use or for Other Remote-Sensing Programs resale to additional customers. Currently Federal experimental or scientific Two classes of standard data products are avail- flight programs include the Landsat series, able: film imagery, which is convenient for those Magsat, and the Heat Capacity Mapping Mission accustomed to working with maps and photo- (HCMM). Landsat 3 is aging but continues to be Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 123

Figure 4. —Current and Probable Landsat Ground Stations

1 1 t t i 7% i i I

the primary source of Earth resources data. Land- for gravity measurements for solid Earth studies, sat D will soon be launched, and if plans to for global stereoscopic imagery for resource ex- launch the follow-on satellite, Landsat D’, come ploration, and for improved remote sensors for to fruition, both are expected to operate until the multiple applications. mid- to late-l 980’s. New sensor capabilities on Landsats D and D’ are expected to be especially NASA has also entered into joint R&D activities useful for nonrenewable resources observations. with other Federal agencies (USDA, USDC, Magsat, launched in 1979, has charted the Earth’s USAID) to advance the understanding of how to magnetic fields to aid in navigation and to pro- apply multiple data sources in improving agricul- vide a better understanding of the solid Earth for tural early warning and crop commodity forecast- geophysical and geologic studies; and, the ing (AgRISTARS). The AgRISTARS program has HCMM has made global measurements of Earth been somewhat restructured by lengthening the surface temperature variation to aid in locating schedules and changing the program scope in mineral resources and in measuring water runoff several areas. This restructuring has been caused from snowmelt. NASA is also planning to fly ex- by constraints on the fiscal year 1982 budgets of periments on early space shuttle missions de- the involved agencies and the delay in the avail- signed to test the applicability of active micro- ability of Landsat D. Other joint research activities wave measurements, and of high-resolution im- are planned with additional Federal agencies and agery for mapping investigations. IT is also study- with international organizations for advancing the ing how to define the appropriate space systems scientific knowledge of the solid Earth. 124 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ENVIRONMENTAL SENSING on their needs through FAA. However, only understanding the dynamics and limitations of about one-third of the farming sector is well- our environment is essential to our long-term sur- served by standard NOAA products. Private vival and important to many day-to-day activities. weather services provide specialized forecasting The global interrelationships between the atmos- to many users whose requirements are not met phere, ocean, land, and space environments can by those products. be studied only from space. These programs are NASA studies and flight missions are directed aided by data from the ocean and Earth resources at all characteristics of the atmosphere, including sensing systems. upper atmospheric and tropospheric air quality, The operational meteorological satellite systems global weather, severe storms, oceanic processes, of NOAA (GOES and TIROS) form the backbone and general climate. of the environmental program. Prediction of the NASA launched three atmospheric research/ weather, monitoring and control of pollution, demonstration satellites in the late 1970’s, ship routing, storm warning, and modeling of SEASAT, NIMBUS-7, and Stratospheric Aerosol long-term trends in climate and the stratosphere and Gas Experiment (SAGE). As noted above, are all areas of study. SEASAT has ceased to function, but returned sig- NOAA’s operational responsibility regarding nificant ocean data, which are being studied. weather and climate is to monitor the weather NIMBUS-7 and SAGE are performing satisfactori- and prepare weather forecasts for a myriad of ly. SAGE primarily measures atmospheric con- users. NOAA, therefore, has the responsibility for centrations of ozone and aerosols in an attempt the ground-based observation systems, the opera- to show how pollutants might be transported tional meteorological satellite system, and the globally. NASA has planned to launch the Halo- related receiving , analyzing, and disseminating gen Occultation Experiment (HALOE) and the systems that turn the space and ground data into Earth Radiation Budget Experiments (ERBE) space- weather forecasts. For the space segment, NOAA craft in the mid-l 980’s. HALOE will measure coordinates with NASA for the improvement of global atmospheric profiles of key species in- the space and space-tied systems and for the pro- volved in the depletion of stratospheric ozone. curement of spacecraft and launch arrangements. ERBE is to measure the radiation balance over the NOAA is also charged with conducting R&D in globe to gain basic insights into the reasons for the analysis and application of satellite data. climatic fluctuations. NASA’s advanced planning includes the uses of satellites for the simultaneous The primary and routine use of the satellite data global study of the radiative, chemical, and dy- from the NOAA system is, of course, weather pre- namic processes occurring in the upper atmos- dicting. NOAA transforms them into a broad vari- phere. ety of weather projections and distributes them throughout the world. In addition to being used It is apparent that air pollution problems must in real-time weather predicting operations, they be solved on a regional basis, and that global are also placed in archives for future theoretical chemical budgets (e.g., carbon dioxide) act both research and case studies. These data are wide- as tracers of transport processes and as a back- ly used by meteorologists and environmental sci- ground for regional events. NASA, the Environ- entists in Government and academia in routine mental Protection Agency (EPA), and NSF are operations throughout the world and are con- focusing on these areas with field analytical and sidered indispensable for conducting atmospher- laboratory studies to quantify the global carbon- ic analyses and preparing short-range weather nitrogen-ozone and sulfur-ammonia-aerosol forecasts. chemical systems. Data derived from spacecraft are essential to these efforts. Users of weather data vary in their involvement with determining the standard weather forecast- Severe storms, tornados, damaging downdrafts, ing services provided by NOAA. Aviators in well- and destructive lightning are being studied by established working groups provide regular data NOAA and NASA to improve observation and Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 125 forecasting of such events. Remotely sensed data microwave moisture sensors, wind sensors, and from NASA’s severe environmental storms and rainfall measurements technique. mesoscale experiment, and ongoing mesoscale modeling efforts for forecast improvement with Materials Processing in Space (MPS) computer interactive systems will lead to a joint MPS is both a set of new technologies designed NASA/NOAA project at NOAA’s National Severe to exploit the unique environment of space and Storm Forecast Center, similar to the recently suc- a developing program to implement these tech- cessful frost-freeze warning demonstration in nologies. The unique properties that make space Florida. Improved airborne wind measurement an ideal environment for processing certain kinds tools and temperature and moisture sounders on of materials are: 1 ) the availability of unlimited, the GOES-D spacecraft are being evaluated. unfiltered solar radiation; 2) the existence of a near-perfect vacuum; 3) a range of temperatures, International Weather Activities from –200° to +200”F; and, most important, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (WMO) 4) microgravity–an almost complete absence of The United States participates in international gravitational force. VVith the exception of long- meteorological programs through WMO, a spe- term microgravity, these properties can be well cialized agency of the United Nations that was enough approximated on Earth to allow their ex- established in 1951. It was formed in order to es- tended effects on materials processing to be in- tablish, coordinate, and improve meteorological vestigated. The factor of microgravity, however, services throughout the world, U.S. operational is what makes MPS so attractive. and experimental meteorological satellites con- Process variables such as temperature, compo- tribute to this effort. WMO members obtain ac- sition, and fluid flow may be controlled far bet- cess to meteorological information from U.S. ter in an environment of microgravity. As a result, weather satellites indirectly through a WMO net- some materials may be manufactured in space work of international, regional, and national with greater precision and fewer defects; others, meteorological centers, and directly from auto- which cannot be made at all on Earth, may be- matic picture transmission (APT) receiving sets. come possible for the first time. MPS looks particularly promising for pharmaceuticals, elec- GLOBAL ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH tronic components, optical equipment, and metal PROGRAM (GARP) alloys. As part of the U.S. worldwide weather R&D activities, NOAA, NSF, and NASA participate Already, a U.S. program to implement these through the National Research Council in GARP. technologies is taking shape. NASA has estab- GARP’s goal is to conduct studies to understand lished an MPS program to pursue the basic sci- the atmosphere, It is sponsored by WMO and ence and the applied R&D of microgravity envi- the International Council of Scientific Unions, ronments. Within NASA’s MPS program, a Com- with participation and funding provided by all mercial Applications Office has been set up to member nations. Current U.S. activities for GARP encourage the private sector to participate. are directed at analyzing parts of the data from the recently successful GARP global weather ex- EARLY WORK IN SPACE periment, assessing the requirements for im- During the earlier years of the Apollo Program, proved operational forecasting and defining several unusual phenomena, peculiar to micro- future remote measurement requirements. This gravity, were first observed. First considered only experiment, conducted in 1979, provided a as posing problems in the engineering of space- unique set of data that did not exist before. As craft systems, these phenomena were later rec- a result, atmospheric numerical forecast models ognized as clues for inventing processes to man- have been improved and space research is be- ufacture products in space for use on Earth. To ing directed to improved temperature sounders, broaden the discussion, NASA organized sympo- surface pressure instruments, passive and active sia in 1968 and 1969 for industry representatives to discuss the possibilities of MPS. NASA also ing, to study both high-temperature calorimetry established in 1969 a new program, “Materials and changes in density, surface tension, and vol- Science and Manufacturing in Space.” ume as liquids solidify. Through the early 1970’s, in-space research Although longer in duration by an order of was conducted on Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo- magnitude (1 O to 60 seconds), the microgravity Soyuz missions. Aboard Apollo 14, 16, and 17, attained by NASA aircraft (KC-132s and F-104Bs) several necessarily brief, but important experi- is much less steady than that of drop tubes and ments were performed to investigate certain basic towers. The aircraft, therefore, do not provide a processes (i.e., heat flow and convection, elec- suitable environment for precise experimenta- trophoresis, and composite casting). Skylab, the tion, but are useful for training crews and for orbiting space laboratory station, allowed for developing and verifying tests of experiment much more extensive experimentation. Altogeth- hardware. er, three teams of astronauts conducted 15 MPS Since introducing the Space Processing Appli- experiments. Skylab’s materials processing facili- cation Rocket (SPAR) Program in 1975, NASA has ty, including a multipurpose electric furnace, pro- flown nine sounding rocket missions. These vided the means of studying more complex proc- flights provide 4 to 7 minutes of microgravity. esses: crystal growth, metal alloying, eutectics, However, severe stresses during launch signifi- welding and brazing, fluid effects, and combus- cantly constrain the design of experiments. The tion, Again, the 1975 flight of the Apollo-Soyuz SPAR program has resulted in an inventory of test project continued the research conducted on low-cost hardware suitable for longer duration the Apollo and Skylab missions. The processes experiments during shuttle operations. investigated included: electrophoresis, crystal growth of semiconductors, processing of mag- FUTURE PLANS nets, convection induced by surface tension, density separation during solidification of two alloys, From the foregoing discussion of work already and halide eutectic growth. Throughout these done in space and on Earth, one can see that missions, the experiments performed in space significant future evolution of MPS experimenta- were essentially repetitions of techniques used tion lies in the direction of providing an extended in terrestrial materials processing. microgravity environment along with more complex hardware. The space shuttle transportation CONCURRENT WORK ON EARTH system holds the key to MPS development. Major shuttle facilities for MPS experimentation (small NASA has perfected three terrestrial facilities self-contained payloads, the materials experiment for attaining microgravity for short periods: drop assembly, and Spacelab) can be used on shuttle tubes and drop towers, aircraft flying high-altitude flights lasting up to 1 month, parabolic trajectories, and sounding rockets. These facilities allow relatively low-cost experi- Small self-contained payloads are packages mentation for MPS investigators to establish and flown in containers rented by NASA to compa- set experimental parameters, to establish proof nies, universities, or private individuals. The of concept, and to provide specimens for labora- payloads, designed by the users, operate under tory research. their own power and carry their own recording systems. Some of them may also be used as test- Drop tubes and towers allow spacelike micro- beds for broader experimentation aboard Space- gravity conditions to be achieved for some 2 to Iab. 4 seconds. In drop tubes, molten droplets are released into a vertical evacuated tube (either 100 The materials experiment assembly (MEA), the or 300 ft long) and are solidified during free fall. first article of new materials processing hardware in drop towers, small rockets (used to overcome to be flown in the shuttle, is also designed to oper- friction) thrust canisters containing experiment ate under its own power in its preliminary ver- packages down vertical guide rails. These appa- sion. Later models will draw power from the shut- ratus provide useful opportunities, however fleet- tle. Accommodating as many as four experiments Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 127 in separately sealed subenclosures, MEA contains pendable launch vehicles (ELVS) will continue to a control computer, a heat rejection system, and provide launch services through the early transi- data recorders. tion period. Spacelab, the centerpiece of NASA’s new MPS The major components of the STS initially in- system, has two major components, the module clude the reusable space shuttle, upper stages, and the pallets. The module provides a habitable the remote manipulator system, and the work- laboratory for scientists and engineers to work shop Spacelab. The shuttle will be launched from comfortably in space. The pallets form an open both the east and west coasts of the United States porch in the cargo bay of the orbiter, where in- with a nominal payload capability of 65,000 struments may be exposed to space and various pounds (29,500 kg) into LEO (1 85-1,110 km). It experimental apparatus may be accommodated. can carry a crew of three to seven persons for mission durations up to 30 days. Four MPS instruments are currently under development for deployment on Space lab. The flu- The space shuttle orbiter, an aircraft-like, re- id experiment system uses Schlieren photography usable spacecraft, will be used to carry payloads and holography to study fluid behavior under to Earth orbit and deploy them from its cargo bay. microgravity. In the vapor crystal growth system, The remote manipulator system can be attached crystals are to be grown from fluids, vapors, or to the orbiter bay to aid the crew in deploying melts of solid materials; the results are recorded or retrieving payloads in space, Upper stages will by video and holography. The pallet-mounted, be included with those payloads that must go far- acoustic, containerless, positioning module is ther than LEO, i.e., on missions to the planets or used to control the position and rotation of a sam- to geosynchronous orbit. Spacelab is a complete ple to be raised to a temperature of 1,600 degrees orbital laboratory that fits into the cargo bay and by radiant heat. The solidification experiment connects with the crew compartment of the system employs a modular furnace in which up orbiter. It will make possible a variety of human- to 16 samples per flight may be processed. So- directed experiments in the space environment. lidification may be achieved, either under uni- Planned utilization of STS may be seen in table form heating and cooling, or directionally, by 9 and figure 5. means of a temperature gradient. NASA is conducting numerous studies to pro- There are several other MPS activities planned vide advanced capabilities for STS: for development if funds are approved. There are ● Thrust augmentation—a study to supplement also important long-term prospects for more ad- the existing shuttle capability with strap-on vanced activities. These and the various foreign assist rockets; efforts, current or planned, are discussed else- ● Solar electric propulsion systems–solar- where in this assessment. powered ion-engine upper stages for varying orbit and payload requirements; Space Transportation ● Orbita/ transfer vehic/es–manned and un- Currently the U.S. Government has the sole manned vehicles capable of moving pay- capability in the United States to launch both loads from the LEO attainable by the shut- manned and unmanned payloads from Earth, tle, either to a different LEO or to higher Each capability presents different opportunities orbits; and different constraints. ● Teleoperator maneuvering system–a remotely controlled payload maneuvering MANNED SPACE SYSTEMS unit; The space transportation system (STS) that has ● Deployable antenna —an experiment to test been developed by NASA, with extensive indus- the feasibility of deploying very large anten- trial involvement under Government funding, is nas; the sole U.S. system planned to carry humans and ● Space p/atforms–shuttle-deployable plat- objects into space in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Ex- forms to perform as test beds for experiments —.—

128 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 9.–STS Operations Traffic Model (34 flights through 1985)

Subtotal ...... 1 6 7 11 16 21 29 34 38 38 38 38 38 29 344 Refights ...... – – 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 Total ...... 1 6 8 12 17 23 31 36 40 40 40 40 40 31 365

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

in space construction for space science and launcher will be ready in the near future (1 to applications; 2 years). Maximum payloads for the Percheron ● Large space structure experiments—to test are planned to be 700 kg into LEO by 1982, and the ability to construct large structures in 200 kg into geosynchronous orbit by 1983. space; ● Liquid-fueled upper stage—an upper stage for use with the shuttle, that will be powered Space Construction by a liquid fuel rather than solid propellant, NASA is planning numerous experiments to test thereby providing greater controllability and and demonstrate the ability and utility of con- payload capacity. structing objects in space. It is clear that space platforms for operational or experimental work EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES will need to be constructed in space because their The existing Government expendable launch size will likely preclude launching them in one vehicles used for routine civilian launches now piece from Earth. Component (beam) builders (Scout, Delta, Atlas, and Centaur) are scheduled have been tested on Earth and await testing in to be phased out by about 1985 or 1986. Should space. Should a permanent orbiting space station the Centaur be selected for the liquid-fueled shut- be included in the space program, its construc- tle upper stage, its production will continue, but tion will of necessity be carried out in space. In not as an Earth to Earth-orbit launch vehicle. Fig- addition, if solar power satellites are deployed, ure 6 illustrates the normal payload capacity for they will have to be constructed in space. these ELVS. Design requirements are being established for As previously mentioned, the U.S. Government both manned and unmanned permanent plat- is the only entity in the United States currently forms that will incorporate evolutionary power launching payloads into space. However, at least systems. NASA is analyzing the feasibility and one privately owned U.S. company, Space Serv- benefits of low-Earth orbital science and applica- ices, Inc., has indicated that its Percheron tions space platforms, which would aggregate Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 129 —

Figure 5.—Shuttle Manifest Through 1984

. .

.:” ” ,“. . .

.s.

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration many long-duration space experiments on un- tor (also under study). For the longer range, NASA manned, shuttle-tended platforms. The postu- is studying a permanent, manned Space Opera- lated initial system could accommodate science tions Center to establish, service, upgrade, and and applications payloads, demonstrate on-orbit operate both the low- and high-altitude platforms. servicing and payload exchange, conduct multi- Its future potential uses could be to tend and disciplinary investigations, and provide an evolu- refurbish a reusable orbital transfer vehicle or- tionary space power system. It could grow to in- biting between low and geostationary orbits and clude a capability for materials processing ex- to construct and assemble large orbiting struc- periments, and eventually a habitat for life sci- tures. ence and human research (fig. 7). In order to plan for support of future possible permanent platforms and facilities, NASA intends NASA is also studying a large communications to extend its research into a series of developmen- platform that could alleviate the potential satura- tal test flights and space demonstrations in large tion of orbit arc and frequency spectrum by ag- space structures, satellite services near to and gregating most communications payloads on a remote from shuttle, including satellite place- common support bus. This platform would be ment, retrieval and repair, and proof test of a serviced and upgraded remotely by a teleopera- satellite tethered from the orbiter. 130 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications — — — ———

Figure 6.—Current NASA Expendable Launch Vehicles 150 1

a) Payload values are for east launch from ESMC for Delta and Atlas Cc!ntaur b) Scout values are for launch from Wallops c) Atlas E/F values are for launch from WSMC and use of a TE 364-4 AK M

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Figure 7.—initial Space Station Conception Solar Power in Space The constancy and strength of sunlight in Sun synchronous or geosynchronous orbits makes the conversion of sunlight to electrical power especially attractive either for use in space or for transmission to terrestrial receivers. Currently, the only active program in the United States is NASA’s program to provide an orbiting photovoltaic power supply that could be used by a spacecraft, including the shuttle, to supplement its normal power supply. A 25 kW module can supply power for a spacelab or construction mission of 60 days or more. After 60 days the flight would be limited by such factors as food and drinking water. The module could also supply plug-in Illustration credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration power for free-flying payloads that would dock Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 131 — . . . . . with it, and it could be detached and parked in ter two studies concluded that, although SPS was orbit between shuttle missions. One version technically feasible, its high initial cost, en- couId itself fly free of the orbiter with instruments vironmental and health uncertainties, and lower for, say, studying the Sun or Earth. Another could estimates for the future demand for electricity be attached to a free-flying spacelab for long- preclude a major research effort at this time. OTA duration missions like observing the Sun continu- identified possible research funding levels that ously through two or more 28-day solar cycles range from $0 to $30 million. There are no spe- or studying plants or animal specimens through cific research funds for SPS in the 1982 Federal several generations. budget. The solar power satellite (SPS), originally proposed in 1968, was the subject of major studies by NASA, the Department of Energy, the National Academy of Sciences, and OTA4 (fig. 8). The lat- Academy of Science, Electric Power From Orbit: A Critque of a 4U .S. Department of Energy, Program Assessment Report State- 5atellite Power system, 1981; Office of Technology Assessment, Solar ment oi Flncflngs, NASA/DOE, Satellite Power Systems Concept De- Power 5_ate//ites, OTA-E-144 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government velopment and Evaluation Program, November 1980; National Printing Office, August 1981.

Figure 8. —Solar Power Satellite Reference System

Array structure

Solar cell array

ity

. . . . $ .

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 132 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Space Science HIGH ENERGY ASTRONOMY OBSERVATORIES (HEAO) DEVELOPMENT Although OTA was not asked to assess space science, we felt it necessary, as a point of infor- A major scientific objective of the HEAO pro- mation, to describe the current U.S. space sci- gram is to observe and investigate not only those ence programs. Parts of the life sciences program )(-ray sources that are already known, but also do have implications for the application of space a much larger number which, because of their technology for human benefit. This area is cen- distance or their low intensity, remained unde- tered in NASA and utilizes space systems, sup- tected prior to HEAO. This work has detected ported by ground-based and airborne observa- classes of intrinsically weak X-ray sources within tions, to conduct scientific investigations to ad- our own galaxy, as well as stronger sources out- vance our knowledge of the Earth and interstellar side our galaxy. Other equally important objec- space, the other stars of our galaxy, and the uni- tives include the observation of rare species of verse as a whole. NASA also conducts a life sci- cosmic rays, which are crucial to our understand- ences program to further the exploration and use ing of heavy element formation, and the search of space by studying space biology and medicine for nuclear gamma ray lines, which are impor- and the origin and evolution of life. Near-term tant in understanding the origin of the elements. activities focus on investigations of human phys- This program promises to advance our under- iology and of the effects of the space environment standing of newly discovered processes that on man. release extraordinary amounts of energy. It will also enhance our understanding of the creation The Office of Space Science and Applications of matter, and deepen our knowledge of ob- at NASA funds the following science programs, served phenomena such as quasars, pulsars, though the funding levels of some may be novae, and supernovae. reduced. SPACE TELESCOPE (ST) DEVELOPMENT PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY PROGRAM The space telescope is expected to make a The major objective of the physics and astron- major contribution to understanding the stars and omy program is to increase our knowledge and galaxies, the nature and behavior of the gas and understanding of the solar terrestrial space envi- dust between them, and the broad question of ronment and the origin, evolution, structure, and the origin and scale of the universe. composition of the universe, including the Sun, It will enhance the ability of astronomers to the stars, and the other celestial bodies. Space- study radiation in the visible and ultraviolet based research is being conducted to investigate regions of the spectrum. Because of its location the physics, chemistry, and transport processes above the atmosphere, it will be more sensitive occurring in the Earth’s magnetosphere, iono- than ground-based telescopes of comparable di- sphere, and atmosphere, and the responses of ameter and will record greater detail about the the transport processes to solar phenomena and objects under study. It will make it possible to variability; the structure and dynamics of the Sun look far into the distant past of our universe. and its long- and short-term variations; cosmic ray, X-ray, gamma ray, ultraviolet, optical, infra- The telescope should also contribute signifi- red, and radio emissions from stars, interstellar cantly to the study of the early stages of stars and gas and dust, pulsars, neutron stars, quasars, the formation of solar systems and to the observa- black holes, and other celestial sources; and the tion of such highly evolved objects as supernova law governing the interactions and processes oc- remnants and white dwarf stars. With it we may curring in the universe. Many of the phenomena be able to determine the nature of quasars, and being investigated in the physics and astronomy the processes by which they emit such enormous program are not detectable from ground-based amounts of energy. It will also be possible to observatories because of the obscuring or distort- study nearby individual stars and perhaps deter- ing effects of the Earth’s atmosphere. mine if they have planetary systems. Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 133

No budget cuts are foreseen for the space tel- plasma physics, stellar astronomy, solar astron- escope. omy, and high-energy astrophysics. Activities are conducted on both a domestic and an interna- GAMMA RAY OBSERVATORY (GRO) DEVELOPMENT tional cooperative basis. The current level of ac- The objective of the GRO program is to meas- tivity is about 60 rocket flights per year. ure gamma ray radiation from the universe in THE PLANETARY PROGRAM order to explore the fundamental physical processes powering it: Certain celestial phenomena This program includes the scientific exploration can be studied only at gamma ray energies. These of our solar system; the planets, their satellites, include direct evidence of the synthesis of the the comets and asteroids, and the interplanetary chemical elements; high-energy astrophysical medium. The program objectives are to under- processes occurring in supernovae, neutron stars, stand the origin and evolution of the solar system, and black holes; gamma ray burst sources; dif- to understand the Earth through comparative fuse gamma ray radiation and unique gamma ray- studies with the other planets, and to understand emitting objects that may exist. Gamma rays rep- how the appearance of life in the solar system resent one of the last frontiers of the electromag- is related to the chemical history of the system. netic spectrum to be explored, because the re- The strategy that has been adopted calls for quired detector technology has only recently equal study of the terrestrial-like inner planets, been developed. The low flux levels of gamma the giant gaseous outer planets, and the small ray quanta, and the high background they pro- bodies (comets and asteroids). Missions to these duce through their interaction with the Earth’s planetary bodies start at the level of recon- atmosphere, coupled with the demand for bet- naissance and exploration, to achieve the most ter spectral, spatial, and temporal resolution of fundamental characterization of the bodies, and source features, combine to require that large proceed to a level of detailed study, The recon- gamma ray instruments be flown in space for a naissance phase of inner planet exploration prolonged period. Observations of gamma rays began in the 1960’s, and has now been com- are likely to provide unique information on the pleted. most astronomically intriguing objects yet discovered: quasars, neutron stars, and black Mars has provided a program focus because holes. of its potential as a site of biological activity, and the Viking landings in 1976 carried out the ex- EXPLORER DEVELOPMENT ploration of this planet forward to a new, high The Explorer program provides the principal level of scientific and technological achievement, means of conducting astronomical studies and setting the stage for the next step of detailed long-term investigations of solar physics and of study. Analyses of the Moon rock samples re- the near-Earth interplanetary environment that turned by Apollo continue to be highly produc- have limited, specific objectives and do not re- tive, as new insights into the early history of the quire major satellite observatories. Included in inner solar system are achieved and as our theo- the present program are missions to study atmos- retical concepts are revised accordingly. The con- pheric and magnetospheric physics; magnetos- tinuing Pioneer Venus mission is taking the study pheric boundaries; interplanetary phenomena; of our nearest neighbor, and closest planetary and X-ray, ultraviolet, and infrared astronomy. analog, beyond the reconnaissance stage to the point where we have made a basic characteri- SUBORBITAL PROGRAMS zation of the massive cloud-covered atmosphere of Venus. The sounding rocket program provides versa- tile, relatively low cost research tools that com- The Galileo mission will conduct direct and plement the capabilities of balloons, aircraft, free- long-duration studies of Jupiter. The objectives flying spacecraft and the space shuttle in all the of this program are to conduct a comprehensive space science disciplines, including the study of exploration of Jupiter, its atmosphere, magneto- the Earth’s ionosphere and magnetosphere, space sphere, and satellites, utilizing a new deep space- 134 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications craft concept that combines both remote sens- The life sciences program is composed of three ing and direct measurements on an orbiter space- major programs. The first consists of flight and craft with separate atmospheric probe. Galileo ground-based experiments, whereby the physio- is the only planetary program still under develop- logical effects of the space environment on ment and is scheduled for launch in 1984. humans are explored. The unique properties of space (e.g., microgravity, radiation, etc.) provide, MISSION OPERATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS for the first time in our history, an opportunity The mission operations and data analysis pro- to explore significant problems in biology under gram funds the operations phase of planetary mis- a controlled set of conditions that cannot be ade- sions after development, launch, and initial in- quately duplicated in laboratories on Earth. The flight checkout are complete. IT also provides for second is the continuous inflight observation of multi mission flight support. Currently, active crews venturing in space and the testing and re- planetary missions being supported within mis- fining of countermeasures and establishing re- sion operations and data analysis are Voyager, quirements in human space exploration. The Pioneer Venus, Pioneer 6-II, Helios, and Viking. third is the studies in exobiology, with special emphasis on a problem of profound philosophical The objective of the Voyager mission to the and scientific significance: origins and the outer planets is to conduct scientific studies of distribution of life in the universe. the Jupiter and Saturn planetary systems, including their numerous satellites and the rings of The life sciences operational medicine program Saturn. While the two spacecraft are cruising to is the catalyst responsible for bringing the science, the outer planets, they are also performing con- technology, and practice of medicine to bear on tinuing investigations of the interplanetary solving the problems of sustaining, supporting, medium. Since their launches in 1977, the two and protecting individuals working in the space Voyager spacecraft have encountered both Jupi- environment. This includes assurances that phys- ter and Saturn and returned spectacular data and ical welfare and performance are preserved and pictures. that adequate treatment of inflight illnesses or injuries is provided. Subsequent to the Saturn encounters, the spacecraft will continue to provide data on the The biomedical research program objective is interplanetary medium. Voyager 1 will investigate to develop the basic medical knowledge needed the outer limits of our solar system and Voyager to enable men and women to operate more ef- 2 will go on to Uranus and Neptune. fectively in space, The program is organized into discrete elements with each designed primarily LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAM to rectify a particular physiological problem ex- The objective of the life sciences program is to pected to affect the human organism in pro- conduct studies in the areas of space biology and longed or repetitive space flight. Thus, motion medicine, and thereby to expand scientific sickness, bone loss, and hormonal disturbances knowledge of the origin and evolution of life, The are the subjects of a continued search for mech- realization of this objective, which is intimately anisms and countermeasures. The program is linked to our understanding of the basic mecha- largely dependent upon the use of ground-based nisms of biological and medical processes, is analogs of space flight. achieved through a program of research con- The space biology activity will explore the role ducted both on Earth and in space. The near-term of gravity in life processes and use gravity as an activities will help us to discover and investigate environmental tool to investigate fundamental the effects of the space environment on humans biological questions. Specific objectives are to: to facilitate their safe, useful participation in space 1 ) investigate and identify the role of gravity in activities. The life sciences program utilizes a plant and animal cellular processes, embryonic composite of disciplines addressing all space-re- development, morphology and physiology; lated problems in biology and medicine. 2) identify the mechanisms of gravity sensing and Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program . 135 transmission of gravity-perception information the concept of universality of biological proc within both plants and animals; 3) identify the esses. interactive effects of gravity and other stimuIi It may be useful to describe one additiona (e.g., light) and stresses (e.g., vibration) on the space science program that has now been sig development of metabolism of organisms; 4) use nificantly cut back, because this cutback has gravity to study the normal nature and proper- ramifications for future international cooperation ties of living organisms; and 5) extend the limits in space applications. of knowledge about plant and animal growth and metabolism to provide for long-term survival and The international solar polar mission (ISPM) was multigeneration reproduction of life in space. This a joint NASA and European Space Agency mis- program provides basic ground-based informa- sion designed to obtain the first view of the solar tion in support of future space flight experiments system from a new perspective—a view from far and life support systems environment. This in- above and far below the plane in which the plan- cludes assurances that physical welfare and per- ets orbit the Sun’s equator, i.e., over the poles formance is preserved and that adequate treat- of the Sun. The two spacecraft would have aided ment of inflight illness or injuries is provided. i n the study of the relationship between the Sun and its magnetic field and particle emissions (solar Exobiology is the study of the origin, evolution, wind and cosmic rays) as a function of solar lati- and distribution of life and life-related molecules tude, and hence might have allowed us to gain on Earth and beyond. Sophisticated analyses of insight into the possible effects of solar activity life as we know it, its chemical precursors and on the Earth’s weather and climate. The objec- its origin, coupled with extrapolation to extrater- tive of the international solar polar mission was restrial environments, affords a unique opportuni- to conduct an exploration of those regions of the ty to address a most fundamental question regard- heliosphere above and below the equatorial ing the existence of such processes beyond the plane of the Sun. Observations in the extreme, Earth. Theories about chemical evolution and the high-latitude regions of the sun have not been origin of life are being refined to reflect results made before, and evidence indicates that this from the most recent planetary and astronomical region of space is greatly different from the region explorations. The current research program also in which the Earth is located. is uncovering an intimate association between the origin and evolution of life on Earth and the proc- The U.S. spacecraft for ISPM was canceled on esses that shaped the evolution of the solar system account of budget constraints. The issues raised itself. These discoveries have highlighted gaps in by its cancellation are discussed in chapter 7. our knowledge which, when completed as the program expands, will ultimately allow tests of

PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON SPACE

Democratic government is based on the prem- ers, and molders of public attitudes and opinion ise that there should be some linkage between as well as representatives of the public in the public attitudes and political choice, not only in political process. Thus, the following account of general but also with respect to specific issues on public attitudes about the space program needs the public agenda. This linkage is not a one-way to be interpreted with the understanding that gen- path, of course; public officials are leaders, teach- eral public opinion is only one determinant of 136 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications public policy, and that its influence is rarely impact in influencing public policy with direct. Public opinion more frequently acts as a respect to the U.S. space program. general constraint, setting boundaries within It is important, however, even if the second of which political leaders are free to chose, or as these propositions is accepted, to recognize that an indirect shaping influence on the attitudes of “while it has considerable intellectual interest and elites inside and outside of government; most entertainment value, space exploration is not a often, it is these attitudes that are closely cor- daily concern of the general public. . . . The lev- related with specific policy choices. els of interest and information in this area are es- From this analysis it follows that: pecially Iow.”s Thus it is likely that public attitudes will provide the background, but not much 1. During the early years of the U.S. space pro- more, against which national space policy will gram, the general public was willing to ac- continue to be formulated. cept the interpretation of society’s leaders as to the significance of space activities. This Public Opinion and Space Policy: 1965-80 made it possible for the United States to first A striking example of a leadership decision not adopt a moderate response to Soviet space being constrained by apparent public opinion is achievement, then to reverse policy and to the U.S. commitment to a manned lunar landing. enter into competition with the Soviets, even In the very month that President John F. Kennedy though public attitudes seemed to be op- announced that he was setting as a national goal posed to such competition. a lunar expedition before 1970, the Gallup Poll 2. More recently, public understanding of the reported that the public was opposed by a 58 to space program, - and a supportive public at- 33 percent margin to spending the up to $40 bil- titude toward that program, have increased lion such an enterprise would require, Until very to the point where they may have political recently, only once since 1965 has the percen- impact. Although an official’s position on tage of U.S. adults calling for the United States space-related issues may not be a crucial to do more in space exceeded the portion believ- determinant of electoral success, prospace ing that the Government should do less. Figure attitudes, and particularly, groups organized 9 compares this division of opinion for the period to reflect them, appear to be having some ‘National Science Board, Science Indicators, /980, p. 169.

Figure 9.–Long-Term Trend Polling Results of U.S. Public Opinion on the Federal Space Effort

60 r

50 t

1:1 0/0 I ~ I I I , ~ 1 i, I, I, I, I,, 1 I ~,, I, ~ ,1 I,, t,,,1, ~ 1\,,, I,, , I, ,, I,, , I,, , I,, , 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

NOTE: Responses to question of whether government should “do more” or “do less” In support of space exploration, 1985-1981. SOURCE: For 1965-1975, Herbert Krugman, “Public Attitudes toward the Apollo Program, ” Journal of Comrnurr/cations, vol. 27, No. 4 (1977), More recent data are derived from Trendex Polls taken for the General Electric Co. Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 137 from 1965 to 1981; the recent shift toward a numbered those holding the opposite view, 53 markedly more prospace position is clear from percent to 39 percent.6 this chart. While prospace opinion appears to be increas- Table 10, which reports opinions for the 1973- ing, the priority assigned to the space program 80 period, is even more revealing, both in terms has historically remained low. Tables 11 and 12 of the longer term trends and in terms of the cur- demonstrate this both for Government priorities rent uprising in prospace opinion. Only in recent in general (table 11) and for priorities within sci- years have space “antagonists” comprised less ence and technology (table 12). What is most rel- than an absolute majority, and the explicitly pro- evant in table 11 is that only the “military, arma- space group grew only slowly, from 7.4 percent ments, and defense” category showed a greater in 1973 to 11.6 percent in 1978. Most recently, increase in percentage in favor between 1977 and however, the figure for those believing the United 1980 than did the “space exploration program,” States is spending too little on space has jumped although this increase only moved space one to 18 percent, and space antagonists are now rank up the priority scale. According to one ana- only 39 percent of the total. The size of the lyst, “the increasing approval of space activities “space neutral” segment has stayed constant, among Americans over the past several years is and thus the gain in support for expanded space spending appears to reflect a real shift in opinion. GRobert D. McWilliams, “The Improving Socio-Political Situation of the American Space Program in the Early 1980’ s,” paper prepared In 1980, for the first time, those of the opinion for Fifth Princeton/AIAA Conference on Space Manufacturing, May that space spending should not be lowered out- 1981, p. 2.

Table IO.—Distribution of Opinion Toward Federal Spending on the Space Program: 1973 Through 1980 (percentages)

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 Too little ...... 7.4 7.7 7.4 9.1 10.1 11.6 18.0 About right ...... 29.3 27.5 30.1 28.0 34.4 35.0 34.6 Too much ...... 58.4 61.0 58.1 60.2 49.6 47.2 39.1 Don’t know ...... 4.7 3.6 4.4 2.5 5.9 6.5 8.3 Total ...... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

SOURCE National Opinion Research Center Polls as reported In Robert D. McWilllams, “The Improving Soclo-Political Situa- tion of the American Space Program in the Early 1980s, ” paper prepared for Fifth Princeton/AIAA Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1981

Table ll.—Percentages of Americans Favoring Increased Funding, and Relative Priority Rankings, for 11 Areas of Federal Government Spending, 1977 and 1980

1977 1977 1980 1980 Percent percent rank percent rank increase Halting the rising crime rate ...... 70.0 1 72.0 1 2.0 Dealing with drug addiction ...... 59.5 64.5 2 5.0 Improving-protecting Nation’s health . . . 58.5 : 57.1 4 – 1.4 Improving-protecting the environment . . 51.2 4 50.8 6 – 0,4 Improving Nation’s education system. . . 49.5 5 54.9 5 5.4 Solving problems of the big cities ...... 46.9 6 45.8 7 -1.1 Improving conditions for blacks...... 27.3 26.2 8 – 1.1 Military, armaments and defense ...... 25.7 ; 60.2 3 34.5 Welfare ...... 13.0 9 14.0 10 1.0 Space exploration program ...... 10.7 10 19.6 9 8.9 Foreign aid...... 3.7 11 5.4 11 1.7 SOURCE’ Robert D. McWilliams, “The lmProving Socio-Political Situation of the American Space Program in the Early 1980s,” paper prepared for Fifth Princeton/AIAA Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1981 138 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 12.—Public Priorities for Federal R&D Spending

Most preferred Least preferred Funding objective Response Rank Response Rank Improving health care ...... 815 11 60 12 Developing energy sources and conserving energy ...... 754 2 40 14 Improving education ...... 630 3 55 13 Reducing crime...... 587 4 82 11 Developing or improving methods for producing food ...... 368 5 253 8 Reducing and controlling pollution ...... 358 6 113 10 Developing or improving weapons for outer space ...... 266 7 403 Preventing and treating drug addiction ...... 259 8 195 Developing faster and safer public transportation...... 210 9 430 5 Improving the safety of automobiles ...... 155 10 284 7 Finding better birth control methods ...... 139 11 705 1,5 Discovering new basic knowledge about man and nature...... 135 12 577 4 Exploring outer space ...... 99 13 705 1.5 Predicting and controlling the weather ...... 60 14 592 3

technology funding from your tax money?”

not a trend that is riding mainly on the coattails It is possible to construct a profile of those who of militarism or growing faith in science and tech- most “support” and those who most “oppose” nology. Rather, it seems that Americans may be the U.S. space program, if “support” and “op- coming to view the space program as being con- pose” are defined as deviations of more than 10 ducive to the achievement of other types of goals percent from the average of all Americans. Table of which they are in favor. ”7 14 contains such a profile, Those who support the space program tend to have one or more of One indication of what the public expects from the following characteristics: male, between 25 space exploration is presented in table 13. A na- and 34, college-educated, professional or tech- tional survey taken for NSF asked adults to iden- nical employment, working for government, in- tify benefits they believed would result from ex- come over $25,000/year and living in the West. ploring outer space. Listed in table 13 are those r Opponents of the space program tend to be: benefits mentioned either first or second by re- female, over 65, black, less than a high school spondents. What is striking about the results is degree, laborers and service workers, and under the high ranking given to an indirect benefit of $5,000 income. One more relevant characteristic the program (“improve other technologies”) and that emerges from another opinion study is that the low rankings given to direct economic bene- those who support increased space spending are fits (“find industrial use, “ “create jobs and other significantly more likely to vote than those who economic benefits”). Compared with other tech- believe that too much is spent on space; over 72 nology-related issues such as nuclear power percent of those who supported an increase in or chemical food additives, a greater proportion space budgets in 1980 voted in the 1976 Presi- of Americans see space exploration as produc- dential election, while only 56 percent of those ing substantially more benefits than potential calling for reduced spending voted that year.9 harm.8

71 bid., p. 8 ‘National Science Board, op. cit., p. 170. 9MclA/illiams, op. cit., p. 16. Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program Ž 139

Table 13.—Perceived Benefits From Space Exploration

First or Benefits second mention Improve other technologies (e.g., computers) ...... 272 Find mineral or other wealth, other resources, sources of energy ...... 200 Increase knowledge of universe and/or of man’s origins ...... 190 Find new areas for future habitation ...... 134 Contact other civilizations, other forms of life ...... 107 Improve rocketry and missile (military) technology...... 43 Find industrial use for space ...... 27 Find new kinds of food/places to raise more food products ...... 26 Create jobs and other economic benefits...... 16 Learn about weather and how to control it...... 13

SOURCE: Institute of Survey Research, p. 164

Table 14.—Profile of Public Attitudes of Space more space positive than either “upper” or Exploration: “In General, Do You Favor or Oppose the Exploration of Outer Space?” “lower” class respondents; ● prospace attitudes have increased substan- Percent Percent tially among whites and only negligibly Group characteristics favor oppose among blacks; and All ...... 60 31 ● support for space is increasing faster for Men...... 71 22 10 Women ...... 49 38 divorcees than for any other marital class. Age 25 t0 34 ...... 70 23 Age over 65 ...... 34 50 There has been a suggestion that the shifts in Black ...... 38 49 space-positive attitudes with respect to variables O to 8 years of schooling ...... 32 50 of social class and education “provide a classic 9 to 11 years of schooling ...... 40 50 Some college, no degree ...... 74 19 example of how social change tends to begin and Bachelor’ s degree ...... 79 15 develop in society. Innovations generally find Graduate degree ...... 85 10 their beginnings in the ideas and efforts of the Professional or technical job...... 78 16 Operatives and laborers ...... 43 43 more highly educated members of the upper- Service workers ...... 47 41 middle class and, if they survive and grow more Work for government ...... 76 17 Under $5,000 income ...... 31 55 prevalent in the upper strata, they then tend to $25,000 to $49,999 income ...... 76 17 catch on at the lower socioeconomic levels.” The Over $50,000 income ...... 74 15 same analyst argues that “the resurgence of 20 Live in West ...... 74 space-positivism in America since 1975 was aonlY those ~ha~acteristics tflat differ by more than 10 Percent ‘rem overall opinion are included. spawned by the upper and middle social classes. SOURCE: Institute for Survey Research, Vo/ //, Deta//ed Fmd/rrgs, p 170. The trend then began to spread throughout the general public with the classic pattern that has characterized other prominent American social The demographic makeup of the “prospace” movements such as the feminist and civil rights group appears to be undergoing some changes 11 crusaders.’” in recent years, although its general characteristics as profiled in table 11 have remained stable. One of the most striking recent developments Among those changes: in the space policy field is the emergence of a number of organized prospace groups. As the ● recent increases in prospace attitude are quotation just cited suggests, the aggregation of much more marked among the most highly individual opinions into more-or-less broadly educated; based interest groups with middle and working ● formerly, “lower” and “working” classes class roots is part of the traditional pattern by were more antispace than were “middle” and “upper” classes. Recently, however, the IOMCwilliarnS, op. cit., pp. 10-1s. “middle” and “working” have become 11 Ibid., p. 14. 140 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications which issues are given increased attention on the ● Aerospace Industries Association, a consor- public agenda. perhaps this is what is happen- tium of major aerospace firms that functions ing with respect to space. The following section as a trade association. describes the recent emergence of a space in- ● Nationa/ Space C/ub, a Washington-based terest group network. group of business and government leaders in the space field. Interest Groups and Space Policy ● University Space Research Association, a During the 1970’s, interest groups organized consortium of universities active in space around one or a few issues and claiming to repre- research that operates several facilities under sent broad sectors of the general popuIation— NASA contract. so-called “public” interest groups—became an Among the most active and/or largest of the increasingly important influence on public policy. public interest or citizen support space groups In part, the increased influence came at the ex- are: pense of political parties as vehicles for articulat- ● ing, influencing, and implementing the public’s De/ta-Vee, a citizen-supported, nonprofit policy preferences.12 Thus the rapid increase in corporation that channels public contribu- space interest groups in recent years may be a tions into the support of specific space activ- development of political significance. A May 1980 ities, such as the continued operation of the survey of space interest groups identified 39 orga- Viking spacecraft on Mars and a U.S. Hal- nizations with nationwide activities.ls In the past ley’s Comet Mission. ● 2 years, and particularly with the transition in ad- High Frontier, a group formulating a national ministrations, there have been a number of one- strategy to make maximum use of space time efforts organized ad hoc to mobilize opinion technology to counter the threat of Soviet on space policy; these groups have provided a military power, to replace current nuclear base for such mobilization efforts. strategy with one based on space defense, and to promote the industrial and commer- There is an active “Coordinating Committee on cial potentials of space. Space” that attempts to identify areas of agree- ● Institute for the Social Science Study of ment and disagreement among the major pro- Space, which sponsors research and publica- space groups; its membership includes 11 of the tions related to the social science aspects of most active organizations. There are two general space exploration and development. types of prospace groups: 1 ) traditional profes- ● L-5 Society, which emphasizes human settle- sional groups, and 2) citizen support groups. ment in space as a long-term goal. Founded Most prominent among the former are: in 1975 by Gerard K. O’Neill, it has broad- . American Institute of Aeronautics and ened its scope to most aspects of space pol- Astronautics, the professional society for icy. Its membership is between 3,OOO and people in the aeronautics and astronautics 4,OOO individuals. ● field, with almost 30,000 members. Nationa/ Space /nstitute, the largest of the broadly based space groups, with over ● American Astronautic/ Society, a group of individuals with professional interest in 10,000 members. Founded in 1975 by Wern- space. Current membership is about 1,000. her von Braun, its emphasis is on communication with general audiences. ● P/anetary Society, which promotes aware- 1 zchar[es Chafer, “The Role of Public Interest Groups In SPace Policy, ” jerry Grey and Christine Krop (eds.), Space A4anufactur- ness of and public involvement in planetary irrg ///, Proceedings of the Fourth Princeton/AIAA Conference (New exploration and search for extraterrestrial York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1979), life. Publishes newsletter, supports research, pp. 185-189. 13Trudy Bell, “Space Activists on the Rise, ” /nsight, August- organizes meetings. Has grown to over September 1980, pp. 1, 3, 10, 13-15. 100,000 members in just over a year. ———

Ch. 5—U.S. Civilian Space Program ● 141

● Space Foundation, a private foundation for opinion polls have confirmed that the citizens of support of space industrialization. the United States were quite supportive of these ● Space Studies Institute, a research perform- achievements. ing and supporting group with focus on use ● A May 1981 Harris survey, taken less than of nonterrestrial resources. 1 month after the initial shuttle flight, found ● World Space Foundation, a group support- 76 percent of Americans calling the shuttle ing research projects to accelerate space ex- “a major breakthrough for U.S. technology ploration (e.g., solar sail). and know-how’ and a 63 to 33 percent The purposes of these and other space groups majority favoring the expenditure of several fall into three general categories: billions of dollars over the next decade to develop the full potential of the shuttle. The 1. educating and informing the public; Harris poll noted that “after the 1969 Moon 2. conducting research themselves; and landing, a 64 to 30 percent majority did not 3. funding external research. feel it was worthwhile to spend an additional Recently added to the list are groups explicitly $4 billion on the Apollo space program” and engaging in political activities. There were at- commented that “current support for spend- tempts to organize prospace Political Action ing on the space program is even more sig- Committees (PACS) for the 1980 election, and at nificant in view of the current overwhelm- least one prospace PAC remains in existence. ing preference for cutting Federal spending. ” The influence of these various organizations ● An August 1981 Associated Press-NBC and groups on space policy is difficult to estimate. survey found that 60 percent of U.S. adults Certainly, as the Reagan administration took of- thought that the United States was not fice in january 1981 and as the proposed NASA spending enough or was spending about the budget was cut several times in the following right amount on the space program, and 66 year, there have been a number of attempts by percent believed that the shuttle was a good one or a coalition of these groups to mobilize investment for the United States. opinion in support of specific projects (e.g., a mission to Halley’s Comet) or for the civilian space ● An October 1981 Associated Press-NBC poll program in general. Whether the reductions in confirmed the results of the earlier survey, the NASA budget would have been even more finding that 60 percent of respondents think severe, had not these groups been active, is a the shuttle program is a good investment, 30 question difficult or impossible to answer. percent do not, and 10 percent aren’t sure. Finally, note should be taken of the emergence A further examination of the results of the May of a Congressional Space Caucus, and a support- Harris poll suggests both that support for the ing Congressional Staff Space Group. This caucus space program is not evenly distributed across is initially limited to the House of Representatives; all strata of U.S. society and that the reasons for its goal is to increase the awareness of Members the support differ substantially among respond- and staff of the benefits of the Nation’s space ents (see tables 15 and 16). The August poll found effort. that 49 percent of respondents believed that the emphasis of the Nation’s space program should be primarily on national defense, 32 percent cited Space Achievement and scientific exploration, 10 percent cited both, and Public Opinion: 1981 9 percent were not sure. By October, these responses had shifted, with 43 percent in support With two successful flights of the shuttle Col- of a defense emphasis and 40 percent favoring umbia and the encounter of Voyager 2 with an emphasis on scientific exploration. In this lat- Saturn, 1981 was a year of spectacular space ter poll, 46 percent of respondents believed that achievement for the United States. Several public the United States should keep its space program 142 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 15.—How Would You Rank the Importance of Various Uses of the Space Shuttle?

Only Not very Very somewhat important important important at all Not sure Percent Percent Percent Percent Doing experiments with new pharmaceutical products that can help cure disease ...... 82 11 5 2 Developing a military capability in space beyond what the Russians are doing...... 68 20 10 2 Putting new communications satellites in space at a much lower cost ...... 64 25 9 2 Doing scientific research on metals, chemicals, and living cells in space . 55 27 16 2 Picking up other U.S. space satellites and repairing them in space...... 47 32 19 2

SOURCE: May 1981 Harris Survey.

Table 16.— “IS the Space Shuttle Program Worth the program do not in themselves prove that Spending Severai Billion Dollars Over the Next 10 there is deep public support for space. But, Years to Develop its Full Potential?” viewed in the context of a quarter century of Not space activities, the recent upswing in opinion Worth it worth it Not sure in favor of the space program appears significant. Percent Percent Percent First of all, current support is part of a long-term Total ...... 63 33 4 trend of increasing support. It cannot, therefore, College educated . . . . . 71 26 3 be explained as the result only of shuttle and Men ...... 76 21 Voyager successes. Second, the trend of increas- 43 3 Women ...... 52 ing support coincides with the proliferation and Blacks ...... 45 53 2 growth of citizens’ support groups. As public Republicans ...... 71 26 3 education about space is perhaps the major over- Democrats ...... 57 39 4 all goal of these groups, their efforts have been Conservatives...... 66 30 4 Liberals ...... 57 41 2 the effect, if not the cause, of continued rising

SOURCE: May 1981 Harris Survey. interest in space. Third, the Space Caucus, arising as a “back bench” movement within Con- gress, rather than in response to the leadership, separate from the programs of other nations, 32 is evidence for a genuine space constituency, i.e., percent favored a joint space program between one whose real interests, economic, political, or the United States and the U. S. S. R., and 15 per- scientific, are at stake. These three conditions sug- cent favored joint ventures with other countries, gest that public awareness of space issues is in- but not with the Soviet Union. creasing and that official space policy may begin Opinion polls, taken singly, do not reveal fund- to receive more constant scrutiny among at least amental views underlying the shifting tides of the attentive public. This would seem to bode opinion. Thus, the facts that by 1981 the success well for those who believe that increased under- of the shuttle and of the Voyager missions spurred standing of the benefits of U.S. activity in space public interest in the U.S. space program and that will lead to continued and firmer public support a clear majority of the public was found to favor for that activity. —

Chapter 6 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS Contents

Page Introduction ...... 145 Access to Classified Information ...... 145 Summary Assessment ...... 147 Separate Programs ...... 147 Technology Transfer...... 147 Asymmetrical Relationships ...... 147 Status of National Security Space Programs ...... 148 Current System ...... 148 Future Developments ...... 151 Civilian-National Security Relationships in Space: 1957-81 ...... 151 Early Policy Choices ...... 152 Program Relationships in the Early Years ...... 153 Current Policy and Policy Review Process ...... 154 Policy Formulation and Program Stresses in the Post-Apollo Period ...... 154 Recent Policy Reviews ...... 155 Current Administration Policy Review ...... 156 Current Institutional and Programmatic Characteristics of Civilian and National Security Space Efforts ...... 156 Mission Differences ...... 156 Openness v. Need for Secrecy ...... 157 Differences in the Institutional Support Base ...... 158 International Aspects ...... 159 Common Civilian-National Security Needs and Cooperative Activities . . . . . 159 Issues and Policy Options ...... 160 Technology Transfer ...... 160 Security Classification Barriers . 162 Interagency Review Mechanisms ...... 163 Future of the Space Shuttle System ...... 164 Man-in-Space ...... 165 Common-Use Systems (Unmanned)...... 166 Civilian Use of Data From DOD-Operated Systems ...... 167 Institutional Change...... 169 Introduction ...... 169 The Original Rationale Reconsidered ...... 169 Options for Future Civilian-National Security Relationships ...... 170

FIGURE

Figure No. Page 10. Historical Budget Summary–Budget Authority ...... 149 Chapter 6 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the National Aeronautics and overall U.S. civilian space policy. The recent rapid Space Administration (NASA), the Department of growth and projections of even more rapid future Defense (DOD), and other Federal agencies have increases in military space programs and budgets evolved a set of interlocking responsibilities for make such a reconsideration essential. U.S. space activities. NASA is designated as the lead agency for most U.S. civilian space efforts. DOD, in accordance with the National Aeronau- Access to Classified Information tics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958, undertakes “ac- Any analysis of the relationships between the tivities peculiar to or primarily associated with the civilian and the national security programs that development of weapons systems, military opera- is intended for public dissemination has to con- tions, or the defense of the United States (includ- front the problem of access to classified informa- ing the research and development (R&D) neces- tion. Information is classified and placed under sary to make effective provision for the defense restrictive security controls if its unrestricted of the United States). ” Responsibility for coordi- publication is deemed to harm the national secu- nating the efforts of the civilian and the military rity. Classified data were not used in the prepara- programs was initially vested in the National Aer- tion of this report. Though discussion of the im- onautics and Space Council (see ch. 10) and a plications of classified-unclassified program rela- Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, although tionships at an unclassified level is necessarily in- both were later abolished under Presidential re- complete and sometimes unconvincing, it is nev- organization plans. It was explicitly recognized ertheless the only available approach to presen- that the President was ultimately responsible for tation of such matters to the general public. The dividing specific responsibilities between DOD material that follows has been written in such a and NASA. way as to provide sufficient insight into the types The premise that there is a need for separate of issues the classified programs generate and to civilian and national security space programs has ensure that the analyses and discussion of options been examined and reaffirmed by several high- are reasonable. Inevitably, there will be conclu- Ievel policy reviews in the intervening years– sions or observations that could be evaluated each concluding that the characteristics of the more completely in a classified document. primary missions of each program justified the It must also be recognized that there are dif- distinct institutional structures that had been de- ferent degrees of classification within the military/ veloped. These reviews also affirmed that rela- intelligence programs. The most highly classified tions between the two programs should be con- are the so-called “National Technical Means” tinually scrutinized and that opportunities for and related systems; information about these cooperation or better coordination should be systems is very closely kept, even within the na- sought. tional security community. These systems are Now that NASA and DOD have been conduct- mostly involved in strategic reconnaissance. ing space programs for nearly 25 years, under Many military systems, on the other hand, such separate charters but with overlapping interests, as communications and navigation satellites, are it is appropriate to consider the current status and not themselves classified, though certain details probable future of their relationships in light of of the technologies involved are kept secret.

145 146 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Cooperation Between DOD and NASA in U.S. Manned Space Programs

NASA DOD

Shared Programs

------I'" ___M_e_rC_u_r_y __ ..... ~-- -_ _ -- Atlas Launch Vehicle I

Gemini ------h Vehicle

G m R Idezvous

Space Capsule t------t------Apollo Saturn V

:lpsule Manned ------Orbiting Laboratory ---- -. -- --- IIC

r------1 , I r------, -----..., I , ,• • Space Station : I I • • I I ,• :------f---- _ .. -: Space Station ,------I Titan III , I I : Re-entry Gemini I 1 i I • • • I• • • ---_ ...... - ...... ~ L .. -- -- -... -...... ',. ------_.. --_.•

Apollo Capsule

Saturn V-Lab I Sky lab 1 J Saturn Ib Modified (man rated)

....__ K_e_n_n_e_d_y __ ...... ------: ___ S_h_u_tt_'_e __~~ ------,,-__v_a_n_d_e_n_b_e_rg __ .. r---' L __ J Cancelled or deferred programs

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs . 147

Summary Assessment is, for the most part, oversimplified and fails to recognize important differences in agency mis- Separate Programs sions and the resulting needs for space systems. Space systems provide an increasing number Different mission objectives entail different em- of vital services to support a variety of military phases on performance characteristics and other and intelligence missions. Continued technolog- design considerations in the development and ical advances, along with the need to counter an adaptation of advanced technology. For exam- increasing level of military space activities by the ple, a military system may have to be able to Soviet Union, will expand the range of desirable operate in a hostile environment, so that military national security programs. Similarly, on the civil- specifications are frequently more stringent than ian side advancing technology will make possi- those for civilian purposes. ble space activities that could contribute signifi- Nevertheless, the adequacy of technology cantly to a number of high-priority national objec- transfer between civilian and national security tives. These include: 1 ) to enhance the image and programs remains an important issue that will be prestige of the United States through continuing examined in some detail in this chapter, The fol- man-in-space activities; 2) to provide a base for lowing observations summarize this analysis: commercial space services, most notably for communications; 3) to conduct research; 4) to extend ● Technology flows in both directions, and the technology base for space and launching both sectors have benefited from such trans- systems; and 5) to perform valuable public serv- fers. General-use space technology is trans- ices such as meteorological observations, storm ferred with relativ ease; mission-specific warning, and other Earth observation or commu- technology only with great difficulty. nication tasks. ● There are few incentives and, frequently, practical penalties for either a national secu- In today’s environment of growth in expendi- rity or a civilian program manager to enter tures for national security combined with reduc- cooperative technology sharing arrange- tions in civilian activities, it is necessary to con- ments with other programs. sider the continued appropriateness of separate ● The need to protect certain information and programs and separate institutions. This is technology for national security purposes especially important with the advent of the space limits its accessibility to civilian users. transportation system, which represents a large ● Procedures exist to enable selected individ- new area of common interest and new opportu- uals from civilian agencies to gain access to nities for technology sharing. Three basic options classified systems and information, but this seem possible: 1 ) separate civilian and military access is imperfect for a variety of reasons; programs; 2) independent space R&D agency for continued management attention is needed all Federal space programs, civilian and military; to keep these procedures functioning effec- and 3) absorption of NASA by DOD and other tively. Federal agencies. These options are discussed under the heading “Institutional Change. ” Asymmetrical Relationships The need to protect national security space ac- Technology Transfer tivities and products results in a continuing asym- Classification barriers necessarily protect sensi- metry in the relationships between the two pro- tive national security information, but their ex- grams. In general, systems operated by DOD are istence disposes many in the civilian community of high national priority; they are established in to attribute unknown but vastly superior capa- response to needs that are not easily questioned bilities to classified systems. This leads to the by those outside of the national security decision- claim that if military technology could be trans- making structure. Similarly, the determination of ferred more rapidly and more thoroughly to the the boundary between classified and unclassified civilian sector, civilian programs would benefit technology is made within the national security greatly from these superior capabilities. This view community. As a result, limitations have been set 148 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

on the allowable performance of civilian systems. equitably reviewed from a disinterested perspec- These limitations tend to persist and act as con- tive, as discussed in chapters 3 and 10. tinuing constraints on civilian users; in some cases, the civilian user community does not know National security concerns affect most, if not the details of the restrictions that exist. There are all, civilian space applications programs; there- few opportunities for the civilian community to fore, a discussion of the relationships between question these restrictions, except within forums the two sectors is especially pertinent to this such as the National security Council (NW, assessment. An outline of the DOD-operated pro- where civilian agency interests are inevitably of grams is given in the following section, but the secondary importance. These asymmetries sug- limitations that result from describing them on gest the need for a forum in which the civilian the basis of unclassified data must be kept in and national security space relationships can be mind.

STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS The national security uses of space technology Current Systems are quite varied; however, they are all “applications” in that space technology is one means to Precise figures regarding expenditures for achieve various national security objectives. The DOD-supported space efforts are unavailable United States depends heavily on space-based because many of them are classified. Figure 10 systems: 1 ) to conduct continuing surveillance of compared published data on spending for civilian activities in many areas of the world, particular- (NASA) and military (DOD) space activities. Over ly those controlled by its potential adversaries, the past several years, the national security and to monitor compliance with international budget has been growing at a much faster rate agreements; 2) to provide timely warning of at- than the civilian one, and is now larger in abso- tacks on the United States and allied territory; and lute terms than the civilian budget. When one 3) to communicate with U.S. military forces recognizes that the single major item in the NASA around the world and at sea. The U.S. national budget, the shuttle, will have DOD as its single security community is also actively exploring largest user, the emphasis on national security ap- other space activities, including: 1 ) the need to plications of space becomes even more marked. protect both civilian and security assets already Current national security space systems per- in orbit from Soviet antisatellite systems; 2) the form (although in a very different context) func- ability to assure “freedom of the roads” for U.S. tions similar to those performed by civilian space spacecraft and launch vehicles by developing a systems. Classification of these systems prohibits deterrent in the form of an antisatellite intercep- a full description of them in this analysis;2 the tor; 3) and the long-range potential of space- following brief descriptions are thus intended on- based weapons for defending the United States ly to emphasize the support role played by cur- and its allies against hostile actions. The sum total rently operational national security space sys- of these activities comprises a fast growing na- tems: tional security space program; many military analysts see space technology as having a revolution- zFUrther information on intelligence and defense activities in space ary impact on national strategy and national pow- is contained in, for example, Trudy E. Bell, “America’s Other Space er in coming years. ’ Program,” The Sciences, December “1979; Eberhard Rechtin, “Future Milita~ Applications in Space,” Speech to International Aerospace Symposium, Paris, June 1981; Thomas H. Karas, /rnp/ications of Space Technology for Strategic Nuclear Competition, Oc- ‘A recent study of the potentials of armed conflict in space is G. casional Paper 25, The Stanley Foundation; j. Preston Layton, “Mil- Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1981); see also itary Space in Transition, ” Aeronautics and Astronautics, October the recently published report High Frontier, from the Heritage 1981; the annual Aeronautics and Space Report of the President Foundation. contains an approved description of naticmal security space efforts. Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs • 149

Figure 10.—Historical Budget Summary-Budget Authority

~ Defense I / . t- /

1 . . . . I i 1 1 1 I 1 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 1 I I I 1 1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 T.Q.a 77 78 79 80 81 1982

Year

aT, Q. - Transitional Quarter. SOURCE Of f!ce of Management and Budgel

● Earth observation. —It was only in October are more specialized and provide advanced 1978 that the existence of strategic surveil- performance, transfer of this technology to lance satellites was officially acknowledged the civilian sector will continue to be an by an American President,3 although the issue, especially as civilian needs become media and general public had assumed their more specialized in turn.4 existence for many years. Earth observation ● Communications. –Although the bulk of satellites are used to perform several different routine military messages are carried over national security-related functions, including: civilian-operated communication circuits, 1. early warning of missile attack; both terrestrial and satellite, there is also a 2. verification of compliance in related in- variety of satellite communications systems ternational arms-control agreements available for the exclusive use of the military such as nuclear testing and strategic mis- services and national command authorities. sile deployment; and These military satellites are crucial links in 3. surveillance of various areas of the the Nation’s command, control, and com- world to gather data required for U.S. munications systems; approximately one- strategic and tactical planning. third of U.S. long-distance military traffic Miiitary systems require degrees and kinds goes by dedicated DOD satellites. of performance not required for civilian pur- A continuing problem in national secur- poses. Many different kinds of satellites and ity communications via satellite is how to sensors are used to satisfy specific requirements. To the degree that military systems 4A Pionwring analysis of the use of space SYStETTIS for surveillance and warning is Philip Klass, Secret Sentries in Space (Random House, JPresident Carter gave public recognition to the existence of in- 1971 ); see also, “Study on the Implications of Establishing an intelligence satellites during an Oct. 1, 1978 speech at the Kennedy ternational Satellite Monitoring Agency,” prepared for the 2d U.N. Space Center. Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, Aug. 6, 1981, pp. 15-18. ——

150 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

combine various existing and future systems ellites. DOD’s global positioning satellite into a coherent “architecture” which would (GPS) system, now in an advanced stage of allow the integrated use of communications development, will provide navigation assist- capability by both civilian and military ance and position location for all military authorities under various crisis and conflict services, and will also be available for civilian situations. At issue here is how dependent use, albeit with somewhat degraded capa- the military should be on nonmilitary com- bilities. Six Navstar satellites are now in orbit, munications channels and how much invest- with a total of 18 envisaged for the complete ment the military should make to ensure system. that civilian channels are survivable and ● Meteorology. —The military operates its own secure under various conditions. For exam- weather satellites using technology rather ple, there has been substantial attention similar to the National Oceanic and Atmo- given to protecting the tracking and data spheric Administration (NOAA) satellites that relay satellites so that they can be used for serve civilian needs. There have been several defense as well as civilian purposes. analyses of the potential for combining civii- Navigation. –There has been a long tradition ian and military meteorological satellite oper- in the United States of providing navigation ations into a single system, but no such services for both military and civilian uses; merger has been approved. that tradition has been extended into the ● Transportation. -The national security com- joint use of operational Navy navigation sat- munity has used the same launch vehicles,

Cooperation Between DOD and NASA in Meteorological Satellites

9 DOD (Air Force)

Common Technology Production

Exchange of Data Air Weather NOAA m-9w - -- 0 --- w Navy 4 * t L

v Wllc SOURCE: OffIce of Technology Assessment. , Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 151

with certain variations, (except for the rience on which to base future decisions on the Saturn-class boosters used exclusively for military role of man in space. manned Apollo launches) to boost its satel- Large-scale development and deployment of lites into orbit as has the civilian space pro- manned and unmanned military systems in gram (e.g., Atlas-Agena, Titan 11, Atlas-Cen- space, beyond those currently required for sup- taur, Titan Ill). This pattern will continue with port purposes, will be based on decisions, not the shuttle. However, the military has sepa- yet made, concerning military doctrine and na- rate checkout and launch facilities, both at tional policy. The notion that space is a fourth Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force theater of war which can supplement or supplant Base, for expendable launch vehicles, and air, sea, and ground operations is not fully ac- is building a shuttle launch complex at cepted by either the civilian or the military leader- Vandenberg. joint use of the shuttle implies ship of the national security community. Exten- joint use of mission control facilities at sive manned military operations and/or weapons Johnson Space Center, though the Air Force in space are still very much in the exploratory is hoping to construct its own Consolidated stage. In addition, current international treaties, Space Operations Center in Colorado such as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Springs. There has been some suggestion of the Soviet Union, as well as hopes for future arms- two separate shuttle fleets, one for civilian control agreements, may prevent or delay the de- and one for national security use. ployment of space weaponry. There is a substantial degree of international concern, expressed Future Developments at the United Nations (U. N.) and elsewhere, For the most part the systems discussed above about any expansion of the arms race into outer support ground-, sea-, and air-based military space. operations and extend or enhance existing logis- tical capabilities. Under consideration now, how- Civilian-National Security ever, are weapons systems that couId operate in Relationships in Space: 1957-81 space. There is a vigorous science and technology development program oriented toward a wide The decision to house defense-related space range of future applications, including antisatellite operations and the R&D leading to them within systems and directed energy weapons. If the DOD and to create a new civilian agency for non- United States should decide to develop and de- defense space research were made in the imme- ploy some sort of space-based, antisatellite or bal- diate wake of Sputnik, as the Eisenhower adminis- listic missile defense system, such an effort would tration began to organize the U.S. space effort. These decisions were controversial; individuals require a major expansion of our space infrastructure, including the development of space plat- both in and outside Government, particularly in forms, space power systems, and space construc- Congress, the defense industry, and the military tion facilities. Pursuing such a course would im- services, believed that the Nation should undertake a single integrated space program under mil- ply major changes in strategic thinking, and thus itary management.G However, President Eisen- a decision to develop space weapons systems is hower and the majority of Congress believed that as much an issue of national policy as it is of tech- there were significant advantages for the coun- nological potentials try in separating the national space effort into Another area of future development is manned separate elements and in creating a separate man- military space operations. Some see a need for -— manned observation, inspection, command and bThe following account of the origins and early evolution of U.S. control, servicing, or other operations in Earth space policy and institutions is drawn from a number of sources including: John Logsdon, The Future of the U.S. Space Program orbit. Military use of the shuttle will provide expe- (Praeger Publishers, 1975); Robert L. RoshIt, An Administrative His- tory of NASA, /953-1963, NASA, 1966, and Enid Bok Schoettle, “The Establishment of NASA, ” in Know/edge of Power: Essays on 5Rechtin, op. cit., pp. 7-8. Science and Government, The Free Press, 1966. 152 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications agement and institutional structure for each for the 1960’s. There were attempts to develop element. a comprehensive national space policy under NSC auspices. The objective of such a policy was Similarly, President Kennedy rejected the no- the development and exploitation of U.S. outer tion, raised early in his administration, of com- space capabilities to achieve scientific, military, bining NASA and Air Force space programs under and political goals, and to establish the United military auspices. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy States as a recognized leader in this field. How- viewed the national space effort as having distinct ever, Eisenhower and his advisors did not believe civilian and military components, and decided that the political returns from space achievement to use the civilian space program as one of the were large enough to merit a major investment major arenas for competition with the Soviet of resources, and thus were unwilling to approve Union. an aggressive civilian space program aimed at po- Early Policy Choices litical objectives. Several factors influenced the decision by the President Kennedy was willing to approve such Eisenhower administration and by Congress to a program, however, and, in Apollo, the United establish a separate civilian space agency. One States undertook an enterprise justified primar- 7 reason was the view of the scientific community ily by national prestige and political payoff. The that the major objectives of the civilian space pro- policy that Ied to the Apollo commitment was for- gram should be scientific in character, and that mulated in the context of developing an inte- these objectives could best be met by a separate grated national space policy. Apollo was the cen- agency not linked to DOD programs. A more tell- terpiece of an across-the-board acceleration of ing concern was Eisenhower’s view that there both civilian and military space programs, aimed were specific and positive benefits for the United at achieving U.S. preeminence in all areas of States, in terms of both foreign policy and space technology. Kennedy was told that “the domestic politics, in creating an open space pro- nonmilitary, noncommercial, nonscientific but gram under civilian control. These benefits were civilian projects such as lunar and planetary ex- particularly evident, given that the Soviet space ploration are . . . part of the battle along the fluid program was closed. The United States could front of the Cold War.”B claim that its civilian space program was an accu- While Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy rate reflection of the open, achievement-oriented both desired a national space program in con- character of American society, while at the same sonance with overall national policy objectives, time developing whatever national security space one which maximized returns on both the civilian systems were deemed necessary through a sec- and military investments of national resources, ond, much less open program. Cooperation with coordination of the two programs was not a other countries, desirable both to meet specific straightforward matter. During the 1960’s the needs for access to sites for tracking stations, and civilian space program, and particularly its cen- to further general foreign policy goals, would be tral activity, Apollo, developed in ways that made greatly facilitated by such a separation. close interactions with major defense space appli- At the policy level, Eisenhower and his top ad- cations difficult. Although NASA did maintain visors did not deal with military and civilian space Earth-oriented science and applications pro- efforts in isolation, but rather viewed them as grams, its major manned and unmanned efforts parts of a single national space program. Eisen- such as Apollo and planetary exploration were hower authorized DOD to undertake whatever oriented outward, away from Earth. Though there military space efforts could be justified by existing were attempts to undertake joint planning for and future military requirements, but he did not tracking stations, meteorological satellites, and approve the futuristic plans generated within the 7 full account of the Apollo decision is contained in Logsdon, Air Force (such as a manned Moon-base) and the A op. cit. Army. Nor did he approve ambitious NASA plans Blbid., p. 126. Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 153 geodetic satellites, none of these resulted in close- though NASA had set its sights on the Moon. At ly integrated civilian-military activities. The ex- the project and program levels, these interactions ception was in the area of launch vehicles. NASA were on balance cooperative and productive. used the Atlas, developed by the Air Force, for However, at the policy and institutional level its Mercury program and the Air Force developed there were, perhaps inevitably, stresses between Titan for the Gemini program. In fact, with the separate programs in the same technological exception of Saturn, which was used only for arena. It is beyond the scope of this assessment NASA’s Apollo program, launch vehicles for all to detail these interactions, but the following brief these manned satellites were shared; DOD had summary may provide some sense of their char- no use for such a large and expensive launch acter. 1° vehicle as Saturn. As DOD requirements for some launch vechicles, such as the Thor and Atlas, MANNED SPACE FLIGHT decreased, these were transferred to NASA. It was the armed services that during the 1950’s In particular, the decision to accomplish Apollo did the first detailed planning for manned space by means of lunar-orbit rendezvous (LOR) was flight, but NASA was assigned the U.S. manned a watershed in separating civilian and military mission in 1958. Project Mercury was based on manned space flight programs for almost a dec- Air Force plans, and the Air Force was left with ade.9 There was extensive controversy preceding only a modest, and never fully funded, space the decision for LOR. Many argued that if Earth- glider program (Dyna-Soar), which was eventual- orbit rendezvous were used to accomplish ly canceled. At one point the Air Force contem- Apollo, the knowledge gained from rendezvous plated a “Blue Gemini” program using NASA’s of spacecraft and assembly of structurs in low- Gemini vehicles; when NASA balked, DOD set- Earth orbit would be valuable not only for the tled for a modest series of experiments on Gemini lunar program, but also for national security activ- flights. Late in 1963, Defense Secretary Mc- ities. However, NASA, driven by a desire to meet Namara approved the Manned Orbital Labora- the lunar landing goal before 1970, chose LOR tory program for the Air Force. This program was as the method most likely to make this achieve- terminated in 1969 because foreseeable military ment possible. This choice, in addition to NASA’s requirements were inadequate to justify it, despite emphasis on planetary exploration in its un- the $1.3 billion already spent. Since that time manned scientific programs, to a large degree NASA has had complete responsibility for the separated the central element of the NASA pro- manned flight portion of the national space program from national security space efforts during gram, although this situation will change when the 1960’s and early 1970’s. the shuttle begins to fly missions dedicated to national security.

Program Relationships in the Early Years LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT The NAS Act, which provided for separate civil- Immediately after the acceleration of the U.S. ian and national security space programs, also space program in 1961, there was an intensive called for “close cooperation among all interested attempt to integrate future launch vehicle devel- agencies of the United States in order to avoid opments. This attempt was not successful, and unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and NASA went on to develop Saturn boosters for equipment. ” As this directive was carried out, Apollo missions while DOD added the Titan Ill there were substantial interactions between civil- as the heavy-duty launcher for military and ian and national security space efforts during the intelligence programs. When it came time to con- first decade of the national space program, even sider whether to continue to use Saturn as the workhorse for the post-Apollo civilian space pro-

gjohn M. Logsdon, “Selecting the Way to the Moon: the Choice IOAn account of early INA!jA-DOD relationships is contained in of the Lunar Orbital Rendezvous Mode, ” Aerospace Historian, June W. Fred Boone, NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years, 1971, contains an account of this decision. NASA Historical Note HHR-32, 1970. 154 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications gram or to develop a new type of reusable launch METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES vehicle, the policy was made in an explicit con- DOD sponsored the initial research on meteor- text of joint civilian-national security require- ological satellites; this work led to the TIROS pro- ments, although the development task was as- gram, which was transferred to NASA and then signed to NASA. That the shuttle would be a mul- became the basis for the first operational civilian tiuse launch vehicle with its design suited to meet weather satellite. DOD used the same contrac- defense and intelligence requirements as well as tor to develop weather satellites dedicated to civilian needs was essential to the program’s military uses. The result has been the existence approval. ’ 1 , of two systems which, while using the same “bus” contain different sensors and fly in different COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES orbits, and a continuing controversy over the Originally, NASA was assigned responsibility for need for separate weather satellite systems. developing passive communications satellite technology (e.g., Echo), whereas DOD devel- EARTH OBSERVATION PROGRAMS oped active communications satellites. There was The advantages of the view from outer space an early shift in this division of labor, and NASA for strategic surveillance were obvious from the by 1960 had begun to develop active communi- beginning, and DOD and various intelligence cations satellites for civilian use. With the cancel- agencies began highly classified Earth observa- lation of the Army’s ADVENT geosynchronous tion programs. As the sensors developed for these satellite program due to technical and manage- early national security programs (e.g., the Return ment problems, it was left to NASA to develop Beam Vidicon) were supplanted by more ad- geosynchronous communications satellites, vanced models, some of them were declassified which have proved to be the key to both civilian and became part of NASA’s civilian remote sens- and military satellite communications efforts. Dur- ing experiments in the late 1960’s. There has ing the 1960’s and 1970’s both NASA and DOD been a continuing tension between the desire to had active R&D programs investigating commu- maintain maximum secrecy about the capabilities nications satellite technology appropriate to dif- of U.S. surveillance systems and the desire to use fering civilian and military requirements. both the products of those systems and the components developed for them for operational civil- lljerw Grey, Enterprise (Morrow, 1979), PP. 66-68. ian applications systems.

CURRENT POLICY AND POLICY REVIEW PROCESS

Policy Formulation and Program Office of Defense Affairs, which was active in Stresses in the Post-Apollo Period maintaining liaison with defense and intelligence space efforts. Tensions rarely escalated to a level Carrying out the Apollo commitment kept at which White House policy offices such as the NASA fully occupied during the 1960’s, and for National Aeronautics and Space Council and the the most part relations between the civilian and Office of Science and Technology got involved national security space programs were conducted in their resolution. on a case-by-case basis, mainly at the project and technology level. Only occasionally, as in the During the past decade, however, there have controversy over control of Gemini and post- been several Presidential-level policy reviews of Apollo manned programs, did the tensions rise the national space effort that have dealt with to the policy and institutional level. The major civilian and national security programs in a com- channel for interaction was the Aeronautics and mon framework. Perhaps the basic point to be Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), a joint made about these reviews is that each examined NASA-DOD body. NASA also established an and revalidated the policy that civilian, military, Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs . 155 and intelligence programs should be carried out civilian and military. The initial review was car- in separate institutional frameworks, although ried out under the guidance of Presidential Re- each review also recognized opportunities for view Memorandum 23, which considered ques- closer cooperation and coordination among tions about civilian-military relationships and these separate programs. resulted in Presidential Directive 37 (PD/NSC-37). This review was followed by further interagency The first such comprehensive review was car- review requested by the president in June 1978, ried out during the summer of 1969 under the which led to a second Presidential Directive auspices of a Space Task Group (STG), created (PD/NSC-42) and a public announcement on U.S. ad hoc and chaired by the Vice President. (The civilian space policy in October 1978. In this deliberations of the STG are described in some statement, President Carter identified decisions detail inch. 5.) President Nixon charged STG with that were designed to set the direction of U.S. providing him a “definitive recommendation on efforts in space over the next decade. Among the direction the national space program should 12 other things, the announced civilian space policy take in the post-Apollo period. ” The review was to promote a balance of applications, sci- considered future directions of both the civilian ence, and technology development that would and military space programs, but its focus was “increase benefits for resources expended on the future for the civilian manned program. through better integration and technology trans- A major and lasting result of STG’S review was fer among the national space programs and by the concept of a reusable space shuttle to serve using more joint projects when appropriate. ” almost all national launch vehicle requirements, from commercial uses to intelligence missions. As part of the Presidential review several deci- To realize this concept, technical characteristics, sions were made in specific applications areas, as well as managerial and funding patterns, were either as program guidance or for the conduct negotiated by NASA and DOD (represented pri- of further studies. marily by the Air Force). As has become evident ● since the 1969-72 period, the interagency plan- NASA was to chair an interagency task force ning did not resolve all of the program issues that to examine options for incorporating current have subsequently caused continuing NASA- and future remote-sensing systems into an DOD tension over the shuttle program.13 integrated national system, with emphasis on defining and meeting user requirements. By 1977, enough stresses had built up among ● The Defense community, NASA, and NOAA the civilian, military, and intelligence space pro- were to conduct a review of meteorological grams that president Carter authorized a Presi- programs to determine the degree to which dential-level space policy review. The stated pur- these programs might be consolidated in the pose of the review was “to resolve potential con- 1980’s and the extent to which separate pro- flicts among the various space program sectors grams supporting specialized defense needs and to recommend coherent space principles and should be maintained. The possibility for in- 14 national space policy.” tegrated systems for ocean observations from space was also to be examined. Recent Policy Reviews ● With respect to technology sharing, steps were to “be taken to facilitate technology The Carter administration adopted the NSC pol- transfer between the space sectors. The ob- icy review process as the primary mechanism for jective was to maximize efficient utilization considering and developing space policy, both of the technologies while maintaining nec- IZTlle space TaSk Group was established by a Feb. 13, 1969, essary security and management relation- memorandum from the President. ships. 1 JEdgar U Isamer, “Space Shuttle Mired in Bureaucratic Feud,” Air Force, September 1980. In November 1979, president Carter approved 14The unclassified version of the results of the review of SPace policy was issued in the form of a White House press release on further civilian space policy that amplified the June 20, 1978. policies established in PDs 37 and 42. The new 156 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications policies were contained in Presidential Direc- discussion difficult. This has been a continuing tive/NSC-54. problem in raising and resolving many issues of civilian-military relationships. The policy decisions in PD-54 were the result of extended interagency debate, and were based, in part, on the results of the various studies and Current Administration Policy Review reviews mandated by PD-42. The various policy reviews of the 1977-79 period continue to provide the formal underpin- PD-54 directed that DOD and the Department ning and guidance that govern today’s programs of Commerce (DOC) maintain and coordinate in both civilian and military applications. How- dual polar-orbiting meteorological programs, with ever, the Reagan administration has initiated a each continuing to procure systems and operate broad examination of the extant policy. Although separate satellites to meet the differing needs of strongly driven by the administration’s perceived the military and civilian sectors. When new polar- need to constrain the Federal budget, the review orbiting satellites became justifiable they were to is intended to be comprehensive, and will include be jointly developed and procured by DOD, an examination of the provisions of the NAS Act. DOC, and NASA in order to maximize tech- The review will focus on the use of the space nology sharing and minimize cost. An “ap- transportation system for civilian and national propriate” coordination mechanism was to be security purposes and on commercialization of established to assure effective cooperation and civilian Earth observation systems. to prevent duplication. The President’s science adviser has undertaken For oceanic programs, PD-54 further stated that the review, which will be coordinated via a “Cab- if oceanographic satellites were to be developed, inet Council” mechanism. The Policy Review DOD, DOC, and NASA were to pursue joint de- Committee (Space) of the Carter administration velopment, acquisition, and management. A has now been disbanded. There are new pres- committee was to be established with expanded sures on several fronts. The administration’s representation to forward recommendations on budget cuts have necessitated a wholesale reeval- policy issues to the policy review committees in uation of many planned civilian space program NSC for consideration and actions. initiatives in applications and also in space sci- The classified character of the basic documents, ences. In addition, the success of the shuttle has accentuated by the use of NSC as the forum for introduced the need to focus on civilian-military discussion, has made congressional and public relationships at a new level of detail.

CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVILIAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE EFFORTS The possibility and desirability of closer civilian- Mission Differences national security relationships in space depend on the strengths and weaknesses of the current NASA is an R&D agency with its primary mis- structure and the differences and similarities be- sion the development and demonstration of tween the two areas of space activity. Although space and aeronautics systems and associated the two programs have certain common interests technology, the provision of launch services, and and a history of cooperating to solve common the operation of research and scientific satellites. problems, their different goals and consequent NASA has a tradition of evaluating the potential divergence in evolution have resulted in different of space technology in a broad societal context institutional and program characteristics. These with a long time horizon. NASA’s R&D efforts are are reviewed below. linked to the requirements of various users, but Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 157 its strongest tendency is towards development of ground-based means of communications new technologies rather than meeting short-term (undersea cables, short-wave) are usually needs of users. Civilian missions require the col- available. laboration of the widest possible body of users Fourth priority went to weather observation to help share and justify the very large front-end and navigation. Because other means exist costs of space systems. For example, the design to carry out their tasks, they are lower in of civilian remote sensing systems has been af- priority than other satellite systems. fected by the need to resolve the data requirements of a multitude of civilian missions and to Openness v. Need for Secrecy determine a fair allocation of costs. Conflicts The NAS Act mandates, among other things, among agencies over instrument selection, sys- that NASA provide for the “ . . . widest prac- tem characteristics, and technical tradeoffs will ticable and appropriate dissemination of informa- continue to plague the Government-sponsored tion concerning its activities and the results there- growth of operational systems. of. ” The specific provision to make information DOD’s space activities, by contrast, have some available to the public contrasts sharply with the characteristics of technology push, but they are information policies governing classified military primarily responsive to the requirements of mil- and intelligence programs, which operate under itary operations. DOD has a clear and vital mis- stringent requirements to protect information, in- sion, national defense, and space technology is cluding even the fact that some of the programs seen as one means, among others, for accomp- exist. lishing it. The military users of space technology The differences in orientation between the civil- are within DOD, and the problems of transfer ian and military programs have been maintained from developer to user are fewer than if the two from the beginning of the programs to the pres- were in separate organizations. DOD has been ent and are fundamental to consideration of considering possible changes in management that policies on technology sharing and other interjec- would reflect the military’s increased dependence tor relationships. on space systems and allow for efficient use of the space shuttle. These include establishing a ● There are inherent conflicts between the separate Space Command, either in the Air Force, need for secrecy in national security pro- or as a fourth service. grams, and the free exchange of data characteristic of the civilian space program. In congressional testimony early in 1981, the These conflicts extend into the project office, Secretary of the Air Force identified an order of where secrecy requirements imposed on priority for the various program activities that the sensitive national security projects are a con- Air Force conducts in space. tinuing fact-of-life, though they are essential- ● First priority was given to the maintenance ly nonexistent on the civilian side. and development of a reliable and satisfac- ● For technology sharing, these differences tory launch vehicle capability. Employing the generate a basically asymmetrical relation- shuttle to maximum advantage for missions ship. Activities or technology in the civilian related to national security and protecting sector are examined in detail for potential against possible delays and failures in the national security uses. The reverse does not shuttle program were considered vital. hold except through specific interagency ● Second priority was given to surveillance and mechanisms that have been formed to pro- warning satellites. These functions general- mote information exchange. Even with in- ly cannot be performed by alternate ground- formation exchange, the civilian commun- based facilities. ity rarely has an opportunity to affect national ● Third priority was assigned to satellites security planning. The reverse is less true. related to communications. Though commu- National security planning may often affect nications satellites are important, alternate civilian programs. 158 ● Civilan Space Policy and Applications

● Military and intelligence missions normally DOD’s role in operating the military and na- enjoy a high relative priority within the tional security programs, on the other hand, Government. This is reinforced by the evolved very differently. Although encompassing secrecy surrounding such programs, making an extensively laboratory structure, DOD moved it dificult for most members of the Executive, away from the “arsenal approach” of in-house of Congress, and the public to criticize them technical laboratories in the years following effectively or to bargain for increased atten- World War Il. The process of developing ballistic tion to and funding for civilian activities. The missiles, the prototype for DOD’s space effort, result is that the military or national secur- followed a pattern in which a Government proj- ity program can seek out or develop new ect team of civilian and military personnel acted technology to aid in accomplishing their mis- as overall managers for a private contractor team; sions, using the full range of classified and one major contractor acted as system integrator. unclassified experience, whereas civilian This pattern persists today. Technical assistance programs have definite limits set on use of for specific parts of the system is often obtained sensitive or classified technology. from government laboratories, but the labora- ● in some cases, not only technical details of tories typically do not undertake management. military or intelligence space systems, but Practically the entire DOD space program man- even the fact that such a system exists may agement is vested in the Air Force Space Divi- be classified. This creates a special burden sion, a part of the Air Force Systems Command. upon the program managers and the con- This Space Division is supported by the Aero- tractor teams, and makes it very difficult to space Corp. as system engineers. Thus, whereas carry out technology-sharing activities with NASA development management activities are other programs. The precautions that may done largely at separate centers, DOD activities be necessary to protect the “fact of” a cer- are centralized. The Space Division has responsi- tain system would act as a significant deter- bilities equivalent to those of NASA in that it is rent to the ability of the classified program responsible for all procurement, launch, and on- team to volunteer its assistance. orbit control and recovery. Generally, when a satellite system becomes operational, the mission aspects of the satellite system come under the Differences in the Institutional control of a user command, say Strategic Air Command or Defense Communications Agency, Support Base while the Space DiviSion maintains control of At NASA’s founding, it incorporated the Na- other aspects of the satellite system including tional Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, its replacements. The Space Division can and does technical centers, and a number of DOD activi- call on other DOD agencies and laboratories. The ties such as the Army Ballistic Missile Group in Space Division has direct control of the launch Huntsville, Ala., and the Jet Propulsion Labora- facilities at the Eastern Test Range at Cape Canav- tory in pasadena, Calif. Thus, NASA inherited an eral and the Western Test Range at Vandenberg infrastructure of Government-owned facilities and AFB. supporting technical staffs that were already famil- Thus, in both the civilian and military space iar with all phases of the agency’s projects, from programs, a great deal of the national capability early definition to the production and test of flight resides in the contractors, and to the extent that hardware. When NASA expanded to meet the a single contractor may support both programs, demands of Apollo and other new program activ- significant technology transfer occurs, without ities in the early 1960’s, it elaborated the pattern documentation and without the need for specific of relatively autonomous technical centers (see efforts. Within NASA, programs are largely devel- ch. 9). NASA’s technical personnel and special- oped and managed by the centers, and any con- ized facilities represent a unique national sideration of technology sharing or closer institu- resource, developed at great cost and represent- tional relations between NASA and DOD needs ing over 20 years of experience in designing and to take into account these differences in the two operating successful space systems. programs. Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 159

International Aspects developed countries. Current discussion in the U.N. and elsewhere about restricting the gather- International cooperation was one of the objec- ing and dissemination of civilian data should not tives set for NASA in 1958, and the United States be expected to affect U.S. military satellites. has pursued an extensive cooperative program with technical, economic, and political benefits. An additional factor that may drive the U.S. Although certain foreign countries participate in space program to emphasize international visibil- some DOD space activities, their participation is ity and accessibility would be the need to re- based on joint defense objectives; its character spond, for practical political considerations, to is quite different, from NASA’s international a newly emerging Soviet presence in peaceful activities. space applications. The Soviets are known to have carried out an ambitious program of launch- There would likely be tension between security ing and recovering film camera satellites with requirements and any extensive interaction be- high-resolution data. The lag by the U.S.S.R. in tween other countries and the United States in critical areas of technology, particularly com- civilian space efforts if there were a much closer puters, has until recently caused the Soviets to civilian-military relationship. Some of these ten- say little about their space applications programs sions are already evident as the military and non- while playing up manned space flight activities. U.S. users both plan to use the shuttle. Scientists However, the Soviets recently issued an impor- in foreign countries might also be less willing to tant paper to the U. N.* that describes their appli- deal with a U.S. space program closely linked to cations programs in greater detail than previously national security activities. available (described in detail in ch. 7). In partic- The relationship between the civilian and mil- ular, the Soviets claimed to be planning a “quick- itary space programs is affected by the presence Iook” sensing system with several types of multi- or absence of treaties, laws, and rules of conduct spectral sensors. Mindful of the tremendous im- governing activities in the “international com- pact of Sputnik, 25 years ago, forums such as the mons” of outer space—i.e., by the entire interna- upcoming U.N. conference, UN ISPACE ’82, to tional legal framework. During the 1960’s prec- be held in Vienna in August 1982, may well pro- edents were set that strengthened the U.S. posi- vide the occasion for the Soviets to announce tion that governments could carry on non- plans to make their data available to other threatening activities constrained only by the pro- countries. hibition in the 1967 “Treaty on Principles Gov- erning the Activities of States in the Exploration Common Civilian-National Security and Use of Outer Space” on weapons of mass Needs and Cooperative Activities destruction. The SALT I agreements in 1972 further recognized that there were “national Many of the problems faced by both civilian technical means of verification” (presumably and national security space programs have com- overhead reconnaissance by spacecraft) and that mon roots in the inescapable realities of the harsh such collection devices should not be interfered space environment and the stringent require- with. Civilian remote sensing systems such as ments associated with launching payloads into Landsat and meteorological satellites have also space. In the early stages both the civilian and operated on a global basis without restriction; military space programs depended on using the partly to forestall criticism, the United States has most suitable military systems. Improving their made data from these systems available to all reliability was an early and important common countries. The emergence of significant programs task for both civilian and military authorities. As by France, Japan, and others during the 1980’s a result, a wide range of basic system details were may complicate the existing ground rules and put shared. They included rocket engine design, additional pressure on the United States to main- *“National Paper: U. S. S.R.,” prepared for the Second U.S. Con- tain open programs conducted in cooperation ference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, with other nations, particularly with less A/Conf. 101/N P/30, Sept. 2, 1981. 160 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications structures, electronics, guidance, control systems, ical data is valuable principally if it is put in the and a variety of subsystems. hands of users as rapidly as possible, and conflicting demands for data between customers may Both programs have common needs for ground mean that one set of users will be slighted if the launch complexes with adequate instrumentation system is less than sufficient for total coverage. for prelaunch, launch, and postlaunch monitor- Military needs for aircraft operations, for exam- ing and control of satellites and vehicles, and ple, may constrain the satellite’s orbital timing launch safety and tracking. These common needs and type of data gathered in ways incompatible have resulted in highly integrated operations at with civilian weather forecasting. both Vandenberg AFB (polar orbit and high inclination launches) and at Kennedy Space Center In collecting observational data of the Earth, (low inclination, deep space, and synchronous the civilian community has information needs orbit launches). that are both identical to and quite separate from those of the military. Both communities have There is also a continuing common need for quite similar requirements for medium-scale better understanding of outer space. This includes maps. However, the military need for intelligence scientific observations of electromagnetic radia- requires high resolutions not needed for most tion at all wavelengths, the characteristics of solar civilian programs. As civilian programs have ma- radiation, studies of the Earth’s atmosphere and tured, additional resolution and spectrum needs its attenuation, propagation and reflection char- have caused some convergence of technical re- acteristics, and variations in gravitational effects. quirements, which further complicates the task Beyond these basic common needs, some civilian of preserving the security of the DOD-operated and national security programs, such as those for systems while improving the capability of systems meteorology and communications, have very used for civilian operations. An example of the similar technical characteristics. difficulties encountered in implementing joint sys- Combining programs that provide specific types tems is the National Oceanographic Satellite Sys- of information, such as the weather data, has tem (NOSS) (for description see pp. 50-51). been an attractive but difficult goal. Meteorolog-

ISSUES AND POLICY OPTIONS

Technology Transfer essing technologies). A special result of applications technology is the data themselves (e.g., Inherent in the establishment of separate na- remote-sensing images), which can be shared tional space programs has been concern for ef- without transferring the technology used to gath- fective “technology transfer” among different er or process them. in general, space-related activities and agencies. In many cases costly tech- technology has been more easily transferred, nologies developed to meet the objectives of one because it is less sensitive and less specialized space program may have direct utility for other than applications technologies. programs. Sharing hardware and expertise can avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, save Technology can be transferred either from civil- scarce financial, technical, and human resources, ian to military/national-security (MNS) programs, and enhance program capabilities. or vice versa. Substantially different issues arise In considering technology transfer, one must depending on the direction and type of technol- distinguish space-related technology (launch ogy involved. In general there are few if any vehicles and facilities for guidance, command, restrictions placed on the transfer of civilian or and control of launchers and satellites) from appli- NASA-developed technology to MNS programs. cations-related technology (sensor systems, com- Problems arise when classified technology or data munication equipment, data collection, and proc- appears to be of use to the civilian sector. Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 161

● Transfers to the civiIian sector of space- duplication of effort. The condition governing related technology developed for the military such transfers is that disclosure of the technology are relatively direct and open for unclassified not reduce the effectiveness of a program or proj- programs and technology, but involve addi- ect, or harm national security. tional controls and supervision when there are classification considerations that affect There are several factors that impede the tech- the MNS programs. In practice, there is con- nology transfer process at the program-manage- siderable sharing of military space-related ment level. There are few internal incentives to technology between the sectors. transfer technology to other programs; from the point of view of national security program man- ● By far the most complex and difficult relationships to manage are those involving the agers, transfer to civilians may compromise secu- transfer of applications-related technology rity and tie up valuable time, money, and man- from the military/national security sector to power in conducting and supervising the transfer. the civilian sector. Since the national security Unless there is a clear quid pro quo in the form applications are highly sensitive, there are of additional resources or the prospect of future necessarily strict limitations on access to aid from the civilian program, technology transfer technical information, even to evaluate its will have low internal priority. potential usefulness for civilian purposes. The competitiveness of the aerospace industry The key to effective transfer is to combine in part offsets the reluctance to share informa- awareness of different programs at the policy and tion and expertise. Competitiveness works in two administrative level, to exchange information at major ways. In the first place, it causes new pro- the technical level, and to agree on joint respon- prietary technology to be developed to improve sibilities: products and sales potential across the space sectors. In the second place, the competitive bid- ● The easiest transfers to implement are those ding for Government work promotes technology that involve the direct use by a private con- sharing because using an existing technology is tractor of technology developed in a classi- less costly in time and resources than develop- fied program to meet similar needs in an- ing a new one. These factors provide an incen- other. This situation allows a lower bid to be tive for both Government and industry to con- made, and enables the contractor to assure sider existing technology and hardware in the adherence to costs and schedules. Since development of system requirements, specifica- contractors cannot themselves approve the tions, and design approaches. Additionally, even transfer of classified technology, the Govern- if a complete system such as a space vehicle may ment must take the lead in facilitating such be classified, technology sharing of many unclas- actions, even though the same personnel sified subsystems or component technologies and facilities may be used by the firm in- may be possible. volved, . Procedures for transfer are most complex In practice, there is a continuing exchange of when a classified technology is suitable for data and viewpoints between programs in the a civilian program but no channels have several sectors at both formal and informal levels. been established for the two programs to in- in many instances informal exchanges and discus- teract. Frequently, no direct interface be- sions are preferred over formal, because of lower tween classified and unclassified programs, visibility and the greater flexibility afforded by the or even between separate classified activities, absence of formal arrangements and their related is allowed at many technical and managerial institutional/bureaucratic implications. Without levels. access to classified information it is impossible to evaluate the overall efficiency of these relation- The objective of technology sharing or transfer ships. arrangements is to ensure that the broadest use is made of available technology and that national Technology transfer is further enhanced in resources are not wasted through unnecessary those situations when a common contractor base 162 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications is involved across sectors, or when personnel Because the effectiveness of a national secur- from one sector and technology are able to move ity program may depend on the security protec- to similar or related functions in other sectors. tion of key attributes, there are many legitimate A good example of the latter has been active or incentives for managers of classified programs se- retired military personnel working with NASA. verely to limit knowledge or access by personnel who have secondary, as opposed to primary, rea- In addition to various informal and intra-indus- sons for program involvement. Technology shar- try mechanisms for technology transfer or sharing inevitably falls in the “secondary” category. ing, there is a formal body to coordinate between On the civilian side there are incentives to remain NASA, DOD, and AACB. AACB is the highest free from the restrictions and encumbrances that level formal coordinating mechanism between classification and security controls require. Shar- DOD and NASA. By a 1960 interagency agreeing classified sector technology with programs in ment, the responsibilities of AACB included: the civilian sector, therefore, has disincentives on ● planning of NASA and DOD activities to both sides. It is warranted only when it can be avoid undesirable duplication and to achieve established that there are sufficient benefits and efficient utilization of resources; savings to civilian programs to justify the transfer, ● coordination of activities of common given additional program costs and potential interest; security risk. ● identification of problems requiring solution Interagency Government mechanisms have by either NASA or DOD; and been established that provide for selected civilian ● exchange of information between NASA and personnel to be cleared in order to have access DOD. to sensitive programs and related technology. AACB is cochaired by the Deputy Administrator Because of the security considerations and “need of NASA and the Director of Defense Research to know” criteria, the number of such person- and Engineering (DDR&E) of DOD. Both of these nel is kept as low as is judged feasible, to dis- are policy-level officials. AACB has panels to deal charge technology transfer or other coordination with issues that arise in several main areas. AACB objectives. The few cleared civilian agency per- is concerned primarily with defining broad poli- sonnel are responsible for knowing the entire cies rather than working out detailed arrange- range of civilian interests in their field and for ments for cooperative activities. Technical details identifying the potential match between civilian have generally been coordinated by special inter- program needs and the classified system technol- agency committees or working groups organized ogy. When the civilian need occurs, an evalua- for those purposes. Many joint NASA/DOD sub- tion is made of the potential benefit in relation panels and committees, which report to AACB to the security risk of release. Though in prac- panels, have been established to assist interac- tice there is wide variation, the relationship be- tion. There are also many individually negotiated tween classified and unclassified programs can- agreements and understandings. not fail to be unbalanced. Personnel working in classified programs can readily learn about technologies under development in unclassified pro- Security Classification Barriers grams, but the reverse does not hold. A security concern at the margin will almost always out- Civilian access to classified technology is inevi- weigh an otherwise equivalent civilian benefit. tably limited. As defined in executive orders that establish the rules for security classification, there There are long-standing controversies concern- are specified levels of potential damage to the na- ing the security classification programs of the tional security that must exist before security clas- Government. The issues have not been whether sification and controls can be imposed. When there should be classification, but how to pro- such conditions exist, the relevant information vide appropriate levels of security protection for is classified at its appropriate level and restricted necessary programs without abuses and without to those individuals possessing the requisite clear- undue shielding of Government activities from ances and “need-to-know.” public scrutiny. Because determinations of Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 163 whether given entities are to be classified and if examine: 1 ) the need to provide continuing pro- so, to what degree, are necessarily made by tection for specific classified systems, technology, members of the national security community and data, and 2) the degree of protection that (under guidelines established by the President as may be required. Oversight is provided by prop- Commander-in-Chief), whose primary responsi- erly cleared congressional committees and staff. bility is to protect national security, not to foster Because the congressional oversight function ex- civilian applications, there is an inevitable tenden- tends to many other aspects of the DOD-oper- cy to “play it safe” by stringently classifying all ated space program, there is need for continu- sensitive materials. ing review of security classifications in order to ease barriers to technology transfer and to the Persons who have had experience in both civil- broader use of data from DOD-operated systems. ian and national security programs acknowledge that there are instances of failure, but also note successes in technology transfer; given the inher- Interagency Review Mechanisms ent difficulties, they generally argue that the processes are as good as it is reasonable to expect The current practice of permitting access to a within current policy guidelines. limited number of key individual from NASA and other civilian agencies with a need to know The uneven relationship between national about the nature and capabilities of classified sys- security and civilian interests is frustrating, pri- tems provides an initial indication of what is avail- marily to personnel in the civilian sector. They able and what is possible. The subsequent steps, distrust the capabilities and incentives of classi- leading to detailed understanding of the classified fied program managers to evaluate the potential system and its components, and relating this un- for civilian uses of technology developed in clas- derstanding to the possible civilian setting in sified programs. Civilian sector personnel are not which the technology might be used, are all de- in a position to “browse” through classified tech- pendent on this initial, survey-type exposure to nology, or to pursue ideas or insights generated the classified systems. Therefore, it is incumbent in the normal course of engineering or scientific on DOD (and other national security entities) to endeavors. Civilian frustration is particularly acute continue the practice of clearing individuals at when independent civilian investigation leads to, various levels in the civilian user agencies and or stumbles onto, technology that has already to provide them with periodic briefings on clas- been classified or is then placed under security sified systems and technologies. it is equally nec- restrictions. essary for agencies with a need for such infor- Within the executive branch, interagency mation to select individuals for access to highly boards and mechanisms charged with exchang- classified information who are capable of making information and coordinating implementation ing broad judgments about the desirability of of policy guidelines provide oversight of transfer technology transfer. Individuals at the policy processes. Congressional oversight is provided level as well as at the technical and managerial through the Select Committees on Intelligence levels are needed in order to cover the various and the various committees that oversee the civil- aspects of the agencies’ needs. ian and other military space programs. An entirely The next steps in the transfer process call for new dimension will be brought into being if sig- more detailed knowledge of the technology and nificant operational space systems are developed a degree of individual specialization that will vary and operated by private commercial firms. greatly depending on the nature of the technol- Additional problems arise from the existence ogy. At this level, quite often an expanded set of various levels of security controls within the of cleared people is required from the civilian classification scheme, whereby those privy to cer- agency, with a very narrow focus on the specif- tain kinds of information may not have access to ics of the system or subsystem involved. This other parts or to the whole. Internal Government degree of access will depend on a determination reviews have been carried out periodically to re- that the technology in question can be transferred 764 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications without compromise. This determination inevi- established, with AACB serving continuously as tably is made by DOD or another national secur- the mechanism for coordinating formal policy at ity agency. If a decision is made that a technology the highest level. The Presidential decision on (or piece of hardware) may not be transferred, the shuitle in 1972 directed it to serve all users, an appeal may be made up to the management civilian and military. This decision entailed level at AACB. Further appeal would require re- development of a vehicle that would integrate ferral to an interagency forum at the White House civilian and military requirements, and military level, usually via the NSC mechanism. Because requirements had a significant bearing on many of the special clearances required for the discus- of its design specifications. sions in such a’forum, the NSC mechanism is well NASA has borne most of the development suited for this purpose. Alternatively, the “mech- funding for the shuttle, rather than sharing this anisms for consensus” discussed in this report responsibility with DOD. The initial plan was to could also serve as the interagency forum, with limit the Air Force to building and operating the properly cleared representatives from the agen- Vandenberg shuttle launch and landing facility, cies involved. and to paying for operating costs for DOD mis- It should be emphasized that there is no indica- sions. The Air Force later assumed development tion that there has been arbitrary or capricious responsibility for the inertial upper stage. application of the security barriers to preclude The rationale for NASA’s lead role in funding civilian use of military technology. The central and management has been that sharing between fact is that national security authorities have lit- the two organizations would complicate the man- tle incentive to press for greater access or use of agement of an already difficult and challenging their technology, systems, or data. Such broad- program and drive up the program’s total costs, ened access is potentially threatening because of and that NASA was better equipped to design and the loss of control it implies—the prospect that oversee manned systems than DOD. A formal more information is being released than is desir- NASA/DOD memorandum of understanding able. These legitimate concerns are not readily (MOU) on management of the space transporta- dismissed, nor can they be easily tested by the tion system was signed in early 1977, and revised civilian agencies. Thus, the interagency mecha- in early 1980. The basic MOU establishes the nism needs a “third party” such as the NSC staff, broad policies; there are additional agreements the Science Adviser, or perhaps the Vice Presi- and MOUS on specific aspects of the program. dent, to ensure that such questions receive balanced consideration. Congress can play an im- A major problem with this arrangement is that portant role through hearings, oversight, and ex- NASA has had to cut other programs to pay for plicit incentives, both in uncovering the scope shuttle overruns. Given DOD’s much larger of the problems and in resolving them. budget, it has been argued that the Air Force should shoulder some of the shuttle costs; the Air Foce has resisted in order to avoid being put in Future of the Space Shuttle System a budget situation similar to NASA’S. An arrangement to “fence off” the shuttle budget so that The shuttle program represents the largest cur- it competes with other national programs, and rent area of interaction between the civilian and not with either agency’s continuing projects, military space sectors, and it will be the continu- would help to alleviate many tensions between ing focus for many of the civilian-military policy NASA and DOD. issues in the period immediately ahead. The shut- At the present time, interaction between NASA tle will be central to both the civilian and military and DOD elements proceeds at all management space programs. levels, with active coordination on a daily basis. From the beginning of consideration of the Inevitably, there has been a continuing series of shuttle, the Air Force worked closely with NASA strains and issues that stem from differences in to incorporate defense requirements into the basic mission and outlook between the two orga- vehicle. Formal coordinating mechanisms were nizations. Many decisions must be made by Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 165

NASA without the opportunity for total coordina- ● NASA, as the development authority, has a tion with all parties of interest, including DOD. detailed understanding of the shuttle and its complexities; this knowledge base is shared Operations of the space shuttle bring civilian between the NASA centers and their con and DOD-operated payloads into the same tractors and cannot be easily shifted to DOD stream of activities, from prelaunch preparations (or to any other organization); through recovery and postlaunch processing, ● there are several non-U.S. payloads currently with the result that special provisions must be scheduled for launch by U.S. vehicles; these made to ensure that adequate protection is pro- and future launches will be more difficult to vided to sensitive information and systems. When accommodate under DOD management. examined in detail, the transportation system can- There is likely to be some foreign resistance not be divorced from its payloads. Every payload to cooperative programs dependent on entails specific operating characteristics that then DOD launches; become subject to some of the same controls that ● the major technical support base for the exist for the compartmented classified systems. shuttle—the NASA centers—would be in a Given this added complexity, many have sug- different agency and would be less easily ac- gested that separate shuttle orbiters uniquely con- cessible to the operational manager (unless figured for DOD launches would be preferable centers were transferred to DOD); this situa- to joint facilities, and that DOD ought to operate tion would create difficulties in implement- a separate shuttle fleet altogether. In the future, ing changes and improvements to the shut- maintaining payload-shuttle compatibility for tle system; and civilian and DOD payloads will be difficult unless ● the image of the U.S. space program would this common-use principle is strongly supported be altered; although still conducted for at the highest levels in the Government, because “peaceful purposes, “ it would be controlled each agency desires to maintain direct control by the military. over all aspects of their programs. There have been suggestions that it might be Man-in-Space appropriate to have DOD assume funding and One of the features of the shuttle is that man management responsibility for the entire shuttle is an integral part of the system, required for its system after it becomes operational, for it appears successful operation and available to operate ex- that among the users DOD would have the larg- periments, to deploy payloads, and to recover est number of missions. This role for DOD would them in order to return them to Earth or to repair have several advantages: and refurbish them in orbit, as appropriate. For ● as the major user, DOD could ensure com- launch of DOD-operated systems, the astronaut patible scheduling for its high-priority crew will need to be aware of the system’s oper- launches; ating characteristics and may be able to contrib- ● under current budget constraints, operations ute to improved operation by using man’s unique costs and engineering refinements for the attributes. These may be DOD personnel or shuttle could more easily be funded by selected non-DOD astronauts. Clearly, foreign DOD; NASA could concentrate on science, astronauts or experimenters could not be em- applications and man-in-space programs; ployed on such missions. Beyond this limitation, and there is a great deal of commonality between ● security requirements for DOD payloads civilian and DOD-operated missions, and signifi- could more easily be accommodated ‘under cant advantage can be taken of this fact, with con- DOD shuttle management. sequent net economies. The disadvantages of such approaches are con- The next major step in advancing the capability siderable, however: of man-in-space is expected to be an extended 166 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications lifetime manned space station in LEO. Experi- basic Thor, Atlas, and Titan missiles form the core ments in such a station are likely to address of a modified and improved family of expendable civilian and DOD objectives, and the lessons space launch vehicles. Even the shuttle uses sol- Iearned will have significance for both civilian and id-fuel strap-on rocket technology with its roots national security purposes. Certain DOD mis- in DOD missile experience and DOD space sions, such as the possible launch of large space launches. platforms with directed energy weapons, could in spacecraft design, detailed characteristics of require a significant role for men in orbit. A space DOD-operated payloads are not generally re- station is likely to be of broad value for both vealed, but as described in earlier sections, there civilian and national security purposes, and re- have been significant common uses in this area. quire continued DOD-NASA coordination for Beyond detailed design features such as solar cell manned space flight. The current policy calls for arrays, radioisotope power supplies, pointing and such coordination, but the mechanisms are large- stabilization instruments, thermal coatings, tem- ly informal. perature control devices (such as the heat pipe), fuel cells, small thrusters, and a host of other sub- If a decision is made to proceed with space sta- systems, there are several major systems that can tion development, it will likely be designed to sat- meet both civilian and DOD needs. isfy broad national needs including those of the One of the potential common-use areas is in national security community. In order to satisfy navigation. The Department of Transportation is this objective, the national security community the lead agency for the civilian national naviga- will need to be brought into the space station tion plan and is responsible for coordination of program at an early phase, and should have a navigation system planning, with the Coast Guard formal and significant presence in the planning and the Federal Aviation Administration as ma- process leading to program approval, when and jor participants. In space, however, DOD has if this occurs. The history of the shuttle demon- taken the lead in the development of global nav- strates that such large-scale, long-term, and highly igation systems. In the earlier transit system and complex developments can be successfully pur- more recently in the new GPS system, DOD’s sued and be responsive to the needs of several needs are being addressed; civilian users are also agencies. The shuttle has also demonstrated that being accommodated, though not with the same such programs are not easy to execute. Many of positioning accuracy as is available to DOD users. the problems with the shuttle concerning inter- In general, civilian use has been considered in national perceptions, separating classified and making GPS decisions, but non-DOD agencies unclassified systems and personnel, and devis- have responded inadequately, leaving the entire ing a joint management structure, would recur burden of justification to the military rather than with a space station. Given our experience with viewing GPS as a joint national system like the the shuttle, special attention should be given to shuttle. providing adequate long-term funding from both the civilian and the military agencies. In telecommunications, the military makes use of civilian systems by leasing transponders from Common-Use Systems (Unmanned) INTELSAT and from U.S. suppliers. The Navy, for example, uses maritime communications links The U.S. space effort has derived considerable provided by COMSAT’S MARlSAT satellites. Pres- benefit from its ability to use civilian and DOD ent-generation communications satellites dedi- technology almost interchangeably wherever cated to DOD are not, however, normally shared such technology was most appropriate to mission with civilian users. As the technology continues needs (with the highly classified and sensitive to mature, and advance concepts such as the DOD-operated systems a partial exception). Per- Large Communications Platform (LCP) become haps the earliest example was the use of DOD realistic possibilities, joint DOD-civilian LCPS may missile propulsion and guidance systems as space evolve. There are numerous issues surrounding launchers. This joint use has continued, as the the concept of LCPS that need to be resolved Ch. 6—Relationship.s Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 167

(discussed inch. 3), and the questions that result out such multiagency programs, but the record fro DOD involvement would add a further degree to date has not been particularly promising. A of complexity to ownership, management, fund- similar situation exists in the land remote-sensing ing, and use of such systems. There appear to arena. There are multiple agency interests, both be no insurmountable barriers to DOD involve- for civilian and national security purposes, in data ment in an LCP, and there may be significant from Landsat-type systems, but no single agen- benefits from use of such a system. These factors cy can justify the investment in a satellite plat- suggest a general guideline that should be fol- form. A cooperative agreement among agencies lowed for DOD programs as well as for those in would appear to be one approach that could the civilian sector: proposed DOD research, move the U.S. program from experimental to development, and demonstration programs in operational status. But long-term Cooperative areas where there is significant civilian interest funding of a common project such as this appears and technology base should be reviewed to to be beyond our current capabilities. determine if there is technology available from the civilian or commercial sector that can be applied to the DOD requirement. Civilian Use of Data From In other applications areas, such as meteorol- DOD-Operated Systems ogy and Earth (and ocean) observations, there is a degree of common use: DOD uses data col- One of the delicate subjects in the relationships lected from platforms primarily supplying civilian between civilian and DOD-operated space pro- users. The executive branch has initiated periodic gram activities is the use of remote-sensing data reviews of meteorological satellites (metsats) to derived from classified systems for civilian pur- ensure: 1 ) that maximum use is made of com- poses. There are presumably two security con- mon systems, and 2) that if there are separate cerns related to the dissemination of data prod- civilian and DOD platforms (as in the case of the ucts from classified programs: sensitive technol- medium-altitude metsats), there is a clear and per- ogy and sensitive information content. suasive justification for separate programs. For ● The question of whether classified sensor or ocean observations, the concept of a NOSS was applications characteristics (e.g., sensor proposed as a common-use system to satisfy the acuteness) are reflected in the data products needs of three agencies—NASA, NOAA, and of a classified system generally can be deter- DOD. Contributions to the program were to mined in advance for an entire class of prod- come from the three agencies, and the sensor sys- ucts. Such products, in theory, could then tems and platform characteristics were to be de- become eligible or not, on the basis of tech- termined by common agreement. Data were to nology, for direct utilization outside of flow into the two user agencies, NOAA and classified controls and established need to DOD; NASA was to be the principal space R&D know. Data might be modified so as to con- agency. The planned multiagency sponsorship ceal the characteristics of the instruments broke down, however, when DOD funding sup- used. In general, too, the sensitivity of tech- port did not materialize because of concern that nology declines steadily with the passage of the attempt to meet multiple needs would raise time. the cost beyond what the Navy was willing to ● The question of whether sensitive informa- pay. tion content is contained in the products of The experience with NOSS indicates that a classified system, generally can be deter- shared or common use of space systems—al- mined only on a case-by-case basis and even though desirable from the standpoint of efficient then may be very difficult to evaluate. For use of national resources—does not occur, and example, the possibilities of disclosing poten- cannot be sustained, without careful attention tially embarrassing information about a for- to management and funding channels and to ap- eign country are almost impossible to dis- proaches that reduce interagency stresses. It prove, particularly in “worst-case” analyses, should be possible for the United States to carry if the original sources of data were classified. —- .—

168 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Information content, therefore, may have Any DOD/civilian program interaction in the longer-lasting sensitivity than the technology use of classified data products, even through involved. screening mechanisms controlled by national security interests, inevitably increases the expo- The unyielding complexities and uncertainties of sure of the national security programs. At the attempting to identify and weigh these two types same time, such joint activity imposes some na- of sensitivities have effectively limited civilian uses tional security controls or considerations on the of the data products from systems that have pri- civilian activities. While these relationships can mary national security-related missions. It is infea- be balanced within the context of Federal Gov- sible in an unclassified report to present a ernment activities and operations, there are no rounded evaluation of the mechanisms that are mechanisms in place to handle such interaction employed to declassify and disseminate informa- with the private sector, State and local govern- tion initially obtained from classified space ments, or academia. To make broad and routine systems. There are, however, some aspects that civilian use of data products generated by clas- are appropriate for open discussion, and il- sified systems it would be necessary to effect luminate the types of issues that are involved: fundamental changes in policy at the national level. Executive orders that have defined the criteria for classification also provide for the An important option, therefore, would be to orderly downgrading and ultimate declassi- conduct an interagency review and/or a congres- fication of data as their original sensitivity sional inquiry of: 1) the degree to which national declines with age. Sensitive intelligence in- security systems can satisfy civilian user needs, formation is eligible for exemption from and 2) the funds, personnel, and hardware re- automatic downgrading at specified inter- quired to satisfy appropriate needs. In the plan- vals, but not from the requirement for peri- ning of next-generation DOD and intelligence odic review. As a result of these overall pro- systems, the possibility of accommodating well- visions, there are mechanisms and proce- defined civilian needs should be explicitly con- dures within all national security related sidered. It may also be appropriate to articulate departments and agencies that regularly ef- a general policy in this area, in order to over- fect the release of data that were once come the obvious reluctance of national security classified. However, the delay often amounts authorities to be burdened by considerations of to a decade or more. civilian utility. Such a policy directive might include the following points: . Information itself, even when derived from currently classified sources, is released occa- DOD-operated systems will be designed to sionally to sharpen public understanding of respond to national security needs and are issues or programs. DOD and the Depart- consistent with the overall principles of ment of State, for example, regularly report “peaceful purposes,” as stated in the NAS on the strategic-military capabilities and pro- Act, and relevant treaty obligations such as grams of the U.S.S.R. or other foreign coun- the Outer Space Treaty; tries. In such cases there is no reference or to the extent that such systems can satisfy attribution to the specific source of the in- civilian user needs, they will be planned and formation. Such decisions inevitably turn on operated to do so, subject to the provision the judgment of the responsible officials, that acceptable performance of the primary who weigh the potential benefits and risks. missions be a priority; One problem is that many civilian agencies cost of incremental additional operations, often do not have highly placed officials with hardware, personnel and supplies, to the ex- the proper security clearances to deal direct- tent these can be explicitly identified, will ly with their opposite numbers in the military be borne by the civilian user or users; and and intelligence agencies. This leaves key there will bean interagency mechanism for decisions entirely in the hands of national coordinating the activities required to carry security authorities. out the above tasks. Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 169

Institutional Change examines is whether this conclusion remains valid in the 1980’s. Introduction The world is a much different place in 1981 The Original Rationale Reconsidered than it was in 1958, when the current policy and The reasons for establishing separate space pro- institutional framework for the national space program structures in 1958 were discussed previ- gram was developed. The United States and other ously. Briefly restated, they included: 1 ) that there leading countries have had almost 25 years to were clear defense and intelligence applications assess the ways in which space achievement of space technology, and that those applications, might, as President Kennedy suggested in 1961, including the R&D supporting them, were best “hold the key to our future on Earth.” carried out under the management of national In carrying out the ApolIo mission, NASA grew security agencies; 2) that there were also scien- into a capable organization, one which became tific, economic, and political justifications, not larger than anyone anticipated in 1958. On the tied to national security applications, for space basis of its over two decades of experience, NASA activities, and that these required a sizable non- has also developed into a particular kind of insti- military space program; 3) that the national in- tution in the eyes of the world, of the U.S. public, terest was best served by keeping these “other” and of its own staff. Any consideration of changes space activities outside the national security in the overall structure of the U.S. space program framework, because: cannot ignore the results of these past 23 years ● they were not relevant to DOD’s mission and of activity. In particular, it must recognize that might even interfere with high-priority secu- the political environment, especially the nature rity-oriented space projects by, for example, and scope of foreign competition and the degree competing for resources and technical talent of U.S. domestic support, has altered a great deal or by making it harder to keep the security- since 1958. related efforts classified; and One major change is that the U.S. national ● the existence of a separate civilian space pro- security space program is larger and more vital gram meant that the United States could to our defense posture than anyone except a few make use of that program as a tool of domes- visionaries expected in 1958. As DOD and the tic and foreign policy by openly engaging in intelligence community exploit existing space both cooperative and competitive interna- capabilities and explore the potential of future tional space efforts of a nonmilitary charac- space systems, they have given an ever more im- ter, and could more easily transfer the results portant role to space technology in U.S. securi- of the Government’s space research efforts ty planning. The national security space program into the civilian economy. has also evolved with particular institutional char- This analysis will present the implications and acteristics, and two decades have demonstrated alternatives that flow from differing assumptions that there are substantial differences in organiza- about the civilian and military programs and their tional style and methods between the civilian and proper relationships. The issue is whether the ad- military space programs. vantages of maintaining the current separation As discussed previously, there have been outweigh the benefits of closer policy, institu- repeated interactions between the separate space tional, and programmatic relationships among the programs, and those interactions reflect a mixed various Government space programs. If it appears record of cooperation and conflict. periodic as- that there is no longer adequate justification for sessments of this record and of the reasons for a large, institutionally distinct civilian space ef- maintaining separate program structures have all fort on the current scale of NASA, then the issue concluded that the existing relationships are fund- becomes how best to reduce or redeploy the ex- amentally sound, What the following discussion isting capabilities (facilities and personnel) of the —

170 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

civilian space effort to meet current priorities and ● Allows defense and intelligence needs. space programs to be managed in the context of their particular goals, Options for Future Civilian-National without slighting civilian programs. Security Relationships ● Preserves high degree of security for DOD/intelligence programs. At this time the United States has a civilian ● Maintains well-established manage- space program which, despite past accomplishment patterns for all sectors. ments and a high degree of technical and mana- ● Stimulates beneficial competition gerial expertise, is having difficulty gathering between projects.

political and budgetary support for new pro- 20 costs: grams. On the other hand, the national security ● May lead to overemphasis within uses of space technology are receiving high prior- NASA on developing new technol- ity. From the national perspective, what would ogy rather than meeting national be the implications of a closer NASA-DOD rela- needs and satisfying potential users. tionship including even the possibility of merg- ● Accepts some duplication and ineffi- ing the civilian, defense, and/or intelligence pro- ciencies. grams into a common structure? ● Increases difficulty of planning and funding national programs of interest There are three distinct kinds of relationships to civilian and military/intelligence the two programs can have, depending on the sectors. status of the two sectors: ● May lead to premature commitment ● Option 1: Separate Civilian and National to a major civilian post-shuttle devel- Security Programs: opment program to maintain vitality A. Separate projects with provisions for of independent civilian sector. technology transfer (status quo). B. Single project with designated lead agen- B. Single project, with designated lead cy.—This has been the procedure adopted agency (space shuttle, metsats). for the space shuttle (and attempted for C. Ad hoc joint management/funding for NOSS), where both sectors are able to specific projects. agree on the need for a common capabil- ● Option 2: independent Space R&D Agency ity. One agency (in this case, NASA) is for both civilian and national security proj- chosen as the lead agenc:y and designs and ects (with operations conducted separately). develops the technology according to its ● Option 3: Absorption of elements of NASA own management procedures, in consulta- by DOD and other Federal agencies. tion with other users. In the case of the shuttle, the current plan is that operations will The following will present the advantages and also be managed by one agency: disadvantages of the three options. 1. Benefits: ● Avoids duplication of effort and asso- Option 1: ciated costs. Separate civilian and military programs. ● Increases political and financial sup- The general rationale for this approach was port for long-term projects. presented in the previous section. In addition, ● Facilitates coordination between de- there are specific pluses and minuses depending veloper and user. on how relations are handled: 2. costs: Leads public and international com- A. Separate projects with provisions for tech- munity to confuse civilian and mili- nology transfer. —This is the current prac- tary programs. tice for most projects: . In the case of the shuttle, has ab- 1. Benefits: sorbed a disproportionate amount of Ch. 6—Relationships Between the Civilian and National Security Space Programs ● 171

NASA budget and personnel, with- major part of NASA’s facilities and out direct support from DOD; lead personnel. agency tends to be left “holding the ● Allows for budgetary and program- bag.” matic coordination of entire U.S. C. Joint management/funding for selected space R&D effort, civilian and mili- projects.–This has not been the practice, tary, including what are now distinct but might be useful to avoid some of the DOD programs; better balance be- problems associated with separate pro- tween technology push and user pull grams and lead agency responsibilities: in what are now NASA programs. 1. Benefits: ● Permits total Federal space budget to ● As for the previous case; in addi- be adjusted to policy priorities and tion, joint management and funding allows the new agency to be reim- would ensure careful attention by bursed from other Government both parties and ease the strains on agencies and private sector for its the lead agency. R&D work in direct support of their 2. costs: requirements. ● As above; however, joint manage- ● Routine links to users would facilitate ment might complicate decision- transition from R&D to operations for making. programs now in NASA. ● Facilitates joint programs in areas Given the underlying separation of the civilian such as space transportation of in- and national security programs, any of the above terest to entire space community. three approaches can be used for specific proj- 2. costs: ects. This gives management considerable leeway ● Inverse of most benefits of option 1; in establishing patterns for cooperation and fund- puts the space agency in a less public ing; in the case of joint civilian-military projects, support role and makes it difficult to congressional oversight would have to involve use for political and foreign policy several subcommittees. purposes. ● Likely, in current context, to result Option 2: in unbalanced R&D program with Independent space R&D agency for all Federal national security requirements pre- space projects, civilian and military. dominant (this might also be consid- In this case, an essentially new agency would ered a benefit). ● be created to manage all U.S. space-related R&D. Disrupts established DOD-contrac- Based primarily on existing NASA and Air Force tor relationships. ● capabilities, the new agency would be oriented Does not answer question of what toward serving a variety of national needs, in- to do with space science programs cluding those of DOD and the civilian agencies such as planetary exploration, be- (Departments of the Interior and Agriculture, cause agency emphasis would be on etc.). The operation and maintenance of systems, user-oriented applications; likely to once developed, would be the responsibility of lead to reemphasis of space science. ● the mission agencies. Potential loss of NASA’s role as innovator and developer of new technol- 1. Benefits: ogies relevant to the civilian econ- Links NASA’s technical capabilities omy. in areas such as manned space flight ● Some highly classified national secu- and space propulsion to high-prior- rity programs will still remain off- ity national security objectives. Iimits. ● Provides political support and policy 3. Requirements: rationale required to preserve the ● Establishing extensive pattern of 172 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

mutual trust and cooperation be- ● Minimizes problems of transition tween new agency and various users from R&D to operations. of its R&D services. ● Provides opportunity to trim or elim- ● Requires some means for resolving inate nonessential parts of NASA in- conflicts between different users stitutional base. over how to employ the new agen- ● May facilitate transfer of space sys- cy’s technical capabilities and over tems to the private sector. priority to be given to different pro- 2. costs: gram activities. ● Loses the benefits posited for op- ● Change in congressional oversight of tion 1. civilian space activities, with more ● Gives up an established and success- emphasis on mission-agency ori- ful institution for uncertain efficien- ented committees (Armed Services, cies and budget savings. Agriculture, Natural Resources, etc.). ● Not clear that NASA centers could easily be absorbed within DOD and Option 3: other mission agencies. ● No single locus for space R&D in Absorption of NASA by DOD and other Federal agencies. support of civilian mission agencies and U.S. private sector. In this case, NASA would be dissolved with key ● Public and congressional reaction elements, such as the centers, being taken over likely to be mixed, but predominant- by DOD, other Federal agencies, and private ly negative; same for overseas reac- firms or universities: tion. 1. Benefits: ● Makes ambitious civilian programs May reduce costs. such as Apollo or permanent Links technical and institutional manned stations much more difficult capabilities relevant to national secu- to consider. rity objectives directly to users within DOD and intelligence agencies. Chapter 7 INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE Contents

Page Introduction ...... 175 Soviet Union...... 204 Communications ...... 205 European Space Agency and joint European Remote Sensing...... 206 Efforts ...... 176 Materials Processing ...... 207 Policy and Budget ...... 177 Launch Vehicles and Manned Current and Projected Applications Operations ...... 207 Programs ...... 177 Cooperation and Competition With Communications ...... 177 Other Countries ...... 208 Remote Sensing ...... 179 People’s Republic of China ...... 209 Materials Processing ...... 179 India ...... 211 Launch Vehicles ...... 181 Future Plans ...... 185 Other Space programs ...... 212 Cooperation/Competition With the Canada ...... 212 United States ...... 185 Brazil ...... 213 Cooperation ...... 185 Domestic/Regional Communications Competition ...... 186 Systems ...... 213 European National Programs ...... 187 Remote Sensing in Developing Countries 214 France ...... 187 Current Applications Programs ...... 188 West Germany ...... 192 Applications Programs ...... 192 LIST OF TABLES Great Britain ...... 194 Table No. Page Organization and Funding ...... 195 17. Contributions of Member States to the Current Applications Programs ...... 195 Principai ESA Programsin 1981 . . . . . 178 Italy ...... 196. 18. Capacity ofAriane and U.S. Launch Other European Programs ...... 196 Vehicles ...... 181 Japan ...... 197 19. Total Successful Orbital Launches . . . 204 Organization and Policy ...... 197 Current and Projected Applications Programs ...... 198 LIST OF FIGURES Communications ...... 198 Figure No. Page Remote Sensing...... 201 11. Organizational Structure of the Materials Processing ...... 201 European Space Agency ...... 176 Launch Vehicles ...... 202 12. Schematic Chart of National Organization ‘Cooperation/Competition With the for Space Activities ...... 199 United States ...... 203 13. Japanese Budget for Space Activities. 200 Non-Western Space Programs: Soviet Union, 14. Current and Probable Landsat People’s Republic of China, India . . . 204 Ground Stations ...... 215 Chapter 7 INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE

INTRODUCTION

The shape, direction, and very existence of the tiveness vis-a-vis commercial rivals, particularly U.S. civilian space program owe much to inter- the United States. As the U.S. post-Apollo space national competition. The basic events are well activities, both public and private, have come to known: the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the concentrate more on potential economic payoffs sudden public discovery of the “space age;” the rather than on large prestige projects, and the continuing series of Soviet space “firsts” in un- Soviet program has turned toward the long-term manned and then manned satellites; and the goal of permanent manned orbital platforms, the sometimes desperate attempts by the United commercial competition in space applications States to catch up, culminating in President technologies and systems from Europe and Japan Kennedy’s 1961 commitment to a manned lunar has become increasingly important. The signifi- landing by 1970, ahead of the Russians. (For a cance of competition between nations has also more detailed description of the early phases of altered, due to the expanded global use of space Soviet-American rivalry in space, see app. G.) technology rising largely out of the successes of the U.S. space program. International organiza- During these years of competition the United tions for global communications, such as States and the Soviet Union had a virtual monop- INTELSAT and INMARSAT, have continued to oly on space systems and technologies: boosters; grow and now include most of the world’s users tracking systems; communications, remote sens- of telecommunications. Through the National ing, and weather satellites; and manned space- Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) craft. Other countries, lacking the military and and the U.S. Agency for International Develop- political motivation, did not at first choose to ex- ment, many developing countries have gained pend the resources needed to develop independ- first-hand experience in the ways satellite com- ent space capabilities. munications and remote-sensing systems can We will not attempt hereto describe the course supply services crucial for economic growth. As of these developments during the 1960’s; the one result, the laws and regulations governing the main elements of the current Soviet space pro- use of outer space have been widely discussed gram will be presented later (see pp. 204-209). by international bodies such as the International Suffice it to say that the U.S. program had, by the Telecommunication Union and the U.N.’S Com- end of the decade, succeeded in demonstrating mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. its superiority in virtually every area—without, Space technology has become an important po- however, forcing the Soviets to abandon their litical resource whose effective use by the United own efforts or to concede permanent U.S. pre- States will be affected by the development of in- eminence. ternational competition. In what follows we will outline, for each major foreign program, its or- The important point is that, beginning in the ganization and goals, its main efforts in the four 1960’s but accelerating rapidly in the 1970’s, applications areas (communications, remote sens- other countries began to enter the field. Political ing, materials processing, and transportation), and motivations, as will be seen, played and continue the prospects for cooperation and/or competition to play a crucial role; to a large extent these were with the United States. identified with maintaining economic competi-

175 .

176 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications .————— .-

EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND JOINT EUROPEAN EFFORTS

Since the early 1960’s Europe has attempted At the beginning of the space age, individual to mount a coordinated space program to com- European states recognized that they could not pete with the United States and Soviet programs mount space programs on the scale of those in in key areas and to ensure European participa- the United States or U.S.S.R, unless there was ex- tion in the economic, scientific, and political tensive cooperation among interested parties. benefits of space activities. The latest and most Even so, there was no attempt to match the successful organization to attempt this task is the manned capabilities being competitively devel- European Space Agency (ESA), made up of 11 full oped by the superpowers. European interest has members—Belgiu m, Denmark, France, Ger- been focused on basic science, on applications many, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, satellites for regional use, and on supporting an Sweden, Switzerland, and the united Kingdom– industrial/technical infrastructure that could con- and two associate members—Austria and Nor- tribute to high-technology enterprises. Despite way. ESA is involved in space science, applica- these shared interests, however, there have been tions, and launch vehicle development, as well continuing difficulties caused by: 1 ) differences as the formulation of policy for European coop- between members about what programs to sup- erative ventures (see fig. 1 1). port and general policies to follow, 2) problems

Figure Il.—Organizational Structure of the European Space Agency Ch. 7—Internationa/ Efforts in Space • 177 in allocating contracts between industries in and operations, launch facilities, and space trans- various countries, 3) disagreement about the ap- portation. 3 The major programs, such as Ariane propriate degree of cooperation with, and de- and Spacelab, are optional, which means that pendence on, the United States, and 4) competi- members can request to be specifically excluded. tion between ESA and national programs. Mandatory contributions are based on each state’s national income; however, no one state can contribute more than 25 percent of the total Policy? and Budget budget. For optional projects, interested par- ESA was founded in May 1975 following several ticipants pay a variable percentage which is ne- years of negotiations and compromises among gotiated between the participants. The degree of the major participants. ESA inherited the pro- national support for various programs in 1981 is grams and facilities of its predecessor organiza- given in table 17. tions, the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), the European Launcher Development ESA’S budget for its first full year of operation Organization (ELDO), and the European Space (1976) was approximately $600 million, of which Conference (ESC). (For a description of Europe’s one-third went for mandatory and two-thirds for pre-ESA activities, see app. G.) An important point optional programs. This compares with NASA’s is that, unlike NASA, ESA is specifically allowed fiscal 1976 appropriation (for space) of $3.22 to operate applications systems, once developed, billion. In 1980, ESA’S budget had risen to $846 with the costs being borne by the users of the million, while NASA’s was $4.68 billion. In both system.1 A second difference, one which partially years, the ESA budget was between one-fifth and offsets the first, is that ESA is responsible for one-sixth NASA’S. (These figures do not constitute carrying out an “industrial policy” designed to a complete comparison of United States and “improve the worldwide competitiveness of European civilian space expenditures, since they European industry,” while ensuring that member fail to include non-NASA programs in the United states participate equitably and, in particular, that States, both Government and private sector, as the return to any member state—i.e., the value well as the space budgets of individual European of the contracts let by ESA—is approximately pro- countries). Since ESA’S two most expensive proj- portionate to the members’ contributions (the ects, Ariane and Spacelab, are largely complete principle of “juste retour” or fair return). The ESA and are not likely to be soon replaced by comparable programs, ESA’S budget is not expected convention explicitly states that it shall “exploit 4 the advantages of free competitive bidding in all to increase over the coming years. cases, except when this would be incompatible with other defined objectives of industrial pol- Current and Projected 5 icy. ”z Hence considerations of cost or efficien- Applications Programs cy may have to take a back seat to the principle of fair return, with predictable results for time- Communications liness and cost effectiveness. This is one of the European communications needs and pro- inevitable shortcomings of a mu Itinational agen- grams have been defined largely by the national cy, and a prime reason why operational systems PTTs (postal, telephone, and telegraph agencies) have generally been handled outside of ESA. acting through CEPT (Conference Europeene de Postes et Telecommunications and the European The ESA members contribute to the organization in two ways: mandatory activities, which in- 3“Convention,” art. V. 4As a multinational organization, ESA has had to develop an ac- clude the scientific programs and basic organiza- counting system to provide for changes in exchange rates between tional expenditures; and optional activities, member states. ESA accounts are kept in ESA Accounting Units (AU) which are specific programs for satellite design rather than any single national currency. The value of the AU vis- a-vis other currencies is reevaluated annually; in 1981, one AU =!$1 .4. I “Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agen- ‘Unless otherwise indicated, figures and information in this sec- cy,” done at Paris May 30, 1975, art. V. tion are taken from Europe’s P/ace in Space, ESA, Paris, January “’Convention,” art. VI], par. 1 sec. d. 1981. —

178 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 17.–Contributions of Member States to the Principal ESA Programs in 1981

Meteosat ECS Ariane General expioita- phase Marecs Marecs develop- budget Science tion Sirio-2 OTS ECS 3 bis A B Spacelab ment Member states: Belgium ...... 4.71 4.49 4.06 3.30 5.17 3.27 3.19 0.95 0.14 5.07 1.92 Denmark...... 2.63 2.51 2.41 — 2.90 0.33 0.74 — — 1.81 0.40 France ...... 22.45 21.40 23.70 7.50 24.69 25.93 26.52 11.92 5.74 12.07 79.34 Germany...... 26.82 25.57 25.66 9.00 25.00 30.68 30.42 19.08 13.29 64.78 5.31 Ireland ...... 0.54 0.54 — — — — — — — — — Italy...... 5.51 12.46 15.07 72.39 14.38 14.78 13.85 2.20 1,28 1.00 5.31 Netherlands...... 6.29 6.00 — 2.50 0.94 1.77 4.63 1.49 2.53 0.34 Spain ...... 5.29 5.04 — 0:50 — 0.17 0.53 0.95 0.34 3.38 4.18 Sweden. , ., ... , . . 4.16 4.25 1.50 4.91 1,62 3.97 2.96 6.61 — 0.63 Switzerland ...... 4.19 3.99 3-48 3.50 4.59 2.13 0.55 — — 1.00 0.08 United Kingdom . . 14.42 13.75 20.60 1.83 15.86 20.15 18.46 55.81 69.89 7.60 2.49 Other participants: Austria ...... 0.68 — — 0.48 — — — — — 0.76 . Canada...... 2.23 — — — — — — — — — — Norway...... 0.08 — — — — — — 1.50 1.22 — — — — — — — — — — — Other income. . . . . — 5.02 ——

SOURCE: From Europe’s Place in Spacer p,9.

Broadcasting Union (EBU). More recently, fore- tor for the estimated $632.8 million program (not casting and coordination have been done within including ground terminals); the first satellite is the Interim Eutelsat Organization, set up within scheduled for an Ariane launch in 1982. CEPT in 1977 to establish a European satellite Marecs.–Marecs is a direct descendant of communications system. Great Britain’s Marots program for ocean com- OTS (Orbital Test Sate//ite).–The OTS project munications, but its design is based, like ECS, on was approved by ESRO in 1971 and launched the experimental OTS. Two satellites will be into geosynchronous orbit in 1978 (aboard a U.S. placed in geostationary orbit over the Atlantic (the Delta 3914) after development by British Aero- Atlantic satellite may eventually be relocated over space Dynamics Group. With a capacity of 3,000 the Indian Ocean) and Pacific to provide ship- telephone circuits, it has been used for various to-ship communications. The international mari- experimental purposes including high-speed sci- time satellite organization, inmarsat, is leasing the entific data transmission and television broad- satellites for its mission. The British Aerospace casting. Current projections are that it may be Dynamics Group is prime contractor, and Britain able to provide useful services for up to 5 more has put up most of the development funding, years. Program cost has been $365.4 million. some 55 percent of Marecs A and almost 70 percent of Marecs B. (In the OTS and ECS programs, ECS (European Communications Satellites).– by contrast, Great Britain contributed a more The OTS was designed to prove the usefulness usual 15 to 20 percent.) Marecs A was launched of an operational European telecommunications on the fourth Ariane test flight December 20, system. In 1978, ESA approved a five-satellite 1981, and Marecs B is scheduled for the first system, based on the OTS design, to provide re- operational flight in September 1982. Program gional communications needs for 10 years. in- cost is $359.8 million. terim Eutelsat will pay user fees for international trunk telephone services and for television trans- L-Sat (large-satellite). –The L-Sat is a descendant mission between members of the European of an earlier program, H-Sat, which was aban- Broadcasting Union. High-speed data transmis- doned by France and Germany in favor of going sion and communication with off-shore oil and ahead with more rapid deployment of their own gas platforms may also be provided. British joint (non-ESA) operational communications and Aerospace Dynamics Group is the prime contrac- television direct broadcast system (see descrip- Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 179 tion, p. 188). As presently envisioned, L-Sat would contractor for the $301 million program was be a very large, advanced experimental commu- Aerospatiale of France. nications satellite to test the feasibility of direct Sirio 2.—Sirio 1 was an experimental Italian TV broadcasting and specialized/business com- communications satellite; the spare, Sirio 2, will munications using small roof-top size terminals. be launched by ESA in 1982 to provide meteor- In addition, it would include equipment for ex- ological data transmission to African ground periments with the as-yet unexploited 30/20 GHz centers, as well as to conduct scientific ex- band. The British have been most enthusiastic periments. Cost for the Italian-built satellite will about L-Sat development, which is seen as com- be $40.6 million. petitive with U.S. technology for future INTELSAT satellites, and British Aerospace has been Earthnet. -A mandatory ESA program, Earth net awarded the prime contract. Still in the design consists of four receiving stations and two proc- definition stage, its estimated launch (either on essing centers which receive remote-sensing and the space shuttle or an advanced Ariane), is set meteorological data from U.S. satellites: Landsat, for 1986. The estimated development cost is $520 Nimbus-7, the Heat Capacity Mapping Mission, million (1 980 price Ievels).b and (formerly) Seasat. The data are available to all ESA members as well as to outside requesters. One of the striking facts in looking at ESA’S communications program is the leading role Spacelab Remote-Sensing Programs. –The first played by Great Britain and British industry. Since Spacelab flight, scheduled for 1983, will carry two there are national and bilateral European projects European remote-sensing experiments. One will being conducted outside ESA, Britain is not the use a very high resolution camera for 1:100,000- only European country fostering satellite telecom- scale mapping. The second involves the develop- munications expertise, but it has one of the ment of a microwave remote sensor to collect broadest and most forward-looking programs (see data through cloud cover. pp. 40-41 for further discussion). ERS 1 (European Remote-Sensing Satellite).– Remote Sensing The Earthnet and Spacelab projects, along with other activities, are designed to prepare for an ESA has been active in both meteorological and advanced remote-sensing satellite, ERS 1. ERS 1 remote-sensing development, though with pri- will be used to monitor icepacks and to sense mary emphasis on the former, coastal and ocean regions; its instruments include Meteosat 7 and 2.—The Meteosat program was a synthetic aperture radar, a radar altimeter, and approved by ESRO in 1972; Meteosat 1 was wind and wave scatterometers. Tentative launch launched (by Thor-Delta) in 1977, and placed in date is mid-1987. (It should be noted that a major a geostationary orbit allowing it to survey Europe, civilian operational/commercial remote sensing Africa, and the Mediterranean. It provides raw system, SPOT, is being undertaken by France, imagery to central European ground-processing Sweden, and Belgium as a national project; the stations for short-term weather forecasting, as well proposed ERS will use the SPOT bus but contain as relaying the processed data to users and trans- different instruments. For a description of SPOT, mitting imagery from U.S. weather satellites sta- see pp. 25-29.) ERS-1 is considered to be one ele- tioned over the Western Hemisphere. Meteosat ment i n a continuing program of Earth observa- 1 has also contributed to global programs set up tion satellites. Studies are underway for further by the World Meteorological Organization. in satellites, including one for land remote sensing. 1979, Meteosat 1 suffered a partial failure of its Materials Processing power system; Meteosat 2 was launched in June 1981 on the third Ariane test flight. The prime ESA does not yet consider materials processing to be an applications area per se, but rather GESA News Release, “New European Telecommunication Satel- lite, Program is Approved,” Dec. 22, 1981. ESA News Release, “ESA an area in which to do basic research that may Microgravity Programme Gets Underway, ” Jan. 18, 1982. someday lead to useful products or processes. 180 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The term “materials science” is used instead of riety of test projects. In 1980, NASA contracted materials processing; experiments in both biology to purchase a second spacelab, including a pres- and materials science will be carried out as part surized module and five instrumentation pallets, of an approved 4-year “microgravity pro- for $183.9 million from the prime contractor, the gramme” budgeted at $52.4 million.7 German firm ERN0.8 ESA’S main contribution to materials science Spacelab is Europe’s first attempt at construct- will be through Spacelab, although sounding ing a manned system; partly for this reason, and rockets are also being used. Spacelab will be the also because of internal management problems major facility for space-based experimentation in compounded by continuing changes in the re- the physical and biological sciences during the quirements for integration with the shuttle orbiter, next decade. Spacelab consists of a pressurized the project has cost considerably more than in- module capable of being carried in the payload itially estimated, and has also been subject to bay of the space shuttle and allowing experiment- delay. The 1973 agreement between NASA and ers to work at a variety of projects in a shirt-sleeve ESA called for delivery of the first unit by 1979; environment. There are also pallets that allow however, since the shuttle program has also been equipment to be exposed directly to vacuum and behind schedule, these delays have had little ef- radiation (see artist’s rendition). Equipment for fect. The increase in costs, however, has caused conducting processing experiments will include problems among the ESA supporters. According furnaces and remote manipulators. to the ESA agreement, if costs rose above 120 percent of original estimates, the supporters could Spacelab is ESA’S largest cooperative project withdraw or renegotiate the terms. In 1979, with NASA. ESA is responsible for designing and estimated costs to completion (approximately delivering, free of charge, an engineering model and a first flight unit (delivered in December $860 million; dollar amounts are inexact because of built-in inflation escalators and exchange-rate 1981 ), which NASA is scheduled to launch in fluctuations)9 were 140 percent of the original mid-l983. The first flight program will involve a joint European-American crew conducting a va- a“Europe Competes With U.S. Programs, ” A W&ST, Mar. 3, 1980, p. 89. 7ESA News Release, “ESA Microgravity Programme Gets Under- “’Sweeping Changes Spur Spacelab Pace, ” AW&ST, Feb. 11, way,” Jan. 18, 1982. 1980). ——

Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 181

estimates. Italy in particular felt it could not con- ities most effectively-the United States, the Euro- tinue to fund Spacelab at its original level of 18 peans, or perhaps the Japanese—remains open. percent and threatened to block the project (largely because its share of Spacelab’s industrial Launch Vehicles participation had fallen to 11 to 12 percent) unless The Ariane I launcher, ESA’S most expensive its contribution was reduced. As a result, Italy’s single program, has recently completed a four- contribution dropped from 18 percent in 1979 flight test program; the first operational flight will to 1 percent in 1981, with the shortfall being take place in September 1982. taken up by other contributors in proportion to their level of participation. Ariane I is a three-stage expendable vehicle, including an advanced liquid oxygen/liquid There have also been various tensions between hydrogen third stage. For a comparison with U.S. NASA and ESA over secondary issues. One prob- launch vehicles, see table 18. lem has been the flight schedule for Spacelab missions, especially since the number of shuttle The current design of Ariane is only the first flights for the first several years has recently been in a series of as many as five models; successive cut back. ESA is also concerned that changing designs are planned to improve payload capac- specifications for shuttle payloads will lead to ex- ity and performance through the 1980’s. The ESA pensive redesign of Spacelab components. ” member states have already approved a program Some European scientists think that NASA re- to develop Ariane 2, 3, and 4. Ariane 2 will be quirements for documentation and prior con- able to place 4,4oo lb in a transfer orbit, and sultation on Spacelab experiments are overly Ariane 3,5,280 Ib.ls Ariane 4, under study by ESA stringent and reflect a desire to restrict European and CNES, will more than double the perform- participation .12 NASA counters that preparations ance of Ariane 1; its further development was ap- for manned missions are of necessity more proved in January 1982, and first launch is sched- rigorous than for other types of flights. Some uled for 1985. An even more ambitious improve- Americans think that, despite the money saved ment, a fifth Ariane version having a liquid ox- by cooperative development, an American ygen/liquid hydrogen second stage and able to SpaceJab program would have been faster and launch 12,100 lb into transfer orbit, is also under would have produced a design better suited to consideration for potential development by the U.S. needs and to the shuttle’s capabilities, and end of the decade. that the (politically motivated) inclusion of the Europeans has resulted in a less-than-optimal 1 Jjeffrey Lenorovitz, technology. “Arianespace Completing Payload Plans, ” AW&ST, JUly 6, 1981, pp. 19-20. It is difficult to evaluate these charges and countercharges objectively; in large part, they stem from the inevitable problems of conducting Table 18.—Capacity of Ariane and U.S. (Commercial) any major cooperative program in advanced Launch Vehicles (in lb) technology, especially one with significant poten- Transfer tial economic effects. Since, for budgetary LEO orbit reasons, the alternative to a European Spacelab Ariane 1...... 10,500 3,700a - - was not a U.S. Spacelab, but no Spacelab at all, Space shuttle ...... 65,000 — Space shuttle with Delta upper many U.S. criticisms are strictly hypothetical. The stage ...... — 2,750 question of who will exploit Spacelab’s capabil- Space shuttle with internal upper stage (under development) ...... — 5,000 Thor-Delta ...... 6,490 2,420 ‘Khris Bulloch, “Spacelab Status: Some Action at Last, ” /rtteravia, Atlas-Centaur ...... 11,200 4,510

November 1981, p. 1,168. ite aThe~e flgure~ ~~~ume the Ariane IS launched from the Kourou launch ‘ ‘ear 11 Eric Quistgaa~d, DirectoF General of ESA, statement before the Equater, while U.S. launches are from Kennedy Space Center In Florida. Senate Commerce Committee, Mar. 25, 1981, p. 7. The equatorial site gwes any geostatlonary payload an approximately 15 per. ‘z’’ U.S.-Europe Collaboration Variable, ” A W&ST, Sept. 1, 1980, cent performance improvement over KSC p. 275. SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment 182 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Utilizing a dual launch system (SYLDA), each Ariane is capable of carrying two separate payloads on each flight. Launches will be made from the French-owned, ESA-funded Kourou spaceport in French Guiana, South America. Located close to the Equator, Kourou is well placed for launching stationary satellites (which orbit over the Equator). With only one pad, it is currently capable of launching five to six flights per year, but construction of a second pad has been approved for operation in 1984 or 1985, allowing for 10 annual launches and providing redundancy. When the Ariane was first proposed, there was considerable skepticism as to whether it could be competitive with the space shuttle and the various U.S. expendable vehicles. There were strong political reasons why several European countries, especially France, desired an independent launch capability (see app. G); in addition, it appears that, as a result of several considerations, the Ariane will be able to compete with the shuttle for many kinds of payloads through the 1980’s. First of all, the shuttle itself is 2 years behind schedule, and has not yet been flown sufficiently to convince users of its reliability. Second, U.S. production of expendable was slowed down and in some cases virtually halted, in expectation that the shuttle would replace all of them during the early 1980’s. As a result, the cost of the Thor-Deltas and Atlas-Centaurs has risen sharply over the last several years. Third, the commercial demand by a number of likely users, especially for communications satellites, is projected to be much larger in the coming decade than was previously thought. Even with the shuttle operating at its initially projected pace, there would be demand for additional launch services.ld However, because of recent and projected budget cutbacks there will be fewer shuttle flights than previously scheduled, another cir- cumstance forcing users to turn to alternate launch vehicles. Fourth, Arianespace is offering customers highly attractive terms, including below-market financing through European banks, and an extended period in whic:h to make repay- Photo credit European Space Agency ment. For these reasons, the Ariane is likely to First launch of Ariane / “Jerry Grey, “Case for a 5th Shuttle and More Expendable Launch Vehicles,” Astronautics and Aeronautics, March 1981. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 183 have a full manifest for the foreseeable future, prime contractor, and SEP (Societe Europeenne despite the superior capabilities of the shuttle. de Propulsion), which is building the propulsion Frederic D’ Al lest, chairman of Arianespace, proj- system. Overall, France has funded over 60 per- ects continued use of Ariane for at least 20 years cent of the project, rising to 79 percent in 1981. despite competition from reusable spacecraft.15 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the The Ariane is now scheduled for a series of ESA Ariane program is the arrangement for commer- and INTELSAT launchings (under ESA auspices) cial operation. Instead of leaving it to ESA or in 1982. As of january 1982, there were approx- CNES, a quasi-private corporation called Ariane- imately $350 million worth of firm orders for space has been established to produce, finance, Arianespace, which will take over Ariane opera- market, and launch Ariane vehicles. ESA and tions in 1983.16 There were also a large number CNES remain responsible for further development of reservations, which may be turned into firm of Ariane 2-5, and for operation of the Guiana orders in the future. These include non-European spaceport. customers such as Colombia, Australia, and the Arianespace is incorporated in France and Arabian Satellite Corporation .17 Recently, Ariane- owned by firms from the states that funded space received its first firm order from an Amer- Ariane’s development, by CNES, and by Euro- ican company, General Telephone & Electronics, pean banks. French investors (including CNES to launch two domestic communications satellites itself, which is the largest single shareholder with in 1984.18 Other orders have followed from West- 34 percent), will own 60 percent; German ones ern Union and Southern Pacific Communications. 20 percent; and the remainder is split up into Ariane is being marketed in the United States smaller portions. Its initial capitalization was ap- through an arrangement with Grumman Aero- proximately $20 million. The first chairman of space Inc. Arianespace policy is to sell its services Arianespace, Frederic D’Allest, is the former to “any customer whose payload is designed for CNES project director for Ariane, and the pro- peaceful use;” this includes payloads from the duction and launching teams will be transferred French military, NATO, and a British Defence directly from CNES in 1982.20 Clearly, the new Communications Satellite.19 Control over the firm will be dominated by the French, and it is political aspects of launch policy is retained, ac- not surprising that France was the prime mover cording to ESA’S agreement with Arianespace, by behind Arianespace’s emergence. The idea of a the ESA Council. private firm was first suggested in 1979, with the The development and subsequent operation of original proposal by CNES calling for 70 percent Ariane have been marked by a number of pecu- French ownership. The basic rationale was that liarities. We have seen the dominant role that only a commercially oriented operation could France played in proposing and developing the manage Ariane so as to compete effectively with project. The prime contractor has been not a the shuttle; trying to operate in a framework re- , private firm or industrial consortium, as for other quiring the unanimous consent of 11 sovereign ESA programs, but CNES (Centre National nations would be far too inefficient. 21 In subse- d’Etudes Spatiales or National Center for Space quent negotiations with ESA and the potential Research), the French Government equivalent of partners, the French percentage was reduced to NASA. CNES in turn has let contracts primarily approximately 60 percent. The most difficult part to French firms, in particular Aerospatiale, the was getting the agreement of other ESA members to turn over the technology and facilities, in- I sj~ffrey Lenorovitz, “Arianespace Completing Payload Plans, ” cluding future developments, to Arianespace; AW&ST, jU!y 6, 1981, p. 19. Germany was particularly opposed. In 1980, “’’Why NASA’s Shuttle May be Left in the Dust, ” Business Week, Jan. 18, 1982, p. 38. . France withheld support for Spacelab funding for ‘7’’ Arianespace Press Kit, ” at 34th International Airshow, Paris, 2 months until Germany signed a political dec- June 1981, pp. 10-13. ‘a’’ Europeans Win Orders to Launch 2 GTE Satellites,” Wa// Street zOArianeSPaCe Press Kit. )ourna/, Nov. 25, 1981. 2)’’ Europeans Organize CommercialAriane Satellite Launch Com- lgArianespace Press Kit, p. 13. pany,” AW&ST, July 9 1979, p. 18. 184 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications ARIANE: YOUR PLACE

, \\'ith an OIX'rational . - laul1(h \'ehi(le t \ '.• .

." • I II I I' I .' . [\...... I' . \ ,"" I • ..... I I f '- ~ .....

,~~ • ... I I " " I \ r ;! 'i',1 ' , L ~ ..... ~ I .....

--.~ j • ~ ." "" , ' I " r ... · . I, I 'I, .. ' " " I" ,

-, ; • , I' I I, , , , , I I: " i I . • • • , " I \ ' ' , • \ ~ " .... \ i ..... I I • I '

• I ... •

ir ,)' I' ~ '- ur ~pt'l'la It\' : f ' ;. . t· il )r' 1· In -I ~,,-'" ; . " into geostationary orbit

• M \, :,~

~ ~

:..' f. "r lw fir"t l'l)fl111Wrci.11 ,. , "J'dCl' \. ,lrrtt'r

• ( r ' N rl1tJoi' ~ 1; "1 RI ,-,ti, f ',. •• \ f' I.. ,'1

i "I' . 'I ~ • :, \ I I, \" I

- I" ,11~1\\hl'I'. I ~

Advertisement from AW&ST, May 1982 Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 185

Iaration agreeing to the transfer to Arianespace.22 not reached, many of these programs may be- Arianespace is currently scheduled to assume re- come exclusively national efforts. sponsibility in 1983 following a series of seven According to an address given by Dr. Massimo ESA flights in 1982 and early 1983. Trella, Technical Director of ESA, at the Paris Air Show in June of 1981, overall European space Future Plans activities will continue to grow in the 1980’s at with the imminent completion of ESA’S two least as rapidly as in the 1970’s, but the division largest applications programs, Spacelab and of responsibility between ESA and national efforts Ariane, the level of ESA activities in the 1980’s can be expected to change. ESA and the various is likely to diminish, For the immediate future the national programs will cooperate in defining and valuable industrial and technical teams organized coordinating a European program, while ESA for these projects will remain occupied building itself “will build up, more than before, its identi- the second Spacelab and designing Ariane 2-5. ty as an R&D organization devoted mainly to No comparable applications projects have yet large projects. More clearly we believe that com- been approved to take their place (though there mercially exploitable systems should be more the has been consideration of a plan to develop responsibility of other initiators in Europe. ” Dr. Spacelab into a free-flying platform as part of a Trella specifically mentioned development of an cooperative program with the United States). A advanced remote-sensing system .25 However, on reduction in ESA activity may reflect the pref- the same occasion Michel Bignier, ESA’S Direc- erence of several member nations for national or tor of Space Transportation Systems, outlined a bilateral programs, especially for commercial ap- future program which emphasized materials processing, development of Ariane 3 and 4, and plications systems, where the cumbersome ESA 2b apparatus can impede timely decisions. It also building and maintaining large space stations. reflects a general worsening of the major Euro- Clearly ESA’S future mix of programs and overall pean economies over the past several years, emphasis remain to be determined. especially those of West Germany and Great Brit- ain. Under its recently elected Director General, Cooperation/Competition With Eric Quistgaard, ESA has been preparing a 10-year the United States plan for the future which is likely to emphasize basic science within an overall reduced budget. Cooperation: The proposed plan estimates a reduction to an The bulk of European cooperative efforts with annual budget of $532 million to $598 million, NASA have been scientific. With one major ex- compared with a 1980 level of $845.8 million .23 ception (to be discussed below) these have in establishing future programs, it will be worked out well. A large number of cooperative necessary for the major partners to compromise missions, in which NASA provided free launch as they did in the past. The British interest in L- services in exchange for scientific experiments Sat development remains high, while the Ger- and data, have been conducted with ESRO and mans are more interested in exploiting Spacelab ESA.27 In general, scientific cooperation is ar- by conducting scientific and materials process- ranged directly between ESA and NASA; only ing missions, and expanding Spacelab’s capabil- Spacelab has required a formal intergovernmental ities. France would like to see aggressive develop- agreement. (Lower level agreements, called ment of the Ariane, including a possible auto-

mated processing station (Solaris) or a manned ZSMaSSirnO Trella, “EsA Policy Directions—Collective VETSUS Na- reusable vehicle. 24 If a successful compromise is tional Programmed,” paper delivered at International Aerospace Symposium, Le Bourget, France, June 2-3, 1981. ZZ’’New Commercial Organization to Take Arial~e Responsibil- 2bMichel Bignier, “Expectations for the Future,” International ity,” AW&ST, Apr. 7, 1980, p. 45. Aerospace Symposium, Le Bourget, France, June 2-3, 1981. ZIJeffrey Lenorovitz, “Europeans Making Plans to Meet Long-term zzFor details, see United States C’ki/;an Space programs, 1958-78, Goals?” AW&ST, Mar. 9, 1981, p. 88. report by Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research ZQpeter Marsh, “what Shou Id Europe Do in Space, ” New SCien- Service, for the House Committee on Science and Technology, tist, Jan. 29, 1981, pp. 290-292. January 1981, pp. 839-841. 186 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications memoranda of understanding, are made with manned space station based on Spacelab mod- U.S. Department of State (DOS) concurrence, ules.29 while letter agreements require no DOS action In general, the advantages of cooperation tend whatever.) to diminish when the project requires much In the field of applications the cooperative direct contact on a day-to-day level; it is record is somewhat more mixed. Serious strains preferable for work to be done as independent- arose when, in 1972, the United States withdrew ly as possible, to avoid time-consuming joint deci- a previous offer for the Europeans to produce a sions. A second difficulty with cooperation in “Space Tug” as part of the Space Transportation space applications is that the prospect of even- System (see app. G). Further mistrust was aroused tual commercial competition between partners when the United States backed out of the Aerosat can cause suspicion and reduce its attractiveness program in 1977. Aerosat was a combined ESA/ to industrial participants.JO U.S./Canadian project to develop an experimen- Despite these difficulties, international coopera- tal air traffic control satellite system. Beginning tion was strongly stressed in Massimo Trella’s June in 1974, ESA and other partners invested con- address, particularly for high-risk, high-expense siderable time and money only to have the Fed- programs: “ESA intends to take the initiative in eral Aviation Administration (the U.S. participant) this direction in order to explore with all in- withdraw because of its inability to fund further terested partners how a wider and more ambi- development. tious international cooperation could be defined A third example is the recent deletion of the and implemented in a strategic R&D program me U.S. spacecraft from the joint International Solar in space in the next decade.”31 It should be noted Polar Mission (ISPM). Though ISPM is a scientific, that the United States is not specifically men- not an applications project, this withdrawal has tioned; ESA has so far not engaged in cooperative reinforced European doubts about general U.S. programs with the Soviet Union, though some reliability. ISPM was to have involved two space- tentative offers were once made without success. craft, one United States and one European, which Other European countries, notably France, have would simultaneously fly over the Sun’s “north” done so and it cannot be ruled out that ESA, part- and “south” poles. Without U.S. participation, ly out of frustration with U.S. unpredictability, much of ESA’S projected $150 million investment may seek out the Soviets despite the difficulties will have been wasted; nevertheless, the U.S. involved in collaborating across the iron Curtain, spacecraft was eliminated in Reagan administration cuts implemented in February 1981. Though Competition ESA objected vigorously and member states pro- Although the total European civilian space tested at the ambassadorial level, additional funds budget is only a fraction of either U.S. or Soviet 28 were not appropriated. These U.S. actions have expenditures (Europe spends only 0.04 percent raised questions about whether ESA can afford of its gross national product (GNP) on space to to trust future U.S. commitments, given the the United States’ 0.2 percent), the areas in which vagaries of annual executive and congressional European technology is commercially competi- budget decisions and the dependent position of tive with the United States are significant and ESA in most projected cooperative projects. growing. The competition from Ariane is perhaps Despite these problems, preliminary talks have most striking, insofar as launch vehicles are the begun on possibie major areas of future coopera- true symbols of space capabilities and were for tion, including joint processing experiments, so long a U.S.-Soviet monopoly. Perhaps equal- possible expansion of Spacelab into a modular free-flying platform, and joint development of a 29’’ Coming Next–A European Base in Space, ” New Scientist, Nov. 51981, p. 356; see also Craig Covault, “NASA Mulls interna- Zejeffrey Lenorovitz, “ESA Seeks Reinstatement of NASA Solar- tional Effort on Space Station, ” A W&S7; Mar. 1, 1982, p. 20. Polar Effort, ” AW&ST, Mar. 2, 1981, pp. 22-23; statement of Eric 30’’ U.S.-Europe Collaboration Variable, ” AW&ST, Sept. 1, 1980, Quistgaard, Senate Commerce Committee hearing, Mar. 25, 1981, p. 275. pp. 1-5. 31 Trella, “ESA Policy Directions, ” p. 7. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space Ž 187 equally significant, however, are European suc- ● focus on relatively few high-opportunity cesses in gaining contracts from INMARSAT and areas; Arabsat for communications satellites, and plans ● assimilation of U.S. technology in key areas, to bid for future generations of INTELSAT satellites avoiding unnecessary duplication; as well. The French SPOT remote-sensing system ● sustained support by the major countries, (discussed below), is scheduled to offer an alter- particularly France and West Germany; and native to U.S. Landsat data beginning in 1984. ● the ability to compromise when necessary, Though it can be argued that some of the Euro- founded on a strong perception that building pean success may be attributed, not to superior and maintaining an industrial base in space technology, but to the desire of international technology is necessary for Europe’s long- organizations and non-U. S. purchasers to de- term economic vitality. crease their dependence on the United States, Though decisions made through ESA may take it is clear that European systems are in many cases more compromise and negotiation than com- equivalent, if not superior, in capabilities and cost parable U.S. program choices, they are less like- effectiveness. However, U.S. objections that ly to be precipitously changed or canceled; the European space technologies, in particular government-to-government character of agree- Ariane, benefit from unfair financial practices, ments gives them considerable weight. As long such as government-subsidized below-market as these conditions remain in effect, the United financing for users, are likely to lead to strains States can expect a high level of competition from between the U.S. and European agencies, ESA and its member states. European success, despite lower expenditures, is related to several factors:

EUROPEAN NATIONAL PROGRAMS

In addition to their participation in ESA, which while avoiding dependence on the United States for most countries constitutes the bulk of their or U. S. S. R., particularly for launch services; 2) ex- space spending, several European states have tensive cooperation between government agen- substantial separate national or bilateral pro- cies and industry; and 3) the development of grams. The activities of France, West Germany, military capabilities associated with France’s in- Britain, and Italy are of particular interest. dependent nuclear deterrent, including ongoing relationships between civilian and military France programs. The decision to cooperate with both the United The French space program is the largest and States and the Soviet Union is indicative of most comprehensive in Europe and the third France’s longstanding desire to mediate between largest in the world, after the United States and East and West and to avoid exclusive dependence Soviet Union. The French have major programs on either superpower. The idea of France as a in space science, applications, and launch vehi- “third Force,” separate from the United States cles. Activities are carried out in several ways: on and NATO (which France partially withdrew from a national basis; bilaterally with West Germany, in 1959), was strongly promoted by DeGaulle, other European countries, the Soviet Union, the who came to power in 1958. DeGaulle saw United States and several third world countries; France as the natural leader of a resurgent and multilaterally through ESA. Europe, and hence encouraged the formation of The French program has been characterized (presumably French-dominated) European mul- by: 1) an ongoing commitment to developing a tilateral associations. Space was an arena in which comprehensive and independent space program the French felt Europe needed to compete; 188 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

France was a major supporter of ESRO and ELDO some objections regarding possible conflict with (particularly the latter) and, eventually, of ESA. INTELSAT–see app. G).35 (For a description of France’s initial space activ- France and West Germany are currently en- ities, see app. G.) In 1964, out of a total civilian gaged in another joint project for direct televi- space budget of $76.8 million, France spent $29.6 sion broadcasting, with each country operating million on ELDO, and $1 million on ESRO. In its own 3-channel satellite for domestic purposes. 1975, the first year of ESA’S existence, $133 mil- The satellites, designated TDF-1 for France and lion out of a total of $254 million, or better than TV-Sat for Germany, are being developed by the percent, went to ESA,32 and in 1981 France 50 Munich-based Eurosatellite Corp., made up of was ESA’S largest contributor with approximate- two French firms, Aerospatiale and Thomson- ly $211.5 million, or 25.06 percent of ESA’S total CSF, and two German ones, Messerschmitt- budget (largely for the Ariane). Blohm-Bolkow and AEG-Telefunken. The French However, the percentage of CNES’S budget go- contribution for development (divided between ing to ESA, as opposed to national and bilateral CNES and government communications agen- programs, has dropped in recent years as ESA cies) is estimated at Ffr 980 million; the satellites spending has slowed and a number of bilateral are scheduled for Ariane launch in late 1984 and and national projects have begun to take shape. eariy 1985.36 The total 1981 budget is Ffr 2,617 million, 37.2 The DBS joint effort was an outgrowth of a pre- percent larger than in 1980; national programs, viously described ESA experimental communica- however, are up 107 percent at 344.82 million, tions project, H-Sat, which was initially backed and bilateral expenditures increased by four times by France, West Germany, and Italy. However, to Ffr 487.52 million.33 In 1982, CNES plans to in 1978 France and Germany withdrew because spend 82 percent more on national programs, of concern over the slow pace of H-Sat develop- within an overall budget that will increase by 18 ment. In particular, the two countries wished to percent. compete in the foreseen European and global The CNES budget comes primarily from the market for DBS satellites and groundstations, Ministry of industry and other civilian ministries; which they saw as expanding rapidly in the in 1981 Ffr 192.8 million came from the Ministry 1980’s. An operational system was felt to provide of Defense, while Ffr 596 million came from greater economic opportunities than another ex- CNES’S own resources.34 perimental system. The agreement to develop TDF-l /TV-Sat was signed in 1979.37 In addition Current Applications Programs to allowing it to enter foreign markets, French na- COMMUNICATIONS tional television estimated that direct broadcast would enable it to provide 100 percent coverage France is currently involved in three major sat- of the entire country for less than half the cost ellite communications programs. The first is a of building additional terrestrial relays. longstanding experimental bilateral effort with West Germany called “Symphonic,” the two sat- Another cooperative venture is the SARGOS ellites of which, launched in 1974 and 1975, are project, part of a joint U.S./Canadian program still partially active. Each Symphonic is a geosyn- called SARSAT designed to provide emergency chronous satellite with a capacity of 200 tele- search and rescue for ships and planes. France phone or 2 TV plus 18 telephone channels. Sym- is supplying three SARGOS units to fly on the U.S. phonic 1 and 2 were built by a consortium NOAA E, F and G satellites. SARGOS is an out- (CIFAS) made up of French and German com- growth of another project, ARGOS, for collect- panies and launched by the United States (after Jsworid.w;de Space Activities, p. 161. 3G’’Space Still a Growth Industry in France, ” p. 406. JZWor/d-W;de Space Programs, p. 168. qzsee “The French Space Effort, ” /rrteravia, june 1979, p. 51 O; 33 ’’ Space Still a Growth Industry in France,” /nterav;a, May 1981, also Roberto Grandi and Giuseppe Richeri, “Western Europe: The p. 406. Development of DBS Systems,” Journa/ of Communication, v. 30, 34 ’’ Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981,” CNES, p. 3. spring 1980, p. 176. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space Ž 189

ing and processing meteorological data from The SPOT images are produced by a linear ar- remote platforms, i.e., ballons, buoys, etc. The ray “push-broom” scanner that produces a con- total French contribution in 1981 to both pro- tinuous picture 60 km wide on the ground. The grams was Ffr 24.7 million.38 images are transmitted digitally from the satellite France is also engaged in a major national com- to ground receivers or they can be stored on tape munications satellite program called Telecom 1 recorders for delayed transmission. The central which is being funded by the Direction Generale receiving and control station is located at Toulouse in southern France. Other countries will de Telecommunications, with CNES project lead- be able to build their own stations, subject to ership, for a projected 1983 launch. Telecom 1 will provide domestic telephone and telex serv- agreements directly with CNES; or, data and proc- ices within France as well as between France and essed data products will be purchasable through its overseas territories, including some military Spotimage, a joint government-industry organization being set up to market SPOT services. In traffic. A major use will be in providing internal many respects Spotimage will be similar to the business communications similar to those previously described Arianespace; CNES will hold planned for the U.S. Satellite Business Systems 34 percent of the company’s shares, with the re- Corporation .39 mainder split between various French firms and 40 REMOTE SENSING government agencies. SPOT transmissions are designed to be compatible with the U.S. Land- Since 1978, CNES has been engaged in a na- sat and Landsat-D receiving stations, so that coun- tional program (with some support from Belgium tries that already possess receivers for Landsat will and Sweden) to develop an operational land be able to receive SPOT, with some adaptation, remote-sensing system called SPOT (Systeme Probatoire d’ Observation de la Terre). Through Though each SPOT satellite has a design life the prime contractor, Matra, CNES is designing of only 2 years, the system is planned to operate a two part satellite consisting of a multipurpose for at least 10 years, so that users can count on bus with power-supply and stationkeeping sys- continuity of data for long-term remote-sensing tems, and a sensor payload that can be altered programs. After the initial launch, scheduled for as the system develops. The SPOT satellites will April 1984, additional satellites will be orbited to be placed in Sun-synchronous 832 km orbits de- ensure continuous service. These satellites will signed to provide 26-day repetitive coverage of be financed partly by Spotimage, and partly by the entire Earth. The initial design calls for two CNES through its revenues from foreign receiv- types of coverage: 1 ) multispectral observation ing stations.41 with 20 m resolution, and 2) black and white ob- The basic reasons for France’s decision to build servation with 10 m resolution. (This compares its own remote-sensing system are similar to those with Landsat 3’s multispectral resolution of 80 m, for its other space applications projects. These and Return-Beam-Vidicon of approximately 30 include: 1 ) to encourage national high-technol- m). Both of SPOT’s instruments can be pointed ogy enterprises; 2) to gain independence from by remote control so as to cover any area of in- the U.S. civil remote-sensing system, Landsat, and terest within a path 950 km wide; each individual to demonstrate French equivalence to U.S. and swath is 60 km in width. This pointing capability Soviet capabilities; 3) to reap the economic and makes it possible to provide semistereoscopic im- political benefits of providing global coverage to ages, i.e., successive views of the same area from other countries; and 4) to develop an indigenous different angles, which are particularly useful for remote-sensing capability for military purposes. mapmaking and geological interpretation. It also allows for viewing a particular region more often @“FrenCh Marl@lng services of Spot Satellite Network, ” AWLLST, than once every 26 days; such frequent coverage Jan. 11, 1982, p. 99, is necessary for agricultural purposes. 41see ~~SpoT-Satel[ite.Ba~ Remote Sensing System, ” CNES bro- chure, 1980; jean-Pierre Fouquet, “The SPOT Satellite, ” paper pre- 3a ’’ Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981 ,“ p. 23. sented at 19th Goddard Symposium, Washington, D. C., Mar. 26, 39’’ Space Still a Growth Industry in France, ” p. 406. 1981. 190 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

In line with this last motivation, a military recon- of services, including the provision of baseline naissance version of SPOT, known as SAMRO, data for further processing; processed data prod- is already being evaluated. SAMRO would use ucts for specialized purposes; and aid, advice, the SPOT bus, but with higher resolution optics and equipment for potential customers. As with and secure communications links. Such a satellite Landsat, users can arrange directly with CNES to would give France the ability to monitor military receive, archive, and distribute SPOT data activities around the world on a continuous through national or regional receiving stations. basis. 42 A smoothly functioning corporate entity, especially one heavily backed by the French Govern- The success of SPOT in gaining a large share ment, would provide strong competition to any of the global market will depend on several fac- future U.S. system. tors. First, how advantageous will users view SPOT’s 10 to 20 m resolution, as opposed to A key question will be the prices charged by Landsat-D’s 80 m (MSS) and 30 m (TM)? Some both SPOT and Landsat D-D’. Landsat prices are users, particularly agricultural ones, will find the currently government subsidized and in no way increased resolution helpful, while others may reflect the true costs of developing, constructing, find it unnecessarily precise. One of the often and operating either the ground or space seg- mentioned reasons for SPOT’s high resolution is ments. If Landsat or any equivalent is run by a to make it attractive to European agricultural private firm, the prices for clata would have to observors, since European farms are typically rise to reflect these costs. Spotimage prices, smaller than U.S. or Soviet ones.43 However, though not yet established, will also be substan- some countries may be concerned that SPOT’s tially higher than those paid by today’s users; high resolution will provide foreign users with too however, it is not likely that either the U.S. or much information. Political agreements on re- French governments, having invested heavily to stricting dissemination of SPOT data may be re- build a prestigious remote-sensing system, would quired to avoid opposition from a number of allow the other to substantially undercut its prices states, and Spotimage has announced that it will for equivalent service. To maintain a market share abide by agreed-on international regulations re- of commercial buyers, as well as the political garding data dissemination. gains of supplying data to third world and other countries, each operator will need to keep prices The second and probably most important ques- competitive with the other. Whether these prices tion is the status of competition from other will be heavily subsidized for political and public- remote-sensing systems, particularly the U.S. service reasons, as at present, or come closer to Landsat D and proposed D’ satellites, which are reflecting the true costs of land remote sensing planned to be operating at approximately the remains to be seen; all such decisions will depend same time (see ch. 3). at least as much on political as economic factors, SPOT remains unproven both technically and including possible competition from future Soviet institutionally. However, the commitment to a and Japanese systems. long-term operational status through a private corporation, Spotimage, will help greatly in giving SPOT the credibility it needs to attract cus- MATERIALS PROCESSING tomers. In particular, worries about the continuity French MPS activities, at this time, are modest of the system (which are evident among Landsat in scope, with a budget of approximately $1 mil- users on account of Landsat’s currently unre- lion to $2 million per year. Bilateral materials solved budgetary and institutional problems) processing experimentation agreements are in ef- should be much less than with Landsat. Spot- fect with Germany and the U.S.S.R. A Franco- image plans to provide an across-the-board range Soviet crystal growth and solidification experiment was carried out aboard the Soviet manned 42’’ France Studies Reconnaissance Version of SPOT Spacecraft,” AW&ST, Aug. 10, 1981. laboratory, Salyut-6, and future cooperative MPS qJSee “The French Space Effort, ” /nteravia, June 1979, P. 508. research is anticipated. In addition, French ex- Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 191 periments on crystal growth and the dynamics FOREIGN COOPERATION/COMPETITION of metal alloy solidification are planned for Aside from ESA, France has major bilateral co- Spacelab 1 and 3. operative programs with West Germany, the In general, the French effort is smaller and more Soviet Union, and the United States; it is the only research directed than German activities. CNES country besides India to deal extensively with has funded a major study, however, on an am- both the major space powers. In 1981, France bitious program called “Solaris,” an unmanned budgeted Ffr 379.8 million for German projects, orbital space station which would be able to con- almost all for joint TDF-1 /TV-Sat development. duct MPS experiments and could be made avail- Thirty-seven million francs were spent with the able during the 1990’s. Solaris would be orbited United States, largely for the ARGOS/ by an Ariane-4 launcher, operating for a lifetime SARGOS project described above, and for up- of up to 15 years. Among its many purposes, the coming experiments on Spacelab. Solaris could serve as an automated orbital ma- Of the 56 million francs earmarked for projects terials processing station, handling up to 2 tons with the Soviet Union, none are for applications of materials in its furnaces. Feedstock would be projects per se.45 However, the fact and extent transported to the station by Ariane-launched un- of cooperative projects are politically significant manned spacecraft. Modules containing proc- in themselves. Furthermore, in light of the his- essed materials would be returned to Earth from torical problems with U.S. commitments, it is Solaris via unpowered reentry vehicles. The proj- clear that the French see access to Soviet launch- ect is still in the conceptual stage and no cost ers and facilities as a potential hedge against U.S. figures are currently available. It is conceivable delays and vacillation. The most visible of upcom- that Solaris might be accepted as a major proj- ing France-Soviet ventures will be the scheduled ect for ESA during the 1980’s, thereby spreading 1982 visit of a French astronaut to the Soviet’s the costs and stimulating MPS research activities Salyut 7 (or a reactivated Salyut 6) space station. in a number of member countries not presently Two French candidates have been training in the pursuing such investigation. Solaris not only Soviet Union since September 1980.% The Soviets represents a major potential French initiative have made a practice of launching non-Soviets utilizing the Ariane launcher, but is a direct for brief orbital stays; to date, however, all such challenge to the U. S./ESA and Soviet manned lab- visitors have been from “fraternal Socialist coun- oratories (Spacelab and Salyut, respectively) tries,” and the flight of an astronaut from a major which currently plan materials-processing ac- Western power can be expected to provide the tivities. CNES plans to study manned facilities Soviets with a great deal of favorable publicity. before deciding on a space-station concept. The French national space program, working LAUNCHERS closely with French industry, will be a major source of commercial competition for the United The Ariane and its future development have States in the 1980’s. French competitiveness is been discussed previously. Among additional result of several factors: possibilities mention should be made of the Hermes manned reusable shuttle, a proposed technically advanced programs in commer- 22,000-lb, 5-man vehicle that might be launched cial areas such as DBS, land remote sensing, by the advanced Ariane V. Though only in a very and launch vehicles; preliminary design stage, the Hermes plan shows establishment of institutions (Arianespace, that the French have by no means resigned them- Spotimage) to market systems aggressively selves to a completely unmanned role in future on a global basis; space activities .44

44’’The French Space Effort,” /nteravia, June 1979, pp. 508-509; 4s’’Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981 ,“ CNES, p. 23. 46~~French Cosmonauts Mission With sOVklS,” “Solaris: France Proposes Large Unmanned Space-Processing Plat- Training for form,” /nteravia, May 1981, p. 822. AW&ST, Dec. 21, 1981, pp. 55-56) 192 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

close government-industry collaboration as coordination through the Research Ministry. De- an accepted feature of French commercial spite—or perhaps on account of—the extensive practice; German experience acquired during World War long-standing government commitment to II, there have been no attempts to produce a Ger- building space capabilities on a par with the man launcher, although Germany has been a United States and Soviet Union; and major contributor to Ariane. Instead, Germany support received through agreements with has launched numerous orbital and suborbital ESA and bilateral partners. payloads on U. S., French, Swedish, and British rockets. The first German scientific satellite, called West Germany Azur, was launched by the United States in No- vember 1969. The bulk of West Germany’s space efforts are conducted in association with ESA or bilaterally Applications Programs with other countries. Germany is one of ESA’S major supporters, supplying almost one-fourth of Almost all of Germany’s efforts in communica- its annual budget. The Ministry for Research and tions and remote sensing are being conducted Technology (BMFT) coordinates and funds most through ESA or bilateral projects with France, German R&D efforts; projects are managed by described previously. In 1981, West Germany will the German Research and Test Establishment for provide the largest single share of ESA’S expend- Aeronautics and Space Flight (DFVLR), which itures for Meteosat, OTS, ECS, and Spacelab.Ag manages Government engineering and test In addition to communications, Germany’s centers, and by the German Research Associa- strongest emphasis has been placed on materials tion (DFG), a self-governing organization that science and processing. Since the German firm allocates funds from various public and private ERNO (a subsidiary of VFW-Fokker) is the prime sources to universities and scientific societies.45 contractor for Spacelab, and Germany is the Space-related expenditures in fiscal 1981 major financial contributor (64.78 percent in amounted to $371 million, of which $82 million 1981 ), German interest in Spacelab exploitation went to DFVLR. Total funding from 1978 to 1982 has been high. In addition, chemicals and mate- is projected to be $1.7 billion .48 rials processing have traditionally been areas of Germany’s major aerospace firms also play a German technical and industrial leadership. The Ministry of Science and Technology provided ap- key role in initiating and funding research proj- proximately $57 million for MPS work from 1978 ects; these include Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) and VFW-Fokker, which recently merged, to 1980 and is authorized to spend $50 million more between 1982 to 1985. Additional funds are and several large electronics firms such as Siemens and AEG-Telefunken. available from non-Federal sources. so Unlike France, Germany has never aimed at The German MPS program is intended to meet achieving an across-the-board set of space the as yet largely undefined needs of the user capabilities, but rather at encouraging an in- community. The ultimate goal of Government digenous aerospace industry, promoting poten- support is substantial involvement of German in- tially valuable scientific and industrial research, dustry in such areas as chemistry, process tech- and supporting European efforts in various ap- nology, metals, composite materials, and plications areas. Compared with France there has crystals .51 been greater emphasis on industrial and univer- Early West German experiments were carried sity initiatives and participation, with Government on the 1975 Apollo/Soyuz manned mission. A

47’’ Review of National and Co-operative International Space Ac- 49Europe’s Place in Space, ESA, January 1981, P. 9. tivities for the Calendar Year 1980,” UNCOPUOS, A/AC.105/286/ ‘“’’ Foreign Materials Expenditures, ” p. 2. Add. 1, Feb. 19, 1981, pp. 34-35. SICommercja/jzation of Materials Processing and Manufacturing 4“Foreign Materials Processing Expenditures,” internal NASA staff in Space, position paper prepared for OTA by TRW, Inc., Apr. 14, paper, May 1, 1981, p. 1. 1981, p. 25. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 193

variety of methods are now being followed, using A wholly German Spacelab mission, the suborbital sounding rockets, small self-contained D-1, is now scheduled for September 1984. payload packages (so-called “Getaway Specials”) The D-1 will carry the Biorack for investiga- attached to the space shuttle, and full-scale tions of cell and molecular biology, and an Spacelab missions. Future flight opportunities advanced fluid physics module. These will using “free-flying” automatic experimental units perform a mixture of open experiments, for for longer periods of time than can be attained which data will be freely disseminated, plus with the present shuttle/spacelab system are also a number of closed experiments with poten- being examined. Primary elements of the Ger- tial commercial benefit. For these latter, Ger- man MPS Program are:52 many has proposed to pay a pro rata share of the normal Spacelab users’ fee; the exact ● TEXUS (technological experiments under financial arrangements have not been con- microgravity): Using British-built Skylark cluded. Prime objectives for the mission are sounding rockets, certain experiments are experiments in the fields of metals, mono- being flight tested in advance of future crystals and materials for electronic applica- Spacelab missions. Five TEXUS flights have tions, boundary layer and transport phenom- been accomplished since 1977, and two ena problems, and physical chemistry and launches per year are planned starting in processing. 1981. TEXUS flight results to date indicate this approach is scientifically and technolog- The German program stresses involvement ically useful. West German experiments with the industrial sector in addition to purely have also flown on U. S. SPAR sounding scientific exploration. The Ministry of Science and rockets. Technology is working closely with both MAN, ● MAUS (materials science autonomous ex- Inc., and Volkswagen. The work at MAN involves periments under zero-G conditions) pro- “skin technology”; this is a process by which gram: Instruments partially based on TEXUS complex refractory metal alloys used for turbine program findings are to be carried in 25 Ger- blades can be melted and resolidified in space man-purchased getaway special canisters. with an oxide skin, which is a plasma sprayed These autonomous packages provide ex- on the surface of the container. New immiscible periments with much longer microgravity metal alloys for potential use as bearing materials duration than attainable with sounding are of interest to Volkswagen. sq rockets. Although the German Government has not ● Spacelab: Germany is supporting major ex- supported any launcher-related programs, aside periments on Spacelab, including a materials from Ariane, mention should be made of a private processing laboratory to be flown on Space- German firm called OTRAG (Orbital Transport- Iab 1 in mid-1983. Materials science ex- und-Raketen Aktiengesellschaft), which has spent periments will be conducted in the materials $65 miliion to $70 million since 1974 trying to science double rack, a largely German con- develop a mass-produced expendable rocket for tribution to the first Spacelab mission. The inexpensive satellite launches. To date, OTRAG facilities include the following: 1) high- has claimed four successful test flights and until temperature thermostat, 2) mirror heating recently planned to launch its first orbital flight facility, 3) isothermal heating facility, in 1982.54 OTRAG hopes to attract private firms 4) capillarity measurement equipment, and third world countries by providing relative- 5) cryostat, 6) fluid physics module, 7) gra- ly simple services at prices that Ariane and, the dient heating facility, 8) UHV chamber, and space shuttle cannot match. The rockets would 9) common support equipment. use off-the-shelf components and an extremely cheap fuel made of diesel oil and nitric acid.

‘*See G. Greger, “Science and Technology of the German MPS S3TRW paper, op. cit, pp. 25-26. Missions, ” paper presented at 1980 AAS Annual meeting, Boston, 54’’ German Company Testing Launch Vehicle in Libya,” AlW&ST, Mass., Oct. 20-23, 1980. Mar. 23, 1981, p. 25. ——...... —.—

194 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The political controversy surrounding OTRAG nent and subsystem contracts on INTELSAT and has been intense, largely as a result of the loca- other communications satellites. The Research tion of its test facilities. Until 1979, OTRAG Ministry is particularly interested in expanding operated out of a 39,000 mi2 area in Zaire, where German capabilities in this area.58 The experience it had agreed to pay the Mobutu government $50 gained in ESA communications projects and par- million per year or 10 percent of gross revenues, ticularly through joint TV-Sat development with whichever was greater, once commercial opera- France will give German industries the ability to tions commenced.55 However there were numer- compete for complete systems in the emerging ous protests, not only from Zaire’s neighbors, DBS market. who feared the rockets might have military uses, but also from the Soviet Union, which was in- Great Britain tensely concerned at any evidence of German development of an independent launch capabil- During the 1970’s British civilian space spend- ity. The German Government was embarrassed ing has been done almost exclusively as part of and tried various means to put OTRAG out of ESA projects. (For a brief description of early business, including passage in 1978 of the so- British space activities, see app. G). Even within called “Lex OTRAG” prohibiting the export of ESA, Great Britain has chosen to concentrate on OTRAG rockets or components. Eventually in- communications and general science, and has ternational pressure forced Zaire to expel contributed relatively little to ESA’S two largest OTRAG; however, the company soon relocated projects, Spacelab and Ariane. British choosiness its test facilities in Libya, partly, according to has been a function in part of budget restrictions OTRAG president Frank Wukasch, because caused by generally poor economic performance Libya’s ruler Muammar Qaddafi “cannot be compared with its continental partners, and to blackmailed” into expelling the company. 56 a fundamental historical uncertainty as to wheth- OTRAG’S presence in Libya reinforced fears that er to opt for close ties with the United States, with its missiles might be used for military purposes, Europe, or with the Commonwealth, Largely be- perhaps against Israel. Recently, it was reported cause of its traditionally close relationship with that OTRAG had withdrawn from Libya and the United States, Britain has not favored devel- would seek new facilities, perhaps in India or opment of a European launcher, whether the South America. 57 Europa or Ariane, considering it uncompetitive and unnecessary. With a strong university re- COOPERATION/COMPETITION WITH THE search base and relatively weak industries, Brit- UNITED STATES ain has preferred to concentrate on basic science The German attitude towards cooperative ven- and on a few areas, especially communications, tures with the United States has generally been in which British firms such as Marconi and British more positive than the French, as shown by Ger- Aerospace could hope to become international- man willingness to take the lead in building ly competitive. In general, the above constraints Spacelab. A large number of cooperative space have made the formulation and implementation science projects are also underway. Cooperation of any coherent space policy very difficult. There with the Soviet Union has been negligible for is little public or political consensus as to Britain’s political reasons. proper role in space activities, and the major political parties often fail to follow through on in- Though there are few major areas where Ger- itiatives begun by their predecessors. A Sep- man projects will directly compete with the tember 1980 memorandum by the British Royal United States, German aerospace and electronics Society, which proposed establishing a National firms have been strong competitors for compo- Council for Space, pointed out that: “The present U.K. efforts in space science and technology 55A w&sT, Sept. 12, 1977, p. 42. are fragmented and there is a serious lack of 5bBradley Graham, “Rocket Firm’s Third World Ties Test Bonn’s Patience,” Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1981, p. 17. 57’’Otrag Ends Libyan Launch Work,” A W&ST, December 1981. Se’’West German Space Program, ” /nteravia, April 1980, p. 312. Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 195 cohesion to such an extent that there appears to tion of a company called Satellite Broadcasting be no overall domestic space policy.”59 Co., Ltd., to provide common carrier DBS services. Two satellites plus a ground spare would be Organization and Funding required at an estimated cost of L100 million; Government responsibility for space has been services would be leased to British broadcasters split between several organizations. The Depart- such as the BBC and Granada television. ment of Trade and industry has funded civilian Another possible venture would involve BAe programs, while the Space Research Council, part and IBM in a business communications service, of the Department of Education and Science, has similar to the newly created U.S. Satellite Business supported scientific projects, including cooper- Systems, of which IBM is a major partner. It is ative ventures with ESRO and NASA. The Post not clear whether such a plan could succeed Office (now British Telecom) has operated com- within Britain alone, and expansion into the Euro- munications networks including INTELSAT re- pean market, with the attendant difficulties of ceiving stations. operating across national boundaries, may be 64 In 1972, the total budget was $55.1 million, of envision ed. which $15.5 million went to ELDO and ESRO. In a somewhat different field, BAe and Marconi By 1976, the budget had risen to $80,2 million, 60 have joined forces, after pressure from the all of which was spent within ESA. In 1981, Defense Ministry, to build the British Ministry of Great Britain was ESA’S third-largest contributor Defence’s proposed communications satellite, with 14.88 percent of the total budget, amount- Skynet IV/Satcom. Although both BAe and Mar- ing to $125.6 million, and was the majority con- coni had initially sought out U.S. industrial tributor to the Marecs ocean communication sat- 61 cooperation, an all-British program was deemed ellite program. Present plans call for a substan- preferable. Launch is estimated to be in early tial increase in space spending, with emphasis on 1985. 65 British Telecom (formerly the Post Office) 62 nationally funded communications satellites. is planning its own Europeanwide business satellite system which will make use of nine trans- Current Applications Programs ponders; two each placed on all four ECSs, and The area in which the British have been most one leased from France’s Telecom 1. The eight active over the past several years is communica- ECS transponders will cost approximately $150 tions satellites. Within ESA, British Aerospace million. Users will purchase ground stations that (BAe) has been the consortium leader for the will provide access to any point in Europe; the system will be operated through an agreement OTS, ECS, and Marecs systems, and Britain was 66 the prime mover behind ESA’S decision to devel- with Interim Eutelsat. op the experimental L-Sat multipurpose commu- it is clear that British industry is eager to move nications platform. In addition, there has been into the potentially lucrative areas of DBS and considerable activity by British agencies and satellite business communications, if necessary private firms, spurred by the Thatcher govern- in conjunction with foreign partners who can pro- ment’s recent decision to open up private com- vide financial and/or marketing support. A major petition in telecommunications by removing question remains as to whether European opera- British Telecom’s monopoly over network oper- 63 tions will be possible given prospective competi- ations. I n June 1981, BAe announced formation from Eurosatellite (the manufacturer of sqsP~ce~l;g~~, BritiSh ! nterplanetary Society, Feb. 2, 1981 t P. 33; TDF-l /TV-Sat) backed by national PTTs. In addi- see also Johnny Hawkes (former Director of space Dept. Of in- tion there are numerous regulatory pitfalls, as well dustry), “Britain in Space: Time to Consolidate, ” New Scientist, Jan. 14, 1982. b~world-wide space Activities, P. 222. b4’’BAe Aiming To Become Major Satellite Operator?” /ntera via, August 1981, pp. 754-755. 61E”~ope’s place in space, ESA, Paris, January 1981 t P 9. bS’!Sky net IV-NOVV an AJ1-British Military Satcom s)@f21Tl,” /fl- 62peter Marsh, “Britain Plans Big Boost for Space Budget, ” New teravia, September 1981, p. 859. Scientist, Feb. 23, 1982. bK’’Satellite Business Communication Comes to Britai n,” 63 Peter Marsh, “communications in the 1980’s—Satellites or Fibre F/ight /nternationa/, Feb. 7, 1981, p. 342. Optics?” New Scientist, July 23, 1981. 196 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications as possible challenges from INTELSAT, if the new Compagnia Nazionale Satelliti di Telecomunica- services threaten to take business away from the zioni is prime contractor on the project. Intelsat system.67 It is still early enough in the evolution of satellite systems for any number of Unlike all other European states except Por- developments to occur, including joint ventures tugal, Italy’s participation in INTELSAT is done between British and European companies. BAe through a private firm, Telespazio, rather than a recently formed a partnership with the French national PTT. Since 1976, Telespazio has also op- firm Matra, called Satcom International, to bid erated a Landsat receiving station at Fucino. on satellite hardware, and similar agreements The Italian space program has suffered from may be made for services. lack of central coordination and public support, as well as the strains of Italy’s turbulent economic and political situation. Space activities have been Italy coordinated and funded by the National Re- Italy has been a consistent supporter of Euro- search Council (CNR), which began to fund pean space activities and in 1981 contributed space-related activities in 1960. Other ministries 9.94 percent of ESA’S budget, or around $82.9 and agencies, such as the Post Office and the million. Italy has not taken the lead in any major Defense Ministry, also play a role. In 1972, Italy applications projects, but has chosen to support spent $19.4 million on space, $9.8 million of which went to ELDO and ESRO; in 1976 this had a variety of programs that would provide Italy’s 68 aerospace and electronics industries with con- risen to $60.5 million, almost all in ESA. Recent- tracts for advanced technologies. Difficulties in ly, the government approved a plan to double meeting its financial obligations to the Spacelab Italy’s space expenditures over the next 2 years; program in the face of large cost overruns led Italy most of the increase will go to fund national pro- to reduce its contribution from 18 percent of grams. These may include a national communica- Spacelab funding in 1979 to 1 percent in 1981. tions satellite (Italsat) and a television DBS system, The recent decision to use Italy’s Sirio 2 com- as well as several cooperative ventures with munications satellite for ESA communications has NASA: IRIS, a small booster for the shuttle given Italy the lead role in that project. payload bay; and the so-called “tethered satellite,” which is designed to be attached to the Aside from its European multilateral contribu- shuttle in orbit by a long umbilical cord.69 Italy tions, Italy has maintained a small national pro- has been a strong supporter of ESA’S experimental gram centered around its unique off-shore launch L-Sat communications platform, and will use one platform, located on the Equator off the shore of of the first satellite’s 2 TV-channels for direct Kenya in the Indian Ocean. The San Marcos plat- television broadcasting. form has been the site of numerous small satellite and sounding rocket launches, mostly by U.S. Recently the Italian Defense Ministry has pro- rockets but including British and European ones posed a domestic military communications sys- as well, which have taken advantage of its equa- tem, SICRAL, for secure voice and data transmis- torial position for experimental flights. The first sion and for use in civil emergencies. The satellite Italian satellite, San Marcos 1, was launched by hardware will be designed and manufactured by Italian firms for eventual launch on either the a U.S. Scout in 1964; subsequent San Marcos 70 series satellites were launched from the San Mar shuttle or Ariane. cos platform, also by Scout. Other European Programs In 1977, Italy orbited an experimental geostationary communications satellite, Sirio 1, on a The space efforts of other countries in Europe U.S. Thor-Delta. The ground spare for that proj- have taken place almost entirely within the Euro- ect, Sirio 2, will be launched in April 1982 by ESA G8Wor/d. Wide Space Activities, p. 176. to disseminate meteorological data; the Italian Ggpeter Marsh, “Italy Joins the New European Space Race, ” New Scientist, Apr. 1, 1982. 70Andrea Lorenzoni, “SICRAL: A Proposed Italian Defence Sat- ‘7’’Communications in the 1980’ s,” New Scientist, July 23, 1981. ellite System,” /nteravia, August 1981, p, 793. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 197 pean agencies, ESRO, ElDO, and now ESA. A few a variety of experimental communications activ- non-ESA projects, however, deserve mention, ities .72 particularly the proposed Nordsat regional com- Another potentially interesting development is munications system to provide television and Compagnie Luxembourgeosie de Telediffusion’s radio broadcasting between Sweden, Norway, (CLT) plan to provide multinational direct televi- Denmark, and Finland. Under discussion since sion programing via satellite by 1985. The com- 1972, the system is designed to promote Scan- pany’s potential difficulties illustrate the problems dinavian cultural unity–the details, which have faced when operating across European bound- been understandably difficult to arrange consider- aries. CLT is Europe’s largest commercial (i. e., ing the many countries involved, are not as yet 71 nongovernment) broadcaster, covering large por- determined. In connection with this proposal, tions of France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden is developing a satellite, known as Vik- and the Netherlands. Since it is in direct coming, for 1984 Ariane launch; it will investigate petition with national broadcasters, foreign magnetospheric conditions preparatory to a pos- governments, particularly Germany, have op- sible communications satellite program. Saab- posed ClT’s expansion plans, in part by trying Scania is building the payload, while Boeing pro- to discourage investment in CLT stock. CLT is provides the satellite bus; Viking will provide Sweden posing a three-channel $250-million satellite that with crucial experience in satellite communica- could broadcast simultaneously in French, Ger- tions operation, and will also further the Swedish man, and Dutch, reaching a potential 100 million goal of encouraging an indigenous commercial viewers. Launch reservations have already been space systems industry. Studies have also been made on both Ariane and the Shuttle.73 done for a second Swedish satellite, Tele-X, for

72’’ Sweden Moves Ahead on Research Satellite,” A W&ST, Sept. 71see R, Grandj, and G. Richeri, “Western Europe: The Develop- 1, 1980, p. 49. ment of DBS Systems, ” )ourna/ of Communication, spring 1980, 73’’The No. 1 Broadcaster Fights Back From Space, ” Business pp. 175-176. Week, May 4, 1981, pp. 66-67.

Organization and Policy responsible today for Japan’s scientific programs. Beginning in the late ]9s0’s and through the Japanese interest in space science and tech- 1960’s ISAS developed the Kappa and Lambda nology began in the mid-l 950’s, when mukilat- series of solid-fuel sounding rockets, which eral planning was underway for the International formed the basis for Japanese scientific and ap- Geophysical Year (1957). Alone among the major plications experiments. The difficulties of rocket space-capable countries, Japan’s space efforts development were enhanced by inadequate were not initially prompted by military concerns. guidance and stabilization technology, which was The postwar Japanese constitution specifically in turn due partly to a self-imposed reluctance prohibited the buildup of large military forces, to fund technologies that might give the rockets and public opinion has been consistently op- enough accuracy to be perceived as having mil- posed to any signs of militarism and to large ex- itary capability.TA ISAS went on to develop orbital penditures for military purposes. Because of the rockets; the first successful 24-kg test satellite was worldwide association of space programs with launched by an advanced Lambda, after several military capabilities, Japan carefully placed its first years of failure, in February 1970. The Mu-class space establishment at the University of Tokyo, orbital launcher achieved its first success in 1971 the country’s foremost educational institution. and has been operated by ISAS since then from The Institute of Space and Aeronautical Sciences its Kagosh ima test range. (ISAS) was founded in 1954, and (though it recently became an independent institute) is still TAworjd.wide Space Activ/t/es, p. 185. ————. -—. ..—

198 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

In 1960, the National Space Activities Commis- sive space program, although it is not necessary sion (NSAC, later SAC) was established in the to produce everything domestically."78 Active in- Prime Minister’s office to give advice on Japan’s ternational cooperation and peaceful develop- overall space program. It operates today as a ment were emphasized as guiding principles, major source of high-level planning, along with the Science and Technology Agency (STA). In Current and Projected 1964, the STA created the National Space De- Applications Programs79 velopment Center to conduct rocket tests; this was due in part to dissatisfaction with ISAS’S pure- Communications ly scientific orientation. In 1969, this became the In December 1977, the Japanese orbited an ex- National Space Development Agency (NASDA), perimental geostationary communications sat- which is today the principal agency for civilian ellite, the CS-Sakura, aboard a U.S. Delta rocket. applications and test programs, launcher devel- 75 The Sakura has been used by the Radio Research opment, and tracking facilities. NASDA operates Labs of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica- the Tsukuba Space Center near Tokyo, Japan’s tions for experiments in 30/20 GHz propagation main satellite test facility, as well as the (the first country in the world to do so), and to Tanegashima launch site, located on an island in gain experience in the control and operation of the south of Japan. communications satellites. An operational system Other space-related activities are conducted by consisting of two satellites, the CS-2a and CS-2b, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in is planned for launch in early and mid-l983, re- satellite communications, and the Transport Min- spectively (CS-2b will be an orbital spare); the istry, which operates the weather service, in me- recently developed N-11 launch vehicle will be teorological satellites. A private firm, Kokusai used. The satellites themselves were built by a Denshin Denwa Ltd., is responsible for relations group led by Mitsubishi Electric and Ford Aero- with INTELSAT. NASDA cooperates with other space.80 The operational system will provide ministries and agencies in the research and design emergency communications as well as links with of applications programs, as well as conducting remote islands; the signals will be receivable by launches (see fig. 12). small transportable Earth stations in either K or C band, and will represent the first operational The Japanese budget for space research was 76 use of 30/20 GHz technology, The satellites will very small, though growing, through the 1960’s. be managed by the Telecommunications Satellite With the establishment of NASDA annual funding Corp. of Japan, established in 1979. has increased rapidly, from a total of $23.5 million in 1968 to almost $477 million in 1981. Of this A parallel program in direct television broad- the bulk, almost 80 percent, goes to NASDA, with casting is also being conductecl, with the BSE-Yuri the remainder split between ISAS and other gov- satellite launched in April 1978 by a U.S. Delta ernment programs (see fig. 1 3). for geostationary experiments in audiovisual transmission. The operational system, with two The budget is drawn up by the SAC on a year- satellites, BS-2a and BS-2b, is planned for N-11 ly basis. In addition, the SAC prepares long-range launch in early 1984 and mid-1985. The Ministry comprehensive plans. The latest 15-year proof Posts and Telecommunications has funded the posal, drawn up in 1978, calls for a total 15-year system, which will enable it to transmit images expenditure of$14 billion to fund an across-the- to mountainous and outlying areas. al board program in space science, applications, and launch-vehicle development. ” The SAC zsMaSaO yoshiki, Acting Chairman, SAC, “Japan’s Space pro- stressed that “Japan should develop the necessary gram, ” paper delivered at International Aerospace Symposium, technical capabilities to carry out her comprehen- Paris, France, June 2-3, 1981, pp. 1-2. ——— ~lnformation in this section, unless otherwise noted, is taken from Tssee world-wide space Programs, p. 186; also NASDA 80-81, NASDA 80-81, NASDA 1980. National Space Development Agency of Japan, pp. 3-4. “’Japan Gaining Maturity in Satellite Technology,” A W&ST, Mar. Tbsee Wor/d-W;de space Activities, p. 204. 3, 1980, p, 92. 77’’Japanese Commission Proposes Ambitious 15-Year Space 8’ “Japanese Gain Capabilities in Advanced”Space Effort,” A W&ST, Plan,” AW&ST, Mar. 27, 1978, p. 23. Mar. 9, 1981, p. 109. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 199

Figure 12.—Schematic Chart of National Organization for Space Activities

r Space Activities Commission Prime Minister’s Office I

L 1 HNational Police Agency I

i I Ministry of Foreign Affairs i

\ .-i.&&~ { I ..+ - Ministry of Education . . I Ministry of Agriculture, 8 - Fisheries Agency Forestry and Fisheries

f Agency of Industrial - Ministry of International I Mechanical Engineering Trade and Industry Science and Technology Laboratory + o 9 I

Japan Meteorological -1 1 Meteorological Satellite Center Agency I

Ministry of Construction Geographical Survey Institute I I I ? ? Ministry of Home Affairs Fire Defense Agency ,

Keidanren Space Activities (Federation of k 1 I 1 Member Companies and Economic Organizations) Promotion Council Trade Associations

SOURCE Nat,ional Space Development Agency of Japan 200 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Figure 13.—Japanese Budget for Space Activitiesa

Unit: + 100 million Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ln- YI “48.0 n stitute of Space and Aeronautical Science, University: of Tokyo, until FY1980) m ;153.5 n National Space Development Agency of Japan (NAS DA)

959.6 * z

1020.1 a 1050.0 d. .:: ““

NOTES: 1. The upper figure in each fiscal year shows the total budget for space actwlties, 2. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage (o/o) as against the total budget for each fiscal year

a“Space in Japan 1981 -1982,” Keldanren, Tokyo, 1981, p. 4 (One dollar = approximately 225 yen, 100 million yen = 444,444 dollars at January 1982 exchange rate,) SOURCE National Space Agency of Japan

The impetus toward operational development achieve geostationary orbit when launched in of these systems has come from a desire to 1979 and 1980 by the Japanese N-1 rocket. The develop expertise in the design and operation of first failure was due to a collision with the third communications satellites for commercial/in- stage motor after separation, the second to an ap- dustrial exploitation. Satellite broadcasting is par- parent misfiring of the apogee engine. The reper- ticularly useful for communicating within Japan’s cussions from these consecutive mishaps, which mountainous and far-flung territory, which in- cost the Japanese an estimated $100 million, have cludes many small islands. They were preceded been great; not only was the chairman of NASDA by extensive ground-based R&D during the forced to resign83 but, more importantly, the 1960’s, including cooperative experiments with Japanese were moved to accelerate their efforts NASA on signals propagation, and the assump- to achieve independence from the United States tion of control over NASA’s advanced experimen- in space capabilities. Both failures were traced tal communication satellite, ATS-1, in 1974.82 to probable malfunctions of U.S.-supplied equipment. Though in the past the Japanese have relied In connection with Japan’s communications heavily on the United States, dissatisfaction with program mention should be made of a failed ex- U.S. technology can only mean fewer contracts perimental program, the Ayame and Ayame 2 sat- for U.S. firms and more emphasis on indigenous ellites. Designed to further test satellite control and communications facilities, both failed to > 83’’Tw0 Mission Failures Force Space Official’s Resignation, ” BIWor/d. w/jde Space Activities, p. 200. AW&ST, june 3, 1980, p. 26. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 201 development and/or deals with European com- lowing ground stations to bounce lasers off it for panics.84 measurement purposes. In the area of ground stations for communica- The most ambitious current program is the tions satellites, Japanese firms have long been Maritime Observation Satellite, MOS-1, which leaders in the manufacture and sale of INTELSAT will be Japan’s first satellite to provide continuous compatible stations and subsystems to develop- global Earth observation. It is designed to observe ing countries. Both Mitsubishi and Nippon Elec- ocean surface phenomena and will include visi- tric have made extensive sales abroad; in addi- ble, infrared, and microwave scanning radio- tion, Japanese firms have obtained subcontracts meters. The primary sensor will be the multi- from Hughes and other U.S. companies for work spectral self-scanning radiometer, a charge- on INTELSAT payloads. coupled device (CCD) providing 50-m resolution imagery. Hence MOS will provide operational ex- Remote Sensing perience with land remote-sensing data collec- Japan has the world’s largest fishing fleet and tion and data-processing, comparable to Land- depends on the oceans not only for food, but for sat and Spot. It is currently scheduled for an N-11 the transportation of vital raw materials and ex- launch in August or September 1986. ports, to a greater extent than any other devel- A proposed follow-onto MOS is the Earth Re- oped country. In addition, Japan is a frequent vic- sources Survey Satellite, ERS-1, a 2,700-lb remote- tim of typhoons formed in the Central Pacific, sensing spacecraft currently in preliminary design. where meteorological facilities are poor and thin- ERS-1 would be launched in 1988 aboard the new ly scattered. Hence there is a special interest in large-capacity H-1A launcher. Possible instru- the development of ocean-monitoring satellites, mentation includes synthetic aperture radar, both for weather prediction and for exploitation stereo camera, and visible infrared measurement of ocean-based resources. systems.86 The ERS-1 would eliminate Japanese Many of the early sounding rockets were used dependence on outside systems such as Land- for meteorological experiments. The first ded- sat and SPOT, and could be used to further the icated Geostationary Meteorological Satellite, search for foreign sources of energy and other GMS-Himawari, was launched in July 1977 by a raw materials. In addition, it would allow Japan U.S. Delta. Still in operation, it has provided the to compete with these systems for the sale of Japan Meteorological Agency with cloud-images remote-sensing data and data products. B’ for public dissemination, along with infrared temperature information, and has disseminated Materials Processing data to other countries in the region. Himawari Japan is cultivating an on-going MPS program was also Japan’s contribution to the World Me- as an element of its 15-year space development teorological Organization’s Global Atmospheric policy. MPS work in developing alloys, com- Research Program (GARP). A second satellite, pound materials, electronic materials, and med- GMS-2, was launched in August 1981 on an N-l! icines, as well as the life sciences, is going for- vehicle; it was developed by a group led by ward with experiments on both the U.S. Space Nihon Electric and Hughes Aerospace.85 The Shuttle and the TT-500-A, a Japanese suborbital GMS-3 is scheduled for launch in the summer of rocket: 1984. ● TT-500-A; This small two-stage suborbital Under development is a geodetic survey sat- rocket with recoverable payload sections ellite, GS-1, for a possible launch in 1985. The provides approximately 7 minutes of micro- GS-1 will be designed to be highly reflective, al- gravity (under 1o-4 G), comparable to the U.S. SPAR and German TEXUS. NASDA has

“’japanese Gain Capabilities in Advanced Space Effort,” AW&ST, Mar. 9, 1981, p. 108. sG’’japanese Gain Capabilities, ” p. 107. as’’japan Gaining Maturity in Satellite Technology,” p. 92. 87’’japan Gaining Maturity,” p. 92. ——— ——

202 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

established a space experiment schedule for Delta technology, subject to an agreement not the IT-500-A of two flights per year. An early to transfer it to any third party. The first flight of 1981 launch carried a metallic compound the new N-1 launcher took place in September processing experiment, while an August 1975, when an 85-kg test satellite, Kiku ETS-1, was flight evaluated semiconductor processing placed in a 1,000-km circular orbit. Basically the techniques. N-1 consists of a Thor first stage, built under ● Space Shuttle: NASDA anticipates funding license in Japan by Mitsubishi Industries; a annual missions with Spacelab, inaugurating Japanese developed liquid-fuel second stage; and its use with a first material processing test a U.S. Thiokol third stage. In all, approximately (FMPT) in fiscal year 1985. The FMPT will 67 percent of the N-1 is supplied by Japanese make use of half or one-third of the available firms. The N-1 can lift 130 kg into geostationary space in the shuttle-carried Spacelab. A orbit; in February 1977, it launched Japan’s first Japanese payload specialist will join shuttle geostationary satellite, making Japan the third crews to conduct the FMPT and later shuttle- country in the world, after the United States and based experiments.88 Soviet Union, to do so. Though the Japanese hope for major potential An uprated version, the N-11, had its first suc- gains from MPS investments, they do not expect cessful test flight in February 1981. The N-ii can them in the near future. MPS experimentation is carry 350 kg, or over twice the N-l’s payload, to seen as a way of insuring a competitive position geosynchronous orbit. Mitsubishi Industries is the 10 or 15 years from now. prime contractor; the major differences from the N-1 are the use of additional solid-fuel strap-on Launch Vehicles boosters and the replacement of the Japanese-de- The Japanese have not had an easy time designed second stage by an improved version of veloping their own launch vehicles. During the the U.S. Aerojet second stage used on the Delta. As a result the Japanese contribution to the N-11 1960’s, ISAS was responsible for designing an 89 orbital launcher; after several years of failure a is only 56 percent, less than for the N-1. The N-11 Lambda sounding rocket was able, with the ad- will replace the N-1 by 1983 and is planned for dition of a fourth stage, to launch Japan’s first use through the mid-l 980’s. satellite in 1970. The Mu series of solid-fuel For the latter 1980’s and 1990’s a new booster rockets was more successful, and the first orbit design, the H-1A, is under development. The was achieved in 1971. The Mu launchers have major innovation is a planned liquid oxygen/ been improved with radio guidance and are used liquid hydrogen second stage, to be built by Mit- by ISAS for scientific flights. Nissan Motors is cur- subishi. The initial version of the H-1A will be able rently designing an advanced version, the to place 550 kg into geosynchronous orbit; a pro- M-3-kai-l, which will be used for Japan’s 1st posed follow-on version would be able to launch planetary exploration flights in the mid-1980’s, 800 kg. The H-1A will also use an inertial-guidance including a planned Halley/Venus mission in system instead of the radio guidance of the N-1 1985. series. Projected development costs are $755 mil- in 1969, NASDA assumed primary responsibili- lion; the first operational flight of the full three- ty for launcher development for applications sat- stage rocket is scheduled for 1987.90 The H-1A ellites. Instead of attempting to develop further is necessary for the launch of advanced heavy versions of the Mu launcher, NASDA decided to satellites such as the proposed ERS-1, and will approach the United States for access to technol- give Japan a launcher roughly equivalent to ESA’S ogy for the Thor-Delta launcher and licensing ar- Ariane 1. However, there are currently no plans rangements to manufacture parts of the Delta in to market any projected launchers on a commer- Japan. The U.S.-Japanese Agreement on Space cial basis. Activities, signed on July 31, 1969, gave Japan 89’’japanese Gain Capabilities,” p. 109; “Japan Gaining A4aturi- ty, ” p. 96. 86’’japan’s Space Program,” p. 16. 90’’japanese Gain Capabilities,” p. 109. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 203 ——

Japan’s launch capabilities have been severe- development of domestic markets, and the mas- ly restricted by agreements with the Japanese tery of techniques for mass production and mar- fishing industry that allow missiles to be fired only keting. Though most of these successes, as in con- at two times of the year, January-February and sumer electronics and automobiles, have not August-Se ptember.91 been in advanced-technology areas, the govern- To date the Japanese have no firm plans for ment and industry have recently been emphasiz- developing a manned launched capability; Jap- ing technically sophisticated products in the belief anese payload specialists will fly on space shut- that Japan must compete there to sustain eco- tle missions during the 1980’s, with the first nomic growth through the end of the century. Japanese astronaut scheduled to fly in fiscal year Space technology is definitely a major area of in- 1985. However, there have been very preliminary terest, and government and industry have been working closely together to prepare for Japanese designs for a “mini-shuttle” capable of carrying a four-man crew plus 1,100 lb of cargo. Such a entry into world markets. vehicle is seen as eventually necessary for full ex- A recent study undertaken by Japan’s influen- ploitation of the scientific and applications pro- tial Ministry of International Trade and Investment grams currently under way.92 (MITI) predicts that by the mid-1 990’s space will be a $4.5 billion per year industry (current sales Cooperation/Competition With of Japanese companies are $480 million, almost the United States entirely to the government). The study emphasizes not only export potential but technological As is clear from the preceding description of spinoffs; an indigenous space industry is vital its major applications programs, Japan has in the since: “As unilateral introduction of technologies past worked closely with NASA and with U.S. in- from foreign countries is getting more difficult, dustry. The transfer of Thor- Delta technology has it is necesary to strengthen Japan’s own bargain- been the largest single result of that cooperation; ing power through accumulation of necessary in addition there have been numerous scientific technological know-how, ” Recognizing that exchanges. Many of Japan’s applications satellites Japan is some 5 to 10 years behind the United have been designed in part by U.S. firms engaged States and Europeans in key areas, especially in joint ventures with Japanese companies. The launch vehicles, there is emphasis on taking ad- Japanese plan to use Spacelab extensively. vantage of Japanese strengths in quality control, mass production, and marketing. 93 At the same time it is clear that the Japanese intend to use the technology and expertise gained Despite the disadvantages of a smaller eco- through cooperation to build up their own in- nomic and technical base to draw on than either dependent government and private sector capa- the United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union, bilities. The immediately resulting systems have and the lack of major military programs to en- been developed to meet national and public sure political and financial support, Japan has suc- needs in communications, meteorology, and re- ceeded in achieving a position of high technical mote sensing; the major commercial effect has and industrial competence in the entire range of been to begin to remove Japan as a market for space activities. Though not yet able to offer full- U.S. systems and launch vehicles. Eventually, scale commercial products or services (with the however, there is no doubt that Japan will at- exception of ground stations), the development tempt to export its equipment and services. There of this capability is only a matter of time. Japanese is a long and well-known pattern of rapid Jap- success has been the result of a number of fac- anese entry into foreign markets, following on tors, including: successful assimilation of imported technology, ● a sustained commitment to civilian space 9’ “Japan Space Effort Moves Into Operational Phase,” A W&ST, development by government and industry Mar. 8, 1982, p. 107. glMasayoshi Kanabay ashi, “japan Sets Mini-Entry in Space Race, ’ 93//epofl of the Deliberation Council on Basic Problems in the Wa// Street Jourrra/, July 20, 1981. Space /ndustry, MITI, Apr. 20, 1981. 204 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

as an integral part of overall plans to keep ticularly strong in Third World countries, where Japan competitive in advanced technology; Japan’s proven ability to provide high-quality ● careful borrowing of technology, mostly products at low cost may give them an edge over from the United States, and assimilation of less reliable European and American competitors. that technology by Japanese industry; In addition, it cannot be ruled out that growing ● close cooperation between government and pressure on Japan to increase its military budget industry, with general coordination by the and regional defense responsibilities may bring Space Advisory Council; about attempts to make use of its expertise in ● strong economic performance over the past space technology for military purposes, with the two decades, together with a rapid matura- additional boost that such a decision would give tion of national scientific and industrial skills; to indigenous aerospace and electronics indus- and tries. Recently, it was reported that Japan was ● willingness by both government and in- considering the deployment of a military recon- dustry to make and adhere to long-range naissance satellite system, which might be built plans. alone or with U.S. cooperation .94

Competition from the Japanese appears assured 94’’japan Reported Making Plans for Reconnaissance Satellite,” during the coming decade and is likely to be par- Aerospace Dai/y, Jan. 11, 1982, p. 45.

NON-WESTERN SPACE PROGRAMS: SOVIET UNION, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INDIA

Soviet Union Unfortunately, the extreme secrecy with which the Soviets have surrounded their programs The Soviet Union has for many years main- makes it difficult to accurately evaluate their pres- tained a space program approximately equivalent ent capabilities and future plans. This secrecy is to, and in some areas considerably ahead of, that due to an unwillingness to acknowledge failures of the United States both in terms of total and/or technical backwardness for fear of damage resources allocated and the kinds of missions car- to Soviet prestige; to concern that foreign coun- ried out. During the 15 years since it became tries might steal or imitate Soviet technology; and clear that they would not win the race to land to the military nature of most of the Soviet space a man on the Moon, the Soviets have made in- program and the lack of separation between ci- cremental and continuing improvements to their vilian and military space institutions. It is launcher and manned-vehicle systems, as well as estimated that 70 percent of Soviet space efforts developing operational capabilities in domestic are purely military, 15 percent are dual mili- and international communications, meteorology, tary/civilian, and the remaining 15 percent purely and remote sensing. Over the past several years civil. gs All launches are conducted by the Stra- the Soviets have launched many more satellites tegic Rocket Forces; the Soviet Air Force operates than the United States (see table 19). the Star City cosmonaut training center. Details of the internal organization are not generally Table 19.—Total (Civilian and Military) Successful available and are subject to controversy. impor- Orbital Launches tant planning and advisory roles are played by

United States U.S.S.R. the State Committee on Science and Technology 1978 ...... 32 88 and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. 1979 ...... 16 87 1980 ...... 13 89 SOURCE: Charles Sheldon 11, “United States and Soviet Progress in Space: Summary Data through 1980 and a Forward Look,” Congressional ‘sSoviet ~j/;taV power, U.S. Department of Defense, September Research Service Report #81-27 S, Jan. 15, 1981, p, 49. 1981, p. 79. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 205

For these reasons, and because the Soviet pro- technology, and to the system of weighted voting gram is not oriented towards commercial systems whereby influence was determined by a coun- that would be competitive with U.S. or other try’s overall use of the system; the Soviets used space technologies, we will not examine the only 2 to 3 percent of global international traf- Soviet program in as much detail as the European fic, compared with the United States’ s 50 to 60 and Japanese. Brief descriptions of major opera- percent. Instead, in 1968 the Soviet Union and tional applications systems will be given, with em- eight other socialist states (Poland, Czech- phasis on potential international implications. oslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Cuba) proposed an alter- Communications native system, which in 1971 was formally agreed Soviet satellite communications development to and called Intersputnik. Although it is open initially took a different path than that of the to any state, few other countries (Syria, Vietnam, United States. The U.S. satellite communications and Laos), have joined, for both political and industry, after initial experiments in the early technical reasons. There is relatively little com- 1960’s with low-orbit satellites and passive reflec- mercial/private traffic between most Intersputnik tors (such as the Echo series), soon turned to ac- members and the rest of the world; in addition, tive geosynchronous satellites. Because of the since the intersputnik network was initially based relatively well-developed U.S. domestic commu- on use of the Molniya satellites, it was difficult nication network, satellites were at first aimed and expensive for INTELSAT Earth stations, which primarily at the rapidly expanding overseas mar- are designed to work with fixed geosynchronous ket; the United States took the initiative in form- satellites, to make use of the moving Molniyas. ing INTELSAT and designating the newly created in recent years, however, the Soviet Union has COMSAT organization to provide the technology begun to orbit geosynchronous Statsionar satel- and management expertise to make INTELSAT lites which are designed to be more acceptable function. In the Soviet Union, however, improv- to global users. In addition, as their international ing domestic communications, particularly to the communications needs have grown the Soviet less-developed central Asian and Siberian re- Union, Cuba, and Rumania, (to be followed soon gions, was a high priority, while international traf- by Poland) have begun to use INTELSAT through fic was minuscule. The Soviet Molniya 1 system Earth stations on their own territories. Increasing began operations in 1965, using large satellites de facto integration of global satellite communications appears to be occurring, even in the ab- placed in elliptical 1 2-hour orbits. Such orbits are 97 easier to attain than geosynchronous ones, allow- sence of formal agreements. ing heavier satellites to be used; they also pro- The Soviets’ first geostationary communications vide better coverage to areas far north of the satellite was launched in 1974. A large system of Equator, though they require relatively expensive geostationary satellites, called Statsionar, has tracking antennas. Similar orbits have been used been established to serve the Soviet Union and for the Molniya 2 and 3 series, first launched in East Europe with a number of different kinds of 1971 and 1974 respectively. The Molniyas have satellites: the Raduga series, six satellites of which provided domestic telephone and television serv- had been launched through 1980, for domestic ices, including color TV transmissions; as more TV and telephone relay; the Ekran series, with advanced Molniyas have become available, the six satellites, for domestic television; and the Gori- Molniya 1 series appears to have been reserved zont series of four satellites for international and for military requirements.9G domestic television transmission. The current ln- For a number of reasons the Soviet Union and tersputnik system relies heavily on the Statsionar its allies were reluctant to join INTELSAT when it was founded in 1964. The Soviets objected to U. S./COMSAT management, to the use of U.S. gTSee Nicholas Matte, Aerospace Law: Telecommunications Sat- e//ites, prepared by the Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, McGill University, for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 96’’U.S. and Soviet Progress in Space, ” p. 52. Council of Canada, 1980, pp. 118-123. 206 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications satellites, and more are expected to be launched tion. The latest such satellite, Cosmos 1151, was in the near future; the Soviets are currently several launched in January 1980.100 years behind in their projections for overall sys- 98 Perhaps the most ambitious civilian-oriented tem deployment. remote-sensing work has been done on manned The Soviets have also announced plans for sev- missions, particularly the Salyut 6. Some 50,000 eral new global communications systems de- photographs have been taken using a large signed to compete with western ones. The Loutch MKF-6m multispectral camera built by Carl Zeiss series of eight satellites is intended to provide Jena in East Germany, and some of the data ob- services comparable to INTELSAT, using 14/11 tained has been shared with allied and develop- GHz frequencies; the Volna mobile communica- ing countries, such as Cuba, Vietnam, Morocco, tions system of seven satellites plans to offer serv- and Angola.l O1 ices to ships and planes similar to those of Marisat The Soviets have been distributing weather and Aerosat. To date none of these planned sat- 99 photos from their Meteor series meteorological ellites have been flown. satellites since 1966; their first retrograde Sun- It would appear that the Soviets, after many synchronous launch, capable of providing daily years of concentrating on domestic and regional coverage of a particular area at the same time of capabilities, are hoping to compete on a more day, was made in 1977. Meteor satellites have global scale. Such an effort stems from: 1) increas- carried a variety of experimental sensors in- ing confidence in their technology, based in part cluding, recently, advanced Earth resources in- on military experience gained in communicating strumentation.1°2 In July 1980, the Soviet Union with a rapidly expanding number of naval vessals launched a prototype remote-sensing satellite and foreign bases and 2) an increase in interna- with three experimental multispectral sensors tional civilian communications with Western and providing ground resolution up to 30 m, with data third world states, due largely to expanded trade to be relayed to the ground via radio. It is planned relations. Not enough is known about the critical to extend this to a full-scale operational system factors to estimate whether Soviet competition with 50-m visible-band resolution .los will be effective: these include the system’s In the U. N., the Soviets have proposed since technical characteristics and reliability, its com- 1979 that distribution of “local,” i.e., 50 m or less, patibility with other global and regional systems, remote-sensing data be subject to the prior con- how the prices charged for services compare with sent of the state being viewed; this does not af- Intelsat and other alternatives, the institutional fect Landsat 3 MSS imagery but would apply to characteristics of any potential user group, and TM data from Landsat D, as well as France’s pro- political considerations. posed SPOT system. The Soviet proposal is de- Remote Sensing signed to restrict the usefulness of U.S. and other Western remote-sensing systems, as well as to The Soviets have no specifically designated limit the dissemination of potentially damaging civilian land remote-sensing system. Large information about the Soviet Union and its allies numbers of short-term film-return Cosmos mis- (e.g., agricultural data that might give foreign sions have been flown for military purposes, and some of these have undoubtedly provided civilian lm’’Review of National and Co-Operative Space Activities for the Calendar Year 1980,” UNCOPUOS, A/AC’. 105/286/Add. 3, May data. Ocean surveillance for the military has been 1, 1981, p. 11. carried out using nuclear-powered active radar 1°’ “The Salyut 6 Mission, ” /nteravia, November 1978, p. 1,084; satellites; two specialized nonnuclear ocean- “Relevance of Space Activities to Monitorifig of Earth Resources and the Environment, ” prepared for 2d U.N. Conference on the ographic satellites are reported to be in opera- Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/BP/3, Apr. 28, 1981, p. 8. ‘02’’Craig Covault, “Soviets Initiating Program on Modular Space 98 ’’ Soviets Continue Aggressive Space Drive, ” AW&ST, Mar. 9, Station,” AW&ST,. July 21, 1981; “Review of Space Activities,” p. 10. 1981. 1°3’’ National Paper: USSR, ” prepared fcjr 2d U.N. Conference 99’’ Soviets Increasing Space Activities, ” AlV&ST, Mar. 3, 1980, on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/ p. 83. NP/30, Sept. 2, 1981, p. 19. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 207 firms a better bargaining position with Soviet pur- used is the Sapwood (A) launcher, a derivative chasers). The United States opposes such a re- of the original ICBM design dating back to the striction. 104 mid-l950s, which in present modified versions There are presently no known Soviet plans to can launch Soyuz manned vehicles up to 6,575 distribute remote-sensing information outside the kg. The larger Proton (D) launcher can carry U. S. S. R.; entry of the Soviets into the global 20,000 kg to LEO and has been used to launch the Salyut space stations; it is not considered market, even on a selective basis, could have a 108 significant effect on future Western commercial reliable enough for manned launches. systems. The Soviets would be likely to sell/ The Soviets have so far failed to produce ad- distribute data for political purposes, which could vanced ELVS comparable to the U.S. Saturn V, mean undercutting global prices while criticiz- which could lift 136,000 kg to LEO, or a reusable ing Western systems (especially those run as vehicle such as the space shuttle. This has been private commercial enterprises) for being too ex- due in part to their inability to develop high- pensive for and/or violating the sovereignty of energy liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen propulsion developing countries. systems, without which launching heavy payloads requires a very large number of stages and Materials Processing strap-ens. The Soviets apparently attempted to Processing experiments have had a high priority launch a Saturn-size vehicle on at least three oc- on recent Soviet space flights, especially aboard casions from 1969 to 1972 as part of their manned the Salyut 6 orbiting laboratory.l05o~ Two separate lunar program, but were unsuccessful. There are furnaces, the Splav-01 and Kristall, have been currently unconfirmed reports that the Soviets are used to conduct experiments on semiconductors, once again seeking to launch a very large ELV, crystal growth, alloys, glasses and metal oxides; as well as to develop a reusable vehicle some- samples have been taken to the ground for de- what smaller than the shuttle. Both advances tailed analysis. Approximately 300 to 350 Soviet would be useful in implementing the Soviet aim of developing large permanently manned orbiting scientists are reported to be actively engaged in l09 materials research related to space processing.l06 Space stations. As usual, details of Soviet results are not public- In recent years the main emphasis of the Soviet ly available; activities appear to be at the basic space program has been on developing and using science level, and can be expected to continue the Salyut series of manned orbiting laboratories. with future Soviet manned flights. Soviet spokes- The first Salyut prototype was launched in 1971; men are characteristically optimistic about space since then five more have been orbited, four suc- manufacturing; a typical observation is cos- cessfully. Several (Salyuts 2, 3, and 5) have ap- monaut Konstantin Feoktistov’s recent claim that parently been military in nature, mainly for high- resolution reconnaissance; Salyuts 4 and 6 have there will eventually be “whole plants for man- ll0 ufacturing products in zero-g. ’’107 been civilian. Salyut 6, still in orbit, has been by far the most successful. Weighing 42,000 lb, Launch Vehicles and Manned Operations it has been visited by 13 separate 2- and 3-man Soyuz crews, including a large number of non- The Soviets have developed a number of ex- Soviet nationals. The Salyut 6 has also rendez- pendable launch vehicles; the most commonly voused with unmanned Progress tankers, which ‘wJames Kay, “The Legal Implications of Remote Sensing by Sat- can dock automatically to resupply the men ellite, ” prepared by Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, aboard. This has enabled the Soviets to conduct McGill University, for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research long-duration missions, including the world Council of Canada, March 1981, p. 73. IOSB. BeIitsky, “Soviet Manned Space Flight 20 Years on, ” @aCe- //ight, vol. 23, No. 5, May 1981, pp. 154-155. 1°8’’ U.S. and Soviet Progress in Space, ” pp. 23-25. IWWS. MUSt spend More to Maintain Lead in Space 7-echnology, 1°9Craig Covau It, “Soviets Developing 12-Man Space Station, ” GAO Report FGMSD-80- 32, Washington, D. C., Jan. 31, 1980, p. 8. AW&ST, June 16, 1980, pp. 26-29. ‘07’ ’Soviets Show Assembly of Space Station Units,” AkV&ST, June 11ONicholas johnson, “The Military and Civilian Salyut Space Pro- 29, 1981, p. 21. grammed,” Spacef/ight, August-September 1979, p. 364. 208 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

record of 185 days in orbit recorded by Valery in the Soviet Union and spent time on board Ryumin and L. Popov in 1980. Numerous exper- Salyut 6. These missions have helped give the iments and studies have been conducted to test Soviet program a politically valuable international the spacecraft themselves as well as the effects image; further such flights, including cosmonauts of weightlessness on human beings, other plant from non-l nterkosmos nations, such as France and animal life, and inorganic materials. Salyut and possibly India, are being planned. cosmonauts have succeeded in working outside the spacecraft to make repairs and to deploy in- Soviet-U.S. space relations have had several struments, such as a 33-ft radio telescope. 111 ups and downs, generally mirroring the overall political climate. The period of initial rivalry from In June 1981 Salyut 6 was visited by a new large 1957 through the Apollo program was character- (30,000 lb) unmanned craft, designated Cosmos ized by extreme competition and mutual claims 1267, which is twice as large as the Pro- of superiority, often made difficult to verify on gress/Soyuz vehicles. The automatic docking per- account of the secrecy with which the Soviet pro- formed by the two vehicles appears to point the gram was conducted. The Apollo success was way to the construction of large modular space typically downplayed by the Soviets, who stressed stations with many times the interior room of the the superiority of their unmanned Lunokhod current Salyuts.112 The Soviets have consistently lunar explorers and the “wastefulness” of the pointed to the establishment of such stations as U.S. manned program, implying that the Soviets the central goal of their space program and as had never intended to send men to the Moon.113 a necessary step in conducting further space ac- However, even during this period the two coun- tivities, including eventual manned missions to tries found it necessary to cooperate in establish- the Moon and planets. In March 1982 the Soviets ing legal and regulatory principles for space ac- launched a new station, Salyut 7. tivities. In the early 1970’s, as the end of the Viet- nam War allowed closer relations to develop and Cooperation and Competition With “detente” became the official policy of both the Other Countries U.S. and Soviet leadership, planning began for The bulk of Soviet joint and cooperative proj- a cooperative manned mission, the Apollo-Soyuz ects have been conducted with allied socialist test project (ASTP). In May 1972, a comprehen- states. In 1967, the Interkosmos program was sive agreement was signed in Moscow as part of founded to coordinate activities between the the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. The agreement cov- Soviet Union, its East European allies, and other ered a variety of mutual scientific and technical communist states such as Mongolia, Cuba, and exchanges in addition to ASTP.11A The ostensible more recently Vietnam. A number of scientific rationale for the mission was to develop a joint satellites have been flown using instruments, docking system so that, in case of emergencies, designed by member-states, under the overall spacecraft from either of the two states could direction of the Soviet Union. Instruments and rendezvous with those of the other. However, experiments, such as East Germany’s multispec- the joining together of the two spacecraft became tral camera, have also flown on the Salyut series; symbolic of the then current “thaw” in relations, many of these were associated with the flight of and was seen by proponents as leading towards guest cosmonauts from participating states. To extended cooperation in future space (and non- date, cosmonauts from Czechoslovakia, Poland, space) activities. Critics saw it as an expensive East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, political stunt which was likely to give the Soviet Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba have been trained Union greater benefits than the United States, in-

11 Jjames Oberg, “The Moon Race Cover-Up,” Reason, August ] 1 ‘Craig Covault, “Radio Telescope Erected on Salyut 6,” AW&ST, 1979, pp. 34-37. Aug. 13, 1979, pp. 54-55. 1 ldsoviet space Programs 1971-75, Staff Report for Senate com- I \z)ames oberg, “The Soviet Aim: a permanent base in sPace, ” mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Aug. 30, 1976, vol. New Scientist, Oct. 1, 1981. 11, p. 105. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 209 sofar as the perceived technical parity between Soviet Union in 1975; in 1979 an Earth-observa- the two systems would tend to elevate the public tion satellite, Bhaskara-1, was launched, and image of the Soviet Union as no longer “behind” Bhaskara-11 was orbited in November 1981. Co- in space technology. For various reasons the July operation with France, outlined earlier in the sec- 1975 rendezvous of Apollo and Soyuz 19, though tion on the French space program, has been pur- spectacular, did not lead to further major coop- sued in materials processing, space biology, and erative activities; this was largely due to the dif- manned flight. ferent directions the two programs took in the The Soviet space effort is large and varied and second half of the 1970’s, as well as to increas- the above has done no more than sketch their ing political tensions. Some of the cooperative major programs. As opposed to the U.S. space projects, such as U.S. biological experiments carried on Cosmos flights in 1975, 1977, and 1979, effort, it seems fair to say that over the past decade, the Soviet program has been character- and exchanges of data from each country’s plan- ized by steady growth and extension of their ca- etary missions have continued, but there are no pabilities. Despite slowness in meeting certain plans for a resumption of major scientific or ap- goals for communications services, ambitious plications exchanges. In 1977, a second agree- programs in communications, remote sensing, ment was concluded between NASA and the and especially the construction and operation of Soviet Academy of Science outlining cooperation orbital stations have been successfully im- in the development of a compatible sea search- plemented. However, it is still an open question and-rescue system, along with further coopera- whether increased Soviet capabilities, and in- tion in manned space flight. Although preliminary creased confidence in their technology, will in- meetings were held, the studies were never com- duce the Soviets to offer applications services to pleted; the Soviets blame the United States for 115 a broader range of global customers. Space tech- not fulfilling this latter part of the agreement. nology is one of the few areas in which the The Soviets and United States are at odds in Soviets could be competitive with the West, and the U.N. over a variety of space issues, such as the political and economic gains of supplying the proper restrictions to be placed on DBS and hardware and services would be attractive. land remote-sensing systems. More importantly, However, Soviet inexperience at operating in a the growing military importance of space tech- competitive business environment may prove, in nologies for surveillance, communications and this as in other fields, to be a major barrier. In navigation has made each side more concerned addition, the marketing of services—as opposed about the other’s capabilities, and less prone to to simple hardware—which require close coop- cooperate directly with the other. The Soviets eration between supplier and customer would have consistently criticized the shuttle as a space run counter to the Soviets’ long-cherished prac- weapon while carrying out active tests of an an- tice of maintaining maximum secrecy about their tisatellite system. technical capabilities, especially in areas where the military is so closely involved. For these Despite extensive publicity for space exploits, reasons it is likely that the Soviets will choose to the Soviets have made only minor attempts to ac- compete selectively, for discrete political aims, tively disseminate either space technology or its rather than enter into general competition for sat- benefits to third-world countries, as the United ellite communications, remote-sensing, or launch States has done through NASA cooperative agree- service markets. ments and the Agency for International Develop- ment (Al D). Outside of allied socialist countries and the United States, significant cooperation has People’s Republic of China (PRC) been pursued with only three countries–France, India, and to a lesser extent, Sweden. India’s first The PRC’S launch technology has been derived satellite, called Aryabhata, was launched by the from the Soviet Union, primarily the SS-4 (Sandal) medium-range liquid-fueled missile, designs for ‘l’’’ National Paper: U. S. S. R,” p. 110. which were given to the Chinese in the late 210 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

1950’s before relations between the two coun- mission tests using the France-German Sym- tries broke down. The central impetus for the phonic have included video teleconferencing and development of further launchers and satellites high-resolution facsimile transmission. According has been to meet security needs: to carry nuclear to terms of the “1979 Understanding on Coopera- warheads to the population centers of the Soviet tion in Space Technology” (part of the United Union, and to provide military reconnaissance States-China Agreement on Cooperation in Sci- and communications. ence and Technology), the Chinese Communica- tions Satellite Corporation indicated a desire to The first Chinese satellite, the 173 kg China 1, purchase a U.S. communications satellite (to be was launched in April 1970 by a CSL-I (Long launched by NASA) including ground equipment, March 1 ) launcher. Since then 10 more satellites but plans have been postponed indefinitely due have been launched (including a recent three- to financial constraints. Discussions also took in-one payload of scientific satellites). Little is place in 1979 and 1980 with non-U.S. partners known about their characteristics, though some such as West Germany’s Messerschmitt-Bolkow- were clearly for military reconnaissance and com- Blohm.119 munications. Starting with China 3 in 1975, launches were made with the FB-1 (Storm) vehi- PRC currently receives meteorological data cle, a version of their CSS-X-4 ICBM, approx- from the U.S. Tires-N and NOAA- 6, and the imately equivalent in size to the U.S. Atlas. The Japanese GMS-1 satellites through indigenous FB-1 can launch a satellite of up to 2 tons into receiving stations. The Central Meteorological LEO.1l6 Bureau had planned to launch a Sun-synchronous weather satellite in 1982, and a com- The Chinese are known to be working on a plementary geosynchronous satellite in 1985. The new launcher, the Long March 3, which would 1982 satellite’s radiometer was to have a 4-km use the two stages of the FB-1 plus a liquid resolution (compared with the U.S. ITOS’ resolu- oxygen/liquid hydrogen upper stage. If successful, tion of 1 km). Due to cutbacks in Chinese R&D this would make them third in the world, after expenditures, the status of these plans is the United States and ESA (perhaps fourth if the uncertain. Japanese succeed first), to use high-energy cryogenic fuels. The Chinese recently announced In remote sensing, the Chinese plan to use that the Long March 3 would be launched in 1983 Landsat and SPOT data extensively before devel- or 1984 and would probably carry China’s first oping their own system; the “1979 Understand- experimental geosynchronous communications ing” indicates China’s intention to purchase a satellite. 117 Landsat ground station from U.S. industry, and procurement activities are continuing. The To date the PRC has no operational commu- Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics is reported nications, meteorological or remote-sensing to be working on various sensors including a satellites, but plans are under way to develop all multispectral scanner.l20 In January 1980, NASA three technologies. Since 1972 and the United and the Chinese Academy of Sciences concluded States-Chinese rapprochement, China has re- a memorandum of understanding giving the PRC ceived significant data and know-how from the direct access to Landsat data. United States. INTELSAT-compatible receiving stations have been bought and established near There have been several reports that the Peking and Shanghai. An experimental COMSAT, Chinese are planning seriously for eventual the STW-2, is scheduled for a 1983 or 1984 manned flights and have begun to train astronauts launch over the Pacific, and indigenous Earth sta- for future missions.l2l However, China’s recent tions and transmitters have been built.118 Trans- reassessment of internal economic and scientific

1 IGEdelson Haas et al., “Eyewitness Report on Chinese Satellite 119’’MBB, Chinese Discuss TV Satellite,” AlV&ST,, Mar. 31, 1980, Work,” Aeronautics and Astronautics, February 1980, p. 44. p. 63. “z’’ China Launches Three-in-One Satellite Payload, ” Aerospace 120’’ Eyewitness Report, ” p. 43. Dai/y, Sept. 22, 1981, pp. 113-114. ‘z’ See David Ritchie, “Dragon in the Sky: China’s Space Pro- 8 11 ’’ Eyewitness Report,” p. 41. gram, ” Technology Review, October 1981, pp. 53-54. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 211

priorities has apparently resulted in a postpone- INCOSPAR was absorbed by the Indian Space Re- ment of plans for manned flights in the 1980’s.’22 search Organization (ISRO), which in 1972 became the central body of the newly created Until recently China’s space capabilities were Department of Space. barely known. Since the death of Mao and the determination of China’s new leadership to Unlike China’s, India’s space activities have not modernize the country by increasing foreign been motivated by military concerns (the military trade and educational/scientific exchanges with has a separate interest in antitank and antiaircraft the West, a number of official and unofficial missiles). Although India is an underdeveloped foreign delegations have been allowed to visit country, it has, because of its size and long- Chinese space facilities. In turn, large numbers standing contacts with the West, a considerable of Chinese have visited U. S., European, and Jap- pool of scientific and administrative talent. The anese facilities, and many Chinese students are space program is designed to use these resources now attending Western engineering and graduate to encourage development, to foster technical programs in the sciences. Up to now, except for and scientific leadership, and to serve as an ex- initial aid from the Soviet Union, Chinese efforts ample (in accord with India’s overall position of have been almost exclusively home-grown. Mil- neutrality between East and West and a leader itary requirements have been paramount, but of the nonaligned movement) of indigenous Third there has also been recognition that satellites World achievements in areas usually considered could play a large role in upgrading China’s in- the preserve of advanced developed countries. ternal communications and television networks, Hence there is an emphasis on developing a com- in locating and managing mineral and energy re- prehensive space capability, and especially sys- sources, and in agricultural planning. Given the tems for rural communications, land manage- previous lack of access to outside technology, ment, and weather forecasting. Foreign assistance Chinese capabilities are impressive, and are likely has been welcomed from a number of countries, to expand rapidly in the near future if outside largely for demonstration projects and joint pro- contacts increase and internal constraints are grams, with the intention of building on the ex- relaxed. The major difficulties are likely to be a perience gained to provide similar services with shortage of trained scientists and technicians, due indigenous resources. Through 1979, India’s total to the educational disruptions of the cultural investment had amounted to some $230 million, revolution; lack of capital and other strains with somewhat higher expenditures anticipated caused by ambitious plans for rapid moderniza- in fulfilling the latest 10-year plan. 123 tion of the entire economy; and lack of foreign India has built and launched a large number exchange for the purchase of outside technology. of Rohini sounding rockets, in addition to pro- Though Mao’s absolute insistence on domestic viding a launch platform for U.S. and Soviet self-reliance has been relaxed, China is likely to sounding rocket experiments.124 In July 1980, be interested in such purchases primarily as a way India successfully tested its four-stage solid fuel of gaining access to technology to be copied or SLV-3 launcher, orbiting the 76-lb Rohini I otherwise appropriated; hence, although China will not in the near future be competing with research satellite; in 1981, it launched a second Rohini, which failed to achieve orbit. Plans are foreign firms or governments for commercial con- under way to produce an augmented SLV, using tracts, it is also not likely to be a major buyer of strap-on boosters, that could place 330 lb into space systems. India LEO, as well as to develop a new launcher capable of orbiting a 600-lb remote-sensing satellite India has had a formal space program since the by the mid-1980 ’s. Though strongly denied by formation of the Indian National Committee for India, there are fears, especially in Pakistan, that Space Research (l NCOSPAR) in 1962. In 1969,

’23H, P. Mama, “India’s Space Program: Across the Board on a 1 Zzsee ‘Jchinese Astronauts Train in Simu Iators, ’ A W&ST, Jan. Shoe String,” /nteravia, January 1980, p. 60. 26, 1981, p. 63. ‘Z4’’ World-Wide Space Activities, ” p. 119. 212 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

India’s launchers may be used as, or be the pre- major cooperative communications satellite proj- cursor to, a delivery system for nuclear weapons. ects, one with the United States and the other with Europe. The Satellite Instructional Television India’s first satellite, the Aryabhata, was launched by the Soviet Union in 1975; it was Experiment (SITE), which lasted for 1 year from August 1, 1975, to July 31, 1976, was a joint pro- largely Indian-built and designed, with Soviet gram with NASA using the ATS-6 large commu- assistance. In 1979, the Soviets launched India’s nications satellite to broadcast educational televi- Bhaskara I remote-sensing satellite, which suffered a partial power failure. The Bhaskara 11, con- sion programs to 5,000 Indian villages. India was responsible for maintenance of the ground equip- taining two television cameras and three micro- ment and for developing the programs; the over- wave radiometers~, was launched in November 1981, and has provided television pictures of the all reaction proved highly favorable and enabled sub-continent. the Government to disseminate important information on health care, agricultural techniques, Another cooperative venture was the June 1981 and birth control to previously inaccessible launch of an experimental communications sat- areas. Additional experiments, including telecon- ellite, the Apple (Ariane Passenger Payload Ex- ferencing and emergency communications, were periment), on ESA’S third Ariane test vehicle. The conducted through the Symphonic Telecommu- satellite suffered a partial failure of its solar- nications Experimental Project (STEP) from July powered electrical system but has continued to 1977 to mid-l 979, using the French-German ex- function with reduced capability.l25 perimental Symphonic communications satellite. India plans to establish an operational com- In remote sensing, India is one of 11 foreign munications system, called Insat, using two countries to have a Landsat receiving station. satellites purchased from Ford Aerospace and Located at Hyderabad, it is operated by the Na- launched by the U.S. Insat-1 was launched in tional Remote Sensing Agency. Current plans call April 1982, and will relay messages and data be- for a remote-sensing satellite to be developed and tween approximately 32 proposed ground sta- launched sometime in the mid-1980’s, building tions, as well as provide direct television service on experience with the Bhaskara series. to rural communities via several thousand inex- 126 India has amassed a large amount of experi- pensive antennas. Insat will also carry a VHRR to provide’ meteorological information. Eventual- ence in designing, building and operating a varie- ly, ISRO plans to produce its own follow-on ty of applications systems. The commitment to achieving an independent capability to use space system, building on experience gained with Ap- technology is longstanding and based on the ben- ple and Insat. eficial results of past usage. Though direct compe- India’s commitment to Insat has been due tition with Western or Japanese systems is not largely to the positive experience gained with two likely in the near future, Indian experience in adapting space capabilities to developing coun- 125’’ Apple Satellite Operational Despite Panel Failure,” AlV&ST, try needs could eventually give them an advan- Sept. 14, 1981, p. 19. 12bBen jamin Elson, “U.S. to Launch Insat Satellite for India,” tage in providing services and/or hardware to AW&ST, Apr. 5, 1982, pp. 56-63. Third World countries.

OTHER SPACE PROGRAMS

Canada ipated in a large number of joint scientific projects with the United States, including the Canada’s space activities are coordinated by Canadian-built Alouette and ISIS ionospheric the Interdepartmental Committee on Space (ICS), research satellites, launched by NASA. The with overall responsibility in the Minister of State Department of Communications cooperated with for Science and Technology. Canada has partic- NASA and ESA in operating the experimental Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 213

Communications Technology Satellite (CTS) from tions and remote sensing to manage its far-flung 1976 to 1979, which pioneered operational use territories and to assist in the development of the of the 14/12 GHz band. Spurred by the difficulties Amazon Basin. The Centro Tecnico Aerospecial of communicating with remote regions in the (CTA) has been responsible for developing the North, Canada in 1972 became the first Western Sonda series of sounding rockets, which are country to initiate operational domestic com- launched from Brazil’s launch facility at Natal in munications via satellite; the Anik A series of three the northeast part of the country. The United comsats were built by Hughes and launched by States, Germany, and other countries have also the United States. In 1978, Telesat Canada began used Brazil’s facilities; a new launch center is now using RCA’s Anik B for voice, data, and televi- being prepared closer to the Equator. sion transmissions. Three Hughes-built Anik C spacecraft are scheduled for launch beginning in In 1975, Brazil and NASA conducted the SACI November 1981. (Advanced Satellite for Interdisciplinary Com- munications) experiment, using NASA’s ATS-6 Canada is also engaged in a major bilateral pro- satellite to transmit television programs to remote gram with NASA to develop a remote manipu- primary schools. Brazil currently leases four lator arm for the U.S. space shuttle. Spar Aero- transponders from INTELSAT for domestic use space Ltd. is developer for the $100 million proj- (with plans to increase this to 81/2 transponders ect. The first arm flew on the second shuttle flight by 1986), and plans to purchase its own comsat in November 1981. As with ESA’S Spacelab, Can- (with provision for technology transfer), to be ada has agreed to pay for development of the arm launched in 1985. and the first prototype, in return for a NASA commitment to purchase additional arms from Brazil is, after the United States, the largest user Spar.127 of Landsat data, and has operated a Landsat ground station since 1973, along with process- Brazil ing facilities. There are currently plans to design and build four remote-sensing and meteorolog- Brazil has had an active interest in space ac- ical satellites, with the first one to be launched tivities since 1961, especially satellite communica- in 1988.128

‘27Craig Covault, “Remote Arm Aids Shuttle Capability,” A W&ST, lzBjim Brooke, “Brazil’s Space Program Prepared to Launch 4 Sat- Sept. 7, 1981, pp. 57-58. ellites by 1993, ” Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1981, p, A22.

DOMESTIC/REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS In addition to the national programs outlined ber 1983. France’s Aerospatiale is the prime con- previously, there are a number of regional satel- tractor, with Ford Aerospace the major U.S. par- lite communications systems that are either ticipate. Australia’s Australsat is planned for the already in operation or in various stages of mid-l 980s. Regional systems have been discussed planning, for Southern Africa and South America, particularly the Andean region, prompted by Col- Indonesia has had the two Hughes-built sat- ombia’s well-developed plans for its Satcol ellites of its Palapa A system operating since 1976 telephone and TV system.12g Currently, a large to link its widespread island area. Spare channels number of countries lease spare transponders have been leased by other countries in the from INTELSAT satellites and purchase ground region. The first Palapa B satellite is scheduled stations for domestic use. This activity, along with for launch in 1983 and will be used by the Philip- the national and regional systems mentioned, in- pines, Thailand, and Malaysia. The Arabsat system, with 21 Middle Eastern countries as par- lz%ee Theo Pirard, “Space Systems Operated and Prepared by ticipants, is scheduled for a first flight in Decem- Developing Countries, ” Spacef/ight, May 1981, pp. 137-139. 214 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications dicates the scale of global interest in satellite serv- supported by increasingly competitive private ices. This is important, first because of the im- and national suppliers of telecommunications plications for the current international com- equipment, who encourage the purchase of spe- munications system, i.e., for INTELSAT; and also cialized services. The long-term effects on because, given the stakes, competition for sales INTELSAT are unclear but may lead to higher of satellites, ground equipment, and launch serv- prices or reduced service, which would be ices between U. S., European, and Japanese firms” especially harmful to those countries that are too is likely to be fierce. The proliferation of satellites small or poor to purchase their own system.130 for local and regional use threatens to take A possible solution would bean expansion of the business away from INTELSAT, damaging its fi- INTELSAT system to provide local and regional nancial viability. As communications needs services. This would require a satellite-ground- become greater and more specialized, and as it station system designed to operate in low-density becomes progesssively more difficult to allocate rural areas, perhaps including direct-broadcast scarce orbital slots and frequencies, many coun- capabilities. tries are determined to have their own system, or a share of a local system, regardless of whether 130See john McLucas, “Global Cooperation in Satellite Commu- such a move is warranted by local demand or nications in a Decade of Policy Divergence, ” paper presented at by financial considerations. Such decisions are International Aerospace Symposium, Paris, France, June 2, 1981.

REMOTE SENSING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES In the field of land remote sensing, the ana- ment and also by other developed countries and Iogue to INTELSAT has been the U.S. Landsat international organizations, to enable various system, which has provided black-and-white and countries to use Landsat. Effective use requires multispectral photographs on a global basis for skilled technicians and equipment to process the the cost of reproduction. U.S. policy was estab- data, as well as integration of satellite informa- lished in 1969, when President Nixon stated at tion with many other information resources. Mul- the 24th U.N. General Assembly that “this pro- tilaterally funded training centers to encourage gram will be dedicated to produce information these capabilities are being established in Upper not only for the United States but also for the Volta, Kenya, and Thailand. world community. ” Foreign nations and agencies can either purchase data from the EROS Data As was discussed above, other global land Center, or receive it directly by establishing their remote-sensing systems besides Landsat are own receiving station, which can (with the cur- planned for the mid-l 980’s. Though such com- rent Landsat satellites) provide images over a petition may eventually improve the quality of 2,700-km radius (see map). Especially in develop- services available, much depends on whether the ing countries where maps are often incomplete competition is political or commercial in nature. and outdated, and information about land use, Private-sector operation of !-andsat, which could forest cover, drainage patterns, mineral deposits put remote sensing on a more commercial basis, and the like is difficult and expensive to obtain, is of concern to many developing countries who satellite imagery has been used extensively to aid see such a move leading to higher prices as well in economic development.’s’ Over the years, as possible violations of their sovereignty by substantial assistance has been provided, large- private companies outside effective government ly by the U.S. Agency for International Develop- control. On the other hand, a “price war” between, say, politically motivated Landsat, SPOT, MOS, and possible Soviet systems might prove 131 For a outline n of some of these uses, see “Relevance of Space beneficial to users but might also undermine the Activities to Monitoring of Earth Resources and the Environment, ” background paper for second U.N. Conference on the Exploration willingness of the sponsoring governments to and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/BP/3, Apr. 28, 1981. continue their operation. The multiplication of Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 215

1 1 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 e

SOURCE” National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Globesat section in chapter 10 of this report. At the present, however, no country or organization has taken the lead in proposing such a system or in establishing the institutional and financial framework that would be needed. Discussion of ways to better use and integrate remote-sensing data, along with other issues of concern to developing countries, will be on the agenda at the upcoming second U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982) to be held at Vienna this coming August. A number of proposals to establish new U.N. bodies dealing with space activities and/or to expand the scope of existing ones will be proposed at the Conference and passed on by the General Assembly in the fall of 1982. Chapter 8 COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY Contents

Page Introduction...... 219 Process of lndustrial Innovation in Space ...... 219 Overview ...... 219 Product, Process, and Service Innovation ...... 220 Satellite Communications ...... 220 Remote Sensing ...... 222 Space Transportation ...... 223 Materials Processing in Space ...... 224 Government Encouragement of Innovation ...... 229 Aeronautics ...... 230 Communications Satellites ...... 231 The Joint Endeavor Agreement ...... 232 Other Space-Related Commercial Activities ...... 234 Financing Space Ventures...... 234 Insurance ...... 235 Hardware Sales ...... 235 The Aerospace In dustry ...... 235 New Markets ...... 236 Ground Support Services...... 236 Chapter 8 COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY

INTRODUCTION A commercial activity is generally understood a profit in a competitive environment), the proc- to be one undertaken for profit in the public mar- esses necessary to achieve this result and the ketplace; “commercialization” then implies the sources of the technologies involved are often transfer of technology from a research and devel- quite different. Such differences become signifi- opment (R&D) and/or federally supported opera- cant in a context such as the U.S. space program, tions stage to a for-profit stage, usually under in which commercialization of space technology private sector ownership and control. It is difficult is encouraged as a matter of policy. The purposes to give a precise definition for commercialization of this chapter will be to: 1 ) identify some of the because the term assumes a variety of specific problems involved in trying to commercialize meanings depending on the context in which it specific space technologies; 2) examine private is used. For example, aerospace companies earn sector attitudes towards commercialization; and a profit on the aircraft they manufacture for the 3) describe some of the current Government pro- military, but military aircraft are generally not con- grams implemented to encourage commerciali- sidered to be commercial products, except inso- zation. far as they are sold to other countries. Civilian This chapter begins with a discussion of the spe- aircraft, on the other hand, are considered thor- cial factors that space introduces to the process oughly commercial, in that they are designed, of industrial innovation. New product, process, developed, and sold to make a profit in a com- and service innovations are analyzed along with petitive marketplace. Nonetheless, such aircraft the barriers and inducements to their commer- depend partly on technology developed by the Federal Government, either for military use, or cialization. The remainder of this chapter discusses several of the current space-related, prof- in a Government research program. itmaking activities and indicates areas in which Though the desired result of all efforts toward the private sector may invest in the future. commercialization may be similar (i. e., to earn

PROCESS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION IN SPACE Overview ket. The purpose of this section will be to explore the Government’s recent emphasis on commer- In most areas of business opportunity, Federal cializing space technology and the reasons R&D funds support or supplement larger private behind the reluctance of the private sector to in- R&D investment. Public funds are generally vest capital in space research. thought to be justified for basic research into high- risk pursuits with long payback times, or for tech- Although the basic characteristics of the inno- nologies having obvious social benefits. With re- vative process (see app. H) can be applied to any spect to space, and with the notable exception industry, innovation in space technology raises of some communications applications, the private several unique problems. Among the special sector has invested relatively little in R&D explor- characteristics of space-based innovation, the ing new business possibilities. This puts the Fed- following stand out: eral Government in the position of pushing technological opportunities in an area without sub- ● Entry costs are extremely high. No form of stantial business interest beyond the aerospace ground-based research, development, and community or an established or integrated mar- demonstration can do away with the require-

219 220 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ment for testing of systems in space before the other space-based business opportunities a new business using space-based technol- which have been identified to date. ogy can apply it commercially. Access to ● Public interests dominate space activities. orbit is very expensive, and will continue to There are few areas of space applications in be expensive even in the shuttle era, particu- which one or more of the following public larly if compared with the costs required to concerns—national security, international develop and demonstrate the commercial economic competition, return to the public viability of most Earth-based innovations. from the investment of Government funds, Even with the less stringent design re- improving the quality of public services pro- quirements of the shuttle payload bay, space vided by Government—are not influential. systems are more expensive to design than As a result, it is difficult to disentangle space their Earth-bound equivalents. The cost of applications from their public-sector origins. using the shuttle as a laboratory to verify or For the foreseeable future, it is difficult to develop potential innovations may discour- understand how space systems will be devel- age many potential developers. This addi- oped and operated as totally private ventures tional expenditure, incurred well before without some form of Government oversight commercial feasibility has been established, or involvement. is a radical departure from normal product development on Earth. Product, Process, and Service Innovation Ž Government controls the means ot access to space. Until some entrepreneur is capable Much of the current discussion concerning of operating a reliable space launch system, space industrialization has focused on the unique access to space will be through launchers de- characteristics of the space environment and the veloped and operated by the Government, new product, process, and service innovations In few other business sectors is an essential that may result from the use of this environment. element of the innovative process totally There is a tendency in such discussions to regard under Government control. Access to space industrialization as an undifferentiated set launches, launch assurances,. availability of of activities, each offering equal opportunities for support facilities, and the cost of space investment and commercialization. Important transportation may all be influenced by non- distinctions concerning the sophistication and business considerations such as changes in reliability of the relevant technologies and the an administration’s space policy, national presence or absence of a market for the proposed security constraints, or fluctuations in con- innovation are often overlooked. Consequently, gressional and public support. If the neces- space activities that have pregent commercial po- sary space facilities are not available when tential are often confused with those that mere- needed, the resulting costly delays could be ly offer productive avenues for basic research. fatal to a new commercial program. It is important to review a few of the current and ● The markets for space industrialization are proposed space activities in order to understand undeveloped. Unlike innovations that how their many individual differences affect their emerge from an existing or clearly possible potential for successful commercialization. The market opportunity, some space-based busi- following section will take a brief look at satellite nesses will be based on totally new capabil- communications, remote sensing and space trans- ities that will have to create new markets. piration, with a more detailed examination of the Communications satellites, the often cited commercial prospects for materials processing in example of successfully commercialized space. space technology, were a more efficient substitute for existing means of long-distance Satellite Communications communication. This interchangeability of To understand how communications satellites technologies is not characteristic of many of fit into the overall scheme of space industrializa- Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology Ž 221 tion, it is necessary to view this technology in an it would provide them with three distinct advan- historical perspective and to disregard for the tages over ground-based communication sys- moment its present complex manifestations. I n tems. These advantages are insensitivity to the late 1950’s in the United States there was a distance, broadcast ability, and flexible routing. great deal of Government and private interest in Distance insensitivity means that the cost of com- satellite communications. The private sector, not- municating between two points remains the same ably AT&T, was keenly aware of the commercial no matter how far they are apart. This must potential of such systems and was proceeding be contrasted with communications by cable, with its-own research while keeping a close watch where the cost is nearly proportional to the length on the progress of both the National Aeronautics of the cable. A satellite is also capable of broad- and Space Administration (NASA) and the De- casting simultaneously to several Earth points, partment of Defense. The research of AT&T even- whereas a cable can carry communications only tually resulted in the design and construction of between two specific locations. Flexible routing Telstar, the U.S. first civilian active repeater means that a satellite’s circuits can be switched satellite. 1 to different routes as traffic patterns change. Ter- restrial circuits, on the other hand, must be plen- The fact that AT&T initiated and funded its own tiful enough to meet peak demands on specific satellite research program without first obtaining fixed routes, from NASA a guarantee for financial or technical assistance is a point that deserves some scrutiny. Another important factor that went into AT&T’s Corporate investment in new product devel- decision to invest in satellite communications was opment is generally undertaken only after a its dominant market position. In addition to its critical appraisal of the relevant technology, the large domestic telephone market, by the time anticipated development cost and anticipated Early Bird was launched in 1965, AT&T owned return, and the market demand. AT&T’s decision a majority interest in all the transatlantic cables to extend its communications network into space connecting North America and Europe. Unlike was no exception to this general rule. the firms which today may be considering some type of enterprise in space, AT&T had a strong From the technological point of view, commu- hold over the market it was about to enter. In nications satellites had three distinct advantages a similar vein, Western Union’s development of over many of the space projects that are presently “Westar,” the first domestic satellite system, under consideration. First, a communications sat- should be viewed in light of Western Union’s ellite is, or rather can be, a very simple device. position as the sole domestic telegraph carrier. All that is required is the proper placement above Its decision to offer domestic satellite service pro- a specific Earth point and the ability to reflect ceeded in large part from its evaluation that a either radio or microwaves to another Earth 2 market for this specialized service existed. point. In the early 1960’s, communications satellites Secondly, much of the research and testing of were also attractive from a financial point of view. a communications satellite could be done on the A Rand Corp. report published at this time had ground. This meant that development time would estimated that a low-altitude satellite system be faster and research costs would be lower and would cost approximately $8,500 a year per more predictable. channel, compared with $27,000 for a new un- Finally, corporate developers had the assurance derwater cable system.4 Though these projections of knowing that when their product was finished were not entirely accurate, the commercial results of the use of communications satellites are 1 D. Smith, Communications Via Sate//ife, 1976, p. 82. reflected in the history of transatlantic telephone ‘Using this basic concept, the U.S. Army Signal Corp, in 1945, charges. In 1966, immediately after the first com- undertook project Diana, which was an attempt to use the Moon as a passive reflector of radio signals. This research led to the development, in 1959, of a two-way transmission system between Wash- 3h4. Kins]ey, Outer Space and /nner Sanctums, 1976, P. 131. ington and Hawaii. Ibid., p. 30. 4D. Smith, op. cit., p. 67. 222 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications munications satellite went into operation, month- problem is that the prices now charged for data ly charges for transatlantic phone circuits will not support systems costs. Up until this time dropped sharply and have continued to fall since the costs of data have reflected only the marginal that times This reduction in price reflects the fact cost of reproduction. This has been possible be- that satellites are a cheaper, more efficient means cause NASA, during the R&D phase of its remote by which to accomplish long-distance terrestrial sensing program, subsidized all of the operation- communications. al costs. In the near future the French and Japa- nese may be operating government-subsidized Remote Sensing remote sensing satellites. If this is the case, U.S. Remote sensing of the Earth from space is the firms, whose price structures must reflect the total second of the space applications with near-term costs of operations, may not be able to compete commercial potential. (For a more detailed dis- in the world market. cussion of this subject see ch. 3.) When Landsat As a result of these factors, it is unlikely that 1 was launched in July of 1972, the U.S. Govern- the private sector will be interested in owning the ment owned and operated, through NASA, both remote sensing system as presently configured the space and ground segments of the system.6 until investors perceive that the probable return Recently, responsibility for the operation of a on investment is at least comparable to that civilian remote sensing system has been as- available from other risk-investment opportuni- signed to the Commerce Department’s National ties. It should be noted that Landsat may not be Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration an appropriate model by which to gage the costs (NOAA). Eventually NOAA will take over the of a commercial remote sensing system. Because operation of the Landsat spacecraft now operated Landsat is an R&D system, it is encumbered with by NASA with the ultimate goal of transferring many costs and inefficiencies that could be elim- both the space and ground segments of the sys- inated in a commercial system developed to meet tem to the private sector. specific user needs with appropriate and cost- Though there is a considerable amount of inter- effective technology. est in remote sensing, it is unclear whether the At this time corporations are involved only indi- private sector can accept the full responsibility rectly in remote sensing from space. In addition for a complete Earth resource system. There are to the products and services developed and man- three main reasons for this reluctance.7 The first ufactured by the aerospace industry for the vari- is that, unlike satellite communications, the mar- ous Federal programs, the private sector has also ket for remote sensing is quite new. Though it developed and provided analytical hardware, is potentially strong, it is now too undefined to software and services to private and Government allow accurate projections of return on invest- users. ment. The second problem is that the Govern- ment is now and will probably remain the largest presently, there are over 50 organizations in the user of remotely sensed data. The success of pri- United States involved in the analysis of remote- vate enterprise in this area will depend on wheth- ly sensed data on a commercial basis. These orga- er or not the Government decides to satisfy its nizations use the imagery acquired from space civilian remote sensing data requirements from to evaluate areas of the Earth’s surface for such a private operator, the price it will pay for such varied purposes as hydrocarbon resource poten- services and whether the Government will agree tial, estimating crop production and land use not to compete with the private sector. The third surveys. Several firms are also selling hardware designed to process remotely sensed data. Sj. E. Schnee, “inventory of Space Activities (Economic), ” presented at the Symposium on Space Activities and Implications, insti- [n the near future, it would appear that private tute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, October 1980. involvement in remote sensing will be limited to bFor a brief history of the Landsat program and technology see: providing the above mentioned hardware sales National Academy of Sciences, Resource Sensing From Space, 1977. 7See generally: An Interagency Task Force “Private Sector involve- and “value-added” services. Only when the mar- ment in Civil Remote Sensing, ” June 15, 1979. kets are sufficiently large, with data prices reflect- ,

Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology Ž 223

ing the true costs of acquisition, can the private in a manner that does not reflect the true costs sector be expected to own and operate remote of operations. From NASA’s standpoint as an sensing systems. R&D agency this subsidy may be desirable because it encourages the use of a newly developed Space Transportation system. However, the shuttle price then becomes Recently there has been considerable discus- the price the private sector must match in order sion concerning the possibility of establishing pri- to compete for commercial payloads. Because vately owned launch systems. This discussion has a commercial operation must not only meet its focused on three alternatives: 1) commercializa- costs but also generate a profit, it is questionable tion of the U.S. present expendable launch ve- whether proven technology such as the U.S. ELVS hicles; 2) transfer of shuttle ownership and/or can be commercially competitive in the absence operation to the private sector; and 3) private of some form of Government assistance. Such development of a new generation of low-cost ex- assistance couId come in the form of a promise pendable launch vehicles. At present, the of a certain number of government launches, ac- absence of a comprehensive Government policy cess to government launch facilities or more tradi- which favors and encourages the participation of tional incentives such as tax breaks. However, the private sector in launch system ownership has given this country’s long-term commitment to the inhibited such developments. shuttle, it seems unlikely that such assistance will be forthcoming. The present expendable launch vehicles (ELVS), such as the McDonnell Douglas Delta and the There has been some discussion concerning General Dynamics Atlas-Centaur, are already the possibility of converting surplus military operated on a quasi-commercial basis. These rockets, such as the Polaris or Minuteman, to vehicles are commonly purchased through NASA commercial launch vehicles. Given that the Gov- by communications companies for communica- ernment would support such a plan, the main ad- tions satellite launches. Although the vehicle is vantage to using these vehicles would be their launched by the Government, its cost and and extremely low cost. There would, however, be those related ground services are borne by the a number of disadvantages. Because these vehi- private sector purchaser. The transition from the cles do not have the power to carry large pay- quasi-commercial provision of launch services to loads to geostationary orbit, they could not be a purely commercial system may be difficult to used to launch many of the newest communica- accomplish. Because the Government has his- tions satellites. Furthermore, the fact that these torically developed and operated launch vehicles launch vehicles would be surplus equipment op- and presently owns all of the sophisticated U.S. erated by nongovernment personnel would make launch facilities, some form of Government-in- it difficult, at least initially, to obtain launch con- dustry cooperation would seem to be a necess- tracts from companies accustomed to the security ity. This, in itself, should not be a cause of con- of dealing with NASA. It would be unlikely that cern because, as the aeronautics industry proves, customers would be willing to entrust valuable Government and industry can work together to payloads to an unproved private company par- the mutual benefit of each. The problem that ticularly if adequate launch insurance were not does arise, however, is that in certain instances available. the goals of the Government are not those of industry. Transfer of the shuttle to the private sector has also been considered. Such a decision would in- For example, the present Government commit- volve a major policy shift on the part of the Gov- ment to the shuttle entails several costs which ernment, with substantial institutional and finan- NASA, at present, does not intend to recover cial reprecussions. Important questions would from shuttle users. This type of subsidy allows the have to be examined: 1) what part, if any, of the shuttle (and likewise the Ariane launch vehicle shuttle development costs should the Govern- of the European Space Agency (ESA)) to be priced ment attempt to recoup; 2) could the national 224 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications security needs of the United States be met by a in joint ventures with the private sector. Because privately owned shuttle; and 3) could a private of the emphasis NASA placed on commercializ- shuttle compete in the international arena with ing MPS technology, it is useful to examine this foreign, subsidized launch systems? None of space application in some detail. these problems necessarily prevents the shuttle from being owned and operated by the private BARRIERS TO COMMERCIALIZATION sector; however, the resolution of any of these OF MPS TECHNOLOGY problems requires a substantial degree of Govern- Most of the products and processes presently ment involvement. being considered for development in space are, at best, in the basic research stage of the innova- Several private firms have also consitiered the tive process. Though it would be correct to say possibility of developing a new generation of low- that the private sector will begin to invest in space cost launch vehicles. However, even using industry only after achieving a more sophisticated proved ELV technology, the high cost and long understanding of how materials and processes development time associated with such an en- behave in space, such an analysis identifies only deavor have so far prevented the successful de- one aspect of its reluctance. A number of com- velopment of such a vehicle. Were such a firm mercial, legal, and organizational factors must to be technologically successful, commercial suc- also be considered. cess would still depend on a positive Government attitude toward such an enterprise. Questions Few attractive investments.—of all the barriers such as launch safety, payload regulation, acquisi- to process innovation in space, the most impor- tion of new launch facilities, and launch agree- tant is that the ideas for new products and proc- ments with foreign governments would still re- esses that have been suggested simply are not quire resolution. The time and expense involved very attractive investments. Industrial R&D proj- in developing a private launch system combined ects are a discretionary expenditure, and therewith government delays and regulatory complica- fore must compete for corporate capital with tions may well create too heavy a burden for the other investment opportunities. A project’s ability private sector to carry alone. to compete is a function of the amount of risk it involves, its estimated front-end costs, and its Materials Processing in Space (MPS) foreseeable rate of return. As indicated earlier in this report (see ch. 3), The risks involved in space innovation are con- the unique properties of outer space, most not- siderable. For example, several pharmaceutical ably microgravity, are amenable to a number of products have been identified that may be pro- industrial processes. Some of the organic and induced either more cheaply or with greater ease organic materials that may in the future be proc- in outer space. However, before any of these essed in space have already been mentioned products could reach the market a number of sig- above. it should be noted, however, that the nas- nificant problems would face the manufacturer. cent state of MPS technology and the lack of First, there would have to be a period of ground- clearly defined markets place materials process- based R&D where the techniques to be employed ing in a long-term, high-cost, high-risk category in space would be developed. Next, the process that is generally beyond the interest and finan- would have to be verified in space. This prob- cial capabilities of most private commercial con- lem depends on the availability of NASA test facil- cerns. It is unrealistic to expect any major finan- ities, such as the shuttle, which in turn depends cial commitments from the private sector until on how the current political and economic envi- the technical capability and economic feasibil- ronment affects NASA funding. Because the Gov- ity of new space processing techniques have been ernment has the right to terminate contracts demonstrated. At least for the near future, the unilaterally, a company that has spent millions responsibility for proving the technical and eco- of dollars on R&D could find itself without ac- nomic feasibility of new space technologies will cess to shuttle flights. Though the Government rest on the Government acting, either alone or might have to reimburse a client’s costs on a con- Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 225 tract it canceled, such reimbursement would not return. When considering the rate of return that include the opportunity costs—that is, the costs a space-based industry might generate, one must of devoting resources to a space processing pro- take into account the development time of such gram in place of some other business opportuni- a project. Because a dollar held today has greater ty. If the process were verified in space, Food and buying power than a dollar held in the future, Drug Administration (FDA) approval would still the dollar that is anticipated in the future must be necessary before the new pharmaceutical be “discounted” to reflect its actual value in product could be marketed, and–depending on today’s dollars. This means that the longer any the complexity of the manufacturing process— project takes from its R&D phase to commer- new legal and regulatory agencies might be cialization, the greater the profit must be when necessary. the project begins to make money. This is particularly true during times of high inflation and Even if all of these R&D hurdles could be high interest rates. The combination of technical cleared, the economic success of a drug manufac- uncertainties and potential problems in obtain- tured in space would still depend on the company’s ability to produce and sell large enough ing the shuttle flights necessary for project verification makes it difficult to predict the specific annual quantities of a new product. It is unlikely that the shuttle, as it is presently con- development time for space-based projects. The figured, could guarantee such a requirement. combination of high-cost, high-risk, long-payback Long-term MPS facilities based in space and dedi- time and uncertain rate of return makes it difficult for space-based projects to compete for internally cated to commercial space processing neither generated corporate capital with other, more exist nor are planned for the near future. traditional, investment opportunities. Similarly, It is by no means certain that a firm wishing conventional methods of financing such as equity to manufacture a product in space would have capital or borrowing may not be available, and to face all of the complications enumerated the degree of risk involved here may also discour- above. The results of MPS experiments under- age the flow of venture capital into this area. g taken over the next 2 to 5 years may reveal many commercially attractive opportunities for prod- Uncertainties as to value of space environ- rnent.-ln addition to the view that there is little ucts or services that can be performed on the shuttle as presently configured. Nonetheless, the to be done in space, there is a tendency in the risks involved in space-based product research business community to believe that whatever can be done in space can also be done on Earth. do create a substantial barrier to investment. Though it is often stated that the microgravity of In addition to the technical and institutional space is fundamentally different from Earth grav- risks involved in utilizing the space environment, ity and cannot be duplicated, new technologies there are also uncertainties regarding cost and have been developed which do minimize the ef- development time. The present shuttle pricing fects of gravity on Earth. Examples of this fact can schedule does not reflect the true costs of opera- be seen in recent developments in containerless tions. A recent General Accounting Office report processing and in the manufacture of latex po- has suggested that NASA should void its pricing lymers. policy (except for those launches that have legally It is believed that one of the advantages to in- binding agreements) and charge “substantially 8 space manufacturing will be that materials can higher prices for future Iaunches." Uncertain- be processed without picking up impurities from ties as to the price of future shuttle missions make it difficult for business planners to estimate the the wall of the container that holds them. Recent- ly a U.S. firm working with NASA developed a cost of space-based product development. containerless processing system for making spe- Firms interested in investing in a new product cial glass products on Earth. 1o in this system the must estimate that product’s potential rate of gThe space industrialization Act of 1979: statement Of Russell Car- son at hearings on H.R. 2337, before the Subcommittee on Space “’NASA Pricing Policy on the Space Transportation System,” GAO Science and Applications, 96th Cong, 1st sess., p. 1767. Report to Congress, Feb. 23, 1982. !Olndustry Week, Mar. 3, 1980, P. 90. 226 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications glass is suspended within a chamber by sound when Congress was trying to fashion an insti- beams in a process called acoustic levitation. tutional structure and a method of ownership Another example of an Earth-based advance that for the Communications Satellite Corporation has a space counterpart is the manufacture of (COMSAT), there were serious reservations about latex polymers. It is believed that, in space, latex allowing the existing international communica- polymers could be enlarged to as much as 40 mi- tions carriers to invest in the corporation. It was crons. Although it had been assumed that the assumed that companies with large investments gravity on Earth would limit the expansion of in existing facilities would be reluctant to take these materials to 2 microns, Norwegian scien- speedy action to implement new satellite systems tists using new chemical techniques have in- that would make their existing facilities obsolete. creased the size of latex polymers to 10 mi- To some extent, a similar concern may be raised crons. 11 Though neither process functions as effi- regarding companies that could benefit from ciently as would similar space-based processes, space-based manufacturing techniques. Even if they are accomplished without the enormous ex- the product that could be produced in space is pense and administrative complexity of space- better or more efficient than its Earth-man- based manufacturing. Industry will be hesitant to ufactured equivalent, a corporation’s prior in- invest in space as long as there is at least some vestments may prohibit it from pursuing this new hope that Earth-based manufacturing techniques technology. can accomplish similiar results. Intellectual property. -Another potential bar- Prior investment in Earth technology.–Even if rier to process innovation in space is the fact that industry could be sure of the commercial viability a large portion of the private sector has no expe- of some of the projects that have been proposed, rience in dealing with the Federal Government its prior investment in Earth-based technology other than as an occasional vendor of supplies may make it reluctant to pursue new innovations and materials. In the normal course of events, a in space. Radical innovation, whether in space firm working for the Government is required to or on the Earth, usually means discarding expen- submit periodic reports detailing the progress of sive equipment before a company has had time its work. Such requirements are at odds with the fully to depreciate it. For example, it has been usual desire of industry to protect its investments suggested that the U.S. auto industry’s enormous in R&D by refusing to disclose details or results investment in automating the manufacture of cast of current research. Industry is also concerned iron brake drums probably delayed by more than that a business relationship with the Government 5 years its transition to disc brakes.12 Some com- could result in the loss of certain intellectual prop- panies prefer safer methods of maximizing prof- erty rights. it, such as advertising, market research, and 13 The Freedom of Information Act raises a num- automation, rather than risking investment in new ber of problems concerning the protection of data products and processes. The majority of industrial product and process development is directed at and proprietary rights. It requires the disclosure of “Government records” upon request, unless reducing costs and increasing profits in the short the records fit into one of the narrow exceptions run. For this reason it is more common for in- to the act. Information obtained under a guaran- dustry to seek new methods of making existing products more cheaply or marketing them more tee of confidentiality may be protected and “trade secrets” are a recognized exception to the effectively than to develop new products. act. A company working with NASA must careful- This is not the first time that this conflict ly screen that which may become a “Govern- between old technology and new has been an ment record” and be sure that if sensitive infor- issue in the space debate. In the early 1960’s, mation becomes “Government record” it qual- ifies as one of the exceptions to the disclosure ‘ 1 Ibid. requirements. IZRobert H. Hayes and William j. Abernathy, “Managing Our WaY to Economic Decline” Harvard Business Review, july and August 1980, p. 70. 135 us. 552. Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology . 227

Several legal issues may inhibit the private sec- law. Some writers have suggested that these tor’s involvement in the innovative process in clauses are merely pragmatic principles without space. The first concerns the question of owner- legal force.l7 Others regard them as binding prin- ship of the patent rights to new products and ciples which obligate states to be responsive in processes discovered during the course of a joint some form to the interests of developing coun- endeavor with NASA. Section 305 of the 1958 tries.l8 NAS Act states that “whenever any invention is made in the performance of any work under any The use of “common interest” clauses in international treaties has brought about strong opposi- contract of [NASA], such invention becomes the tion from the private sector. The most common exclusive property of the United States unless [NASA] waives rights thereto . . . "14 A strict argument heard in this regard is that the concept of equitable sharing is inconsistent with the con- reading of this section would vest in NASA the cept of profit, and in the absence of the profit ownership of all inventions discovered while motive private enterprise cannot be expected to working for, or in a joint venture with NASA. risk capital on space investments. At this stage Over the last two decades NASA has limited the of space industrialization such considerations application of section 305 to activities performed have had only a minimal effect on the private for NASA which have as their main purpose the decisions whether or not to invest in space. development of some new product or process. With regard to joint ventures, it has been NASA’s INDUCEMENTS TO PROCESS INNOVATION position that neither party assumes any obliga- IN SPACE tion to perform inventive work for the other, and Profit potential. –Though there are substantial accordingly each party retains the rights to any physical, economic, and psychological barriers invention that may be made in the course of the 15 to process innovation in space, certain in- venture. ducements do exist which may encourage private International Law. –I n the area of international sector participation in this area. Probably the law, the private sector seems to be troubled by most important incentive to the private sector is the growing use in international treaties of “com- the potential for making a profit. At the present mon interest” clauses such as the Common Heri- time only two product areas seem to offer the tage of Mankind principle which has been dis- combination of technical feasibility and market cussed at the Law of the Sea Convention and ap- potential that are necessary for a profitable ven- pears in the proposed Moon Treaty.l6 Simply ture. The first of these product areas is pharma- stated, these clauses assert that certain resources, ceuticals. such as the minerals on the ocean floor and on McDonnell Douglas together with Ortho Phar- the Moon and the “slots” in geostationary orbit, maceutical Corp. has investigated the commercial are presently under the jurisdiction and control cial potential of several pharmaceutical products, of no sovereign power; these resources, being which could be processed by electrophoresis in finite and exhaustible, should not be allocated space, and has entered into a joint agreement to the developed countries on a first-come, first- with NASA to test this technology. This project served basis, but rather, should be made to bene- has been described by McDonnell Douglas as an fit all nations. Although these “common interest” “aggressive, well-ordered commercial business clauses have found their way into all the major venture” in which the combined investment of space treaties, there is considerable uncertainty the pat-ties will be measured in terms of millions as to their status within the body of international of dollars. Clearly McDonnell Douglas and Ortho

T 442 u .s, c. 2451, et. seq. I Jspace Industrializatio Act of 1979: statement of Robert A. n 1 ZC. Q. Christol, “The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Cap- Frosch at hearings on H.R. 2337, before the Subcommittee on Space turing an Illusive Concept and Applying It to World Needs, ” XVIII, Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science and Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1976, p. 42. Technology, 96 Cong. 1st sess., 1979. 15. Gorove, “Limitations on the Principle of Freedom of Explora- 16Agreement coverning the Activities of States on the Moon and tion and Use of Outer Space,” X111, Colloquium on the Law of Outer Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. doc. A1341664. Space, 1973, p. 74, et. seq. 228 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications believe that there is a profit to be made in devel- into an agreement with NASA to study the solidi- oping this technology. fication of cast iron. The purpose of this research will be to gain a better understanding of how the Other potentially profitable products that can graphite formation of cast iron influences the be manufactured in space are the starting material metal’s properties. It is expected that low-gravity for electronic devices such as large-diameter crys- experiments will provide insights into this ques- tals. Like pharmaceuticals, these crystals have a tion which, though obtained in space, will have high market value per unit mass. The facilities practical use on Earth. needed to manufacture the basic materials are also small, so that the total orbital mass is low, Institutional incentives. — In order to encourage even for very high production rates. The econom- private involvement, NASA has established the ic advantage of manufacturing the starting mate- Commercial Applications Office in its MPS pro- rials for electronic devices in space is less sure gram. This office forms a bridge between NASA than for pharmaceuticals and no one has made and the private sector which provides assistance a major investment in this technology.l9 It should to the industrial user and suggestions to NASA be noted that the Earth-manufactured electronic on how the commercial growth of MPS might be devices presently enjoy a sales level of about $16 advanced. Joint projects between industry and billion per year with an estimated growth rate of NASA are “no exchange of funds” agreements 10 to 15 percent annually for the next 10 years. to cooperate in a given area with each party Such a healthy market is conducive to innova- assigned specific tasks to accomplish. The Com- tion and may eventually provide the incentive for mercial Applications Office has developed three the private sector to invest in space-based manu- basic levels of working relationships with private facturing techniques. organ izations: In addition to products, it is possible that the Technical exchange agreement (TEA) .–For private sector may find it profitable to offer cer- companies interested in applying microgravity tain space-based services. The GTI Joint Endeavor technology, but not ready to commit to a specific Agreement with NASA (discussed below) is based space flight experiment or venture, NASA has on this assumption. GTI is developing a metal- developed TEA. Under a TEA, NASA and a com- lurgical furnace which it hopes to rent to parties pany agree to exchange technical information interested in the effects of solidification in micro- and cooperate in the conduct and analysis of gravity. As experience is gained in MPS research, ground-based research programs. In this agree- it is likely that other space-based services will be ment, a firm can become familiar with micrograv- offered by the private sector. ity technology and its applicability to the company product line at minimal expense. Under Scientific knowdedge. –Another reason that the TEA, the private company funds its own participa- private sector may wish to invest in process inno- tion, and derives direct access to and results from vation in space is to gain a better understanding NASA facilities and research, with NASA gaining of present Earth-based manufacturing techniques. the support and expertise of the private com- For example, methods now used for the commer- pany’s industrial research capability. cial growth of large crystals have been developed empirically with little theoretical understanding Industrial guest investigators (lGl).–ln an IGI of what occurs at the microlevel during growth. agreement, NASA and industry share sufficient It is possible that significant improvements in mutual scientific interest that a company arranges Earth-based crystal growth could result if low- for one of its scientists to collaborate (at company gravity experiments were to provide a better the- expense) with a NASA-sponsored principal inves- oretical understanding of the growth process. In tigator on a space flight MPS experiment. Once a similar vein, the John Deere Corp. has entered the parties agree to the contribution to be made to the objectives of the experiment, the IGI

lgMaterials processing in Space, report of the Committee on Scien- becomes a member of the investigation team, tific and Technological Aspects of Materials Processing in Space, thus adding industrial expertise and insight to the National Research Council, 1978, p. 40. experiment. .

Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 229

Joint endeavor agreement (JEA)-JEA is a co- bill proposed the creation of a mixed-ownership operative arrangement in which private partici- corporation funded initially by Congress to “pro- pants and NASA share common program objec- mote, encourage, and assist in the development tives, program responsibilities, and financial risk. of new products, processes, services, and indus- The objective of a JEA is to encourage early space tries using the properties of the space environ- ventures and demonstrate the usefulness of space merit. ” technology to meet marketplace needs. A JEA is a legal agreement between equal partners, and As a mixed-ownership corporation, SIC would is not a procurement action; no funds are ex- be managed by a Board of Directors appointed changed between NASA and the industrial part- by the President, consisting of a chairman, three ner. A private participant selects an experiment qualified members of the executive branch, and and/or technology demonstration for a joint eight members from the private sector. The endeavor which complies with MPS program ob- financing of SIC would take the form of a “Space jectives, conducts the necessary ground investiga- Industrialization Trust Fund.” Congress would tion, and develops flight hardware at company provide this fund with $50 million per year for expense. As incentive for this investment, NASA the first 2 fiscal years and then additional sums agrees to provide free shuttle flights for projects as might be necessary. which meet certain basic criteria, such as tech- When the Board of Directors determined that nical merit, contribution to innovation, and ac- the corporation was operating “successfully, ef- ceptable business arrangements. As further incen- fectively, and profitably,” then it would take tive, the participant is allowed to retain certain steps to transfer SIC from a mixed-ownership cor- proprietary rights to the results, particularly the poration to pure public ownership. As a public- non patentable information that yields a compet- ly held corporation, the financing for SIC would itive edge in marketing products based on MPS derive from issuing capital stock and selling non- results. However, NASA receives sufficient data voting securities and bonds. to evaluate the significance of the results, and requires that any promising technologies be applied One would assume, in light of the financial diffi- commercially on a timely basis, or published. culties involved in private sector participation in materials processing in space, that a proposal NASA has developed these three types of work- such as SIC would meet with general approval. ing relationships in order to attract private-sector This, however, has not been the case. Many have interest at varying investment levels. It hopes that hastened to point out that though the proposed firms with limited funds and cautious R&D pol- SIC is a step in the right direction, the idea in its icies may start out with a TEA or an IGI and, if present form contains some serious problems. in-space experimentation appears valuable, The problems most often cited by those oppos- upgrade their cooperative efforts to a JEA. ing SIC in its present form are: 1 ) that such a pro- Another interesting method for attracting and posal is premature in that the attributes of space maintaining the interest of private enterprise in are not generally understood; and 2) that it may interfere with the activities of NASA, particular- space-based manufacturing is the proposed Space 21 Industrialization Corporation (SIC) .20 ly its MPS program. The bill which proposed SIC declares that it is a finding of Congress that “space activities Government Encouragement have matured to the point where the attributes of Innovation of space are generally understood” and a “number of potential uses of the properties of the space Government involvement in the process of in- environment are already known to have commer- novation raises important questions as to the ap- cial applications. ” In light of these findings, the propriate roles of the public and private sectors

‘“’’ The Space Industrialization Act of 1979,” H.R. 2337. 21The Space Industrialization Act of 1979, op. cit., P. 64. 230 ŽCivilian Space Policy and Applications in the development and operation of new tech- high bypass tubofan jet engine, the microwave nology. Ordinarily, the private sector bears the Landing system, the turboprop engine, and many total responsibility for funding R&D intended to others were all introduced for commercial ex- be incorporated into commercial systems. How- ploitation in the American market after years of fundamental R&D work by NACA and later by ever, over the past several decades the Govern- 22 ment has provided significant support, not only NASA. for basic research but also for applied research, In its generally successful efforts to launch gov- technology and systems development, and even ernment-developed aviation technology into the demonstration projects in the aerospace industry. private sector, NASA exploys two concepts for In each of these instances, the Government role identifying at what point the development of a in the process of innovation was determined by given technology should become the responsibil- the complex interaction of such variables as: the ity of the private sector. These two concepts are sophistication of the technology involved, its “technology validation” and its logical followup, perceived importance to national goals, the struc- “technology readiness. "23 The former describes ture of the market to which the technology is ad- the state of a technique, still under investigation, dressed, the level of industry interest, and the when its essential performance characteristics ability of the private sector to develop the rele- have been proved but before there is confidence vant technology without Government support. in the level of costs associated with fabrication of that device or technique under investigation. The following section presents three different The latter term, “technology readiness” is em- examples of how Government intervention has ployed to describe a technology that has been been used to direct and encourage technological demonstrated to have a reasonably high proba- innovation. bility of resulting in a commercially manageable Aeronautics fabrication process. Note that NASA does not actually design a fabrication process, but only “cer- An often-cited example of Government success tifies” in an informal way that the road seems in moving new technology out of its own con- clear for a private firm to do so. In this sense the trol and into the private sector, is NASA’s aero- technology is “ready” for the private sector. nautical research program. This effort began as NASA has performed the generic R&D that is nec- a direct outgrowth of the program of the National essary to prove the worth of a new application Advisory Council on Aeronautics (NACA), in- of engineering science to aviation technology. It itiated in the mid-1920’s and formalized in March does this both for the particular technology in 1946 by the National Aeronautical Research Pol- question and also, if the success of the first stages icy. This policy, promulgated to clarify the rela- warrants, for the fabrication or manufacturing tionship of NACA with other R&D agencies, technology necessary to produce the innovation. charged NACA with the responsibility for con- If at this point industry wishes to shoulder the risk ducting “research in the aeronautical sciences.” of further specific R&D (which is usually much By comparison, the policy assigned to industry more expensive than the preliminary, generic the responsibility for the “application of research R&D) based on its judgment of level of expected results in the design and development of im- return on its investment, it may do so with a much proved aircraft equipment.” In other words, the greater degree of confidence than if it were to Government agreed to assume the responsibil- start a technology validating process from scratch. ity of early applied research but product develop- Essentially, this process is one of lowering the ment would remain the responsibility of the pri- threshold of risk for private investment in a new vate sector. This approach seems to have worked and promising technical development. Doing so rather well, inasmuch as the history of U.S. ci- at public expense is justifiable so long as there vilian aviation is crowded with examples of technology which found its way into commercial use ZZNMW, The High Speed Frontier: Case Histories of Four NACA Programs (1980). after initial, early research at government ex- 20f%ce of Technology Assessment, Impact of Advanced Air Trans- pense. For example, super critical airfoils, the port Tmhno/ogy, Part 1; pp. 10, 34, 1979. .

Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 231 are significant public as well as private benefits guidelines, it is probable that the development to be exploited in the innovative product, serv- of this technology would have proceeded without ice, or process. It should be pointed out, in the creation of an organization such as COMSAT. respect to this last notion, that in order for NASA to be confident of the existence of a “significant COMSAT was the product of public policy con- public benefit” to be had from its generic tech- siderations and not of the marketplace. With the Kennedy administration came a strong commit- nology development efforts, a well-developed market for civilian aviation services was an im- ment to the space program as a means to en- portant given condition. The importance of a hance U.S. prestige and security. It was felt that well-developed market and its effect on Govern- satellite communications could be one area of ment R&D is examined in greater detail in the early U.S. competence. As a result an additional following discussion of communications satellites $10 million was added to the 1961 NASA budget for communications development. and materials processing in space. The addition of these funds had several effects Communications Satellites on the communications satellite innovative proc- Communications satellite technology from its ess. The most obvious effect was that NASA had inception was pursued with enthusiasm by the the funds and the mandate to “push” com- private sector. The initial Government position munications technology to maintain U.S. leader- articulated during the Eisenhower administration ship in this field. A peripheral, though seeming- was that NASA should “take the lead within the ly intended result was a postponement of private executive branch both to advance the needed re- sector investment in this technology. This devel- search and development and to encourage pri- opment reflected the decision of the Kennedy ad- vate industry to apply its resources toward the ministration to assess the policy implications earliest practicable utilization of space technology before placing the development of communica- for commercial civil communications require- tions satellites in private hands. It was also consist- ments . . . "24 At this time AT&T’s position as the ent with the administration’s desire to keep satel- sole U.S. international telephone carrier and its lite communications responsive to Government financial ability and willingness to commit funds policy and its cautious approach to what seemed to the development of communication satellites an imminent AT&T monopoly in international made it the obvious industry partner for NASA communications. efforts. By September 1960, AT&T was ready to In a curious inversion of the normal chain of request that NASA clarify its policies concerning events, the Government used its ability to sub- aid to companies working to develop communi- sidize innovation to retard the process of com- cations satellites25 and had already contacted the mercialization rather than to speed it. The Gov- Governments of France, Britain, and Germany ernment wished to ensure that any transfer of about plans for low-altitude satellites to provide technology occurred under conditions that would transatlantic telephone and television service.26 be responsive to foreign policy considerations. Hughes Aircraft had also contacted NASA to ex- This desire was accomplished by the statutory press its interest in, and ideas for, communica- creation of the unique public/private COMSAT.27 tions satellites. COMSAT is a private corporation with a mo- Had the Eisenhower administration’s policy nopoly in the business of international satellite been continued, it is almost certain that the pri- communications. The Communication Satellite vate sector would have undertaken the commer- Act of 1962 provided that ownership and financ- cialization of satellite communications. With ing of the corporation would be accomplished NASA supplying technical assistance and FCC through the issuance of capital stock. The act orig- regulating such communication under traditional inally reserved 50 percent of the stock for purchase by communications common carriers au- Z4D. Smith, p. 70. Zslbid. at 70. Z61bid. Zzcommunication satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S. C. 721. 232 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications thorized by FCC. The act also initially provided tiative and the risks associated with the evolution that the Board of Directors was to be composed of the communications satellite. Others believed of six members elected by the common carrier that NASA should continue its R&D role because stockholders, six elected by the rest of the stock- the NAS Act of 1958 mandated it to ensure U.S. holders, and three appointed by the President leadership in space technology. NASA’s position with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 In in the mid-1 960’s was that it should be allowed this manner Congress sought to insure that the to continue research in advanced technology, Government retained some degree of internal whereas COMSAT’S R&D would be directed to control over the organization. establishing the initial operating systems. The COMSAT Act also provides certain exter- Using this and similar arguments, NASA con- nal controls which allow the Government to reg- tinued to receive funding and to do communica- ulate and direct COMSAT’S activities. Section tions satellite R&D until January 1973. At this 201 (a) of the act grants the President the author- time, the combination of NASA budget limitations ity to undertake such activities as aiding the plan- and the success of commercial satellites for both ning and development of the system, reviewing international and domestic service led NASA to all phases of development and operation, super- phase out its work on advanced communication vising the relationship of the corporation with for- systems. eign governments, and insuring foreign participation in the system. Further, the act gives FCC the The Joint Endeavor Agreement power, among other things, to ensure competi- The primary method by which the Government tion in the procurement of equipment and serv- is seeking to encourage private sector participa- ice, to regulate technical compatibility between tion in MPS research is through innovative NASA/ satellites and ground stations, to set ratemaking industry relationships such as the Technical Ex- procedures, and to approve technical character- change Agreement (TEA), the Industrial Guest in- istics of the system. vestigation Agreement (IGIA) and the joint En- The Government’s support of innovation in deavor Agreement (JEA). Since JEA requires the communications satellite technology benefited greatest commitment on the part of NASA and COMSAT in two ways. First, the technology even- the private sector participant, it is useful to ex- tually transferred to the new corporation was amine this arrangement, its problems, and its more advanced than that which would otherwise potential for success. have been available for commercialization in the As of January 31, 1982, there were two jEAs early 1960’s; second, this technology was devel- in effect. The first of these agreements, referred oped at the public expense. The complicating fac- to earlier, was with McDonnell Douglas Astro- tor is that because COMSAT was not solely a nautics Co. (MDAC) and the second is with the commercial venture founded in response to mar- GTI Corp. ket demands but rather a hybrid organization designed to implement public policy, the respon- The subject matter of MDAC/JEA is a process sibility for innovation in satellite technology has called continuous flow electrophoresis (C-F-E). never been clear. After COMSAT was established, This process separates materials in solution by there was considerable disagreement as to what subjecting them to an electrical field as they flow role NASA should play in further communications continuously through a chamber. The McDon- satellite research and development. Many felt that nell Douglas C-F-E experiment will use the shut- COMSAT, as a private entity, should take the ini- tle, at NASA’s expense, to develop and demonstrate the applicability of that process to the creation of marketable quantities of pharmaceutical zeThe Communication Satellite Act was amended in 1969. Sec. products. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. has been 303 (a) now states that if the shares of voting stock held by the com- selected by McDonnell Douglas as a partner in munications common carriers is less than 8 percent, the common its materials processing business venture. Ortho carriers are not allowed to elect directors separately (47 U.S.C. 73 3(a)), Presently, the common carriers hold less than one-fourth of has completed a detailed market analysis on the 1 percent of the total shares outstanding. first C-F-E candidate product to be produced in Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 233 space. The corporation is now developing a de- the development of processes that would tailed animal test program for the product, to be compete with those resulting from the followed by a clinical test program. “Substantial MDAC endeavor. NASA is not precluded, sums of money” (in the tens of millions of dollars) however, from selling flight time on the shut- have been and will continue to be invested by tle to any other organizations wanting to both parties in the venture. According to MDAC, conduct the same or similar experiments. optimization of C-F-E ground units has been com- ● Patent and data rights.–NASA will not ac- pleted, and fabrication of apparatus for space quire rights in inventions made by MDAC or flight demonstration onboard the shuttle in 1982 its associates in the course of the joint en- is now under way. deavor, unless MDAC fails to exploit the in- In addition, the conceptual design of a precom- ventions or terminates the agreement, or unless the NASA Administrator determines that mercial space flight pilot plant has been initiated. a national emergency exists involving a seri- Present plans call for pilot plant demonstration in 1985/1 986, and maintaining this schedule ous threat to the public health. should result in commercial operation by 1986 In the event that inventions or improve- or 1987. ments are made during the joint endeavor, MDAC need not report these to the Govern- The subject of the JEA with GTI Corp. is a ment. Records will be retained by MDAC metallurgical furnace. GTI’s furnace is a 200-lb and, if requested by NASA, the company will computer-controlled chamber that will be flown provide a brief description of the invention. in the cargo bay of the shuttle. The furnace will Such description is protected as data or a have 37 compartments for the melting and reso- trade secret if appropriate. lidification of some 220 alloy samples. Should this ● Confidentiality. –The JEA requires that data JEA prove the technical and commercial feasibility supplied by MDAC shall not be related out- of this furnace, GTI will market its ability to side the Government, except after notice to manage metallurgical experiments in microgravity the originator and agreement by the recipi- to interested public and private sector research ent to protect it from unauthorized use and organizations. disclosure. ● The JEA requires GTI to develop this furnace Recoupment. —Lastly, to provide the financial incentive for MDAC’S investment, the and NASA to test it on four shuttle flights. The jEA explicitly recognizes MDAC’S right to a first flight is presently scheduled for the third “fair return on investment.” Coupled with quarter of 1984. patent and data rights provisions of the JEA, Because MDAC/JEA has, and probably will con- a “fair return on investment” is to be tinue to serve as a model for future JEAs, and measured by what is obtained in the appro- since the industry/Government relationship estab- priate industry, including such factors as the lished in this agreement differs drastically from high-risk, long-term nature of the invest- the Government’s relationship to COMSAT, it is ment. useful to scrutinize the structure and purpose of this agreement. It is apparent from this brief review that the Government role in MPS is significantly different To create a climate suitable for commercializa- from its role in the development of aviation and tion in the MDAC case, the first JEA had to ad- communications satellite technologies. In part dress the following issues: this can be attributed to the fact that the markets ● ExcLusivity. — I n return for MDAC’s prom i se and technology for MPS are still in an embryonic to make results of the work available to the stage. In addition, research in communications U.S. public on reasonable terms and condi- satellites and civilian aviation can be conducted tions, NASA agrees to refrain from entering with only minimal recourse to Government fa- into similar joint endeavors or international cilities and the commercial operation of these cooperative agreements directly related to technologies can be accomplished with little —. .-—

234 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Government oversight. MPS research and prod- tions could proceed without close Government uct development, on the other hand, are still cooperation. For the near future, the JEA appears highly dependent on Government facilities. to bean important tool for continuing the unique Should such research result in a marketable prod- Government/industry relationship which is essen- uct, it is unclear how commercial MPS opera- tial to the development of a mature MPS industry.

OTHER SPACE-RELATED COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES Although this chapter has focused primarily on small part of the cost of the satellite, and in- the private sector’s involvement in fields of com- surance covering both interruption of service and munications and materials processing, with a less business loss can be purchased to protect this in- detailed look at remote sensing and space trans- vestment. In addition, by using sale/leaseback portation, it should be noted that the private sec- arrangements, the tax benefits that accrue from tor has several other opportunities for space-ori- transponder ownership can be sold to a third ented, profitmaking activities. Some of the more party. important of these activities are discussed below. Presumably, other space technologies will follow the path that communications satellites have Financing Space Ventures followed over the last two decades. As these Private banking institutions may have a role to technologies become more reliable and new fi- play in the future financing of both governmen- nancial arrangements allow the burden of their tal and nongovernmental space programs. Be- cost to be spread out among more investors, it cause the Government has played the lead role is certain that the role that private financial insti- in developing space systems, the involvement of tutions play in the commercialization of these private financial institutions has been rather lim- technologies will increase. ited. This is particularly true in the United States, Though private financial institutions have been and it seems unlikely that any significant changes reluctant to participate in space ventures, it is will occur in the near future. The situation in possible that innovative financial arrangements Europe is slightly different, in that, though the such as the R&D limited partnership may provide space projects are primarily funded by the gov- funds in this area.30 Basically stated, an R&D ernments, European banks have been involved limited partnership is a partnership formed for a in these projects as shareholders and as a source specific purpose, such as the development of a of loan capital .29 new product. This arrangement provides impor- Financial institutions have generally been reluctant tax advantages, in particular that participants tant to invest large sums of money in high-risk, may offset their investment in the R&D limited long-term space projects of the private sector. As partnership against their current income, even if new products are refined and their value as in- the latter was derived from an unrelated source. vestments proved, financing of private space ac- GTI intends to rely heavily on this mechanism to tivities will become more common. Recently, for finance its JEA with NASA. Should the GTI expe- example, financial institutions have been willing rience be favorable, there is no reason why the to fund the purchase of satellite transponders be- R&D limited partnership could not be used to cause communications satellites have come to be finance other private space ventures. regarded as relatively safe and attractive in- . vestments. The cost of transponders (approximately $10 million to $15 million) is a relatively 30 ’’ Limited Partnerships: Protits and Danger, ” cornm~ities, Vll (March/April 1978), 46; “Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships,” 29 G. Mazowita, “Space Industrialization, Programs, Policy, and /-/arvarc/ Law Review XC (1975), 745-762;“Tax Classification of Lim- Private Enterprise, ” Center for Research of Air and Space Law, ited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelter, ” New York McGill University, June 1981, p. 60. University Law Review Lll, 2, May 1977, 408-441. Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology Ž 235

Insurance in such a situation could be as high as $100 million to payload owner and an additional $500 mil- The industrialization of space will open up a lion for third-party claimants.32 The shuttle, there- new market for the insurance industry. As the fore, introduces costs at a level and of a complex- number and variety of space activities increase, ity unprecedented in the era of single payloads new methods of insuring against unforeseen flown on ELVs. Whether the relatively small losses will be needed. If such developments are group of underwriters who insure ELVs will be forthcoming, they will help to make investment able to handle the entire liability for space shut- in space more predictable and therefore more at- 31 tle operations is an open question. tractive to the private sector. Presently, there are four basic categories of sat- Hardware sales ellite insurance available: Aerospace Industry ● Ground insurance covers the satellite, launch vehicle, and related launch equip- The aerospace industry has been the principal ment until launch attempt or lift-off. private sector participant in commercial space ac- ● Launch failure insurance commences imme- tivities. The reasons for this are rather simple. The diately after lift-off and remains in effect un- aerospace industry has the most complete under- til the satellite achieves a successful orbit. standing of the advantages and limitations of the ● Satellite life insurance commences when space environment and employs large numbers launch failure insurance coverage termi- of people who are knowledgeable in space-re- nates. Satellite life insurance protects against lated technology. Industries that may profit con- financial damage caused by loss of orbit or siderably from space technology, such as phar- power, or by some technical malfunction. maceuticals, electronics, and metallurgy, are This insurance can be used to cover the re- reluctant to invest in R&D projects that require placement costs of the satellite and for eco- knowledge, personnel, and support facilities that nomic losses arising from disruption of serv- they do not have. ice. Another major advantage held by the aero- ● Liability insurance is used to compensate space industry is its traditionally close relation- third parties for bodily injury or property ship with Government. This relationship has had damage caused by the satellite or the launch two important consequences. The first, which vehicle. was mentioned above, is that the industry, often The types of insurance mentioned above were working under Government contract, has been developed primarily with expendable launch able to develop the expertise to deal with the vehicles in mind. The introduction of the shuttle space environment. The second is that the Gov- as an operational launch vehicle will present ernment, particularly the military, and the aero- substantial challenges to the insurance industry. space industry are accustomed to cooperating On the one hand, the shuttle should increase the and relying on one another. Most other indus- number of insurable payloads launched per year, tries, however, have little contact with the Gov- thereby providing a wider base over which to ernment, except in its role as regulator and taxer. spread risk. This should result in lower insurance Furthermore, normal Government procurement costs and increased participation by U.S. and for- practices, in which the aerospace industry is well- eign underwriters. On the other hand, the fact versed, are complex and raise numerous prob- that the shuttle can carry several payloads on one lems regarding the retention of intellectual flight raises serious questions about the effect that property. the loss of an entire shuttle might have on under- The structure of the aerospace industry also writers and insurance premiums. Potential liability provides some substantive advantages for devel- qZAViatiOn week and Space Technology, Apr. 30, 1979, P. 148; 3’Satellite Communications, “Condo Satellites: Can We Insure Contact, “Insurance Coverage in Outer Space, ” December 1977, Them?” August 1981, p. 45. p. 5. 236 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications oping technologies such as MPS. This industry is A recent marketing strategy report, written composed of a few large and essentially non- under contract for NASA, found that most firms diversified companies. This structure is a conse- are unwilling to undertake alone the substantial quence of an environment where competition is expense involved in the product identification, limited and funds are available to engage in large financing, hardware development and marketing but uncertain research projects. The aerospace necessary to commercialize space technology .33 industry has frequently been involved in long- The report suggested that NASA should attempt term projects starting with basic scientific research to disaggregate this process in order to facilitate and resulting ’in innovative new products. This private sector participation in MPS. There is some “long-range” perspective which will be necessary indication that this process of disaggregation will for MPS development is not characteristic of occur as a matter of course, as experience with many other industries. MPS grows. The JEA entered into between NASA and GTI tends to support this assumption. GTI’s New Markets willingness to accept the financial responsibility Until recently, the efforts of the private sector for one aspect of the commercialization process have been directed primarily to supplying the (in this instance, the provision of a valuable Government’s needs for launch vehicles, satel- research tool), may provide the incentive for lites, and related space hardware. As the user other firms to invest research dollars in this area. community for such hardware gradually broad- Small firms, universities, and research organiza- ens, it can be assumed that an increasingly greater tions generally do not have the capital necessary proportion of industry revenues will be derived to undertake independent research in space. from nongovernment sales. However, if the facilities were available at a relatively low cost, then a broad range of other- The first nongovernment aerospace market to wise unaffordable research might be undertaken. be developed was that of communications satellites. The private sector revenues from this market Ground Support Services are on the order of billions of dollars, and estimates for future demand suggest even greater re- Space technology requires a rather elaborate turns. Other opportunities for private sector aero- network of ground support services and facilities. space sales will flow from the development of the As this industry continues to expand, the private Boeing inertial upper stage and the McDonnell sector will almost certainly play a dispropor- Douglas spinning solid upper stage. These two tionately large part in the provision of such serv- upper stages will be used to transfer private-sector ices. A few early examples of this trend have al- payloads from the shuttle to the geostationary ready begun to appear. orbit. Yet another area of potential private-sector The initial placement and subsequent mainte- revenue will be the sale and lease of multiuser nance of a satellite in its proper orbit requires an instrumentation designed for MPS research on the elaborate tracking, telemetry, and control net- shuttle (discussed above in ch. 4). Examples of work. NASA has previously provided these serv- such instrumentation include the materials exper- ices, but as space activities become more com- iment assembly (MEA), developed by NASA, and mon, commercial firms could provide them. the metallurgical furnace being developed by GTI COMSAT has already begun to do so. In 1979, Corp. in a JEA with NASA. This last type of pri- COMSAT established the first commercial facil- vate-sector involvement may prove to be quite ity for satellite tracking, telemetry, and control significant. When NASA began the development services. 34 The COMSAT Launch Control Center of the MEA, it anticipated that private institutions (LCC) takes control of the spacecraft after lift-off might wish to lease this device to conduct their own experiments. Similarly, GTI’s development JJPrepared by students of the “Creative Marketing Strategy” efforts are predicated on the assumption that a course, Harvard Business School, “Materials Processing in Space: A Marketing Strategy,” June 1981. substantial market exists for relatively inexpen- Jdcommunications Satellite Corp. Magazine, No. 1, 1980, PP. 26 sive space-based research facilities. and 33; No. 5, 1981, pp. 9 and 38. Ch. 8—Commercialization of Space Technology ● 237 and injection into the transfer orbit, oversees the ble for refurbishment of orbiters after flight for insertion of the satellite into its proper orbital slot, subsequent missions, checkout and assembly of and then performs the functional checkout. Fol- the solid rocket boosters, external tanks, and lowing verification of proper operation, control other shuttle elements, and for support opera- of the satellite is then handed over to the owner/ tions and materials, including maintenance and operator for further verification, testing, and ulti- facilities operations. mately, operations. The LCC was used for the first The transfer of shuttle processing to the private time with the launch of SBS-1 in November 1980. sector is an important step toward commercializ- Another area in which the private sector will ing the entire space shuttle program. As has been certainly play an increasingly important role will mentioned many times before, industry is reluc- be in the provision of postflight processing of the tant to invest in the shuttle, or any new space shuttle. Currently, NASA, using more than 25 in- technology, because it cannot accurately assess dividual contractors, is responsible for shuttle the risks and the potential return. As industry processing; it has, however, recently invited in- becomes familiar with the shuttle, or other new dustry to bid on a contract to perform this func- space technologies, it will be in a better position tion.35 The company chosen would be responsi- to make the kind of financial assessments which must precede any major commercial investment. JSAViatlOn week ancf Space Technology, “Shuttle Contracts TO Be Let to Industry,” Nov. 2, 1981, p. 51; Aviation Week and Space Technology, “Processing Efficiencies of Shuttle Studied,” Nov. 30, 1981, p. 18. Chapter 9 INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Contents

Page Introduction...... 241 policy ...... 241 Current Institutional Framework ...... 241 Current NASA Structure ...... 242 Department of Commerce Space Activities...... 243 Other Federal Space Efforts ...... 245 Differing Goals, Differing Structures ...... 245 An Expanded National Space Program ...... 245 Continuation of the Status Quo ...... 246 A Tightly Constrained Program ...... 246 institutions for Space Applications R&D ...... 248 Institutional Issues and Demonstration Projects ...... 250 institutions for Space Applications Operations...... 251 Private Benefits, Private Operators, Government Regulation ...... 251 Public Benefits, Public Operators...... 252 Organizational Alternatives When the Benefits Are Mixed ...... 253 Transition From Development to Operations: Institutional Aspects ...... 254 Transition to Government Operations ...... 255 Transition From Government R&D to Private Operation ...... 256 institutions for Supporting Space Operations ...... 256 Space Applications in an International Context: Institutional Aspects ...... 257 Institutional Aspects of Specific Applications ...... 259 Communications ...... 259 Remote Sensing ...... 260 Materials Processing ...... 262 Transportation ...... 263

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page 20. Federal Agencies Active in the National Space Effort ...... 242 21. NASA and Its Contractor Base...... 243 22. NASA Institutional Structure ...... 244

FIGURE

Figure No. Page 15. Management Structure of NODS ...... 249 Chapter 9 INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

National civilian space policy is implemented stitution are not tied to some set of externally in a specific institutional framework, one which determined needs or goals, then the internal has evolved over the almost 25 years of U.S. needs and objectives of the institution itself— space activity. (The evolution of that framework growth, maintenance, or, at a minimum, survival is described in app. A.) This framework is the —can emerge as dominant influences on policy. means for accomplishing policy objectives, and The U.S. space program has not been immune it must be evaluated by how well it has done so to this tendency. For example, in 1969 the pro- and, more importantly, can be expected to do posals for a future space program built around so in the future. Is the current institutional frame- orbiting space stations and a space transporta- work, which was largely established in the early tion system operating in the region between the years of the civilian space program, still appropri- Earth and the Moon, with an eventual goal of ate, given the options for future national space manned planetary exploration, emerged from policy? This chapter will examine this question within the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- and suggest the characteristics of alternate institu- ministration’s (NASA’S) manned space flight orga- tional frameworks for the U.S. space applications nization, not in response to some externally im- effort. posed goal or objective.

Policy overall, this assessment explicitly recognizes that the private sector can play an increasingly policy formulation includes, first, the identifica- important role in space. The present chapter, in tion and evaluation of alternative objectives and treating Government institutions and public pol- ways of achieving them, and second, the choice icy mechanisms, provides some guidelines for of a particular set of objectives and courses of determining the appropriate division between action (i.e., policies). Policy implementation is the public and private sector roles in space, and it application of policies to achieve particular goals. considers various methods and incentives to stim- Although policy choice and policy execution are ulate and support private sector activity, including closely intertwined, this chapter focuses on the potential mechanisms for Government/industry institutional framework for implementing pol- cooperation or collaboration in space applica- icy, not on the mechanisms for policy formula- tions. tion and choice, which are discussed in chapter 10. What receives attention, rather, are the links In summary, this chapter analyzes issues related between policy objectives and institutions, and to alternative institutional frameworks for orga- the difficulties of establishing any one framework nizing the Government’s share of the national to meet significantly differing or changing objec- civilian space applications program. It does not attempt to identify a single “best” framework; the tives. choice of an institutional arrangement— is a deriv- One qualification to this distinction is immedi- ative issue, one dependent on answering the ately necessary. If the activities of a particular in- question, “Best for what?”

CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK Before alternative institutions are examined, it ernment actor for civilian programs is still NASA, is important to characterize the current structure although other Federal agencies are becoming within the Federal Government. The major Gov- increasingly involved in space. Table 20 lists the

241 —.—

242 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 20.—Federal Agencies Active in the National Space Effortn

Budget for space activities (FY 1982 estimate Significant Agency in millions) space-related work Department of Defense ...... $5,916.3 Communications, command and cent rol. Navigation, environmental forecasting. Surveillance R&D related to future military applications.

NASA ...... $5,617.3 R&D related to science and applications; transportation

Department of Commerce ...... $126.3 Environmental monitoring. Remote sensing (in 1983). Weather satellites.

Department of Energy...... $38.0 Space nuclear power systems. Department of Agriculture ...... $17.2 Crop assessment. Monitoring of soil, water, and vegetation.

Department of the Interior ...... $12.6 Surveillance and monitoring of natural resources. Mapping.

alt is not ~O~~ibla t. ~r~vlde a separate budget estimate for irltelllgence-related space activities, some of which are included in DOD figures.

SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget.

Government agencies with significant space-re- 2. COMSAT was chartered to be the initial op- lated activities. erator of communications satellites used for international traffic; later, the domestic com- Current NASA Structure munications satellite market was opened to any firm that could meet regulatory require- The institution with primary responsibility for ments. the civilian space program is NASA, created in 3. NASA operates space launch systems as well 1958 in response to Sputnik and mobilized in as conducting R&D on space transportation. 1961 to achieve a goal of preeminence in all areas of space activity, particularly the development of NASA’s internal structure has remained basical- the (large) technological systems required for the ly unchanged during the past two decades. NASA Apollo program. It is essential to emphasize that headquarters in Washington is responsible for NASA was not designed to conduct routine overall management and technical direction of operation of space systems that provide services the various activities carried out by NASA field to public and private users. Instead, operational centers (many of which were inherited from the responsibilities have been assigned ad hoc: National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics), and outside contractors. it is also the focal point 1. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- for relations with the Executive Office of the Presi- ministration’s (NOAA’s) National Environ- dent, Congress, and other Federal agencies. The mental Satellite Services (formerly the various NASA field centers are in charge of spe- Weather Bureau) operates meteorological cific projects; most of the actual R&D work is per- satellites, while NASA continues to do rele- formed by private contractors. The Federal Gov- vant research and development (R&D); ernment initiates programs and projects, monitors NOAA is also scheduled to assume manage- technical performance of contractors, and (to ment of the Landsat remote-sensing system date) has been the primary user of the spacecraft in early 1983. and launch systems incorporating the results of Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 243

R&D. Some 80 to 90 percent of NASA’s annual provide the means for carrying out challenging budget goes to external grants and contracts; this and significant efforts, as Apollo, the space shut- pattern has remained relatively constant over the tle, and Voyager (among many other accomplish- years. Though NASA has maintained a substan- ments), have demonstrated. As Congress and the tial in-house research capability, the bulk of its Nation consider future objectives for the U.S. expenditures have gone to establish an extensive space program, the resources NASA has already network of research organizations in industry, developed must be considered. If these resources universities, and nonprofit organizations. Table are not used wisely and well, they will disperse 21 shows the past and present size of NASA and and will be difficult to reassemble. its support base. The set of NASA field centers today is the same Department of Commerce as it was during the early 1960’s, except that a recent reorganization has led to a reduction in Space Activities the number of centers reporting directly to NASA The Department of Commerce’s (DOC’S) in- headquarters. Table 22 gives information on the volvement in space dates to 1961, when Congress current NASA field center structure. Because directed DOC to establish and operate a meteor- NASA is responsible for different kinds of space ological satellite system to observe worldwide en- activities (as well as experimental aeronautical vironmental conditions and to report, process, work), including science, applications, and devel- and apply data obtained by this system. This opment of technical capability, and because re- responsibility is now borne by NOAA. More spe- sponsibility for each of those missions and its cifically, NOAA’s meteorological satellite pro- associated projects is rather closely tied to one grams are lodged in the National Earth Satellite or more field centers, one of NASA headquarters’ Service (NESS) (until recently the National Envi- major responsibilities is allocating priorities and ronmental Satellite Service). I n November 1979, resources. Decisions on policy and program pri- NOAA was also assigned responsibility for operat- orities thus directly affect the associated field ing the U.S. land remote-sensing satellite systems, centers, and the current structure fosters com- beginning with Landsat-D, in 1983. petition among the centers within NASA’s overall program. In this competition, for reasons to Through the years NASA and NOAA have be examined, technology development and worked closely together to improve the Nation’s space science and exploration have traditional- ability to observe Earth from space: NASA con- ly been more successful than space applications. ducts R&D, and NOAA operates the satellite sys- NASA’s institutional base constitutes an impres- tems once they have been proved. This relation- sive national resource for space R&D. NASA’s ship dates back to the initial TIROS weather sat- personnel, facilities, and contractor support base ellites and will continue i n the Landsat program.

Table 21 .—NASA and Its Contractor Base

NASA Personnel Personnel at Funds provided to budget at NASA NASA grantees and contractors, in NASA field in millions Year millions headquarters centers a Industry University and nonprofit 1962 $1,825.3 1,641 26,938 $1,030 $50 1966 $5,175.0 2,152 35,903 $4,087 $178 1971 $3,312.6 1,894 31,805 $2,279 $162 1981 $5,537.2 1,658 25,755 $3,746 $361

aJet propulsion Laborato~ is included, although formally it is part of the California Institute of Technology SOURCE: National Aeronautics and SDace Administration. —

244 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table 22.—NASA Institutional Structure

FY 1980 FY 1980 FY 1980 R&D research and program personnel Name of center funding management funding complement Headquarters (Washington, D. C.) ...... $ 133.8 $89.5 1,658 Johnson Space Center—manned flight (Houston, Tex.)...... 1,347.3 164.1 3,616 Ames Research Center (Mountain View, Calif.)...... 159.7 87.8 2,212 Goddard Space Flight Center—remote sensing (Greenbelt, Md.)...... 548.3 151.2 3,941 Kennedy Space Center—launch services (Cocoa Beach, Fla.) ...... 277.1 133,2 2,291 Langley Research Center (Hampton, Va.) ...... 169.8 114.0 3,094 Lewis Research Center—aeronautical research (Cleveland, Ohio) ...... 168.1 94.8 2,901 Marshall Space Flight Center—space propulsion (Huntsville, Ala.) ., ...... 846.8 155.9 3,646 National Space Technologies Laboratory (Bay St. Louis, Miss.) ...... 9.2 4.9 111 Jet Propulsion Laboratorya-space — science (Pasadena, Calif.) ...... 276.5 —— $3,936.6 $995.4 23,470

aJpL is f~eraliy funded but is operated by the California Institute Of Technology. SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Technology Assessment.

Satellites currently operated by NOAA/NESS in- orological data from NOAA satellites are also clude: 1) polar orbiting satellites with day and widely disseminated and used by foreign coun- night global coverage and 2) geostationary satel- tries. lites that provide continuous viewing of cloud and storm patterns in the Western Hemisphere. In ad- NOAA integrates satellite-derived data with dition, NOAA was to have been a participant, data derived from other sources in preparing together with NASA and the Department of the weather forecasts and warnings about disturb- Navy, in a proposed National Oceanic Satellite ances on the Sun, in space, in the upper at- System; (NOSS) the project, however, has been mosphere, and in the Earth’s magnetic field; in- indefinitely deferred. tegrated data are used in various resource management tasks as well. In addition to using NESS disseminates its data and products within satellite-derived data for operations, NOAA con- a few hours of acquisition to a wide variety of ducts a variety of R&D programs which make use users, the most prominent of which are the Na- of these data or directly support its space-related tional Weather Service and the Department of activities. Defense (DOD). The data are also recorded and archived by NOAA’s Environmental Data and in- Other DOC organizations involved in space- formation Services. The data from the geosta- related activities include the Maritime Administra- tionary satellites are distributed in real-time to tion, which uses satellites to improve the efficien- seven satellite field services stations, which fur- cy of ship communication, navigation, and opera- ther distribute them to a number of users. Mete- tions, and the National Telecommunications and Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 245

Information Administration, which is the Federal 2. The Department of the Interior (DOI) uses agency responsible for policy on the use of the space-derived data in executing its responsi- frequency spectrum and geostationary orbit and bilities in resource management. The U.S. for exploring new applications of telecommunica- Geological Survey, part of DOI, manages the tions technology. Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS) program, which develops, demonstrates, Other Federal Space Efforts and encourages applications of remotely sensed data acquired from both aircraft and The largest Government space program, at least spacecraft (see app. B on the Bureau of Land as measured by budget outlays, is conducted by Management). DOD. This chapter focuses on civilian space ac- 3. Other agencies of the Government, particu- tivities; for a description of DOD programs, see larly the-Department of Agriculture, but also chapter 6. The space programs of other agencies organizations such as the Environmental Pro- are as follows: tection Agency, make routine use of space- 1. The Department of Energy (DOE) carries out derived data (particularly from Landsat) in technology development and production ef- carrying out their missions. They do not, forts for nuclear-powered electric generators however, participate in space-related hard- to be used on long-duration spacecraft suit- ware development. The Department of Agri- able for planetary missions. DOE has stud- culture has been a major participant in such ied space systems to dispose of nuclear R&D efforts as LACIE (large area crop inven- waste, and makes use of remote sensing data tory experiment) and AgRISTARS, and inte- in support of its responsibilities to seek grates Earth observation data in its crop as- energy sources and to site facilities for nu- sessment and forecasting operations (see clear waste disposal. and other energy-related app. C on Foreign Agricultural Service), needs.

DIFFERING GOALS, DIFFERING STRUCTURES

There is no single institutional framework that An Expanded National Space Program is “best” for the civilian space program. Rather, different national objectives in space can best be One possibility for the national space effort is accomplished by different institutional structures; setting another Apollo-like goal, i.e., a large and goals and the means to achieve them should be challenging enterprise to be achieved on a press- matched. The three scenarios below suggest the ing schedule. Several such enterprises have been wide variety of institutional frameworks possible, suggested over the past few years; most involve and how they are related to various futures for the development of capabilities for routine the civilian space program:.- manned operations in low-Earth orbit, now that the shuttle has made this location more accessi- ● an expanded program, focusing either on a ble for a variety of purposes. Other proposed ob- new goal comparable to Apollo or the shut- jectives include: 1) a large structure in geosyn- tle, or on a variety of advanced applications chronous orbit, and development of reusable projects; transportation to GSO, and 2) solar power satel- ● continuation of the status quo; and lites. NASA’s current leadership has endorsed the ● further reductions in the Government share concept of some form of low-orbit, manned, of the civilian space program. space operations center as NASA’s next major 246 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications project, and congressional space committees more pluralistic. Several mission agencies and pri- have, in general, supported such proposals.1 Like vate firms could participate substantially. the shuttle, an orbiting operations center would be a means to carry out a variety of space appli- Continuation of the Status Quo cations and science missions, not an end in itself. Development and testing of the space shuttle Such a high-technology development project have been the major components of NASA’s would require the kind of engineering effort budget over the past few years, and they are likely which current NASA development centers are to dominate for the next three or four. Partly as best able to provide. NASA’s present institutional a consequence, there have been few “new structure is largely a product of the 1961 commit- starts” in any program area—science, explora- ments to preeminence in space, particularly the tion, applications, or technology development. Apollo program. One consideration is that the Continuation of this situation would reflect a ability of NASA and its contractors to undertake policy decision that NASA’s major role should be a substantial engineering effort will erode with- developing space transportation capabilities for out a commitment to such an enterprise. Scien- other users, such as DOD, the private sector, and tific and engineering talent of the highest quali- other civilian agencies. Activities in space science ty is in short supply in the United States. Given and applications would continue, but at relatively the current shortage of manpower available to low levels. support military and private sector space activities, NASA’s personnel will be lured away to The United States probably could not afford to more challenging work elsewhere if NASA does maintain NASA’s entire institutional base under not soon undertake a major new effort. Some this scenario. Although it may be in the national have suggested that NASA and its technical and interest to maintain NASA’s capacity to under- managerial capabilities should be mobilized for take a major technology program, NASA as it cur- nonspace R&D projects, particularly in energy. rently exists would eventually become outdated. Whether NASA’s technical expertise, prob- Certain applications activities, and their associ- lem-solving approach, and institutional char- ated centers, might be “spun-off” to the private acteristics are relevant to meeting other national sector or the military. goals requires further analysis, and is outside the scope of this assessment. A Tightly Constrained Program Another scenario would be based on a judg- A variation of the preceding scenario with ment that the current and potential benefits of somewhat the same institutional implications is applying space technology justify increased Gov- one in which no compelling rationale for a large- ernment investment in applications R&D, particu- scale civilian space program gains acceptance. larly in the face of international competition and In this case, NASA’s size, scope, and mission foreign government support for applications pro- would be reduced to a continued but restricted grams. Included in this scenario would be Federal investigation of potential space applications. Ag- commitments: 1 ) to take the policy and institu- gressive pursuit of other promising opportunities tional initiatives needed to move from develop- would be postponed until the potential payoffs ment to operations in the public sector, and 2) can justify investment of substantial public re- to introduce innovative methods to bring the pri- sources. One possibility is the gradual retrench- vate sector into full partnership. There would be ment of NASA toward a research and early techno overriding Apollo-like project to key the na- nology development organization with close links tional effort; rather, the program would become to the users of R&D. This restricted range of responsibilities would be similar to that of NASA’s predecessor, the National Advisory Committee ‘Administrator lames Beggs has repeated Iy made this point, and on Aeronautics (NACA).2 there is currently a top-level study underway within NASA related to future space station plans. See, for example, Aviation Week and IFOr a discussionof NACA, see Arthur L. Levine, The future of Space Technology, July 27, 1981, pp. 23-25. U.S. Space Program (New York: Praeger, 1975), ch. 2. Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 247

A key issue in all the above scenarios would In either alternative, more effective instruments be the division of roles and responsibilities be- would be required to link private and public sec- tween public and private sectors, and between tor users of space technology with NASA, the NASA and other agencies within the Federal central R&D space agency. A tradition of col- structure. There are two possible basic alter- laboration between NASA as an R&D agency, natives, and the remainder of this chapter pro- operators of space systems, and the user com- vides criteria for evaluating them. These alter- munities has not yet developed, but is a necessi- natives are: ty if this alternative is to be viable. NACA, NASA’s predecessor, had a mixed public-private govern- 1. NASA could become the civilian space agen- ing board representing all interests involved in cy, not just the space R&D agency. In addi- aeronautics, both civilian and military. While not tion to continuing to do R&D, NASA would necessarily a relevant model for a “new NASA, ” operate space transportation services, the this pattern of developer-user linkage proved very space segment and initial data processing for successful in advancing the U.S. position in Earth observation systems (weather, land re- aeronaut ics.3 mote sensing, ocean remote sensing), public Much of the remainder of this chapter is a service communications satellites, and other detailed analysis of the institutional issues in- space systems pro bono publico. NASA volved in operating space technologies and in would also develop common “in-orbit infra- strengthening coordination between govern- structure, “ i.e., platforms, power supplies, mental and nongovernmental developers, oper- communications and telemetry systems, ators, and users of space technology. construction and servicing capabilities, etc., which public and private organizations As the issues relating to commercialization are could use on a reimbursable basis. In this discussed in chapter 8, the following will concen- scheme, NASA would assist firms in trans- trate on Government operations, though many forming new space applications into profit- of the issues involved are similar. For the purpose able commercial ventures. of this analysis, it is possible to separate the process of applying space technology into five distinct 2. NASA could remain limited to an R&D role, phases, each of which has different institutional and other Government agencies, such as implications. The following sections discuss ge- NOAA, or private or quasi-private sector en- neric institutional implications. tities, such as COMSAT, would undertake various operational activities. NASA, in this 1. research and development; option, could either: a) conduct an R&D ap- 2. demonstration; plications program to advance technology 3. transition to operational status; without regard for its immediate commer- 4. operational status; and cial potential, b) concentrate on public good 5. support of operational systems, including applications of space technology, leaving it continuing R&D in an applications area. to the private sector to invest in developing After this general discussion, and after analysis commercial applications, or c) focus on sup- of the international institutional aspects of space porting public and private users. One issue applications in the next section, the last section related to this scenario is the allocation of discusses the institutional issues specific to each responsibility for operating “space utilities” applications area, such as transportation, power, communications, construction facilities, etc. Jlbid. 248 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

INSTITUTIONS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS R&D NASA was assigned Government responsibili- ever, NASA continued to emphasize the develop- ty for civilian space R&D by the National ment of more sophisticated applications technol- Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act of 1958. How- ogy rather than bringing adequate applications ever the act was not specific about NASA’s (or systems into early operation. This is in part a anyone else’s) role in using or operating the reflection of the reality that, once NASA com- results of that R&D. In space applications, almost pletes R&D for an applications program, it must by definition, R&D is conducted not as an end transfer it to some user outside of the agency. in itself but as a necessary step in reducing uncer- Consequently, the organization tends to hold on tainties and developing methods for the use of to programs, even if that means prolonging the space systems to provide public or private ben- R&D phase beyond the optimum point. The efits. Since applications are meant to be used, Landsat program, which many users have been the key institutional question is how to create a treating as if it were already operational, is a case productive relationship between performers of in point. R&D and the ultimate users. In recent years, NASA has put a higher priori- There are crucial differences between R&D ty on developing closer relationships with poten- conducted for systems to be operated by the tial operators and users of space technology, par- Government and R&D for those to be operated ticularly in remote sensing and advanced satellite by private firms. In particular, R&D for commer- communications. The management structure cial applications must be influenced by considera- 4 which had been adopted for the now-canceled tions of eventual profitability. However, there NOSS gave NASA a central R&D role in bringing are also important common elements, particularly the demonstration system into being, but in- with respect to the relationship between user and volved users, particularly from other Federal developer. In the space sector, NASA has from agencies, in management committees at three dif- the start (with the exception of launch services) ferent levels of program operation. Figure 15 il- been confined to R&D. This limitation, reinforced lustrates the NOSS management structure; it by the fact that NASA attracted in its early years seems that a similar structure might be ap- engineers oriented towards advancing the fron- propriate in other applications areas. tiers of knowledge and technological capability, and the institutional culture derived from missions such as Apollo and planetary exploration, have Such a structure links R&D managers with users certainly influenced NASA’s applications efforts. and provides a setting for resolving differences NASA has developed an orientation towards in priorities, technical requirements, and budg- “technology push” efforts. This orientation etary commitments among involved participants. militates against being responsive to potential Few space applications R&D projects serve a operators and users of space technology, who ex- single set of user requirements, and few will in- ercise “demand pull” on the directions of space volve only NASA in their conduct. Thus a man- applications development. agement structure for future application programs in which developers, operators, and users are NASA, particularly in its early years, inevitably linked from the start appears an improvement put more stress on advancing the technological over past management practices in, for example, frontier than on developing technology in re- the Landsat program. sponse to user demands (which were virtually nonexistent) or in anticipation of the kinds of There is an unavoidable tension between the demands likely to arise. As the practical uses of developers of a new technological capability and the new technologies began to take shape, how- those who hope to use it. The most frequent fail-

4 ure in Federal R&D programs is inadequate at- This distinction is well-made in Peter House and David Jones, Geftirrg It tithe She/f (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1977), chs. tention to the realities and needs of eventual users 3-5. in the planning and earliest research phases of Ch. 9—lnstitutional Considerations . 249

Figure 15.–Management Structure of NOSS

a programs Engineers prefer to work in an en- should be careful attention to the costs of oper- vironment where the only constraints are tech- ating a system. R&D serves in large part as a nological. In addition, the resources provided for means of reducing uncertainty, but reducing cost planning an R&D project, as opposed to conduct- and performance uncertainties may be just as ing it, are often inadequate. As R&D is being crucial as reducing technical uncertainties. Cer- planned, users should participate in identifying tainly the benefit calculus will be different for specific applications, the environment in which public and private applications, since Govern- they must operate, and the economic factors that ment is not concerned with showing a profit. [f will constrain an operational system. None of a service can never be profitable, but society these factors has been given priority in NASA’s needs it, then it is Government that propwly pro- applications programs until recently; rather, new vides such a service. Even for public services, technological opportunities have been the driv- however, operating costs must be a continuing ing force in R&D planning. focus of concern throughout an R&D effort. Space activities are justified by a variety of ra- The LACIE program provides an example of tionales. But to the degree that space applications such problems in the space applications area.6 are justified by their potential benefits, there These problems can be avoided if developers work closely with users in guiding an R&D proj- ‘Norman McEachron, et ● l., Management of Federal R&D for Wt. Commercialization, report from SRI International to Experimental Technology Incentives Program, Department of Commerce, 1978, %eneral Accounting Office, Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Prog- p. IV-28. ms and Pro6&ms, GAO Report, PSAD-78-52, Apr. 7, 1978. 250 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

If the R&D is in an area intended for eventual than has been the case with NASA’s past applica- commercialization, then market analysis needs tions programs. Users must be significantly in- to be incorporated even at early stages in the R&D volved, without stultifying the creativity of re- effort. The total range of users, their current pat- searchers. Some means of resolving inconsisten- terns of operation, and the ways in which a new cies among user needs is required. Cost perform- application might modify those patterns need to ance as well as technical performance must be be identified. The likelihood that services or prod- borne in mind throughout the R&D process. In ucts can be produced at a cost acceptable to pri- areas of new applications, the R&D project vate purchasers needs to be estimated, and these should be designed to give early and concrete estimates refined during the life history of the evidence of specific benefits and the ways in R&D effort. In this way, R&D intended for com- which they will assist various classes of users. The mercial application will be guided by private sec- kind of management structure which had been tor considerations from its inception. planned for the NOSS program might provide In summary, then, the R&D phase of space ap- many of these features for public sector uses; plications activities needs to incorporate sub- commercial activities require market analysis and private sector involvement. stantially more planning for eventual application

INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS The primary goal of an R&D program is to re- a new technology to operational status.7 Those duce uncertainties about the technical charac- characteristics include: teristics of an application opportunity. By con- 1. A technology we//in hand. Demonstration trast, a demonstration project is intended to il- projects are not laboratories for resolving lustrate the performance of a new technological technological problems; rather, a successful capability in a realistic operating environment, demonstration project concentrates on pro- in order to provide the information which poten- viding information on the nontechnology-re- tial operators need to bring that new technology Iated characteristics of a new capability. on line. When an R&D program provides evi- Thus, demonstration projects should not be dence that a new technology is likely to be com- initiated prematurely, while major techno- mercially viable, potential private sector operators logical uncertainties remain. can undertake their own demonstration. But 2. Cost and risk sharing between developer and when the R&D program does not provide clear evidence, or when the benefits have a mixed potential operator. If the demonstration project is a marketing tool to demonstrate to po- public/private character, then the Government must subsidize at least part of the demonstration tential users the operating characteristics of phase. a new technology, but these users are not included in planning or, where feasible, in Failure to recognize and adjust to the dif- sharing the costs and risks of the demonstra- ferences between the R&D and demonstration tion project, it is unlikely that the project will stages is a likely source of difficulty in bringing be responsive to the users’ need for infor- new applications into being; it is very difficult to mation. combine R&D and demonstration efforts in one 3. Congruence with technology delivery sys- undertaking. tem. In order to bring a new technology into * It is possible to specify characteristics linked to 7Walter Baer, Leland Johnson, and Edward Merrow, Ana/ysis of Federa//y-Funded Demonstration Projects, report from Rand Cor- the success of a demonstration project in pro- poration to Experimental Technology Incentives Program, Depart- viding the information to decide whether to take ment of Commerce, 1976, p. v, Ch. 9—lnstitutional Considerations Ž 251

being there must exist some way to translate to be resolved in order to make the Federal R&D a technological possibility into an operating effort in applications more likely to pay off. In par- reality. The demonstration project should be ticular, NASA has not been able to secure the organized to reflect the specific character- budgetary resources or political support required istics of such a “technology delivery sys- to conduct a demonstration, as defined here, of tern. ” When the technological capability remote-sensing systems; rather, NASA has at- does not match existing manufacturing or tempted to combine R&D and demonstration ef- utilization patterns, particular care is needed forts in the Landsat program. Earlier communica- to consider how those patterns might be tions satellites such as the Syncom project in the affected. 1960’s and the ATS applications technology sat- 4. Inclusion of all elements needed for opera- ellite projects in the 1970’s approximated some tion. Successful demonstration projects of the requirements of a successful demonstra- should include in their planning and execution project, although even in these cases R&D tion: potential operating organizations, po- and demonstration goals were combined. Ex- tential users of a new technological capabili- perience suggests that operators and users, ty, manufacturers of the systems in which the whether private or public, are not willing to in- R&D result will be embedded, potential reg- vest in a demonstration effort because of the par- ulators, and other target audiences. ticular characteristics of space activity, such as 5. Absence of tight time constraints. Demon- high front-end cost and technical uncertainties. stration projects which face tight time and As is implied by the definition of demonstra- budget constraints are less likely to provide tion project as concerned primarily with nontech- the necessary information needed for an op- nical aspects of a new technology, the design and eration decision. execution of a successful demonstration project The demonstration phase has proven to be a requires people trained in marketing, manufac- crucial step in translating R&D work into suc- turing processes, and other aspects of system op- cessful operating systems; experience in the eration in addition to individuals concerned with defense sector (“fly before you buy”), for exam- the technical aspects. Planning of a demonstra- ple, confirms this observation. The role of a sep- tion project should insure that these capabilities arate demonstration phase is an area of both are included in the project teams. Demonstra- policy and program uncertainty in recent space tion projects managed and staffed by engineers applications efforts, and this uncertainty needs alone are unlikely to be successful.

INSTITUTIONS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS OPERATIONS Properly speaking, the next topic should be the tion will discuss the institutional framework for institutional issues related to making the transi- making space applications technologies operation from demonstration of a new application to tional. its incorporation in operational systems. How- ever, it makes little sense to discuss institutional Private Benefits, Private Operators, alternatives for this transition phase without some Government Regulation prior discussion of “transition to what?” In addition, there are important differences between If the benefit to be delivered is primarily or a space application operated by Government, purely private in character, such as point-to-point and one in the private sector. Therefore, this sec- telephone or television relay, then private sec- 252 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications tor operators are the appropriate entities for that tion than by the potential of a new technology. application. The Government role in this situa- Alternatively, engineers tend to stress techno- tion, once the transition from a Federal R&D pro- logical advancement and the development of gram is complete, is regulatory in character. new equipment, which may yield an impractical system. New technological capabilities are, after all, Public Benefits, Public Operators only means to accomplishing some set of broader ends; in the organization of the Federal Govern- When a service has an overwhelmingly public- ment, most agencies are assigned a specific mis- good character, it is often (though not always) sion, rather than being organized around the the case that Government itself operates the means needed to provide the services they of- system that provides that service. The social fer. According to this model, space application security program, the census, and military forces systems should not be managed by a “space” are examples of systems managed under public agency but by those who make ultimate use of auspices. In the space applications area, mete- the technology, i.e., the mission agencies. An ex- orological data closely approximates a pure ample is NOAA’s operation of weather satellites, public good, and the national Government has which are developed and built by NASA, accord- not only developed but operated weather satel- ing to NOAA specifications. NOAA in effect lites through NOAA. serves as a middleman between the developer, The major institutional issue related to Gov- NASA, and the end users, domestic and interna- ernment operation of a space applications sys- tional. A major problem arises when space system is whether NASA or some other Govern- tems, particularly remote sensing, serve a number ment agency should operate space systems. The of functions and a variety of users. This diversity NAS Act has been interpreted to limit NASA to makes it difficult to relate these applications to an R&D role, but reviews over the past decade a single mission agency such as Commerce, in- have noted that it is possible, even without leg- terior, or Agriculture. islative revision, to assign more of an operational Arguments supporting a single organization for responsibility to NASA. Certainly, it would be development and operations are to a large degree possible to modify the 1958 act specifically to per- the converse of those just stated. R&D can best mit or mandate NASA to assume an operational responsibility. be made responsible to the requirements of both ultimate operators and users if a single chain of The question of whether NASA or some other command deals with both phases of a project. agency should operate Government-owned Organizations with heavy investment in existing space systems depends on whether it is more systems are likely to be unresponsive to new tech- desirable to link development and operation in nologies and associated ways of doing business a single organization, or to separate development developed by “outsiders.” If a technology is from operation so that each organization has its transferred from one organization to another, dif- own management structure. The major argument ficult problems of changes in organizational loyal- for separating development and operation is the ty, and disruption of prior relationships with sup- likelihood that the conflicts between them will pliers, contractors, and users, are likely to occur. interfere with the ultimate objective of estab- The management of applications systems on the lishing the optimum applications system. The basis of their technological character rather than characteristics of a particular organization will the function they perform makes sense, it is determine whether user requirements or engi- argued, because of the multiplicity of users with neering desiderata predominate. Users tend to different requirements, and because continuing be conservative, to prefer only incremental R&D can be more effectively incorporated into changes from current practice, and to be driven existing systems if both are carried out in the same more by consideration of cost and ease of opera- organizational structure. Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 253

The ideal framework for bringing a new ap- ice to nongovernmental users and to make plication into operation is an effective and a profit on those services; meaningful partnership between developing and 3. single privately owned and operated system using organizations. In some cases, particularly with guaranteed Government purchases and where the new technology provides a service that some protection from competition. The is not presently provided by established agencies, owners of such a system would have the and where extensive technical and managerial responsibility for developing and servicing expertise is required to operate the system, it is the private market for the system’s products; preferable to retain close ties between developer and and operator. This is clearly the case for launch 4. privately owned and operated system or sys- vehicles. In land remote sensing, too, it can be tems (depending on the demand) with open argued that NASA is the appropriate agency both competition for sales to both public and to develop and to operate a Federal system, private markets and with the prices of its pro- rather than transferring operations either to duct or service determined by market forces. another Federal agency (i. e., NOAA) or to a private firm. (Commercialization of remote sens- The criteria for selecting among these alter- ing would eliminate NASA’s operational role.) natives are specific to particular applications areas Transferring responsibility to NOAA, as is present- and thus are discussed in detail in section X11. In ly being done, may not be desirable. For manag- general, the Government-owned alternatives ing weather satellites, on the other hand, NOAA would be preferable if the Government were, at has the past experience, service orientation, and least for the foreseeable future, the dominant close ties to users required for effective opera- user, or if major noneconomic factors, such as tion. NASA can be of service by acting as “prime foreign policy or national security concerns, con- contractor” in meeting specifications set largely strained the use of the application. Private sec- by the user agency. tor operation would be preferable when it offers greater efficiency, more flexibility, more effective Organizational Alternatives When linkages to various user communities, and where the economic incentives for a private operator the Benefits Are Mixed are strong enough to ensure that the new applica- When both Government and the private section gets a fair test as an operational system, Any tor are major users of a new service, there is a choice among these alternatives is likely to be variety of institutional options. Which alternative controversial, and dependent in large part on po- is preferred depends on the characteristics of the litical philosophy and the specifics of a particular application and of existing organizations, and on situation. the likelihood that the new application will be A comparison of prior efforts to establish opera- integrated smoothly into the existing institutional framework. Thus, general guidelines are difficult tional systems is important in analyzing institutional alternatives. (This comparison is limited to to state. The organizational alternatives in this situation are several. They include: domestic entities at this point; section Xl contains analysis of the experience of international entities 1. Government-owned and Government-oper- such as INTELSAT and INMARSAT.) In the space ated system in which private users of the area, the most significant institution created so system purchase services or products from far has been COMSAT; this experience is ana- Government at a cost which is determined lyzed in some detail in chapter 8. What is rele- by Federal policy rather than market forces; vant here is to recognize that COMSAT was cre- 2. Government-owned, but contractor-operated for a combination of political as well as ated system in which the Government uses economic reasons. One strong motivation was a large portion of the system’s products but to avoid granting a monopoly in international where the contractor is also free, within sateliite communications to AT&T. However, some set of Federal restrictions, to offer serv- there was a recognition that satellite communica- 254 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications tions could be a private profit-making venture. drance to systems which are servicing both public Thus, the majority of Congress in 1962 thought and private markets. In addition, the character it inappropriate to create a Government-owned of the civil service system, the need for annual entry in the communications business, and pre- or frequent authorizations and appropriations to ferred to establish a private alternative. COMSAT cover operating expenses, and the desire to keep originated out of a desire to move quickly to an the direct Federal payroll as small as possible all international communication system based on lead to the frequent selection of a private sector satellites; it is only in the past decade that operator to provide a service with mixed pub- COMSAT General, a subsidiary of the basic lic/private characteristics. COMSAT organization, has begun to seek domestic market opportunities in other areas of space Apparently, other countries find that the flex- applications. COMSAT General can be seen as ibility needed for developing markets for space a typical private sector firm seeking to maximiz- applications is likely to be found outside of the ing return on its investor’s funds, rather than an formal government framework. For example, the organization with its origin in Government policy. European Space Agency has created a quasi- private entity called Arianespace to be the There was substantial organizational innovation marketer and operator of space Iaunch services in establishing a private nuclear industry, and using the recently developed Ariane booster. some of this experience may be relevant to space There are 50 investors, ranging from major banks applications. A number of major facilities, requir- and aerospace firms to various European governing large amounts of capital investment, were ments, particularly the French; formally, Ariane- created; an example is uranium enrichment space is a French corporation. While Arianespace plants. These multibillion-dol lar facilities were de- is charged with operating and marketing space veloped by the Government, and now are Gov- launch services, the European Space Agency, an ernment-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) intergovernmental organization, remains in entities that sell enriched uranium to private charge of further development of the Ariane nuclear operators while also providing fuel for launch system. The French are organizing a sim- the Government’s atomic programs. In addition, ilar quasi-private organization called Spotimage a number of the major energy laboratories in the to market the products of the French remote- United States, such as Oak Ridge National sensing satellite SPOT. The major point is that the Laboratory and Los Alamos Laboratory, are Europeans perceive that the competitive activities operated under Government contract by private needed to make their launch vehicle and remote- entities as diverse as Union Carbide and the sensing programs successful are better performed University of California. This kind of organiza- outside of government, though closely linked to tional flexibility in the energy sector may be ap- government programs. It should be noted that propriate in space applications as well. both Arianespace and Spotimage will be heavily A major argument for getting space applications subsidized by their government sponsors; thus operations away from Government- owned and it will be very difficult to get an accurate evalua- operated structures is that the bureaucratic tion of their economic viability. (For detailed dis- rigidities of the public sector are a major hin- cussion see ch. 7.)

TRANSITION FROM DEVELOPMENT TO OPERATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS The transition from R&D to operations is per- see immediate returns on the investment in space haps the most difficult policy/institutional chal- technology which the United States has made Ienge for space applications. Understandably, over the past two decades. Policy makers are both Congress and the executive branch wish to aware of the extensive benefits predicted for Ch. 9—institutional Considerations Ž 255 space technology, and they exert pressure on the Transition to Government Operations Federal space community to accelerate the delivery of those benefits. NASA, desiring to con- Ideally, the eventual operator would be iden- tinue its applications R&D program, is strongly tified when the R&D project aimed at investigat- motivated to emphasize the great potential of ing a particular application was initiated. In this space applications and to suggest that continued way a partnership between the developer and the R&D is required to investigate current and future eventual operator could evolve throughout the applications fully. The impression that space ap- project. The developer should pay careful atten- plications benefits are “just around the corner” tion to operator and user concerns such as cost, is enhanced by the apparent (in retrospect) ease operating requirements, and reliability. An orga- with which the transition from R&D to operations nization which is a candidate for operating a new was made in satellite communications. The out- applications system should have the technical ca- look for other technologies is more complex, pabilities needed to understand technological op- however. tions, to assist in translating user and operational requirements into technical specifications, and Communications satellites provided more ef- to consult with R&D project managers as prob- ficient means of performing a well-established lems arise. function. Once the advantages of communications satellites were demonstrated for a few coun- These desirable characteristics are more likely tries already linked by other means of long to emerge if the operating entity is identified early distance communication, it was relatively straight- on; if development and operation were com- forward to expand satellite communications to bined in a single organization, they would be other countries and to other related activities. more likely to be present. in addition, early iden- Other space applications, however, such as land tification of the eventual operator could minimize remote sensing, are not substitutes for existing bureaucratic conflict over the assignment of re- technological systems; rather they offer new op- sponsibility for operations. Such has not been the portunities for which established users and opera- case in past applications efforts, particularly in tional entities do not exist. Thus, a key to a suc- the remote-sensing area. cessful transition is to identify and aggregate Though it would be desirable, in some respect, users; Government institutions to perform this to designate the eventual operator at the outset task are not well developed. of an applications R&D effort, it may not be possi- Another important consideration is to initiate ble to do so, particularly if the current policy of the operational system at a time when the user limiting NASA to an R&D role is maintained. The community is ready for it, not prematurely. A will- likelihood of choosing the appropriate operator ingness to make investments with long-term pay- is diminished when the application produces backs and careful policy and program design is benefits of value to multiple users. In this situa- crucial to a successful transition from develop- tion, it is tempting to wait until the R&D project ment to operations. is further along to assign responsibilities for operations, in the hope that the appropriate operator institutional issues are different when the op- will become more evident. The history of the erator is to be a Government agency or an enti- remote-sensing program suggests the problems ty operating under Government contract, and in deferring the designation of a lead agency (see when the intended operator is a private-sector, app. A). profit-oriented organization. Each of these categories will be treated separately in the discussion By identifying an operating agency early on, which follows. policy makers avoid the problem of having the 256 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

transition plan developed totally within the space-based innovation; these include a new in- development organization; such a transition plan vestment authority called a Space Bank or a more is unlikely to reflect the concerns of a user- broadly chartered development organization oriented organization. called a Space Industrialization Corporation. The provision by Government of investment capital or other substantial forms of quasi-commercial Transition From Government R&D to support would represent a significant departure Private Operation from past Federal actions. Although other countries (most notably Japan and some European An important issue in commercializing federally countries) have provided this kind of support to sponsored research is what Federal actions their private sectors, it seems likely that given the beyond R&D, if any, are required to make this strong U.S. tradition of separating the public and transition. Several Federal incentives are dis- private sectors, and the current trend towards cussed in chapters 8 and 10 of this report. The restricting the Federal Government, that there question regarding institutions centers around would be strong opposition to creating new Gov- whether NASA, or any other Federal agency, cur- ernment institutions of this sort. On the other rently has the authority or capabilities to provide hand, concern for declining American industrial such potentially desirable incentives. Though productivity and the increasing threat of foreign there has been substantial cooperation between competition in advanced technology areas could NASA and the private sector, this has generally make such innovations politically attractive. taken the form of a contract specified by NASA and bid on by private firms. The new Joint En- In bringing the first commercial application of deavor Agreement is a significant move in devel- space technology, communications satellites, into oping new patterns of partnership aimed at en- being, the Federal Government did take a sub- couraging private sector investment. The Federal stantial institutional initiative in creating a Government, and particularly NASA, is still learn- semiprivate designated entity, COMSAT, to man- ing how to collaborate effectively with business age the satellite system. An important issue is in fostering commercial opportunities based on whether similar kinds of institutional innovations Government-developed technology in all sectors, are required in other applications areas. This not just space. This has happened slowly, given question is addressed later in this chapter, par- the traditional adversary relationship between ticularly in the following section, which deals with public and private sectors. providing broad-based infrastructure to support space applications. There have been a number of suggestions for creating new Federal institutions to encourage

INSTITUTIONS FOR SUPPORTING SPACE OPERATIONS An important institutional question concerns “space utility” providing these common services the provision of routine support operations for to a variety of users, not only industrial but also public and private industrial activities in space. scientific and perhaps military. Such operations would include reliable and affordable transportation from the surface of the Should such space utilities be operated by a Earth to low-Earth orbit, and between low-Earth private or public entity? Almost certainly, given orbit and other desired orbital locations; con- the multiple users of in-orbit facilities and of space struction and maintenance of orbital platforms; transportation, it will be Government that pro- and providing in-orbit power and communica- vides the initial investments to develop these tions. it is possible to conceive of some form of capabilities. NASA’s plans for a space platform Ch. 9—institutional Considerations • 257

or operations center are driven by the eventual shuttle development and demonstration program need for routine in-orbit capabilities such as those will provide information on costs and experience just discussed. with operating characteristics, allowing potential private operators to evaluate the possibility of The period during which this kind of “infra- profitable commercial operation. NASA is cur- structure” for supporting space operations will rently contracting out large segments of shuttle be required is a decade or more in the future. management and maintenance to private firms, Thus, it is somewhat premature to carry out a de- and recently invited aerospace companies and tailed analysis of institutional alternatives. How- airlines to bid on the provision of a complete ever, many of these issues will arise in the course package of services for processing the shuttle for of arriving at an institutional framework for oper- launch. ating the space shuttle, and the approach taken to shuttle operations is likely to set a precedent The argument that a Government entity should for other forms of support services. Thus, the fol- provide space transportation services is based on lowing analysis of institutional options for shut- several beliefs. One is that the use of launch vehi- tle operations is also relevant to other support cles for military and intelligence missions makes systems for space. it desirable to keep launch technology under Government control. Others are that the principal There are essentially two ways an operational user of launch services in the foreseeable future space transportation service using the space shut- will continue to be Government, and that no pri- tle might be organized. One is to create a desig- vate sector firm without extensive Government nated private firm, or use an existing firm or con- subsidy would be able to provide the launch serv- sortium, to own and operate space transporta- ices Government will require. Another is that fur- tion services for all users (with the possible excep- ther Federal development of space launch capa- tion of the military and intelligence services). The bility is desirable and R&D toward this capabil- second is to have the Government operate the ity should be carried out in close conjunction shuttle fleet and sell launch services on a reim- with current operations in space transportation. bursable basis to private sector users, as is the current practice with expendable launch systems. Private ownership and operation of space sys- Of course, either alternative could face competi- tems would give rise to a need for Federal over- tion in providing launch services from a U.S. pri- sight and regulation. For a discussion of the issues vate organization or Arianespace. involved, see chapter 8. While routine launches of payloads into near- Another option for providing space transporta- Earth or high-Earth orbit now seems like an ex- tion services or orbital support services is inter- ceedingly complex and risky undertaking, there national ownership and management of a space is no technological reason why these services utility or a common space platform. The analysis could not be provided by a private operator with below of international dimensions of space appli- sufficient resources and experience. The current cations raises this subject briefly.

SPACE APPLICATIONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS international cooperation in sharing data from of internationalization. A touchstone for any anal- meteorological systems and in operating interna- ysis of such suggestions is the successful experi- tional and communications satellites has proved ence of the International Telecommunications successful for almost two decades, and thus it is Satellite Organization (I NTELSAT). The United not surprising that other space applications are States took the lead in 1964 in helping to found frequently suggested as candidates for some form a multinational entity for using communications ..

258 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications satellites for video and voice transmissions among which ownership is proportional to investment various countries; the original 19 signatories of and/or usage. the INTELSAT interim agreement have grown to 106 owners of a unique international organiza- The institutional choice is between some form tion. The most striking feature of INTELSAT is of international consortium, a la INTELSAT, or that it combines policy management by govern- continuation and expansion of the current U.S. ment representatives (for the most part) with the national system. A variation of this latter alterna- operation of a successful commercial enterprise tive would be if the U.S. system were privately returning 14 percent annually on its owner’s in- owned and operated, since foreign governments vestment. Thus, INTELSAT provides a seductive have a number of concerns related to private con- model for other areas of space applications. The trol over remote-sensing operations. Any private question is whether this kind of international or- sector operator of remote-sensing systems would ganization can, or should, be duplicated in other have to operate, with respect to non-U.S. imag- applications areas. ing, under a specific set of Government policy guidelines. A brief review of various applications areas suggests the limitations of the INTELSAT model. Cer- The most important benefit from a successful tainly materials processing is in much too early international remote-sensing system may well be a stage of development to consider any perma- political, rather than technical or economic. An nent institutional arrangements, much less a pos- international system could allow participating sible multinational one. This is particularly so countries to have a say in system management; since the most likely path for developing materials this feature would be especially attractive to a na- processing applications is through private enter- tion that receives substantial benefits from remote prises. Space transportation at this point is an area sensing but cannot afford to carry out such activ- of international competition, not collaboration, ities by itself. Other benefits to the United States and there is no indication that the current devel- of an internationally owned and operated system opers of space launch systems will want to oper- would include some degree of cost sharing, some ate them as anything but national public or pri- ability to limit the development of other national vate enterprises. There are some potential new systems and the resultant competition for remote- international dimensions to advanced communi- sensing markets, and less suspicion that the cations satellites, such as navigation and search United States was appropriating information for and rescue systems, but in general, most ad- its own purposes, It is also likely that limits on vances in communications satellites are likely to resolution could be more easily agreed on if there be incorporated in INTELSAT or INMARSAT. It were a single international system rather than is only in remote sensing that the issue of inter- competing national systems. Finally, effective in- national institutions is currently relevant, and ternational cooperation for the common good is most of this section devotes its attention to this desirable in itself, transcending the direct bene- issue. There is also some discussion of the poten- fits to be achieved from remote-sensing tech- tial for internationalizing space support services, nology. particularly large orbital platforms in low or geosynchronous orbit. Creating this kind of international institution for it has been the policy of the United States since remote-sensing operations would not be straight- 1969 to make the benefits of the U.S. remote- forward. It is sometimes forgotten that it took sensing program available to all peoples of the from 1964, when the interim INTELSAT agree- world. At issue now is how best to implement ment was concluded, to 1971, when the defini- that policy: through a U.S.-owned and operated tive INTELSAT agreements were signed, to make system which makes its own arrangements for in- the transition from a U.S.-dominated communica- ternational participation, or through some form tions satellite system to a more equitable arrange- of internationally owned and operated system in ment. Ch. 9—institutional Considerations • 259

Because there are conflicting national interests been important in the development of non-U.S. related to remote sensing activities, and because communications satellite technology and launch there are private sector as well as public sector system capabilities. concerns involved, negotiations preceding the founding of an international institution would of Unlike COMSAT, which is essentially a private necessity be lengthy. In addition, the kinds of sector organization, most nation-states’ represen- problems which have arisen at the domestic level tatives in INTELSAT are publicly owned commu- in the process of establishing an operational struc- nications organizations. Thus, INTELSAT demon- ture for remote sensing are likely to be repeated strates that it is possible to combine privately and at the international level. For example, organiza- publicly owned organizations in the same institutions as diverse as the Food and Agriculture Orga- tional framework. However, a number of issues nization, the World Meteorological Organization, related to remote sensing did not arise in the case and other, more politically motivated, U.N. or- of communications. In particular, if an interna- ganizations are likely to make a claim for some tional entity were initially based on a U.S. system share in the control of any new international or- owned and operated by a private firm, it is not ganization for remote sensing. clear how the current policy of open access to data could be maintained, while at the same time The history of INTELSAT also suggests that the the economic interests of the private entity were ability of the United States to influence the direc- protected. There are clearly tensions between the tion and policies of a similar organization for current policy goal of commercializing U.S. re- remote sensing would diminish over time, as the mote-sensing operations and the preceding argu- organization itself matured. In addition, if the new ment that international institutions might well international organization is successful the eco- operate a remote-sensing system. nomic benefits will flow not only to the United States but to other countries owning and using Previously there was discussion of a possible the system; the U.S. aerospace industry could space utility to provide common services required lose its dominant position in remote-sensing tech- by a variety of operations in space. This space nology as the institution awards contracts on the utility would be an international entity, where in- basis of international competition. On the other vestment and ownership would be distributed hand, competition for U.S. systems will arise even among a set of regional, allied, or global partners. in the absence of any INTELSAT-type organiza- Although internationalization of an emerging tion; such an institution could serve to regulate space operations utility is not fully explored here, or forestall the establishment of competitive this possibility deserves continued attention as ap- systems such as SPOT. Here again, the INTELSAT plication programs and their supporting infra- experience is relevant; INTELSAT contracts have structure mature.

INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS

The discussion of generic institutional issues Communications previously discussed provides a basis for identifying institutional concerns for each of the applica- The primary issue in communications satellites tion areas treated in this assessment and for sug- is not institutional. As has been discussed in gesting ways to deal with these concerns. Each chapters 3 and 8, NASA’s major thrust in this area application area—communications, remote sens- is a proposed research, development, and dem- ing, materials processing, and transportation-is onstration effort in the 30/20 GHz range. This examined below from this perspective. assessment has suggested that it may not be nec- 260 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications essary for the Government to provide most of the date, users of the remote-sensing system have not funding for the flight demonstration of a satellite participated significantly in decisions regarding embodying this technology; the private sector its status and future. The transfer of Landsat man- could use the results of related R&D conducted agement to NOAA is designed to alleviate this under the sponsorship of national security agen- shortcoming. cies as a starting place to mount a demonstration effort funded primarily from its own resources. The division of responsibilities between any future R&D program in remote sensing and the If, however, a decision to continue a NASA operations of a working land remote-sensing sys- communications R&D effort in the 30/20 GHz tem will have to be negotiated. If, as is suggested region were made, then this program should be below, NASA is assigned the operational role, this conducted in close cooperation with both satel- issue becomes less problematic. If the operator lite manufacturers and communications satellite is another Government agency, or a private firm, users. In both its R&D and its demonstration it may be desirable for NASA to perform some phases, this program might be amenable to insti- or all of continuing R&D. tutional experiments such as public-private cost- sharing and risk-sharing and to joint planning and Though Landsat has succeeded in providing the management structures. It may be possible to information needed to understand the kinds of move quickly to a demonstration of a 30/20 GHz public and private benefits that can be gained system, but care should be taken not to under- from remote-sensing technology, it has not been take such a demonstration if R&D is not essen- able to provide sufficient information on costs tially complete. As has been discussed earlier in and on the potential market for remote-sensing this chapter, attempting to combine the R&D and data. Again, this is largely because the program demonstration phases is not usually a successful has been run as an R&D, rather than a demonstra- approach. tion, effort. One heritage of the “Apollo-era” NASA is a desire to control most or all of a system If the proposed NASA 30/20 GHz RD&D pro- development process, emphasizing its research gram is initiated, and if it is planned and man- and engineering aspects, rather than to share con- aged according to the principles discussed pre- trol with other entities, including other Federal viously, then no additional Federal actions should agencies. This tendency has been noted for the be required in order to make the transition from initial Landsat and Seasat programs, and it seems R&D to operations. If this new capability proves characteristic of the Landsat-D effort as well. to be technically and economically viable, pri- Landsat-D involves the first use in orbit of an ad- vate firms will incorporate it in planning them for vanced sensor called the thematic mapper, the the next generation of communications satellites. characteristics of which are not well enough known to consider it an operational system. The prospects for successfully achieving the Remote Sensing quite different objectives of a NASA R&D program and a NOAA demonstration program within Many of the problems related to the Nation’s this single flight effort seem limited. Most of the R&D program in land remote sensing result from principles for a successful demonstration effort the different perspectives of developers and users. presented previously have been violated in put- NASA views this effort as one of developing a new ting together the plans for Landsat-D. Users have and experimental capability; the various users see not been closely involved in planning the pro- the results of the program as immediately bene- gram; there is a poor match between the charac- ficial and have attempted to treat the system as teristics of the advanced sensors to be flown on if it were already operational. NASA has been Landsat-D and the needs of the existing or poten- caught between carrying out its R&D mission and tial user community for remote-sensing data; and responding to users who want to make immedi- a fair degree of tension exists between NASA and ate operational use of the Landsat system. To NOAA on account of their differing objectives for Ch. 9—institutional Considerations ● 261

the program. In addition, technical problems with way for 3 years now. The current transition plan- the thematic mapper have made the effort even ning has been plagued by external and internal more of a development rather than demonstra- difficulties. NOAA, the Government agency re- tion undertaking. sponsible for the transition, has not been given the resources to acquire the technical and eco- Undoubtedly there is a tradeoff between sepa- nomic capabilities needed to deal effectively with rating the development and demonstration NASA, the present operator, or with eventual phases, and the high cost of flying a fully qualified operators and users, public and private. The lack space system at least twice, but the increased of budgetary and institutional commitment to the assurance of accomplishing program objectives commercialization of remote sensing has pre- makes such an investment worthwhile. The Land- vented potential private sector operators from sat program has not been planned with a clear taking the Government’s efforts very seriously. understanding of the requirements of bringing an innovative new technology into operation. In ad- Recently, COMSAT General proposed to assume ownership and operation of NOAA’s mete- dition to the problems of incorporating a new 8 way of doing things into existing patterns, Land- orological and remote-sensing satellites. The sat has exacerbated rather than minimized institu- prospects for such takeover depend on the bai- tional conflicts and differences of perspective af- ance between public and private markets for fecting operator and user acceptance of the new Earth observation data. Certainly the established technology. market for meteorological data is governmental in character, and presumably the Government It is probably too late to remedy some of the would contract to buy those data from the pri- basic flaws in the design of the Landsat effort. vately operated system and to make it available Rather, there should be an attempt to recognize as a public good, if the COMSAT proposal were the institutional, funding, and programmatic con- adopted. There is also a large public sector mar- straints under which the Landsat-D effort now ket for remote-sensing data at the Federal, State, operates, and to determine whether those con- local, and international level, and presumably the straints can be modified in order to reflect a more Federal Government would also purchase the balanced approach to development and demon- data needed to serve the public market from stration of a new technology. The issue of the in- COMSAT. If these two public markets turn out stitutional framework for an operational remote- to form an overwhelming share of the total de- sensing system has been controversial for almost mand for Earth observation data, then the a decade now. There has been extensive analysis COMSAT proposal should be approved if it both by the executive branch and by Congress; would provide significant efficiencies in operating the full range of that analysis will not be reviewed performance and cost. An alternative to the here. This discussion will be limited to applying COMSAT proposal would be that a Government general principles provided previously to current agency operate remote-sensing systems and proposals for operational remote-sensing systems. make their outputs available to the private sector at a cost reflecting, for example, the marginal The key policy issue in choosing an institutional cost of obtaining and reproducing the data or framework is whether the benefits derived from some attempt to recoup system development ex- remote sensing are primarily public or private; penses, the available evidence suggests that they are a mixture of both. Because Landsat has been run If, however, the Government market for mete- as an R&D program, and because the prices of orological and/or remote-sensing data were rela- Landsat data have been heavily subsidized, the tively soon to become a minor share of the total market for data from an operational but more ex- demand, then the COMSAT proposal would be pensive system is not well defined. better understood as an innovative and aggressive institutional initiative on the part of a private firm,

The process of moving remote sensing from 8Klaus Heiss, “New Economic Structures for Space in the R&D to commercial operations has been under- Eighties,” Astronautics artd Aeronautics, january 1981, pp. 19-21. 262 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications whose risks are minimized by guaranteed public appropriate ways of accomplishing this. What is purchases, but not totally eliminated. A major crucial is designing the materials processing R&D issue would be whether the Government should effort in ways that consider the likely future oper- attempt to recoup any of the R&D and system ating environment of commercial activities, rather development costs that made a private venture than exploring exciting technological possibilities, in remote sensing possible. The alternative is to while paying no attention to the commercial view the sunk costs as an appropriate Federal potential. stimulus to private sector activity. Access to The demonstration phase for most kinds of remote-sensing products by non-U.S. users would materials processing activity is still some years in be another area of concern. Provision would the future. However, the McDonnell Douglas/ have to be made to ensure that private, profit-ori- Ortho Pharmaceutical joint venture experiment ented operation (whether by COMSAT or in some is planning for a flight demonstration in the other form) is compatible with the current U.S. mid-l 980’s. The basic technology will be tested policy of unrestricted access to all available data. in orbit first; if successful, a separate effort will In addition, a national remote-sensing system to demonstrate that technology in an operating which is privately operated may not be compati- environment. ble with eventual internationalization of remote- sensing efforts. This approach to developing and demonstrating materials processing capabilities seems ap- If the current policy of early commercialization propriate for other projects as well. Given that of remote sensing were modified or reversed, it materials processing must ultimately be commer- might be preferable to have either NOAA or cialized in order to be successful, there should NASA operate remote-sensing systems. The anal- be continuing strong, emphasis on the involve- ysis in this chapter suggests that NASA would be ment of private industy in MPS activity, especial- a better choice than NOAA as an operating agen- ly as the transition from R&D to the demonstra- cy, since remote-sensing technology is still evolv- tion phase is planned. The kind of risk- and cost- ing rapidly and the existing relationships between sharing that currently characterizes the joint En- the users and NASA form a basis for continua- deavor Agreement (and is discussed above for tion and expansion. demonstration efforts in the communications satellite area) should also characterize any further Materials Processing demonstration of materials processing tech- The research effort that might lead to wide- nology. spread use of space for processing or manufac- A great deal of attention has been given to the turing is still in its early stages. Much more basic general question of possible Government initia- and applied science is required before a wide tives to stimulate the transition from the demon- range of specific applications can be tested. Thus stration phase to private operations. Two sets of the materials processing program provides the congressional hearings have been held, and a best opportunity within the current program of proposal to establish a Space Industrialization space applications R&D for applying the princi- Corporation, as a source of investment and other ples identified above. Materials processing in policy stimuli, has received extensive analysis.g space is an example of a technological opportun- While this attention to transition planning for ity where the conditions which call for Federal materials processing is laudable, the relatively involvement exist—high risk, high cost, long time early stage of the materials processing program to pay back. It is clear that materials processing suggests that it would be premature to select any makes sense only as a commercial activity, and particular form of government subsidy for the thus any federally funded R&D should be planned post-demonstration transition phase. Much more with considerations of market and cost in mind. Innovative policy instruments such as the joint 9House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Endeavor Agreement (discussed in ch. 8) may be Technology, hearings on Space Industrialization Act, 1979 and 1980. Ch. 9—lnstitutional Considerations • 263 needs to be learned from the experience of, for tual demonstration phase of the shuttle program example, the joint endeavor experiment before is likely to extend beyond 1985, and the infor- an efficient and equitable mode of Government- mation needed for private-sector operators to industry cooperation can be identified for materi- make an accurate assessment of the potential re- als processing or other new space technologies. turns from shuttle operations is unlikely to result from the early years of the shuttle effort. Transportation The transition to an operational system will re- Continuing improvement and upgrading of the quire that, whoever the eventual operator may space shuttle and development of a truly reusable be, policies with respect to patent and proprie- orbit-to-orbit transfer stage appear to be crucial tary information protection, launch assurances, elements of the Federal R&D effort in space trans- Government preemption rights, and costs must portation. Given its strong institutional capabilities be developed. A variety of institutions will have in space propulsion and vehicle design, NASA to evolve, especially those for marketing, insur- is the appropriate focus for further R&D in this ing, and financing operational launches. The field. Essential to an R&D effort that serves space competition from potential privately developed transportation users will be stability and predicta- expendable launch systems with lower perform- bility, so that users can expect to have new ance but also lower costs than the shuttle may launch capabilities available on schedule and at play an important role in future private sector predictable prices. operations. The transition phase is particularly complicated by the mixture of military, intelli- The initial flights of the space shuttle are billed, gence, and civilian Government requirements, correctly, as development rather than demonstra- together with private sector requirements for tion efforts. However, there is no separate dem- space transportation services. Institutions for onstration phase as part of the STS program; after resolving these conflicting demands will be the initial four flights, the system will be declared requ i red. operational and begin to fly payloads regularly. In reality, demonstration of the operating char- Providing routine space transportation services acteristics of the space transportation system, and is different from operating the three applications particularly those of the shuttle, will come over discussed above: transportation services support time as the costs of each incremental shuttle operations in space, rather than being integral to flight, and the potentials and constraints of the a particular applications system. The issues re- shuttle as a launch system become better known. lated to the operational form for space transpor- It should be recognized, therefore, that the ac- tation services have been discussed previously.

94-915 - - 82 - 1 B —— . . .

Chapter 10 POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR ASSESSMENT Contents

Page Introduction...... 267 Policy Guidance: Categories and Criteria ...... 267 National Aeronautics and Space Act ...... 267 COMSAT Act and Related Legislation ...... 268 Other Legislative Measures ...... 268 Additional Considerations ...... 270 Summary of lssues ...... 271 Need for Consistent High-Level Attention to Space Policy ...... 273 The Executive ...... 273 The Legislative ...... 274 Institutional ...... 275 International ...... 275 Policy Synthesis...... 276 Need for High-Level Attention to Space Policy in the Executive Branch . . . . 276 Reestablish the National Aeronautics and Space Council ...... 276 Committee of the National Security Council or a Subset of a “Cabinet Council’s” Responsibilities ...... 277 Presidential or National Commission ...... 278 Establish a New Department ...... 279 Institutional Changes-Clarifying the Public-Private Sector Roles ...... 281 Space Telecommunications...... 282 Clarifying the R&D Role of Government in Space Communications ...... 282 R&D to Support Regulatory Decision ...... 283 Earth Observation From Space ...... 284 Space Transportation ...... 288 Applications R&D-Strengthening the NASA Role ...... 291 International Aspects ...... 293 Telecommunications Services ...... 294 Land Remote Sensing...... 296 Economic Measures ...... 300 Space Development Bank ...... 301 Tax Incentives, ...... 301 Integrated Policy Options for Space Applications ...... 302 Continuing the Current Policy Framework ...... 302 Increasing the International Emphasis ...... 302 increasing the National Private Sector Role ...... 303 Increased High-Level Policy Focus...... 304 FIGURE

Figure No. Page 16. Civilian Space Budget ...... 273 17. NASA Funding for Communications Satellite Technology...... 282 Chapter 10 POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION This chapter brings together the background, icy” might be expected to provide recommen- technologies, and specific issues that are needed dations for new projects. As understood in this to formulate and analyze policy options. It estab- assessment, space policy is the set of guidelines lishes a range of policies that maybe considered which establishes the goals and the institutional i n the light of the analysis in the earlier chapters framework for the civilian space applications proof this report and current congressional practice gram and broadly defines its implementation. This and suggests a specific policy formulation. It also definition of space policy includes the types of assesses the policy options with respect to their measures that are within the domain of legisla- potential effect on existing and future programs. tive action. Specific program elements or space is confused with systems are not, strictly speaking, “policy” and Frequently, “space policy” are only treated to illustrate the options discussed. “space program, ” and a review of “space pol-

POLICY GUIDANCE: CATEGORIES AND CRITERIA

A number of general categories and criteria ● Goals or objectives. —The specific areas guide the process of formulating policy. This sec- defined in the NAS Act include a very gen- tion summarizes some of the policies that now eral guide to the scope of the U.S. space pro- exist and from them develops the categories and gram, e.g., “expansion of human knowl- criteria to be employed in selecting possible edge . . . , “ “improvement of . . . aeronau- future policy options. tical and space vehicles,” “development and operation of vehicles capable of carry- National Aeronautics and Space Act ing instruments . . . and living organisms (NAS Act)’ through space, “ “long-range studies of the potential benefits of . . . aeronautical and The principal guidance may be derived from space activities, “ “preservation of the role the 1958 NAS Act, the existing legislative authori- of the United States as a leader . . . ,“ ty for the civilian space program, where there is “making available to agencies . . . con- a declaration of policy and purpose and where cerned with defense . . . discoveries (by the functions assigned to the National Aeronau- NASA, and vice versa),” “cooperation . . . tics and Space Administration (NASA) are speci- with other nations, ” “ground propulsion fied. This legislation sets forth the following systems R& D,” “ . . . development of ad- general categories of policy guidance: vanced automobile propulsion systems, ” and “ . . . research . . . to alleviate and ● Guiding principles or philosophy.—Such minimize the effects of disability. ” phrases as “ . . . peaceful purposes for the ● benefit of all mankind” and “ . . . a civilian Organization.–The act specified formation of a new agency, NASA, and a new coordi- agency exercising control over aeronautical nating body, the National Aeronautics and and space activities sponsored by the United Space Council (which no longer exists–see States, except . . . defense . . . “ provide broad philosophical guidelines for the con- ch. 3 and 9). It did not specify the internal organization of NASA, but did name the duct of the national space program. members of the Council. Several executive INationa/ Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and level positions were specified for NASA, in- related legislation. Public Law 85-568 (see app. i). cluding an Administrator, a Deputy Ad-

267 268 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ministrator, and seven Associate Adminis- numbers of medium-altitude satellites that, as trators. they moved in their orbits, would periodically ● Functions.—Both the Space Council and enter and leave the fields of view of the many NASA were given specific functional respon- ground antennas sending and receiving signals sibilities. The Council was charged with: de- through the system. The difficulties of managing veloping a comprehensive program of aero- multiple systems, each involving many moving nautical and space activities; responsibility satellite repeaters and the consequent high prob- for the direction of major aeronautical and ability of overlapping and interfering signals, space activities; providing for cooperation made a single system appear a necessity. How- between agencies; and resolving differences ever, experiments with synchronous-orbit plat- on aeronautical and space matters. In ad- forms soon demonstrated the desirability of using dition, the act specified that NASA would high-altitude repeaters for the system, making plan, direct and conduct aeronautical and multiple systems technically more feasible. There space activities, use the scientific communi- were also strong political reasons to favor a single ty, disseminate widely the knowledge it multinational system dominated by the United gained, and conduct R&D in specific areas. States. In addition, the financial and managerial ● Budgets or resources. —An annual authoriza- efficiencies of a single system were significant. tion and appropriations process was re- Hence, the momentum for a single global system quired, with no special multiyear features was sufficient to preserve the initial international for longer term programs and no guidance organization that was established, INTELSAT, and about appropriate levels of support. more recently, to extend the concept to marine communications via a similar structure, 3 COMSAT Act and Related Legislation INMARSAT. Congress again acted to designate COMSAT to act as the U.S. participant in the The “Communications Satellite Act of 1962” INMARSAT system. (Public Law 87-624)2 was an innovative policy step that recognized the rapidly growing poten- Other Legislative Measures tial of space platforms for communications services as well as the need to clarify the institutional When the NAS Act was enacted in 1958, the setting for providing these services. it created a nature and scope of the Nation’s future space ac- new, for-profit corporation, the Communications tivities were only dimly visible. In more recent Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), to act for the legislation, such as in the energy field (where the United States in establishing an international, technologies are better known and Congress is commercial, communications satellite system. It very familiar with the institutions), the relevant also clearly affirmed that NASA would cooperate legislation has been significantly more detailed with COMSAT in research and development and broader in scope. While the wisdom of a de- (R&D) and provide reimbursable launch and asso- tailed specification of internal agency structure ciated services. and specific programs is open to considerable de- The intent of the legislation, inter alia, was to bate, this recent practice suggests that similar measures may properly be considered in this move rapidly toward establishing such a system and to remove some of the ambiguities and un- analysis. For example: certainties about the possible role of other firms, ● Technology-specific goals or objectives. — especially AT&T, that could have entered the in- In the energy field, Congress has mandated ternational satellite communications picture. that certain particular technologies be de- There was a clear intent to have a single global veloped:A electric vehicles, ocean thermal system. This was largely for technical reasons: at the time the most likely system involved large acommunjcatjons Sate//jte Act of 1%2, Amendment: International Maritime Satellite Communications Act, Title V, Public Law 95-564, approved Nov. 1, 1978. ‘Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Public Law 87-624, 87th qExamples include: Solar Energy Research, Development and Cong., H.R. 11040, Aug. 31, 1962. Demonstration Act of 1974, Public Law 93-473, Oct. 26, 1974; Geo- Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment Ž 269

electric Conversion (OTEC) systems, photo- where there are several potential strategies voltaic systems, and magnetic-confinement for producing a desirable product, a policy fusion (using Tokamak devices). A compara- option is for the Government to guarantee ble action in the space field might be to to purchase a given quantity of the product specify the development of a solar-electric at a set price, high enough to provide an at- propulsion system or a synchronous-orbit tractive rate of return to the risk-taker. In storm warning system. These examples of such a case, the private supplier is respon- congressional “policy” setting come very sible for detailed management of the proj- close to being program definitions. At the ect, for the technical choices that are made, beginning of this chapter, it was stated that and for the ultimate delivery of the product. such program definition would not be con- There is limited experience with this ap- sidered except as part of a larger policy proach, but it does appear to be applicable framework. It must be recognized, however, to Earth observations, and possibly to other that there may often be pressures to include space applications services. specific technological directions in new ● Regulatory measures. –Economic regulation space policy measures, and that such action (as contrasted with regulation to protect the is not inconsistent with the pattern set in public health, interest and safety) has been other high-technology areas. At the very employed where the public interest requires least, it is essential to consider the policy im- a mechanism to control pricing, entry into plications of mandating particular projects, a market, service delivery, and industry including the effects on institutional struc- structure. A typical example is the Federal tures, public-private relations, and the bal- Communications Commission (FCC) oper- ance between scientific and applications ating under the Communications Act of programs. 1934.6 In addition to carrying out its regu- Tax and other incentives; loan guarantees. – latory functions, FCC has recently been in- Among the policy tools that have been used strumental in allowing limited multiple en- to achieve specific goals by affecting the try into certain parts of the telecommunica- behavior of individuals and private firms, the tions market. h is necessary to institute some economic incentive has been the most typ- form of regulatory authority when the nature ical. Such incentives have been enacted by of a service makes a monopoly supplier nec- various methods: 1 ) by adding a tax levy to essary, as was originally true for the Nation’s discourage, or reducing a tax to encourage, long-distance telephone system. In the early specific activities; 2) through direct subsidy years of the system, the technology that was (e.g., food stamps); or 3) through loans and available required a single switched system loan guarantees (to students, homebuyers, for long-distance service. As technology ad- etc.). A recent example of this practice in vanced, at first with broad-band microwave the energy area combined all three of these repeater systems, and then with satellites incentives in the Windfall Profits/Synfuels having broad-band capabilities, the necessi- Corp. packages ty for maintaining a long-distance monopoly One additional example of an economic largely disappeared. Consequently, akerna- incentive deserves further mention—i. e., a tive commercial systems have been allowed guaranteed price for delivery of a product to compete with AT&T; many of these rely at some future time. In some instances, on satellites. Thus, an advancing technology that brings about changes in the market thermal Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act characteristics of the service system may ob- of 1974, Public Law 93-410, Sept. 3, 1974; Electric and Hybrid Vehi- cle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976,Public viate the monopolistic entity. When such a Law 94-413, Sept. 17, 1976; and Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineer- change does occur, there needs to be suffi- ing Act of 1980, Public Law 96-386, Oct. 7, 1980. Scrude Oi/ Wjndfa// Profits Tax Act of 1979, Public Law 96-223; approved Apr. 2, 1980 and Energy Security Act of 1979, Public Law 6communjcatjons Act of 1934, as amended, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 96-294, approved June 30, 1980. USC 609. 270 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

cient flexibility in the regulatory framework strategic weapons systems, would not nec- to permit both open entry and movement essarily be given detailed attention if a man- toward expanded competition. dated report were not required. No mandate Exemption from other /aws.—ln many cases, can ensure that the response will be of high the process of setting public policy requires quality, that attention will be paid to the that a balance be struck between competing issues specified, or that the deadline for the constituencies, or that different incentives report will be met. In fact, congressional be offered to achieve similar objectives. mandates have been increasingly ignored or When the circumstances do call for such a given such cursory attention that their orig- balance, the measures available to the law- inal intent has been negated. With the pres- maker include relief from provisions of com- sures of the congressional calendar making peting laws. For example, antitrust laws in- it difficult for members to oversee the tre- tended to increase competition, and thereby mendous volume of laws already enacted, to provide better products and services at there are many cases of missed deadlines, lower prices to the consuming public, re- inadequate responses, or complete lack of strict monopolistic activities of corporations. attention which go without significant con- However, in some instances where the pub- gressional objection. This causes the process lic interest seemed better served by collec- to break down even further. Nevertheless, tive action than by competition, Congress a mandated report, if properly followed up has granted statutory exemption from the and if the necessary resources and time ex- antitrust laws. Examples of such exemptions ist to complete it, can be a useful policy include the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, tool—particularly if it is part of a larger policy which allows agricultural cooperatives to initiative, or if the leadership for ensuring its market jointly and to set uniform prices for preparation is clearly specified. their products; the Norris-LaGuardia Act of In addition to mandated reports, there are 1932, which allows collective bargaining by several other requirements that may be in- organized labor; and the Defense Produc- cluded to encourage greater attention to tion Act of 1950, which grants a limited ex- overall policy: 1 ) establishing an advisory emption to contractors who, at the request mechanism that utilizes relevant expertise of the President, enter cooperative agree- outside of the particular agency or departments related to national defense. It may be ment involved; 2) specifying project mile- desirable to grant a similar exemption to in- stones or “sunset” provisions to be met dustries that would agree to combine their before additional authority or budget is pro- resources to develop new space applications vided by Congress; 3) requiring coordina- technologies. tion with other agencies or with specific in- Reporting and other special requirements.– ternational bodies. Perhaps the most used policy requirement that has been adopted by Congress in recent times is the mandated report. One reason Additional Considerations for these often cumbersome reporting requirements is to oblige the executive branch These general areas of policy development pro- to attend to planning in a way that does not vide wide latitude for responding to the issues involve significant amounts of appropriated facing the civilian space program today, and for funds. For example, construction of a spe- generating innovative approaches to emerging cific system such as a new strategic bomber questions and future problems. In evaluating spe- is subject to extensive reporting and review cific options that fall within the general types of in connection with the large annual appro- policy, the following questions need to be consid- priation required. A more general issue, ered: such as the strategic posture of the United ● Is it feasible?—l n this assessment, the term States or the tradeoffs among various new “feasibility” will be used to imply that pro- Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 271

spective policies are consistent with an ac- benefits, an improved competitive position cepted understanding of the appropriate abroad, or enhanced national security? roles of Government and the private sector, ● Can it be implemented?–This again is large- the separation of powers between Congress ly a question of judgment in determining (on and the executive branch, etc.; in other the basis of experience or other data) that words, that the option does not require a a desirable policy change may or may not revolutionary change in current practice. be capable of being implemented in the The assumption is that changes that are less “real world, ” given practical questions of disruptive and evolutionary in character will timing, cost, depth and extent of previous have a greater likelihood of serious consid- commitments, institutional inertia, or an in- eration and possible adoption than more ability to dictate a course of action to other revolutionary measures, and that the bene- nations. In such judgments, there will always fits of the civilian space program, however be room for debate. Therefore, wherever it great, do not justify radical changes in is appropriate in the policy synthesis, ques- American institutions and practices. tions of U.S. ability to implement a policy will be highlighted. ● Is it in the public interest?—The motivation for making changes to space policy is to In summary, the foregoing discussion has fo- serve the public interest and not just to pro- cused on the major questions that should be con- mote a particular constituency or industrial sidered in order to evaluate possible policy op- sector. Hence, an additional test for accept- tions. It has also identified the general classes of able policy changes would be (among other policy initiatives that appear to be relevant to factors): does this change promise greater space applications. The next section will review public benefit, in lower net costs, better serv- the major issues and problems with our current ices, more rapid introduction of new serv- situation that prompt the search for new policies ices, a favorable distribution of expected and solutions.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

The search for new policy options is stimulated since Explorer 1. The following factors make the by the belief that significant new services, and present a particularly appropriate time for review: consequent public and private benefits, could the advent of the shuttle and the conditions of result from a vigorous exploitation of current and fiscal stringency that may lead to a reduced ef- future innovations in space. The Government fort in large-scale engineering development for may promote such new systems through policies NASA; the appearance for the first time of signifi- that will, inter alia, lower barriers that may exist; cant economic competition from foreign coun- provide new mechanisms for interested parties tries; the rapid development of military space sys- to cooperate; and, in general, encourage public tems; and the prospect of new commercial op- and private investment in space applications portunities in remote sensing and materials commensurate with the prospective benefits to processing. society. The flaws in our existing policy cannot be attrib- In this analysis, we proceed from a basic prem- uted to a single overriding cause. In a number ise—that the existing policy framework, which of ways, it fails to provide the kind of stimulus has served to organize the Nation’s initial efforts and guidance to our national space efforts to en- in space, should be reviewed for possible changes sure that the country’s public and private re- in the light of current and emerging technology, sources are used in the most beneficial fashion. as well as the more than 20 years experience in This shortcoming is highlighted by the fact that space operations that the Nation has acquired several foreign countries intend to develop their 272 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications own space applications systems, some of which the overall resources available, and hence, on the will be more advanced, and more suited for ap- state of the national economy and the Federal plications, than are comparable U.S. systems. The budget. To require that investments in space ap- growing domestic interest in space is evident in plications be explicitly compared with other alter- industry initiatives and congressional hearings on natives is to apply a constraint that is inappropri- space policy,7 recently introduced legislation,8 ate to public policy issues. Nevertheless, in a pe- the growing number of voluntary space associa- riod of fiscal restraint and intense scrutiny of all tions (see ch. 5); and efforts by individual entre- Government expenditures, the space program preneurs to develop private launch systems and can expect to have to defend its claim to a share satellites. All of these varying developments of Federal revenues, and to justify its programs reflect the remarkable maturation of space tech- by arguing that they contribute to national goals nology over the past decade, as well as the great such as defense or increased industrial productiv- but unfulfilled promise that further development ity. offers for delivering useful services, gaining inter- This situation is made difficult insofar as many national prestige, and satisfying the human spirit of the societal benefits are not immediately realiz- of adventure. able or are difficult, if not impossible, to quanti- Implicit in the concerns of the constituencies fy. They include such abstract notions as interna- mentioned above is the claim that, compared tional prestige, national self-image, and incentives with the potential benefits to be achieved, U.S. to individual achievements; a single mission or investment in civilian space applications may be project is often not easily identified with a specific misdirected or too low. This claim raises two im- set of benefits. For example, the successful flight portant questions: 1) What is the relative impor- of a meteorological satellite does not generate tance of increased public or private investment public attention in the United States. However, in space applications as compared with alter- not only do large segments of the U.S. economy native investments (in defense, social programs, depend on the accurate data such satellites pro- new pIant and machinery, etc.)? 2) What are the vide, but other nations around the world are possible benefits or returns, and to what degree eager subscribers to this information and see the can one ascertain their extent and magnitude? United States in a more positive light because of this service. It is the accumulation of many such These issues be will be implicit through the sec- small but significant positive effects that con- tions that follow; briefly, we can respond thus. stitutes the sum of intangible benefits from the First, the claim that we are investing too little in national space effort. space applications does not imply that we are also investing too much in other worthwhile areas. Because of the effects of space investments are Furthermore, opportunity costs in the public pol- derived primarily from many small, though by no icy arena cannot be rigorously compared. The means insignificant programs, it is difficult to sus- resolution of the annual conflict among alterna- tain public investment at a level and scope appro- tive allocations of public resources is necessarily priate to the potential of the consequent benefits. political, subject to all the vagaries of human judg- Partly for this reason it is important to consider ment, prejudice, and intuition. Much depends on public policy incentives for private sector space investments that could complement or substitute 7Un@d States Civilian Space Poiicy, hearings before the Subcom- mittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on for direct public expenditures. Private investment Science and Technology, U.S. H. R., 96th Congress, 2d sess., July will occur only if the benefits (usually in the form 23, 24, 1980, No, 152, USGPO, Washington, 1980. BFor example: The Space /nciustriaiization Act of 1979; hearings of direct profits) to the private investor are rela- before the Subcommittee on Space, Science and Applications, of tively assured (i.e., low risk), and are of sufficient the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. H. R., 96th Con- magnitude to be attractive in comparison with gress, 1st Session, on H.R. 2337, May 22,23, and june 26,27, 1979, other alternatives. Policy incentives must promote No. 47. 9For example: Carl Sagan’s “planeta~ Society, ” which has an these conditions while ensuring that the public active, informed and rapidly growing membership. and national interest are also served. Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 273

The issues discussed in this chapter derive from, adding up to a waste of scarce resources. All of among other sources, a series of workshops held these have already occurred in recent NASA at OTA for the purpose of identifying the major budgets. issues or concerns facing the U.S. space program (table 1, in ch. 3) and suggesting policies that The Executive might be adopted to resolve those issues. In the Carter administration, several major in- Need for Consistent High-Level teragency reviews of space policy were carried out under the aegis of the National Security Attention to Space Policy Council, and in the process a Policy Review Com- Current space policy does not translate easily mittee (PRC) for space was established with the into a set of specific goals, program areas, or mis- Director of the Office of Science and Technology sion opportunities. Hence, during periods when Policy (OSTP) as the chairman. The issues re- there is a national preoccupation with social, de- viewed during this period involved principally fense, or economic issues that bear no direct rela- space applications and the civilian/military inter- tion to the civilian space program, the process face, and led to three (classified) Presidential di- of planning and budgeting for specific missions rectives and several public statements concern- may fall victim to lack of high-level attention and focus. Because there is no current long-term commitment to specific goals (after space shuttle de- Figure 16.-Civilian Space Budget velopment is complete), and because the most recent presidential statement on space program 19 goals (by President Carter in 1978)1° was vague 18 with respect to the content and timing of future 17 objectives (beyond “utilization of the shuttle”), 16 annual budget and program decisions have tended to be made ad hoc. When decisions are 15 made in the context of annual budget prepara- 14 tions, they unfortunately are biased by the re- 13 stricted nature of the forum (primarily discussions between the agencies with space allocations in 12 their budgets and the Office of Management and 11 Budget), and by the tendency to look for short- term economies, to shrink or limit programs and 10 future-year costs, to refine and improve manage- 9 ment, and to fit the program into a budget target. 8 While these are necessary and important management considerations, they are not suited to 7 developing and identifying a creative program or 6 a national commitment to long-term space pro- 5 gram goals. For consistent, long-term policy ob- 4 jectives to be developed and carried out, the budget process must necessarily follow policy 3 guidance, and not the reverse. Without such pol- 2 icy commitments, the annual budget process will 1 result in mission deferrals, stretched schedules, 0 and even cancellation of well-developed projects, 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 198 3 Fiscal year

Io’’white House Fact sheet, U.S. Civil Space Policy, office of the White House Press Secretary, ” Oct. 11, 1978. 274 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications ing: 1 ) assignment of responsibility for operational tinuing defined responsibility for developing satellite Earth-sensing systems to NOAA; 2) transi- space program goals and objectives, reviewing tion to commercial operation for Landsat; and the plans to achieve the objectives, and iden- 3) general civilian space policy .11 In the Reagan tifying the resources that may be required. This administration, the PRC (Space) has been aban- responsibility would include periodic public pres- doned and an independent review of the Carter entation of the goals and objectives developed administration decisions and other space program by the executive branch to Congress for debate questions is underway (see ch. 6 for a descrip- and ratification. A forum for implementing these tion of the review). One of the principal partici- procedures could have a broad scope, defined pants in this review is the Director of OSTP. In in detail by Congress, or its responsibilities might the 1976 legislation establishing OSTP, the Direc- be described by Congress in general terms, with tor is given a broad assignment that includes pro- its detailed structure to be determined by the ex- viding the President with analyses of major pol- ecutive branch. icies, plans, and programs involving science and It should be noted that, in its original form, the technology. Among the priority goals delineated legislation establishing NASA also created a coor- for science and technology is “advancing the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space.”lz dinating mechanism, the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), whose responsibilities OSTP can act as a focus for space policy develop- included civilian/military coordination and, more ment, provided: 1 ) the President determines that he wants OSTP to play such a role, and 2) there significantly, development of “a comprehensive are enough personnel and funds available for the program of aeronautical and space activities to be conducted by departments and agencies of Office in addition to its other responsibilities for the United States. ” The Council was abolished science and technology policy. Currently, OSTP’S limited budget and staff resources (approximately by President Nixon in 1973 at the same time that the Science Adviser’s Office was removed from $1.5 million in fiscal year 1982 and 11 permanent positions) make it difficult for the Office to the Executive Office of the President. The Presi- dent’s Science Advisory Committee was also assume a major continuing role in evaluating abolished. This now defunct NASC is one exam- space policy. ple of an executive branch mechanism that could Despite the efforts of the Carter administration, satisfy the needs identified above. NASC’S original two major problems with Executive direction of functions and composition should be reviewed the space program have arisen in recent years: in the light of developments in current technol- 1 ) failure to identify and commit to major new ogy and changes in agency relationships. The goals, and 2) failure to implement programs to scope of its responsibilities would have to be clar- accomplish goals already announced or identi- ified: would it be limited to civilian programs on- fied. These problems suggest that the Executive ly? to the civilian/military relationship? or ex- has been ineffective in focusing its attention on tended to include both civilian and military pro- the space program, because of pressure from the grams, and private sector activities? external environment (such as budget constraints and an emphasis on national issues that are not The Legislative clearly addressed by the civilian space program) and because of internal difficulties (such as the Congress, insofar as it oversees and reviews ex- administrative structure of NASA, and the deter- ecutive branch agencies and programs and initi- mination to complete current large programs ates and passes on legislation, is an essential part such as the shuttle). Better procedures are needed of the policy process. Committee hearings bring periodically to focus high-level attention on space forth critical issues for public airing and debate, program needs, procedures that will fix a con- and staff papers, investigations and congressional

IJReorganization plan No. 1 of 1973, 38 Federal Register 9579, I I Ibid. Apr. 18, 1973, 87 Stat. 1089, abolished the National Aeronautics IZNationa/ Science and Technology Policy, Organization and pri- and Space Council together with its functions, and the Office of orities Act of 1976, Public Law 94-282, May 11, 1976. Science and Technology, efective July 1, 1973. Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 275 agency reports all contribute to the review frame- applications areas. For example, there is no clear work. In addition, major policy initiatives fre- guidance regarding the nature of commercial in- quently originate in Congress. The COMSAT volvement in operational systems, whether exist- Act,14 for instance, had its origins largely in Con- ing or new entities should play a role, whether gress, though it was well supported at the time Government will purchase services or fly its own by the president and his advisers. systems, or whether the United States will favor international competition or a cooperative frame- Congress’ watchdog role, primarily determined work. It should also be noted that today’s circum- by the yearly budget cycle, often leaves congres- stances have characteristics that are quite dif- sional committees at a disadvantage with regard ferent from those encountered in the early 1960’s. to setting policy. They can be so caught up re- Then, there were no reliable vehicles to launch sponding to initiatives from the president, that competitive communications satellites beyond they are unable to take the time to formulate pol- those controlled by the United States and the icy or to form a long-term vision of national Soviet Union; there were no real alternatives to programs. cooperation. The character of the market was In addition, the present committee structure, also very different, International communications in which several different committees have juris- was a well-developed business involving long-dis- diction over different parts of the space program, tance underwater and subsurface cables, high-fre- makes it difficult to consider the program as a quency radio, and microwave links for short dis- whole. In recent years, there has been no cen- tances. Government agencies or private concerns tral focus in Congress for space matters. The Con- were engaged in supplying services, so that add- gressional Space Caucus recently formed in the ing a satellite repeater was a relatively straight- House of Representatives may provide an infor- forward step in extending and improving this ex- mal forum for discussion of space program prior- isting business base. Customers were identified ities and direction within Congress. Its formation and demand was already established, factors reflects the concern of some members about the which provided a solid base for the rapid devel- uncertain direction of the U.S. space program. opment of the space segments—particularly with Neither it nor policy studies can substitute for a the better quality service that was provided. broader, sustained debate on the place of the A major issue therefore is: Are there alternative space program in the totality of national objec- institutional frameworks that would facilitate de- tives, in which all the major actors are repre- velopment of desirable new space applications sented. services and overcome barriers that exist, wheth- Institutional er from lack of a clear national policy, underdeveloped markets, or other uncertainties? An In developing space telecommunications, the associated issue is: Can the private and public sec- U.S. founded new national entities and interna- tor roles be more clearly defined to assist in more tional structures that would design and procure effective and timely exploitation of space applica- satellites, operate the systems, and provide serv- tions opportunities? A further question of impor- ices to international users. These measures en- tance is: Should NASA be given responsibility to abled private capital to flow into the system, operate space applications systems? resolved Government/private sector relationships, and started the commercialization process International that led to a larger array of services. Many of the Space activities (outside of short-duration verti- national and international problems confronting the united States at the time COMSAT and cal sounding rocket flights), unlike many other areas of national endeavor, cannot be confined INTELSAT were established have analogs in the to the region over a given nation’s territory. Or- current situation in remote sensing and in other bital flight inevitably brings the space vehicle over other nations. In the 1967 Treaty on Principles 140p. cit., Communications !%tellite Act of 1962. Governing the Activities of States in the Explora- 276 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon tion has been increasingly challenged by Com- and Other Celestial Bodies, “outer space” was munist and Third World countries which favor recognized as a nonappropriable area analogous restrictions on space activities. In pursuing new to the high seas, and hence open to use by all opportunities for applying technology to space, nations. Policy regarding the well recognized in- the United States must weigh the national benefits ternational character of space activities was estab- accruing from aggressive competition against the lished in the NAS Act, where the guideline of need for, and benefits from, broader cooperation “peaceful purposes for the benefit of all man- in the international arena. kind” was fundamental to the U.S. program. In The issues to be addressed include: 1) What addition, U.S. activities were to be conducted so benefits has the United States received from its as to contribute materially to the following objec- cooperative programs? 2) How is the desire for “Cooperation by the United tive (among others): cooperation to be reconciled with maintaining States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the U.S. preeminence? 3) How should the United peaceful application of the results thereof.”ls States respond to the growth of competitive space applications programs in Europe and japan? in applications, there are several national con- 4) Are there benefits to be gained by inter- cerns that may limit our ability to obtain internationalizing civilian Earth observations satellite national agreements on the development and use systems? How can they be realized? 5) What of space systems. The United States has tradi- framework would enable systems to be estab- tionally advocated open access to outer space lished which would gather global information on and free commercial competition, but this posi- topics of broad common interest, such as ozone concentrations, carbon dioxide levels, and bio- I soP+ cit., NatiOna/ Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. mass inventory?

POLICY SYNTHESIS

The kinds of legislative and policy options, the ● Form a Presidential or National Commission categories and criteria for their evaluation, and ● Establish a new department. the major issues involved, have now been identified. This background enables us to outline a Reestablish the National Aeronautics number of specific policy options available to and Space Council (NASC) Congress for more detailed consideration. In the The NASC was disbanded in 1973 together with next section, we integrate selected options into the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and compatible and coherent packages. The various the President’s Science Advisory Committee options are organized by the issues which sug- (PSAC), as part of a move to reduce the size of gest them. the Executive Office and remove so-called “advo- cacy” groups from immediate proximity to the President. l6 OST was reestablished by legislation (as OSTP) in 197617 but no strong constituency Need for High-Level Attention to Space emerged to press for the reestablishment of NASC Policy in the Executive Branch at that time. The original charter for NASC in the The range of responses to deal with this issue 1958 NAS Act implied a strong need for conflict is very broad. Possible actions by Congress in- resolution and better coordination among agen- clude the following: cies engaged in space activities. At present, the Ž Reestablish the National Aeronautics and 160p. Cit., Reorganization pbtl No. 1 of 1973. 170p3 Cit., NatiOnd/ Science and Technology pdkY, %an;z+ Space Council (NASC). tion and Priorities Act of 1976. Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment .277 needs for high-level coordination as well as for the Vice President; however, the space program “a comprehensive program of aeronautical and does not appear to have high enough priority in space activities . . . ,“ as stated in the original the administration for this sort of treatment. NASC legislation are of critical importance.18 A Therefore, it may be difficult for Congress to reestablished NASC might provide a suitable establish any new mechanisms for defining and forum to focus attention on space program goals coordinating space policy, whether it is a new and objectives, problems of program coordina- NASC or another option. tion, competing claims of different interest The existence of an NASC would enable agen- groups, and a variety of other matters. Whereas cies to focus their policy concerns at a high level, the old NASC was composed of members from with the prospect of influencing critical decisions. NASA, the Departments of Defense, Transporta- {t would remove overall program content and tion, State, and the Atomic Energy Commission, strategy decisions from a strictly budget-oriented membership in a new NASC should be broad- setting, as is the case today. This would greatly ened to include Agriculture, Interior, and Com- enhance the likelihood that long-term programs merce (NOAA). The original NASC was chaired and goals can be agreed upon and effectively pur- by the Vice President, who was considered a sued. By having the Office of Management and neutral arbitrator with access to the President; Budget (OMB) represented as an observer on the with the addition of observers from the Office of Council, deliberations would have the benefit of Management and Budget and the President’s a realistic view of the budget situation. It should Science and Technology Adviser, a new NASC be understood that the deliberations of a reconsti- would bring together all the major Government tuted NASC would not receive adequate atten- space interests. It could serve to generate the tion from either the agencies or OMB, unless needed commitment to specific program content, there were direct Vice Presidential interest and aid in preparation of annual budget proposals, involvement. This would carry with it the pros- and give the space program higher visibility with pect of direct contact with the President, and the President. The Council probably should have would make the difference between a Council a central staff working for an Executive Secretary, with little or no power and a Council with an im- although the staff could be primarily composed portant role in the policy process. of detailees from the agencies involved. Only a few professionals would be needed on the staff Annual expenditures by the Federal Govern- in order to perform the basic Council tasks. ment for civilian and military space activities ex- However, adding the requirement of an annual ceed $10 billion, all of which is “discretionary,” report would increase staff size appreciably. Oc- i.e., not subject to a mandated formula or spe- casional reports to the public on space program cified service. A body such as the NASC would goals, plans, or achievements could be part of enable these expenditures to receive the high- the output of a core staff. level review and attention appropriate to their national significance. The Reagan Administration does not appear to favor new entities in the Executive Office, al- Committee of the National Security Council though topical committees of the Cabinet have (NSC) or a Subset of a “Cabinet been formed for specific policy areas. The NASA Council’s” Responsibilities Administrator does not have Cabinet status and therefore is not represented at this level. An ex- Because it concerns the internal management ception has been the appointment of vice Presi- of the Executive Office, this option is not amenable to congressional action. It has been included dent Bush as chairman of a committee for regulatory review, demonstrating that it is possible to here for the sake of completeness. have the administration accept a new entity in In the Carter administration, the lack of a high- the Executive Office under the chairmanship of Ievel policy focus in the executive branch was lop. cit., Nationa/ Aeronautics Space Act of /9S8, title 11, p. 4, recognized as a problem, and the solution was sec 201, d-2. the formation of a Policy Review Committee for 278 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Space (PRC-Space) within the structure of the of viable options. On the positive side, the Cabi- NSC. (In the Carter administration, there were net Council may allow for significant high-level various PRC’S dealing with specific national secu- attention to whatever proposals reach its agenda. rity areas). The chairman of the PRC-Space was the Director of the Office of Science and Tech- Presidential or National Commission nology Policy (OSTP). By contrast, the Reagan ad- A device that is occasionally employed to inves- ministration has favored routing space issues tigate a broad area of national interest is a presi- through a new “Cabinet Council” managed by dential or National (implying congressional and White House staff, with advice from the Direc- private involvement) commission, board, com- tor of OSTP and the Special Assistant for National mittee, or council. Examples are: Security Affairs (see ch. 6). The Commission on Intergovernmental Rela- By using the NSC structure for space policy tions. A 26-member bipartisan permanent review there is a rather strong orientation toward body with State and National Government national security and military affairs. The civilian representatives, from both the legislative and space program, while sometimes having a strong executive branches, and members from the international impact, has traditionally been sepa- general public whose purpose is to review rated from specific military and national securi- and recommend improvements in the Fed- ty programs. NSC is managed by a foreign-policy eral system. oriented staff with little of the necessary back- Water Resources Council. Established to ground in dealing with commercial or technologi- maintain a continuing study of national water cal concerns. requirements. The Council reviews plans of While the OSTP Director is a relatively neutral river basin commissions, assembles these figure, the stature of his office vis-a-vis the White plans and submits them to Congress via the House has varied considerably and does not President. It also administers a program of compare with that of the Vice President. On the Federal grants for water and land resource positive side, NSC has typically been a very im- planning. portant focal point for setting policy in recent ad- Procurement Commission. An ad hoc group ministrations, so that issues raised in this forum for reviewing Federal procurement policy, usually reach the President for decision. This pro- with public and private membership and a vides a degree of access not easily matched ex- limited lifetime (it has completed its work). cept by OMB and the key White House staff. It prepared a comprehensive set of policy Whether this situation will continue in the Reagan recommendations and procedural changes. administration is not clear. In addition, NSC is equipped to consider issues dealing with the high- One possibility for space is to charter for a spe- ly classified military and intelligence space pro- cified term, a “National Space Commission” with grams, by individuals fully cleared for access to membership from the general public, State and local governments, industry (particularly aero- the classified aspects. This is particularly impor- space and electronics firms), academia, Congress, tant for such common systems as the space shuttle and tracking and data relay systems, and in and the executive branch—NASA, State, DOD, connection with the transfer of technology from Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture. The Com- the classified to the civilian programs. mission would be charged with reviewing and assessing the civilian space program and its bene- Use of the new “Cabinet Council” method of fits, and recommending long- and short-term ob- reviewing space policy forces these issues to com- jectives, and a time frame for their achievement. pete with a much larger array of other policy con- The product of the Commission would be a major cerns for the very limited staff time available to report, recommending short- and long-term goals support the councils. Without a dedicated staff, for the U.S. space program. The Commission adequate attention is not likely to be given to would be publicly supported; following its report, understanding the issues and to the development congressional hearings could be held on its Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 279 recommendations, and legislation prepared for development and operation, manned flight, consideration by congress. satellite integration, tracking and data acquisition; an Environment and Natural Resources Adminis- Such a forum enables participation from a tration with land, atmosphere, and ocean activ- broad set of interests in developing program ities from NASA, NOAA, DOE and possibly the goals; it operates in a manner that is outside normal channels and hence would be less threaten- U.S. Geological Survey from Interior; an Industrial ing to the annual budget preparation process; it Technology Administration with the National Bu- would be public and could solicit public input reau of Standards, Patent Office, and applied as appropriate; and it would serve as an expres- technology programs from NSF; and an Energy sion of broad national and bipartisan support for R&D Administration with the core DOE programs such as solar, conservation, fossil, nuclear, and the civilian space program. In order to provide fusion. The department could have a special proj- a specific objective for such a group, a major report should probably be specified, with annual ects office for interdisciplinary issues that require updates for the life of the Commission. broad contributions such as communications and information, science and technology, or for lim- A National Space Commission, because of its ited-life projects such as robotics development public, short-term nature, could not substitute for (to assist in accelerating commercialization of this a means within the administration to resolve is- new technology). In such a department, responsi- sues, develop policy proposals, review goals, and bility for leadership in generating space program set strategy for the space program. The Commis- goals and objectives would lie with an Adminis- sion therefore is complementary to the previous trator for Space Operations, assisted by others— two options, although it would deal with many Research, Environment and National Resources, of the same issues. The Commission would have Energy, Industrial Technology, and Special Proj- the advantage of being able to evaluate public ects. These components would be responsible for response and support, and to focus that support generating programs in space science, weather on specific goals. It also provides a device for full and meteorology, Earth observations, space man- discussion of congressional, executive branch, ufacturing, and telecommunications. Together, and private sector views in a constructive setting. they would constitute the civilian space program. Coordination with DOD and national intelligence Establish a New Department space programs would still be required, and for This concept would place NASA in a larger this purpose a Cabinet-level Space Council might Cabinet-level structure, perhaps one that incorpo- also be desirable to resolve issues that arise, to rated a group of science and technology agen- provide a forum for program coordination and cies. The principal focus for space policy would to enable consideration of other aspects, such as be a Cabinet officer responsible for setting space foreign policy considerations (which would be goals, as well as integrating these goals into a supplied by the Secretary of State). larger science and technology policy framework. This option would be extremely difficult to im- The following choice of functions to be grouped plement, since it would involve many congres- together is largely illustrative–a considerably sional jurisdictions and appear to threaten existing more detailed discussion would be required to agency constituencies. On the other hand, the treat this subject adequately than is appropriate Reagan administration has indicated that it plans to this report.19 If, for the purposes of this assess- to dismantle the Department of Energy, and this ment, we designated it the Department of Basic could provide the stimulus for giving serious con- and Applied Sciences, it might have a Research sideration to formation of a new department by Administration with components from the NSF, grouping together high-technology agencies, in- NASA, and DOE; a Space Operations Administra- cluding the R&D elements from the present DOE. tion with responsibility for launch vehicle Many foreign countries, including Japan and most

19FOr example, see reports of the U.S. House of Representatives of Western Europe, have ministerial-level depart- Committee on Science and Technology in 1967, 1972, and 1977. ments dealing with science and technology. 280 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

A new, high-technology R&D department to most of the civilian space program authorization deal with space policy issues would facilitate ac- and oversight shifted from several subcommittees cess to the President. It could also strengthen bar- of the Committee on Science and Technology to gaining with OMB in the budget process, and only one, the eight-member Subcommittee on might even (depending on the other agencies and Space Science and Applications of the Commit- functions that were included in the new depart- tee on Science and Technology; in the Senate the ment) result in economies in areas where com- Committee on Space was disbanded and respon- mon support functions can be combined (pro- sibility for space matters was assumed by the curement, administration, facilities, personnel, nine-member Subcommittee on Science, Tech- etc.). It is also possible that better use of support- nology, and Space of the Committee on Com- ing laboratories would result from incorporating merce, Science, and Technology. In addition to, them into a larger departmental structure. the military responsibilities of the Armed Services Committees, space activities in Commerce, Interi- LEGISLATIVE BRANCH or, Agriculture, and Energy Departments are In the future, Congress could take a much overseen by different committees. stronger hand in formulating space policy and co- In recent years, Congress has addressed many ordinating the different national space programs. of the policy issues discussed in this report; in par- Congress played a major role in the initial stages ticular, it has dealt with the uses of the space shut- of the U.S. space program by drawing up the NAS tle, the transition to an operational remote- Act, and Members of Congress were leaders in sensing system, international competition, and helping to focus national attention on space ex- commercialization of space technology. The ploration. Other critical policy decisions, such as absence of a coherent and comprehensive na- the COMSAT Act in 1962, were also initiated by tional civilian policy has surfaced as a recurrent Congress. Both the House and Senate formed full concern, and hearings on this subject were held committees to oversee civilian space activities, by both Houses in 1979z0 and 1980.21 In the Sen- while assigning responsibility for military space ate, S. 212, the “National Space and Aeronautics programs to their respective Armed Services Policy Act of 1979,” and S. 244 “to establish na- Committees. tional space policy and program direction” were During the Apollo years, Congress supported introduced. Both bills proposed establishing long- major programs proposed by the executive term programs in accord with explicit policy prin- branch and voted increasing annual budgets for ciples, with S. 212 specifying particular projects NASA. However, in the late 1960’s and early as well. 1970’s, NASA budgets and program proposals In the House, hearings were held in May and came under increasing attack as being too ambi- June 1979 on H.R. 2337, the Space industrializa- tious for a period when domestic social programs tion Act of 1979,22 which called for establishment and the Vietnam war required ever-larger na- of a national Space Industrialization Corporation tional commitments. Despite a strong core of to encourage public-private exploitation of com- congressional supporters, congressional critics on mercial opportunities in space. In both 1979 and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 1980, the House passed H.R. 2335, the Solar HUD and Independent Agencies succeeded in reducing NASA plans for major post-Apollo pro- ‘“’’U.S. Civilian Space Policy,” hearings before the Subcommit- grams. NASA’s space budget reached a low of tee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Com- merce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Jan. 25 and 31 $2,758.5 billion in 1974, down from a 1965 high and Feb. 1, 1979. of $5,137.6 billion (in current dollars; if inflation ‘l’’ United States Civilian Space Policy,” hearings before the Sub- is taken into account, the differences are much committee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee greater). on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, july 23 and 24, 1980. In the mid -l 970’s, both the House and Senate zz “The Space industrialization Act of 1979, ” hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Commit- restructured their authorizing committees for tee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, space activities. In the House, responsibility for May 22 and 23; june 26 and 27, 1979. Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 281

Power Satellite Research, Development, and Eval- ● Jurisdictional overlap and committee rela- uation Program Act of 1979,23 which would have tions. –The different committees and sub- authorized $25 million for R&D on solar power committees with responsibilities for various satellites. In 1981, the Space Policy Act of 1981 civilian programs create a need for coordina- was introduced (H. R. 371 2), and general hear- tion, if oversight of national programs and ings on civilian space policy were held in integration of national policy is to be accom- September. plished. Relations between civilian and mili- The problems of coordinating policy and estab- tary programs are particularly sensitive. In previous years, Congressmen sitting on both lishing long-term goals are mirrored in Congress’ the Space and Armed Services Committees own activities. To a much greater extent than in the executive branch, Congress’ ability to deal provided informal coordination. Today, only with these problems depends on informal and one Senator and one Representative belong personal responses, rather than institutional or to both the space subcommittees and Armed legislative changes. The problems facing sus- Services Committees or Intelligence Commit- tees. tained and broad-based congressional attention to space policy are: Given strong enough leadership and sufficiently ● Not a high national or regional priority. — widespread perception of the importance of the Space programs and policy have not recently issue, institutional or jurisdictional barriers to a been high on the national agenda as com- comprehensive consideration of space policy are pared with questions of social, economic, not insurmountable. joint hearings, multiple refer- and foreign policy. In addition, constituent rals of legislation, and ad hoc committees or addi- interests force relatively few Representatives tions to committees are several ways to cut across or Senators to consider space (a number of established territories. Congressmen, including former astronauts, In recent years both the House and the Senate have strong personal interests in this area and have criticized many specific administration ac- have contributed to the increased attention to space policy in recent years). tions as well as the lack of an overall policy. So far, none of the proposed reforms of space policy ● Staff size and experience. —The change from full committee to subcommittee oversight, or initiatives for major program changes have been adopted. However, the continued absence coupled with recent Senate staff cutbacks, may make it more difficult for Congress to of executive leadership guarantees that Congress deal with the many issues involved. is more and more likely to take the initiative in setting long-range goals for exploiting the shut-

ZJ’’Solar Power Satellite,” hearings for the Subcommittee on Space tle, commercializing space technologies, and Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Tech- meeting international competition. nology, U.S. House of Representatives, Mar. 28, 29, and 30, 1979.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES—CLARIFYING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR ROLES In space applications, the services and products ly available as a public service. A similar pattern involve both Government and private firms and has been established in oceanographic obser- institutions. The multitude of interests and players vations. In communications, Government per- has raised questions concerning the appropriate formed much of the early research and demon- role of each in developing and operating applica- stration, but industry and regulated entities have tions systems. In one area, weather and atmos- developed the platforms and supplied the serv- pheric observations, the Federal Government has ices—subject to regulation by FCC and consistent traditionally collected the data and made it free- with agreements under the International Tele- 282 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications ———.———— -— — communication Union (ITU). In satellite Earth Clarifying the R&D Role of Government observations the Government has performed in Space Communications. much of the research, developed and demon- An important policy option is to clarify and strated the platforms and distributed the data. make more explicit the role of NASA in support- Private industry has supplied users with value- ing R&D needs for space communications. In -added services. (By contrast, aircraft surveys are order to accomplish this, it may be desirable to normally done by private industry without Gov- legislate NASA’s responsibilities in R&D for ad- ernment involvement in any phase of their work.) vanced communications satellites. The NASA in space manufacturing and space transportation, program in communications was cut back for Government has taken the lead, but private sec- most of the decade of the 1970’s (despite the gen- tor involvement is growing. An important issue eral guidance of the NAS Act and COMSAT legis- therefore ,is to clarify ways in which the private lation) (see fig. 16), However, NASA had earlier and public sectors might work with one another. contributed significantly to progress in space telecommunications, providing much of the tech- Space Telecommunications nology and systems in use today. NASA could contribute to the solution of current and future Initially, international satellite communications problems, such as utilization of the 30/20 GHz were established as a Government-regulated mo- frequency (see ch. 3). A continuing telecom- nopoly through INTELSAT and the U.S. represen- munications technology program would include tative, COMSAT (see ch. 8). As the technology fundamental work at higher frequencies and has advanced and new customers for it have demonstrations of technology and systems. been identified, domestic satellite services have been established and competition for domestic It will be very important for industry and NASA services has been allowed. Maritime communi- to cooperate in defining the appropriate high-risk cations are being developed along the lines of areas for Government support and the boundary INTELSAT, through the international maritime sat- between Government and industry for develop- ellite organization (l NMARSAT), in which ment of specific systems. Industry can and should COMSAT is also the designated U.S. participant. work with NASA to sponsor cooperative commu- INMARSAT came into existence in 1979 in rec- nications technology demonstrations. To ensure ognition of the desirability of instituting a single adequate consultation between NASA (as a lead (monopoly) system for maritime services while agency for this work) and industry, an industry- encouraging competition for certain other com- Government consultative committee could be munications satellite applications. In the future, it appears that lower costs, more Figure 17.—NASA Funding for Communications Satellite Technology (In constant year 1983 dollars, demand for capacity, and greater diversity of serv- i.e., adjusted for inflation) ices will characterize the domestic communications industry. Direct broadcast satellites for 175 r Communications television signals to the home are likely in the v phasedown decision mid-l 980’s. Business services are expanding, especially for data communications and specialized D functions. The industrial firms that can act as sup- Communications pliers are available, and the existing service . reentry decl$lon markets provide an important revenue base for future new ventures. The principal areas of con- Fiscal year 1$83 dollars cern are the availability of the electromagnetic . frequency spectrum in the light of competing 25 demands for services, international control of i I i i assigned orbital positions for satellites (through 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 ITU), and domestic regulation of technical and Year commercial characteristics. SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Adminlstratlon Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 283 specified that would consider space communicat- minimize risk and to push NASA to carry out tasks ions research and technology needs. On such that industry might otherwise be expected to do. a committee, in addition to NASA, Government Given NASA’s desire to maintain its budget and would be represented by DOD, NTIA (Com- institutional structure, it can be expected to merce), State, and FCC, while the industry rep- acquiesce. The example of the HEPAP is instruc- resentatives would include aerospace contrac- tive in this regard. For it the incentives are very tors, the common carriers, COMSAT and other similar: have the Government do more, expand, space services suppliers. The deliberations of this press forward faster, etc. The counterbalance is committee could be submitted to the Congress the competition and rivalry among the various as part of the annual budget. A committee with research groups, and the pressures of other agen- a similar function already exists in high-energy cy demands, OMB, and eventually Congress. physics, called the High Energy Physics Advisory Within a communications committee, such pres- Panel (HEPAP). It includes all the interested par- sures can be counterbalanced by competition be- ties in the field and is sponsored by the principal tween companies, Federal agencies, OMB and agency responsible, DOE. HEPAP serves to re- Congress. DOD’s role would bean additional fac- solve the various independent views of what is tor. By including DOD in the consultative group, needed and periodically presents an integrated the technology base that is being supported for plan for new facilities and research needs. military purposes would be represented directly. Not all of the developments could be dis- Open-ended assignment of a space communi- cussed, but general knowledge of classified pro- cations R&D role to NASA might be difficult to grams could be a valuable asset in discussions sustain for several reasons: 1 ) uncertain and pos- of technology needs. sibly larger budget needs would be resisted by OMB and the administration; 2) users might have If in addition to acting as consultants, the in- little role in NASA demonstrations, with the result dustry also took a more active role in financially that unnecessary and uneconomic technologies supporting demonstrations of new satellite sys- might be pursued (i.e., there is the danger that tems (see Communications Issue, ch. 3), its own it would become a technological “hobby shop”); stake in the type and direction of work that is and 3) NASA might create unrealistic expecta- done would be greater. Because industry had a tions by demonstrating sophisticated new tech- strong financial interest, the development work nology not ready for commercial introduction. done would be more likely to reflect the genuine On the other hand, remaining silent regarding the needs of industry. in sum, the above suggestions NASA role invites the type of decision that was could lead to a role for NASA that represents a made in the early 1970’s, when the NASA com- balance between technology push and demand munications satellite platform and technology pull. demonstration program were terminated. The consequences of this decision are covered in R&D to Support Regulatory Decisions chapter 4. Regulation is always the product of balancing By specifying that NASA should perform com- among the affected interests. In the balancing munications satellite R&D, including demonstra- process, it is important that the regulatory tion of technologies and platforms, and also spe- authorities have the best possible technical infor- cifying that there will be formal user and indus- mation available. The ultimate decisions will re- try involvement in identifying the extent and flect their grasp of the technology as well as po- nature of the program, the open-ended nature litical and economic constraints, the biases of the of the assignment can be modified. Such a con- people involved, and the effectiveness of the vari- sultative process can serve as a forum for bring- ous lobbying groups. The regulatory body for ing out independent views and ensuring the rele- communications, FCC, has an R&D section and vance of the NASA program. One danger of such a technical staff to interpret the impact of new a mechanism is that industry may press for too technology on regulations, and vice versa. But large a role for NASA, since their incentive is to the exploding telecommunications and informa- 284 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications tion technologies have created serious overload- tion to identify and defend its interests. In some ing of this staff and their limited budget. It would cases, better technical information is likely to be unrealistic to consider space communications yield better international agreements, by remov- experiments and demonstrations to be within ing misunderstandings about the effects of new their capability. However, both nationally and in- technologies. ternationally, regulations are being made that control the numbers of satellites that will be per- Earth Observations From Space mitted (by controlling synchronous orbital slots), their power levels and signal characteristics, the Civilian Earth observations from space encom- frequencies used, and a variety of other technical passes a variety of space platforms, sensors and details. Information for these decisions comes mission objectives, ranging from weather obser- from a variety of sources–some private (like Bell vations made by NOAA, to ocean observations Labs and COMSAT Labs) and some Government and Landsat-type systems. The technology for (e.g., DOD, NBS, NOAA, and NASA), but there weather observations via satellite has developed is no lead agency for space communications R&D from the limited capability of the early experi- to support regulation. This suggests the follow- mental systems to a relatively mature technology. ing policy option: The relationship between NASA as the R&D and launching agency, and NOAA as the operational ~ Modify NASA’s legislative charter to direct the authority has also developed and matured over Agency to pursue communications R&D to sup- time. In general, this relationship now demon- port the needs of prospective regulatory actions, strates how NOAA, as a lead agency with a clear both nationally and via ITU, internationally. in- mission to perform, can interact with an R&D ternationally, the United States has much at stake agency, NASA, to stimulate and take advantage in the allocation of orbital slots for satellites, the of advanced technology and adapt it to opera- assignment of frequencies, and the technical tional use (see ch. 9). The major areas of con- characteristics of allowable signals and signal cern today are the Landsat and future oceano- strengths. The United States should also be pre- graphic satellite programs. pared to take stronger action to ensure more realistic decisions in ITU. These decisions are often driven by unwarranted fears of smaller nations, For land remote sensing, the relationships between public and private interests are currently based on poor technical information, and by perhaps the most difficult areas to treat. The political objectives. Both of these aspects should Carter administration, and now the Reagan ad- be addressed, the first by better dissemination of ministration as well, favored turning over this ac- technical information, perhaps by a traveling tivity to private ownership and management, team of experts with equipment capable of dem- while the private sector, for the most pat-t, does onstrating essential data, and the second through not yet see a sufficient market to be able to re- stronger leverage from the State Department. A high-level space policy mechanism such as the spond. Caught up in the present uncertainty are NASC could provide the proper exposure at the the users of the data; a private industry of value- -added companies that has grown up to process White House for these international political measures, and a separate subgroup for interna- and interpret the raw sensed data, and the aero- tional space communications may be desirable. space contractors capable of designing and building the satellites and other hardware. Complicat- Clarifying the NASA role would enable better ing the scene are international pressures from a planning of space communications research and large number of other countries interested in demonstration programs by the agency and help using Landsat data (some with dedicated receiv- to provide a more competent and predictable set ing stations); from a few countries planning the of regulations for public and private users to deal development of competitive systems; and from with. By giving more attention to the preparation a number of countries with national concerns and technical backup for international negotia- about the collection and use of remotely sensed tions, the United States would be in a better posi- data gathered about their territory. Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment . 285

policy options to resolve some of these issues a single supplier (or even a consortium) would include the folIowing: come forward to propose a data collection system without data purchase guarantees similar to those FOR THE SPACE SEGMENT proposed by COMSAT. Thus, the likelihood is Laissez-faire or open entry. The Government that a truly open entry policy would result in no would agree to operate space platforms through entry. Landsat D and possibly D’. Further satellite sys- Single designated entity. Whenever the service tems would then become the responsibility of pri- to be provided is such that the necessary capital vate industry. Government users would purchase investments are very large in relation to the in- data from private suppliers under commercial dustry base, and the technology and character terms and conditions. Private suppliers would sell of the system makes competitive suppliers either data to international users on a nondiscriminatory impractical or highly wasteful of resources, the basis. Any private supplier or consortium (domes- conditions may warrant designating a monopo- tic or foreign) could purchase launch services and ly supplier. A typical example was the designa- fly a land remote-sensing satellite. If the market tion of AT&T as the long-distance carrier for did not support the service, it would terminate domestic telephone communications. With a after Landsat D or D’, except for possible DOD monopoly supplier, however, regulatory mecha- or foreign collection platforms. nisms are required to control pricing and to in- With the current cost of launch services and sure continued service by the supplier. FCC car- satellites, there is only a very limited prospect that ries out this function, as well as a variety of other private sector suppliers would enter the field for important roles in communications. An impor- the space segment. An important indicator is the tant characteristic of the regulatory process must nature of the current COMSAT suggestion that be the ability to change the monopoly situation it assume responsibility for all operational remote- to respond to new technological advances that sensing systems.24 They feel that the market is suf- modify the monopoly characteristics of the sys- ficiently marginal that transfer of all current opera- tem. FCC has responded to such changes in the tional remote sensing would (including meteoro- domestic telecommunications industry, although logical satellites) be required, and the Govern- there has been criticism that it acted much too ment would have to commit to purchase its data slowly. from the COMSAT systems. Such marginal eco- On the premise that conditions may exist in nomics indicate very strongly that competition land remote sensing for a monopoly supplier, one would not exist (beyond subsidized foreign sys- policy option would be to give a single private tems) if COMSAT were allowed to proceed with sector entity the role of developer and operator its proposal. This would create a de facto mo- of the space segment. Since the revenue base for nopoly, although in principle the prospect of sale of the raw data does not appear adequate open entry would be available. The de facto to support a positive return on the investment, monopoly would continue until technology ad- the Government would also guarantee purchase vanced to the point that reliable, low-cost access of a minimum amount of the output, perhaps at to space and low-cost platforms was available, subsidized prices, until costs and markets have thus allowing competitors to enter without the developed to permit Government to decrease its massive capital investments required today. role gradually. Because a monopoly position If the COMSAT initiative is not pursued, and implies some regulatory control in order to pro- other approaches are entertained through open tect the public interest, a new institution would solicitation of the industry, it is uncertain whether probably be required to regulate prices, entry into the field, quality of services, and to control the amount and extent of Government subsidy. Z4C;v;/ [and ~e~ote Sensing Systems, joint hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, House Com- The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) is a good mittee on Science and Technology; Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, example of such a regulatory agency. It original- Science, and Transportation, July 22 and 23, 1981. ly regulated entry, controlled routes, reviewed 286 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications fares and revenues, and provided significant di- improve the cost v. revenue relationship for these rect cash subsidies to the airline operators while services. Here, the analogy with civilian aviation the airline industry built its market and its ability again illustrates a Government policy option. In to sustain profitable operations. The Government aviation, the Government established the Na- also guaranteed the purchase of services, in the tional Advisory Committee on Aeronautics early days with subsidized airmail contracts to the (NACA) and its supporting laboratory structure airlines, and later with Government cargo and over 65 years ago to improve aeronautic technol- passenger traffic. The rationale for treating this ogy in the United States. The Federal Govern- industry in such a special way is similar to the ment still continues to support advances in aero- rationale that applies to land remote sensing, viz., nautics through NASA. The users of this technol- there is a service to be supplied which would be ogy are the military and civilian aircraft manufac- highly beneficial to the public, and which could turers, and the beneficiaries are the American eventually become an independent and profit- public. Thus, a similar technology development able private enterprise given initial subsidy. role by Government might be appropriate in sup- Because it is normal practice in our free enter- port of SDA, and desirable in terms of long-term prise system for the Government to use commer- benefits to the public. cial suppliers, the Government should be prepared to act in a way that ensures continuation Thus, the NASA role as a technology “push” of the services while building toward a self- agency would continue, including definition and sustaining capability in industry. With the passage development of new sensors, platforms and asso- of time and growing industry maturity, the ciated subsystems, and supporting technologies regulatory authority can decrease and eventual- such as launch vehicles, on-orbit control, track- ly cease–as is the plan for the CAB. ing and data recovery. This would be very close to the current situation with respect to R&D for This suggests establishing a new entity, which meteorological satellites and the previous NASA for purposes of this analysis will be called the role in the communications satellite area. Space Development Authority (SDA). SDA would have a role for new and emerging space applica- Establishing a regulated monopoly in remote tions very similar to CAB in air transportation. sensing, although less desirable than true compe- Since there are more opportunities than simply tition, can result in high-quality services and sig- land remote sensing, SDA could function in all nificant public benefit (e.g., AT&T and long-dis- applications areas. It would control entry into tance telephone service). A key characteristic of data collection operations, initially establishing effective regulation is that it be as little as neces- criteria for the monopoly supplier, and later per- sary in order to protect the public interest. In ad- mit greater competition as the market develops. dition, the boundary between regulated functions It would review pricing of services and establish and unregulated functions needs to be flexible a fair rate of return using guidelines derived from in order to respond to changing industry dynam- other, similar regulatory situations. SDA might ics and the effects of new technology. Therefore, support this rate of return by adding a direct sub- SDA should operate under guidelines that specify sidy from appropriated funds. It would review minimal regulation and responsiveness to any proposed satellite configurations and establish, changes that would allow for more open compe- with the aid of the user community, minimum tition. desired performance characteristics for proposed systems. The choice of technology, specific de- Adoption of the COMSAT initiative or one sim- sign characteristics, and award of contracts for ilar to it from another corporation or consortium hardware would be the responsibility of the would appear to require establishing a mecha- monopoly supplier. nism such as SDA. If not, the control over pricing would be difficult, and quality of service An important further consideration is the re- would be continually open to negotiation, with sponsibility for advancing technology in order to little in the way of alternatives open to the Gov- continue improving the services provided and to ernment except canceling the agreement. There Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 287 are additional questions regarding responsibility would be independent of NASA and NOAA, but for performing R&D on advanced sensors (NASA probably would include a portion of the existing or COMSAT, or both?), distribution of data by pri- space applications staff of both of these agencies. vate companies and international access to the While publicly funded and hence accountable data, that would need to be resolved. These are to Congress, it would collect user charges (like not insurmountable, but they do raise doubts the recently disestablished Panama Canal Co., a about the ability to anticipate and spell out all former Government entity that was initially pub- of the conditions for a transfer to a single desig- licly funded but eventually became self-support- nated entity that would protect the interests of ing). It would not conduct R&D, but would identi- Government and the public. Creation of an over- fy targets for NASA attention, and serve to chan- sight and regulatory authority such as SDA would nel to concerns of data users such as NOAA, enable these issues to be addressed as they arise USDA, and Interior in Governments; State and and would appear to be a wise precaution to ac- local governments; and private users (including company a policy decision to establish a private companies that process and interpret the monopoly supplier. data) to NASA. SASA would be organized to provide a valuable service at the lowest cost. SASA Government as the Operator. An alternative might assume responsibility for a variety of other approach to the space segment, (consistent with space-related applications functions, such as the conclusion that a monopoly position is re- meteorological and ocean-sensing data, storm quired, would be to retain the Government as warning, emergency communications, search operator instead of a regulated, private sector en- and rescue identification and location, public tity. In this alternative, procurement of the satel- navigation, and other noncommercial services. lites, their operation and control, and the initial in this role it would be much like a private reception and distribution of the data stream monopoly supplier, except for: 1 ) its status as a would remain a Government function. Selection Government entity, 2) the fact that a separate of system characteristics (sensors, orbits, number regulatory entity would not be required, and of satellites, type of coverage, and other parame- 3) the periodic review of its operation that would ters) should be done through consultation with occur through the annual budget process. the user community, and for this a formal structure is probably desirable. A Remote Sensing If NASA were given the role of space segment Users Group such as NOAA is now in the proc- operator, the advantages would be: good integra- ess of setting up would help ensure that users tion with the present launch authority, assured have an opportunity to participate in the plan- technical competence, and substantial agency in- ning of new systems and in the operation of exist- terest in the technology and its successful employing platforms. ment. On the negative side, NASA is prone to push the technology rather than its uses, and In this case the operator could be either the tends to continue experimentation rather than R&D and launching agency, NASA; an agency allow a system to become operational. closer to a user community such as NOAA, USDA, or Interior; or a new Government entity If it were a single established user agency, the established for this purpose that brought together problems would be somewhat reversed. The several existing roles. NOAA will be responsible technical aspects become more difficult to man- for overseeing the operation of the Landsat sys- age and to integrate into the user’s normal way tem after Landsat D is launched. of doing business; the format of satellite data is likely to conflict with previous ways of obtain- However, if a new agency were set up, for ex- ing similar information, while the agency as a ample, a Space Applications Services Administra- whole will not have much stake in the successful tion (SASA) it could be responsible for defining, outcome of a satellite program that is only a small procuring, and operating satellites and ground part of their total mission. On the other hand, stations and providing an assured flow of data there would be greater sensitivity to user needs from space applications systems. This agency and better contact with the user community .

288 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

(though quite likely not with all of the users in seems appropriate. Access to the initial processed the case of multipurpose satellite systems). The data stream should remain open to all customers satellite system would more rapidly become but at a realistic fee schedule, reviewed and ap- standardized and operational in this mode; once proved by SDA. In order to protect the initial posi- accomplished, new technology would probably tion of the monopoly supplier, it would probably be resisted unless “proven” and reliable. be necessary to restrict competitive entry into the field of reception and initial processing of the sat- In the case of a new Government entity created ellite data stream. to assume responsibility for satellite applications systems, many of the above characteristics would As far as the space segment is concerned, a U.S. be favorably modified, but other problems would monopoly supplier appears to be necessary, at be increased. least for the foreseeable future. Competition is likely to be provided by one or more international NASA would undoubtedly promote its mission systems capable of supplying similar data. (A by looking for, and attempting to satisfy demand more detailed discussion of international aspects, for, new applications services. This would depend and policy options that respond to the growing in part on obtaining support from NASA for technology development. By operating meteorologi- capabilities of other nations, is found later in this cal systems and Landsat, NASA might begin with chapter.) a sufficient base to provide a critical mass for con- The ground segment is as important to the total tinuing operations. effectiveness of a remote-sensing system as the space platforms. The point is that providing ade- GROUND SEGMENT quate capacity for data handling and processing, There are three areas to consider: 1 ) operation compatible equipment, and common data for- and control of the space segment; 2) reception mats should receive the same careful attention and processing of returned data; and 3) distribu- as the more glamorous and visible spacecraft. For tion and interpretative processing of returned this reason, it is important that the processing data. For the space segment it appears that use system be at least as responsive to user needs as of NASA facilities on a reimbursable basis would to the R&D agency. If NASA were to assume re- be a sensible beginning. Independent control sponsibility for an operational remote-sensing centers would be established as the business system, there would need to be a stronger in- increased. volvement by the users in determining the characteristics of the data processing system than is To receive and distribute satellite-derived infor- presently the case. mation, current technology requires an array of unique and expensive equipment to convert raw returned data to images or other coherent forms. Space Transportation Since many users, such as agricultural analysts, Throughout this analysis the implied assump- require quick distribution of recently acquired tion has been that launch vehicles and their sup- data, there is a need for high throughput for the porting systems such as launch complexes, track- processing center and redundant equipment to ing, and control facilities would continue to be allow for breakdowns or other system problems. available through customary channels. However, Thus, for this segment, the potential exists for hav- space transportation systems themselves may also ing a regulated monopoly supplier. This could be considered subject to possible new policy ini- quite logically be the same entity that was respon- tiatives as defined in the beginning of this chapter. sible for the space segment, in order to ensure compatibility of equipment and processing capac- For the most part, launching payloads into ity as satellite designs and instruments change. space has been sufficiently costly and complex that Government sponsorship has been required For the interpretive processing of returned data, to develop and operate all but the most limited on the other hand, an embryonic industry is systems. As the cost and importance of payloads, already established, and continued open entry civilian and military, have increased, it has also Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment Ž 289 become particularly important to ensure that portation for manned and unmanned payloads. there is a high degree of reliability and a low prob- The presence of man has focused public atten- ability of catastrophic failure. These concerns tion on its operations; it is viewed as another step reach a peak when manned vehicles are in- in the continuing East-West competition in space, volved; only the two space superpowers, the Recently there has been considerable discussion United States and the U. S. S. R., have devoted the about the possibility of private ownership and resources and effort to carry out such operations. operation of the shuttle system. For a number of reasons, this does not appear to be a likely pros- In considering policy options for space trans- pect for the near term. One reason is the special portation, therefore, it is useful to distinguish be- political significance of manned spaceflight, as tween the type and scale of operations involved, mentioned above. Although the frequency of op- e.g., manned systems; large, unmanned systems erations envisioned for the shuttle—about one to synchronous, interplanetary or low-Earth tra- launch every 10 days–will result in the public jectories; small, low-altitude unmanned systems. devoting less attention to individual shuttle MANNED SYSTEMS launches, and accepting man in space as relatively routine, it still appears likely that the loss The presence of man in space has captured the of astronauts in space would be a major blow to imagination of people throughout the world, and national prestige. Given the cost of maintaining has given national space efforts some of their adequate launch, recovery, and refurbishment most memorable moments. When astronauts are crews and facilities for the shuttle system, con- involved, there is always the possibility of a tinued Government control and overall manage- catastrophic failure leading to death or injury; ment seems likely. such a disaster can have widespread effects on public opinion and hence on the future of the A second factor is that, although each shuttle space program. The fire in the Apollo 204 cap- orbiter is projected to have a lifetime of about sule in 1967, which killed three astronauts, 100 launches, there will be a continuing need for though it occurred on the ground, caused a system modifications and rework that are part of lengthy delay in the Apollo flight schedule. The the standard experience associated with any new death of Soviet cosmonauts on reentry in 2 and complex system such as the shuttle. For these separate incidents in 1967 and 1971 had similar changes and continuing engineering support of consequences. The result is that great care is the system, the resources of the Federal Govern- given to the safety, reliability and resistance to ment are likely to be needed—as well as the ex- single-point failures of manned systems. This also pertise of the major NASA Centers, Johnson (JSC) includes launch vehicles, which go through and Marshall (MSFC). special procedures in order to make them “mandated. ” These special procedures are reflected in Third, the shuttle is planned to be the “delivery increased costs and in a sizeable support estab- truck” for most low-altitude payloads, whether lishment for manned flight, both of which have manned or unmanned, including national secu- been sufficiently large that only government has rity as well as civilian or commercial payloads. had the resources to conduct manned space op- The contributions of space systems to national erations. Only the United States and the Soviet security are significant and appear to be increas- Union have been willing to make the investments ing; so it is not likely that the Government will required to engage in manned flight, and this has wish to forego control over, and assurance of the resulted in a form of symbolic East-West competi- availability of, adequate transportation to orbit. tion, centered around such space endeavors, that Direct Government operation of the shuttle and rarely applies to the popular perceptions of un- technical support for the shuttle system would manned space activities. be needed in order to provide the necessary assurances to national security authorities. The development of the space shuttle has given the United States a launch vehicle that is simul- Fourth, there is the question of liability. The taneously a manned system and a form of trans- shuttle, in its launch configuration, represents a 290 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications very high and concentrated amount of energy work toward improvement of unmanned expend- which, if it were to crash in a populated area, able launch vehicles has been minimal and there could have widespread detrimental economic has been no new unmanned launch vehicle de- consequences. Other forms of system failure velopment. For a number of reasons, the cost of could also be very costly from the standpoint of shuttle launches will be higher, and their availa- liability. Government is the institution most bility less frequent, than was originally an- capable of handling such contingencies; although ticipated. All current U.S. expendable have also private insurance may be available to private risen sharply in price, in large part because of the shuttle operators, it would be another cost fac- decision to develop the shuttle and phase out the tor that would tend to limit private sector opera- use of ELVs. This appears to leave several “win- tion of the shuttle system. dows” in the potential marketplace for such There is currently a proposal by an investment systems. The major gaps are in the area of low- 25 cost, relatively uncomplicated launches to low- group for private-sector purchase of an addi- Earth orbit and low-cost synchronous orbit tional shuttle orbiter. The proposal calls for this orbiter to join the Government fleet of shuttle sys- emplacement of modest-sized payloads. It is to the second of these that the Japanese and Euro- tems, in return for which the consortium provid- pean developments seem particularly well suited. ing the funds would act as the sole shuttle pay- In the United States, private investors are spon- load marketing agents. The needs for continued soring work toward the former “win dow" 26 Low- Government control outlined above would not cost space transportation, however, cannot at- prevent such an arrangement, nor other innova- tract much of a market if it does not provide tive mixes of public and private investment. Such proposals should be viewed on their merits. It reasonably high reliability, because the cost of does not seem profitable to attempt to construct payloads continues to be high. Hence, the willingness of a customer to entrust launch of a $30 policies in advance that would adequately foresee million to $50 million communications satellite all of the nuances of such proposed arrange- to a low-cost launcher will depend more on ments. launcher reliability than on a small difference in LARGE UNMANNED SYSTEMS launch cost. The transportation systems for a wide variety Given the trend in alternative unmanned sys- of sizeable unmanned payloads either to low- or tems the United States could consider, as an op- high-Earth orbit or on trajectories beyond Earth tjon, developing a complementary, simple, reli- orbit comprise the bulk of space launch vehicles able, and low-cost expendable booster that for all nations and have been the source of great- would serve to test the state-of-the-art in such est interest by nations that wish to enter the space systems and would act as a companion to the business. As the basic technology that is needed shuttle. Such a development could be carried out for such launch vehicles is now quite widespread, after a broadly based competition for the best the early near-monopoly by the United States and ideas that would contribute to the dual objectives the Soviet Union is rapidly breaking down. The of low cost and adequate reliability. Such a pro- Japanese, the Europeans, the People’s Republic gram would be far more amenable to private op- of China, and India have all demonstrated their eration, under appropriate safeguards, than abilities to develop launchers, and other nations would the shuttle. The launch vehicle options for could produce launchers if they decided to make the U.S. and international users would be ex- such a commitment. panded, and the U.S. would keep a valuable part of future space transportation alive and develop- For reasons described earlier, the United States ing through this mechanism. “Competition” with has chosen to develop a manned system to launch large unmanned payloads. In the interim, 26see statement of David Hannah in “Future Space programs: 1981, ” hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and 25Craig Covault, “Firm Sets Down-Payment for Buy of Space Shut- Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, Sept. tle,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jan. 18, 1982. 21, 22, and 23, 1981. Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 291

Photo credit: McDonald-Douglas Corp. \ Payload Assist Module for use in boosting shuttle payloads to higher orbits

~,+ $ *

for generating and enforcing the necessary regulations. In order to support industry’s efforts to develop and launch its own vehicles it will be essen- Photo credit: RCA Corp. tial to designate a lead agency to coordinate these RCA Saturn launch aboard a Delta launcher efforts. the shuttle would be allowed, recognizing that Applications R&D—Strengthening the shuttle need not be used for all such launches. the NASA Role SMALL UNMANNED SYSTEMS As pointed out earlier, existing space policy There is a family of small sounding rockets and identifies NASA as a performer of R&D for space derivative systems that provide invaluable access systems, while remaining silent on operational to space for scientists with small-scale research responsibilities for the agency. The original NAS payloads. These may be extended in capability legislation says nothing about specific applica- for modest cost, and it would appear that open tions, and beyond maintaining U.S. leadership entry into this field should be permitted. How- in space science and technology, there are few ever, here, as in the case of private launchers for indicators of the pace of programs that might be low-Earth orbit, there is no policy in place for generated. Thus, when the Nixon administration regulating such launches. Nor is it clear which decided that the communications R&D programs Federal agency or agencies will be responsible of NASA were unnecessary and terminated the 292 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) series, ary between Government support and private or there was little basis for challenging that decision. user support lies must be made on a case-by-case basis, for each technology is different in regard NASA does not lack the internal staff support to its operational adaptability and use. This issue, for a more vigorous role in space applications. i.e., what it is appropriate for NASA to support, Such support could range from fundamental re- will therefore continue to be raised in the con- search to demonstration of sensors and integrated text of the annual budget preparations. The ef- systems. However, there are other important in- fect of a policy statement clarifying the existence ternal claimants on NASA’s resources, particularly of a NASA role will still result in debate on the the manned programs (shuttle, Spacelab) and extent to which that role requires, for example, space science programs (including planetary ex- a demonstration of a new technology on a satel- ploration). Consequently, the annual budget re- lite platform. Such demonstrations may be specif- quest for NASA is a compromise among the var- ically allowed in the policy, but they would not ious opportunities for new starts (if any), the be required. There will continue to be a need for demands of each of the major agency programs considered judgment, discussion, and debate on for continuing baseline support, and the costs of such questions. This suggests a second policy ini- prior-year commitments. The relative priority ac- tiative. corded space applications R&D may vary considerably in this setting, depending on NASA’s One of the important aspects of any space ap- management attitudes, the effectiveness of the plication is the user community. This communi- internal advocates for applications R&D, and the ty may be small and poorly defined for a newly urgency asociated with the applications areas in- identified or emerging application, or it may be volved. very large and amorphous as in the the case of The policy responses to these situations involve users of satellite weather data. Whatever its stage relatively minor adjustments to the existing frame- of development, it should always be possible to work, but despite their limited nature, they may seek out and identify users and to have represent- be significant over time in generating additional atives become involved in a review of the NASA attention to space applications needs. program in their area of interest (see ch. 9 for a discussion). Approval of particular applications The first deals with NASA’s assigned responsi- demonstration systems could then be made with bilities for space applications. One option is that the aid of informed advice from the community space policy legislation recognize explicitly the affected by this work. NASA could be required continuing need for a program of fundamental by legislation to convene and support such user research and demonstration activities in support advisory groups and to include their reports as of space applications. This would include ad- part of the justifications for the applications ef- vancement of technology in areas where the ulti- forts proposed by the Agency. NASA has had mate user is in the private sector as well as in such groups, but their role has been primarily in- Government. The rationale for such a posture is ternal to NASA. What is suggested here is a re- very similar to the argument used for Govern- quirement that such groups report publicly to the ment funding of basic research and demonstra- Congress as well as to OMB. It should be noted tion in fields such as aeronautics. Specifically, that such user advisory groups would include Government support may be appropriate when other Federal Government agencies and State the risk is high, many of the benefits are nonap- and local governments, as well as private mem- propriable, the time for potential benefits to ac- bers. crue is long, and there are extensive potential public benefits. As such technology becomes suit- One additional policy option may be consid- able for incorporation in an operational system, ered. In order to highlight the stature and impor- the future operators should become responsible tance of NASA’s applications R&D efforts within for the planning and engineering to utilize the the agency, and their prominence in dealings new technology. judgments on where the bound- with OMB, it may be desirable to legislate .an . Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 293 organizational change within NASA. Specifically, regulations. They have attracted the interest of the applications programs could be made the several users other than the United States. responsibility of a Deputy Administrator of Ap- In the international arena, two major forces are plications, who would be in parallel with a Depu- at work—competition and cooperation (see ch. ty Administrator of Operations and would have 7). In the early years of the development and evo- overall responsibility for planning, coordinating lution of space technology, the virtual monopo- and implementing space applications research, ly on space technology of the two major powers as well as selected satellite demonstrations. This individual would support user advisory groups made it both desirable and necessary for other and—given the appropriate policy changes— nations to cooperate in order to gain access to space for scientific and applications purposes. As could be responsible for operational systems the technical sophistication of other nations has within NASA’s purview. increased, some have developed an independent NASA’s role in support of space applications capability for designing and constructing satellites R&D will continue to be uncertain, and funding and launchers. levels will remain unpredictable, without more Though the United States as a matter of national specific assignment of responsibility. NASA must take care to solicit and respond to the views of policy has favored international competition as a device for improving goods and services and potential systems users; however, in cases where lowering their costs, there are circumstances prospective users fail to recognize the potential under which this policy is modified, e.g., when of a new technology, or resist its introduction, NASA may need to promote the new technology a regulated monopoly supplier, such as INTELSAT, is established as described in earlier actively. sections. Participants are required to plan national and regional satellite communications systems so International Aspects as not to damage INTELSAT’S technical and financial integrity. The U.S. approach to international part of the existing space policy of the United competition has been subject to additional con- States is that activities in space will be conducted straints. For example, national security considera- “for the benefit of all man kind,” and one of the tions would force the United States to restrict en- objectives of the U.S. space program is “Coopera- try of foreign steel at the point where U.S. in- tion . . . with other nations and groups of the na- dustrial capacity was being threatened. U.S. in- tions in work done . . . and in peaceful applica- dustry is also protected, in principle, against tion of the results thereof.” In international law, predatory pricing, “dumping,” and other non- outer space is recognized as a nonappropriable competitive practices, in space, the U.S. policy area, analogous to the high seas, that is open to toward satellite and satellite subsystem develop- use by any state. From its very beginning, the ment, provision of services via space systems, and space program has been directed toward foreign development of space launching capability has policy concerns and has recognized the inherent- tended to favor, respectively, open competition, ly global nature of much that is done in space. single systems, and nonproliferation of launch This is particularly true for many space applica- capability. tions areas. Satellite systems that receive or transmit information have the capacity to serve a wide U.S. policy must recognize the competitive range of international users and to provide data capabilities that already exist overseas, and the about any part of the globe. Other systems, such plans of several nations to initiate and continue as those for materials processing in space, depend the development of competitive systems. Where upon the uniqueness of the space environment conditions warrant (such as when there are lim- (e.g. microgravity) and are not inherently global ited markets or problems with signal interference in nature; nevertheless, since they would take from competitive systems), U.S. policy may favor place in space, outside the territory of any State, limiting competition by fostering a single global they would be affected by international laws and system, In other circumstances, such as meteoro- 294 ● Civilian Space PolicY and Applications logical observations, the united States has coop- for the satellite system designer, for the shaping erated with other nations in the use of satellites of ground patterns for signals broadcast from for data collection, and the coordination of sep- satellites is not a mature technology. Restrictions arately funded national systems. The exchange on transmitting across borders could affect the of information permits all participants to derive economic prospects for proposed DBS networks, benefits that exceed the returns from a solely na- especially in Europe. tional system and at much less cost for each indi- For direct broadcast systems, many of these po- vidual participant. litical and economic concerns are reflected in Telecommunications Services discussions of technical requirements, limitations on orbital spacing for geosynchronous satellites, In telecommunications, the United States sup- and the allocation of frequencies. The major ported single cooperative global systems for spe- forum has been the International Telecommuni- cific services and helped to establish INTELSAT cations Union (ITU) and its periodic global and and later INMARSAT. The U.S. position is based regional Administrative Radio Conferences. As in on the fact that economies of scale, the size of many other international bodies, the majority of the international market, and the requirement for the participating countries are not highly devel- compatible reception and transmission of signals oped technologically, and this fact often makes favor a highly integrated network with a single it difficult to gain acceptance for new space serv- management structure. The situation becomes ices. It is also often the case that the technology more complex, however, for proposed direct associated with such services is ahead of the other broadcast satellite (DBS) systems, in which the necessary infrastructure to make use of the sys- satellite distributes signals directly to individual tem, particularly trained technical and managerial receivers. The technical and political feasibility personnel. Often, the resolution of ostensibly of such a system was demonstrated almost a dec- technical issues revolves around political conflicts ade ago with the United States- India experimental between developed and less developed coun- program (SITE) for providing educational televi- tries, Soviet bloc and Western states, and other sion materials to remote villages using one of the such divisions. in such situations, the inter- U.S. ATS series. Such systems, which have been national regulatory process may require consid- proposed by a number of U.S. and European en- erable clarification and debate about the industry tities, may threaten the existing structure of ter- structure, the sociological impacts, economics, restrial broadcast stations and cable television and other key features of new service. distribution, and hence have been approached with great caution by the United States and All nations, especially in the third world, share foreign regulatory and communications au- legitimate concerns about the availability of ade- thorities. quate electromagnetic spectrum for current and future services and, as pointed out earlier, infor- Direct broadcasting raises both domestic and mation content and use of the spectrum for DBS international concerns about regulation of pro- systems. The space applications policy options gram content and competition with local pro- that are to be considered should reflect these con- grams. One of the principal worries is the trans- cerns, as well as U.S. public interest as a leading mission of signals beyond national boundaries, user and producer of telecommunications tech- either because of unintentional “spillover” or in- nology. The options tend to fall into two general tentional beaming of signals across international categories, aggressive competition and broad- borders. These concerns have been debated at ened cooperation. the U.N. and other international bodies for many years, without agreement on regulations for DBS systems. The United States has opposed restric- AGGRESSIVE COMPETITION tions on the international flow of information in- Many of the possible initiatives have been pio- cluding those proposed for DBS. Severe limita- neered in this area by the long-standing practices tions on spillover could create serious problems that the united States has followed in helping to Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 295 organize and extend the role of INTELSAT. Ag- of technological know-how as a result of a broad gressive competition by the United States in this set of space and telecommunications develop- growing marketplace has been tempered by the ments, both publicly and privately funded, over necessity of gaining broad acceptance of and the past 20 to 40 years. Other nations have highly adherence to the INTELSAT agreements, and by skilled scientists and engineers similarly engaged, the fact that, until now, the United States has although generally not with the same level of been the sole supplier of most of INTELSAT’S space systems experience. For specific technol- hardware and managerial expertise. Political ogies, e.g., reliable, long-life, high-power travel- forces have necessitated more sharing of procure- ing wave tubes, U.S. suppliers may find that they ments and technology than might be the case in can benefit from technology that exists overseas. a highly competitive environment. Future devel- [n other areas, such as total systems design, the opments under the broad umbrellas of INTELSAT reverse may be true. In some cases, cooperative and INMARSAT can be expected to be similarly ventures with overseas firms may be desirable for constrained; competition for I NTELSAT contracts political reasons; for instance, in negotiating the is likely to be more intense than in the past. How- contracts for the recent sale of equipment and ever, there are new services that do not fall under services to Arabsat, a communications satellite these umbrellas and are being pursued by U.S. consortium consisting of a number of Middle East- suppliers. These services involve purchases of ern countries, Ford Aerospace could not be the ground or space hardware that are needed for prime contractor because of its position on the a foreign system, via a solicitation that is open “Arab blacklist” for having dealt with Israel. Ford to any qualified supplier. then became a subcontractor (although receiving a majority of the value of the contract) to a One principal area of concern has been the dif- French firm, Aerospatiale, which took the lead ference between U.S. practice–which calls for in negotiations. the rigorous application of antitrust provisions to any U.S. firms intending to bid—and that of our For a number of reasons, U.S. policy has fa- overseas competitors, where there is often a high vored limited duplicative launch vehicle develop- degree of collaboration among Government and ments, but this policy has not been strongly pur- various industry suppliers. Hence, if we were to sued. Both technology transfer from the United adopt a policy of “aggressive competition” in this States, as in the case of the sale of Thor-Delta area, it would imply that U.S. policy on antitrust technology to Japan, and indigenous develop- restrictions and restrictions on other forms of in- ments such as the European Ariane vehicle, have formation exchange for space communications resulted in the imminent availability of capable, would be relaxed in order to encourage joint ven- yet relatively low-cost foreign launch vehicles for tures by industry the better to exploit the U.S. applications payloads that are competitive with technology base. This plan could be accom- United States and Soviet systems. Thus, we are plished by encouraging industry to take advan- at the threshold of a period in which “aggressive tage of a procedure already available in the competition’ will probably be practiced by Justice Department Antitrust Division to render others, whether or not the U.S. policy favors such prompt advisory opinions in response to industry a posture. requests to work together on such projects. This would have the effect of strengthening the U.S. BROADENED COOPERATION position vis-a-vis our overseas competitors. The growth in foreign technical capabilities, Another possibility is expanded collaboration their aspirations for a greater market share for with overseas firms. One issue that results from their industry, and their desire to have more inde- such collaboration is: How to guard against the pendent control over development and deploy- possibility that technology transfer between the ment of space systems for their own use have United States and foreign partners may enable changed the space applications outlook. The ex- them to become more competitive on subse- istence of an independent launch capability is quent contracts? U.S. suppliers have a great deal particularly significant in this regard, because it 296 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications permits a great deal of flexibility in placing pacity ground stations and would make maxi- competitive national or regional systems into orbit mum use of the spectrum through multiple spot and in providing a variety of specialized services. beams, “on-call” service, and other techniques appropriate for low-volume users. In principle, In the communications realm there would ap- any nation should be able to obtain satellite com- pear to be little prospect of a near-term threat to munications that are matched to its particular INTELSAT’S long-distance and overseas markets stage of development, economic needs, and the from independent launch of satellites for general density of local communications infrastructure. purpose communications because of the size and sophistication of the INTELSAT system and its expected ability to keep pace with technology. For By providing leadership in identifying the spe- INTELSAT and also for INMARSAT, it appears that cialized needs of smaller nations and translating no U.S. policy change is needed. With regard to these into technical specifications for communi- a foreign nation’s internal communications sys- cations services, the United States can accelerate tems, current U.S. policy recognizes that this is the process whereby space communications can an internal question for the specific nation, and— be readily provided to all nations. By bringing given that it constitutes no violation of other inter- these multiple small users together, the aggre- national agreements—would launch or otherwise gated market should be capable of supporting ap- support such a system in accord with established propriate satellites. This would tend to reduce or principles regarding foreign cooperation. eliminate the need for ad hoc groups of nations to organize independent regional systems. Conse- A possible future problem for INTELSAT may quently, greater technical compatibility would be come from the proliferation of regional systems ensured, and there would be greater likelihood such as Arabsat, Nordsat, and others. A policy of continuing technological advances to improve of “broadened cooperation” would entail a and broaden the services provided. The proposed strong U.S. effort to bring such systems under a entity would be analogous to a local telephone cooperative umbrella. The basis for this policy system, connected through a switching system would be both economic and technical. Econom- to a larger network, but providing individual lines ically, it would be advantageous to use the to many small subscribers at the local level. larger-scale requirements already embodied in INTELSAT to provide additional service exten- sions for those nations able to use the large- Land Remote Sensing capacity ground stations currently needed for Remote sensing from space has inherent inter- system compatibility. For nations with limited in- national ramifications because the vantage point ternal communications infrastructure, satellite provided by the orbiting space platform provides systems designed to operate with smaller and broad synoptic coverage that is not limited to na- much less costly ground stations are attractive. tional boundaries. In contrast to the international The technology for these systems has been dem- cooperation that is essential for a successful global onstrated and several such systems are planned communications system, remote sensing does not or in operation, and U.S. policy might be to help require direct cooperation to be successfully pur- extend this type of service to a much wider sued—although cooperation in providing number of potential users. The mechanism for “ground truth” information is very useful, and this could be a separate subdivision within foreign ground stations collect data that would INTELSAT (for specialized services) or a new otherwise be unavailable. The fact that coopera- cooperative international/ enterprise. In both tion is not essential has allowed Earth remote cases, the basic objective would be to provide sensing to develop without a clear, international multiple small users access to high-quality com- framework that would deal with such questions munications services that are more compatible as rights to data, maximum resolution limits, tech- with a limited local infrastructure, and with a nical characteristics of the sensors and platforms, limited ability to invest in ground station capac- data format, orbits and repetition rates, and a host ity. The system would be optimized for low-ca- of other policy and operational questions. Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment • 297

In approaching the international aspects of systems, would permit significant improvements remote sensing, the United States has been in ground resolution, and that multispectral sens- guided by several principles: 1) overflight of a na- ing could be provided at adequate resolutions tion by an orbiting satellite should not be prohib- and at appropriate wave lengths, on a timely ited, assuming other treaty obligations are ful- basis, for international as well as national use. filled; 2) the civilian remote-sensing program Therefore, it is likely that anything other nations should not give rise to negative reactions that may choose to provide via an Earth-sensing sys- might constrain military and intelligence uses of tem, could be matched or improved upon by the space platforms; 3) cooperation with other na- United States if there were adequate budget sup- tions is encouraged; and 4) data collected are to port and commitment. It should be kept in mind be made available to any interested party on a that any U.S. system will have to compete with nondiscriminatory basis, for a fee. The early flights SPOT and its derivatives, whose products are not of the Landsat series of satellites resulted from likely to be priced to reflect their true cost. Polit- unilateral decisions of the United States; interna- ical considerations of national prestige and ad- tional aspects were incorporated largely as by- vancement of high-technology enterprises may products of the effort to generate users and transcend questions of cost recovery. In short, develop a better understanding of user re- aggressive competition is not likely to cause sys- quirements. Consistent with the principles listed tems like SPOT to be discontinued, although it above, the data have been been made available may make such investments less profitable. widely on a nondiscriminatory basis, Earth sta- The implications of aggressive competition ap- tions have been sold to enable other nations to pear to favor a continued role for Government collect data directly, and careful choice of resolu- as the operator of the space segment, but with tion limits and sensor performance characteristics has caused many of the early concerns about a clear commitment to operational status for the Landsat as a spy in the sky to dissipate. in the in- system. This commitment would assure continuity of data, adequate processing capacity to interim, the United States officially revealed its sure timely availability of data to international as military reconnaissance satellite program—con- well as national users, and an active R&D pro- firming what most observers already believed–so gram to support system improvements. that, at least publicly, the role of Landsat and its follow-on systems could be more clearly ad- Pricing of products would be competitive with dressed in the international arena. alternative systems. The premise would be that the overall global and national benefits, particu- The United States clearly had a significant lead larly the nonmonetary ones, would justify the in civilian remote sensing—almost a decade subsidy to this system. Examples of the latter in- ahead of Soviet and emerging European and Jap- clude the goodwill that would accrue to the anese systems. With the passage of time and the United States from use of data forewarning crop lack of a clear U.S. commitment to maintaining failures, severe storms, or other hazards; post- an operational Landsat, the development of com- disaster monitoring; monitoring the global bio- petitive systems such as the French SPOT was a mass inventory; monitoring the status of the logical consequence. Some policy options avail- ozone layer and other worldwide environmen- able to the United States before the French de- tal phenomena. cided to proceed with SPOT may now be fore- closed by its existence; they will at least be significantly modified. In general, the policy op- LAISSEZ FAIRE tions fall into three categories: aggressive compe- As an alternative, the united States could also tition, laissez faire, and expanded cooperation. turn over responsibility for operational systems, if any, to the private sector and buy the data it AGGRESSIVE COMPETITION needs from whatever source was most appropri- It may be assumed that U.S. technology, inate—including foreign systems. Government cluding what is available from national security users might be able to obtain appropriately .

298 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications screened data from classified systems, but the essed data. The returned data stream from the principal sources of remotely sensed data would common operational platforms would be en- be commercial suppliers. The market would de- coded so that only consortium members would termine pricing and availability, and Government have direct access to the data. Others would be would be precluded from direct competition with able to purchase data from the central organiza- the private sector. This posture would not fore- tion at established prices. The rationale for this close a continuing R&D role for NASA, but would approach is based on the following. require that any operational system be developed ● in the private sector. Satellites that serve to dem- Market. -the current limited and uncertain onstrate a sensor or system could be Government market for these data makes competitive systems redundant, and is not adequate to sup- funded or might be jointly supported. Pricing of port a commercial operator. products would be set by the private supplier, ● Interest.—There is broad international inter- perhaps with Government participation. Because it can be expected that foreign systems will be est in such systems. ● Competition. –It is too late for the United subsidized, a private U.S. operator may have difficulty competing unless the Federal Government States successfully to preempt foreign competition by offering greater or more favorable provides equivalent support. if industry did not access to future Landsat data. see an adequate market for remotely sensed ● Cooperation.— By joining together, large and products and did not purchase a satellite, there small nations can participate in the benefits would be no operational U.S. system, and U.S. from a common global system with less fear users would have to seek other means of obtain- of exploitation by particular nations or pri- ing their data. vate firms. ● Globa/ systems. –This approach would facil- BROADENED COOPERATION itate global monitoring systems for critical en- Alternatively, the United States could seek to vironmental factors such as forest inventory, extend the arena of formal cooperative arrange- biomass, carbon dioxide and ozone concen- ments to include ocean and land remote sens- trations, which could be operated as joint ing. Under such broadened cooperation, the pat- projects by the consortium. tern established under INTELSAT would be ● Economies of sca/e.–Economies of scale adapted to the remote-sensing field, For exam- could be achieved by common use of Earth ple, it should be possible to define a single man- facilities and data processing facilities to agement authority that would assume responsibil- serve multiple customers, and lower cost sat- ity for global operational systems, establish tech- ellites. These advantages are similar to those nical specifications, procure satellites, and oper- that INTELSAT enjoys in its multiple-satellite ate the satellites and the initial data reception and purchases. processing facilities. The initial startup period for the consortium In order to make such a new international en- could be handled in a way very similar to the tity possible, participating nations would be ex- INTELSAT model, with interim agreements in pected to forego launch and operation of national force for a fixed period during which the detailed systems for civilian purposes. This would not pre- operating practices would be negotiated. Some clude national R&D on sensors or platforms; but of the current practices that are followed in the such systems could not substitute for commit- communications area could be expected to carry ments to the global consortium. Successful R&D over to the global satellite consortium, including could be integrated into the global system under procedures for procuring operational satellites, a negotiated arrangement. Basically, the United contracting for launch services, and establishing States would be proposing to join together with satellite control facilities. The ground processing other nations in launching and operating a com- of data is sufficiently complex and sensitive (par- mon set of data collection platforms, with reve- ticularly control of decoding) that the initial stages nue to be obtained from the sale of raw or proc- should probably be a consortium responsibility, Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 299 rather than being handled by individual govern- policy, that is, the principle that there shall be ments, with subsequent interpretation made by open access via satellite systems to co//ect such other entities, either government or private sec- data, is not infringed by the Globesat practices tor. For the purposes of this assessment, such a suggested above. It is simply the civilian use that consortium will be called “Globesat.” is being controlled, if specified by a participating country, and this use would reflect legitimate eco- The differences between communications and nomic interests that the United States also shares. remote sensing need additional comment. Com- Thus, it appears that Globesat could operate in munications requires active cooperation, remote a fashion that is both consistent with longstand- sensing does not. Any alternatives to a global co- ing principles of U.S. policy and yet respect the operative entity such as INTELSAT still require valid concerns of other participating nations. agreement and compatibility between separate states. The alternative to Globesat, however, is Is it possible for Globesat to function under the completely independent national collection plat- auspices of the United Nations? There are organi- forms. Communications involves a shared benefit zations, such as the World Health Organization between the linked points, while the sensed data (WHO) and World Meteorological Organization from an observation satellite are primarily of value (WMO), that have successfully overcome some to the controlling authority or to entities who use of the inhibiting characteristics of such broad the data for specific purposes. sponsorship. However, it would appear that Globesat is not suitable to a U.N. format, at least Privately owned international communications in its formative stages. The large number of com- have, for the most part, minimal national securi- peting interests, coupled with fears of exploita- ty implications. Conversely, increasing resolution tion, would likely make reaching agreement on for satellite observations leads inevitably to na- a system very difficult. The overwhelming dif- tional sensitivities regarding the detection of mil- ficulties that the Law of the Sea Treaty has faced itary installations, troop or equipment deploy- are a case in point. Transition to a U .N. relation- ment, and other sensitive information. Globesat ship would be an issue for consideration at some would provide a forum for reaching common future time. In 1978 France proposed, at the agreement on system specifications and could U. N., that a remote-sensing agency be estab- serve to alleviate sensitivities on the part of par- lished to monitor worldwide military activities ticipating nations regarding the nature of civilian and disseminate information to all countries, remote-sensing data that would be available re- thereby forestalling aggression. If such a plan garding their country. Using encoded data were agreed upon, Globesat could be the ap- streams would allow selective processing so that it would be possible to limit access to high-resolu- propriate entity to operate the system. tion data from a particular nation if that nation A major concern in a system with multiple required imposition of such limitations. It can be owners and users is the adequacy of data collec- expected that most nations would avail them- tion to serve user needs. Telephone, television, selves of this privilege, charging a fee for foreign and digital data are the principal components of or private sector access to high-resolution data. international communications traffic, and com- Alternatively, it could be Globesat policy that a mon systems can be designed to fit a variety of nation could restrict access to high-resolution such users. For Earth observations, however, satis- data for a fixed maximum period of time, say 6 fying user needs is not as simple; the users are or 12 months. This would reduce sensitivity about not well organized, and their data needs are not military movements and would enable national standardized or well understood. In addition, the interests to have the first opportunity to use the most desirable observation times, frequency of data. As pointed out earlier, U.S. policy has been observation, and spectral bands differ from user to gain acceptance of “open skies” and “open to user. Hence a difficult set of compromises data” policies; restrictive actions carried out would be required to establish the satellite system under Globesat might appear to undermine these specifications. Combining several sensors on a positions. However, the basic concern of U.S. single platform would be traded off against the 300 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications advantages of multiple platforms with fewer sen- riod of U.S. indecision regarding remote sensing sors. Presumably sensors such as those planned and the resulting efforts by other nations to satis- for SPOT and Landsat would be candidates, as fy their needs through independent systems. It well as others that may originate elsewhere. In would take a strong U.S. commitment to Globe- Globesat, the united States would have no guar- sat for such an entity to be initiated and estab- antee that the compromises would satisfy U.S. lished. needs; however, because the united States would be a major user and source of revenue, Economic Measures it is likely that these needs would be given some priority. There is also no guarantee of continuity One of the common characteristics of space of data, but there is no guarantee of data con- applications systems is the high entry cost asso- tinuity for strictly national systems, either. It seems ciated with the development and institution of probable that an international consortium such new systems. The principal hurdle has been the as Globesat, with broad user and national sup- high cost and difficulty of transporting the satellite port, would have a greater commitment to con- to its proper orbit. A large additional cost results tinuity than would be the case for a single U.S. from the absolute necessity for extremely high supplier. reliability for the payload, which must function for long periods of time without maintenance or The adoption of the Globesat option would im- repairs. Complicating factors are the environmen- ply that several policy options defined earlier tal stresses: the shock and vibration of launch, would become impractical. For example, crea- and the vacuum, low gravity, alternating heat and tion of a single national regulated satellite cold, electromagnetic radiation, and solar wind operator for U.S. remote sensing would be coun- of space. The net result, given the small numbers ter to the principles upon which Globesat would of satellites actually flown, has been that virtual- be based; Globesat would substitute for the U.S. ly each satellite has been a new and delicate operating entity. However, there would be a design requiring its own set of tests. need for a U.S. representative to Globesat that would reflect the views of various U.S. users. This [t is possible that routine and reliable access representative could be a designated Govern- to space via the shuttle and the availability of ment agency, and existing group, or a new enti- astronauts to perform tasks such as replacement ty that would have responsibility for distribution of wornout parts, repairs, or fueling could lead of U.S. data, as well as coordination of the various to an era of less costly satellite platforms. As part user community needs. of the shuttle program, many of these concepts will be explored, including developing a common An important unknown in considering Globesat spacecraft bus that would provide standardized would be the position of the Soviet Union. The housekeeping functions needed for all satellites, Soviet Union has operated remote-sensing satel- such as command and data links, power, attitude lites for many years, and recently announced its control and station keeping. In addition, NASA intention to provide a “continuous-look” system similar to Western satellites. The Soviets could use has offered small amounts of shuttle payload bay space at very low cost, the so-called getaway such a system to compete with Globesat; alterna- specials, for small experimental packages. But tively, if they were to join, the difficulties of agree- these are only the first steps along the road to- ing on system specifications and operating details ward lower cost access to space, and it is not like- might be much greater. ly that significant change will occur, at least in In summary, many of the international con- the next decade or so. Satellite maintenance is cerns about remote sensing could be suitably ac- severely limited by our inability (even with the commodated within a global consortium that shuttle) to transport men into geosynchronous could also fulfill U.S. needs. At this point, it may orbit, where most communications satellites are not be possible to obtain international agreement located. Thus, although steps are being taken that on such a structure because of the prolonged pe- could lower the high cost of satellites, this will Ch. 10–Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment . 301

remain a significant barrier to commercial entry ject of recent congressional hearings. (A more into space applications service areas. detailed discussion of this specific piece of legislation can be found in chapter 8.) Beyond the direct cost of the satellite, there are additional costs for the construction and opera- The role of SDB would be to: 1 ) receive pro- tion of ground facilities to link with the satellite. posals for space applications investments; Communications and remote sensing require ex- 2) evaluate these applications; 3) if acceptable, tensive satellite control facilities, ground receiv- provide funds at preferential loan rates and ing stations, and data processing systems. Materi- establish a deferred payback schedule; and als processing in space is relatively free of such 4) monitor the progress of the business plans on costs. the basis of which loans have been made. SDB would require initial authority for drawing rights With such significant entry costs, private sec- upon Treasury funds appropriated for this pur- tor involvement in space applications has been pose, but in the long term the SDB would be self- limited (see ch. 8). Government policy has served as a primary stimulus for such involvement, pri- sustaining and pay back the initial appropriations. marily in communications, through regulation, SDB would provide an initial subsidy to qualified joint Endeavor Agreements, and congressional entrepreneurs, with the amounts and areas to be actions such as the COMSAT Act, the National determined by negotiation and the developing Aeronautics and Space Act (for R&D), and marketplace. INMARSAT legislation. If there is to be a new SDB could also provide incentives for private thrust to open space applications for commer- entities to form joint ventures for specific serv- cial exploitation, the economic barriers to entry ices for which a single supplier was not available need to be addressed. Several approaches appear or appropriate. As such, SDB could act as a quasi- feasible. regulatory body, controlling entry into space applications fields to maximize social benefit. (It Space Development Bank should be recognized that there are limitations Government has used the device of a develop- to this role. For corporations like COMSAT, with ment bank or system of loan guarantees to a continuing statutory role in space applications finance socially desirable objectives in a wide and a large and growing revenue base, entry into variety of settings, from international develop- new space applications services would not de- ment (World Bank, Interamerican Development pend on incentives such as SDB would provide. Bank) to sale of U.S. products (Export-import An expansion of COMSAT into other areas, par- Bank) and U.S. housing (Federal Housing Admin- ticularly remote sensing, would create—de- istration and Veterans Administration loans, Fed- facto–a commercial space applications monopo- eral National Mortgage Association, Farm Credit ly. As explained earlier, the public interest would Administration, Federal Home Loan Bank Sys- likely require that such a monopoly be accom- tem). More recently, loans or loan guarantees panied by a Federal regulatory authority.) have been used to make a college education SDB, on the other hand, would be associated more accessible, to prevent the collapse of major with more open entry. The provision of capital corporations (Lockheed and Chrysler), and to at low rates would serve to attract a broad array provide incentives to small business. Thus, a of potential suppliers, and a separate regulatory determination by the Congress that the growth body may, therefore, not be needed. of space applications was socially and nationally desirable and that the preferred approach was to keep such growth as much as possible in the Tax Incentives private commercial sector, would open the possi- The tax incentive is another governmental bility of establishing a Space Development Bank device used to promote socially beneficial ac- (SDB). A similar concept, the Space industrializa- tions. It is currently being employed to encourage tion Corporation (H. R. 2337), has been the sub- R&D generally, to stimulate energy conservation 302 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

and use of solar energy, and to encourage invest- is almost completely free from Government man- ment in new plant and equipment. The advan- agement and, therefore, more nearly reflects the tage of the tax incentive is that very little addi- realities of the marketplace as it is understood by tional Government manpower is needed to ad- the private firms. minister its provisions —and the decision making

INTEGRATED POLICY OPTIONS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS The previous section outlined a number of indi- tutional structure and the extent of the private vidual policy options to address specific issues. role. In this section, the policy options will be grouped Continuation of the current legislative frame- into larger patterns or themes to give a more inte- work permits policies ranging from strong Gov- grated picture of the range of options available. ernment leadership and participation to a laissez It should be recognized that the grouping of faire approach in which Government stands aside policy options presented in the following material and explicitly invites private groups to assume a is illustrative and may be modified by the addi- larger role, without emphasizing or requiring any tion or deletion of specific elements. The options one approach. are not necessarily exclusive of one another. They While there is a wide latitude permitted by the are presented in this integrated fashion to give current policies, there are no clear goals, no a better understanding of the types of actions that timetable and no overall direction for space ap- may be contemplated and the relationships plications. As a result, it is difficult for the Govern- among the various policy elements. ment to identify and pursue the benefits of space applications. Continuing the Current Policy Framework If nothing is proposed beyond current policy and practice, neither the U.S. private sector, the Current policy, as expressed by the existing leg- Government, nor the public at large will benefit islation, permits a great deal of flexibility to orga- fully from the country’s large space investments nize and conduct a strong space applications pro- over the past 24 years. U.S. leadership in many gram and gives implicit authority to Government, areas will be lost. Viewed in an historical perspec- not only to conduct R&D but also to operate sys- tive, such a course would raise serious questions tems. There is, in addition, wide latitude to assign about our ability as a nation to pursue long-term specific tasks to agencies and to permit private- objectives when faced with short-term problems. sector participation in essentially any phase of activity. Thus, the role of the private sector in re- Increasing the International Emphasis mote sensing could be expanded to include operation of space and ground segments simply by A number of policy options hinge upon the ap- Administrative action. (Transfer of ownership of proach that is adopted toward international com- existing satellites systems, which are Government petition and cooperation. This approach suggests property, would require separate congressional a strategy that may be termed “international em- action. ) The policy framework for space commu- phasis.” Under this approach, the United States nications is also flexible and permits both Govern- could adopt a general guideline; i.e., “all in- ment and private sector roles in a wide range of herently international civilian space applications services, subject to FCC and ITU regulations. The should be carried out on a cooperative interna- specialized position of COMSAT is defined in leg- tional basis, and be the subject of an agreed in- islation and therefore restricts the choices in this stitutional framework. ” If this approach were area. In transportation and materials processing, followed, we would pursue the establishment of there is similar flexibility with respect to the insti- an entity like Globesat for remote sensing and Ch. 10—Policy Alternatives and Their Assessment ● 303 a new communications satellite structure that an opportunity to create a common entity—if the would vigorously develop the market for small, United States moves promptly and decisively. low-volume users. U.S. needs would be met by Another aspect of this approach is that it implies these entities, as appropriate; as a consequence, some loss of independent action on the part of questions of private-sector entry and foreign com- the United States. We would be (as in INTELSAT) petition would become moot–given that the nec- foregoing our own independent systems in favor essary international entities were successfully of a cooperative international effort. Arriving at established. The United States could designate an agreement among the international partici- COMSAT and/or other entities to represent it in pants regarding the number of satellites, their sen- these new international bodies. Other applica- sors, data formats, and other operating charac- tions such as transportation and materials proc- teristics, as well as the procurement guidelines essing are not inherently international and would for equipment and services, may be a difficult and therefore be treated separately. NASA would con- prolonged task. The procurement guidelines can tinue to do R&D on new technology, but on a be expected to result in mandatory sharing of the much more limited basis. It might also do some development and production tasks among the development work under contract with interna- participants and, hence, a possible reduction in tional organizations. The requirements of U.S. U.S. contracts as well as sharing of U.S.-devel- users would need to be identified systematically oped technology with overseas firms. and formally in order to provide adequate, timely Finally, the reality of the growing independent specifications for Globesat and other entities. space capabilities of other nations means that Responsibility for convening such groups and in- they will eventually be able to carry out such a corporating their needs into U.S. positions in the plan without U.S. participation, if they choose. appropriate international bodies would reside Although such a prospect is not likely in the near with the chosen U.S. representative. future, other data collection systems will be A policy with an international empahsis is at- launched, if Globesat is not established, each of tractive because it tends to clarify so many other which will compete for a limited market. The related aspects of the policy picture. It has the alternative of a common system has strong eco- effect of moving operational responsibilities out nomic and political advantages. of the U.S. Government, via an international quasi-private entity, and thereby reducing direct Government expenditures for such systems. It is Increasing the National consistent with U.S. policy in communications, Private Sector Role in which we have strongly supported a single global system via INTELSAT and INMARSAT. [t The approach here would be to extend the cur- clarifies the issue of international competition in rent U.S. practice of maintaining an independent remote sensing by creating a strong incentive to data collection system, but one that gives the pri- participate in the common, i.e., Globesat, system. vate sector a stronger role in specifying the system and the method of operation on. The basic prin- This option also carries with it a number of risks ciple would be: “/t is U.S. policy that the private or limitations. The outcome of such a U.S. initiative on the international front is problematic. sector own and operate space systems. ” There Sovereign nations will tend to protect their inter- are several basic approaches: ests and seek advantages in this area as in many ● Open entry. —This would involve encourag- others. It would therefore require considerable ing multiple suppliers to provide services. In- care in outlining the advantages of a common sys- centives would be offered via tax breaks, tem (or systems, e.g., using SPOT as well as Land- loans, and other financial aid via an SDB; in sat technology) and in creating strong incentives addition there might be guarantees of Gov- for the principal initial partners to join with the ernment data purchase, no Government United States. Though the optimal moment for competition, and measures to preclude a this proposal has probably passed, there is still monopoly supplier. In communications, the 304 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

conditions for regulated, open entry have al- private firms and/or the Government will buy ready been established. data from foreign systems. The approach outlined

● here is consistent with a policy that would per- Private monopoly. —This alternative applies mit purchase of data from a foreign system by pri- principally to remote sensing. In this case, vate users without restriction, but subject Govern- the entity could be an already established corporation, or a new public-private comment users to whatever purchase agreements had pany. Ground-segment ownership would been negotiated with a private U.S. supplier (or follow the choice for ownership of the space suppliers). segment, as explained in an earlier section. The choice of a private-sector monopoly Increased High-Level Policy Focus supplier would be accompanied by establishing a regulatory body. Spanning the range of all of the above approaches, there is the suggestion that both cur- ● Government rnonopoly. -Continuation of rent and continuing developments in space policy the current Government monopoly for the would profit from increased high-level attention space segment would be possible, with in- in the executive branch and Congress. There are creased private-sector participation in the several approaches that may be taken to accom- ownership and operation of all the ground plish this increased high-level review and deci- data reception and processing stations. This sion on national space policy. They are all com- recognizes the currently limited marketplace patible with the various policy options discussed and the need for continued Government in the preceding sections. The premise on which support of operations to ensure maximum they are based is that space policy is sufficiently public benefit from space applications, par- important to warrant greater attention from both ticularly remote-sensing systems. the executive and legislative branches of the Gov- ernment. Because this approach is principally an extension of current policies, though increased em- The policy directions set by the different ap- phasis is given to the role of the private sector—a proaches above would require attention by the point of view strongly supported by the Reagan administration and Congress in the form of imple- administration—it probably would be the easiest menting guidelines, program direction, and budg- on which to develop a consensus between Con- et decisions—in short, of continuing followup gress and the executive branch. But a national over a number of years. International initiatives, consensus does not necessarily lead to a satisfac- if adopted, must receive high-level endorsement tory resolution of all the issues, particularly in and be integrated into the overall foreign policy view of the degree of sophistication and instance of the United States: the responsibility to dependence found in other nations today. The implement such initiatives cannot be left to a United States can attempt to meet this competi- single agency. Thus, whatever new approaches tion and continue its own independent develop- are taken, they should be matched by suitable ments, including increased private-sector involve- steps to strengthen the process of developing ment, or it can seek a collaborative and cooper- space policy. Without such a step, the other ative framework as outlined in the previous sec- measures are likely to be less than adequate in tion. If we choose an independent course, addi- meeting the many needs identified in this assess- tional policy questions arise, such as whether U.S. ment. APPENDIXES Appendix A INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM

Introduction a single agency for all Government space programs managed by the military, either at the level This section focuses on the relationship between of the Secretary of Defense or by one of the space policy and the institutions of the space program. armed services, most likely the Air Force; It traces the origin and evolution of the institutional a new Cabinet-level Department of Science and structure of the U.S. Government for civilian space Technology which, among its other responsibil- activities, and it asks whether that structure, as it ex- ities, would have charge of the civilian space ists today, is appropriate to the kind of civilian space effort; program the United States has today and will have in adding space to the responsibilities of the Atomic the near future. Institutional effectiveness is a means Energy Commission; to the success of certain policies, not an end in itself. expanding the responsibility of the National Ad- On the other hand, a mismatch between policy and visory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) to in- structure is likely to be a major barrier to such suc- clude a substantial component of space activities; cess, and thus an issue deserving of detailed attention. and Not infrequently in Government programs, particu- creating a new civilian agency with a responsibili- lar policies reflect the requirements of a particular in- ty for Government space activities, except those stitutional structure. As the subsequent discussion will primarily associated with defense applications suggest, there is not much evidence of this being the (which would be managed by the Department of case with respect to the civilian space effort. It seems, Defense (DOD)). rather, that for space, the relationship is as most Once the decision to separate civil and military students of public administration would have it: that space activities was made, the claims by DOD and is, structure follows strategy. In the U.S. space pro- by the armed services that they were the appropriate grams, institutions to a large degree have been based managers of the national space program found limited on and designed to implement agreed-on policies and political support either within Congress or in the carry out particular programs, rather than the reverse public (outside of those constituencies with close con- relationship. nections to the military). The idea that the U.S. space What follow attempts to demonstrate how the basic program in its civilian aspects should be an open, policy principles were translated into a particular institutional structure, and how that structure has unclassified effort was widely accepted among those concerned with shaping national space policy. evolved since its inception. It does not purport to be a definitive description of the institutional structure As the Government agency concerned with aero- of the U.S. space program or of its evolution over the nautics research, NACA mounted a campaign to have last two decades. Rather, it highlights those charac- space added to its activities. However, NACA was an teristics of and relationships among structures that ap- introspective, research-oriented agency with little pear relevant to any evaluation of the current and orientation toward major technological enterprises. future organization of the national space effort. Further, it was an agency managed by a committee, not by a single executive; this was an administrative Separate Programs, Separate Structures arrangement strongly preferred by the scientific community as a means of insulating Government activities The policy decision with the most direct impact on with strong scientific components from “politics. ” A the structure of the U.S. space program was that call- similar form of organization had been accepted for ing for the institutional separation within the Govern- the Atomic Energy Commission and had been pro- ment of the civilian and military space activities (see posed, but vetoed by President Truman, for the Na- ch. 6). In the immediate post-Sputnik period, when tional Science Foundation. What Eisenhower’s admin- it was evident that some accelerated response to the istrative, budgetary, and policy advisers wanted was Soviet space accomplishments by the United States an agency responsive to the policy directions of the was required, there were a number of contenders for President, headed by a single individual responsible the job of managing the national space effort. they for implementing those policy directives, and with the included: capabilities for carrying out potentially major research

307 308 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

and development (R&D) activities. Those activities, it the California Institute of Technology. NASA was au- was thought, would be pursued within the aerospace thorized to develop several new field centers related industry under Government contract rather than “in- to its mission, including the Goddard Space Flight house” with Federal laboratories. They thus con- Center for science and applications programs and the cluded that the creation of an essentially new Federal Manned Spacecraft Center (later the Johnson Space structure for space, but one built around the NACA Center) for manned programs, and to develop a civil- core of technical capability and research institutions, ian launch facility at Cape Canaveral, Fla. (later the was the appropriate route to go. Kennedy Space Center).1 These were added to the In the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS) Act three former NACA centers: Langley, Lewis, and of 1958, the primacy of civilian objectives in space Ames; in addition smaller NACA facilities at Wallops was stated: “it is the policy of the United States that Island, Va., and Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., came activities in space should be devoted to peaceful pur- under NASA control. By 1962, NASA had in place an poses for the benefit of all mankind;” and the respon- impressive institutional capability, one fully mobilized sibility for those activities was given to a civilian agen- for meeting a broad set of national objectives in space. cy: “Such activities shall “be the responsibility of and This Government institutional base for civilian space shall be directed by a civilian agency exercising con- programs was reinforced by the development of an trol over aeronautical and space activities sponsored elaborate external network of organizations—indus- by the United States.” tries, universities, and nonprofits—involved in carry- One area of controversy in the development of the ing out the civilian space program under NASA con- 1958 NAS Act was whether the new space agency tracts or grants. In addition, as space activities should be responsible for all space R&D, including that matured, other Government agencies, including the ultimately to be used by the military for defense ap- Departments of Agriculture; Commerce; Energy; plications. The decision was to make explicit from the Health, Education, and Welfare; and Interior also start the total separation of these two major categories became involved in space-related activities. At the of space activities, with the National Aeronautics and peak of the Apollo program in fiscal year 1965, fully Space Administration (NASA) having no direct involve- 94 percent of NASA’s budget obligations went to ex- ment in military work. Thus, the NAS Act also declared ternal grants and contracts, and NASA’s prime con- that DOD should have responsibility for “activities tractors in turn created a wide base of more special- peculiar to or primarily associated with the develop- ized subcontractors. Of direct NASA procurements in ment of weapons systems, military operations, or the that year, 79 percent went to business firms, 8 per- defense of the United States (including the research cent to educational institutions, 12 percent to other and development necessary to make effective provi- Government agencies, and 1 percent to nonprofit sions for the defense of the United States).” organizations. This pattern has remained consistent The formal separation of the civilian and military over the years; in fiscal 1978, the same percentage space activities into different institutional frameworks (94 percent) of NASA’s budget went to extramural pro- meant transferring to the new civilian space agency curement, and the distribution among performers was functions related to its mission but under military con- rather similiar—business (81 percent); educational in- trol and, particularly after NASA had been assigned stitutions (12 percent); nonprofits (1 percent); and the lunar landing mission, developing new capabil- other Government agencies (6 percent). ities required to carry out an active space R&D effort. As the development of Government space activities Within DOD there was a desire to develop a space during the 1960’s and 1970’s continued, the separa- R&D and a space operations structure, and to deter- tion between the civilian and military (including in- mine the division of responsibility at the Secretary of telligence) communities became quite pronounced. Defense level between the various military services. The Government developed and maintained separate Both the NASA buildup and the development of the and distinct institutional structures for both functions, initial military structure for space were accomplished not only in terms of line agencies within the executive by the early 1960’s. branch, but also in terms of policy review, budget de- Within the first 2 years of its existence, NASA had velopment and review, and congressional oversight. transferred to it a number of facilities, programs, and The elements of the Government space program coor- personnel that had formerly been operating under dinated their work but in a limited way compared to military auspices. These included, from the Army, the the separate efforts developed by each element of the Von Braun rocket development team at Huntsville, Government space effort. Ala. (which became the core of the Marshall Space Flight Center), and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at I There was already a military launch facility at the Cape. Appendix A—institutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program . 309

The NASA structure created under the direction of reviewed in the Senate by the Subcommittee on Sci- its first two administrators, Keith Glennan and James ence, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Webb, has remained basically unchanged during the Commerce, Science, and Transportation; there is no past two decades. NASA headquarters in Washington separate Senate Space Committee. In the House, the is responsible for policy development and overall Committee on Science and Astronautics in 1974 was management and technical direction of the various renamed the Committee on Science and Technology components of the civilian space research program. and its jurisdiction was broadened to cover most ci- Technical management of those specific projects is vilian science and technology activities, rather than assigned to one of the various NASA field centers. being focused primarily on NASA efforts. NASA has adopted the “Air Force model” of agency- This institutional base offers the potential for rapid contractor relationships, in which most R&D work is mobilization if the Nation decided to accelerate the performed outside the Government by the aerospace pace of its civilian space effort; the consequences of industry. The Government role is that of program and allowing the NASA and contractor institutional bases project initiator, technical monitor of contractor per- to shrink are unclear. It may be a sound national in- formance, and user of the results of the R&D efforts. vestment to maintain a strong institutional capability The set of field centers under NASA authority to- within the Government for civilian space develop- day is the same as it was during the early 1960’s.2 ment, even though that capability is not always be- Because NASA is responsible for civilian space activ- ing fully utilized. On the other hand, as this report has ities aimed at a number of different purposes, includ- argued throughout, it may also be appropriate, as U.S. ing science, applications, and development of tech- activities in space mature, to shift more of the respon- nological capability, and because the responsibility for sibility for program and project planning and develop- each of those missions is lodged in a different field ment for space applications and transportation to the center, one of NASA headquarters’ major responsi- private sector, with a parallel diminution of Govern- bilities is allocating priorities and resources across the ment’s institutional involvement. NASA institutional complex. The vitality of various In 1977-78, a National Security Council Policy field centers is closely related to the priority assigned Review Committee reviewed the structure of the na- to particular types of space activities under that tional space program. The report validated the fun- center’s control, and thus there is strong institutional damental principle of separating civilian and military motivation to compete for particular emphases within space activities. It concluded that “our current direc- the overall NASA program. tion set forth in the Space Act in 1958 is well-founded” Congress dealt with the need to establish a firm pol- and that “the United States will maintain current icy foundation for space by creating two temporary responsibility and management among the various select committees in early 1958. Later that year it space programs. ”3 established two new standing committees to deal with civilian space matters. In the Senate this responsibili- Policy and Program Coordination ty was given to the Committee on Aeronautical and The decision to separate civilian and military space Space Sciences; in the House, to the Committee on activities led naturally to the requirement for policy Science and Astronautics. Both of these committees and program coordination between the programs. The derived their visibility and status within Congress from type of policy coordination needed and mechanisms the importance of program oversight and their author- for coordination have been, and continue to be, con- ization authority over those programs. As long as the troversial issues (see ch. 6). The nature of coordina- civilian space program was a matter of high national tion at the program level has been less problematic priority with major budgetary support there was a cor- and working-level cooperation between civilian and responding degree of status in being involved with military space efforts has been the rule. However, oc- these two congressional committees. However, as the casional disputes have arisen over, for example, pro- resources allocated to civilian space activity declined posed civilian uses of technology developed for na- after Apollo, Congress viewed space activities as just tional security purposes. one among various science and technology programs During the 1958 debate on space policy, a major of Government, and during the 1970’s committee ju- congressional concern was the relationship between risdictions and names were modified to reflect this military and civilian objectives in space and some reality. Now the programs of NASA and the National broader set of national interests. Senate Majority Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration are

2Except for the brief period during which NASA also had an Electronics 3The only public announcement of the results of this review was in the Research Center in Cambridge, Mass. form of a June 20, 1978, press release from the White House, 310 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Leader Lyndon Johnson, in particular, was convinced and in 1973 President Nixon proposed its dissolution. that space policy ought to be the subject of Presiden- Congress raised no objection and the Space Council tial attention; the Eisenhower administration was far went out of existence. less convinced that space policy deserved such high Without a central policy coordinating structure dur- priority. Johnson wanted to coordinate policy at a high ing the 1970’s, stresses among various Government level by creating an Executive Office group modeled space activities developed. Several of these were the on the National Security Council but dedicated spe- results of disagreements between NASA and DOD cifically to aeronautical and space activities. The over the appropriate national security constraints to Eisenhower adminstration reluctantly accepted John- be applied to civilian space efforts, particularly for son’s notion as a price of getting the space legislation Earth observations. NASA-DOD relationships with through Congress, and a National Aeronautics and respect to the space shuttle program have been Space Council was established by the NAS Act. The another area of controversy. It was these stresses that Space Council was to be a high-level advisory body, were the primary cause of the Carter administration chaired by the President and consiting of the heads review of national space policy that began in 1977. of other agencies concerned with space activities and A major result of that review was the reestablish- several nongovernmental members.4 It was to assist ment of a Presidential-level policy review process for and advise the President in developing a comprehen- space. The process existed in the form of a Policy sive program of aeronautical and space activities, in Review Committee (Space), operating under National assigning specific space missions to various agencies, Security Council auspices but chaired by the Direc- and i n resolving differences among agencies over tor of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. space policy and program. This committee provided a forum for all involved Fed- Although the Eisenhower adminstration agreed to eral agencies (including Departments such as Interior the inclusion of the Space Council in the legislation and Agriculture) to air their views on space policy, to setting up the national space effort, it never used the advise the President on proposed changes in national Council. Rather, space policy under Eisenhower was space policy, to resolve disputes among agencies, and developed through the channels of the National Se- to provide for rapid referral of space policy issues to curity Council and Bureau of the Budget. Eisenhower the President for decision when required. Unlike the believed that civilian and military functions in space Space Council, the Policy Review Committee (Space) development were “separate responsibilities requir- did not have a standing professional staff structure. ing no coordinating body. ” Thus, in 1960 he asked Rather, it served as recognition of the need to for- Congress to abolish the Space Council. malize the channels of interaction among the various This proposal was sidetracked by Lyndon Johnson. components of Government space activity rather than When Kennedy won the 1960 election, with Johnson have policy and program disputes settled through the as his Vice President, the new President was con- budgetary review process or other means of interagen- vinced to keep the Space Council but to change the cy coordination. legislation so it would be chaired by the Vice Presi- The structures for coordination among military and dent. During the Kennedy administration, the Space civilian space efforts at the program level have had Council hired its first staff members and played an ac- a rather different history than those for policy-level tive role in developing the national policies that led coordination. The 1958 NAS Act created an institu- to the Apollo project and to the administration’s position for coordination at this level, the Civilian Military tion on communications satellites. In the rest of the Liaison Committee (CMLC), but that statutory com- 1960’s, under the Johnson and Nixon administration, mittee, like the Space Council, was a congressionally the Space Council continued to exist, but stood at the imposed structure and was seldom used. Rather, margins of most space policy debates. it developed NASA and DOD set up a number of working-level a relatively large (for the Executive Office) staff under groups on issues of interest to both agencies as the the leadership of Vice Presidents Hubert Humphrey early years of the space program passed. CMLC was and Spiro Agnew. However, as the priority assigned eventually abolished and replaced by a nonstatutory to the civilian space program continued to decrease Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board in the President’s agenda and as the separate space (AACB), which formalized the contacts between activities of the Government became governed in- NASA and DOD at the working level. AACB was es- creasingly from within the separate agencies, the tablished by NASA-DOD agreement in 1960 and was Space Council became rather a moribund institution, given responsibility for coordinating NASA and DOD activities so as to “avoid undesirable duplication . . .

4These nongovernmental members were never appointed and the posi- achieve efficient utilization of available resources” and tions were eliminated when the space council was reorganized in 1961. undertake” the coordination of activities in areas of Appendix A—lnstitutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program ● 311

common interest. The early years of AACB were quite nological frontier in space applications than on de- productive in terms of data exchanges and creating veloping technology either in response to user de- an awareness of what the other agency’s plans were; mand or in anticipation of the kinds of demands likely AACB continues to exist today as the primary mecha- to arise as new capabilities became known. In addi- nism for addressing major program issues of interest tion, NASA has developed a history of emphasizing to DOD and NASA in space. However, as the separate the development of constantly more sophisticated NASA and defense programs became more institution- technology in its application programs rather than alized in the 1960’s and 1970’s there has been a concentrating on bringing an adequate application tendency for coordination between the programs to system into early operation. This is at least in some be defensive in character, i.e., aimed at protecting measure a reflection of the institutional reality that, each agency’s own programs and “turf.” once NASA completes R&D for an applications program, it must transfer that program to some user out- From Research to Operation side of the agency. There is an organizational tendency to attempt to hold onto programs, even if that In the 1958 debate over space activities the notion means prolonging the R&D phase beyond the social- of operating civilian space systems did not receive ly optimum points Since the early 1970’s, NASA has much attention. The NAS Act gave NASA the respon- placed a high priority on developing closer relation- sibility for most aeronautical and space activities but ships with potential users of space technology, particu- defined those activities as: 1 ) research into problems larly in remote sensing and advanced satellite commu- of flight within and outside the Earth’s atmosphere; nications. 2) the development, the construction, testing and op- The first test of NASA’s bias toward continuing R&D eration for research purposes of aeronautical and in applications was in weather satellites. in the early space vehicles; and 3) such other activities as may be 1960’s NASA’s initial meteorological satellite program, required for the exploration of space. This language which had been transferred from DOD, was called NASA to R&D activities, and that was seemed to limit TIROS. As the agency in charge of space R&D, NASA the general understanding of the agency’s mission at regarded TIROS as only the first step in weather satel- the time. lite development and wanted to go immediately to the By providing launch services to a variety of cus- creation of an advanced meteorological satellite called tomers, including other Government agencies, the NIMBUS. The Weather Bureau within the Department Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and of Commerce, a potential user agency, had another other private sector firms, and other countries, NASA point of view. TIROS would markedly improve its serv- has gone beyond R&D to a clearly operational role ices, and the Weather Bureau wanted NASA to focus in one area. Restriction to R&D has had little impact on it rather than initiate a new weather satellite pro- on NASA’s efforts in space science and exploration gram. However, it took several years and substantial or technology development, but it has had a definite bureaucratic conflict before NASA was willing to shift impact for space applications. its emphasis away from the advanced NIMBUS devel- Limiting NASA to the R&D part of the job of bring- opment program back to completing TIROS and bringing space applications into being means that other ing it to an operational state.6 Eventually, NASA users of space technology are necessarily involved in worked out an effective agreement with the Weather the total applications effort. NASA has developed an Bureau both to support on-going meteorological satel- orientation toward “technology push” efforts rather lite activities and to continue R&D on advanced sen- than a tradition of close coupling with potential users sors relevant to meteorological applications. of space technology who would exercise “demand The complex history of the use of satellites for pull” on the development of space applications. remote sensing of land and ocean areas demonstrates While NASA has almost from its start included “tech- the institutional problems stemming from, among nology transfer” functions in its organization, many other sources, NASA’s focus on R&D and its lack of observers think that NASA has so far done an inade- close links with potential users of operational space quate job of marketing its technological capabilities systems. The debate over the appropriate develop- to potential users of space application systems.

5 While an emphasis on developing and demonstrat- There may be technical and managerial as well as I nstltutlonal reasons ing new technical capabilities is often necessary to why the development of a space application may take longer than onglnally hoped for. Some also suggest that there have been instances of premature convince potential users of their value, especially in shdts from R&D to operational status In space applications. situations where no preexisting user community ex- bFor a detailed account of the NASA/Weather Bureau dispute, see Richard Chapman, TIROS-NIMBUS: Administrative, Political, and Technological Prob- ists, most observers believe that NASA, particularly in /ems of Developing Weather Sate//ites (Syracuse, N. Y,: Interuniverslty Case its early years, put more stress on pushing the tech- Program, Inc., 1972).

94-915 0 - 82 - 21 312 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

ment pace and management structure for the Land- of those interested in preventing monopoly power in sat system has extended over a decade. new areas of human activity, such a development was A major issue as arrangements for operational land not desirable. The situation was further clouded by remote sensing have been debated is whether NASA’s the recognition that, even if AT&T or another private charter ought to be revised to extend its authority to entity developed a communications satellite using its the operation of space applications sytems. The Pres- own funds, it would have to depend on launchers idential directive of November 1979 ended this debate developed with public money to place that satellite with the decision to keep NASA as an R&D agency into orbit. Thus the Kennedy administration reversed in remote sensing and to assign civilian Earth obser- the Eisenhower policy of leaving communications sat- vation operations within the Government to NOAA, ellite research to the private sector; Kennedy author- even though there were other claimants to a share of ized NASA to conduct a vigorous program of research the operational remote-sensing role such as the De- in the communications satellite area. partment of the Interior and the Department of Agri- There were some in 1961 and 1962, as space com- culture. Throughout the Landsat program, NASA has munications approached reality, who thought that the emphasized the experimental nature of the early Government should not only be involved in commu- remote-sensing satelites. While it has worked with nications satellite R&D and make the results of that potential users to make them aware of possible appli- research available to a variety of potential private sec- cations of Landsat data to their programs, it has also tor firms for commercialization, but also that the Gov- proposed more advanced sensors for orbital evalua- ernment itself should take advantage of that research tion in later Landsat satellites, but it has not given and undertake the operational satellite communica- priority attention to developing the ground segment, tions role, returning the eventual profits to the Treas- including associated data management and informa- ury. The advocates of this position were not able to tion processing and dissemination systems, required gather majority support in the 1962 debate over com- for early deployment of a first generation operational munications satellite policy. With the creation of a remote-sensing system. new institution, COMSAT, which had some aspects of public control but was fundamentally a new private Public-Private Sector Relations enterprise, the notion that the Government should go into the communications satellite business itself dis- NASA’s relationships as an R&D agency for space appeared.s with other potential users of space applications are The precedent established during the communica- relatively underdeveloped; this is particularly the case tions satellite debate was that developing new applica- when those users are not other Government agencies, tions of space technology with commercial potential but rather private sector, profit-oriented firms. The ap- and nurturing them to operational status is a mixed propriate division of responsibility between public and private sector-public sector responsibility, with the ap- private organizations for research and development propriate division of roles to be determined on an ad oriented toward commercial applications for space hoc basis for each area of applications; the goal, how- technology has been problematic since the start of the ever, is eventual private sector operation of civilian space age.7 space application systems. In each area in which a This issue initially surfaced in communications sat- space application has reached or approached maturi- ellite research. The Eisenhower adminsitration recog- ty, such as point-to-point communications and some nized that communication via satellite was an area of applications of satellite remote sensing, business struc- potential major economic payoff and decided, in tures have emerged that operate as commercial enter- keeping with its general pro-business orientation, that prises related to that application. The Government has communication satellite research should be left to continued to fund research in other areas of space ap- those interested in making a profit in it. Others, how- plications with potential commercial utility, including ever, feared that allowing only private entitites to de- space transportation, materials processing, and other velop the technology of space communications meant aspects of remote sensing, with the hope of discover- in effect giving a virtual monopoly in that area to the ing whether there are indeed profitable opportunities corporation with the most resources available to infor private sector involvement in those areas, and vest in communications satellite research, American demonstrating to potential operators what those op- Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T). From the perspective portunities are. It maybe that continued Government

This problem is not limited to the space sector. The issue of Federal policies affecting private sector innovation, including direct support of civilian ‘For a full discussion, see Jonathan F. Galloway, The Po/itics arrd R&D, has been a subject of much recent discussion within both the executive Technology of Sate//ite Communications (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & branch and Congress. Co., 1972). Appendix A—institutional Evolution of the U.S. Space Program ● 313

willingness to push the applications of space technol- take them only when they are the most efficient means ogy and to bear the costs and risks of the research, of meeting broader national objectives. development, and demonstration phases of commer- The initial result of the commitment to across-the- cializing those applications is the only way for some board preeminence was to create in NASA an agen- of them to become reality, at least in the short to cy with the structure, institutional relationships, and midterm. organizational culture needed to carry out a high-pri- Advanced communications was one area of policy ority, nationally mobilized effort to developing a large- and institutional controversy during the Nixon and scale technology. NASA, at least in formal terms, re- Ford administrations. NASA was ordered in 1973 to mains today an organization designed for such pur- end its communications R&D efforts, on the grounds poses, but the terms of a national commitment to Lead- that the space communications business was far ership in space activities are much less clear than they enough advanced so that it should be totally a private were during the peak of the Apollo program in the sector responsibility. The consequence of this deci- mid-l 960’s. As space activities have matured, and as sion was that the U.S. private sector concentrated on they promise to grow and become even more routine only those aspects of space communications which over the coming decade, a major institutional issue had the promise of early commercial payoff; other is whether a single central space agency with the governments, most notably France and Japan, have desire and structure for carrying out an integrated, provided R&D support for advanced space commu- high-priority national space effort in the civilian sec- nications development, leading to increasing interna- tor is an anomaly. tional competition with U.S. firms for sales of advanced communications satellites. This situation led The International Context: the Carter administration in 1978 to decide that the Cooperation and Competition potential economic and social benefits of communications satellites were not being adequately tended to During the 1960’s, NASA developed international by private sector R&D. The Carter administration rees- cooperative programs that were clearly secondary in tablished a NASA research effort in advanced space priority to using space technology as a demonstration communications and Information Administration of of national technical resources. Almost all of NASA’s the Department of Commerce with assisting in market international activities were scientific in character and aggregation and possible development of domestic were carried out under policy guidelines that kept and international public satellite communication them limited in scope, including the restrictions that services. cooperation had to be based on mutual scientific benefit and that there would be no exchange of funds be- From “Preeminence” to “Leadership” tween the United States and its partners in interna- President Kennedy in 1961 committed the United tional space activities. This limited concept of inter- States to a policy of “preeminence” in all areas of national cooperation was broadened during the space activity. The notion that the United States 1970’s to the applications area, as a number of na- should maintain a position of “leadership” in space tions become interested in the Landsat program, build- activity has been repeated by each Chief Executive ing their own ground stations or otherwise receiving since Kennedy, Landsat data, and for the first time paying NASA a fee As other countries in Europe, Asia, and South Amer- for access to the remote-sensing satellites. Other appli- ica develop independent space capabilities and as the cation efforts also had international dimensions; for Soviet Union continues an extremely active space ef- example, the Application Technology Satellite and fort, how the United States will continue policies of Communications Technology Satellite programs dem- “leadership” and “preeminence” is unclear (see chs. onstrated some of the uses of communications satel- 3, 9, and 10). One possibility is for the United States lites for education and health care in both develop- to compete across the board with other nations in all ing and industrialized countries (see ch. 7). areas of space activity, from the development of large, Also during the 1970’s, there was limited use of in- permanent manned structures in orbit, through vari- ternational cooperation in space technology to serve ous types of space applications, to exploration of the what were explicitly foreign policy goals. The leading cosmos. Another option is to focus U.S. space prior- 9A major exception was the set of international agreements required to ities in areas of high national payoff (which would in- establish a global tracking network, IOFor the fo ndatlons of U.S. policy toward intern atlona( cooperation, see clude international leadership in those areas). Another u Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/ Space Cooperation (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Pren- option is to view application activities in space as com- ttce Hall, 1965); for criticism, see Don Kash, The Po/itics of Space Coopera- petitors with Earth-bound enterprises, and to under- tion (West Lafayette, Ind,: Purdue University Studies, 1967), 314 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

example was U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in the Apollo- petition and international collaboration in space Soyuz test project. Increasingly, the potential of space should be a dynamic one. Competition between U.S. as a tool of our foreign assistance program and as a and European launch vehicles for payloads in the means of demonstrating our concern for the develop- 1980’s is just one example. A number of issues being ing countries has led to assistance programs in a vari- debated in international forums could affect U.S. ci- ety of third- and fourth-world countries that use Land- vilian space activities in the coming decades. Examples sat data. are the actions of the World Adminsitrative Radio Con- Cooperation with our major industrial partners and ferences in allocating frequencies (and potentially slots potential competitors in space technology develop- in geosynchronous orbit) and the debate in the United ment began during the same time period. The Euro- Nations on a Moon treaty. The United Nations has pean Space Agency assumed the responsibility for de- also scheduled a Conference on Space Applications veloping the Spacelab, which is to be flown on the for 1982. shuttle as a base for orbital scientific experiments re- The Soviet Union, West Germany, France, Japan, quiring the presence of human experimenters. The Brazil—and indeed a number of other countries—are U.S. stance toward cooperative programs that would allocating significant resources to space R&D. In com- develop commercially useful space technology is ing years, the U.S. civilian space program will func- however, somewhat ambivalent, because of possible tion in an international context quite different than has economic returns from these activities and because been the case. The institutional implications of this of the desire of the United States either to maintain changed context—for example, how to relate space or establish a competitive advantage. activities to foreign policy objectives and how to carry ‘As other major nations develop advanced space out the diplomacy required to support our space technology, the mixture between international com- objectives— require examination.

. Appendix B USE OF LANDSAT DATA BY THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Introduction tion range from very basic and efficient visual interpretations of Landsat photographs to highly technical and This case study was prepared by the Bureau of Land complex digital image processing of digital tapes. Management (BLM) of the Department of the Interior Table B-1 lists some examples of past and current pro- to illustrate its use of Landsat data. It shows that Land- grams conducted in BLM that have made use of Land- sat data have become an integral part of BLM’s strat- sat data. BLM views Landsat and any other remote- egy for managing the land and resources under its sensing technologies as basic tools. The products of care. these tools are integrated and are then used within BLM utilizes Landsat data in numerous programs. the frameworks of various programs to improve their These programs use both photographs and digital tape quality and efficiency as well as to reduce program products. Interpreted Landsat data are used to assist costs. Thus, Landsat data aid BLM in inventory and in mapping basic vegetation, soils, geology, and ener- planning primarily by streamlining and structuring gy and mineral resources. The processes of interpreta- these activities.

Table 6.1 .—Examples of Past and Current Programs Utilizing Landsat Data

Size (acres in Status f_andsat-aided program Location millions) Complete Current Task/purpose 1. Denali Project Alaska 3.5 x Test and evaluate Landsat aided resource mapping in northern spruce tundra biome. 2. AVRI Project Arizona 2.1 x Test and evaluate Landsat.aided resource mapping in the Southwest desert community. 3. IVRI Project Idaho 3.7 x Test and evaluate Landsat-aided resource mapping in sagebrush grassland community. 4. California Desert Plan California 25 x Fulfill requirements of Federal Land Policy and Management Act. 5. Northwest Tier Pipeline Oregon 3.0 x Provide information for environmental statement. 6. Taos Project New Mexico 5.8 x Provide information for Planning System. 7. Havasu Project Arizona 1.0 x Provide basic soils prestratification. 8. Jarbidge Project Idaho 1.3 x Provide information for Planning System. 9. Mining Disturbance Missouri 3.0 x Detect and map mining trespass. 10. Fuels Mapping Alaska 5.0 x Map fuels loading in areas in high wildfire potential. 11. Phoenix Project Arizona 6.3 x Provide information for Planning System. 12. Coeur d’Alene Idaho 1.0 x Update existing forest inventory.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

315 316 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Two Activities of Importance to BLM ning decisions are made for specific areas so that the unique characteristics of each area are fully For the purpose of this report, two activities in BLM considered. MFP indicates what is to be done have been selected for detailed analysis. Both are en- with each resource within each unit. countered daily in BLM State and district offices and Activity plan.–The activity plan is prepared for both share the common thread of requiring inventory each individual resource unit to define the man- information for application to resource management. ner in which the resultant activities shall achieve The first application is known as the planning system the objective and constraints of the MFP. The ac- and requires a more generalized level of inventory tivity plan is specific to the users and special inter- data than the second program. This second program, ests involved. An allotment management plan is the soil vegetation inventory method (SVIM), is a field- an example of an activity plan. intensive effort that requires a detailed inventory data Since its development and adoption by the entire set. These data are used for such tasks as allocating BLM in 1969, the planning system has been a major grazing lands. For the details of the programs, the factor in BLM program activities. All BLM offices, in- reader is referred to the manuals that are listed in the cluding the Outer Continental Shelf Program, employ bibliography at the end of this report. the technique. Its primary strength is that it has system- atized the planning process, and enhanced the quality of BLM management. However, it is labor inten- The Planning System sive. During the last 5 years, approximately $60 million The BLM planning system provides a systematic ap- have been budgeted for planning system applications, proach to gathering, analyzing, and integrating multi- with an estimated workforce of 450 positions. ple resource data into an overall management plan. A variety of products are required in the planning The system permits informed and objective multiple- system. Figure B-1 is an example of the basic unit use decisions through identifying and reconciling con- resource analysis map depicting current vegetation. flicting land and resource uses. It is an internal man- Figure B-2 is an example of a wildlife habitat overlay agement tool that helps blend diverse authorities and showing areas of Desert Tortoise habitat. Table B-2 land use opportunities. It is also a managerial system is an example of tabular data utilized within the proc- through which the BLM Director, State directors, and ess. Although BLM is the primary user of the informa- district managers develop and manage the various tion, numerous other individuals, organizations, and BLM program activities. Each of these activities has private concerns have access to the data, e.g., local a primary mission or purpose for which objectives and ranchers, environmental societies, and Federal and standards are defined. This system provides for a multi- State Government agencies. ple resource program consisting of: lands, minerals, recreation, wildlife, watershed, forestry, and range. Soil Vegetation Inventory Method The system consists of three basic steps. These–unit SVIM is the BLM method for conducting basic soil resource analysis (URA), managment framework plan and vegetation inventories. SVIM supports the plan- (MFP), activity plan–are briefly described below. ning system as well as other activities such as environmental statements. The process provides a uniform Components of the Planning System and systematic method of detailed inventory. It does not inventory all renewable resources. However, it ● Unit resource analysis (URA).—URA provides a does provide a framework for inventories of the num- comprehensive analysis of inventory data, bers and kinds of wildlife species, and also gathers resource problems, conditions, users, production, basic data for use in other resource inventories. quality, capabilities, and management potential SVIM evolved from a number of requirements, but for use in preparing a management framework the primary catalyst was the need to acquire high-qual- plan. In other words, URA provides resource in- ity resource data for use in developing environmen- formation pertinent to decisions about land use tal statements concerning grazing. Since its inception resources management in a unit of land. It also in 1978, it has been applied in a variety of forms provides continuity in retaining and maintaining throughout BLM. The major strengths of this proce- resource data. URA supports the multiple-use dure are: 1) the high-quality data that are available as concept and is prepared by individual resource a result of data collection in the field; 2) ability to specialists. integrate soils and vegetation information in the map- ● Management framework plan (MFP). —M FP rec- ping process; and 3) the vast wealth of data that are onciles conflicts in land and resource use. Plan- available for use once the inventory is completed. The Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior ● 317

Figure B-f .—Vegetation and Soii Associations

LEGEND Vegetation Subtypes

Annuals Mountain Shrub

Conifer Plnyon·Juniper - Creosotebush - Sagebrush - Desert Shrub -mlJ Saltbush -r-=J Grassland -CJ Waste -[--~-"J HaJj·shrub 318 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications ——

Figure B.2.— Desert Tortoise Habitat

d’— ‘(- . . . I . . I (-’[ 7 %4

I f,

LEGEND

J I . . \ - —. O12J4S

SHIVWITS ES AREA %.1.. ” tile, Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior ● 319

Table B-2.—Tabular Data Used in the Planning Process

composition cornposition Full stocking condition No action Elimination Vegetation

T — 8 4 — 2 — Wolf hole Lake 38 42 — 9 Wolf hole Canyon 14 9 23 23 — 56 16 Mine Valley T 14 T 64 5 T T 12 13 64 49 64 39 Same as current species composition

SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management process also has a few weak points. For example, the specialists, wildlife specialists, etc. have been involved detail that is listed as a strength is also a weakness in these inventories. because of the labor-intensive nature of detailed field work. Similarly, without a means of automatically han- Transition to the Use of Landsat Data dling the data, the voluminous amount of data available are not readily usable. Another related weakness BLM has followed an organized approach in the test, is the cost of these inventories. Recently programs evaluation, and implementation of Landsat data. A have been developed on the mainframe computer sys- complete description of that approach can be found tem at Denver Service Center to store and manipulate in several reports (see bibliography). In 1977, BLM, the tabular data collected in SVIM. In addition, a linear National Aeronautics and Space Administration optimization model has been developed to allocate (NASA), and the U.S. Geological Survey EROS Pro- vegetation production among the competing uses. To gram agreed on a phased program to implement this date, this tabular data has not been tied to a digitized technology in BLM. The program was designed to pro- mapping process. vide BLM an opportunity to test the technology in an In the 3 years since the SVIM inventories were estab- operational manner, to evaluate the results of the tests, lished, an estimated $14 million have been spent on and finally to implement those aspects of the technol- them. They have covered about 32 million acres and ogy most suited to assist BLM data collection and re- have required 7,200 work-months. A skill mix of vege- source management needs. During this transfer of re- tation, soil, forestry, wildlife, and range conservation mote-sensing technology to BLM, BLM assimilated the 320 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

procedures and equipment into a small core staff to enhance his product. BLM is currently developing housed within an existing research and development guidelines to the field offices for the use of this new (R&D) organization at the Denver Service Center. tool and is becoming increasingly dependent on it to From this core staff of three persons, the present effect required operating economics. Branch of Remote Sensing (BRS) grew. A continuing process of reporting and reviewing the status of the USER ACCEPTANCE program was followed that resulted in many changes to the program. These changes were implemented on Whether field people will accept and utilize new a test site basis. Since the project was structured to approaches and whether management will believe test the technology in three diverse areas, changes in results obtained through these new concepts, are ma- program orientation were made at the onset of activ- jor factors in the transition, In any organization, the ities in each subsequent test site. This procedure pro- “field type” is notoriously concerned that any change vided BLM: 1 ) time to plan carefully and implement may adversely affect his ability to do the field work the changes, 2) ability to build upon each test site in that is so necessary for good management practices. a systematic fashion, and 3) prevention of unnecessary Similarly, management personnel are reluctant to and costly changes within each phase of the program. change something that heretofore has worked well. At this time, the program has been incorporated in These are valid concerns that were recognized in the the operations of BLM; and Landsat-assisted programs project planning stages of this program. In order to are currently being conducted in several areas. combat these fears an extensive educational program In addition to the program just described, a number was incorporated as an integral part of the study. Since of other factors have caused the BLM to use Landsat the beginning of the program, training courses in data. For example, the congressionally mandated Cali- remote sensing have been a mainstay of each phase fornia Desert Plan (CDP) utilized Landsat imagery of the project. The sessions have covered basic photo because of tight schedules and funding. in this study interpretation procedures as well as advanced digital Landsat data were used to view the unit at a broad image processing. In addition, they have addressed scale from which areas for intensive study were cho- a variety of subjects—vegetation, geology, soils, etc. sen. These areas were then sampled with finer scale To date, over 750 BLM resource specialists have re- methods appropriate to the resource requirement, ceived training through these programs. This training e.g., aerial photography. Vegetation, soil geology, is continuing on an annual basis, and in the near energy, and mineral resources were included in the future, special sessions specifically oriented to man- effort. Without Landsat, it is questionable that CDP agers are planned. would have been accomplished within the time and cost constraints. In addition, there is the natural proc- Program Continuity ess whereby technology is used by personnel in the In the last 5 years BLM has made a substantial com- field because of the acute needs for data that exist at mitment to the use of Landsat data. This commitment the working level. That is, if a technology can be uti- represents a major investment of labor and equip- lized to acquire information needed at the field level ment. Thus, the continuation and improvement of the then it is often used without prior knowledge of man- Landsat system is of vital interest to BLM. At this time, agement. There is no doubt that the methodology it is understood that Landsat D’ is the last satellite would have gained use and acceptance in BLM, but authorized for the program. The prospect of terminat- the major program described in the preceding para- ing the Landsat program will greatly affect the future graph caused a more organized and Bureau-wide decisions of BLM toward continued use of Landsat adoption. data. Reluctance to adopt a full-scale program can be Transition to Space Data expected. Managers must have a guarantee that data will continue to be available before they can be asked It is of paramount importance that the reader keep to embrace the technology. BLM is willing to consider in mind the closing words of the first paragraph of this other alternatives, such as using data from the pro- report: “Landsat data aid the BLM in inventory and posed Japanese and European satellites. However, planning by streamlining and structuring these activ- these satellites are not in orbit and can only be con- ities.” Landsat data are used to improve inventory sidered as potential alternatives. In addition, there quality, to enhance data retention and renewal, and doesn’t appear to be any assurance that the desired to reduce inventory costs. The use of Landsat data has private sector takeover of Landsat is likely. Thus, to not led to replacing programs. Thus, Landsat is primar- a user organization like BLM, the picture is confusing ily a new tool that is available to the resource specialist and bleak. In the face of continued increasing costs Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior . 321 for all services, BLM shall seek to make its limited in- program was conducted in phases, in which each ventory dollars stretch even further. Present policies phase had increasing complexity. In this manner, it do not seem to guarantee the continuity of Landsat/ was possible to answer basic questions concerning the Earth Resource Satellite data needed for BLM to make technology prior to expending funds on subsequent a complete switch to reliance on satellite data. phases, The results of this program were extremely For the immediate future, the continuing availabil- successful, and portions of the technology have been ity of Landsat MSS data is required for programs that used in BLM. Table B-3 illustrates some of the manage- are under way or planned. In addition, BLM has a ment opportunity map overlays that are currently longer term requirement for data of greater spectral being used in the planning system. These particular and spatial resolution. At present, the available Land- overlays resulted from the Landsat-aided analysis in sat data barely meet some BLM requirements. In order the Arizona project and are typical of the requirements to realize the full potential of such capability, data of of the planning system. Table B-4 illustrates the tabular increased resolution are mandatory. At present, we data that are available as a result of this program. This can only streamline and economize by utilizing Land- information is also applicable to the planning system. sat as a sampling frame. in the future, we must pro- The true utility of this technology lies in the flexibility vide increasingly detailed data or face a stagnation of of the data base that is developed as part of the analy- the program and a consequent halt in transition to sis. Joining Landsat data with ancillary data in a these powerful tools. Thus, both the current multispec- geographic data base provides a previously unheard- tral scanner and the future thematic mapper data are of dimension to the planning system. A typical data- of great interest to BLM. base may consiste of the following elements. ● computer classes representing land cover from Acquisition of Hardware and Software Landsat data; ● slope, aspect, elevation; As an integral part of the joint BLM-NASA-EROS ● photo interpretation data; program, BLM acquired and installed a digital image ● sources of water; processing system at the Denver Service Center. This ● road net; system is currently being used to support inventory ● production for forest, woodland, and rangeland projects in BLM. The system includes a complete resources; Earth resources data processing software package. ● ground data; It is projected to have a lo-year lifespan, but is modu- ● administrative units; and lar in nature to allow for both software and hardware ● soil information. improvements. As the need for Landsat data increase, Although Landsat is only one aspect of this broad additional processing capability in terms of other data base, it is in fact the foundation underpinning systems or approaches must be considered. For ex- other data. From this data base, the types of products ample, BLM anticipates inventorying 30 million acres listed in table B-3 can be produced. Figure B-3 illus- annually on the single system currently in operation trates a basic map of current vegetation produced at the Denver Service Center. Depending upon sup- from this technology for use in URA. An example of port requirements for BLM inventories this figure will another product of the data base is shown in figure fall far short of the total requirements of BLM. Thus, B-4. Depicted here is its use to delineate areas of high further acquisition of hardware and software may be potential for Desert Big Horn Sheep habitation. The necessitated by the transition to Landsat-aided inven- digital nature of this data base provides a great deal tories. of flexibility. Products can be made at extremely low cost, and they can also be revised in an economical and efficient manner. The data base is also very easily revised as new information becomes available, Applications of Landsat in the Planning System Benefits, Budget, and Personnel The BLM-NASA-EROS wildland vegetation resource The costs of developing the data base from Landsat inventory project was specifically designed to test and data are very attractive. By contrast, the process of pro- evaluate the use of Landsat data for application in the ducing necessary map overlays by hand is labor inten- - planning system. BLM conducted a test program in sive, time consuming, and is by nature subjective. The three test sites in Alaska, Arizona, and Idaho, which study project maintained detailed records of costs, are representative of the lands managed by BLM. The both recurring and nonrecurring. The costs associated 322 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Table B-3.—Management Opportunity (Arizona Strip District)

Management products Scale Management parameters Current use Potential use

. , . . . -- - - Potential juniper—pinyon 1 :126,720 vegetallon: ua percent Two areas identified Hlgn“” ‘ lor‘ tA,- AMP,“”- cutting/burning areas juniper—pinyon for tree use permits HMP. Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft Slope: 0-15 percent Aspect: within % mile of a road. Potential blackbrush treatment 1 :126,710 Vegetation: high Used in programmatic High for EA, AMP, areas component blackbrush blackbrush - HMP, EIS. with grass understory sagebrush Elevation: 4,500-5,000 ft burning EA Slope: variable Aspect: north, northeast. Potential antelope habitat 1:126,720 Vegetation: Great Basin Being used for HMP High for HMP, URA, . desert shrub, plains and MFP. grassland Elevation: 4,000-6,000 ft Slope: 0-20 percent Aspect: variable. ESL overlay sagebrush 1:126,720 Vegetation: 50 percent Available for office High for EIS treatment areas sagebrush with use implementation perennial grass EA’s, and AMP’s, understory HMP. Elevation: variable Slope: less than 15 percent Aspect: variable 10-acre minimum. ESL overlay rangeland 1 :126,720 Current production of Available for office To prove suitability suitability usable forage above use of allotment. 20 lbs/acre Located within 4 miles of water Elevation: variable Slope: less than 51 percent Aspect: variable. Potential mule deer summer 1 :126,710 Vegetation: juniper- Available for office High for HMP, URA, range pinyon, ponderosa use and MFP. pine Elevation: above 6,000 ft Slope: variable Aspect: variable. Potential mule deer 1 :126,720 Vegetation: variable Available for office High for HMP, URA, intermediate range Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft use and MFP. Slope: 0-100 percent Aspect: variable. Potential mule deer winter 1 :126,720 Vegetation: variable Available for office High for HMP, URA, range Elevation: 3,000-5,000 ft use and MFP. Slope: 0-100 percent Aspect: variable. Potential burning areas 1 :126,720 Vegetation: sufficient Available for office High for EA, AMP, grass understory for use HMP. natural reseeding Elevation: 4,250-6,240 ft Slope: variable Aspect: variable. Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior Ž 323

Table B“3.—Management Opportunity (Arizona Strip District) (Continued)

Management products Scale Management parameters Current use Potential use

Potential juniper. pinyon 1:126,710 Vegetation: juniper- Available for office High for EA, AMP, burning areas pinyon, 35 to 50 use HMP. percent, mountain shrub, 7 percent, Mojave Desert shrub, 7 percent Elevation: 5,000-6,000 ft Slope: 0-15 percent Aspect: variable. Potential burning areas 1:126,710 Vegetation: sufficient Available for office High for EA, AMP, grass understory for use HMP. natural reseeding Elevation: 3,250-5,750 ft Slope: variable Aspect: variable.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment,

Table B-4.-Grand Planning Unit Area: 31,688 acres; 12,777 hectares; 2 percent of planning unit

Elevation Slope Aspecty Class (ft.) Acres Percent area Class percent Acres Percent area Class Acres Percent area 3,000 402 1 0-5 22,759 72 NW 2,646 8 3,500 771 2 6-10 3,443 11 N 4,510 14 4,000 3,101 10 11-20 2,650 8 NE 5,857 18 4,500 3,975 13 21-50 2,364 7 E 7,406 23 5,000 11,487 36 51-100 439 1 SE 2,434 5,500 11,249 35 100 33 1 s 2,703 : 6,000 681 2 Sw 3,420 11 6,500 22 1 w 2,712 9

Cover type description based on photo data, 212 photo plots

Evergreen Mohave Great Basin Mountain Plains woodland desert shrub desert shrub shrub grassland Juniper-pinyon Mixed desert Big sagebrush ...... 1 Mixed chaparral .. ..1 Grama-galleta-shrub- shrub. .. .22 shrub. . . . .1 Big sagebrush-perennial grass. ...7 Turbinella oak .. ...3 steppe ...... 1 Big sagebrush-mixed shrub .. ...17 Cheatgrass shrub. ...1 Big sagebrush-tree...... 8 Fourwing saltbush ...... 1 Blackbrush ...... 3 Blackbrush-tree ...... 2 Blackbrush-other desert shrub. ..14 Snakeweed ...... 14 Little rabbitbrush ...... 4

Total, percent 22 1 71 4 2

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. ———-

324 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications -. ——

Figure B-3.–Current Vegetation Map

with producing the detailed maps in the project were larly, the complexity of the area could cause an in- $0.07 per acre. This includes establishing the data crease in the unit cost. base, which includes Landsat classification results, digital terrain data (elevation, slope, and aspect), photo Potential Applications of Landsat to SVIM interpretation results, ground data collection results, and digitized ownership boundaries. The geographic- The BLM-NASA-EROS wildland vegetation resource ally referenced data base allows extraction of subse- inventory project concluded that using Landsat data quent information by coordinates of any scale and in has the potential to reduce the cost of SVIM inven- any practical form. The cost associated with this sec- tories. Consequently, a program was conducted in fis- ondary data extraction is $0.0006 per acre. These costs cal year 1981 to test and evaluate the feasibility of this are in 1980 dollars and are subject to a number of con- concept. The objective of the study was to determine siderations. For example, it is possible to study larger the utility of Landsat and ancillary data when com- areas without increase in the unit cost per acre. Simi- bined with soils data in generating site writeup area Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior Ž 325

Figure B.4.—Potential Desert Bighorn Sheep Habitat

ARIZONA STRIP DISTRICT, ARIZONA SOURCE DATA AUGUST 26, 1977 SCENE I.D. 2947-17074 MAPPING UNIT 10 ACRES (4 HECTARES)

I I \ r

20%

240000 Mocao

(WA) maps for SVIM inventories. A test site in Wyom- in two phases. Part one tested and evaluated the hy- ing where SVIM data collected by traditional means pothesis on a site that is covered by a SVIM inven- is available for quality and cost comparison has been tory. The results of this test are not yet available. How- identified for this program. The project was conducted ever, once feasibility is demonstrated, the process will —— —— —— — —

326 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

be defined in detail and implemented in a new area. and revised, the ease with which the data base can Careful cost records will be maintained so that a def- be revised, and the low cost to use the data base as inite conclusion can be reached on cost savings. well as its low initial cost are all factors which will Initial studies indicate a potential for significant sav- generate increased use of this technology. ings in field work and product preparation. Savings in personnel in the form of time and work efficiency Different Personnel Requirements are possible. Once again, a new mix of personnel (technologists/resource specialists) will be required, As a result of this program, BLM has experienced but these will be persons already involved in these an influx of technical specialists who have comple- programs. The budget appropriated for the test phase mented the existing BLM expertise. These individuals of this program is approximately $100,000. consist of foresters, botanists, range conservationists, geologists, systems analysts, physicists, etc., who by virture of formal education or work-related experience Effects of Programs have become specialists in the field of remote sens- Utilizing Landsat Data ing. Table B-5 provides a list of individual technical skills now found in BRS (new organization resulting Technical Impacts from this program) at the Denver Service Center The ost substantial technical byproduct of this pro- (DSC). Table B-6 is a list of individual skills support- gram has been the acquisition by BLM of a complete ing the BLM remote-sensing R&D programs. An off-the-shelf remote-sensing digital image processing unusual skill mix exists in these groups. Such a skill system and associated software. The acquisition of this mix is mandatory in order to: 1 ) be responsive to BLM equipment at a cost of approximately $500,000 (cost resource management requirements, and 2) imple- of equipment and facilities) represented a sharp depar- ment successfully a technical program at the field ture from previous philosophies in the organization, level. The advent of this technology has also affected It was a recognition by management of the need to operations and personnel at the field level. Most BLM bring space age technology to bear upon the problems offices that become involved in the program appoint associated with resources management. remote-sensing coordinators who are normally per- As the program has evolved, it has also become ob- sons within the existing organization such as soil scien- vious that there is a growing potential requirement for tists, foresters, and range conservationists. Once a distributed system. BLM field offices will also need selected, these persons receive intensive training in to be capable of conducting routine analysis of Land- the technology and then work in concert with their sat data. This will be a function of schedules, availabili- BLM counterparts at DSC for the duration of the proj- ty of resources, and the individual field office techno- ect. logical capabilities. In addition, the field offices will need to reach and revise their Landsat data base, It Economic Effects may also be useful for BLM offices to use the process- To compare overall planning system costs with ing capability at the EROS Data Center (EDC). Similar- Landsat costs is not realistic. Since Landsat data are ly, BLM Alaska will use the EDC Field Office system in Anchorage. Table B=5.—lndividual Skills Supporting Preliminary tests of the system have been very posi- BLM Remote-Sensing R&D Programs tive. Its products have been determined to have direct application in management activities. They have also Remote Sensing Skills—Branch of Remote Sensing. been found to be as accurate, and in some instances Forestry Geology more accurate, than those that are produced by more Wildlife Biology conventional means. Furthermore, the products are Botany more easily produced and, as a result, more readily Remote-Sensing Skills—TGS Contractor available to field personnel. The geographically Forestry referenced digital data base containing Landsat data Earth Resources and anciIlary information has proved to be an ex- Biometrics tremely valuable management tool. Range Science Environmental Monitoring The importance of the geographically referenced Wildlife Biology data base that results from this technology is just begin- System Analyst ning to be realized. The accuracy of the information, Programing the timeliness with which products can be produced SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management. Appendix B—Use of Landsat Data by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior . 327

Table B-6.—Remote-Sensing Skills—Division of Scientific Systems Development

Remote-Sensing Skills—Division of Scientific Systems Development Geology Remote-Sensing Science Statistics Cartography Computer Systems Physics

SOURCE: Bureau of Land Management utilized to support the planning system, only those It is estimated that 3 work years have been dedi- parts of the latter which are replaced by methods using cated to coordinating and managing these efforts in Landsat data may be considered. A small example that the last 5 years. illustrates potential savings is the generation of a habitat map involving vegetation, slope, aspect, elevation, International Effects disturbance corridors, and sources of water at a scale The current programs have not affected world trade, of 1:1 26,720 (1/2 inch = 1 mile) for a 2 million acre prices, or the competitive position of the United States. area. This would cost on the order of $500, if the Land- Nor have they affected the current system on inter- sat geographic data base were used, The same prod- national land use policy formulation. However, they uct produced by hand in the traditional manner would have led to some international cooperation between typically cost at least $2,500. To produce the map by BLM and Mexico and BLM and Australia. In a recent traditional means would take a matter of weeks, while project, BLM provided extensive support and coopera- the Landsat-derived map could be produced in a mat- tion to Australia. An Australian scientist worked at the ter of hours (from an established data base). The for- BLM facility in Denver to do a Landsat analysis on the mer would be subject to the bias of the analyst, while BLM image processing system. BLM is also supporting the latter would be objective within the criteria speci- a project between the United States and Mexico to fied. In addition, the traditional map would be difficult, map desertification indicators in two test sites i n Mex- costly, and time consuming to revise, but the Landsat ico and one in the United States. map could be quickly modified and regenerated, The Landsat map would also be inherently more accurate and could be legally defended if required. Bibliography In another example, BLM proposes to streamline the process of SVIM inventory by incorporating Landsat Bonner, K. G., “Mapping Rangeland Vegetation in Arizona data with SVIM. Such action is expected to reduce from Color Infrared Aerial Photographs and Landsat im- costs by approximately 20 percent. agery, ” in abstracts of papers, 32d annual meeting, Society of Range Management, Casper, Wyo., February Institutional Effects 1979. Bonner, K. G., “Mapping Rangeland Vegetation in North- BLM Landsat remote-sensing program has produced western Arizona From Landsat Image, ” Journal of some institutional benefits, It has caused exchange of Range Management, 1980 (in press). information and cooperative projects that are still in Bonner, W. J., Jr., “Information Requirements of Natural progress between BLM and other Federal, State, and Resource Inventories,” in proceedings, vol. 47, Na- local governments. Such exchanges are also occur- tional Computer Conferences, American Federation of ring between BLM and industry and BLM and the aca- Processing Societies, Anaheim, Calif., June 1978, pp. demic community. Examples of some of these are: 87-91. “Wildland Vegetation Resource Inventory-interim Geological Survey, National Park Service, NASA, St;tus Report for Management, BLM Office of Scientif- Forest Service, Corps of Engineers, Soil Conser- ic Systems Development, Denver Service Center, Feb- vation Service, and Bureau of Indian Affairs. ruary 1979. University of California–Berkeley, Riverside; “Wildland Vegetation Resource Inventory–Second University of Arizona, and University of Alaska. Int’erim Status Report for Management,” BLM Office Raytheon, IBM, Geospectra Corp., ESL, Inc., and of Scientific Systems Development, Denver Service Technicolor Graphic Services. Center, September 1979.

94-915 c - 82 - 2‘2 328 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

, “Utilization of Landsat for Natural Resource inven- in Proceedings of 6th Canadian Symposium of Remote tories, ” presented at the Utilization of Space Data on Sensing, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, May 1980 (in Forestry and Range Resource Seminar, National De- press). fense University, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Miller, W. A., et al., “Digital Landsat and Terrain Data Ap- Washington, D. C., September 1979. plied to an Arid Land Resource Inventory” in proceed- “Applications of Remote Sensing: Aspects of the ings of Arid Land Resource Inventory Conference, La BL’M Wildland Vegetation Resource Inventory Project,” Paz, Mexico, December 1980 (in press). BLM Office of Scientific Systems Development, Denver National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Compilers, Service Center, March 1980. Department of the Interior–Land Inventories, in Aero- Bonner, W. J., Jr., and J. Morgart, “How to Use Landsat as nautics and Space Report of the President, 1980 Activ- a Sampling Frame for Inventories in Arid Climates, ” in ities, Washington, D. C., 1980 (in press). Proceedings of Arid Land Resource Inventory Confer- Rohde, W. G., et al,, “A Stratified-Cluster Sampling Proce- ence, La Paz, Mexico, December 1980 (in press). dure Applied to a Wildland Vegetation Inventory Using Bonner, W. J., Jr., W. G. Rohde, and W. A. Miller, “Map- Remote Sensing: Xlll International Symposium on Re- ping of Rangeland Vegetation With Digital Landsat and mote Sensing, ” of the environment, in proceedings of Terrain Data, “ in Proceedings of Remote Sensing for Environmental Research Institute of Michigan, Ann Ar- Resource Management Symposium, Soil Conservation bor, Mich., 1979, pp. 167-179. Society of America, Ankeny, Iowa, 1980 (in press). Rohde, W. G., E. Hertz, and W. A. Miller, “Integration of Gialdini, M., NASA/BLM APT, phase II, final report, ESL, Inc., Digital Landsat Data and Terrain Data for Mapping NASA contract NAS 9-16014, 1981. Wildland Resources” (abs.), in proceedings of Remote Johnson, G. R., and W. G. Rohde, “Landsat Digital Analysis Sensing for Natural Resources Symposium, University Techniques Required for Wildland Resource Classifica- of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho; September 1979, pp. 393- tion, “ in Proceedings of Arid Land Resource Inventory 394. Conference, La Paz, Mexico, December 1980 (in press). Rohde, W. G., and W. A. Miller, AVRI, project final report, Linden, D. S., W. G. Rohde, and K, G. Bonner, “Estimating USGS, EROS office internal report to BLM-Denver, the Area of Vegetation Types with Landsat and Ancillary EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, S. Dak., 1980. Data, ” in Proceedings of Arid Land Resource inven- U.S. Geological Survey, the AVRI Project–Arizona Vegeta- tory Conference, La Paz; Mexico, December 1980 (in tion Resource Inventory: in Landsat Data Users Notes, press). Issue No. 14, EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, S. Dak., Miller, W. A., G. E. Johnson, and W. G. Rohde, “Role of September 1980, pp. 6-7. Aerial Photographs in Classification of Landsat Data, ” Appendix C FOREIGN AGRICULTURE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, CROP CONDITION ASSESSMENT*

Introduction Iysts is made available to the public through the following kinds of publications: The Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) is one of two FAS circulars for major commodities (scheduled Federal agencies that can be said to be utilizing re- and unscheduled). These circulars contain as a mote-sensing satellite data in a daily operational for- minimum the current official USDA acreage, mat. Its unique qualities as an operational program yield, and production estimates. have been and are that, although like many other Gov- Weekly roundups that provide interim updates ernment users, it acquires, processes, and analyzes between the release of the scheduled circulars, repetitive Landsat data, FAS is the only agency routine- particularly with regard to unusual or unexpected ly having a requirement to produce a product in near events which may impact production. real time. Foreign Agriculture Magazine (monthly) that pub- FAS has been notably successful in managing the lishes articles on foreign agricultural matters of transition from limited use of data derived from a general interest. research and development (R&D) system to full inte- The scheduled “circulars” and the “Weekly Round- gration of data from an operational system. If the R&D up” reports are released on a predetermined schedule system is built and tested by one agency, but the oper- to provide equal access by all users. The current FAS ational system is to be managed by another, then ap- remote-sensing program was initiated in 1973 with the propriate cross-agency responsibilities for managing conception of the large area crop inventory experi- the transition must be devised. In addition, the hard- ment (LACIE). LACIE was a joint cooperative effort ware and software incorporated in the R&D system among USDA, the National Aeronautics and Space are usually more advanced than what the user agen- Administration (NASA), and the National Oceanic and cy requires or can even use. The success of FAS in Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The goal of effecting this transition provides a model that the Fed- LACIE was to develop, test, and evaluate a system for eral Government, as well as State and municipal gov- predicting foreign wheat production through the use ernments, might follow. of Landsat satellite data, weather and agricultural data, and advanced data processing technology. LACIE The FAS Mission began with the signing of an interagency memoran- The primary FAS mission is to develop, maintain, dum of understanding in 1974, and ended in 1978. and expand foreign markets for U.S. agricultural com- Each participating agency contributed funds and per- modities. To accomplish this mission, FAS maintains sonnel to the project. a worldwide agricultural intelligence and reporting The project was directed by a three-agency, high- system to provide timely and accurate information on level, executive steering group, with LACIE project world agricultural production and trade. The informa- management assigned to a project management team tion provided by FAS enables U.S. farmers and traders (PMT) made up of senior technical managers from to adjust to changes in world demand for U.S. each of the agencies. The NASA technical manager agricultural products. The information is also used by was responsible for day-to-day operations, but man- the Department of Agriculture (USDA), other Federal agement decisions were made by the joint PMT. agencies, the Congress, and others in the formulation The LACIE approach was to: 1 ) develop wheat area of foreign market development and export sales pol- measurements from analysis of randomly selected icies, and in developing strategies for negotiating inter- Landsat sample segments; 2) estimate yield through national trade agreements. use of weather-related regression yield models; and 3) multiply area by yield to develop regional and coun- Product try production estimates. The USDA LACIE project team developed a set of Current information covering principal agricultural USDA user requirements based on 1 ) interviews with commodities that has been developed by USDA ana- FAS commodity analysts, embassy attaches and man-

*This report is a condensation of a larger report submitted to OTA agement, 2) reviews of the FAS operational forecasting as a case study. The aid of FAS in contributing to this assessment systems, and 3) discussion with users of FAS global is gratefully acknowledged. crop information. These requirements were evaluated

329 330 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

for accuracy and timeliness and presented to the exec- Long-Range Planning utive steering group. However, because the then- The long-range (5-year) management plan guided current Landsat technology (ERTS 1 ) would not fully all activities in the transition to operational applica- meet USDA user requirements, the requirements were tion of space-acquired data. Commencing in 1978, a modified, at the insistence of one of the technical series of yearly management plans were initiated. agencies, to a level thought to be achievable. These plans contain, on a year-by-year basis, the next level of resource detail and task description. Results Major problerns.-The problems encountered in the transition to space-aided data collection were not just During its lifetime, LACIE produced wheat produc- technical in nature, but encompassed the entire scope tion estimates as follows: U.S. Great Plains in 1975, of institutional reactions toward implementing a new 1976, and 1977; Canada in 1976; two Soviet Union technology: indicator regions in 1976; and the entire Soviet Union External: in 1977 and 1978. Generally, all of the winter wheat . timely receipt of Landsat data from NASA and the Soviet spring wheat estimates were acceptably ● timely receipt of meteorological data from the Air close to official USDA figures. However, the U.S. and Force; and Canada spring wheat estimates failed to meet the . lack of R&D assistance to transfer activities LACIE accuracy objectives. The poor performance on Internal: spring wheat was largely due to the compressed grow- ● education of end user; and ing season for spring wheat and the presence of other ● establishment of means to provide FAS “confusion crops.” The results of LACIE were reported meteorological data from the World Food and at a symposium that was held at the Johnson Space Agricultural Situation Board within 24 hours. Center in October 1978. Continuing problems. –R&D support to technology transfer activities, and physical separation of analytical functions from the end user of a product. The data Hardware and Software Considerations base generally available to the FAS analysts is: . Landsat—3 days to 3 weeks after acquisition; Technology transfer in any environment carries a . weather station reports-24 hours after receipt by certain element of risk. The relative novelty of space NOAA; and data collection and analysis for foreign agricultural ap- ● environmental satellites—34/48 hours after acqui- plications significantly increased this risk factor. sition. Therefore, a policy was adopted that was calculated These data are further supplemented, where and to minimize financial risk to USDA while retaining when available, from on-ground observations (ground maximum flexibility to deal with technological contin- truth) for areas of interest, but these inputs are limited gencies. The three major elements of this policy were: and in some cases unavailable, Examples of the analyt- 1. All hardware and software procured to support ical products derived from this variety data sources the design would be commercially available “off- are: the-shelf” and vendor-maintained. Narrative assessments of: 2. Discrete functions were designed to operate on ● crop and pasture conditions and probable im- a single mini computer, yet retain the capability pacts on production; for interfunction communications. Ž outlook for water for irrigation; and 3. All application programing was to be modular • planting and/or harvest conditions. and would conform-to Federal and Department Maps that show: standards for information processing. ● crop stress lines; ● plots of vegetative index numbers, including com- Management Approach parison to baseline years; ● snow cover, temperature, and potential winterkill FAS applied management by objective and struc- lines; and tured decisionmaking to the transition from R&D to ● precipitation and soil moisture, and deviation a user test and subsequently to full operation. The pro- from baseline years. fessional staff was involved in the technology transfer Color displays: process, starting with the initial planning process. These use several media, including photographs, Without this involvement, successful transfer of tech- color graphics terminals, video tape recorders, and nology would not have occurred. overhead projectors. Examples of color products are: Appendix C—Foreign Agriculture service, Department of Agriculture, Crop Condition Assessment Ž 331

● analyzed Landsat data; same as those encountered during the transition from ● current and historical soil moisture; R&D to operational status. However, their effect is ● current and average crop calendars; even greater, given the requirement to provide short • soiIs information; and turnaround data analysis and reporting. Again, prob- Ž daily precipitation for selected 10-day periods, lems can be divided into those internal to FAS and FAS management by objective requires the develop- those that are external: ment of long-range objectives as a basis for defining Negotiating arrangements with NASA to: longer term goals, which in turn form the basis for the • Furnish Landsat data within 48 hours after collec- planning documents described. tion. (To date, NASA has been unable to meet FAS timing requirements.) Management Planning ● Accept and process FAS orders for repetitive and This activity builds on the long-range planning for one-time Landsat data collection. the transition from R&D to an operational system. The Unanticipated changes in Landsat data format. Orig- 5-year management plan, originally developed to inally, NASA announced that the data would be deliv- guide the transition, is reviewed annually in light of ered in a high-density digital product tape (HDDT), FAS objectives and requirements, revised as neces- on which radiometric and geometric corrections and sary, and presented to management for approval. resampling had already been accomplished. Then, Short-term. -An annual management plan translates NASA and the U.S. Department of the Interior (USDI) the appropriate portions of the 5-year plan into a plan jointly announced that the standard tape format would for the coming fiscal year that contains tasking be changed to HDDT archival tape, on which only schedules and resource requirements. the radiometric corrections had been made. As a result, FAS was forced to divert approximately Contingency Planning $250,000 from its planned system enhancement to modify the scene processing unit to accommodate the This process identifies potential barriers to the order- new format. ly progress of crop estimation and estimates the prob- Inability of Landsat-D to provide full geographic cov- ability of their occurrence. Plans are then developed erage. The proposed Landsat- D, with its dependence to avert or minimize the consequences. on the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS) An appropriate example of such a situation is the will not provide timely (24-hour) coverage for India, anticipated lack of multispectral scanner (MSS) data Pakistan, and a major portion of the U.S.S.R. spring between the demise of Landsat-3 and the operational wheat region. These areas are critical to FAS. USDA readiness of Landsat-D. In anticipation of such an repeatedly requested installation of wide-band tape event, a contingency plan was developed which in- recorders on Landsat-D and D’ to ensure full geo- volves the use of the NOAA-6 and NOAA-7 satellite graphic coverage. However, the tape recorders are sensors as alternate data sources. Correlations be- not included in the planned system configuration. tween the Landsat and NOAA-6 data, and a hardware system to accept, process, and analyze the data are Strong probability of a lengthy Landsat MSS data gap currently under development. between the end of Landsat-3 and the operational readiness of Landsat-D (this has already occurred). FAS Budget Planning and USDA were unable to alter NASA’s schedule, which seemed to be dictated more by a preoccupa- In addition to management and operations plan- tion with technical problems with the Thematic Map- ning, the Crop Condition Assessment Division (CCAD) per than by the pressing need of users for continuity had developed a long-range financial plan that proof MSS data. jects CCAD’S operations and systems replacement The uncertainty about MSS data continuity required costs for the next 5 years. This 5-year financial plan the diversion of analytical resources to development is updated annually. The plan is used to prepare realis- of techniques to use NOAA’s environmental satellites tic CCAD cost estimates as input to the FAS and USDA as an alternative data source. budget process, and to develop procurement strat- Lack of rapid turnaround R&D assistance in develop- egies for replacing computer systems as they become ing, testing, and implementing techniques to processs obsolete. and analyze environmental satellite data. This slowness seemed to stem from the R&D community’s per- Problems ception that its role was to carry out basic and long- The problems encountered in developing and im- term research as opposed to applied research to solve plementing the operational system are essentially the pressing problems. 332 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Internal: quirements document, which was developed during ● establishing system credibility with FAS commodi- LACIE and subsequently reaffirmed in informal corre- ty analysts and others. spondence between USDA and NASA/NOAA. Addi- issues outstanding: tionally, the requirements were also documented as delays in delivery of Landsat data; input to the recent Integrated Remote Sensing Systems probability of an extended break in Landsat data Study (IRS3), These requirements are as follows: continuity; lack of timely data for India, Pakistan, and part Data Delivery of Soviet Union through the 1980’s; and lack of R&D support to resolve near-term opera- Data delivery requirements in support of FAS operational problems. tions are as follows: HDDT in Product (“P”) format with radiometric and geometric corrections applied. Nearest Improvement in Information neighbor resampling is preferred.; For the past 2 years, the project has been analyzing delivery systems should not introduce data errors space-acquired meteorological data and providing over and above those inherent in the collector; condition assessments to FAS commodity analysts. and These reports are not used by the agency as “stand pass-to-pass registration of frame data is a alone” reports, but are used as additional input in for- minimum requirement. Header data for registra- mulating the agency’s country-by-country production tion to a given cartographic base is also con- and demand forecasts. Because the reports have only sidered a requirement. been available for 2 years and because they are integrated into multisource reports, it is impossible at this Data Timeliness time to quantify improvements to the FAS information Timeliness of data is a critical technical requirement system. However, qualitative improvements through for FAS. The quantification of this requirement is speci- enhancements to the FAS analytical process are evi- fied below: dent. Examples of services that improve the analysis Ž All data collected by the 4-band MSS are to be and increase confidence are as follows: made available for processing by FAS within 48 ● early warnings of situations that may affect agri- hours after acquisition by the satellite. cultural commodity production and assessments All special FAS requests to activate the collector over of probable impact; areas routinely scheduled for coverge must be sched- ● continuous monitoring of conditions in foreign uled within 24 hours after receipt of the request. high-risk/high-priority regions throughout the en- Data retransmission required because of errors or tire crop production cycle, and issuance of peri- omissions must occur within a 12-hour period regard- odic assessment reports; and less of error source. ● confirmation (or denial) of reported situations affecting foreign crops. Data Continuity Availability to analysts and embassy attaches of information in gridded data base relative to: The requirement for data continuity has two discrete moisture available to plants at planting time and elements: day-by-day processing and delivery to the throughout the growth cycle and deviation from user; and data coverage comparability between space baseline years; platforms, with no gap in time between operational crop growth stage at any specified time, and devi- readiness of successive collection platforms. Each of ations from baseline; these FAS requirements is summarized as follows: daily temperature/precipitation, and deviations; Day-by-Day Data Receipt (reliability) soils/climate information for areas of interest; and ● total daily data collection must be processed and agricultural acreage, yield and production statis- delivered to FAS within the timeliness criterion; tics at subcountry/province level. and ● data backlogs cannot be tolerated within the Landsat and Successor Systems Requirements scheduled operations and resource base of FAS. Data Gap Ground Data Handling.-This function is the corner- The data gap potential is the most worrisome situa- stone of any operational use of data acquired from tion a user of satellite data can face. In this context space. The FAS technical requirements relative to this FAS has initiated and supported the following require- function were first stated in the Department’s user re- ments: Appendix C—Foreign Agriculture Service, Department of Agriculture, Crop Condition Assessment ● 333

A space platform with fully operational MSS to U.S. competitive advantage in the world market and be in orbit at all times; perhaps “stagnate” our level of exports. It could also the 4-band MSS with on-board wide-band tape permit other nations to compete in markets that have recorders to be continuously operated through been traditionally dominated by the United States. the 1980’s; This situation may not be acceptable given the need a single satellite (collector) operational with a for expanded U.S. markets to offset the increasing backup available for launch to assure data conti- dollar flow for oil imports. This is a national policy nuity; and question that FAS and USDA cannot resolve. How- total world coverage capability with no “black ever, national policy on the international availability holes,” or data gaps due to other priorities as are of U.S. space technology and/or data collected from expected to occur with Landsat-D and TDRSS. space will have a significant impact on the value to Experience during the past 2 years of operation have the United States of improved agricultural information. reinforced these technical requirements. Current FAS analytical capabiIities are facing serious degradation International Cooperation because the minimum requirements defined in this section have not been satisfied, and apparently will The current system and the preceding R&D have not be satisfied during the Landsat-D system lifetime. stimulated interest in bilateral cooperation in the exchange of technology. The following will serve as an example: Personnel Impact In early 1977, the President of Mexico received an No FAS functions or positions will be eliminated as in-depth briefing by FAS of LACIE results and USDA a result of the current system. However, automation application of remote-sensing technology. This brief- and the integration of new data sources into the ana- ing led to agreements in principle between the Secre- lytical and decisionmaking process will relieve senior tary of Agriculture and the Mexican Minister of Agri- analysts to concentrate on additional tasks that have culture later to exchange mutually beneficial technol- been levied upon commodity programs by Congress ogy. FAS and Mexican technical managers developed and the executive branch without a compensating in- a plan for an exchange of technical staff between the crease in personnel. Ministry of Agriculture and FAS (CCAD). NASA’s International Affairs office was represented International Impact at all meetings in Washington and Mexico City. One problem encountered in these planning sessions was It is not possible at this time accurately to determine NASA’s insistence that Mexico purchase a ground re- the dollar value that changes in the system will have ceiving station even though all areas of interest to the on the dollar value of U.S. exports, world prices, U.S. Mexican Government were routinely collected to competitive position and economic policy. However, meet U.S. data requirements and processed through over the next 4 to 6 years, given a “free market” envi- NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. This problem ronment, the real value to the United States of cur- could have been resolved, but factors external to rent foreign crop information will increase dramatical- USDA and NASA halted further communications to- ly. The magnitude of this value will depend in a large ward negotiations of a working bilateral agreement. measure upon the U.S. policy concerning export of Given the increasing awareness of the need for space-related technology to nations who compete for closer ties between the United States and Mexico, it U.S. foreign markets. A policy of open and equal ac- would seem to be in the U.S. interest to reopen nego- cess to agricultural data collected by U.S. space plat- tiations that would lead to a bilateral agreement reform and related technology could tend to reduce the garding agricultural applications of space technology. Appendix D MATERIALS SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IN MICROGRAVITY*

Introduction clients in a liquid or gas are unpredictable and chaotic, and can lead to unwanted structural and composition- Two hundred miles above Earth, unfiltered solar al differences in solid material. Both crystal growth and radiation, a near-perfect vacuum, and temperature ex- solidification processes are enhanced if convective dis- tremes ranging from –200° to +200° F exist in an turbances are suppressed. The microgravity of space environment almost free of gravitational force. The re- should provide a means to suppress convective phe- cent interest in materials processing in space (MPS) nomena. has its origin in the belief that the unique attributes Sedimentation/Buoyancy. On Earth, gravity causes of this environment may have important scientific and heavier components to settle in a mixture while less- commercial applications. dense materials rise. Sedimentation and buoyancy With the exception of microgravity, the attributes complicate manufacturing techniques for alloys of dif- of the space environment can be duplicated on Earth ferent density elements and for composite materials. in sufficient quantities and duration to investigate their In microgravity, lighter density materials will remain extended effect on processes and materials. Though in suspension for indefinite periods of time, thereby microgravity can be simulated by using airplanes, allowing the processing of homogeneous composites sounding rockets, and in some instances magnetic and alloys where the constituents have large density fields, such simulations are generally of short duration, differences. involve only limited quantities of test material, and Hydrostatic Pressure. Hydrostatic pressure puts a often introduce complicating factors such as vibration strain on materials during solidification. Certain crys- and impurities. The long-term microgravity environ- tals are sufficiently dense and delicate that they are ment of space introduces a new dimension in control- susceptible to strain under their own weight at growth ling process variables such as temperature, composi- temperatures. Such strain-induced deformations in tion, and fluid flow. Through this experimentation, crystals degrade their electro-optical performance. In new opportunities for understanding and improving microgravity, heat-treated, melted, or resolidified ground-based production methods will be created, alloys might be developed free of deformation by coat- and, where practical and economical, select materials ing the machined shape with a thin oxide skin, serv- may be produced in space. ing as a mold. Container Effects. Containerless processing elimi- Scientific Status of Materials nates problems of container contamination and wall Processing in Space effects, often the greatest source of impurities and imperfections while forming molten material. In micro- Microgravity Alterations of gravity, a material may be melted, manipulated, and Processing Phenomena shaped, free of contact with a container or crucible by using acoustic, electromagnetic, or electrostatic By using the long-duration, microgravity environ- fields. Surface tension would hold the material togeth- ment of an orbiting spacecraft, new manufacturing er in mass, a force overpowered hereon Earth by grav- processes can be designed. On Earth the theoretical ity. performance characteristics of materials are inhibited by such gravity-induced phenomena as convection, segregation, buoyancy, and sedimentation. These MPS Product Applications 1 phenomena function in the following manner: In general, the MPS program is interested in studies Convection. The spontaneous stirring and mixing of process parameters to enhance control and produc- that occurs as currents flow between temperature gra- tivity in Earth manufacturing, to prepare limited quantities of precursor materials to provide baseline or ref- *McDonnell Douglas, the Materials Processing in Space Projects Office of NASA, and TRW each provided a case study for this appendix. Their aid erence data, and to develop methods unique to the is gratefully acknowledged. space environment by which materials can be pre- ‘See generally: L. K. Zoner, “Materials Science and Engineering in Space, ” pared. All these research tasks rely upon the range of in Commercial Operations in Space, 1980-2MXI, 18th Goddard Symposium, AAS, vol. 51, Science and Technology Series, 1981, pp. 20-26; K. Moritz, process parameters being extended through the re- “In the Realm of ZercG,” T/WSystems and Energy, winter 1978, pp. 16-24. duction of gravity.

334 Appendix D—Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity . 335

Examples of potential applications derived from MPS the melt or sedimentation, can greatly influence the research are as follows. structure of metals and alloys. Directional solidification in microgravity allows complicated shapes, such Crystal Growth2 as turbine blades, to be melted and directionally resolidified to increase axial strength while using a thin Melt growth is the most widely exploited technique oxide skin to maintain the shape. Additional interest to produce high-technology, single-crystal materials is based on the potential of approaching the theoreti- for semiconductor chips used in large-scale integrated cal maximum magnetic strength of materials that are circuits for communications and computers. Chemical 10 times higher than currently realized on Earth. homogeneity, which will maximize electrical perform- Another group of potential candidates for in-space ance, is believed possible through microgravity proc- production is that of miscibility gap alloys. These alloys essing. Commercially valuable crystals for sensitive in- defy preparation on Earth in bulk quantities because frared sensors, most difficult to grow on Earth, may of gravity-driven effects that cause the materials to be enhanced by melt growth in a microgravity envi- segregate upon solidification. There are some 500 ronment. such combinations of materials that have a liquid- As a variation of melt growth, float-zone growth phase miscibility gap. Processed in microgravity, these techniques are widely used to produce crystals such materials might have such diverse applications as elec- as doped silicon for semiconductors and solar cells. trical contacts (as replacements for silver and gold) and Although large, efficient crystals are grown commer- self-lubricating bearings. cially with this process on Earth, gravity does limit the Solidification kinetics in the casting of alloys under size and type of crystals that can be produced and nonterrestrial conditions can produce fine-grained introduces growth rate fluctuations that cause chem- structure in the interior of a casting. This phenomenon ical inhomogeneities that necessitate cutting the could have application in common products such as crystal into smalI chips for high-performance applica- iron engine castings. tions. Undercooked solidification is the rapid quenching Solution growth of crystals in the MPS program em- of molten materials at temperatures well below their phasizes creation of room-temperature, infrared detec- freezing points. By containedess processing in micro- tor materials, and gallium-arsenide (GaAs) semi-con- gravity, a vast array of materials is expected to be proc- ductors for a wide range of applications from micro- essed in the amorphous state, thus extending the wave devices to computers and solid-state lasers. Infra- materials properties available to mechanical and opti- red defectivity of current available material is con- cal designers. Enhanced glasses manufactured by strained to about 20 percent of the theoretical limit means of this process could improve their energy- because of gravity-influenced growth defects. GaAs transfer efficiency for applications such as laser hosts. semiconductors can be readily grown on Earth, but In addition, such studies may shed light on methods with considerable imperfections, for obtaining superconductors that work at higher The absence of gravity opens new possibilities for temperatures. the growth of large, flat, pure crystals by vapor technique; therefore, the MPS program includes the inves- Containerless Processing tigation of Hg12 nuclear detector crystals that can be Containerless processing may permit the creation used at ambient temperature. Because the crystal has of amorphous (glass) materials that cannot be made a layered structure, self-deformation during growth in on Earth, and may allow the analysis of molten materi- sizes under 1 g is believed to be an important factor als at temperatures that would exceed the melting i n producing dislocations that degrade the perform- point of crucibles on Earth. By elimination of nuclea- ance of the crystal as a nuclear-energy detector. The tion associated with container walls, it should be possi- growth of such a crystal in microgravity could elimi- ble to extend the glass-forming range of many materi- nate such strains at the growth temperature. als, including some metals, resulting in new and unique glasses with exotic properties. An application Solidification3 of this process is in the production of ultrapure glass Control of the solidification of metals and alloys is used in optical waveguides for high-frequency com- the key element in the field of metallurgy. Gravita- munications. Other possible applications are fusion- tional effects, such as buoyancy-driven convection of energy lasers, fiber optics communications, cable networks, and self-focusing lenses. 2S. Waters, ‘‘Tapping the Resources of a New Continent, ” Part 1—Materials Processing, Mechanical Engineering, June 1981, pp. 26-39. 4N. j. Barter, “Materials Processing in Space, ” Impact for the 3S. Solomon, “Factories in Space,” Science Digest Special, September/ 1980’s–Conference on Selected Technology for Business and Industry, May C)ctober 1980, pp. 58-61, 114, 14-15, 1980, pp. 11-16, ——.

336 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Fluids and Chemical Processess ing studies of brazing and welding phenomena under microgravity conditions. On Earth, fluid and chemical processes are affected In the course of these investigations, it was found by gravity-driven convection or sedimentation. Micro- that unrestrained liquid masses would form large free- gravity eliminates these effects, thereby allowing com- flying globules, that vapor bubbles could grow virtual- ponents to be isolated for study with a degree of freely without limit in boiling liquids, and that flames dom not otherwise possible. quickly become blanketed with their own combus- A potential application of this technique would be tion products. These effects of weightlessness were first the production of monodisperse latex spheres in treated as problems in the engineering of spacecraft space. These spheres are too large to be grown by systems, only later to be recognized as exploitable polymerization and too small to be sized by microsiev- phenomena useful in creating novel processes and ing on Earth. Because of the absence of sedimenta- products in space. tion in microgravity, these latex spheres might be mass In 1966, personnel from NASA’s Marshall Space produced from a polymerization process while in sus- Flight Center embarked on a series of visits to manu- pension. These spheres, available only in research facturing companies to explore possible industrial in- quantities, are used in calibrating electron micro- terest in space applications. In 1969, NASA initiated scopes, light-scattering devices and filters, in the its first formal space processing activities under the measurement of pore size in membranes, and in sero- program title: “Materials Science and Manufacturing logical tests for a multitude of diseases. in Space.” This program was jointly sponsored by the The biomedical applications of microgravity such agency’s Office of Manned Spaceflight and Office of as electrophoresis, isoelectric focusing, phase parti- Aeronautics and Space Technology. To date, in-space tioning, suspension cell culturing, crystallization of MPS research has been pursued on the Apollo, Skylab, macromolecules, and blood flow (rheology) processes and Apollo/Soyuz manned spaceflight programs. will also be evaluated in the MPS program. Applica- tion of these techniques in biomedical sciences could Apollo7 lead to production of human insulin; purification of hemopoietic stem cells for treatment of certain types An MPS flight experiment program was inaugurated of leukemia; or production of collagen, used for arti- in 1971 when three “demonstration” experiments ficial corneas, artificial skin for wound and burn treat- were performed on the Apollo 14 lunar mission. These ments, and for membranes to aid i n cardiovascular simple science demonstrations consisted of heat flow and orthopedic surgery. and convection, electrophoretic separation, and composite casting experiments. On Apollo 16 in early Status of MPS Technology 1972, a more ambitious electrophoresis experiment was conducted, and in 1972 Apollo 17 carried a heat- History of the MPS Program flow and convection demonstration.

The space processing program presently sponsored Skylab8 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion (NASA) germinated in the mid-to-late 1960’s,6 fos- The 100-ton Skylab space laboratory station, flown tered by the need to master propellant characteristics, 1973-74, offered the first opportunity for extensive ex- fire control, and the assembly of structures in space– perimentation in the microgravity environment of elements all essential to manned spaceflight. Propel- space. A total of 15 MPS experiments and nine science lant requirements of the Apollo lunar landing program demonstrations were conducted on Skylab. The com- stimulated research on the effects of surface tensions plement of MPS experiments included: crystal growth, and inertia in partially filled containers. Similarly, inter- metal composites, eutectics (a combination of two est in on-orbit repair and assembly required engineer- materials that has a lower melting point than either material alone), welding and brazing, fluid effects, and combustion processes. 5N. j. Barter and D. M. Waltz, Materials Processing in Space: A Weightless A materials processing facility (MPF) was an integral Proposition, AIAA-80-0878, presented at AlAA International Annual Meeting part of Skylab and was designed to accommodate all and Technical Display, Baltimore, Md., May 6-11, 1980, pp. 3-4; E. C. McKannan, Survey of U.S. Materials Processing and Manufacturing in Space Programs, NASA TM-82427, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama, July 1981, p. 1. 7j. H. Bredt, op. cit., 1974, p. 77. ‘j. H. Bredt, “Status of NASA Space-Processing Research,” in Processing 5kylab, Our First Space Station, Leland F. Belew (cd.), NASA SP-400, Wash- and Manufacturing in Space, proceedings of a symposium held at Frascati, ington, D.C. 1977, pp. 148-1 51; Sky/ab Experiments, Materia/s Science, Vo/. Italy, by European Space Research Organization, Mar, 25-27, 1974., p. 76; 3, NASA EP-1 12, May 1973; Proceedings of Third Space Processing Sympo- Op. Cit., L.K. Zoner, 1981, pp. 19-20. sium—Sky/ab Resu/ts, vol. 1 and 2, Alabama, june 1974. Appendix D—Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity . 337

Skylab space processing experiments involving the economically justifiable processes for producing mate- melting and resolidification of materials. This facility rials in space could be found. was capable of venting into space, thus providing an The STAMPS committee stressed two points that evacuated environment for the experiments desired. emerged from the testimony of its advisors and from A multipurpose electric furnace, capable of reaching previous materials experimentation in space:11 1,000° C, was fitted within MPF allowing eight metals First, the space environment usually contributes at experiments to be conducted. least as many problems as it solves. In sophistication, reliability, convenience, and cost, terrestrial experi-

g ApO llO /SO yUZ mentation is generally superior to what can be expected in space. Second, space experimentation will The joint Soviet-American Apollo/Soyuz Test Proj- have little value unless its planning is founded on sub- ect (ASTP), which flew in 1975, carried 12 space proc- stantial Earth-based information and unless the results essing experiments and three demonstrations. Among are coupled to those of complementary terrestrial pro- them: crystal growth of semiconductors, zero-gravity grams. ” processing of magnets, surface tension-induced con- The STAMPS report indicated that some space envi- vection, density separation during solidification of two ronment parameters, such as the level of vacuum, alloys, and halide eutectic growth, In addition, two temperature, or high-energy radiation can be better electrophoresis experiments were conducted on realized on Earth. Even long periods of low gravity, ASTP, one of which was developed and funded by achieved only through orbital flight, may be jeopard- the Federal Republic of Germany. ized by several factors. Among these are: gas venting, A modified Skylab furnace, capable of reaching fluid dumps, use of evaporators, crew motions, and 1,150°C with increased control of temperature perturbations of the shuttle orbit itself. These factors ranges, was carried aboard the ASTP. ASTP allowed could induce accelerations, creating small forces of several investigators to confirm Skylab results and gravity (G-jitter), which in turn might affect the low- make additional tests of previously observed phenom- gravity requirement of space processing. ena. Singled out in the report were commercial space The Apollo, Skylab, and ASTP experiments were processing of vaccines using electrophoresis (the sepa- conceptually simple and limited in scope. The hard- ration of particles of different mass/charge ratios in an ware was designed on the basis of equipment used electric field) and growing silicon crystals for use in on the ground and the experiments were supported electronics. The STAMPS study found no clearcut ad- by limited Earth-based research. Consequently, the ex- vantage in either case over terrestrial processes, In the periments were basically reproductions of current case of electrophoresis, use of the technique on Earth techniques of processing materials carried out under has not yet been optimized. low gravity conditions. With the close of the Apollo The study group commented that low gravity ap- program in 1975, no further MPS spaceflight oppor- pears to offer certain capabilities in studying the prop- tunities were available. erties of boiling, combustion and melting, processes that are not now well understood. It was also felt that The STAMPS Report the ability of containerless processing to avoid contamination and increase purity may hold great prom- A special study to provide guidance for NASA’s pro- ise. But even these possibilities must be subject to gram for materials processing space was published in critical evaluation of comparative costs and likelihood 1978 by the Committee on Scientific and Techno- of success. The NAS study group indicated that the logical Aspects of Materials Processing in Space commercial utilization of such understanding lacks (STAMPS), 10 an ad hoc committee of the Space Appli- promise. cations Board under the National Academy of Sci- The STAMPS committee suggested that the organi- ences (NAS). Drawing on comments and advice from zation and management of future space processing more than 100 experts in materials science and tech- should include the use of the space shuttle as a na- nology, the NAS study concluded that the prospects tional facility. This would include use of the Spacelab for economical space manufacturing are limited and by scientists and engineers working in universities, need to be better defined on a case-by-case basis. Fur- government laboratories, or industrial concerns. User ther, the STAMPS report stated that no examples of rates should be established, but not designed to cover the total real cost of operating the facility. 9Apollo-Soyuz Pamphlet No, 8: Zero-G Technology, NASA EP-140, Wash- ington, D.C. October 1977. IOMater/a/s prWe55;ng in Space, report of the Committee on Scientific and Technological Aspects of Materials Processing Space, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C,. 1978. 1 I Ibid. 338 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

In concluding its findings, the STAMPS study sug- concepts flown on Skylab. Typical experiments are gested the demonstration and development of signifi- similar to those performed in a drop tube. cant materials processing in space techniques should be paid for by NASA. To this end, the committee sug- Research aircraft gested certain technical and management changes to NASA employs KC-1 35 and F-1046 aircraft, flying improve the effectiveness of the NASA MPS effort. The on parabolic trajectories, to provide 10 to 60 seconds STAMPS report noted that NASA’s MPS efforts had of microgravity. Experiment packages flown in the “suffered from poorly conceived and designed experi- KC-1 35, because of the size of the aircraft, can be ments, often done in crude apparatus, from which larger in size than in the small F-104B, although weak conclusions were drawn and, in some cases, approximately twice the microgravity environment overpublicized.” can be obtained (30 to 60 seconds) by the jet fighter. In consonance with the recommendations of the Minimum gravity level obtainable is approximately STAMPS committee, a scientific advisory committee 10-2 g. However, this value is unsteady, and therefore has been formed, responsive to the MPS Division Di- these means are unsuitable for precise experiments. rector, to aid in future program planning and policy- Although the data obtained from research aircraft are making relative to scientific aspects of the program. limited, such flights do allow for valuable crew train- Peer groups have been empaneled to assist in the ing, experiment hardware development, and verifi- selection and periodic review of scientific experimen- cation tests. tation and the periodic review of plans and policies. 12 Sounding rockets Terrestrial Facilities The space-processing application rocket (SPAR) pro- In the absence of spaceflight opportunities for MPS gram has been instituted to provide some continuity experiment, NASA began using drop tubes and drop in flight experimentation between the ASTP flight and towers, aircraft, and sounding rockets to simulate the the space shuttle MPS opportunities.14 The SPAR microgravity environmental J Using such ground-based rocket is a Black Brant sounding rocket equipped with research technologies, prospective MPS investigators recoverable payload system. SPAR was introduced in could acquire microgravity test data to: 1) establish 1975 and has accomplished nine flights to date. Typ- experiment parameters, 2) establish proof of concept, ically, SPAR can attain between 4 to 7 minutes of low- and 3) provide specimens for laboratory research. gravity phenomena, providing levels of 1O-5 to 10-6g for payloads up to 300 kg. Because of the severe Drop tubes and towers launch environment as measured by acceleration, To provide a low-cost, flexible and readily available vibration and spin rate of SPAR at liftoff, and later spin low-g test facility, the Marshall Space Flight Center down, MPS experiment design is an arduous under- operates two drop tubes (one of 100-ft length and one taking. The short flight times of SPAR are not con- of 300-ft length). These drop tubes provide 2 to 4 sec- ducive to crystal growth or biological separation. onds of microgravity. However, they can be used for certain fluid and so- In drop tubes, molten droplets are released into a lidification experiments. The SPAR program has led column of vacuum and are solidified during 2.6 sec- to an inventory of low-cost hardware, suitable for onds of vertical free fall, thus experiencing an effec- longer duration experimentation during shuttle operative force of 10-7 g. Typical experiments utilizing this tion. A materials experiment assembly (MEA) designed facility include studies in high-temperature calorime- to be compatible with the shuttle/Spacelab has been try, and in liquid densities, surface tensions, and developed by using SPAR technology. volume changes due to solidification, In using the drop tower, an experiment package is Shuttle/Spacelab Programs placed in a canister thrusted by small rocket motors An operational space shuttle will further the evolu- to overcome air resistance and guide-rail friction. Ex- tion of materials processing in space. MPS experimen- periment-laden canisters as heavy as 204 kg can ex- -5 tation on planned shuttle flights of up to 1 month will perience an effective force of as little as 10 g dur- 15 make use of the following shuttle facilities: ing a 4-second drop tower test. Drop towers proved invaluable in verifying apparatus and experimental 14j. H. Bredt, “NASA Plans for Space Processing Experiments on Sounding Rockets,” in Processing and Manufacturing in Space, proceedings of a sym- 12E, c, Mc~annan, op. cit., July 1981, P. 18. posium held at Frascati, Italy, Mar. 25-27, 1974, pp. 71-73; R. j. Naumann I lMaterla15 processing in Space Program: Handbook for Participants, Pre- and H. W. Herring, op. cit., 1980, pp. 99-103. pared for NASA by ORI, Inc., February 1980, pp. III-5 to III-19. ISE, C. McKannan, op. cit., jUly 1981, P. 41. Appendix D—Materials Science and Engineering in Microgravity • 339

Small Self-Contained Payloads Fluid Experiment System (FES): Mounted in a double rack aboard Spacelab, the FES experiment These containers are available for rent by companies, universities, and private citizens for a cost de- uses Schlieren photography and holography to pendent upon the size and weight of the experiment study fluid behavior under microgravity. package. Containers with a maximum weight of 200 Vapor Crystal Growth (VCG) System: Crystals are 3 to be grown from fluids, vapors, or from melts lb and measuring 5 ft can be rented for $10,000 (in of solid materials, recorded by holographic and 1975 dollars). They are accommodated on a space- video recording in common use with the FES. available basis and must contain their own power and internal data recording systems. Though limited by Acoustic Contain Containerless Positioning Module (ACPM): The ACPM is located on a pallet and size and the absence of in-space manipulation, the uses 3-axis acoustic positioning to control the small self-contained payloads may provide data useful position and rotation of a sample heated radi- in larger Spacelab experimentation or in joint en- antly to temperatures up to 1,600° C. deavors between industry and NASA. Solidification Experiment System (SES): A modular Materials Experiment Assembly furnace facility ”that can accommodate up to 16 samples per flight that are automatically loaded The first article of new materials processing hard- and unloaded on command. These samples can ware to be flown i n the shuttle is the MEA, a self-con- be processed with uniform heating and cooling tained package attached to a Spacelab pallet. MEA has or with a temperature gradient and directionally been developed to be compatible with SPAR technol- solidified. SES is to be located on a Spacelab pal- ogy and reconditioned SPAR equipment. MEA oper- let. ates under its own power, containing a control com- As funding permits, additional MPS/shuttle activity puter, heat rejection system, and data recorders, and is expected to include the following systems:19 can accommodate up to four experiments in its sepa- Floating Zone System: Used to determine how far rately sealed subenclosures. It is anticipated that pri- the zone refining technique can be carried in vate institutions may wish to lease MEA from NASA space, and to what degree crystal size and purity to conduct experiments of a proprietary nature, al- can be increased. Attached to a pallet. though legal and financial aspects of this possibility Electromagnetic Containerless Processing System: have yet to be clarified.16 A processing module for heating and cooling control independent of positioning control. Attached Spacelab Modules and Pallets to a pallet. Bioseparation System: Designed to enhance un- Shuttle MPS systems can be divided into two groups: derstanding of electrophoresis and its variations. 1 ) those located in the pressurized Spacelab module, Contained in Spacelab. and 2) those positioned on the Spacelab pallet. ’ Electrostatic Contain Processing System: Spacelab is a habitable module providing a shirt-sleeve Used for processing and shaping larger, complex laboratory for scientists and engineers to work in materials. Contained in Spacelab. space. Carried into orbit in the shuttle cargo bay, Spacelab remains attached to the orbiter for flight Future MPS Efforts durations of up to 1 month. The interior of the module is fitted with racks arranged in single and double as- Three types of materials processing experiments semblies to house experiments. have been selected for future shuttle missions. These Unpressurized, u-shapted segmented pallets can are: also be attached in the orbiter cargo bay. These pallets Group 1. Experiments that take advantage of the great- form an open porch, exposing instruments directly to ly reduced convective flow to provide quiescent space and accommodating experiments controlled growth or solidification conditions with precise con- from Spacelab, the orbiter flight deck, or the Earth. trol of temperature, growth rate and composition. Up to five pallets can be fitted in the cargo bay and Experiments in this category include: combinations of moducles and pallets can be flown. Ž growth of solid-solution single crystals; The major “facility-class, multiuser instruments” . semiconductor materials growth in low-g environ- presently under development in the shuttle/MPS pro- ment; gram consist of:18 19D. Dooling, “The Space Factory” in the ///ustrated Encyclopedia of Space 160P, Clt note 17, pp. I II-52-III-53. Techrro/ogy, pp. 21 9-220; R. ). Naumann, “U.S. National Report on Materials 17J. R. Carruthers and L. K. Zoner, “Materials Processing Studies in Space, ” Processing in Space, ” presentation to Working Group 8, Materials Science NASA (unnumbered) Apr. 10, 1979, pp. 20-23. in Space, COSPAR meeting (No. 78-1 15), Innsbruck, Austria, june 1978, pp. IBN, ). Bafler and D, M, Waltz, op. cit., May 1980, PP. 4-5. 20-22. 340 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

vapor growth of alloy-type semiconductor crys- data systems. As a total unit, MEC and power system tals; would fly freely, utilizing the shuttle only to deliver

Hgl2 crystal growth for nuclear detectors; raw materials and to extract finished products for solution growth of crystals in zero gravity; and return to Earth, 2o alined magnetic composites. It is conceivable that the MEC activity will require Group 2. Experiments involving glasses or glass proc- increased human attention, necessitating habitable, esses. These experiments take advantage of the con- Spacelab-type modules, which could lead to a tainerless aspects of space processing as well as the manned space station. This station may well serve as absence of Stokes bubble rise to investigate a national space facility for large-scale, commercial phenomena that cannot be unambiguously studied space processing.21 on Earth. Experiments in this category include: ● refining of glasses in space; Conclusions Ž physical phenomena in containerless glass processing; and The scientific basis for manufacturing commercial • containerless preparation of advanced optical products in space is limited, resting on a total of 8 glasses. hours of in-space research. The economic rationale Group 3. The remaining experiments depend primar- for fabricating materials in space, therefore, can be ily on the absence of sedimentation to keep a assessed only when a suitable reservoir of knowledge material of different density in suspension during has been established. The result from sounding a process. Experiments in this category include: rockets, aircraft, and ground facilities as well as from Ž solid electrolytes containing dispersed particles; the limited experimentation aboard spacecraft suggest, • liquid miscibility gap materials; and however, that space processing techniques which ● production of large particle size monodisperse yield products of high value and low volume may be latexes in microgravity. commercially feasible. It is anticipated that the projected needs of MPS, It must be recognized that even if a material is iden- as measured by numbers of samples, processing time, tified that is sufficiently unique, useful, and valuable and power required to support sustained, systematic to be manufactured or processed in space, the high MPS activity, will surpass present shuttle capabilities. inherent cost of space processing will be a strong in- Use of a 2S-kW power system has been advocated centive for industry to find means of duplicating the to extend shuttle stay-time in orbit (from a maximum process on the ground or to find a cheaper substitute 30 days to 90 days) and to provide greater levels of for the material. For this reason it may be desirable power supportive of MPS payloads. Longer duration for the Government to subsidize the initial phases of shuttle flights, coupled with increased power to con- MPS research and product development. The contin- duct experiments, would reduce the net cost of ex- ued and orderly development of space-based manu- perimentation. facturing techniques will depend heavily upon the Eventually, a materials experiment carrier (MEC) establishment of a firm national commitment to main- could serve as a transition between exploratory MPS tain and enhance U.S. space capabilities. research and prepilot manufacturing plants. MEC would carry several second-generation MPS modules ZOR, j. NaUnlarlrl and H. W. Herring, op. cit., 1980, pp. 107-108. 21 D. M. Waltz and R. L. Hammel, “Space Factories, ” (77-56), presented and, attached to the 25-kW power system, would con- to the 28th International Astronautical Federation (IAF), Prague, Sept. 25-Oct. tain its own heat-rejection equipment, control and 1, 1977. Appendix E World Climate, the Oceans, and Early Indications of Climatic Change

Definition. -’’Climate” is how one characterizes used to increase understanding of the behavior of the the weather at a particular place as it occurs over peri- atmosphere, to improve models, and to assess our ods of weeks, years, centuries, or millenia. The mod- ability to predict future behavior of the atmosphere. ern notion of climate includes its variation and ex- A second major objective was to improve our under- treme occurrences as well as its average conditions. standing of the Earth’s climate. At the present time, there is accuracy in the detailed The data from the Global Weather Experiment 3-to 5-day weather forecasts. For periods longer than (GWE)–the ultimate phase of GARP–are still being that, one begins to speak in less detailed terms, to analyzed, but already dramatic results are coming to describe more general features such as mean condi- light. For instance, through a combination of surface tions and the likelihood of various departures from the drifting buoys and satellite-borne data collection sys- mean. Over these longer periods of time (weeks, tems, measurements taken during the GWE revealed months, seasons), the climate at a particular place a previously unobserved complexity in the atmospher- seems to be influenced by progressively more distant ic conditions over the Southern oceans. These vast, forces, such as ocean conditions, solar radiation, and remote areas had been largely unmonitored prior to polar ice variations. Thus, we speak of an interactive the GWE. In addition, satellite-acquired cloud image climate system which includes atmospheric, oceanic, data have revealed important interhemispheric flows cryospheric and solar influences among other factors. which influence atmospheric conditions in the North- ern Hemisphere. These findings are important Historical Perspective because the large-scale aspects of climate are truly global in nature. This has become progressively clear Recent dramatic advances in meteorology and cli- over the years, as scientists such as Hadley, Rossby, matology are due to three concurrent streams of Walker, Bjerknes, and many others, have described development. First, the basic scientific understanding the overall features of the planetary atmospheric flow of atmospheric (and oceanic) behavior has grown. about the Earth. Now means are becoming available Physical and mathematical models have been con- that demonstrate directly, through observations, the structed which duplicate rather well the overall global nature of climate. behavior of the atmosphere. Detailed numerical models as used in weather forecasts show reasonable Over the last decade, we have become increasing- predictive skill. Climate models, though much less ly aware of our vulnerability to extreme climate precise in time and space resolution, successfully events. The “Dust Bowl” conditions of the 1930’s and their attendant impacts on agriculture and the duplicate the large features of the observed climate. economy have been well documented. During 1972, Second, and more recently, electronic computers unanticipated drought and adverse growing condi- have enabled the development of more detailed and tions led to severe shortages in the world-wide sup- complex models and the solution of their associated of grains. This led to adverse domestic economic mathematical equations. The large computing ma- ply impacts including the U.S. sale of wheat to the Soviet chines also enable the inclusion and effective treatment of vast amounts of actual data rather than sum- Union at prices lower than the world prices. The ef- marized data or proxy parameters. fect of the 1973 Middle East oil embargo was height- Third, and most recent, observations from space ened when fuel shortages occurred while there was provide truly global data to describe global-scale very cold weather in New England and the Midwest. The California drought of 1976 and 1977 would have climate. A pair of polar-orbiting satellites can view had very adverse effects had it persisted any longer. each point on Earth four times a day. A satellite in geosynchronous orbit can continuously monitor con- Because modern society is vulnerable to climate oc- ditions over almost a whole hemisphere. currences, important benefits could also result from These advances Ied to the Global Atmosphere Re- knowing climate variations in advance. jack Thom- search Program (CARP) conducted during the last dec- son, a noted meteorologist, has estimated that the total . ade. The objective of this program was to observe the annual monetary loss due to poor weather conditions atmosphere and produce the most comprehensive set was approximately $13 billion (in 1971 ). Of that of data ever compiled. These data were then to be amount, about $418 million could have been saved

341 342 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

if reliable 30- and 90-day forecasts had been available. worldwide commodity trading, it is important to ana- The larger part of the “protectable” loss required lyze current conditions in relation to the climate norm. shorter forecasts, 5 days or less. Thompson found the Crop yield models require not only the current sectors most benefiting from climate forecasts to be: weather data but also the climatology for the regions. agriculture, energy, public safety, construction, com- To be useful, these data must be gathered, processed munications, and electric power. Given the large in- and disseminated to users very quickly. crease in energy costs since 1972, the potential sav- Mindful of our vulnerability to climate, our oppor- ings from reliable climate forecasts should today be tunities to improve our knowledge of climate, and the much greater than estimated by Thompson. opportunities to make beneficial use of improved Just as the value of reliable climate forecasts is being climate information, the Congress passed and the defined, the research community is developing prom- President enacted the National Climate Program Act ising techniques for providing reliable seasonal (Public Law 95-367, dated Sept. 17, 1978). forecasts as much as 6 months in advance. These results have come from diagnostic studies of the “Southern Oscillation.” This phenomenon involves The National Climate Program a family of climate fluctuations around the globe— including links between atmosphere and ocean con- The purpose of the National Climate Program is “to ditions in the tropical Pacific and subsequent climate understand and respond to natural and man-induced behavior over North America. Warming of central climate processes. ” In establishing the national pro- equatorial Pacific water typically leads to displacement gram, the act set up mechanisms for coordinating and of the North American jet stream northward over the integrating the climate activities of the Federal agen- West and southward over the East. This causes below cies. In particular, the act established a National normal surface temperatures in the populous eastern Climate Program Office as lead entity for administer- United States and warm temperature in the West. The ing the program and required the preparation of a severe winter of 1976-77 (following the 1976 El Nino 5-year plan to state the goals and priorities of the pro- ocean warming) was typical of this pattern. gram and the roles of the Federal agencies in conduct- The hope for seasonal forecasts lies in the recogni- ing the program. tion that ocean conditions oflen persist for several The current (and first) 5-year plan emphasizes the months. Thus, when appropriate ocean conditions de- production of useful climate information based on ex- velop (usually during our spring and summer) they will isting knowledge while simultaneously expanding our indicate the likelihood of subsequent anomalous understanding of climate and its impact on society. winter conditions occurring in the United States. The priority programs (and associated lead agencies) In a more recent study, Brown-Weiss confirmed that in each of these activity areas are as follows: 3-to 4-month forecasts would be very useful to public utilities for planning natural gas purchases and in plan- Activity category Principal thrust Lead agency ning the mix of petroleum products (e.g., the relative 1. Providing climate Generation and NOAA products dissemination of amounts of gasoline versus heating oil). climate information In addition to forecasts, there are many important Climate prediction NOAA Il. Responding to Carbon dioxide, DOE uses of climate information falling under the general impacts and policy environment, and heading “Applied Climatology.” This refers to the sta- implications of society tistical characterization of the climate based on the climate Climate and world USDA data record. Examples are: the estimation of fuel and food production electric power demand based upon heating and cool- III. Understanding climate Solar and Earth NASA ing degree days; planting crops based on the latest radiation Ocean heat transport NSF data of a killing frost; designing dams based on max- and storage imum probable precipitation. Many of these statistical application techniques have been developed because reliable forecasts have not been possible. others, for Potential Contributions From instance those associated with the design of structures, Space Capabilities would probably continue even if forecasts were available because the life of the structure is so long. Direct satellite measurements and satellite relay of Finally, there are important applications which re- data will make important contributions to all of the quire “current climate” information. For example, in above tasks. Considering the continuing elements of monitoring growing conditions in areas important to the National Climate Program, space contributions Appendix E—World Climate, the Oceans, and Early Indications of Climatic Change Ž 343 — and requirements on space systems are likely to be heat globally. These problems will be addressed as follows: through a progressive series of studies culminating in Impact Assessment: Effects of climate on processes a global ocean circulation experiment. A typical in- and natural resources. —This area of the program con- terim experiment is the CAGE experiment to measure cerns direct climate effects such as the development the fluxes of heat, mass, and momentum through of crop yield models and energy demand models in “fixed” ocean and atmospheric boundaries. Satellites terms of climate variables. Demonstration programs will be needed to give the heat balance at the top of such as the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment the atmosphere and provide other supporting data (LACIE), and the snowmelt runoff project in Califor- (e.g., data collected from drifting buoys). nia have provided important tests of the uses of space- A key satellite experiment in ocean climate studies acquired data. It is recommended that such activities will be the TOPEX mission. As currently planned, the continue with even greater end-user involvement. mission will use a satellite altimeter and radar scat- These demonstration projects provide for develop- terometer to measure sea-surface topography and ment of effective user application models. wind fields. The aim is to provide information on sur- Climate System Research: a) Developrnent of cli- face currents and wind stress, The mission may in- mate simulation and prediction models.—The main clude a microwave radiometer to provide improved contribution to this area is likely to be from improved sea-surface temperature data. These data, especially computer power and computation techniques. Space on a global scale, are very important to the under- systems will provide better global data both as input standing of the transport of energy from lower to to the models and as a check on model outputs. This higher latitudes and the exchange of energy between will remove input data as a source for model errors the ocean and the atmosphere. The TOPEX mission and permit selection of the best modeling approaches. derives from the GOES, SEASAT family of altimetric b) Studies of physical climate processes.–ln order satellites. It is planned for flight in the mid- 1980’s. progressively to extend our knowledge of the overall 3) Cryosphere; The expansion and recession of the climate system, certain key processes are selected for polar ice packs are thought to be important indicators detailed study. There is, for instance, a good deal of of climate. The annual variations in the extent of con- interest currently in ocean-heat transport, air-sea in- tinental snow packs may also be an indicator. Certain- teractions, the oceans’ role in the global carbon cycle, ly the extent of continental and polar ice cover in- and stratospheric processes. Space systems, in con- fluences the radiation balance of the planet. The ICES junction with other measurement techniques, will satellite mission is an experiment to give detailed data contribute significantly to these process studies. on the great Greenland and Antarctic ice packs. Data, Information, and Services: a) Observation.– One recent study indicates that the rise in sea level The object here is to compile an accurate, objective since 1940 may be related to the melting of the polar record of climate behavior for both applications and ice caps as a result of atmospheric warming due to research. It is in this area that space capabilities will increased CO2 in the atmosphere. The melted ice make the most important contributions to climate ac- would tend to cool the oceans and thereby the at- tivities. The observation programs are subdivided mosphere, masking a direct thermal signal of in- along climate regimes: atmosphere, oceans, cryo- creased C0 . Satellite data on the oceans, polar sphere, stratosphere, and solar. The contributions are 2 regions and the stratosphere will be needed to gain likely to be as follows: conclusive data on these questions. 1 ) Atmosphere: Data from the operational weather satellites are first used for weather purposes. These 4) Stratosphere: Important progress has been made data are then archived and become a major contribu- in developing satellite-borne stratospheric composition to the climate record. They include atmospheric tion measurement techniques. Much of this effort has temperature, moisture, cloud imagery, and sea-surface been stimulated by concern over changes in the strat- temperature. ospheric ozone layer. An ozone monitoring sensor is 2) Oceans: As the oceans cover three-fourths of the being developed for incorporation onto the opera- Earth’s surface, they have a profound effect on the tional weather satellite system to enable ozone climate. Because the areas are so vast, satellites, in monitoring. combination with in situ devices, provide an effective At the present time, the precision in satellite ozone approach to measurements. Plans are now being for- measurements is about that of Earth-based measure- mulated for progams extending into the next decade ments. But satellite data provide a global view difficult to understand the oceans’ role in climate. A key aspect (if not impossible) to infer from the sparse ground is how the oceans store, transport, and redistribute measurement network.

94-915 0 - 82 - 23 344 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

5) Solar: The Sun provides the energy which gives ferred to as the development of climatically significant rise to atmospheric and oceanic movements. There data sets. are attempts under way to measure variations in solar Secondly, because of the nature of the climate sys- energy arriving at and leaving the Earth (the radiation tem and the resulting central tendencies of the data, budget) and to relate such variations to climate monitoring for climate is likely to require greater preci- variability. The Earth radiation budget experiment is iion than short-term monitoring (e.g., weather). That part of this effort. Because of the complex nature of is, where one is measuring diurnal variations in tem- atmospheric absorption, it is necessary to monitor the perature there are likely to be greater fluctuations radiation above the atmosphere. Spacecraft provide than, say, in the annual mean temperature from year the only means for continuous solar and Earth radia- to year. tion monitoring. Thirdly, there must be a commitment to acquire and 6) Diagnosis and Projection: Climate diagnosis is prepare new and existing data for climate uses. This the detailed analytical and statistical study of climatic may involve some risk. At this stage, one is not always events to try to relate climate observations (temper- certain that the “best” parameters are being meas- ature, pressure, winds, etc.) with the inner workings ured. Nevertheless, in order to make useful tests, of the climate system. Diagnostic studies associated analyzable data sets covering significant time periods with the Southern Oscillation (SO) and other at- must be available, For example, it was planned that mospheric and oceanic phenomena hold potential for the Earth radiation budget should be monitored over developing new techniques for seasonal climate at least one solar activity cycle (1 1 years). Yet, because prediction. of severe budget constraints, there is no activity under Because ocean conditions tend to persist over sev- way to sustain the measurements beyond the initial eral months, it may be possible to predict several system to be launched in 1984. months in advance when certain abnormally cold win- ters are likely to occur over the populous eastern Because of the vast and remote areas involved, and United States. because of the general hostility of the environment for measurement equipment, satellite systems (in con- However, in order to verify these hypotheses and assess the reliability of resulting predictions, much bet- junction with in-situ platforms) offer a reliable, cost- effective way to collect important ocean-climate data. ter sea-surface temperature (SST) data will be needed. This was demonstrated during the global weather ex- The most reliable data are probably provided by ocean buoys. But these data leave wide ocean areas un- periment. During this and the next decade, efforts must be made to gain further knowledge of the proc- covered. Reliable satellite-acquired data, because of esses by which the oceans transport and store heat. wide area coverage, will be a great improvement. Ex- New satellite techniques (for measuring surface cur- isting satellite-measured SST data are not sufficiently rents, wind stress, and surface temperature, interalia) precise to meet climate requirements; improved SST have promise for playing major roles in those efforts. sensors are required. Stratospheric monitoring and polar ice monitoring will also contribute to early detection of climate change. Requirements From the National Climate Program The Climate Program Impact Upon Now that the program components have been in- National Space Policy troduced, it is of interest to discuss certain requirements inherent to climate monitoring. The over- OTA has outlined six principles and associated riding requirement is for a continuous, intercom- issues underlying U.S. civil space activities. The im- parable data record for a span of time that is pact of the National Climate Program is analyzed in relation to each of these principles quoted below: climatologically significant. In most instances, this is several years. More generally, the longer the record 1. “Space activities maybe justified by political, the more valuable it is in determining the likelihood as well as by social, economic, scientific, techno- of “extreme” occurrences. Yet, even a period of few logical, or other benefits.” years exceeds the life of most satellite sensors. Thus, In the early years of the space program, national in the planning for monitoring from space, account space goals were primarily engineering-oriented. The must be taken of the need for continuity of data, re- cutting edge of space technology was in learning how quiring intercalibration of instruments, documentation to successfully launch and recover space vehicles, to of data handling techniques, and so forth. This is re- “put a man on the Moon by 1970.” Now that much Appendix E—World Climate, the oceans, and Early Indications of Climatic Change ● 345

of the engineering capability is secured, it would ap- —improved long-term data continuity; and pear that any new national space goals are more like- —increased data volume, possibly demanding the ly to be oriented toward application of space technol- total payload of a given satellite. ogy. Indeed, the national governmental policy chal- On the other hand, if these capabilities can be ob- lenge for the 1980’s seems to be shaping up to be to tained through reliance upon multipurpose satel- make the economy stronger, in which case all pro- lites, it would seem potentially more efficient. A grams, including space activities, will be evaluated in system of multipurpose Earth remote-sensing satel- terms of their economic contribution. lites could result in fewer space platforms carrying The long-term goals of the national climate program the same same sensing capacity. are primarily economic—to be able to routinely pre- 2. “The United States should be ‘a leader’ (cf. dict climatic variations (weekly to seasonal) for Space Act of 1958) in ‘aeronautical and space sci- economic payoffs in energy conservation, agricultural ence and technology and in the application there- productivity, water resources management, and resort of to the conduct of peaceful activities . . . “ management as well as long-term climatic change Climate research and climate forecasting are in- potentially associated with, say, atmospheric CO Z herently global, Climate activities, following the prece- buildup. The near-term objectives of the climate pro- dent set in meteorology, are characterized by a high grams are primarily in research aimed at improved degree of international cooperation and sharing, e.g., understanding of climate on which to build climate GARP. However, in practice most of the remote sens- prediction skills. Therefore, the climate program ap- ing in support of climate studies around the world has plications of space technology can be seen as eco- been done by U.S. satellites. nomic in the long run and mainly research or scien- While the U.S. commitment to climate studies and tific in the short term. forecasting will serve to maintain U.S. visibility in There are certain characteristics of the climate pro- world climate activities, the objectives of U.S. climate gram’s space requirements that must be taken into ac- activities are primarily economic and scientific. It is count i n the formulation of any comprehensive na- in the best interest of the U.S. climate program to tional space policy: maintain an atmosphere of international cooperation a) Remote sensing from space is essential to and participation so as to gain scientific and engineer- climate research and forecasting, For obtaining cer- ing support from other nations in the interests of effi- tain climatic parameters, e.g., measuring the Earth cient and rapid cooperative progress in climatology. radiation budget, there are no alternatives to space- borne sensors. 3. “Civilian and military space activities will be b) Climate studies require long periods (often conducted in separate (and independent) institu- measurable in decades) of data continuity. This is tional structures. ” different from most other space applications (e.g., Since the climate program will, for the foreseeable weather). Consequently, the accuracy and precision future, procure much data from space platforms jus- of data useful for short-term purposes may be wholly tified primarily for other purposes, ownership of those inadequate for climate. platforms whether by military or civilian institutions c) Climate studies require truly global coverage. will make no difference so long as data quality, quan- Present coverage is inadequate because data from tity, and timeliness are adequate. Conversely, if the the tropical oceans and the Southern Hemisphere, climate program requirements evolve in such a way which are crucial to climate forecasts, are most as to necessitate dedicated climate satellites, the in- sparse. Future coverage may be even less complete tegration of U.S. military and civilian satellite systems if the number of meteorological satellites is reduced under a common institutional structure could affect in response to fiscal constraints. climate data acquisition, but that effect cannot now d) Overall, U.S. climate program activities are be projected. more reliant upon multipurpose satellites, especially 4. “The National Aeronautics and Space Ad- meteorological satellites, than on climate satellites. ministration, established by the Space Act of 1958, There is an open question whether this trend will is authorized to conduct research, development, be continued into the future because climate reconstruction, testing, and operation for research search requirements and the evolving climate fore- purposes of (aeronautical and) space vehicles. It casting skill will necessitate: is not authorized to have operational responsibil- —monitoring climate-unique parameters potential- ity for space systems. ” ly requiring unique satellite orbits or unique The national climate program, as a user of multipur- sensors; pose satellites owned and operated by nonclimate 346 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

program entities, would be neutral on the question the long run after climate forecasting has been proven, of the identity of the U.S. civil space system operator. and even then total commercialization seems im- However, to the degree that the climate program’s probable. data requirements necessitate a dedicated climate The evidence is strong that the core of the climate satellite system, the operational responsibility ques- program will remain a public function for the foresee- tion will be acute. able future and that no more than the value-added components will be commercialized. Climate fore- 5. “Commercialization of space technology and casts, the long-term objective of the climate program, applications should be promoted. ” are certain to be, in part, public goods. Certain major From the point of view of the potential commercial public policy decisions, such as those potentially supplier of climate remote-sensing data, the climate associated with CO , acid rain, or ozone, will be program with its requirement for long-term data con- 1 heavily dependent upon climate forecasts. The fore- tinuity would appear a promising market. From the point of view of Government climate pro- casts themselves and the capability to produce them gram managers, commercialization of the satellites will almost certainly be a government responsibility because the market for such global climate predictions that supply climate observations is of concern primar- will not be commercially viable. Hence, a core climate ily in terms of cost but also in terms of data quality program capability will be governmental for the fore- and timeliness. If a large, diversified (many firms) satellite remote-sensing industry were to develop, seeable future. inter-firm competition could be expected to work in 6. “The United States will engage in coopera- the interests of the climate programs to keep data tive, international activities involving peaceful prices low and data quality, quantity and timeliness uses of outer space. ” high. If, on the other hand, the private remote sens- As discussed under issue B, climatology is global in ing industry were to be essentially monopolistic, the nature, U.S. climate activities are rooted in interna- climate program managers’ concerns would be justi- tional cooperation, and remotely sensed climate data fied. are openly shared in the international community. On a broader commercialization question, if the en- Nonetheless, it is an open question whether the U.S. tire climate program were to be commercialized, it would feel comfortable being reliant upon foreign seems obvious that the satellites supplying the climate owned/operated satelites for our core climate observa- data would also be commercial. Commercialization tions. of the entire climate program is a possibility only in Appendix F THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIM E OF OUTER SPACE

Introduction of two subcommittees, one of which studies the scientific and technical, and the other the legal aspects of Few human endeavors have occasioned the degree space activities. Since its inception, the Legal Subcom- of international legal scrutiny given to the develop- mittee has been responsible for the formulation of five ment of space technology. Because space activities major treaties: generally involve technologies that do not respect na- Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of tional boundaries, new stresses have been placed on States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, traditional international legal principles. These princi- Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ples, based on the rights and powers of territorial sov- (1 967)2 ereignty, are often in conflict with the most efficient Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the utilization of new space systems. In order to resolve Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects the complex legal problems that have arisen in the Launched into Outer Space (1968)3 space age, nations, both technologically advanced Convention on International Liability for Damage and developing, have been forced to rely increasing- Caused by Space Objects (1 972)4 ly on international cooperation. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched. The purpose of this appendix is to discuss the im- into Outer Space (1 974)5 portant legal principles and international organizations Agreement Governing the Activities of States on that have been developed to regulate the use of outer the Moon and Other-Celestial Bodies (1979)6 space. Additionally, it describes the possible effects that these principles and organizations may have on With the exception of the 1979 Moon agreement, the private sector interest and investment in specific space United States has signed and ratified each of these in- systems. It should be noted that since this discussion ternational agreements. focuses exclusively on the international legal regime COPOUS is currently conducting negotiations in the of outer space, the many complex issues involved in following areas: the domestic regulation of private investment in space ● Remote sensing. COPUOS has been negotiating technology are not discussed. a statement of principles on remote sensing since 1979. Considerable disagreement still exists be- International Organizations tween states on this subject and it is unlikely that a consensus will be reached in the near future. This appendix only discusses the activities of the ● Direct broadcast satellites. COPUOS has been in- Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space volved in trying to reach agreement on a set of (COPUOS), the International Telecommunication principles for direct broadcast satellites since Union (ITU), and the United Nations Education, Scien- 1968. However, there seems to be no easy solu- tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Though tion to the debate betweeen states advocating there are numerous other international organizations whose activites involve outer space to some degree, 8 21 UST 241 O; TIAS 6347; Senate Report No. 8, 90th Cong. 1 st sess., April most are not involved in formulating of international 17, 1967; Senate CommKtee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 90th Cong., law and policy. 1st sess., staff report on “Treaty on Prlnclpies Governing the Actlwtles of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, ” committee print, 1967. ‘19 UST 7570; TIAS 6599; “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched Into Space: Analy- sis and Background Data;” Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sci- COPUOS has been, and continues to be, the chief ence, 90th Cong. 2d sess., committee print, July 16, 1968. architect of the international legal regime of outer 424 UST 2389; TIAS 7762; Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, 92d Cong., 2d sess., staff report on “Convention on international space. COPUOS was established by resolution of the Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob)ects, ” committee print, 1972. General Assembly of the United Nations (U. N.) in 5TIAS 848(I; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences; 94th 1958 to study the problems brought into existence by Cong., 1st sess,, staff report on “ConventIon on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, ” committee print, 1975. the advent of the space age,l COPUOS is composed 6U. N. General Assembly Resolution A/34/68, Dec. 14, 1979; Senate Com- mittee on Commerce, Science, and Technology, 96th Cong., 2d sess., “Agree- ‘ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1348 (X111) “QuestIon of the Peaceful ment Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal Use of Outer Space, ” Dec. 13, 1958. Bodies, ” committee print, 1980

347 —

348 . Civilian space Policy and Applications

free flow of information and those advocating a stitution is revised by the Plenipotentiary Conference regime of prior consent. when technological (and recently, political) changes Ž Nuclear power sources in space. Since the Cos- reduce the effectiveness of existing provisions. The Ad- mos 954 accident in 1978, in which radioactive ministrative Regulations are updated more frequently debris from a Soviet satellite fell on northern through WARCS and Regional Administrative Radio Canada, there has been increased international Conferences (RARCS) and are the means by which the concern over use of nuclear energy to power sat- technical coordination and regulation of international ellites. COPUOS has focused its attention on four communications is actually accomplished. Member- major issues: safety, prior notification, emergen- ship is open to all countries and currently ITU has 154 cy assistance, and liability for damages. To date, members. The formal results of RARCS and WARCS no international consensus has been reached. are reached by each country exercising one vote and, Ž Delimitation of outer space. The question of when ratified by the member states, they have the where air space ends and outer space begins has force of international treaties. troubled international legal theorists since the The primary function of ITU is to allocate the beginning of the space age. The Soviets have radiofrequency spectrum among competing services

recently proposed that outer space should be (e.g., fixed, mobile, aeronautical, maritime, and space) considered to begin in the area of 100 to 110 km and to register the frequency assignments of its mem- above sea level, The United States has consistent- ber states in order to avoid interference. The interna- ly maintained that no decision should be taken tional Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) of ITU per- until a more complete understanding of the scien- forms many of these important technical functions. tific and technical characteristics of low-orbit sat- IFRB records the frequency assignments made by dif- ellites is obtained. ferent countries in accordance with WARC and RARC ● Military activities in space. COPUOS has period- regulations and furnishes advice to ITU members on ically addressed issues relating to militarization; technical matters (e.g., the maximim practicable current treaties ban nuclear weapons and other number of radio channels in those portions of the weapons of “mass destruction. ” Discussions of spectrum where harmful interference may occur). In military activities have increased lately, now that 1973, the duties of ITU were enlarged by a modifica- both the United States and the Soviet Union are tion of its Convention. This modification provided that developing anti-satellite devices and other weap- IFRB was “to effect . . . an orderly recording of the ons. A number of developing countries have ob- positions assigned by countries to geostationary sat- jected to militarization, and in 1981 the Soviet ellites. ”9 Union proposed that the General Assembly dis- ITU has been the major forum in the recent debates cuss a draft treaty prohibiting the stationing of all regarding the a priori grant of portions of the radio weapons in outer space, with special reference spectrum and the geostationary orbit to countries pres- to the U.S. space shuttle. The U.S. has objected ently lacking space technology. This subject is dis- to attempts by COPUOS to take up this issue. cussed in greater detail in section IV. UNESCO International Telecommunication Union Though UNESCO does not have a technical or reg- ITU is an international, intergovernmental organiza- ulatory role such as ITU nor a broad mandate similar tion and the U.N.S’ specialized agency for telecom- to that of COPUOS to address international space munications.7 The purpose of ITU is to coordinate and issues, it has been active in the discussion of space- regulate international activities in the field of com- related problems. Some of its more important activities munications. Since radio communication is essential include: to all outer space activities, it was logical that ITU be ● Convention on satellite signal piracy. UNESCO, charged with the task of allocating radiofrequencies together with the World Intellectual Property for space as well as terrestrial communications. To this Organization, sponsored an international con- end, a World Administrative Radio Conference f in 1974 which adopted the “Convention (WARC) held in 1959 that resulted in the first in- erence r was Relating to the Distribution of Program me-Carry- ternational agreements applicable to space activities. ing Signals Transmitted by Satellite’’.l O States party The basic governing documents of ITU are its Con-

stitution and its Administrative Regulations. The Con- ‘International Telecommunications Convention (Geneva), Dec. 21, 1959; TIAS 4892, 12 UST 1761. 7For a detailed look at ITU, see, Radiofrequerrcy Use and Management: glnternational Telecommunication Convention, 1973, article 10(3); TIAS Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979, Office 8572. of Technolorw. Assessment, 1982. 10N .M. Matte, Aerospace Law, 1977, PP. 39-40. Appendix F—The International Legal Regime of Outer Space Ž 349

to the Convention agree to “take adequate meas- utilization of space technology for commercial civil ures” to prevent the distribution of “program e- communications requirements (emphasis added). carrying signals” by unauthorized personnel. This enthusiasm for private enterprise was not ● Satellite broadcasting and the free flow of infor- shared by all nations. In 1962, the Soviet Union sub- mation. UNESCO has also been working on a mitted to COPUOS a “Draft Declaration of the Basic “Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertain- Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Infor- ing to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. ” It was mation, the Spread of Education and Greater Cul- suggested in the draft that, “All activities of any kind 11 tural Exchange”. ’ Strong objections have been pertaining to the exploration of outer space shall be voiced against this declaration on the grounds carried out solely and exclusively by States . . . “13 The that instead of encouraging the free-flow of in- United States responded to this position by pointing formation, it encourages censorship. Many be- out that pursuant to U.S. policy, as reflected in the lieve that this Declaration of Principles was used Communications Satellite Act of 1962, private firms by its authors as a means to attract international had already been given the right to engage in space attention to the “New World Information Order” activity. In order to reconcile this conflict, the United (discussed infra, sec. Ill (c)(3)). States proposed that states bear the responsibility for ● Technical assistance to member states. UNESCO the launching of space vehicles, whether such vehicles has worked with a number of African, Asian, and be the property of the state or its nationals.14 In this Latin American states, helping them to assess their manner, the United States hoped to reassure other general communication needs. UNESCO is pres- states that private activity could be controlled, albeit ently conducting several long-range studies to indirectly, through international regulation. determine the practicality of using regional sat- The principle of state responsibility for the actions ellite systems to supply educational and cultural of its nationals is incorporated in both articles Vi and development programs to certain developing IX of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.15 Although the countries. 1967 Principles Treaty does not specifically grant private industry the right to undertake activities in The Status of Nongovernmental Entities outer space, the U.N. debates on this subject make it clear that such activities were contemplated by the As the role of private industry varies within each of drafters. the nations of the world, and as it is those nations and A few authors have suggested that though the 1967 not their private industries that enter into international Principles Treaty may sanction the presence of space agreements, it is understandable that some con- nongovernmental entities in space, article I can be fusion exists as to the legal status of private industry read to prevent the commercial use of outer space. ’ 16 in outer space. This section will examine some of the Article I states, in relevant part: practical and theoretical problems that arise when try- The exploration and use of outer space, including the ing to fit the activities of private enterprise into a Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out framework designed primarily to regulate the actions for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, ir- of states. respective of their degree of economic or scientific In the United States, it has been consistent govern- development, and shall be the province of all mankind. ment policy to encourage the involvement of private It is argued that commercial use would be contradic- enterprise in its space programs. When President tory to article 1, in that its drafters intended the benefits Eisenhower announced his administration’s space pol- of outer space exploration and use to flow to all man- icy in 1960, he stated: kind, and not to private investors. This somewhat tech- (T)o achieve the early establishment of a communica- nical argument finds little support in either the specific tion satellite system which can be used on a commer- language of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or its legis- cial basis is a national objective which will require the lative history. concerted capabilities and funds of both Government and private enterprise . . . With regard to communication satellites, I have directed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to take the lead within the 1 ZWhite House Press Release, Dec. 30, 1960; see also, D. D, Smi[h, Com- Executive Branch both to advance the needed research munication wa Satellite, 1976, p. 72. I JU N. Document A/AC. 105/L.2; U. N. Document A/5/81 Annex 3. and development and to encourage private enterprise 14u “N , DOcu ment A/AC. 105/L.5 U, N. Document A/5/81, Annex 3. to apply its resources toward the earliest practical I Ssee Aflicle VI of the Outer Space Treaty. 16see, for example, Marcuff, Traite’ de Droit International Public de 1’ 11 u ,N, Document A/AC, 105/1 04, Jllly 2S, 1972. Espace, 1973, p. 671. 350 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

State Responsibility for Nongovernment Entities its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight. ”19 Given that private enterprise may conduct activities Two points should be mentioned here. First, the in space for profit if the appropriate state will take 1972 Liability Convention does not grant either rights responsibility for such actions, it becomes necessary or responsibilities to nongovernmental entities. If the to examine the nature of this responsibility. Some nationals of a launching state cause damage, it is the authors, in analyzing article VI of the 1967 Principles state damaged, under article Vlll, which “may pre- Treaty, have suggested that a state’s responsibilities 20 sent to a launching state a claim for compensation. ” are extensive: This somewhat formalistic approach to compensation (While no one would doubt the need for government is sufficient at this time since states exercise almost control over space activity at its present stage, the sec- complete control over launch and tracking facilities ond sentence of article VI would prohibit, as a matter and there is no “pure” private enterprise in outer of treaty obligation, strictly private, unregulated activi- space. However, as the activities of private enterprise ty in space or on celestial bodies even at a time when increase in frequency and scope, new and more effi- such private activity becomes most commonplace. Al- though the terms “authorization” and “continuing cient procedures will have to be developed to han- supervision” are open to different interpretations, it dle the claims for compensation which are certain to would appear that Article VI requires a certain mini- arise. mum of licensing and enforced adherence to govern- A second point of interest concerning the Liability ment-imposed regulations. ’ 7 Convention is the fact that it applies, by its terms, only In addition to article Vi’s general statement of re- to “launching states” which are defined in article I as: sponsibility, article IX of the Principles Treaty requires ● a state that launches or procures the launching that if a state or its nationals are going to undertake of a space object; and any activity in space which “would cause potentially ● a state from whose territory or facility a space ob- harmful interference with activities of other states,” ject is launched. then the state planning the activity “shall undertake Under this scheme, if state A launches a space ob- appropriate international consultation before project for the nationals of state B, both states are con- ceeding with any such activity. ”18 Article IX’S require- sidered launching states and have joint liability for ment that the international consultation shall precede damage under article V of the Liability Convention. the proposed activity is quite significant, in that it im- This is the case even though under the language of poses an active duty to regulate rather than a merely article IX of the 1967 Principles Treaty it is state B that passive duty to supervise. Under article IX a state has bears the international responsibility for the “poten- a duty to interfere with or prohibit altogether potentially harmful” activities of its nationals. This problem tially harmful activities by its nationals at least until is somewhat alleviated by article V of the Liability Con- such time as the effects of the proposed activity are vention that allows a state that has paid compensa- made known to the international community. tion for damages “to present a claim for indemnifica- The Outer Space Treaty does not attempt to direct tion to other participants in the joint launching. ” states as to how these responsibilities should be car- These rather complex international remedies are ried out. This is appropriate since a state’s control over presently workable only because it is the activity of its nationals involves complex questions of domestic states and not individuals that predominates in space. law. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, on the other hand, As this situation changes a new legal regime, which was not written to supply an exhaustive set of rules more fully comprehends the role of the individual in to regulate the conduct of states, but rather to sketch space activities, will have to be developed. the rough outline of a new international regime. One of the more important attempts to delineate the Limitations on Nongovernmental Entities responsibilities of states in outer space occurred in 1972 with the adoption by COPUOS of the “Conven- Having discussed the status of private activity in tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by space and the methods of control over such activity, Space Objects.” This treaty extends the concept of it is important now to examine the limitations that the present legal regime of outer space places on the ac- state responsibility to include the concept of liability for damage caused by space objects. Article II of the tivities of the private sector. To answer this question Liability Treaty establishes the principle that a launch- requires an analysis of several recently articulated prin- ing state is absolutely liable for “damage caused by ciples. These are the Principle of Nonappropriation

1 Zjaserltuleyarla and Lee, Manual Of Space Law, VOI. 1, 1‘379, P. 17. Igsee Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. lasee Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. %ee Article Vlll of the Outer Space Treaty. Appendix F—The International Legal Regime of Outer Space ● 351

of Space Resources, the Principle of the Common Her- ticle IX’S statement that a “station shall use only that itage of Mankind (CHM), and the New World Infor- area which is required for the needs of the station” mation Order. and article Xl (3)’s statement that such stations “shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or sub- PRINCIPLE OF NONAPPROPRIATION surface of the Moon or any areas thereof. ” The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles included THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND (CHM) the statement that, “Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by claim of Though the CHM principle is complex in its applica- sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any tion, in theory it is quite simple. Basically stated, the other means. ”2l With minor changes, this language principle maintains that there are certain resources, is repeated in article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty such as the minerals on the ocean floor and on the and article Xl (2) of the proposed Moon Treaty. The Moon, that are presently under the jurisdiction and legislative history of these instruments and the subse- control of no sovereign power. These resources, being quent activities of states has revealed little controver- finite and exhaustible, should not be allocated to the sy concerning the prohibition against appropriation developed countries on a first come, first served basis, by claim of sovereignty. However, this harmony of but rather, should be used for the benefit of all na- opinion has not recently been shared with regard to tions. Though this principle has recently received its the prohibition against appropriation by means of use greatest attention in relation to the Law of the Sea Con- or occupation. vention, it has frequently appeared in discussions con- The issue of appropriation by “use and occupation” cerning the exploration and use of outer space.23 involves a number of complex considerations. Most In 1958, when President Eisenhower announced his ventures into space involve some degree of appro- administration’s space policy, he called upon states priation, since the placement of a satellite into orbit “to promote the peaceful use of space and to utilize precludes the use by other states of that same orbit, the new knowledge obtained from space science and Any alteration of the present “first come, first served” technology for the benefit of mankind.”24 Subsequent use of the geostationary orbit or in the rights of priority to this statement, the concept that space activities now recognized as applying to currently operating sys- should be undertaken for the benefit of mankind ap- tems could have serious repercussions on the U.S. peared in the NAS Act of 1958,25 in important General communications industry. Some third world countries Assembly resolutions on space and as article I of the have suggested that radiofrequency assignments and 1967 Principles Treaty. Although these “common in- the incidental use of the geostationary orbit should terest” clauses found their way into the major space be limited to the life of the satellite. This suggestion treaties, there was considerable uncertainty as to their is contrary to the current practice in the United States. status within the body of international law. Some In the United States, the Federal Communications authors have suggested that these “common interest” Commission licenses communication common car- clauses were merely pragmatic principles without legal riers to provide a continuous service to the public. force. Others believe that the placement of the “com- Some third world countries have argued that this mon interest” clauses within the operational part of method of continuous use is tantamount to an ap- treaties, as opposed to a mere statement of intentions propriation. As a result they advocate the a priori in the preamble, indicated that such provisions must allocation of radiofrequencies and orbit positions (see be regarded as binding.2G As a binding principle it sec. IV infra). The proposed Moon Treaty recognizes the problems ZJR. B, Owens, statement at hearings on the Moon Treaty, “Agreement Govern~ng the Activkies of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal Bodies, ” inherent in a “first come, first served” method of before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate allocating resources and attempts to limit the effects Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d sess., of de facto appropriation on the exploration and ex- 1980. Ambassador M C. W. Pinto of Srl Lanka has Interpreted the CHM prin- 22 ciple to apply to the law of the sea In this manner: “Thts (Common Heritage ploitation of the Moon and other celestial bodies. of Mankind) means that those (seabed) minerals cannot be freely mined. They The recognition of the problem appears in article Vlll are not there, so to speak, for the taking. The common heritage of mankind where it is stated that states parties “shall not interfere is the common property of mankind. . If you touch the nodules at the bottom of the sea, you touch my propefly. If you take them away, you take with the activities of other states parties, ” This sec- away my property. ” tion clearly grants an important right to “first users” Z4’’lntroductton to Outer Space,” an explanatory statement by the Presi- dent’s Science Adwsory Commmee, 1958, p. 1. of Moon resources. This right is then qualified by ar- 25C. Q. Christol, “The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Capturing an Illusive Concept and Applylng it to World Needs, ” XVIII the Co//oqutum on ZI u ,fQ. General Assembly Resolution 1962, article XVIII, par. 3. the Law of Outer Space, 1976, p. 42. 22LJ ,N. General Assembly Resolution 34/68, “Agreement Governing the 2bN. M. Matte, “Aerospace Law: Telecommunications SatellNes, ” Center Actlvltles of States on the Moon and Other Celestlal Bodies, ” Dec. 14, 1979. for Research of Air and Space Law, McGIII University, p. 38. 352 Ž Civilian Space Policy and Applications

created an obligation among states “to be in some veloping countries have been subjected to the “cul- form responsive to the interest of developing coun- tural imperialism” of a capitalist, consumer-oriented tries, and to provide for some form of distribution of society. The New World Information Order seeks to benefits derived from such (space) activities.”27 remedy this situation by: 1 ) encouraging the develop- The principle of CHM has generally been opposed ment of a third world information infrastructure; 2) by the private sector. The most common argument controlling the West’s access to developing countries; heard in this regard is that any attempt at international and 3) limiting the Western media’s ability to dissemi- regulation of the profits derived from space will in- nate information in developing countries. so hibit private enterprise from making the necessary in- The long-term effects of this principle on the free vestments in space technology. Advocates of this posi- flow of information throughout the world are, for the tion often point to article Xl (7) of the proposed Moon most part, beyond the scope of this report. However, Treaty’s statement that one of the purposes of the in- the continued adherence to the New World informa- ternational regime is to assure “an equitable sharing” tion Order by a substantial number of Communist and of resources.28 It is argued that the concept of third world countries could have important near-term equitable sharing is inconsistent with the concept of effects in the field of satellite communications. Most profit, and in the absence of the profit motive private notably, the Western developed nations can expect enterprise cannot be expected to risk capital on space to encounter strong opposition to the previously used investments. “first come, first served” method of allocating the elec- The most repeated criticism of the CHM principle tromagnetic spectrum and the orbital positions in the is that it lacks proper definition. It is argued that its geostationary arc (discussed in greater detail below). “novelty, generality, philosophical underpinnings— In addition, private communications firms may en- as opposed to legal—and uncertain historical pedi- counter new tariffs and regulations designed to slow gree” render it far too vague to act as a tool in the the flow of information and communications services regulation of international conduct.29 These criticisms to the third world. New tax laws have also been pro- are valid at least to the extent that they regard the prin- posed which would require the payment of a portion ciple’s uncertainty, for except for article Xl of the of the assessed value of information flowing into or Moon Treaty’s suggestion of an international regime, through a country. Future restrictions can also be ex- nowhere are a state’s duties under the CHM princi- pected on the establishment of ground stations and ple defined. on access to the foreign transmission lines necessary for the terrestrial transmission of satellite data. THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER The New World Information Order is a principle es- Communications Satellites poused by the Soviet Union and certain third world countries that maintains that there is an imbalance in Not long after ITU began to regulate satellite com- both the amount and kind of news emanating from munications certain international tensions arose con- the information and communication systems concerning its methods of allocating what many believed trolled by the Western industrialized nations. These to be scarce space resources.Jl Radiofrequencies that countries allege that as a result of this imbalance the have been duly registered with ITU receive interna- third world and communist countries have been por- tional recognition and protection. Therefore, early trayed in a distorted manner to the populations of the registration of a radiofrequency is given priority over developed countries, while the populations of the de- later requests for the registration of the same frequency. Many developing nations have voiced opposition to this principle of priority on the basis that future ZTlbid., p. 39. Z8Article XI (7) of the Moon Treaty states: “7. The main purposes of the access to the radio spectrum and positions in geosta- international regime to be established shall include: tionary orbit, which are necessary for effective sat- (a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the ellite communication, will be limited by the present Moon; (b) The rational management of those resources; activities of the developed nations. (c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources; Reflecting this concern, the ITU convention was (d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the develop- modified in 1973 to state: ing countires as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the Moon shall be given special consideration. %. Q. Christol, “The Common Heritage of Mankind in the Moon Treaty,” ‘OB. Cowlan, “internationally Organizing for Space, ” paper submitted to paper submitted to symposium on “Space Activities and Implications, ” International Conference on Doing Business in Space, Nov. 12-14, 1981, Center for Research of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Oct. 16-17, reprinted in ALI-ABA Conference Materials. 1980. 31 rd. M. Matte, op. cit. Appendix F—The International Legal Regime of Outer Space ● 353

In using frequency bands for space radio services, Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial Members shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by resources, that they must be used efficiently and eco- any other means. nomically so that countries may have equitable access The developed countries have taken the position that to both in conformity with the provisions of the Radio the assignment of orbital positions to states would con- Regulations according to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal .32 stitute an appropriation and therefore is forbidden by the Outer Space Treaty. The third world has general- There is considerable confusion in the international ly argued that since the geostationary orbit is only community as to what is meant by the “efficient and useful in connection with communication satellites, economical” use of radiofrequencies and the geosta- and since ITU regulates the latter, it should also have tionary orbit. The developing states have argued that jurisdiction over the former. The United States has op- because these resources are limited, an a priori alloca- posed this extension of the power of ITU. tion should be made to assure that countries which The subject of a priori allocation of radiofrequen- presently do not utilize space may be able to do so cies and geostationary orbit positions was addressed in the future. The states with substantial space but not resolved at the latest WARC in 1979. This sub- resources have generally taken the position that at- ject will be debated again at the 1983 RARC and the tempts to reduce space to an “international con- 1984 WARC where, it is hoped, a reasoned and prac- dominium” are neither efficient and economical nor tical solution can be found that will accommodate the sanctioned by international law. needs of both the developing and the developed It has been argued by the United States that the nations. allocation of space resources on any basis other than use is inefficient because it reduces the incentive to adopt spectrum and orbit conserving technologies and Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS) 33 patterns of use. The United States and other devel- DBS are a new generation of communications satel- oped countries maintain that through the creative use lites capable of transmitting signals strong enough to of the frequency spectrum, as seen in the adoption be picked up by individuals utilizing small (less than of 30/20 G Hz for communications, and the develop- 4 1 m in diameter), home receiving dishes.J This is to ment of new space systems, such as large space plat- be contrasted with the currently operating communi- forms, the future needs of the developing countries cations satellites that transmit weak signals to large, can be easily met. However, some third world coun- fixed Earth stations that must then rebroadcast the tries feel that it is not in their best interest to continue signal to the public using terrestrial facilities. to rely on the developed countries to supply their The major advantage of DBS technology is that it communication needs. Several of these countries, does away with the need for an elaborate terrestrial notably India and Brazil, are in the process of develop- distribution system, thereby making possible the trans- ing an indigenous satellite communication capability. mission of programs to widely dispersed populations, In the near future, the communication systems devel- remote areas, or to countries without a sophisticated oped by these countries will be less sophisticated and communications infrastructure. The research and de- therefore less efficient than those designed by nations velopment necessary to realize DBS technology was already well versed in space technology. A priori al- undertaken by the National Aeronautics and Space location plans are attractive because the satellites they Administration and proven in both the U.S. ATS-6 and will be developing may require the type of orbital the Canadian/U. S. CTS satellites. Presently, France, spacing presently utilized. The developing countries Germany, Luxembourg, and groupings of Arab and may argue that it is in their best interest to resist an Scandinavian countries are planning for DBS systems international regime predicated on the development or for multipurpose communications satellites able to of advanced, resource-efficient technology because directly broadcast.Js Some of these systems are plan- such a regime would render their indigenous technol- ned for operational status by the mid-] 980’s. ogy obsolete. Though DBS technology offers the potential for There is some question as to whether a priori alloca- large-scale educational, health and public service tion plans might not be contrary to the letter and the programing–a fact that was amply proven by the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Article 2 of the treaty states: Wee generally: “Policies for Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites,” Federal Communication Commission staff report, September 1980. J~lnternat(ona/ Te[ecornmuntcation COflveflttOfl, OP. c;t JSBarbara Luxenberg, “Preliminary OK for Direct Broadcast Satellites, ” ]Qffice of Technology Assessment, Op. cit., P. 30 Aeronautics and Astronautics, September 1981, p. 20. 354 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

U.S./India ATS-6 experiments–some have raised the expenditures necessary to adapt DBS tech- serious questions concerning the international regula- nology to the particular needs of developing tion of this technology. The Soviet Union has ex- countries. This is particularly true if the private pressed concern that DBS maybe used to spread pro- sector is to play a significant role in this develop- paganda or misinformation designed to create social ment. unrest. Several third world countries have expressed 3. ITU regulations constitute a sufficient safeguard the fear that this technology will be used by the against unauthorized DBS transmissions. Some Western, developed nations as a tool of cultural or U.S. experts argue that the need for technical co- economic imperialism. It is feared that commercial ordination has obviated the need for political reg- advertising by the developed countries might disrupt ulation. In addition to providing working defini- the social fabric of developing nations by creating a tions for the various types of DBS service and allo- demand for consumer goods that is not consonant cating frequencies to DBS, the ITU, in 1971, with national plans for social and economic develop- adopted Radio Regulation 428 A which provides: ment. In devising the characteristics of a space station The Soviet Union, France, and numerous Third in the broadcasting-satellite service, all technical World countries have argued that the sovereign rights means available shall be used to reduce, to the of a country prohibit broadcasting across national maximum extent practicable, the radiation over boundaries in the absence of a prior agreement with the territory of other countries unless an agree- the receiving state. The United States has opposed this ment has been previously reached with such view and has advocated a policy of free flow of infor- countries. mation. The opposition of the United States to the doc- In the view of the United States, the ITU pro- trine of prior consent has centered around four major cedures are a sufficient safeguard against the mis- themes that can be summarized as follows:qb use of DBS technology and are, in fact, a form 1. There has been insufficient experience with of prior consent. The countries that do not ac- broadcast satellites to determine what, if any, cept this position argue that the ITU decisions political constraints should be placed on their deal only with the physical transmission of a sat- use. In the DBS debates of the early 1970’s the ellite signal and do not address the right of coun- United States argued that it was unwise to fashion tries to regulate the message content of foreign regulations without knowing the specific prob- broadcasts. lems that would be caused by this technology. 4. The prior consent principle undermines the con- The ATS-6 experiments in India were frequently cept of international free flow of information. The used as an example of the fact that the control United States has taken the position that the free over programing and distribution of DBS services exchange of ideas and information, as affirmed could remain firmly within the local government in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of of the receiving country, thereby obviating the Human Rights and other U.N. resolutions, should 7 need for international regulation. The United not be inhibited.q Many U.S. experts believe that States still maintains that as experience with acquiescence in a prior consent regime for DBS transborder DBS service grows, the fears of would be an undesirable precedent that could “cultural imperialism” presently harbored by be applied to other means of communication or many nations will diminish. dissemination of information. The DBS issue can 2. Enactment of a set of political principles for DBS be viewed as one aspect of a growing pattern of could inhibit the development of technology restraints being promoted under the umbrella of valuable to the third world countries. Most of the the New World Information Order. technical problems with DBS have been, or are In addition to the positions held by those advocating in the process of being solved. The two major prior consent and the United States, a third, com- questions from a domestic U.S. perspective are promise position has been put forward in a joint pro- how to configure DBS satellites to respond to posal by the Canadian and Swedish Governments.38 specific markets and whether DBS offers a signifi- This proposal suggests that advance agreement would cant economic advantage over conventional be necessary concerning the basic issue of broadcasts means of broadcasting. Restrictive international by the satellites of one country into the territory of regulations may make economically unjustifiable another country. However, the content of the trans-

JbThe following four themes derived from: Wilson P. Dizard, ‘‘The U.S. 37U, N. General Assembly Resolution 217 (Ill), Dec. 10, 1948. Position: DBS and Free Flow,” )ourna/ of Communication, vol. 30, spring Js’’Draft Principles Governing Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite,” 1980, pp. 157-168. U.N. Document A/AC, 105/1 17, 1973. Appendix F—The International Legal Regime of Outer Space Ž 355

missions would be left to the discretion of the broad- tion and regularly supplies Landsat data to other casting country. To date, this proposal has not gained governments, international organizations, private sec- substantial support of either the United States or the tor businesses and individuals. countries which advocate a prior consent regime. It is helpful to analyze some of the legal arguments used to defend the positions that were articulated Remote Sensing above. Basically, arguments that favor limiting remote- sensing activities are premised on the assumption that The term remote sensing refers to the use of satellites the rights of territorial sovereignty allow a state to pro- capable of detecting reflected or emitted electromag- tect itself from information gathering activities directed netic radiation for the purpose of gathering informa- toward its own natural resources. There is very little tion about the Earth .39 Presently, the only civilian in either traditional international law or i n the treaties remote-sensing system is the Landsat system of the which deal specifically with space that substantiates United States. Though this system is operated by the this assumption. Government, there is considerable indication that the It is generally accepted that a sovereign nation may private sector may have a significant role to play in protect itself from information gathering activities remote sensing in the near future. (For a more com- within its borders, either on the ground or from the plete discussion of the private sector’s role in remote air. The legal basis for each of these manifestations sensing, see ch. 2) If the policy decision is made in of sovereignty is not necessarily applicable to outer the United States to encourage the private sector to space activities. Because traditional international law take as active a role in remote sensing as it has taken recognizes that the laws of a sovereign state apply to in communications satellites, the Government must all within its borders, activities of foreign nationals may ensure the existence of a receptive economic and legal be controlled while they are physically within that environment. The existence of a restrictive interna- state. Likewise, traditional international law, and arti- tional regime could limit the private sector’s ability cle 2 of the Chicago Convention of 1944, recognize to invest in this new technology. that a state has absolute sovereignty over the air space There has been considerable discussion in the in- above its national boundaries,40 Control over the ac- ternational community concerning what restrictions, tivities of foreign nationals in both cases is predicated if any, should be placed on the use and distribution on the fact that such activities are accomplished within of remotely sensed data. Some of the major principles the sovereign territory of a state. being discussed are: Remote sensing is problematic from a legal perspec- Prior consent. Some states have argued that coun- tive because, on the one hand, it is an activity under- tries planning to engage in remote-sensing activities taken in space, and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty guar- should be required first to obtain the permission of antees that space shall be “free for exploration and the countries they intend to sense. use by all States;” yet, on the other hand, the activity Restricted data dissemination. A recent joint pro- is directed toward the observation of territories under posal by the French and the Soviets has suggested that the control of separate sovereign states. information gathered by remote sensing should not For this reason, many nations have argued that some be transferred to third-party states without the prior form of international control is necessary to protect consent of the state sensed. the interests of the sensed states and to prevent abuses Limited resolution. Some states have evinced con- that may result from the dissemination of remotely cern regarding advances in remote-sensing technology sensed data. The United States takes the position that that will allow extremely detailed observation. They restrictions on remote sensing would result in data be- feel that if such data were freely available from a ing available to only those states having the financial civilian commercial system it might threaten the and technical ability to provide their own space and security and economic interests of the sensed state. ground systems. Furthermore, even if a country had Unrestricted sensing. The United States has general- the technology to fly a remote-sensing system, it would ly opposed the placing of restrictions on remote-sens- not be inclined to do so if it knew in advance that it ing activities and data dissemination. The United States would have to undertake the financially prohibitive presently maintains a policy of free data dissemina- and scientifically disadvantageous exercise of separating the billions of bits of remotely sensed data along political boundaries. Jqsee generally: National Academy of Sciences, Resource Serwng From Outer Space, 1977; N. M. Matte, H. DeSaussure, Lega/ /mp/ications of Remote Sensing From Outer Space, 1976, ’61 Statistics 1180, 15 U .N.T. S. 295. 356 ● Civilian Space policy and Applications

OUTER SPACE TREATY

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Done at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967; Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America April 25, 1967; . Ratified by the President of the United States of America May 24, 1967; Ratification of the United States of America deposited at Washing- ton, London, and Moscow October 10, 1967; Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America Octo- ber 10, 1967; Entered into force October 10,1967.

B Y THE P RESIDENT OF THE U NITED STATES OF A MERICA A PROCLAMATION

W HEREAS the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967 in behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and was signed at one or more of the three capitals in behalf of a number of other States; WHERE.AS the text of the Treaty, in the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese languages, as certified by the Department of Stab of the United States of America, is word for word as follows:

(23) ANNEX XIX

Article Z

Article 111 45s ANNEX XIX THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 459

Article IV . .

Article V Article 1X

Article VI

Article X

Article VII .4rtic/2 XI

Article XV

Article Xll

Article XV1

Article X111 I

Article XV1l

.4rticle XIV Appendix G BACKGROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

Early United States/Soviet Competition by the inaccuracies of the missiles themselves. To be effective at long ranges, even against large unpro- Prior to world War II, the leading centers of rocket tected targets (i.e., cities), these missiles had to carry research had been Germany and the Soviet Union. very heavy, high-yield (multi megaton) warheads. In both cases the primary impetus for research was Hence, the missiles themselves had to be, above all, military, supported by extensive amateur and civilian large. The result was a series of large, inexpensive, in- activities. The United States, by contrast, lacked a co- efficient (relatively low thrust) boosters capable of car- ordinated rocket program, though the work of isolated rying thousands of pounds halfway around the world individuals, notably Robert Goddard, helped give the —or into orbit. It is these early designs, first perfected United States an important experimental base. in the mid-l 9s0’s, that still today serve as the back- During the war many nations developed rockets for bone of the Soviet missile fleet, both for intercontinen- various military uses, particularly tactical battlefield tal ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and for orbital launchers. support (the Soviets relied heavily on massed rocket The United States, in contrast, did not at first feel barrages); but by far the most advanced work was a similar urgency to develop ICBMS, especially the done by the Germans. This culminated, late in the very heavy variety favored by the Soviets. However, war, in the first long-range unmanned vehicles: the by the mid-l 950’s the United States had several rocket V-1, an air-breathing “cruise missile” used for short- development programs under way: the Army’s Jupiter range attack on population centers such as London, booster; the Thor and Atlas missiles (developed by the and the much more advanced and dangerous V-2, the Air Force); and a civilian booster, Vanguard, which first operational ballistic missile. was, however, essentially managed by the Navy. At the end of the war two of the rival victors, the Contrary to popular belief, the Soviets were not reti- United States and Soviet Union, divided up the major- cent about their intention to launch an artificial satel- ity of the German rocket assets. The Soviets, having lite; as early as 19.ss, Soviet scientists were predicting occupied the main German testing center at Peene- success within a few years, and the October 4, 19s7, munde on the Baltic Sea, seized the bulk of the hard- orbiting of Sputnik was foreshadowed by numerous ware, while the Americans (along with the British and public statements. Nevertheless, the public and inter- French) succeeded in capturing and employing many national surprise was intense, and there were wide- of the most talented scientists and engineers, including spread demands for the United States to match or sur- the most important, Wernher von Braun. In both the pass the Soviet challenge. There were several reasons. United States and U. S. S. R., these resources formed The Soviet Union and United States each had grown the basis for each country’s succeeding rocket pro- accustomed to seeing the other as rivals across a grams. whole range of political, economic, and cultural activ- The direction and pace of these programs were de- ities. Both saw themselves as representing social and termined above all by the differing military require- economic systems whose superiority would be dem- ments of the two nations. During the decade follow- onstrated by whether they could outperform their ing World War 11, the United States relied for its secu- competitors. At stake for e,ach was the legitimacy of rity (and that of its allies) on its large fleet of long-range its system in the eyes not only of its current adherents bombers equipped with nuclear weapons. Stationed but of billions of potential adherents throughout the in Europe and the Far East, these forces were capable world. The United States was acknowledged to be the of directly attacking the Soviet Union and hence of leader in economic and scientific affairs, and although deterring any hypothetical Soviet conventional attack the Soviets took pains to publicize the ever-growing in Europe. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no amounts of steel, concrete, oil, and foodstuffs pro- comparable delivery system, for they lacked both the duced annually, it was increasingly clear that competi- bombers and, even more importantly, forward bases tion in the nuclear age was more a matter of quality within range of the continental United States. The than quantity. In no technical area had the Soviets Soviets therefore saw long-range ballistic missiles as been able to outperform the West; Sputnik was a blow the only way to counter U.S. nuclear superiority, and to the West’s confidence in the superior quality of its placed a correspondingly high priority on their devel- science and technology, and hence in the superiority opment. The type of missile they proceeded to build of the political/economic system that produced it. was determined first of all by the extreme heaviness With hindsight we can see that Sputnik represented of the first generations of Soviet weapons, as well as an exceptional case of temporary leadership brought Appendix G—Background for International Programs c 361 about by the special emphasis on heavy missiles de- itary requirements, prospective social and economic scribed above. The sophistication of the Soviet pay- benefit, and, especially for the manned programs, loads and instrumentation, including their manned prestige and competition. By the end of the decade, capsules, was well below that of even the first U.S. the United States had developed manned and un- satellites. It did not indicate a comprehensive capabil- manned civilian systems demonstrably superior to ity in advanced technologies on a par with the United those of the Soviet Union. During the 1970’s, com- States; it did not even indicate, as many thought it petition was reduced, due partly to d~tente and a gen- must, that the Soviets enjoyed a dangerous lead in mil- eral lowering of tensions between the two countries, itary ICBMS. The “missile-gap” controversy, which and also to the differing emphases of the respective played an important role in the 1960 Presidential elec- programs, While the United States focused on the tion, and which prompted a major commitment by space shuttle, the Soviets orbited the Salyut series of the United States to the deployment of U.S.-based manned, resupplyable orbiting laboratories. increas- ICBMS and foreign-based MRBMs, as well as to civil ingly, competition with the Soviets has changed from defense, was a chimera. There is no doubt that the open and highly publicized civilian space spectacu- Soviets, upon seeing Sputnik’s effect on world opin- lars, to secret military and intelligence systems. (For ion, did their best to foster the notion of across-the- further details see ch. 7.)1 board Soviet technical and military equivalence, if not superiority, and that this effort, abetted by the extreme Joint European Efforts secrecy with which the Soviet program was conducted, was largely successful, especially in the third In 1960-61, three separate European agencies were world. In particular, Premier Khrushchev asserted that created to deal with different aspects of space. The the Soviets, with their ICBMS, which could supposedly European Launcher Development Organization “hit a fly in outer space,” had achieved strategic (ELDO) aimed at creating a jointly funded launcher, nuclear parity with the United States. eventually named the “Europa. ” ELDO was basically That these claims were exaggerated became clear a coordinating body for separate national projects; the in 1962 when Khrushchev, lacking the credible Soviet- eventual plans for Europa called for a British first stage based ICBM force he had earlier claimed, attempted (the Blue Streak military IRBM), a French second stage, to redress the balance by placing MRBMs in Cuba, a West German third stage, Italian test satellites, Bel- with disastrous results. Soviet space successes, and the gian downrange guidance systems, and Dutch tele- Western reaction, played an important role in public metry links. By 1968, the cost estimates for the Europa estimates of comparative military strength. The above had climbed from an initial $190 million to $71o mil- shows why it was the United States and the U.S.S.R. lion to $77o million, causing intense disagreements that were the first to develop boosters capable of among the participants. The military implications of launching substantial payloads into orbit. Other coun- possessing a long-range missile complicated agree- tries, lacking these military/competitive needs, did not ments even further.2 As a result of the problems at first choose to expend the resources needed to de- caused by inadequate coordination, none of the 11 velop an independent booster capability. It is instruc- test launches of the Europa, the last of which took tive to note that France, the European nation historic- place in 1971, succeeded in placing a payload in ally most eager to have its own launcher, and the one orbit.J Along the way the British, dismayed by rising that has already built its own MRBM deterrent, is also costs for what they saw as obsolescent technology, Western Europe’s largest nuclear power and the one decided in 1968 to reduce their financial commitment most determined to remain independent of the super- and eventually withdrew altogether. This left France powers. Similarly, China’s launcher development pro- as the project’s strongest backer. In 1973, the Europa gram has been motivated by its determination to field was finally cancel led in favor of a new project, the a nuclear delivery system. Frenchdominated Ariane, which was eventually taken Having developed missiles capable of launching up by the European Space Agency (ESA). payloads into orbit, both the United States and the 1 For information on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet U.S.S.R. began to construct a number of different sat- Union, see Soviet Space Programs 1971-75, 2 VOIS., Congressional Research ellites. Scientific instruments, remote-sensing cameras, Service Staff Repofi for Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sci- ences, Aug. 30, 1976; Jerry Grey, Enterprise (New York: William Morrow satellites for weather observation and military surveil- & Co., 1979); and James Oberg, Red Star in Orbit, (New York: Random lance, communications satellites, and manned space- House, 1981). ‘Mihiel Schwarz, “European Policies on Space Science and Technology craft were all flown within a few years of Sputnik. The 1960-1978,” Research Policy 8, 1979, p. 208. 3See World-Wide Space Activities, CRS Science Polic Research Division, type and pace of development were determined by report done for House Committee on Science and TecK nology, September a combination of scientific and technical curiosity, mil- 1977, pp. 265-273. 362 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The second major agency was the European Space (ESC), which met for the next 9 years and provided Research Organization (ESRO) which was formally es- the forum for the founding of ESA in 1975. tablished in 1962. Loosely modeled on CERN, the co- There was first of alla consensus within the ESC that operative European Nuclear Research Center, ESRO there should be a single coordinated European pro- intended to develop satellites and instruments for con- gram, but there was disagreement about the relative ducting scientific experiments in space, including weight to give the three program areas: science, appli- tracking and relay stations, and to procure launch serv- cations, and launch vehicles. Basic science and ices.4 ESRO (unlike ELDO) achieved a high degree of launcher development were already the province of credibility, and was able to cooperate successfully ESRO and ELDO, respectively, but applications activ- with NASA and other countries. A major difficulty ities were seen as increasingly important. For one ESRO faced, one which it shared with ELDO, was the thing, U.S. and Soviet successes with communications principle of “juste retour” (fair return). Participating and weather satellites had shown the usefulness of countries contributed to the agencies a certain assess- space applications. For another, there was increased ment (for ESRO, an amount roughly in proportion to European awareness of the importance of advanced their gross national product), and the agency contracts technology in maintaining a competitive position in were supposed to be let in the same ratios; i.e., if international trade and influence vis-à-vis the super- France provided 20 percent of the budget, 20 percent powers, especially the United States. In 1967, J. of the amount of ESRO’S contracts were supposed to Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s book, “The American be with French firms (in fact, France’s share of the con- Challenge, ” in which he predicted the decline of Euro- tracts was consistently higher than its budget contribu- pean industry faced with American technical and tion).s This resulted in many contracts being let on managerial superiority, “polemicized the United political and partisan grounds rather than to the low- States economic invasion of Europe and aroused a est or most qualified bidder.6 Eventually, to circum- popular interest in technology comparable to the Sput- vent the destructive and time-consuming quarreling nik aftermath in the United States.”8 At the same time, over contracts, European aerospace and electronics however, there was increasing concern in both Europe firms formed themselves into three formal multina- and the United States about reaping useful economic tional consortia-called COSMOS, MESH, and STAR– and social benefits from space technologies; by the to bid on European projects. end of the 1960’s, there was little enthusiasm on either From 1967 to 1975 (when it merged into the ESA), continent for large prestige projects such as Apollo. ESRO launched nine scientific satellites and 168 To be publicly acceptable, investments had to be jus- sounding rockets7 The most important development tified by concrete and relatively short-term payoffs, over time was a growing interest in applications satel- The British skepticism about continuing the Europa lites; in 1968, ESRO was first given a mandate to study project, mentioned previously, reflected this shift; the applications, especially in communications and mete- British saw Europa as an unnecessary and expensive orology. By 1975, ESRO was engaged in four major item being pursued to the detriment of more useful applications projects: 1 ) a maritime navigation satel- and technically advanced applications satellites. The lite, Marots; 2) an experimental communications satel- British, along with the Italians and a few others, lite, OTS; 3) Aerosat, a joint venture with the United thought U.S. launchers were perfectly adequate and States for aeronautical communications; and 4) Meteo- likely to be considerably cheaper than the inefficient sat, a regional meteorological satellite. Europa. The prolauncher countries, however, led by A third organization, the Conference Europeéne de France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, thought that Telecommunications par Satellites (CETS), was formed the United States could not be counted on to launch to discuss European participation in INTELSAT. It was European applications satellites that might compete made up of national Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph with U.S. systems, especially in telecommunications. (PTT) agencies and played little role in formulating The United States had launched ESRO’S scientific sat- space policy or programs. ellites without any problems, but there were no guar- In 1966, the members of ELDO, concerned about antees as to other types of payloads. lack of harmony between countries and programs, In 1969, the question of the American relationship established the 12-nation European Space Conference became a key issue. In making plans for the post- Apollo space program, U.S. policy makers placed 4 1 bid., p. 237. strong emphasis on soliciting European participation, ‘See Walter McDougall, “Space Age Europe 1957-1 980,” paper presented at the Conference on the History of Space Activity, Yale University, Feb. 7 1981, p. 6. %chwarz, op. cit., p. 211. ‘JHenry Nau, Nationa/ Po/ltm and /nternationa/ Technology (Baltimore: TWorld-Wide Space Activities, op. cit., pp. 254-256. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 55. Appendix G—Background for lnternational Programs ● 363

partly to strengthen political and economic ties and signatories to consult with INTELSAT to ensure the partly to lessen the costs. In October 1969, the United “technical compatibility” of any proposed operational States proposed that Europe undertake to build a international telecommunications satellites, as well as major segment of the proposed space transportation to avoid “significant economic harm” caused by re- system. Emphasis was placed on the “space tug, ” an gional competition. In fact, this issue did affect plans expendable orbit-to-orbit rocket, because the exper- to launch the French-German Symphonic communi- tise accumulated in developing the Europa could be cations satellite, which the United States agreed to do used to develop the tug. The Europeans concurred, (in 1971) only after it was declared an experimental and began extensive planning for eventual construc- rather than an operational system, in part to avoid the tion. However, in 1972 the United States withdrew issue of whether the United States would launch an its offer, partly because the entire post-Apollo program operational satellite.12 This experience strengthened was being scaled back, because of doubts about Euro- French determination to develop an autonomous pean technical capabilities; and also because the Air launch capability. Force thought the military potential of the tug was too Resolution of these issues made the negotiations in great to permit dependence on outside sources.9 In- ESC over establishing ESA prolonged and compli- stead, the United States “offered” the Europeans the cated.13 Essentially, the successful outcome involved sortie lab (later known as Spacelab) or a number of compromise among the three largest participants, constituent parts of the space shuttle. Withdrawal of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, with each the tug proposal angered the Europeans, not only agreeing to back the others’ preferred projects i n ex- because of the considerable time and expense in- change for reciprocal support. vested, but because some countries, particularly The French wanted to build a launcher, specifical- France, were suspicious that the United States did not ly the L3S or Ariane, which was first conceived in 1972 want the Europeans to develop their own space as a unilateral French project. In order to get ESA sup- transportation capability, and wished instead to retain port, the French agreed to provide the bulk of the a U.S. monopoly on launchers. One result was re- funding for research and testing (approximately 60 newed commitment to a European rocket; another percent), with Germany providing some 20 percent, was French consultation with the Soviet Union about Belgium 5 percent, and various other participants the possible future use of Soviet launchers. remainder. The British reluctantly agreed to a 1 to 2 The question of U.S. guarantees to launch European percent contribution. The Ariane would be launched applications satellites was related to U.S.-European from France’s spaceport at Kourou in French Guiana, collaboration, in that many Europeans were con- and the main contractor would be a French firm, vinced that such guarantees were contingent on Euro- Aerospatiale. pean willingness to build and fund part of the U.S. West Germany had been a strong backer of a Euro- post-Apollo program. In 1971, the United States prom- pean launcher and also of the proposed space tug. ised to assist with Iaunches, provided they were “for When the tug offer was withdrawn, the Germans’ pre- peaceful purposes and consistent with obligations ferred project became Spacelab, which they saw as under relevant international arrangements’’.10 Similar a vehicle for conducting scientific and commercial ex- assurances were later granted to all “other countries periments as well as for improving German industrial and international organizations on a nondiscrimina- and technical skills. More so than the French, the Ger- tory, reimbursable basis.”11 The United States insisted mans believed that U.S. launch guarantees could be that this policy would be honored regardless of Euro- trusted. Following high-level talks between President pean participation: the qualification of consistency Pompidou of France and Chancellor Brandt of Ger- with “relevant international arrangements” was, how- many in 1973, the two countries agreed to a quid pro ever, a potential stumbling block, especially to launch- quo: the Germans would fund approximately 60 per- ing European communications satellites. The relevant cent of Spacelab, and the French 20 percent, in return agreement was the “International Telecommunica- for similar but reversed support for Ariane.14 tions Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) Agreement, ” The United Kingdom had less enthusiasm for sup- signed August 20, 1971, which, in article XIV, required porting a wide range of major space projects than either France or Germany, preferring to concentrate 9Schwarz, op. cit., p. 22o. 10Le~er from u, A, Johnson, U ,S. Under Secretary of State for PO[itica[ Af- on applications satellites and on cooperative scientific fairs, to Mlntster Theo Lefevre, Cha~rrnan of the European Space Conference, Sept. 1, 1971. I I See ‘ ‘Launch ASSU rances pOllcy, ” White House Press Release of Oct. 9, 12wor/d. wjc/e Space Activities, Op. Cit., P. 1961. 1972; in Space Law: Se/ectecf Basic Documents, 2d cd., committee print for I ~For detail discussion see World-Wide Space Activities, Op. cit., PP. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, December 293-303. 1978, p. 557. )aWor/d. W;de Space Activities, op. Cit., P. 286.

94-9: 5 n - B 2 - 25 .—

364 • Civilian Space Policy and Applications

programs. Though Britain strongly favored the estab- until 1973, A large number of the satellites launched lishment of a single European space agency, British were used for military-related geodetic work; others support for ESA hinged on the potential competition were for experiments in communications and atmo- between its Geostationary Technology Satellite (GTS) spheric research. and ESRO’S proposed Marots maritime communica- The French also built satellites for launch on U.S. tions satellite. Eventually, Britain agreed to drop its and Soviet vehicles; the first U.S.-launched French GTS in favor of becoming the Marots project leader satellite went upon December 6, 1965 (oniy 10 days and providing some 56 percent of the funding. It also after the Asterix, suggesting that the French were agreed to support the Ariane and Spacelab programs, understandably eager to have the first French satellite though at fairly low levels. These compromises (the placed in orbit by a national launcher). In 1971, the so-called “Second Package Deal”) were essentially Soviet Union launched a French scientific satellite, worked out by July 1973, paving the way for the draft- Aureole. Talks with the Soviets began in 1965 and a ing of an ESA charter and the founding of ESA in May number of cooperative projects, including the train- 1975. ing of two French astronauts for an upcoming Salyut mission, have taken place. France Great Britain In 1960, France announced plans to build an IRBM designed to carry nuclear weapons, and an industrial The British initiated a two-stage military rocket pro- consortium called SEREB was formed to build military gram in 1956. In 1960, the program was canceled due missiles. SEREB eventually became active in civilian to a conviction that it was militarily obsolete; the “Blue developments as well. In 1961, a civilian agency, the Streak” first stage was then proposed as part of ELDO’S Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), was Europa launcher, of which Great Britain was initially formed under the Ministry of State for Scientific a strong supporter. Research, Atomic and Space Affairs. During the 1960’s Great Britain developed a num- At first the French hoped for close cooperation with ber of scientific satellites known as the Ariel series, the United States, but the United States was reluctant the first of which was launched by the United States to transfer its newly acquired missile technology in 1964. Great Britain was an active supporter of both abroad.15 After considerable effort, the first operational ELDO and ESRO; in addition, it embarked in 1964 on French IRBM, the S-2, was deployed in 1971, and the a major launch development program known as Black first submarine-launched missile in 1972. Arrow. In 1971, the Black Arrow succeeded in orbiting Meanwhile, CNES began work on a series of civilian a single 66-kg satellite, called Prospero, from the launchers, the so-called “precious stones” series. The Australian test range at Woomera, following which the only successful launcher was the Diamant version, program was canceled. Despite the L1 1.5 million which in November 1965 orbited the first French satel- spent, the government determined that using U.S. lite, the 42-kg Asterix, from the French testing grounds launchers would be significantly less expensive–un- in Saharan Algeria. France was also a major partici- Iike the French, the British had no concern that the pant in ELDO, whose ill-fated Europa was to have used United States would balk at launching commercially a Diamant as its second stage. The Diamant in various competitive or military payloads. In 1969, the United versions made successful orbital flights from Algeria States orbited the first of two Skynet geosynchronous and later from the Kourou spaceport in French Guiana military communications satellites.l G

~Swor\d.wide s~ce Activities, op. cit., p. 148. lbWOr/~wi& s~ce Activities, op. cit., pp. 217-234. Appendix H INDUSTRIAL INNOVATIVE PROCESS

Innovation corporation-wide task that involves the skills and personalities of everyone from the scientists and engineers If the United States is to remain a leader in the de- in the lab to the top legal and financial management. velopment and use of space technology, it will be nec- Because of this wide spectrum of interested parties, essary to enlist a greater share of private resources to the process of project selection is highly dependent augment the contributions of the Federal Govern- on the flow of information within the firm. The ob- ment. In each of the four technologies dealt with in ject of scientists and engineers is generally new knowl- this report, the opportunities for private investment edge, and they tend to focus on the problem of techni- have increased dramatically in very recent times. In cal success. its attempts to encourage industrial participation, the Managers, on the other hand, are concerned with National Aeronautics and Space Administration marketing a profitable product and therefore focus on (NASA) has not only identified many potential com- development time, risk, and potential return on invest- mercial applications for space technology, but has de- ment. This marked difference in interests and goals veloped new institutional mechanisms for increasing may result in a communication gap that prevents man- the flow of Government expertise and resources to agement from getting the technical information that the private sector. With a few exceptions, however, it needs to assess projects accurately.2 the private sector has remained unenthusiastic about This problem is particularly significant in the con- the prospects of investing in space. text of NASA’s desire to involve the private sector in The purpose of this appendix will be to take a brief the commercialization of space technology. The proc- look at the process of innovation in order to establish ess of project selection within a firm is already com- a framework within which to discuss the issue of complex. When the administrative problem of coordinat- mercializing space technology. Because the subject ing NASA’s management structure and technical ex- of industrial innovation is complex, and highly de- pertise with that of the firm is added, such a project pendent on subtle factors such as the willingness to may appear unattractive. NASA’S Joint Endeavor take risks and the acuity of technical and business Agreements (discussed in ch. 8) and related institu- judgments, generalizations in this area can be decep- tional arrangements are designed, in part, to address tive. Nevertheless, it is useful to identify some of the this problem. key factors that motivate the private sector to allocate resources to the pursuit of product development and The Decision to Innovate improvement. Innovation is one means used by firms to stimulate Innovation is generally defined by economists to be growth and to compete with other firms within an in- the first commercial application of a new or improved dustry. Improvements in a product or process can lead product or production process. The process by which to a reduction in the costs of production or improve- innovations are developed can be viewed as a se- ments in performance or quality. In this manner, inno- quence of three interdependent events. ’ vation can increase a firm’s market share, profits, or Ž Generation of an idea, involving the synthesis of both. Innovation may also be directed to the develop- a market need and the recognition of a technical ment of new products targeted for existing or poten- capability for meeting that need. tial markets. ● Problern solving including the setting of specific Innovation is not the only way, and often not the technical goals and the search for alternate methods best way for individual firms to stimulate growth and of meeting those goals. to compete. These goals can also be accomplished ● Irnplernentation or commercialization, consisting of by noninnovative methods designed to maximize engineering design, tooling for production, plant sales, such as advertising or new marketing strategies, construction, production and marketing start-up, or to minimize cost, as by standardizing production and first commercial introduction. techniques. A firm is also not limited to internal Analyzing these three stages, it becomes apparent development, but can pursue growth and a competi- that the management of technical innovation requires tive edge through merger, acquisitions, and diversifi- much more than the maintenance of a productive cation.3 research and development (R&D) laboratory. It is a ‘Edwin Mansfield, The Economics of Technical Change, 1968, pp. 59-61. ‘James M. Utterback, “Innovation in Industry and the Diffusion of Tech- ‘Attilio Bisio and Lawrence Gastwirt, Turning Research and Development nology,” Science, vol. 183, Feb. 15, 1974, p. 621. Into Profit, 1979, p. 37.

365 366 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Within the industrial sector a small number of specif- This results in part from the fact that no single firm ic industries make a disproportionate contribution to controls a significant enough portion of the market to the total annual amount of R&D expenditures. Table make a sustained research endeavor profitable. Since H-1 demonstrates that five industrial categories–air- market share directly affects revenue flow and the re- craft and missiles, electrical equipment, machinery, turn that a firm may anticipate on a particular invest- motor vehicles, and chemical products—accounted ment, firms with a small share of a particular market for over 75 percent of total industrial spending in 1978. cannot afford to make large investments in R&D. S The large interindustry differences in R&D expendi- Innovative activity tends to be greater in new in- tures illustrate the fact that different firms and different dustries and industries characterized by rapid growth industries do not attach the same importance to R&D and expanding markets.6 Initially, competition in these investment. industries is based on product quality and perform- The decision by a firm to allocate resources to the ance and a second-best product may have little value. pursuit of innovation can be viewed as a function of However, as such industries begin to mature, competi- two major factors. The first is the firm’s potential for tion starts to become based on price and the produc- innovation as dictated by external considerations such tion process, and therefore the product becomes rela- as the structure and maturity of the industry, the in- tively standardized. Innovations that are pursued after dustry relationship with Government and the overall this time tend to be incremental process innovations state of the economy. The second factor is the firm’s that will lower the unit costs of production. Eventual- willingness to innovate as dictated by internal finan- ly, as large investments are made in plant and equip- cial, technical and human resources and the particular ment, manufacturers are less inclined to pursue radical corporate strategy, or “personality,” of the firm. innovations in either the product or the manufacturing process, as this could render their existing capital Potential for Innovation base obsolete.7 An interesting example of this can be seen in the Federal Government programs, incentives, and reg- U.S. satellite communications industry. Until 1973, ulations have a significant role to play in the creation NASA played the leading role in the development of of an industry’s operating environment, Federal Gov- advanced communications satellite technology. When ernment support of the electrical equipment and aero- the NASA program was phased down, it was assumed space industries is largely responsible for the fact that that the private sector would continue to finance and these two industries combined constitute almost half develop the communications systems necessary to of the entire R&D expenditures in 1978 (table H-1). meet future needs. Though the communications in- By supplying the funds or the financial incentive to dustry did continue to fund R&D programs, most of conduct research, and by guaranteeing a market for the research was dedicated to improving the opera- new product and process innovations, the Govern- tional capabilities and the reliability of existing ment can encourage a level of R&D activity that would systems. As a result, the U.S. satellite communications not otherwise be maintained. (This subject is discussed industry may face strong competition from the Japa- in greater detail later). nese and the Europeans, both of whom have begun Of course, this is not to say that Government finan- to develop the high-frequency satellite systems that cial support is the main factor in stimulating industrial may be necessary to meet the future demand for sat- innovation in all industries. Certain industries, notably ellite communication services. pharmaceuticals and chemicals, maintain very high Industrial innovation is also affected by the overall R&D to sales ratios and receive very little Government health of the economy. An economy characterized support. 4 This is the result of the fact that competi- by a high rate of inflation and generally volatile finan- tion in these industries is primarily based on new prod- cial markets has an adverse effect on all types of in- uct development and improved product performance. vestment but is particularly damaging to investment Another factor that affects the level of R&D spend- in innovation. Under such conditions firms show a ing is the structure of a particular industry. Whether preference for short-term, low-risk investments. or not it is profitable for a firm to invest in innovative Radical innovations, which by their nature are risky activities is to some degree dictated by the number and often require long periods of time between con- of potential rivals and the overall market profit poten- cept identification and eventual commercialization, tial. in an industry composed of many small sellers, do not compete well for corporate resources. such as home construction or brick manufacturing, the rate of innovation has been traditionally very low. SMansfield, op. cit. Wtterback, op. cit. 7Christopher T. Hill and James H. Utterback, Techno/ogica/ Innovation for 4 D. Schwartzman, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry. a Dynamic Economy, 1979, p. 53. Appendix H—Industrial Innovative Process ● 367

co . 0

0300JC7 NComm

......

“In 368 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The stimulus to innovate may also stem from criti- be a technical and commercial success, and the finan- cal shortages or a sharp rise in cost of the resources cial ability of a firm to undertake the project. Although necessary for production. For example, intensive formal, quantitative project selection techniques can research on synthetic rubber was only undertaken be used to project such factors as rates of return and after certain cartel agreements caused the price of pay-out periods, in the final analysis the decision to natural rubber to increase dramatically.8 A more re- innovate is a strategic choice that depends upon a cor- cent example is the aerospace industry’s attempts to porate manager’s business and technical acumen. design jet engines with greater fuel efficiency. This Some analysts have charged that U.S. corporate decision was undertaken in response to rising fuel managers have underestimated the need for innova- costs and the threat of temporary fuel shortages. Ris- tion. They contend that this has resulted in the decline ing labor costs have also contributed significantly to in innovation and productivity growth and deficits in innovations in robotics and industrial automation.g the balance of trade. A recent article charged that By their preference for servicing existing markets Willingness to Innovate rather than creating new ones and by their devotion to short-term returns and “management by numbers,” At the broad level of R&D strategy, individual firms many (American managers) have effectively forsworn must assess the relative advantages of innovation v. long-term technological superiority as a competitive imitation. Innovation is attractive if being first yields weapon. a strong market position and if barriers to entry (e.g., Because of the existence of other factors such as in- patent protection, capital requirements, control over flation, tax laws, labor costs, Government regulation, distribution) can be erected which limit the ability of fear of capital shortages, or the price of imported oil other firms to copy or improve upon a product.10 On it is difficult to gauge the truth of this assessment. It the other hand, the risk assumed by the imitator is is important to note, however, that to the extent that much lower, and if the innovator is very successful corporate managers do rely on quantitative project he may create a market large enough to accommodate selection techniques, there is some evidence that such the imitator. The R&D strategy of a firm can have many techniques tend to be biased against ambitious proj- different orientations to the market:11 ects with potentially large payoffs.13 These techniques Ž First to market—based on strong R&D, technical often utilize formal market surveys to compare the es- leadership, and risk taking. timated returns on investment for alternative projects. . Follow the leader—based on strong development Reliance on such surveys can be misleading in that resources and the ability to act quickly as the mar- consumers are often unable to appreciate the value ket starts its growth phase. of major innovations before they are commercial- . Applications engineering—based on product ized. 14 A Though major innovations may have a much modifications to fit the needs of particular cus- greater profit potential than modest product improve- tomers in mature markets. ments, they are more difficult to justify using formal For each new product or service being sought or market surveys. considered, the firm must also assess the effects of that This fact has important ramifications for potentially product or service on the firm’s present manufactur- commercializable space applications. Because such ing, distribution, and office facilities. New product projects involve both technical and market uncertain- development can be sought to enhance an existing ties, industry has viewed them as unattractive invest- area of competence such as a distribution system, a ment. It is difficult to assess, at this point, whether in- production capability, or promotional skills. Such dustry’s cautious view of space is the result of myopic development may also be primarily defensive in char- management techniques or insight based on experi- acter, as when a firm pursues a product in order to ence in dealing with complex investment decisions. spread the risks of its involvement in a highly cyclical IZRobert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy, “Managing OUr Way to ECO- industry. nomic Decline,” Harvard Business Review, july-August 1980, p. 70. The decision of a firm to allocate resources to inno- IJEdwin Mansfield, et al., The I?oduction and Application of New Industrial Technology, 1977, p. 43. vation is a subjective determination on the part of 14Hayes, op. cit., p. 71; Hayes and Abernathy point out that: “The ar6u- management that takes into consideration the need ment that consumer analyses and formal market surveys should dominate to innovate, the probability that a given project will other considerations when allocating resources to product development is untenable. It may be useful to remember that the initial market estimate for computers in 1945 projected total worldwide sales of only 10 units. Similar- %. W. Stocking and M. W. Watkins, Cartels in Action, 1964, p. 73. ly, even the most carefully researched analysis of consumer preferences for gjohn D. Fisk, /ndustria/ Robs in the U. S.: /ssues and Perspectives, Con- gas-guzzling cars in an era of gasoline abundance offers little useful guidance gressional Research Service, March 1981. to today’s automobile manufacture in making wise product investment deci- IOBisio, op. cit., p. 37. sions. Customers may know what their needs are, but they often define those II Bisio, op. cit., p. 38. needs in terms of existing products, processes, markets, and prices. ” Appendix H—industrial Innovative Process ● 369

The answers to such questions may be forthcoming ment program. Ordinarily, the private sector bears the as Europe and Japan target specific space technologies total responsibility for funding R&D intended to be infor commercial application. corporated into commercial systems. However, over In space applications, as well as other high-technol- the past decade the Government has provided signifi- ogy industries, the Government has played, and con- cant support, not only for basic research but also for tinues to play, a major role in product identification applied research, technology and systems develop- and development. It is important therefore to examine ment, and even demonstration projects in such areas the nature of this role and Some of the methods by as space and energy technology. which it is accomplished. A policy decision to support R&D in an area intended for eventual commercialization is a decision Government Role in Innovation to augment or override market forces as a determinant of R&D investment. In the United States, the sci- The Government plays an extremely important role entific and technological sectors that have advanced in the innovative process, particularly in the area of most rapidly in the 20th century, including space, are basic research. The impact of such financial support those that have received substantial assistance from has been particularly significant in the aerospace, elec- the Federal Government.15 This assistance has taken tronics and computer industries, where expensive the form, among others, of direct financial support for basic research has been essential to product develop- R&D and of the creation of Government organizations ment. Government can provide financial support of to manage the research programs carried out with R&D both directly and indirectly, through a variety such support. of mechanisms. Such support does, however, raise im- The establishment of NASA, and this organization’s portant questions as to the appropriate roles of the early work on communications satellites, are examples public and private sectors in the development and of substantial Government involvement in a commer- operation of new technology. One way to address this cially viable technology. Another example can be problem is to identify the kind of benefit–public good found in the development of electronic component or private good—that a new technology will provide. technology. The reason for early U.S. domination of A public good is one that cannot profitably be di- this industry is directly related to the R&D support provided, priced, and sold to the individual members of vided by the Government. In the early 1950’s, the mil- a collectivity (i.e., a city, State or country). Govern- itary services, desiring to make their equipment more ments traditionally have existed to provide public portable and to increase its reliability in the field, goods such as highways, sea and air navigation aids, began to finance semiconductor R&Don a large scale. and national defense. A private good, by contrast, is Between 1955 and 1961, the Government spent ap- one that can be provided through a market transac- proximately $66 million on semiconductor R&D and tion to those who desire it and are willing to pay the production refinements. price set by the provider, Of course, it is often the case that a particular product or service produces mixed Purchase Guarantees benefits, making it difficult for a private sector sup- In addition to direct financial support the Govern- plier to justify the cost of providing the benefit. In this ment may encourage innovation and the commerciali- situation, some argue that the Government should in- zation of new technologies in a number of ways, such tervene to correct this lack of market incentive by as guarantees, technology transfers, and favorable tax using public funds to invest in technology intended treatment. One example of the influence of market for eventual use in the private sector. guarantees can be seen in the integrated circuit indus- Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally in the con- try. Though the basic inventions in this industry re- text of Government funding, the definitions of public sulted from work done under Government contract, good and private good are highly political in character. the technical breakthrough that allowed mass produc- It is important to recognize that when discussing tech- tion was accomplished by Fairchild Industries without nologies that may benefit large segments of society, 16 any Federal support. The fact that there was a clear it is a matter of judgment and philosophy, not an issue Government demand for these products and proc- for analytical resolution, which should be provided esses was an important factor in the firm’s decision through Government programs and which through to undertake this research in the first place. Future private activity. The most controversial area with respect to R&D 15J. Schnee, “Government Programs and the Growth of High-Technology funding by the Government is that in which eventual Industries,” Research Policy, vol. 7 no. 2 (1978), p. 4. commercialization is a major objective in the develop- lbOECD, Gaps in Technology: Electronic Components, 1968, p. 59. 370 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

developments in remote sensing may provide another Government regulation can also delay the introduc- example of the importance of a Government-guaran- tion of new and useful products and processes. An teed market. Several plans have been proposed that example of this fact can be seen in the history of the envision the transfer of the Landsat system to a private use of satellites for domestic communications. In 1963, sector organization. All of these plans are contingent when NASA began launching its Syncom series of sat- on the Government’s agreement to purchase its re- ellites utilizing the geosynchronous orbit, it became motely sensed data from such an organization, apparent that the use of this orbit would have impor- thereby guaranteeing that such a venture would have tant applications for domestic communications. Yet, a stable financial base. it was not until 1974 that commercial domestic satellite service was available in the United States. This long Technology Transfer period between the technical realization and the commercial application of the technology was marked by In addition to providing assured product demand, scores of legal and organizational battles over systems it is also significant that the Government develops ownerships involving the Federal Communication technologies that have either a director indirect usage Commission (FCC), the Justice Department, the White in the private sector. An example of this can be seen House and the numerous segments of private industry in the computer industry. Because of Government who wished to use the technology. The result of nearly sales in this industry companies were able to fund their a decade of struggling was that FCC, in 1972, an- R&D programs at very high Ievels.17 This resulted in nounced its multientry decision which held that any a rate of technological progress that exceeded that qualified entity, subject to certain conditions, could which could have occurred in a normal commercial own and operate a commercial satellite system. Mean- environment. In addition, military requirements with while, Canada had been enjoying for years a domestic respect to computer size, speed, and reliability far ex- satellite system built by a U.S. company and launched ceeded what would have been requested by the busi- by NASA.19 ness community. result, the technology that was As a In the near future, Government regulation will have transfered to the private sector was far more sophisti- a significant role to play in the development of private- cated than it would have been without Government ly owned launch systems. At present, several different involvement. Finally, because of the military’s exten- agencies, each with uncertain authority, are issuing sive use of this new technology, the computer industry regulations that have an effect on private launches. was able to overcome the natural skepticism that No lead agency has been designated to address critical would have existed in the business community toward issues such as aerial and maritime clearance, the de- an untried product. There are many examples of tech- velopment of new commercial launch sites, the need nology transfers in the aerospace industry that have for a comprehensive indemnification scheme, and resulted or may result in important commercial prod- methods by which to authorize and license payloads. ucts. The obvious examples that have been mentioned Because of the importance of these issues both domes- above are advanced communication systems and re- tically and internationally, it is certain that some form mote-sensing technology. of regulation will be necessary. Whether or not such regulation will encourage or hinder the flow of private Government Regulation capital into this infant industry is yet to be seen. Though the effects of Government regulation on innovation are not completely understood, many are of Tax Incentives the opinion that regulation is a factor in the recent The Government may also stimulate R&D expendi- decline of innovation in the United States. A recent tures by allowing industries to use the tax system to report by the National Research Council tended, with reduce the cost of such endeavors. Three of the main certain reservations, to agree with this opinion.18 It incentives in the present tax system are depreciation stated that though the reasons for the decline in U.S. allowances, investment tax credits, and the deductibil- innovation are varied and complex, there are a num- ity of R&D outlays. Depreciation allows a firm to de- ber of cases (such as new pesticides, certain chemical duct as a business expense the cost of certain assets compounds and railroad shipping services), where sol- over the period of their useful life. Investment tax id documentation existed to prove that regulation con- credits allow firms to take a certain percentage of new tributed to this decline. *

I Zschnw, op. cit., p. 10. locational Research Council, The Impact of Regulation on Industrial Inn* pears that regulation has caused R&D capital funds to be used to meet regula- vation, 1979, p. 9. tions, it has also had the effect of stimulating the development of new socially ● The NRC report does point out, however, that in certain instances Govern- desirable products such as pollution-control equipment and technology. ment regulation may act to stimulate innovation. For example, though it ap- T9M. Kinsley, Outer Space and /nner Sanctums, 1976, p. 131. Appendix H—industrial Innovative Process • 371

investment purchases as a credit against their tax liabil- outlays, an investment tax credit of 10 percent, and ity. Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code permits a depreciable life of plant and equipment of 14 years. firms to deduct total R&D outlays in the year that the Taking these factors into consideration, if a firm wants expenditures are incurred. to earn a 15-percent return on investment, taking into Though the intricacies of the corporate tax system account the time value or money, it must anticipate are beyond the scope of this report, a simple exam- pre-tax earnings of over $90 million. If the tax regula- ple is helpful to illustrate some of the ways that tions in this example are altered to allow a 150-percent changes in the tax structure can create the incentive deduction on R&D outlays, an investment tax credit to innovate .20 of 25 percent, and a 5-year depreciation on the plant Figure H-1 depicts an R&D project with a 20-year and equipment, the required pre-tax earnings to development time and a 15-year market life. It achieve a 15-percent return on investment would be assumes a research expenditure of $1 million per year, cut in half. Figure 5 demonstrates the effect of these an investment of $50 million spread over 4 years to changes. build the manufacturing facility, and a venture suc- Although models set forth in figures H-1 and H-2 cess rate of 100 percent. It also assumes that the tax are in many ways overly simplistic, they do point out regulations allow a 100-percent deduction for R&D how the tax system can be used to help firms recover ——— .—. .— the cost of their R&D efforts. By making R&D expend- ~~john s Benjarnln, stdternerlt on the Space Industrlallzatlon Act of 1979 itures easier to recover, firms will have the incentive (H. R, 2337), hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Ap- pllcatlons of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 96th Cong. to invest in more and longer research and develop- 1st sess , 1979. ment projects.

Figure H-1.— Results of Project Model for 20-Year Development Time

(millions) Time (years) +

Figure H.2.—Effect of Tax Law Modifications on Project Model

SOURCE The Space Industrialization Act of 1979: hearings on H.R. 2337 before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, 96th Cong., Ist sess. 45 (statement of Dr. John S. Benjamin). Appendix I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as Amended

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT OF 195& AS AMENDED AN ACT To provide tor reeeareh LDto problems ot ftlght within and outaide the earth's atmosphere, and tor other purposes Be it mtlC~d by the S61'I4te aM HlYU8e 0/ RepruMltta ewe. 0/ the United Statu 0/ America in Oongreu tU .emlJl6d, TITLE I-SHORT TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY, AND DEFINITIONS

mOIlT T1TLII Sm. 101. This Act may be cited as the "National Aero nautics.and Space Act of 1958".

DEOLABATION (D' POLICY AND PUllP08Il

SEC. 102. (a) The Co~ hereby declares that it is 42 U.s.c, ~Il the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind. (b) The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United States ~uire that ad~uate ~tt~~mfu~:: c~t~ :~~=v= be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian ~ncy exercising control over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United States, except that activities pecUliar to or primarily associated with the development of wellPOns systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development n~ to make eft'ective provision for the defense of the United States) shall be the re sponsibility of, and shall be directed by, the Department I)f Defense; and that determination as to which such agency has responsibility for and direction of any such activity shall be made by the President in conformity with section 201 ( e ) . (c) The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be conducted so -as to contribute materially to one or more of the following objectives : (1) The expansion of human know ledge 01 phe nomena in the atmosphere and space;

(499)

372 500 501

TITLE II-COORDINATION OF AERONAUTI- CAL AND SPACE ACTIVITIES 503 502

FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION 504 505

Acquisition, construction, maintenance, etc., of property.

Cafeterias and other facilities for employees.

Gifts.

5 A ut nrrjzatlon to r’1~ at rate not to e~ceed $100 per diem for ln - “~ Authorl:v tn lea~e hulldlass In the District of Columbla was ridded dividunls mm. unended by Public Law 9.3-316, June 22, 197A, section 6 to sec. 202(h) (3), T-? Stnt. 430. bv Pllbllc L-IW R6-20. Mav 13. 1959 (88 Stat. 2A3). ( ?S Stnt. 2 1). The erect of 40 U. S.C. 24 has been modified by Public Lnw 90-S30 Octcber 4. 1969 (82 Stat. 944). • 506 507

(10) when determined by the Administrator to be of tAe concession and may not 'be taken for public n~, and 8Ub~eet to such security investigations W!Ie without just compensation; • as he maY' determme to be appropriate, to employ (12) with the approval of the President, to enter aliens without regard to statutory provisions. pro into cooperative ~nts under which members hibiting payment of compensation to aliens; of the Army, Nary, Air Force, and Marine Corps (11) to provide by concession, without ~rd to may be detailed bv the appropriate Secretary for section 321 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 412; services in the perlormance of functions under this 40 U.S.C. 303b), on such terms as the Administra Act to the same extent as that to which they might tor may deem to be appropriate and to be necessary be lawfully assigned in the Department of Defense; to protect the concessloner against loss of his in (13) (A) to eonsider ascertain, adjust, deter vestment in propertJJ~ut not anticipated profits) re mine, Settfe, and pay, on behalf of the United States, sulting from the A . istration's discretIonary acts in full satisfaction thereof, any claim for $5,000 or and decisions, for the construction, maintenance, and less against the United States for bodily injury, operation of all manner of facilities and equipment death, or damage to or loss of real or personal for visitors to the several installations of the Admin prope~ result~ from the ~ond~ct of the ~dmin istration and, in connection therewith, to provide istratlon's functIons as specified m subsection ~a} services incident to the dissemination of information of this section, where such claim is presented to the concerning its activities to such visitors, without Administration in writing within two years after tho charge .01· with a reasonable charge therefor (with accident or incident out of which the claim arises; this authority being in addition to any other author and ity which the Adriiinistration may have to provide (B) if the Administration considers that a claim facilities, equipment, and services for visitors to its in excess of $5,000 is meritorious and would other installations). A concession agreement under this wise be covered by this paragraph, to report the paragraph may be negotiated with any qualified facts and circumstances tliereof to the Congress for proposer following due consideration of &ll pro its consideration; T and posa.ls received after reasonable public notice of the [(14)] Repealed.' mtention to contract. The concessioner shall be af forded a reasonable opportunity to make a profit CIVILIAN-MILITARY LIAISON COMMITrEE· commensurate with the capital invested and the SIIe. 204. (a) There shall be a Civilian-Militarv T.ial- C2U... e.MT~ obl~tions assumed, and the consideration paid by lIOn Committee consisting of- ." ---- Jkt La , .~. him for the concession shall be based on the probable (1) a Chainnan. who shall hA thA h ...rul th,,-_n'" • value of such op~rtunity and not on maximizing mel who Shall be appoiJ"te~rby -the-presid~t~~-~il revenue to the Umted States. Eo.~ concession-agree serve at the pleasure of the President.10 ment shall specify the manner in which the con cessioner's recordS are to be maintained, and shall ·P'ubUc Law 93-74• .July 23. 1973. seetlon 8 (87 ~tat. 114) added provide for access to any such records by the Ad r~w~pe.i1·8~~u.:!r' u~~\:~i~~t ~~) 30:'~h:9~ra:e~~::f~~1~8a1~~ ministration and the COmptroller General of the (11). 72 8tat. 431. Wblclf: formerly lluthortHd NASA. ··to employ retiree! _ml_oDed odleen of the arme4 forces of the United 3t1ltes and com. United States for a period of five years after the peuate them at the rate establlBhed tor the ~tiOIl!l oecupied by them within the AdmJDI.tration. lub;eet only to the llmltatlo•• In PII)" sd close of the business year to which such records re (orUlln 118C!. 212 of the Act ot .June 30. 1932. aa amended (15 U.~.C. ~911)." late. A concessioner may be accorded a possessory 'ftr:eg::l~r.nf~r:.n .::.t a~~ t03~Yin~1&~. ~Je~i~~!~~'c~~!k interest, consisting of 8.l1 incidents of ownership e!IIte • • • the law~ COnl'E'rniDIIJ the eiYiJlaa etDnloyment nt retired mem lien at the DDUormf'd semeee. • • .,. Pertinent IIOrtlolLl or tile Dual except legal title (which shall vest in the United Comlldl'llti8A A~t are llet forth ID AppeDdu B. ' States), in any structure, fixture, or improvement he tr;r':-o~·d~':a.o~:: .!e::.~~d!fe(:A~.:'~. ~it:~~~ UJuler the Fed· con...qf;ructs or locates upon land owned by the United • Public Law 91-646• .January 2. 1971. seetJon 220(.) (2) (M Stat. (803), repealed seettoo. 203(b) (14). States; and, with the approval of the Administra • The Committee wal abolished by Reorganization PIlln No. 4 of 19615. tion such ~rv interest may be ass~ed, trans elreetiYe .July 27. 19M (30 Federal &.g1.ter 9353. Jul)" 2S. 19815. j9 Stat. 4 131~), and-Its fuDction. were transferred to the PresldeDt. ferred, encumbered, or relinquished by him, and, »PrnloUJI lancunge In sec. 204(a) (1) (72 Stat. 431) providing tor eompenaatloD of the Ch.t1rmaD at the l8te of )t20.000 per aDnum wa. unless otherwise provided by contract, shall not be r!pealed OD August 14. 1964. by the Federal Exeeutl.e Salary Act ot 1084 extinguished by the expiration or other termination ,_pro, see. 305(13)(B) (78 Stat. 423). No subltUtute prOVision was made t) replace the laDguage repealed. 508 509

I~TERN ATIUN AL ~uurJ!;ltA·nu.l.'j

SEC. 205. The Administration~ under the foreign policy 42 U.S.C. 2415 guidance of the President. may engage in a program of mternational cooperation in work done pursuant to this Act, and in the peaceful application of the results there- )f, pursuant to agreements made by the President with I . he advice and consent of the Senate. I

REPURTIS TU THE CU!'ItiKt.::." Prellident'll SEC. 206. (a) The President shall transmit to the annual report ot activities ot ~ongress in January of each year a report, which shall all agenCies. mdude (1) a comprehensive description of the pro grammed activities and the accomplishments of all agen cies of the "Cnited States in the field of aeronautics and space activities during the preceding calendar vear. and .(2) an evaluation of such actiyities nnd uccomplishments KeeoluUon of cllfrerencl'll by m terms of the attainment of. or the failure to attain, the President. objectives described in section 102(c) of this Act. (b) Any report made under this section shall contain such recommendations for additional leO'isJation as the .\dmi~istrator or the President may cOI~sider necessary O!' (leslrable for the attainment of the objectives described in section 102 (c) of this Act. (c\ ~ 0 in formation "hi('h r.:lS b>en ('1nssifie~ ior rea sons of national. secnri.ty shall be included in any report made under thIS sectIon, unless such information has ~en. de~la~i!1ed. by, or pursuant to authorization given by. the PresIdent.a 201 (e). . SEC. 207. Notwithstanding- the provisions of this or anv ChalrmaD • ~otwithst~nding ..meeotae (d) the provisions of any other law, other law, the Administration may not report to a dis un or retired any actIve or retIred oft!cer of the A~~, Navy, or Air posal agE-ncy as excess to the needs of the Administration Approval by otlleer. Force may serve as ChaIrman of the LIaIson Committee C'nngreselonal m an~ ]a:r:d having an estimated value in exces!! of $1)0.000 committees. 3 without prejudice to his active or retired status as such 0. ".hI~h IS o\vned by the United. States and under the iuris I officer: ~ny such a.ctive officer serving as Chairman of dIc~lOn and ~ontrol of the Administration, unless (A) a the LIaIson CommIttee shall receive, in addition to his pay and allowances, including special incentive pay:.:. ~erIOd of thlrty days has passed after the receipt by the :-speaker and the Committee on Science and Astronautics· an amount ~qual ~ the di!ference between such pay and of the HOl~se of Representatives and the President nnd allowances] mcluding specIal and incentive pays. and the the CommIttee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of compensatIOn fixed ~y subsection (a) (1) for such Chair man. Any such retIred officer serving as Chairman of !he Senate ?f. a report by the Administrator or his des- 19n.ee contammg a full and complete statement of the tIle Liaison CO~illlittee shall receive the compei.sation actIOn proJ.>osed to b~ taken and the facts and circum fixed by subsection (a) (1) for such Chairman and his stances rehed upon m support of such action, or (B) retired pay, subject to section 201 of the Dual Compen n sation Act. 12 Public La"" 92-68, August 6 1971 section 7 (8~ St t 177 J:;b~:~t1~~:.sectlon (a) ot section' 206 and renumbered th~' rema~nl~ USee. 304(d). 72 Stat. 4'32. wu amended to read u above by the Dual CompcnRlltion Act. ~ec. 401(g). Aultust 19. 1964 (78 Stat. 490). That part he • ~01;j4Tb~ "Committee Reform Amendmenta ot 1974," enacted O.-to ot "e('. ,t04 (d) which had referr_ed to the compensation "fixed by 8ub!lec. t\~ ot th • ~ anged. ttb:, name ot tbe Committee on Selence and Aatronau (It) (1) WIlS repellled by sec. 3001 (13) (B) ot the Federlll Execut\T'P Salary TechnoiOC:. ouae 0 epresentatives to tbe Committee on Science and g: D~,~r~~~~~:ago~ Sl~:: ~~3~o~t !~O~:III~,g:tC:~e blo~e;tie~~l~!-ir ~! no provl!

NATIONAL ADVISORY CO:aoaI'TEE FOR AERONAUTICS TRANSFER OF BELATED FUNCTIONS

Note uDder 42 U.S.C. 24:)3- 42 U.S.C. 2472. SEC. 301. (a) The National Ad:visory Committee for SEC. 302. (a) Subject.to the provisions of this section, Tranfers to Termination. Aeronautics, on the effective date of this section. shall the President. for a period of four years after the date of l"ASA. TranRfer I1f fectlola .. cease to exist. On such date all functions, powers, enactment of this Act, may transfer to the Administra duties, and obligations, and all real and personal prop tion any functions (including powers, duties. activities, ertyl personnel (other than members of the Commjttl'e), facilities, and parts of functions) of any other depart fundS, and records of that organization, shall be trans ment or agency of the United States, or of any officer or ferred to the Administration. organizational entity thereof, which relate primarily to Procurement. (0) Section 2302 of title 10 of the United St.ntes Code the functions, powers, and duties of the Administration is amended by striking out "or the Executive Secretary as prescribed by section 203 of this Act. In connection of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." with any such transfer. the President may, under this and inserting in. lieu thereof "or the Administrator of the section or other applicable authority, provide for ap National Aeronautics and Space Administration."; and propriate transfers of records, property, civilian person section 2303 of such tide iO is amended by striking out nl'lL a.nd funds.IS Reports to ''The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." --('b)Wh;~~~~r any such transfer is made before Janu Congress. and inserting in lieu thereof "The National Aeronautics ary 1, 1959, the President shall transmit to the Speaker and Space Administration." of the House of Representatives and the President pro National leCurlty; (c) The first section of the Act of August 26. 1950 tempore of the Senate a full and complete report con IUlpenllon of (5 U.S.C. 22-1),16 is amended by striking out "the Direc cerning the nature and effect of such transfer. employee-. tor, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics" and (c) After December 31, 1958, no transfer shall be inserting in lieu thereof ''the Administration of the N a made under this section until (1) a full and complete re tionAl Aeronautics and Space Administration", and by port concerning the nature and effect of such proposed striking: out "Oi" National Adv-isory Committee for Aero !..,ransfer has .~f! .t,ran"sm.itted. b,. ~h~ ~resi?en~ to. the nautics" and inserting in lieu thereof "or National Aero \;ongress, ana \~} tne nrst perIOa 01 SIXty caJenaal' aays na.utics and Space Administration". of regular session of the Congress following the date of Unitary Wind (d) The Unita,ry Wind Tunnel Plan Act of 1949 (50 receipt of suc~ report by the Congress has expired with Tun~l Plan Actot 1949. U.S.C. 511-515) is amended (1) by striking out "The out the adoptIon by the Congress of a concurrent resolu National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (herein tion sta.ting that the Congress does not favor such after referred to as the 'Committel")" and inserting in transfer. lieu thereof "The Administrator of the National Al'ro ACCESS TO INFORMATION na.utics and Space Administration (hereinafter referred SEC. 303. Informat.ion obtained or developed bv the 42 U.S.C. 24~4. to as the 'Admipistrator')"; (2) bv striking out "Com Public Inspec· Administrator in the performance of his functions under tlon: excep· mittee" or "Committee's" wherever they appear and in tions. serting in lieu thereof "Administrator" and "Adminis this Act sha)l be ma~e availab~e for public inspection, trator's", respectively; and (3) by striking out "its" ex.cept (A) InfOrm~tlOn authorized or required by Fed whereve.r it appears and inserting In lieu thereof "his". eral statute to be WIthheld, and (B) information classi fied to protect the ~lational security: Provided, That JClI'eeUYe date. ( e) t5 This section shall take enect ninety days after

le Transfers eursuant to ~('c. 302 have bl'l'n: Executive Ordpr 10783 11 Publle Law 98-74, ,.pm, section 7 (87 Stilt. 175), Idded s('ctlon 207. October 1. 19.>8, traosferrtnc from the ~partJnf'nt of D~en"e the 10 Th~ l:tlt nllZt ot tile third. provl,o of the al'l"t section of the Act o( Proj('('t VANGt'AnD and other projPcts of Advanced Research Projects A1tpft 24. 1950' (84 Stnt. "'71\) WU. repealed bY'see. 5 of Pnbllc Law Agency and of Departm('nt of the Air Force r('lating t() SPRce activities' 89-380, Mareb 30. 1'968 (80 Stat. 95). Other portlo_ 0(. tM A('t of Executive Order 10i93. December 3. 19.'i8. transferring from Dl-partment .~!t 26. 1936 (!!4 Stat. 476) were rpJ)f'olPd bY' ~PC. R(!!) 0' ?~h1!(" !,nw of the .\rmy the .T .. t Propul",lon Laborat"ry (n ..ar Pasadena. California) : 89-554 (80 Stat. 632) lind renlaced by 5 U.S.C. 3571. :i!i94. 7~12. 75011('\. Transfer PVln. delivered to Con:rress January H. 1 P60. et'l'ectlve ~f,trch 15. 7512IC). 7532). 5 U.S.C. :il'i94 W"I rene~led by lIec. 1(34) (B) ot Public 1960. transferring from tbe Depnrtmt'nt of D('tt'nse tbe Ilct:\"ltlel ot LPw !m-Rlt. ~"tember 11. lA67 (111 !'Itllt. 201 \. development And rl'l'learch of sps('(' ,·phlcl .. ~yst('m!l lind ~pel'j!lcalIy the 11 EtreeUve c~le of bulllne" September 30, 1958, by virtue of proc lamation of September 25, 1958. (23 Federal Relrillter 7596, S~tem ?~;':~oiI'::~~!vgl~~rlI~b~~~)I~i8Ion of the Army Ballistic ~U8sl1e Agency ber 30, 1938.) 512

Investigations.

Referral to F.B.I.

Penalty.

Inventions made {n performance of work tinder contract. 514 515 •

or explGratiOR work and the in'!8Dtion is related to of the United States. If, within such time, t~ .Adminis the work he was employed or lIS!DPed to perform! or trator files such a request with the Colllllll88loner, ~e that it was within the scope of hIS ~mploym~t d~ Commissioner shall transmit notice thereof to ~~ appli- whether o~ not it was made dunug workin2 hours, cant, and shall issue such patent to the A~ !loud f or with a contribution by the Government C?f the use unless the applicant within thirty days after receIpt of Patet 0 of Gonrnment facilitiflB, equipment, matenals, allo such notice requests a bearing before a Board?f. Patent IaterfereDe& cated ftmds, information proprietary to the Gov Interferences on the question whether the AdmlNat.rator ernment, or services of Government employees dur- is entitled under this section to receift such patent. The ing working hours; or . . Board may hear and determine, in acoordance with nlles (2) the person who made the inventIon was not em- __ ..:I -I"w-J'AdUl'eS established for intei'f.,,~nce eases, the auu ,p."""" . . shall be b- CJuestion 80 presented, and its determinatIon 811 ~~~roro:x=':! :rr,~~~e :~~ t::~~t ]ect to appeal by the applicant or by the A~inistratol" theless related to the cont~, or to the work or to the COurt of Customs and Patent Appeals m ~rd duties he was employed or assIgned to I?8rform, an? anee with procedures governing appealS from deelSlons was made durln2 working hours. or WIth a contn of the Board of Patent Interferences in other proceed- bution from the ~-oV8rnmmlt of the sert I'8fe~~ to in clause (1),. . such invention shall be the exclUSlV& :property of the ~.) Whenever any patent has been issued to any &l?P~i- ~==t cant in conformity with subsection (d), and the Adminis- ~li.~':l United States, and if such invention ~ patentable, a trator thereafter has reason to believe that the statement patent therefor shall be issued ~ .the Umted States upon filed by the applicant in connection therewith contained application made by the Administrator. ~ess the Ad any false representation of any material fact., ~ Ad- ministrator waives all or any' PlI:rt of the ~hts .of the ministrator within five years after the date of lSBUance United States to such invention In confornuty Wlth the provisions of subsection (f) of this section. -of such patent may file with the Commissioner a request for the transfer to the Administrator of title to such (b) Each contract entered into by the Administrator patent on the records of the Commissioner. Notice of any with any party for t~~ performance. of any work shall contain e1l'ective proVlSlOns under which such party shall 'SUch request shall be transmitted by the Commissioner to furnish promptly to the Administrat.or a written report the owner of record of such patent, and title to such patent shall be 80 transferred to the Administrator un- containing full and complete techni~l information c

States will be served thereby. Anv such waiver may be or upon application of any person~ to make a monetary Application. made upon such terms and Under 'such con<1:itions as the award, in such amount and upon such terms as he shall Administrator shan determine to be reqUIred for the determine to be warranted, to any person (as defined by protection of the· int~rests of the Unite~ Sta~s. Ellch section 305) for any scientific or technical contribution to such waiver made WIth respect to any InVentIOn shall the Administration which is determined by the Adminis be subject to the reservation by the Administrator of an trator to have significant value in the conduct of aero irrevocable, nonexclusive, nontransferable, royalty-free nautical and space activities. Each application mude for Referral to lD"entlonl aDd license for the practice of such invention throughout the any such award shall be referred to the Inventions and CODtributlona world by or on behalf of the United States or Ilny for- Contributions Board estab1ish~d under section 305 of ~c;'!~J ~::- this Act. Such B.oard shall ~rd to each such appli ommendatloD. ;rib ~!eu~;dt §~~ia~ ~~~~~t~o~r a~~re;~~~; cant an opportumty for heanng upon such applicatlOn, lD"eDDOU &Da under this subsection shall be referred to an Inventions and shall transmit to the Administrator its recommenda CODtrlbatiODI and Contributions Board which shall be established bv tion as to the terms of the award, if any, to be made to DetermiDatloD Board. by Admlnls· the Administrator within the Administration. Such such applicant fo~. such contribution. In dett'rmining trator. Board shall accord to each interested porty an opportu the tenns aud condItIOns of any award the Administrator nity for hearinl!:, and shall transmit to the Admimstrator shall take into IM:-eount- its findings of fact with respect to such proposal and its (1) the value of the contribution to the United recommendations for action to be taken with respect States; thereto. (2) the aggregate amount of any sums which have (g) The Administrator shall determine, and promul been expended by the applicant for the development gute re~lations specifying the terms and conditions upon of such contribution; which licenses will be granted by the Administration for (3) the amount of any compensation (other than the prattice by any person (other than an agency of the salary received for services rendered a.5 an officer umi States) of any invention for which the Adminis or employee of the Government) previous1y recei ved trato holds a patent on behalf of the United States. by the applicant for or on account of the use of 8uch ProteetioD ( The Administrator is a nthorizE'd to take a 11 contributIOn by the United States: and of tltl.. sui ble and necessary steps to protect any invention ( 4:) such other factors as the Administrator shall or discovery to which he has ti~le, .and to. requi:e that det~rmjne to be material. contractors or persor~ who fetaul tItle to InventIons or (b) If more than one applicant under subsection (a) discoveries under this section protect the inventions or claims an interest ill the same contribution, the Admin dis('overies to which the Administration has or may istrator shall ascertain and determine the respective in acquire a license of use. . terest of such applicants, and shall apportion any award uefeD.. (i) The Administration shall be considered a defense to be made with respect to such contribution among such • "DI:7. agency of the United States for the purpose of chapter applicants in such proportions as he shall determine to 17 of title 35 of the .United States Code. be ~'1uitable. No award may be made under sllbsection (a) (j) As used in this section- with respect to any contribution- (1) the term "people" means any individual. (1) unless the applicant surrenders, by such means Surrender of :lalm~ to partnership, corporation, association, institution, or as the Administrator shan determine to be effective, ~mpensatloD. Other entity. - . , , all claims which such applicant may have to receive (2) the term "contract" means any actual or any compensation (other than the award made under proposed contract, agreement, understanding, or this section) for the use of such contribution or any other arrangement, and inc1udes any assignment, element thereof at any time bv or on hE>ha1f of the substitution of parties, or subbcontract executed or United Statf's or by or on behllif of any foreign gov entered into thereunder; and ernment pursuant to any treaty or agreement with (3) the term "made", when used in relation to the United States, within the United Siates or at any any invention, means the conception or first actual other place; Umitatlon of reduction to practice of such invention. (2) in any amount exceedi~ $100,000, unless the lmount; report Administrator has transmitted to the appropriate to Concrelll. CONTRIBUTIONS AWARDS committees of the Congress a full and complete report concerning the amount and terms of, and the t2 U.1:S.\:. 2408. SEC. 306. (a) Subject to the provisions of this section, basis for, such proposed award, and thirty calendar ~he Administrator is authorized, upon his own initiative days of regular session of the Congress have expired • after receipt of such report by such committees. 518 519

“TITLE IV—IJPPER ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH

%URF’OSE AND FOLEY “SIX. 401. (a) The purpose of this title is to authorize and direct th;mA~#nistrstion to develop and carry out a comprehensive pro- 42 USC 2- research tihnology, and monitoring of the henomena of 5t e upper atmosp~em so as to rovide for an understan aing of and to maintain the chemical and p 1!ysical integrity of the Earth’s upper atmos he= “(b The Congress deelaree that it is the policy of the United States to un 1ertake an Immediate and appropriate research, technolo , and monitoring program that will provide for understanding the Tp ysics and chemistry of the Eafi’s upper atmosphe~ . %EP’INITIONS

“SEC 402. For the purpose of this title the t.enn ‘up r atmosphere’ 42 Usc 2482 meana that portion of the Earth’s sensible atmoepr em above the troposphere “~RAX AUTHO~

“SEC 403. (a) In order to -my out the purposes of this title the 42 USC ~ Administration in cooperation with other Fedemd agenciq shaU initiate and carry out a pro- o! resemwh, technology, mcuntonng, and other appro ride activities d!mct.ed to undemtamd the physica and chemistry /’o the up r atmesphem. . “(b). In carrying outr eprovisions ofthistitle the Adxnix&t~m shall- ‘(l) arrange for artici ationby theech+lcand engines - community, of bed the 5.ation’s induatrml or~~–~~~- an‘% instituting of higher education in planning and awg out IT mr re@rement of prior authorizing legialatioo, a= A ~dk & Publlc Law 86-IS, June 15.1959 (73 Stat 75 42 U.S.C. 2480?. appropriate research, in developing necesaaxy technology and m = !3ubaee. (C) of ace. 307, added by aec 6 of ~bllc tiW 88-113. SqMem- milting n ob3ervation8 im&mea3urernent8; ‘- ber 6.1968 (77 StaL 144). ‘(2) promdqv y way of gran~ cont~ scholarship or other arrangements, to the maximum extent practicable anr consistent with other lam for the widest practicable and ap~ro@ate participation of -tie scientific and engineering commuruty m the pm ~ aufioti by thia title; and 3 make all results of the program aut.horiaed by this title avai Ha le to the ap ropriata regulatory agencies and provide for the widest practica \le dissemination of such results.

%NTERNAllONAL IYX)IZRATION

%= 404. In car .m oti the provisions of this titlq the Adminis- 42 USC2~ tratio~, subject to Zfe irection of the President and after consulta-

tion with the secretary of State+ shall make every effort to enlist thel su P@ ~d. Cqw.qatlon of ap ropriate acientista and engineera of; Otler countnea and Memationa? organizations.n. I SEU 9. This Act may be cited as the “National Aeronautics andl x titIG Space Administration Authorization A% 1976”. Approved June 19, 1975. Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary Abbreviations and Acronyms

AACB — Aeronautics and Astronautics DOI — Department of Interior Coordinating Board DOMSAT — Domestic Communications AlAA — American Institute of Aeronautics Satellites and Astronautics DSCS — Defense Satellite Communication AID — Agency for International System Development EBU — European Broadcasting Union APPLE — Ariane Passenger Payload ECS — European Communication Experiment Satellites (ESA) A-sat — antisatellite EIRP — effective isotropically radiated ASTP — Apollo-Soyuz Test Project power (measured in watts) ATS — Applications Technology Satellite ELDO — European Space Vehicle BLM — Bureau of Land Management (DOI) Launcher Development 6SS — broadcasting-satellite services Organization CCAD — Crop Condition Assessment ELV — expendable launch vehicle Division EROS — Earth Resources Observation CCD — charge coupled device Systems CCIR — International Radio Consultative ERS — European Remote-Sensing Committee of the International Satellite Telecommunication Union ESA — European Space Agency CC ITT — International Telegraph and ESRO — European Space Research Telephone Consultative Organization Committee of the International FAS — Foreign Agricultural Service Telecommunication Union (of the DOA) CCT — computer-compatible tape FCC — Federal Communications Magnetic tape containing digit I Commission data in appropriate format. FLTSATCOM – Fleet Satellite Communication CEPT — Conference Europeene de Postes System (Navy) et Telecommunications FM — frequency modulation CFE — continuous flow electrophoresis FSS — fixed satellite service CIFASA — French German Consortium GARP — Global Atmospheric Research CLT — Campagnie Luxembourgeosie de Program (of the World Telediffusion Meteorological Organization) CNES — Centre National D’Etudes GEO — geostationary orbit Spatiales, National Center for GHz — gigahertz (91 billion cycles Space Research–French per second) equivalent of NASA GMS — Geostationary Meteorological COMSAT — Communications Satellite Satellite (Japan) Corporation GNP — gross national product COPUOS — Committee on the Peaceful Uses GPS — global positioning satellite of Outer Space (United Nations) (sometimes NAVSTAR/GPS-DOD) CTA — Centro Tecnico Aerospecial HDDT — high-density digital tape (Brazil) HDT-A — high-density digital tapes of CTS — Communications Technology either MSS or RBV data that Satellite have been radiometrically but DBS — Direct Broadcast Satellite not geometrically corrected. dBw — a measure of power, decibels HF — high frequency referenced to 1 watt HLLV — heavy-lift launch vehicle DDR&E — Director of Defense Research Hz — hertz; a unit of frequency equal and Engineering to one cycle per second DNS — The Department of Defense IAF — International Astronautical Navigation Satellite System Federation DOC — Department of Commerce ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile DOD — Department of Defense Ics — Interdepartmental Committee on DOE — Department of Energy Space (Canada)

385 386 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

IEEE — Institute of Electrical and MHz — megahertz (1 Ob cycles Electronics Engineers per second) IFOV — instantaneous field of view MLA — multi-linear array—solid state IFRB — International Frequency technology for remote-sensing Registration Board MOS — Maritime Observation Satellite IGI . Industrial Guest Investigator (Japan) INMARSAT — International Maritime Satellite MOU — Memorandum of Understanding Organization MPS — materials processing space INTELSAT — International Telecommunication MPTS — microwave power transmission Satellite Organization, with 106 system member-nations that own and MSS — multispectral scanner operate the satellites in the MW — megawatt (1 OG watts) Global Communication Satellite NACA — National Advisory Committee System for Aeronautics IRAC — Interdepartment Radio Advisory NAS — National Academy of Sciences Committee NASA — National Aeronautics and IRS — Indian Remote-Sensing Satellite Space Administration Proposed by Indian Space NASDA — National Space Development Research Organization Agency (Japan) ISAS — Institute for Space and NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Aeronautical Sciences Japanese Organization (established in 1954 at the NESS — National Environmental Satellite University of Tokyo) Service ISPM — International Solar Polar Mission NOAA — National Oceanic and ISRO — Indian Space Research Atmospheric Administration Organization NOSS — National Oceanic Satellite ITU — International Telecommunication System Union NSF — National Science Foundation JEA — Joint Endeavor Agreement NTIA — National Telecommunications kHz — kilohertz (1 ,000 cycles and Information Agency (DOC) per second) OMB — Office of Management KSC — Kennedy Space Center and Budget LACIE — Large Area Crop Inventory OTA — Office of Technology Assessment Experiment OTRAG — Orbital Transport and Raketen Landsat — Land remote-sensing satellites Aktiengesellschaft (German (formerly ERTS; Earth Resources private firm) Technology Satellites) of the OTS — Orbital Test Satellite (European) series currently operated PRC — People’s Republic of China by NASA PRC (Space) — Policy Review Committee on Landsat D — The next generation of NASA’s Space established by Presidential land remote-sensing satellites directive in May 1978, to Follow-on spacecraft of this provide a forum for discussion cf series will be sequentially proposed changes to national designated Landsat D’, space policy and for rapid Landsat D“, etc. referral of issues to the President LASS — The Land Applications Satellite for decision System under consideration by PTT — Postal Telephone & Telegraph ESA for a 1987/88 launch Agencies LCP — Large Communications Platform RARC — Regional Administrative Radio LEO — low-Earth orbit (up to Conference approximately 500 km) RBV — return beam vidicon LOS — Land Observations Satellites R&D — research and development being considered by Japan for Slc — Space Industrialization 1987 launch Corporation Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary ● 387

SITE — Satellite Instructional Television VHF — very high frequency Experiment (India) WARC – World Administrative Radio SLAR — side looking airborne radar Conference (conducted by ITU) Solaris — proposed French free-flying, WARC-77 – A specialized World automated, industrial processing Administrative Radio Conference station that met in Geneva in the winter SPS — solar power satellite of 1977 to plan for the broad- SSTO — single stage to orbit casting-satellite service in the space vehicle band 11.7 to 12.5 GHz STEP . Symphonic Telecommunications WARC-79 – A General World Administrative Experimental Project (India) Radio Conference that met in STS — space transportation system Geneva in the Fall of 1979 to TDRSS — Tracking. and Data Relay revise the international radio Satellite System regulations of ITU. TEA — Technical Exchange Agreement WBTR – wide-band tape recorder TM — thematic mapper WMO – World Meteorological USDA — U.S. Department of Agricukure Organization (U. N. Agency) USGS — U.S. Geological Survey (DOI) Glossary

A priori planning of radiofrequencies-procedure by format and received at the ground station. These which frequencies and orbital locations are allotted readings must be interpreted and converted to other to individual countries according to a plan negoti- dimensions for most applications purposes. ated by member nations and implemented by ITU. Decibel–a unit for expressing the ratio of two Access fee–the charge paid by operators of ground amounts of electric or acoustics signal power equal stations for the right to receive the data transmitted to 10 times the common logarithm of this ratio, A from land remote-sensing satellites. ratio of 10 is 10 dB, a ratio of 100 is 20 dB, a ratio AgRISTARS–Agriculture and Resources Inventory of 1,000 is 30 dB, etc. Surveys Through Aerospace Remote Sensing. Large, Digital transmission—a technique that transmits the cooperative, multiyear development program of the signal in the form of one of a discrete number of Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, codes. The information content of the signal is con- NASA, and AID. Will develop, test, and evaluate cerned with discrete states of the signal, such as ways to use remotely sensed data to produce early the presence or absence of a voltage, a contact in warnings of crop stress, crop assessments and fore- the open or closed position, or a hole or no hole casts, small-area land cover and water evaluation, in certain positions on a card. and renewable and nonrenewable resource inven- Direct readout–the capability that allows ground sta- tories. tions to collect and interpret the data messages that Allocation (of frequency band) –entry in the table of are transmitted from satellites. frequency allocations of a given frequency band for EROS Data Center—a facility that collects, processes, the purpose of its use by one or more terrestrial or archives, and distributes data obtained from satel- space radiocommunication services or the radio as- lite, aircraft, and other systems, operated by the tronomy service under specified conditions. This U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of in- term shall also be applied to the frequency band terior, at Sioux Falls, S. Dak. concerned. Earth exploration-satellite service-a radio-commu- Assigned frequency–the center of the frequency nication service between Earth stations and one or band assigned to a station. more space stations, which may include links be- Assigned frequency band–the frequency band within tween space stations, in which: 1 ) information re- which the emission of a station is authorized; the lating to the characteristics of the Earth and its width of the band equals the necessary bandwidth natural phenomena is obtained from active sen- plus twice the absolute value of the frequency tol- sors or passive sensors on Earth satellites; 2) similar erance. Where space stations are concerned, the information is collected from airborne or Earth- assigned frequency band includes twice the max- based platforms; 3) such information may be imum Doppler shift that may occur in relation to distributed to Earth stations within the system con- any point of the Earth’s surface. cerned; and 4) platform interrogation may be in- Band–in radio, frequencies that are within two defi- cluded. This service may also include feeder links nite limits and are allocated for a definite purpose necessary for its operation. or service, e.g., the standard AM broadcast band. Emission–radiation produced, or the production of Broadcasting-satellite service-a radio-communica- radiation, by a radio transmitting station. tion service in which signals transmitted or retrans- Fixed-satellite service-a radio-communication serv- mitted by space stations are intended for direct re- ice between Earth stations at specified fixed points ception by the general public. when one or more satellites are used; in some Broadcasting sewice-a radio-communication service cases this service includes satellite-to-satellite links, in which the transmissions are intended for direct which may also be effected in the intersatellite ser- reception by the general public. This service may vice; the fixed-satellite service may also include include sound transmission, television transmis- feeder links for other space radio-communication sions, or other types of transmission. services. Containerless processing–a technique by which ma- Fixed service-a radio-communication service be- terials may be processed without a supporting con- tween specified fixed points. tainer; this may be accomplished by using the mi- Frequency—the number of complete oscillations per crogravity environment of space or by employing second of an electromagnetic wave, measured in such methods as ultrasonic levitation on Earth. hertz (Hz). One hertz equals one cycle per second. Data–in this document, “data” is used to specify the Frequency allocation table (national)–a table in the sensor voltage readings that are transmitted in digital FCC Rules and Regulations allocating bands of fre- —

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary ● 389

quencies, in the usable portion of the radio spec- field of international telecommunications including trum, to radio-communication services. spectrum management. Present membership is 155 Frequency of obsewation-the normal period, usually nations. measured in days, elapsing between two sequen- ITU Convention–the governing instrument of ITU tial times at which a point on the Earth falls within that sets forth the structure and activities of the the field of view of one of the spacecraft of the Union; only the plenipotentiary conference of ITU system. can amend or revise the Convention; it last met in Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellite Malaga-Torremoiinos in 1973, and will meet again whose circular and direct orbit lies in the plane of in September 1982. the Earth’s Equator and which thus remains fixed Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE)–a relative to the Earth; by extension, a satellite whose demonstration program (1974-1977) that used Land- position remains approximately fixed relative to the sat and weather data to provide estimates of wheat Earth. production. Geostationary satellite orbit–the orbit in which a sat- Kourou–Ariane’s South American Launch Site. ellite must be placed to be a geostationary satellite. Maritime radio-navigation satellite service–a radio- Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite whose navigation satellite service in which Earth stations period of revolution is equal to the period of rota- are located onboard ships. tion of the Earth about its axis. Micron–unit of length equal to one-millionth (1 O-b) GSFC–Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA) of a meter. Harmful interference-interference that endangers Microwave—a comparatively short electromagnetic the functioning of a radionavigation service or of wave, especially one between 100 cm and 1 cm in other safety services or seriously degrades, ob- wavelength or, equivalently, between 0.3 and 30 structs, or repeatedly interrupts a radio-communi- GHz in frequency. cation service operating in accordance with these Multispectral scanner (MSS)–an instrument which regulations. provides data in four bands of the visible and near- Illuminance–irradiance; rate of energy per solid angle infrared portions of the spectrum. The MSS scans measured at a given point. a swath 185 km wide and has an instantaneous field Infrared (l R)–that part of the spectrum from the red of view (I FOV) of 80 meters. end of visible light to the microwave region; that Orbit–the path, relative to a specified frame of refer- is, from about 0.7 m to 1 mm. ence, described by the center of mass of a satellite Instantaneous field of view (l FOV)-the field of view or other object in space subjected primarily to nat- of a scanning instrument with the scan motor ural forces, mainly the force of gravity. stopped. Outer Space Treaty–the abbreviated name for the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) multilateral Treaty of Principles Governing the Ac- —a body of 20 Federal agencies and departments tivities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer that assists NTIA in the development of the National Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bod- Table of Frequency Allocations, the assignment of ies, which established in 17 articles general prin- frequencies to stations operated by the Federal Gov- ciples governing the activities in outer space of State ernment, and other spectrum management func- parties to the Treaty in support of the use of outer tions. space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of Interference-the effect of unwanted energy due to all peoples. The United States is a party to the Outer one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or Space Treaty, which entered into force October 10, inductions upon reception in a radio-communica- 1967. tion system, manifested by any performance degra- Permissible interference-interference at a higher tion, misinterpretation, or loss of information that level than that defined as permissible interference, could be extracted in the absence of such unwanted and which has been agreed upon between two or energy. more administrations without prejudice to other ad- International Frequency Registration Board (lFRB)–a ministrations. permanent organ of ITU with five officials elected Polarization–the electric (E) and magnetic (H) fields by the plenipotentiary conference, examines noti- that comprise a propagating electromagnetic wave fications of frequency assignments from member- may be fixed in relation to Earth’s horizon, or they nations for conformity with the radio regulations. may rotate. By convention, the vector of the E field International Telecommunication Union (lTU)–the is related to Earth’s horizon: if the two are perpen- U. N.-related organization with responsibilities in the dicular, the wave is said to be vertically polarized; 390 . civilian Space Policy and Applications

if parallel, horizontally polarized. When the E and Satellite system–a space system using one or more H fields are continuously rotating with respect to artificial Earth satellites. the horizon, the wave is said to be elliptically Side lobe–refers to power radiated from an antenna polarized. in a direction other than the desired direction of Power density—the quantity of electromagnetic transmission. energy that flows through a given area per unit of Space system-any group of cooperating Earth stations time. Formally, power density is specified in watts and/or space stations employing space-radio com- per square meter (W/mz), but by tradition in bio- munication for specific purposes. logical effects studies it is usually expressed in Spectral bands–portions of the electromagnetic spec- milliwats per square centimeter (mW/cmz). trum of energy radiated or reflected by the Earth Power flux density–a measure of the power radiated to which spacecraft sensors are sensitive. by a transmitter, used as a constraint on certain serv- SPOT–Satellite Probatoire d’Observation de la Terre. ices to protect other services in a shared band. This system is scheduled for launch by France in Primary service-a class of allocation. Stations in a pri- 1984 and is to contain two 3-channel multispectral/ mary service may not cause harmful interference panchromatic multilineal visible spectrum array to stations in the same, or another primary service, sensors. lts objectives are to develop satellite renew- and can claim protection from interference from sta- able and nonrenewable resource observation tech- tions in primary, permitted, and secondary services. niques and to develop a stereo and cartographic Printed in solid capitals in the ITU table of alloca- data archive. tions. Standard data products-data in prescribed form that Propagation–the transmission of electromagnetic are put through additional computer processes at wave energy from one point to another. the satellite ground processing facility. Two classes Radar–a radio-determination system based on the of standard data products are currently available— comparison of reference signals with radio signals film imagery, which is convenient for those ac- reflected, or retransmitted, from the position to be customed to working with maps and photographs, determined. and computer-compatible tapes. The tape form is Regions of ITU–for the allocation of frequencies, the suitable for input to standard computers and lends world has been divided into three regions by ITU. itself to automated or specialized data handling and Exact boundaries of the regions are given in the analysis. radio regulations; a general description follows: Stereo coverage–refers to the availability of data from region 1–Europe, Africa, the U. S. S. R., Turkey, the which the variation in the height of the surface Territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic, and being viewed can be determined. areas to the north of the U. S. S. R.; region 2—North, Telecommunications-any transmission, emission, or Central, and South Americas, the Caribbean, and reception of signals, wiring, images, and sounds or Greenland; and region 3–Asia, Oceania, Australia, intelligences of any nature by wire, radio, optical, and New Zealand. or other electromagnetic systems. Return beam vidicon (RBV)-cameras which essen- Thematic mapper (TM)–an instrument containing tially provide black and white TV images. Each RBV seven spectral bands, including three in the infrared IFOV of 30 m for all but the ther- image from Landsat 3 covers an area 90 km on a region, with an mal infrared band which has an IFOV of 120 m. side (180 km total swath) and has an equivalent IFOV of 40 m. Timeliness—the length of time between the observa- S-Band–a frequency band over which MSS data are tion itself and the delivery of suitable processed data transmitted to foreign ground station operators on to users or to the archive. the reproduction or resale of Landsat standard data Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)–a products. communications system to be used for the relay of Satellite–a body that revolves around another body data direct from Landsat to a single U.S. ground sta- of preponderant mass and that has a motion pri- tion at White Sands, N.M. marily and permanently determined by the force Transmission fee–a fee that could be paid by foreign of attraction of that other body. ground station operators for data transmitted and Satellite link–a radio link between a transmitting received. Earth station and a receiving Earth station through Value-added products-are products derived from one satellite. standard data as a result of manipulation by computers Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Glossary . 391

and/or interpreted in various ways to provide infor- Zone of exclusion–an area over the Indian subcon- mation about the surface of the Earth. tinent and south-central U.S.S.R. where direct sat- Wave guide–a device for transmitting and guiding ellite transmission to the TDRSS is physically impos- radiofrequency waves. sible. X-band—a frequency band over which a combination signal of MSS and TM data from Landsat D will be transmitted directly to foreign ground stations.